TAIWAN’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND
CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS
Yu-Shan Wu
Institute of Political Science
Academia Sinica
Abstract
Cross-Strait relations are embedded in a tripartite, two-level game. Washington,
Beijing and Taipei are the three players. Policy makers in each player country find
themselves constrained by both international and domestic parameters. In the 1990’s
and into the 2000’s, one finds the main impetus that moved the
Washington-Beijing-Taipei triangle in Taiwan’s domestic politics, particularly in its
presidential elections. Democratization since the late 1980’s brought about the dual
trends of nativization and cross-Strait engagement that define Taiwan’s electoral
politics. Both the 1999-2000 and the 2003-2004 presidential campaigns witnessed
these dual trends and the impact they had on the presidential contenders.
Vote-maximizing calculations prompted the contenders to converge toward the center
of the mainland policy map and advocate mixed identity and equi-importance of
economy and security in 1999-2000. Four years later with the migration of the gravity
of mainstream public opinion towards greater nativization and greater engagement,
both the pan-blue and pan-green presidential candidates repositioned themselves to
capture the moving votes. As the referendum cum new constitution cause gained
momentum on the island, Beijing and Washington were brought into the picture. They
laid constraints on Taiwan’s presidential contenders. Domestic factors also play a
critical role in determining the behaviors of the United States and the PRC in the
tripartite game. With all the three players locked in “hard” positions by their
respective domestic politics, the 2003-2004 situation generated great tension among
them.
Paper presented at the USC’s 40th Anniversary Conference: The State of
Contemporary China, Universities Service Centre, Hong Kong, January 6-7, 2004.
Please do not cite without consent by the author.
TAIWAN’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND
CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS
Yu-Shan Wu
Institute of Political Science
Academia Sinica
Introduction
Cross-Taiwan Strait relations must be viewed in the Washington-Beijing-Taipei
triangle (Bao 1999, Wu 2001a, Wachman 2001).1 This is the case because the United
States has been playing a decisive role in the cross-Straits relations ever since 1949,
providing protection for Taiwan against the military threat from the Mainland most of
the time, yet not refraining from damaging the island’s vital interest when required by
Washington’s global strategic needs. Prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union,
the American attitude towards Mainland China and Taiwan was to a great extend
contingent on the superpower rivalry (Wu 1996). 2 In the 1990’s, with the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, and with the rise of the PRC as a challenger to
America’s regional and global hegemony, the US took a new perspective. This decade
witnessed great improvement of Taipei-Washington ties and serious confrontations
between the US and the PRC. Both Taipei and Beijing courted Washington which
constituted an unintending pivot in the triangle (Wu 2000b). The baseline of that trend
continues into the 2000’s.
1
The concept of the “strategic triangle” has been conventionally applied to the relationship
between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the PRC (Dittmer 1987). However, as Lowell Dittmer
(one of the major proponents of the strategic triangle concept) argues, this concept is applicable to any
triangular relations as long as three criteria are met, viz., (a) it circumscribes the relationship among
three rational, sovereign actors, (b) in which the bilateral relationship among any two of them is
contingent on their relationship with third, and (c) national security is at stake (Dittmer 1981). It is
obvious that the Taipei-Washington-Beijing relations satisfy these conditions. Also following Dittmer's
usage, one can identify this triangle as the “mini-triangle,” as compared with the “great strategic
triangle” that denotes the relations between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing (Wu 2000a).
During the 1950’s, when the Sino-Soviet alliance was still robust, the US reacted with a
containment policy and was firmly on Taiwan’s side when it came to the island’s defense. There was a
formal alliance between the US and the Republic of China and American military presence in Taiwan
was prominent. As Mao Zedong broke up with his erstwhile Soviet comrades, Washington thought of
luring Beijing into its arms, but the shuangfan (anti American imperialism and anti-Soviet revisionism)
policy pursued during the Cultural Revolution period precluded a Sino-American rapprochement in the
1960’s. The next decade witnessed a shift of the PRC’s policy as the Soviet threat mounted, and
normalization of Sino-American relations ensued. Taiwan was dumped, although the country’s security
was guaranteed in the Taiwan Relations Act. As the US-Soviet rivalry surged and then subsided in the
1980’s, the US kept viewing its relations with the PRC through the prism of superpower politics. China
was considered strategically vital to US interest, and Taiwan was relegated to secondary consideration,
although political survival of the country was still guaranteed.
2
1
With the Washington-Beijing-Taipei strategic triangle as the overarching
framework for analysis, one nevertheless needs to investigate into the political
environments of the three players for the momentum that drives the triangular
relations. It is interesting to note that the driving force of the triangle shifted from one
actor to another. In the 1970’s it was the strategic calculations by the US President
Richard Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger that propelled the
strategic triangle to evolve. In the 1980’s Mainland China’s paramount leader Deng
Xiaoping redefined the game with his reconciliatory “one China, two systems”
formula. In the 1990’s Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the US and his
“special state-to-state theory” (or “two-state theory”) antagonized the Mainland and
touched off two Taiwan Straits crises. Obviously, international triangular factors and
domestic political factors interact to form the framework in which cross-Strait
relations evolve. What we have is a tripartite, two-level game.3
This paper starts with identifying the momentum of cross-Strait relations since
the 1990’s in Taiwan’s domestic politics. Two scenarios are then presented, one
predicting greater reconciliation based on increasing economic integration and
expanding social ties across the Taiwan Strait, while the other predicting greater
confrontation based on further nativization (bentuhua) of Taiwan politics and
impending declaration of Taiwan independence. The dual trends of nativization and
cross-Strait engagement compelled the presidential candidates in 2000 to converge
towards the middle ground. In 2003-04, however, a change of mass psychology
prompted entirely different reactions from the candidates, compelling them to race for
referendum and a fundamental change of the constitutional order. Political parties
hastily positioned themselves on the unification-independence spectrum and the
economic-security spectrum to maximize vote or to take rearguard action.
International actors are drawn into the turmoil and forced to utter warnings, in an
attempt to re-impose the triangular structure that emerged in the 1990’s. The situation
has become highly volatile. In this picture driving force is found in Taiwan’s changing
mass psychology, rapidly growing cross-Strait engagement, and the island’s electoral
cycles.4 All the three factors are direct results of democratization in the late 1980’s.
3
For the notion of “two-level game,” see Putman 1988, Iida 1993, Evans, et al. eds. 1993, Mo
1994. For an application of the “two-level game” to cross-Strait relations, see Lin 2000.
4
Obviously, Beijing also took initiatives towards Taiwan in the 1990’s, such as Jiang Zemin’s
Eight Points of January 1995. However, those initiatives were rendered ineffective by Taiwan’s drive
towards greater assertiveness in the midst of severe domestic political competition. For an examination
of the PRC’s Taiwan policy shifts, see Swaine 2001.
2
Emergence of the triad: democratization, nativization, and cross-Strait engagement
As Taiwan was under martial law in the 1950’s through the 1980’s, the country’s
policy towards Mainland China followed the ruling KMT’s orthodox party line: no
contact, no negotiation, and no compromise with the Chinese communists regime (the
three no’s). The cornerstone of the ROC’s foreign policy was an alliance with the U.S.
against the common Communist enemy. When Washington changed course in the
1970’s, Taiwan was recalcitrant, sticking to its anti-communist policy and refusing to
make a compromise with its Communist rival. The change of U.S. mind did put
tremendous pressure on President Chiang Ching-kuo, as he struggled to keep the
derecognized island country politically alive. Obviously a robust economy was not
enough. Ching-kuo’s ultimate solution was to democratize the ROC’s political system,
in a bid to win the favor of the Americans. The maturing of the Taiwan society and the
rise of the Tang-wai opposition also played an important role in Ching-kuo’s
democratization decision. The main motive for his 1986 decision to lift the martial
law, however, was to improve Taiwan’s position in the Washington-Beijing-Taiwan
triangle.5
Prior to democratization, the Republic of China held as its paramount goal a
unified and democratic China, the authoritarian rule under Chiang Kai-shek and his
son Ching-kuo notwithstanding. As such, the ROC system had two archrivals: the
communist regime on the Mainland that stands for a unified China under the CCP’s
one-party dictatorship, and the Taiwan independence movement that strives for a
separatist, democratic Taiwan. When martial law was enforced, the Communist and
Taiwan independence trends were suppressed. The KMT insisted on its own
shuangfan policy, i.e., anti-communism cum anti-Taiwan independence (fangong
fantaidu). With political decompression and democratization, however, the genie was
out of the bottle. Ever since Chiang’s decision in 1986, two trends have been pulling
Taiwan towards different directions, one to fraternize with Mainland China, the other
to permanently separate from it (Wu 1993). Both trends have root in the
democratization decision. In short, democratization led to nativization and the drive
towards independence on the one hand, and cross-Strait engagement and the trend
towards political integration on the other hand. Ultimately, nativization and
The fact that Chiang Ching-kuo announced his intention to lift Taiwan’s martial law and the ban
on forming new political parties when he was interviewed by Katharine Graham, the veteran top
executive of the Washington Post on October 7, 1986, suggests that Taiwan’s democratization was
aimed at the American audience, and not mainly for domestic consumption. See “Taipei Mayor Mourns
Katharine
Graham,”
Taiwan
Headlines,
July
19,
2001,
at
http://www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/20010719/20010719s6.html, accessed on November 25, 2003.
