Applied Ethics
Equality/Justice beyond Humanity: Animal Welfare & Animal Rights
1. What is the moral status of animals? How ought we to treat animals? Should we
treat non-human animals in the same way as we should treat our fellow human
beings? Do non-human animals have rights?
 Animal experimentation, commercial farming, hunting, the eating of meat, the
existence of zoos and circuses, destruction of habitats: all of these and other
practices involving animals have come under intense scrutiny and moral
evaluation.
 Speciesism: a prejudice for one’s own species and against other species.
 Vegetarianism: the refusal to eat the flesh of animals and the favoring of a diet of
vegetables.
2. Kant and anthropocentric (human-centered) ethics: Since animals are not
self-conscious rational agents capable of forming moral law, and are there merely as a
means to our end, they are not part of the moral kingdom (of ends). Strictly speaking,
animals do not merit our moral concern. But we should be kind to animals because
that will help to develop good character in us and help us to treat our fellow human
beings in a humane way. Thus, “our duties towards animals are merely indirect duties
towards humanity.” (Kant)
 “If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer capable of service, he
does not fail in his duty to the dog, for the dog cannot judge, but his act is
inhuman and damages in himself that humanity which it is his duty to show
towards mankind.” (Kant)
 Our treatment of animals might affect our treatment of humans. Thus treating an
animal badly is wrong because it reflects a moral attitude that may lead a person
to treat humans badly as well.
 We should treat humans as ends because they are free, autonomous and rational
beings; and we could treat non-human animals as mere means since they are not
autonomous and rational. Thus, it would be legitimate to treat other living beings
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simply as means to our ends.
 We have statues or laws, making cruelty to animals a crime. They impose duty on
people not to treat animals cruelly. But still animals do not have rights since they
are not moral agents.
 Actually, animals themselves are not the directly intended beneficiaries of laws
prohibiting cruelty to animals. Such laws are aimed to protect human beings by
preventing the growth of cruel habits or sentiments that could later threaten
humans with harm. It is not the mistreated dog who is the object of concern. Our
concern is for the feelings of human beings.
Objection: If we could kill and torture animals without leading to habits of cruelty to
people, then would it be all right? We should not inflict pain or suffering on human
beings or on animals, “because they suffer”, as Jeremy Bentham pointed out. Peter
Singer is now further developing Bentham’s ideas in utilitarian terms.
3. Peter Singer’s utilitarian position: We have dismantled discrimination on the
basis of race and sex, why not expand our moral horizons and apply the moral
principle of equality to animals? Practices that were previously regarded as natural
and inevitable now come to be seen as the result of unjustifiable prejudice. Just as
people once thought it incredible that women or Blacks ought not to be treated as
equal to white men, so now speciesists ridicule the idea that all animals ought to
given equal consideration.
 It is a fact that humans are not equal. “Humans come in different shapes and sizes;
they come with differing moral capacities, differing intellectual abilities, differing
amounts of benevolent feeling and sensitivity to the needs of others, differing
abilities to communicate effectively, and differing capacities to experience
pleasure and pain.” If the demand for equality were based on the actual equality of
human beings, we would have to stop demanding equality among humans.
 The claim to equality (equal consideration of interests) does not depend on
intelligence, moral capacity, physical strength, or similar facts. Equality is a moral
ideal. There is no morally compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference
in ability between two persons justifies any difference in the amount of
consideration we give to satisfying their needs and interests. The principle of the
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equality of human beings is not a description, but a prescription of how we ought
to treat humans.
3.1 Speciesism is wrong: It is equality that the cases against racism and sexism must
ultimately rest. And with principle of equality, speciesism is also to be condemned. If
possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human being to use
another for her own ends, how can it entitle human beings to exploit non-human
animals?
 Principle of equality is equal consideration of interests. The capacity for
suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a
condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful
way. It is meaningless to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked
along the road by a boy. A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer.
But a cat does have an interest in not being tortured, because it will suffer.
 Sentience is necessary for having interests. An object without sentience cannot be
said to have interests. Sentience is also sufficient for having interests. A being that
is sentient has at least minimal interests—the interest in not suffering.
 To speak of A’s interest in x might mean either (a) A is interested in (wants,
desires, cares about) x, or (b) that x is in A’s interest (that x will contribute to A’s
well-being).
 Sentience (the capacity to suffer or experience enjoyment) is the defensible
boundary of concern for the interests of others. If a sentient being suffers, there is
no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No
matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its
suffering be counted equally with the like suffering of any other sentient beings.
 Racists/sexists violate the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the
interests of members of their own race/sex, when there is clash between their
interests and the interests of those of another race/sex. Similarly, the speciesists
allow the interests of their own species to override the greater interests of
members of other species.