5
3
engagement express themselves as competing agendas offered by electoral
competitors in Taiwan. Hence democratization not only gave rise to the nativization
and engagement trends, it also provide the platform for the battling of the competing
trends. In all, democratization, nativization, and engagement constitute the triad that
defines Taiwan’s politics.6
The relation between democratization and nativization is quite straightforward
(Wachman 1994a, Chen 1997). Democratization provides the institutional space for
airing nativist messages and agitating for separatist goals. It also offers incentives for
politicians to mobilize sub-ethnic emotions and acquire support from particular
identity groups in electoral competition (Wu Nai-the 1994). Lingering sub-ethnic
tension between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders is a well established fact in
Taiwan (Chang 1994), even though the KMT regime had been quite skillful in
silencing the dissidence, recruiting native Taiwanese elite into the establishment, and
inculcating Chinese nationalism amongst the population under martial law. Political
decompression necessarily provided outlets for pent frustration and anger in native
political activists. New political opportunities were firmly grasped by the
Tang-wai-turned-DPP opposition. Through rapid escalation, the opposition moved
from demanding complete democracy to advocating outright independence and the
establishment of a new nation. This development is hardly surprising in a nascent
democracy with prominent identity cleavage.7
In the 1990’s, mass psychology in Taiwan was undergoing gradual but steady
migration away from Chinese nationalism towards a new Taiwanese national identity,
as shown in the declining percentage of those considering themselves “exclusively
Chinese, not Taiwanese,” and a corresponding increase in the number of those calling
themselves exclusively Taiwanese (Ho and Liu 2003). Those in the middle, i.e.,
“Chinese cum Taiwanese,” held the majority (Chang and Wang 2003). However, the
trend was unmistakable. The Chinese self perception of the population was on a
constant decline, while the Taiwanese identity was on a constant rise (see figure 1)
(Wu 2001b). Taiwanese nationalism surged with a vengeance (Lin 2002). One can
contribute this to several factors: the nativization campaign led by no other than the
6
It is interesting to note that these three elements of the triad fall squarely into the research
agenda of political institution study, political psychology, and political economy. For theoretical
approaches designed to analyze cross-Strait relations from these three and other perspectives, see Bao
and Wu 1999.
One only has to take a look at the other “third-wave democracies” with ethnic cleavages, such as
Russia, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Under no circumstances would the potential ethnic tension
not be tapped by political forces in their competition for supremacy in national politics.
7
4
ROC president cum KMT chairman Lee Teng-hui, the agitation by the opposition DPP,
the unpleasant encounters with Beijing (1995-96 missile crisis, etc.), the realization by
the public that the world (particularly the West) views Taiwan and China as separate
entities, etc. Whatever the cause, it is undeniable that a new national consciousness is
forming that competed with and gradually overwhelmed the old Chinese nationalist
identity (Wachman 1994b). The phenomenon is particularly true in Southern Taiwan
where nativist feelings run high.
Figure 1 about here.
Democratization also gave rise to another trend, no less prominent than the surge
of nativism. When Taiwan and Mainland China were separated in 1949 as a result of
the Chinese civil war, intensive cross-Straits commercial activities came to an abrupt
and artificial stop. One can imagine the “mainland fever” (dalure) that would ensue
when cross-Straits trade (albeit in an indirect form) was again made possible. Taiwan
businessmen and above all investors enthusiastically embraced the opening up of
Taiwan’s Mainland policy necessitated by general political liberalization and
democratization since the late 1980’s. Huge investments have been made by Taiwan
businessmen who saw on the Mainland unbound market opportunities, ample and
low-cost supply of labor and resources, highly pro-business government policies, and
a weak environmentalist movement. The surge of the NT against the US dollar in
1987-1997 created another unstoppable impetus. Based on this investment drive, huge
trade flows ensued. The bulk of cross-Strait trade has been the export of producers’
goods from Taiwan to the Mainland. As a result, Taiwan’s export dependency on the
Mainland rose from 2.28 percent in 1987 to 17.52 percent in 1999. Total trade
dependency of Taiwan on the Mainland also surged from 1.71 percent in 1987 to
11.12 percent in 1999 (see table 1). The KMT government was unable to suppress this
engagement trend (Leng 1996). The cross-Strait trade helped Taiwan to maintain an
overall trade surplus and sustain the island economy’s continued growth (Wu 1995a).
Both Mainland and Taiwan gained accession to the WTO in 2001/2002. One can
expect even further investment and trade activities across the Taiwan Strait on the
WTO platform. With cross-Strait economic ties strengthened, social connections are
being rebuilt and developed. The communities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait that
directly interact with each other have been growing exponentially, making any serious
disturbance of the status quo highly costly to both Mainland and Taiwan (Wei 1997).
The need for policy coordination and functional cooperation prompted the two sides
5
to temporarily set aside their fundamental political differences and engage in the
Kinmen talks of 1990 and Koo-Wang talks of 1993. Various integration modes have
been suggested (Chang 2000, Chang 2003), and academic and policy discussion on
economic and political integration are in vogue (Wu 1995, Kao 1999).
Table 1 about here.
Democratization set into motion two different trends: nativization and
cross-Strait engagement. The logical conclusion of the nativist development is Taiwan
independence, while the tendency of the engagement trend is towards economic and
political integration with the Chinese Mainland (see figure 2) (Wu 1997: 166-167).
Taiwan has been torn between political alienation and economic integration with the
Mainland (Wu 1994a). The old ROC shuangfan formula of anti-Communism cum
anti-Taiwan independence is no longer sustainable under the attack from both ends.
With more nativism and more engagement, Taiwan’s political landscape and Taipei’s
mainland policy experienced sea changes in the 1990’s and 2000’s.
Figure 2 about here.
Converging to the middle in 1999-2000
We can use a mainland policy map to demonstrate the trend towards nativization
and engagement, and furthermore, the various parties’ pursuit of votes through
repositioning themselves on the map (see figure 3).8 This policy map has an identity
spectrum as the horizontal axis and an economic-security spectrum as the vertical axis
(Wu 1998).9 Under the authoritarian rule of the KMT in the 1950’s through the
1980’s, the official position of the government and public preferences fell in the
fourth quadrant, i.e., unification cum security. From the late 1980’s on, the
distribution of public preferences gradually moved to the origin, as a result of
8
For the green parties (the Democratic Progressive Party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union, and the
Taiwan Independence Party), the mainland policy is the China policy.
Those who argue that Taiwan’s security will be jeopardized by too close economic ties with the
Chinese Mainland position themselves towards the security end of this interest spectrum. Those who
argue that economic development is paramount for Taiwan, or that economic integration with the
Mainland would pose no security threat or even strengthen Taiwan’s security position themselves
towards the economic end of the interest spectrum. For similar concepts and relevant arguments, see
Hsieh, 1995, 2003; Wu 1994b, 1995b.
9
6
nativization and cross-Strait engagement. In the mid 1990’s, there appeared a standard
distribution of public preferences on both spectra; those favoring a mixed identity (i.e.,
those who consider themselves to be both Chinese and Taiwanese, and favor neither
rapid unification nor rapid independence) are the most numerous on the horizontal
spectrum, as are those who place equal importance on both national security
(including foreign relations) and cross-Strait economic relations as shown on the
vertical. This being the case, public preferences are concentrated at the origin, where
the two spectra meet. Perceiving the up-left shift, political parties that attempted to
maximize their votes repositioned themselves accordingly. They thus moved to the
origin.
With the inauguration of Lee Teng-hui as president, the KMT began its tilt
toward the center on the unification-independence axis, culminating in the “special
state-to-state theory” of July 1999. At the same time, the party remained highly
suspicious of any economic link with the Chinese mainland, hence keeping its
traditional pro-security position, as typified in the 1996 policy of “patience over
haste” (jieji yongren). With Lee’s “leftward” tilt, the intra KMT factional power
struggle intensified, resulting ultimately in the departure of the New KMT Alliance
from the party and the founding of the New Party. The NP led by Jaw Shao-kang and
Wang Chien-shien then moved rapidly toward a position favoring economic interests
and cross-Strait engagement, positioning itself in the first quadrant.10 At the same
time, the KMT nonmainstreamers (the conservatives) insisted on the traditional
unification cum security stance and remained in the party. Led by Prime Minister Hau
Pei-tsun (1990-1993), the nonmainstreamers were able to survive in the KMT until
they openly challenged Lee in the 1996 presidential elections by presenting their own
ticket. The failure of their candidates (Lin Yang-kang and Hau Pei-tsun) in the
elections spelled the political demise of the nonmainstream faction. 11 Gradually Lin
and Hau also advocated a pro-engagement policy, making them closer to the NP’s
position. In sum, we see the old KMT splitting into two directions, with one moving
left (the mainstream faction under Lee) and the other moving up (the nonmainstream
faction and the NP). The general direction of movement for the pan-blue camp on the
policy map is thus up-left.
10
In February 1998, under the pressure of the upcoming parliamentary elections, a segment of the
NP leadership advocated “one China, two countries” as the party’s new formula on the identity
question. On the map, this is clearly a shift to the left. Since the NP’s original position was in the
upper-right region, this movement leftward fulfills the prediction that all political parties converge
toward the origin.
11
The Lin-Hau ticket garnered 14.5% of the popular vote, compared to the 54% grasped by Lee
and Lien Chan. Both Lin and Hau lost their posts as KMT vice-chairs for breaking party discipline by
running on a separate ticket.
7
On the pro-independence side, the DPP started as a radical movement in the third
quadrant, championing the establishment of a new nation while loathing cross-Strait
engagement. After the 1995 parliamentary elections, however, Chairman Shih
Ming-teh led the party away from its dogmatic insistence on Taiwan independence
and repositioned it to the right (Grand Reconciliation). Shih’s successor Hsu
Hsin-liang then advocated a pro-engagement stance of “boldly moving westward”
(dadan xijin) that invited strong opposition from the fundamentalists who insisted on
“strengthening base and moving westward” (qiangben jianjin). Through a vehement
debate in February 1998, a compromise was reached at the mid point—“strengthening
the base, moving westward” (qiangben xijin). In general terms, one finds the DPP
move up-right, approaching the origin.
Figure 3 about here.
In the observations above, it is shown that electoral politics is the driving force
behind the mainland policies of Taiwan’s various political parties. Ideological
commitments and the initial need for support from the party faithful determined the
initial positions of the political parties as mapped in figure 4. Then the need to
maximize electoral support and the concentration of public preferences at the center
induced the three parties to adjust their mainland policy towards the middle ground.
This is shown in the leftward moves by the KMT, the upward move by the NP, and
the upward /rightward moves by the DPP. Based on this analysis, it is likely that
vote-maximizing strategies will bring the parties even closer together, provided that
public preferences continue to cluster towards the center on the identity and interest
spectra (Wu 1999).
The 2000 presidential elections further testified the convergent pattern. Figure 4
shows the tracks of all the political parties in Taiwan on the Mainland policy map.
Lee’s 1999 “two-state theory” and the subsequent partial backtracking had moved the
KMT’s position on the identity spectrum very close to the center (no commitment to
either unification or independence). This position was adopted by the KMT’s
presidential candidate Lien Chan who had been handpicked by Lee as his successor.
Unlike Lee, however, Lien had developed a moderate image through his
pro-engagement stance. He led the KMT upward on our policy map (figure 4) by
proposing “ten articles” that lowered the conditions for Taiwan to accept the “three
8
links” long desired by Beijing.12 This proposal is a far cry from the “patience over
haste” policy, and shows Lien’s position is quite up in the first quadrant.
The same convergent pattern is apparent with James Soong. Soong was a popular
Governor of Taiwan Province. His popularity brought him a solid political base
outside the KMT. As Lee had designated the then Vice President Lien Chan as Lee’s
successor and run as the KMT’s presidential candidate, Soong calculated that he had a
fairly good chance to win as an independent candidate. Because Soong was the only
mainlander among the three major presidential candidates, he was particularly
vulnerable to accusations of betraying Taiwan’s interest. As a result, Soong was
extremely careful in his critique of the “two-state theory,” questioning its decision
making process rather than content.13 On the identity spectrum, Soong characterized
cross-Strait relations as “quasi-international.” He also came up with a mild proposal
for relaxing regulations governing cross-Strait exchanges. Soong’s position on our
policy map is in the first quadrant, closer to the New Party’s position than Lien or
Chen. This accounts for the overwhelming support for Soong among the New Party’s
followers.
On the pro-independence camp, one also finds the convergent pattern evident
with the DPP’s presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian. One major weakness of the
DPP’s 1998 China policy compromise, i.e., qiangben xijin, was that it had not been
endorsed by the DPP’s most powerful politician Taipei Mayor Chen. Chen had been
an ardent champion of Taiwan independence for years. However, the defeat in the
mayoral elections of December 1998 changed Chen’s mind as he realized that the
majority of Taiwan’s voters were not ready for an abrupt severance with the Republic
of China’s constitutional order. At the time when Chen became the DPP’s presidential
candidate in 1999 a major repositioning of the DPP on the identity spectrum had been
underway. The May 8 Resolution on the Future of Taiwan recognized the Republic of
China’s legitimacy that had been hitherto denied by the DPP.14 It was a big step
Lien’s “ten articles” called for a return to the Guidelines for National Unification that had been
cast aside in the last years of Lee’s reign. Taipei would be willing to establish the three links and enter
into official political dialogue geared towards unification with Beijing as long as there is good will
from the mainland, the conditions set in the Guideline (“peaceful solution of conflict” and “mutual
respect in the international arena”) notwithstanding.
12
13
In July 1999, Soong was interviewed by Washington Post and expressed his support of the
“three links” and political dialogue with mainland China. Soong also opposed Taiwan’s “money
diplomacy” and its bid for joining the United Nations. Furthermore, he questioned the necessity and
desirability of deploying the TMD. Soong’s remarks soon became Lien’s and Chen’s proofs that the
former governor of Taiwan was betraying the interest of the Taiwan people. Washington Post, July 3,
1999, p. A15.
14
Prior to the passing of that resolution, the DPP’s ostensible goal was to replace the Republic of
9
towards the center of the identity spectrum, and it was synchronized with Chen’s
nomination. The next major step was Chen’s proposal for direct sea link and one-way
air link with profit-sharing with the mainland, a plan designed to soften Lee’s
“patience over haste” policy. This pro-engagement proposal was a move upwards.15
The DPP thus shifted up right from its down left position, attracted by the weight of
votes concentrated at the origin. As it turned out, Chen’s shift to the center of both
identity and interest spectra contributed greatly to his winning the 2000 presidential
elections with a plurality of 39.3 percent of the vote. Soong garnered 36.8 percent,
and Lien received a distant 23.1 percent.
If one takes a look at the three presidential candidates’ mainland policy position,
one would find all of them favoring a version of the “two-state” theory, and all of
them showing willingness to relax the “patience over haste” policy. The momentum
for their converging towards the center of the identity and interest spectra was derived
from the presidential elections and the perceived concentration of popular support for
the middle-of-the-road policy.
Figure 4 about here.