 What makes all sentient beings morally considerable is not their rationality or
moral capacity but their ability to suffer. All sentient beings have interests, and the
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frustration of interests leads to suffering. Utilitarianism seeks to maximize the
satisfaction of interests or to minimize sufferings whether they be those of humans
or animals. Therefore it is morally wrong to inflict sufferings upon animals in
‘factory (or commercial) farm’, hunting, and experiment.
3.2 Rearing and killing animals is wrong: Our practice of rearing and killing other
animals in order to eat them is a clear case of the sacrifice of the important interests of
other animals in order to satisfy our trivial interests, our pleasure of taste. To avoid
speciesism we must stop this practice, since we could satisfy our need for protein and
other essential nutrients far more efficiently with a diet that replaced animal flesh by
soy beans and other high-protein vegetable products.
3.3 Using animals for experiment is wrong: Discrimination is again observed in
animal experimentation in order to see if certain substances are safe for human beings.
“Would the experimenter be prepared to perform his/her experiment on an orphaned
human infant, if that were the only way to save many human lives?”
 The experimenter shows a bias in favor of his own species whenever he carries
out an experiment on a nonhuman animal for a purpose that he would not think
justified him in using a human being at an equal or lower level of sentience,
awareness, etc.
3.4 Speciesism in contemporary philosophy: Philosophy as being practiced in the
universities today does not challenge anyone’s preconceptions about our relation with
other species. A philosopher said: “all men are to be treated as equals, not because
they are equal, in any respect, but simply because they are human. They are human
because they have emotions and desires, and are able to think, and hence are capable
of enjoying a good life in a sense in which other animals are not.” (W. Frankena)
 What is this capacity to enjoy the good life which all humans have, but no other
animals? Other animals have emotions and desires, and appear to be capable of
enjoying a good life.
 The intrinsic dignity of humans, some philosophers claim, is the basis for the
moral gulf that is commonly thought to separate humans and animals. But the
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appeal to the intrinsic dignity of humans appears to solve the egalitarian’s problem
only as long as it goes unchallenged.
 Why it should be that all humans—including infants, mental defectives, Hitler,
Stalin, etc—have some kind of dignity or worth that no elephant, pig, or
chimpanzee can ever achieve? The question is difficult to answer as our request
for some relevant fact that justifies the inequality of humans and other animals.
4. Criticisms and objections to Singer:
i) A criticism directed against utilitarianism is the measurement problems. Singer’s
equal-consideration-of-interests principle confronts enormous complexity in
application. Humans are different from animals and thus equal consideration does not
entail equal or identical treatment. Further, interests and suffering admit of degrees.
Not all interests deserve to be treated equally and not all suffering is created equal.
 Do you really want to give the interests of a mouse equal consideration when they
conflict with the interests of a poor boy it might bite? How do human’s interests in
timber compare with birds’ interests in building their nests at tree-tops?
ii) It is a consistent position that instead of abolishing factory farming, we improve
factory farms or seek alternative methods, in order that animals no longer lead
miserable lives, if people’s interest in rearing and eating animal meat is far greater
than animals’ sufferings. Killing animals for food may be justified if the farming
conditions are not detrimental to animal welfare and killing is humanely performed.
iii) Furthermore, Singer’s utilitarian theory even fails to show that it is wrong to treat
nonhuman animals as they are now being treated in modern farming and using
animals for scientific research, so long as the present treatment of animals might
produce greatest interests of the greatest number of sentient beings. Some animal
research may be justified by its vital importance, as it may enable us to find cures for
alleviate painful diseases. Activities which have an adverse impact on the well-being
of animals may be justified if, all things considered, they lead to a net increase in
welfare for humans or animals.
iv) Singer uses principle of equality as well as principle of utility. But there is no
necessary connection, no established harmony between respect for the equality of
interests and promoting the utilitarian maximization of interests.
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 The principle of utility might be used to justify the radical kinds of different
treatments between individuals or groups of individuals, and thus it might justify
racism and sexism, as well as speciesism.
 Racism, sexism and speciesism, which seem to be eliminated by the principle of
equality of interests could be resurrected and justified by the principle of utility.
5. Deontological rights position (Tom Regan): This equal rights position contends
that animals and humans share some essential psychological properties, like desires,
memory, feeling, etc, and thereby give us all equal intrinsic value upon which equal
rights are founded. All rights are inalienable and cannot be forfeited. Animals, like
humans, are ends in themselves. The maximization of happiness or utility is not
sufficient to override these rights. The fundamental wrong we are doing to animals is
not the pain, nor the suffering, but that we use animals as our resources or means, as
having instrumental value.
 Regan’s radical position thus calls for:
(i) total abolition of the use of animals in science;
(ii) total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture;
(iii) total elimination of commercial and sport hunting and trapping.