Racing to referendum in 2003-04
There is a stark contrast between the converging pattern of 2000 presidential
elections and the racing to independence in the 2004 elections. Although the basic
logic is the same: all political parties are repositioning themselves on the mainland
China policy map to maximize their votes, the different estimates of popular
psychology led to entirely different strategies.
Put in a nutshell, the up left shift of Taiwan’s popular psychology did not stop at
the origin on our policy map. It continued to develop along that general direction. On
the one hand, no one can deny the importance of cross-Strait economic relations to the
growth of Taiwan’s economy, or the political influence of the 300,000 Taiwan
China with a Republic of Taiwan, a new and independent nation, as stipulated in the party constitution.
The change of tone in the Resolution was justified by claiming that Taiwan has already been
independent, and thus there is no need to declare independence a second time.
Chen’s proposal was endorsed by the DPP White Paper on China Policy for the 21st Century
of November.
15
10
businessmen and workers residing on the mainland. From 2000 to 2003, Taiwan’s
export dependency on the Mainland rose from 16.87 percent in 2000 to 24.00 percent
in 2003 (January-July). Total trade dependency also rose from 10.84 percent in 2000
to 16.61 percent in 2003 (January-July) (see Table 1). The Mainland was the
destination of 74.35 percent of Taiwan’s outbound investment (Mainland Affairs
Council 2003: 4).16 This means pro-engagement policy is a given for any political
party striving to gain majority support in Taiwan’s politics. The pan-blue KMT and
the PFP became ardent supporters of rapid engagement with the mainland, starting
with the establishment of the three links. The DPP also moved in the pro-engagement
direction, although at a much slower pace than the critics demanded. The Economic
Development Conference held prior to the 2001 parliamentary elections was
convened by the DPP government to demonstrate to the nation its commitment to
liberalizing cross-Strait transactions, among other things. The “mini-three links” that
liberalized trade between the offshore islands of Kinmen, Matsu and the mainland is
another step towards greater cross-Strait engagement. In sum, one finds all the major
political parties, except the staunchly pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union
(TSU), espousing various degrees of pro-engagement liberalization policy.
There is another trend in a different direction. After twelve years of Lee
Teng-hui’s nativist rule, plus three years of Chen Shui-bian’s pro-independence
policies (including rewriting history textbooks, etc.), Taiwan’s national identity has
been undergoing gradual shift away from Chinese nationalism. Popular frustration
from the country’s continued international isolation easily played into the hands of the
independence advocates. Highhanded treatment of Taiwan’s delegates to international
organizations by mainland officials fueled resentment. The most recent sore was
Taiwan’s failure to gain access to the World Health Organization at the height of the
SARS scare. The military threat applied quite effectively by Beijing in the past
against Taiwan independence lost part of its credibility as the threat had never been
substantiated and the repeated stern warnings by mainland officials became more
annoying than feared. Even with unprecedented trade dependency on the Chinese
Mainland and accelerating proliferation of social ties across the Strait, the Chinese
self perception of the population continued to decline (from 13.1 percent in 2000 to
9.9 percent in 2003) while the Taiwanese identity rose correspondingly (from 36.9
percent in 2000 to 41.5 percent in 2003).17 It is apparent that economic integration
In 1991 to July 2003, Taiwan’s investment on the Chinese Mainland amounted to US$32.26
billion, or 46.8 percent of Taiwan’s total outbound investment (Mainland Affairs Council 2003: 4).
16
17
It is interesting to note that even though the national identity of Taiwan’s population has
undergone sea changes, their explicit attitudes on unification vs. independence has not experienced
corresponding changes. The absolute majority favor maintaining the status quo (Chen, et al. 1999,
11
coincided with political alienation, as clearly seen in figure 2. This latent migration of
mass psychology was not clearly known to politicians in the beginning. Through
conscious testing and unintentional exposure, the magnitude of the psychological shift
was revealed, and political parties acted to grasp the opportunities or to minimize
possible damage derived from the popular change of mood.
When Chen came to power with his much moderated stance on cross-Strait
relations, two possibilities presented themselves. The first was for Chen to continue
treading the middle way, and the DPP would become a fully in-system party,
competing with the pan-blue parties with the constitutional framework of the
Republic of China. In this scenario, the DPP is finally “tamed” through acquiring
vested interest in the status quo. The second possibility is for the DPP to use the
administrative power in its hands to pursue its ultimate ideological goal of abolishing
the Republic of China and replacing it with an independent Republic of Taiwan. The
major mechanism to accomplish this goal would be a constitutional referendum as
long been advocated by the supporters of Taiwan independence. If one takes a careful
look at President-elect and President Chen’s statements after the elections of March
18, one finds he did his very best to tone down the pro-Taiwan independence position
that he had used to hold. Following the moderate line established in the Resolution on
the Future of Taiwan, and the DPP White Paper on China Policy, Chen declared in his
inauguration speech that he would not declare independence, would not change the
name of the Republic of China, would not include the “two-state theory” into the
constitution, would not hold referendum on independence, and would not abrogate the
Guidelines for National Unification, or abolish the National Unification Council, as
long as mainland China does not use force against Taiwan. The “four no’s” (sibu
yimeiyou) were actually a return to the DPP’s pre-1991 position of “conditional
independence.” They signified a major concession on Chen’s part to reconcile with
the political reality that the new government was facing: less than 40 percent of
popular support, an opposition-dominated parliament, the PLA’s sable rattling from
across the Taiwan Strait, and constraints imposed by Taiwan’s major patron the US.
For a time, it seemed the DPP might after all be turned from an anti-system,
quasi-revolutionary movement to an in-system political party.
2000). This paper does not use the public attitude on unification vs. independence as a barometer for
gauging mass psychology, for that attitude reflects not only fundamental national identities, but also
fear of uncertainties (Chen and Chen 2003). The huge discrepancy between the large number of the
self-proclaimed “exclusive Taiwanese” and the much smaller number of those who are for
independence demonstrates the insensitivity of the unification/independence attitude as an indicator of
the change in popular mood. See Wu 2001b.
12
Subsequent development left everyone guessing what would be Chen’s ultimate
decision on the unification/status quo/independence issue. Beijing might be soothed
and the pan-blue camp a bit relaxed when Chen talked about unification as a viable
option for Taiwan, and when he encouraged cross-Strait economic and cultural
integration as a precursor to political integration (zhengzhi tonghe) (Chen 2000). He
further endorsed the consensus reached by the members of an advisory group headed
by Lee Yuan-tseh, President of the Academia Sinica, that calls for responding to the
mainland’s “one-China principle” with reference to the ROC Constitution, which has
a one-China framework. Taiwan’s abrupt economic downturn and Mainland China’s
continuous rapid growth in 2000-2001 built Beijing’s confidence that time was on
their side (Wu 2002). However, the same Chen changed his tone rapidly whenever
deemed proper in domestic political context or as a tit for tat strategy against the
mainland’s pressure. Hence when Beijing lured Taiwan’s ally Nauru to break ties with
Taipei in July 2002, at the time when Chen assumed chairmanship of the DPP, Chen
responded by describing the cross-Strait situation as “one country on each side”
(yibian yiguo), which was semantically equivalent to Lee’s controversial “two-state
theory” announced three years before. Logically “political integration” and “one
country on each side” do not conflict, as the former is in the future tense, and the
latter in the present tense. The political emphasis, however, was completely different
in the two messages.
As the 2004 presidential elections drew near, the pan-green camp’s main
campaign strategy remained unclear. Sub-ethnic issues, national identity, and
cross-Strait relations were not the main foci in the December 2001 parliamentary
elections. One year later, where Chen campaigned for the DPP’s Taipei mayoral
candidate Lee Ying-yuan, the President’s repeated criticism of the popular incumbent
KMT Mayor Ma Ying-jiou as running like a PRC’s chief executive (teshou) a la Tung
Chee-hua backfired. Even though Chen soon stopped his provocative rhetoric, in the
end Lee got a meager 36 percent of popular vote, compared with Ma’s 64 percent.
Obviously depicting the pan-blue politicians as Beijing’s collaborators did not sell
well in Taipei City. Would the DPP then opt for a public policy debate in the
presidential campaign? This was obviously what the pan-blue camp wanted Chen to
do, for Taiwan’s economy had just experienced an unprecedented crisis, and the DPP
government’s performance left much to be desired even in the minds of those
pan-green supporters. As it turned out, the DPP’s presidential campaign went much
farther than public policy debate. No less than the existence of the Republic of China
and war and peace in the Taiwan Strait is at stake.
13
The DPP had long been advocating the establishment of a new Republic of
Taiwan through a referendum. Since Chen gave the “four no’s” promise in his
inaugural speech in May 2001, however, pro-referendum talks had become much rarer
from DPP politicians. The development since the beginning of 2003 made an impact
on the calculation of the DPP’s campaign strategists. On the one hand, there emerged
a genuine political crisis for the green camp. After protracted negotiations, Lien Chan
and James Soong finally bridged their differences and formed a joint ticket in
February. Neither of the two stood any chance of defeating Chen if they ran separately.
This dire political reality forced Soong to go to the KMT and accepted to run for vice
president in a joint ticket with Lien. With Lien and Soong joining forces, the KMT
and the PFP closed ranks, and the pan-blue camp was given a badly-needed boost to
their morale. The prospect of a pan-blue victory looked very real. The by-election of
the magistrate of the Hualien county in August dealt another blow to the DPP.
Hualien’s by-election was widely seen as a prelude to next year’s presidential race,
although this east coast county is structurally “deep blue” and untypical of Taiwan’s
political landscape. With both camps committing great resources to the battle in
Hualien, particularly with President Chen and Premier Yu Shyi-kun heading a massive
campaign for the DPP candidate You Ying-lung, the voters still delivered a stunning
defeat to the pan-green camp. 18 The solidarity in the newly formed KMT-PFP
alliance was put to test and proved resilient. The landslide victory for the pan-blue
camp further raised supporters’ expectations on Lien and Soong winning the 2004
presidential race. All this looked ominous to the green camp. With less than desirable
performance, recent electoral defeats, and tested solidarity in the enemy camp, the
DPP obviously needed a bold strategy to regain momentum. Referendum and new
constitution as political issues are dangerously close to Taiwan independence and
entail great risk, both domestically and internationally. In the past, when the DPP ran
national level elections with Taiwan independence as the major platform, it always
suffered the most serious defeat.19 For the DPP to plunge into this troubled water,
some testing is necessary.
The water was tested by the DPP’s junior partner, the Taiwan Solidarity Union
led by former President Lee Teng-hui. Lee was a master politician, defeating his
18
Hsieh Shen-san, the pan-blue candidate, garnered more than 50 percent of popular vote, while
the DPP’s You Ying-lung received only 29 percent of the vote.
19
Take for example, in the 1991 National Assembly elections the DPP received only 22.8 percent
of the vote, and in the 1996 presidential elections, the DPP’s candidate Peng Ming-min garnered a
meager 21.1 percent of popular vote. In both cases, the DPP ran a single-issue campaign for Taiwan
independence. The votes the party received under those circumstances were significantly less than
normal.
14
political rivals and gaining supreme power through careful factional maneuvering and
invoking populist pressure to bear on the KMT and the government in the twelve
years of his rule. After the humiliating defeat of Lien Chan in the 2000 presidential
elections, Lee was forced to resign from his party post. He then became a most vocal
critic of the KMT and established the Taiwan Solidarity Union, a staunched
pro-independence party on the left end of Taiwan political spectrum. The TSU
originally planned a mass demonstration for “rectifying Taiwan’s name” (euphemism
for Taiwan independence) on May 11.20 That demonstration was later postponed due
to the spread of SARS. When it finally took place on September 6, it was estimated
that some 200,000 people took to the streets. By that time, Lee had successfully
repositioned himself on the identity spectrum as the most ardent advocate of Taiwan
independence, and the TSU had replaced the TAIP as the representative of the
fundamentalist wing in the green camp. 21 The success of the September 6
demonstration fueled the aspirations of the supporters of the green camp and
convinced the DPP strategists that the identity issue should be swiftly brought to the
campaign limelight.
Lee tested Taiwan’s political temperature and exposed that much had changed
since the island’s traumatic experience with SARS. As the TSU’s “name rectification
campaign” was gaining momentum, the DPP acutely sensed the shift in Taiwan’s
mass psychology in favor of more assertiveness against the Chinese mainland. As has
been mentioned earlier, in early 2003 people in Taiwan were scared to death by the
SARS epidemic that proved highly contagious and fatal.22 The fact that mainland
China held the disease secret for a prolonged period of time, thus precipitating its
spread, and that it did its best to prevent Taiwan from gaining access to the WHO and
to the advise and expertise that international organization can offer totally antagonized
the island’s scared population. The way in which Taiwan’s demand for WHO
accession was bluntly refuted by the PRC’s Vice Premier Wu Yi and Beijing’s
Representative to the WHO Sha Zukang was vividly depicted in a video widely
20
For the May 11 demonstration, see the web of The Alliance to Campaign for Rectifying the
Name of Taiwan at http://www.511taiwan.net/.
21
Lee is certainly a man of a strong sense of nativist mission. However, he is also an a master
politician. Having been dislodged from the KMT, Lee managed to make a comeback through the only
possible route, i.e., as the leader of the independence movement. Lee could not insert himself into the
middle area of the identity spectrum for that area had been overcrowded. Lee also lacked the credential
to lead the far-right (i.e., those staunched pro-unification) force. As the first Taiwanese to become the
president of the country, Lee is uniquely endowed to be the leader of the independence movement.
22
Taiwan reported 671 SARS cases to the WHO, accounting for 7.95 percent of global reportage.
The SARS death toll for Taiwan was 84, or 10.33 percent of the global total. See Chiu 2003.
15
circulated on the web and shown in the Legislative Yuan. 23 The green camp took
advantage of this opportunity and accused China of endangering the lives of the
people in Taiwan.24 The pan-blue camp was depicted as collaborating with China, as
shown in the Kao Ming-chien incident. 25 On May 20, Chen declared that the
government would hold a referendum in tandem with the 2004 presidential elections
on whether Taiwan should join the WHO. This way, SARS was used to provide
legitimacy to hold a referendum, a mechanism long advocated by the pan-green camp
as the surest vehicle to Taiwan independence. Chen and the DPP strategists clearly
saw in the post-SARS period an opportunity to regain momentum in the presidential
race.
In the following months, Chen enthusiastically put forward a schedule for
launching a new constitution through referendum. In mid September, Lee Teng-hui
suggested that Taiwan has to declare independence prior to 2008 in order not to be
overwhelmed by the surge of Chinese nationalism that would certainly accompany the
2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Chen’s timetable was more urgent. On September 28,
Chen declared that in 2006 the DPP shall celebrate the birth of a new constitution for
Taiwan. 26 The blue camp initially resisted both notions (referendum and new
constitution) and wished to bring the campaign back to public policy debate and
economic and social issues. However, the radicalization of Chen’s campaign
coincided with a sharp decline of support for the Lien-Soong ticket, and a surge of
Chen’s popularity. Unable to redefine the campaign agenda, or come up with a strong
In an interview with Far Eastern Economic Review, President Chen reported that “prior
to the WHO meeting, the Chinese authorities decided to obstruct Taiwan's application for me
mbership, they wouldn't even let us be an observer, and we had no choice but to accept it. A
nd then, Sha Zukang, a Chinese official, actually said ‘Who cares about you? Who cares abou
t Taiwan? Who cares about you Taiwan people?’ This was transmitted by television to the eye
s of Taiwan’s 23 million people. I know that people were upset by this. The Taiwanese people
that they always claim concern for, they now say they don’t care about. They don’t care abo
ut the health and medical care of the Taiwanese people. How can this not hurt the feelings of
the Taiwanese people?” See “Interview: Chen Shui-bian, Political Pugilist,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 31, 2003. < http://www.feer.com/articles/2003/0307_31/p016region.html>.
23
24
The Department of Health ran an ad in a major Taiwan newspaper depicting China as
threatening Taiwan with missiles and SARS.
25
In the mentioned Far Eastern Economic Review interview, President Chen also discussed the
Kao Ming-chien incident in which Kao, a PFP legislator, was accused of accepting China’s designation
as one of its representatives for a conference on SARS. Chen stated that “This Kao Ming-chien incident
sent a wave through Taiwan. It showed that China so oppresses Taiwan that it will even politicize
Taiwan's participation in a symposium on fighting SARS…This incident has caused great damage to the
Lien-Soong campaign, including Mr. James Soong himself.” See “Interview: Chen Shui-bian, Political
Pugilist.”