5.1 Regan’s argument for animal rights:
(a) Normal and mature animals are not only sentient but have other mental capacities
as well, like the capacities for emotion, belief, desire, memory, and some degree of
self-awareness. They are not only alive in the biological sense but have some
psychological properties. Creatures with such capacities are said to be
subjects-of-a-life, and thus can be harmed or benefited.
(b) All subjects-of-a-life have inherent value, a value independent of other things or
values. My value as an individual is independent of my usefulness to you. Yours is not
dependent on your usefulness to me. In opposition to utilitarianism, harm to an
individual cannot be justified by the production of a greater net benefit to other
individuals.
(c) To have inherent value is to have value independent of interests, needs, or uses of
anyone else. Inherent value is to have value in and of oneself. In contrast, a thing’s
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instrumental value is a function of how it might be used by, or a means to others.
(d) Beings or objects with inherent value are ends in themselves, not merely means to
some other end. It is wrong to beings with inherent value as mere means to other
ends—because to do so is to deny the inherent value these beings possess.
(e) Inherent value does not come in degrees, but equal for all subjects-of-a-life. All
who have inherent value have it equally, whether they are humans or animals. All
those who have inherent value should be treated with equal respect.
(f) It is morally wrong to treat creatures which have inherent value as mere means,
especially mere means to the production of the greatest overall good. We thus have
moral duty not to harm creatures which have inherent value. Egalitarian justice
demands that individuals with inherent value should be treated with equal respect. All
individuals with inherent value thus have the right to be treated with the same respect.
(g)Therefore, all subjects-of-a-life, including animals, have rights. Moral rights
generate duties not only to refrain from inflicting harm upon living creatures with
inherent value but also to help them when they are endangered by others.
6. Criticisms and objections to Tom Regan:
i) We only have limited moral concern to some animals which are subjects-of-a-life.
Although Regan speaks of animals generally, the subject-of-a-life criteria apply to
normal mammals only. Most non-human animals are not up to standard of being
subjects-of-a-life and thus they do not have rights.
ii) Only humans possess will and autonomy. Humans confront choices that are moral,
and humans lay down moral laws, for others and for themselves. People are
self-legislative, autonomous. Nonhuman animals lack this capacity for moral
judgment. They are not capable of exercising or responding to moral claims, of
recognizing just claims against other moral agents. Between species of animals, say,
between humans on the one hand and dogs on the other, the morally relevant
differences are enormous. Therefore, nonhuman animals do not have rights.
iii) Animals cannot have rights, since they cannot have duties, and since animals are
not moral agents. They cannot be reasoned with or instructed in their responsibilities.
They are subject to and act according to their brute instincts which they are unable to
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control. Animals cannot make agreements, promises or claims, cannot be blamed for
what would be called ‘moral failures’ in a person. Animals are therefore incapable of
acting rightly or wrongly, of having obligations.
iv) Argument against vegetarianism: One way of ensuring animal rights is to avoid
using animals for food at all and to eat only vegetables. But, even though animals
have interests and rights, those interests and rights are less important than human’s
rights and interests. And our interests and rights can override their interests and rights.
Therefore it is nothing wrong for us to use them for food, just as animals in nature use
other animals and vegetables for food.
 A moderate view says that we have duty or responsibility to not make animals
suffer, or not to slaughter whole species and make extinct. Human beings still are
entitled within these moral limitations to kill animals for food.
v) Regan’s and Singer’s theories are individualistic, not holistic. Their ethics is
concerned with protecting and promoting the interest or well-being of individuals, not
whole species or communities. An animal that is a member of an endangered species,
say a panda, has no special moral status. That is, we have no greater duty to a panda
than to a stray dog. We certainly have no direct moral obligation to the millions of
species of plants and animals that are not subjects-of-a-life.
 Individualistic theories are inadequate for environmental ethics because they fail
to offer direct reasons for the moral consideration of ecosystems, wilderness and
endangered species.
Suggested readings:
1. Julie C. Van Camp, Jeffrey Olen & Vincent Barry, Applying Ethics: A Text with
Readings (11th ed.), Chapters 11. Wadsworth, 2015. Course book.
2. Peter Singer, All Animals are Equal, in Environmental Philosophy: From Animal
Rights to Radical Ecology, M. E. Zimmerman, J. Baird Callicot, et al (ed). Prentice
Hall, 2005.
3. Tom Regan, Animal Rights, Human Wrongs, in Environmental Philosophy: From
Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, M. E. Zimmerman, J. Baird Callicot, et al (ed).
Prentice Hall, 2005.
4. Bonnie Steinbock, Speciesism and the Idea of Equality, in Barbara MacKinnon’s
Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues, Thomson, 2004.
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