26
On November 11 Chen put a date for his constitutional referendum on Dec 10, World Human
Rights Day, in 2006 and enactment on May 20, 2008.
16
defense for the pan-blue position, Lien was convinced that a radical departure from
the old party line was necessary, and the pan-blue camp needed to face the
referendum/new constitution issue directly. Lien felt the pan-blue parties had for too
long provided a public good for Taiwan and suffered. The DPP had been chanting
unrealizable reform and independence goals, and counted the pan-blue camp to bloc
their utopian plans. This way, the DPP could accuse the pan-blues for thwarting
reform, and reap political benefits. It was time for the pan-blue alliance to adjust their
positions and expose Chen, forcing him to show whether he really wanted immediate
independence. The last straw that breaks the camel’s back was Washington’s warm
welcome and high-profile reception of President Chen when he transited the US on
route to and from Taiwan’s Latin American allies on a highly publicized diplomatic
trip in early November.27 Seeing the popularity of the Lien-Soong ticket dropping and
the US not doing its share in checking Chen with his explicit flirtation with Taiwan
independence, Lien was urged by his advisors that a turnabout on the referendum/new
constitution issue was imperative. On November 12, Lien embraced referendum.
Three days later, he put forward the blue-camp’s “three-step plan” for amending the
ROC constitution. According to Lien’s plan, Taiwan would have a constitutional
overhaul by 2005. From Lee’s 2008 independence plan, to Chen’s 2006 constitutional
referendum, to Lien’s 2005 constitutional overhaul, all politicians in Taiwan joined a
race to change the country’s current political system (see figure 5). Since the ROC
system is intrinsically linked to cross-Strait relations, the election-driven
constitutional changes scheduled for the next five years in the various plans would
bring about the highest degree of uncertainty and volatilities to the region. Nothing
less than the very existence of the ROC and peace over Taiwan Strait are held hostage
to electoral politics on the island.
Figure 5 about here.
With his surprise turnabout on the referendum/new constitution issue, Lien
swiftly promised that the KMT-PFP would favor rapid passage of a referendum law
27
Therese Shaheen, the Washington-based chairwoman of the American Institute in Taiwan, the
de facto U.S. embassy, revealed that President Bush is the “secret guardian angel” of Taiwan at a
high-profile reception for Chen that the AIT held in New York City during Chen’s transit. On a
different occasion, Shaheen also stressed the Bush administration had never said it “opposes Taiwan
independence.” Mainland Chinese officials said Shaheen’s statement and her effusive praise of Chen
emboldened Chen to pursue his independence drive. Even after Beijing escalated its warnings against
Chen, John Pomfret, “China Warns Taiwan That Attack May Be ‘Unavoidable’,” Washington Post, 20
November 2003, A28.
17
that would enable people to make decisions on local, national, and constitutional
issues. Except for an insistence on keeping the name of the country unchanged (the
Republic of China), Lien was open-minded to all proposals for amending the
constitution. On November 27, the pan-blue version of the Referendum Law passed
through the Legislative Yuan. It instituted referendum as a legitimate instrument for
enacting people’s will. However, there are a lot of procedural constraints. For national
referendum proposals, one needs to gather signatures of more than five percent of the
total number of voters taking part in the last presidential elections. A referendum
deliberation commission will be set up to determine the eligibility of referendum
proposals. Commissioners are to be nominated by parliamentary parties based on their
seat shares. Constitutional amendments cannot be initiated by ordinary citizens. They
have to pass through the legislature with an absolute majority and then for the people
to confirm in referendums. With all those constraints in it, the new law was described
as a “bird-cage” referendum law by the pan-greens who attempted to launch
countermeasures. However the law does provide an opportunity for the president to
initiate a referendum when the country faces external threats that endanger national
sovereignty.28 This “defensive referendum” has long been the DPP’s insistence. It
dates back to the DPP’s 1987 Resolution of “four if’s” and Chen’s 2000 inaugural
speech of “four no’s” in which Taiwan independence is used as a deterrent against
specific contingencies.29 After the passage of the Referendum Law, however, Chen
rapidly declared that he would exercise his presidential prerogative to initiate a
“defensive referendum,” since the country was being threatened by 496 missiles
deployed across the Taiwan Strait.30 Eager to show that he was still in control of the
situation and grasp whatever initiative left for him to exercise by the Referendum Law,
28
Article 16 of the Referendum Law passed by the Legislative Yuan on November 27 reads:
“When the country is threatened by external forces (dan guojia zaoshou waili weixie), so that national
sovereignty may be subject to change (zhi guojia zhuquan you gaibian zhi yu), the President may
through the resolution of the Executive Yuan submit for referendum matters concerning national
security.”
29
In the April 17 resolution it is stated that the DPP would advocate Taiwan independence if the
KMT goes into peace negotiations with the CCP, if the KMT betrays the interest of the Taiwan people,
if the CCP unifies Taiwan, or if the KMT fails to practice genuine constitutional democracy. In Chen’s
2000 inaugural speech it is stated that as long as the CCP does not intend to use force against Taiwan,
he promises that during his term he would not declare independence, would not change the name of the
country, would not put the “two-state theory” into the constitution, and would not initiate a referendum
on the issue of unification/independence to change the status quo of the country, neither would there be
any attempt to abrogate the Guidelines for National Unification, or to abolish the National Unification
Council.
30
For those worried about the president abusing his power in initiating a national referendum
granted to him in the new Referendum Law, Chen did exactly that by making the broadest
interpretation of the conditions for the president to launch a referendum, for the existence of the PLA
missiles across the Taiwan Straits does not reasonably constitute external forces that threaten the
country and subject the country’s sovereignty to change.
18
Chen jumped to the decision of holding a defensive referendum before he had figured
out what he would ask Taiwan’s voters to decide in that referendum. Under mounting
pressure from the opposition and from Washington and Beijing, Chen promised that
his defensive referendum would not aim at changing the status quo, but would rather
strengthening the status quo. If Chen really initiates a referendum in this context, it
would be a twist of the DPP’s own tradition and a subversion of the spirit and intent
of the Referendum Law that provides the president the power to initiate an
independence referendum to deter Mainland aggression (Cossa 2003). A deterrent
would be turned into a protest against the Mainland’s military threat, or a provocation
that may lead to genuine armed conflict.
In Chen’s own calculation, however, a referendum on non-independence issues
still serves his interest by rallying popular support around the President’s flag. The
referendum from the very beginning was not to decide on anything, but to provide
extra incentive for voters to cast their ballots for Chen since they endorse his stance
on the referendum, a fact one can clearly see with the issues that were suggested for
the March 20 referendum: whether Taiwan should join the WHO, whether the
Mainland should withdraw all the missiles targeting Taiwan, whether Taiwan should
embrace the “one country, two systems” espoused by Beijing, whether Taiwan should
have a nuclear-free homeland, etc. These are all issues where the government’s
position coincides with mainstream public opinions. It was for the same reason that
the pan-blue opposition attempted to include in the referendum other issues such as
whether the government should be allowed to borrow beyond legal limit and pass the
debt onto future generations, or whether the national insurance premium should be
raised. It is clear that the referendum issue has been completely hijacked by the
presidential elections.
The 2003-04 race to referendum is in stark contrast with the 1999-2000
convergence to the middle. It shows the dual trends of nativization and engagement
that have been evolving for over a decade. If we locate all the policy positions of the
major political parties in Taiwan, and connect them with lines of different colors, we
get figure 6. We find the blue line (KMT) zigzagging up and left, from the fourth
quadrant to the second. The orange line (PFP) also shifts to the left, from the first to
the second quadrant. The DPP’s green line takes a different course, starting at the
third quadrant, moving toward the origin, and shifting back to the left. It is apparent
that during the 1999-2000 presidential campaign period, all the political parties
recognized that votes were concentrated at the origin, hence the convergence of party
positions from both ends of the identity spectrum towards the center. There were also
19
concurrent upward movements, suggesting the recognized importance of cross-Strait
engagement. In 2003-04 all the presidential candidates are again chasing the political
center of gravity. After the SARS scare the pan-green camp found people much more
receptible to the notion of referendum and to a new constitution. Independence was
euphemized as “rectification of name” and gained much better reception than before.
Referendum, new constitution, and independence were linked but emphasized
differently to different audiences, so that the green fundamentalist support was
secured and the middle voters were also lured toward the green camp. Ultimately the
pressure of electoral politics forced the pan-blue parties to join the chorus, and the
two teams competed to institute referendums and rewrite the constitution.
The 2003-04 presidential campaign witnessed not just racing to national
referendum and new constitution, it also witnessed a powerful drive towards
deepening of cross-Strait engagement. The core issue remained the establishment of
full three links. On the pan-blue side, both Lien and Soong had committed themselves
to three links and treated improving cross-Strait relations a top priority. On the
pan-green side, besides vowing to honor the conclusions of the 2001 Economic
Development Conference which explicitly called for three links, Chen pledged he
would institute direct transport across the Taiwan Strait by the end of 2004. The blue
camp responded by charging Chen was insincere and claiming direct transport could
be established as early as mid-2004 under Lien and Soong. As in the race to embrace
referendum and new constitution, the two camps also competed in promising rapid
development toward cross-Strait engagement. The driving force behind this
engagement race is overwhelming support of three links and direct transport by the
public.31
If we put the referendum and the engagement drives together, we see a clear
up-left movement of both camps in 2003-04, compared with their positions in the
previous presidential elections. The driving force is the continuous migration of the
political center of gravity, of the mainstream public opinion, from the origin up-left to
the second quadrant. This up-left movement testifies the dual development of
nativization and cross-Strait engagement (see figure 6).
Figure 6 about here.
31
As recognized by the government, popular support for three links and direct transport stands at
60 to 70 percent (Executive Yuan 2003: 54).
20
Reimposition of International Constraints
As has been mentioned at the beginning of this paper, cross-Strait relations
cannot be understood solely in domestic politics. Although it is true that Taiwan’s
electoral politics has been injecting greatest volatility into cross-Strait relations since
the 1990’s, it is undeniable that Washington exercises enormous influence in shaping
the relations between Taiwan and mainland China. In 1999-2000, there was a happy
coincidence of the convergent positions of Taiwan’s main presidential candidates and
the preference of the United States at maintaining the status quo. When Lee Teng-hui
attempted to push his “two-state theory” dangerously close to Washington’s limit,
tremendous pressure was brought on Taiwan and Lee was forced to backtrack. This
time, with Chen and Lien racing to embrace referendum and new constitution,
Washington was taken by surprise, and so was Beijing. The new CCP leadership was
not ready to force a showdown with the US over Taiwan at this particular moment.
They learned a lesson in the 1995-96 crisis and would want to concentrate on
economic development instead of dueling with the world’s hegemon. When Lien and
Soong were leading in the race and sticking to their anti-referendum position, Beijing
felt no need to intervene. However, when the popularity of the Lien-Soong ticket
began dropping and Chen’s call for referendums gained momentum, Beijing sensed
the need to act. At this point, the Chinese Communist leaders were fully aware that
sable rattling would backfire and help Chen to gain more votes, as happened in 2000.
However, Chen’s daring flirtation with the independence issue left Beijing with no
choice but to state its stance. As it happened, when the race to referendum took
greater momentum, Beijing’s warnings became sterner.32 For fear of chasing votes
into Chen’s arms, the Chinese leaders pressured the US to bring Taiwan into line. At
first, the pro-Taipei Bush administration was reluctant to act. After Lien gave in on the
referendum issue, and in expectation of serious complaints from Premier Wen Jiabao
scheduled to visit Washington in early December, the Bush administration finally
spoke out.33 The remarks by the State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher on
32
Hence Maj. Gen. Wang Zaixi, deputy director of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office stated bluntly
that “If the Taiwan authorities collude with all splittist forces to openly engage in pro-independence
activities and challenge the mainland and the ‘one China’ principle, the use of force may become
unavoidable.” This was the first such blatant warning issued by a Mainland Chinese official since
former Premier Zhu Rongji gave stern warning to Taiwan’s voters on the eve of Taiwan’s 2000
presidential elections in which Chen won by a narrow margin.
33
On December 1, the State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher made it clear that the US
“opposed” Taiwan holding a referendum towards independence. After reiterating the usual US position
that “…we oppose any attempt by either side to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Straits.
We also urge both sides to refrain from actions or statements that increase tensions or make dialogue
more difficult to achieve,” Boucher added that “Therefore, we would be opposed to any referenda that
21
the US opposing independence referendum was followed by President Bush’s warning
when he received Premier Wen against the “leader of Taiwan” who may make
unilateral decisions to change the status quo.34 Clearly Washington favored the status
quo, and shared with Beijing’s view that Chen had been tilting towards scrapping the
status quo, despite repeated denials by Taiwan’s officials who claimed that Chen’s
March 20 referendum was designed to safeguard the status quo. The DPP’s
referendum initiative came at a time when the US was preoccupied with Iraq and with
seeking China’s cooperation in trying to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear
weapons program. Washington needed Beijing’s cooperation and so Beijing cashed in.
Washington’s bottom line is supporting Taiwan’s democracy to the extent of not
violating the “one-China principle.” This is to prevent a showdown with Beijing over
an issue not central to the US interests (i.e. whether Taiwan is recognized as an
independent state). The Americans think Taiwan does not need to redefine their
country in order to pursue democracy. Throughout the 1990’s, particularly after the
crisis of 1995-96, a modus vivendi has been developed which calls for Beijing not to
use force, and for Taiwan not to declare independence, and Washington would
underwrite this tacit agreement. Although nothing in written has thus far come out of
the modus vivendi, limits have been put on Beijing’s and Taipei’s behaviors. Beijing
learned it the hard way in 1995-96, while Taipei has yet to test the limit. The flirtation
with Taiwan independence by Chen in his presidential campaign came very close to
such a test.
In figure 7 we use a dotted red lines to delineate the area of political
maneuvering tolerated by Washington. Opposition parties do not need to heed those
limits, but the ruling party needs to. As Chen’s presidential campaign deviated to the
would change Taiwan’s status or move towards independence,” and stated again that President Chen
pledged the “four no’s” in his inaugural address in the year 2000 and that “We appreciate President
Chen’s pledge in 2000, and his subsequent reaffirmations of it, and we take it very seriously.” This is in
sharp contrast with the previous US official position of simply “not supporting” Taiwan independence.
See State Department Noon Briefing, December 1 at <usinfo.org/wf/031201/epf102.htm>, accessed 3
December 2003.
34
After a meeting in the White House with visiting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Bush said in
response to a question about the planned referendum, “We oppose any unilateral decision by either
China or Taiwan to change the status quo. And the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan
indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally, to change the status quo, which we
oppose.” For his part, Wen said China “respects the desire of the people in Taiwan for democracy,” but
that some Taiwanese leaders were “only using democracy as an excuse” to move toward splitting
Taiwan away from China, which the Beijing government “cannot tolerate.” He said China is
determined to uphold its “one-China policy” and maintain “national unity,” but also would not give up
“our aspiration for peaceful reunification.” William Branigin, “U.S. Reaffirms ‘One China’ Policy:
Bush Cautions Taiwan as He Receives Chinese Premier Wen at White House,” Washington Post, 9
December 203 at <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49366-2003Dec9.html>.
22
“forbidden zone,” US officials began to raise their voices and issue statements of
disapproval. Mounting pressure was put on the DPP. When the referendum law was
passing through the Legislative Yuan, the DPP caucus forced one of its members
Trong Chai to withdraw his blatantly pro-independence referendum bill from the floor,
and when the pan-blue parties refused to allow withdrawal and forced a vote on
Chai’s bill, the DPP legislators abstained en bloc. It is obvious that Washington’s
pressure was behind the scene.
Figure 7 about here.
Chen’s dilemma is to make moves on the referendum issue so as to consolidate
pan-green support, and antagonize Beijing to such an extent that it issues threats
destined to antagonize the middle voters, and yet not to damage his long-term
relations with Washington or to look bad when he is forced to backtrack. 35 This is a
tight rope. The 2003-04 presidential campaign shows the cross-Strait relations are
embedded in the Washington-Beijing-Taipei triangle, and even though Taiwan’s
domestic politics may be the driving force behind recent development, the
international constraints are genuine. This does not mean that Chen will immediately
follow whatever Washington demands him to do, for getting elected is a first priority
for any democratic politician facing elections. It does mean, given Taiwan’s
vulnerabilities and the vital importance of the US support in the island’s stormy
relations with the Chinese mainland, that Chen, or for that matter any other Taiwan
politician, can continue defying Washington’s will for long.
At the time of the writing of this paper, President Chen refused to back up on his “defensive
referendum” scheduled for March 21, 2004. His political brinkmanship has already undermined
Taipei-Washington relations and caused a damaging tilt of President Bush’s attitude to Beijing’s side.
Unable to cave in for fear of losing face, and in the hope that people would rally around his flag, Chen
sticks to his referendum plan even under huge US pressure. Whether Chen would ultimately cave in,
however, will be decided by his popularity rating. If Chen is successful in whipping up popular support
for him as an embattled president under unjust international pressure and his tenacity in holding the
“defensive referendum” proves a vote getter, then he may not cave in. In this case, damage control on
the Taipei-Washington tie would have to wait until after the presidential elections. On the other hand, if
his brinkmanship backfires and hurts his rating, then he would for sure back down. Either way, he will
be forced to repair the damaged relations with the US and reorient his policies towards independence
sooner or later. To provoke Mainland China and alienate the US at the same time is totally unfeasible.
However, as will be discussed in the conclusion, the necessary tilt towards idealism in the US China
policy as the American presidential elections draws near may modify Washington’s attitude and
provides Chen with some leeway.
35
23
Conclusion
Domestic politics and international strategic triangle are the two games in which
Taiwan’s politicians find themselves. Electoral cycles determine the urgency with
which politicians perceive their moves on the mainland policy map. In 1999-2000, all
the three major presidential contenders, Lian Chan, Chen Shui-bian, and James Soong
positioned themselves toward the origin in the policy map, championing mixed
identity and equi-importance of economy and security. In 2003-2004, electoral
imperatives first compelled Lien and Soong to join forces, then induced Chen to
explore the potential popular support in taking a more assertive stance against the
Mainland. The SARS scare and the ostensible success of Lee Teng-hui’s “rectifying
Taiwan’s name” movement emboldened Chen into open flirtation with constitutional
revolution aimed at independence. Unable to stall Chen’s momentum and suffering
from dropping popularity, Lien made a turnabout and embraced constitutional
referendum. The two camps found themselves in a race to rewrite the constitution and
change the fundamental political structure of the Republic of China. At the same time,
both the pan-blues and the pan-greens were eager to show their commitment to
establishing three links with the Chinese mainland. They competed in making
promises to establish direct transport across the Taiwan Straits. They acted on the
mainstream public opinion which is at the same time for assertiveness against and
engagement with the Mainland. This status of Taiwan’s mass psychology is the result
of more than a decade of nativization and cross-Strait engagement. It prompted
politicians to respond and to maneuver to the resultant opportunities and constraints.
In short, electoral imperatives expose the change of mass psychology.
The movements of politicians in the presidential race also demonstrate the
constraints imposed by external forces. Taiwan’s security is threatened by the
Mainland while guaranteed by the US. Political maneuvers by Taiwan’s presidential
contenders act on the strategic triangle which reacts to activities on the island. The
race to embrace constitutional referendum provokes Beijing and deeply concerns
Washington. The responses of the two to the tilt towards independence then feed into
the political process in Taiwan. Chen’s referendum was in this way redirected to
“maintaining the status quo.” International pressure was also behind the DPP’s
abandoning a more blatantly pro-independence version of the Referendum Law
authored by one of its legislators. With both Chen and Lien competing to show they
enjoy Washington’s endorsement, any slight change of the American policy towards
Taiwan and the Mainland may tilt the delicate balance of power between the pan-blue
and the pan-green camps. For that reason neither of the two camps has a free hand in
designing their Mainland policy.
24
The interplay of domestic and international factors determines the Mainland
policies of different politicians in Taiwan. Similar logic lies behind the evolvement of
Washington’s China policy and Beijing’s Taiwan policy (Wu 2001a). It is argued that
presidential elections in the US always prompted Washington’s politicians to debate
on their positions towards China. During normal time, the president of the United
States usually takes a realist approach towards the PRC, recognizing its growing
power and seeking its cooperation in regional and global issues, while checking its
influence when the interests of the two countries do not coincide. Here international
real politics reigns. When presidential elections approach, however, idealism runs
high and the incumbent’s realist China policy is subject to criticism by his political
opponents based in the Congress and in the press. In order to meet those criticisms,
the incumbent president would then take some actions to appease the idealists. After
the presidential elections, it would not take long before realism again reigns, and the
new president would change course to reflect business and security interests of the
country. Elections forced politicians to concentrate on domestic preferences, which
always stress idealism. When relatively emancipated from electoral pressure,
politicians are geared to international politics, and realism creeps back.36
The policy makers in the Chinese mainland face constraints that are less
institutional and less electoral than in the US and in Taiwan, but real nevertheless.
Since nationalism is rising on the mainland and has become the main legitimating
factor for the communist regime, Beijing’s basic attitude on the Taiwan issue is that of
intransigent irredentism. 37 Under these circumstances, only paramount political
leaders with indisputable authority can take a soft-line approach towards Taiwan
(Chang 1995). One finds the weaker the communist leader’s grip on power, the more
intransigent he is when dealing with Taiwan. In the Chinese Mainland, the CCP’s
party congresses are functional equivalents to presidential elections in the US and in
Taiwan.38 It is reasonable to expect challenge to the incumbent to rise when the party
Accompanying these periodical changes in Washington’s China policy is a discernible
long-term trend towards greater concern over China’s rising power and a possible Sino-US clash in the
foreseeable future, probably over the Taiwan issue (e.g., Bernstein and Monroe 1997, Swain 2000,
Shlapak, et al., 2000, Pollack 2002, Wang 2003).
36
Actually, Taiwan has played an important role in the development of Mainland China’s surging
nationalism (Dittmer 2003). For the possible conflict between the two nationalisms across the Taiwan
Strait, see Wang 2001.
37
38
It is true that the outcome of the intra-party factional struggle is usually sealed before the party
congress is held, and the congress only serves the function of ratifying the result of elite competition
that took place beforehand. However, with the regularly held party congresses, one can still get a rough
schedule of power struggle in the high echelon of the CCP.
25
congress is approaching, and the political leader to be in a defensive mood when
challenged. This generalization, when applied to the policy making on the Taiwan
issue, suggests greater maneuverability and possible concessions to Taiwan with the
incumbent leader’s power secured during the intervals between party congresses, and
high intransigence when the next congress is in the offing.
Viewed in this perspective, the 2003-04 presidential campaign in Taiwan and the
shifts of the Mainland policies by the two competing camps spell great uncertainties
and entails enormous risks. On the Taiwan side, change of mass psychology has
touched off a race to embrace referendums and new constitution. On the US side,
impending presidential elections suggest greater difficulties by the incumbent to side
with Taiwan, and a natural inclination to challenge Beijing’s position toward Taiwan.
On the PRC side, the newly installed Hu Jingtao-Wen Jiabao system is not strong
enough to be flexible on Taiwan. The proper relations between the front-line party
leaders and the mentor—Jiang Zemin are still to be worked out, making it extremely
difficult for any leader to appear “soft” towards Taiwan. With all the three parties
locked in hard positions, the chances of serious conflicts in the Taiwan Straits are real.
This survey of the evolvement of Taiwan’s policy towards the Chinese Mainland
points out cross-Strait relations are embedded in a tripartite, two-level game. Both
international and domestic factors are important. In this game, domestic politics in the
three players provide the basic momentum, while the interactions among the three set
the parameters in which politicians act. Since the 1990’s, Taiwan’s democratization
has added great volatility to the tripartite game. The 2003-2004 presidential campaign
in Taiwan has already touched off chain reactions that immediately involve all the
three players. It is not unlikely that in the future the main momentum in the tripartite
game would come from the PRC or from the US. At this stage, the source of greatest
volatility in the Washington-Beijing-Taipei triangle remains in Taiwan’s domestic
politics, particularly in its presidential electoral cycles.
26
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