September 20: Origins and Evolution
Hamilton: Federalist 70
-necessity of energetic executive
-energy comes from unity, duration, support, competent powers.
-safety: dependence on people, responsibility
-a single executive and numerous legislature: exec needs energy, leg adapted to
deliberation and wisdom
-unity can be destroyed in two ways:
1. vesting power in 2+ magistrates of equal dignity and authority
2. vesting power in one person subject to control and cooperation of others
-experience of other nations tell us that plurality in exec is bad
-dangers of having plurality in exec:
1. difference of opinion
2. animosity
3. disagreements lessen respectability, authority, delay plans, etc
4. doesn’t facilitate fast action in an emergency
5. could split the community into factions
6. tends to conceal faults, destroy responsibility
Madison: Federalist 47
-Madison responds to objections that the Constitution violates the maxim that legislative,
executive, judicial departments must be separate and distinct
-Two arguments that depts aren’t completely distinct but have influence on each other:
1) Montesquieu (author of separation maxim) didn’t mean that departments have
no partial agency in, or control over, other departments
-Evidence: British Constitution doesn’t have completely distinct leg,
exec, and jud branches
2) As understood in America , maxim hasn’t meant complete separation
-Evidence: Madison goes through the Constitutions of all the states, cites
their language on separation, then the actual involvement of the three
branches with each other—claims that they show the haste and
inexperience with which they were written
The United States Constitution
I’ll assume that everyone knows the general ideas behind the Constitution so I’ll focus
mainly on Article II which deals directly with the presidency.
The first section just explains the basics of the office, 4 year terms, elected by electoral
college, who is and isn’t eligible to run, what to do if he dies in office, and describes how
his pay will work.
Section 2 enumerates most of his direct powers.
Commander in Chief of all armed forces, including the militia if its called up.
Can demand written reports from the principal officer of any executive office on anything
pertaining to their job.
He can grant pardons and reprieves to anyone except in cases of impeachment.
He can make treaties if two thirds of the Senate agree.
He can nominate, and with Senate approval appoint ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls. Members of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States
that Congress decides he should be in charge of. They can decide to allow someone else
to appoint newly created offices.
He can fill vacancies in the Senate with people whose terms will end when the session
ends.
Section 3 deals with his dealing with Congress
From time to time he must inform Congress of the state of the union.
He can call on Congress to consider measures he feels are necessary and important.
On extraordinary occasions he can call both or either Houses, and he decides when and if
there will be an adjournment.
He’ll receive ambassadors and other public ministers.
He’s to make sure the laws are being executed.
He’ll commission all officers of the United States.
Section 4 states the pres., vice-pres., and all civil officers can be impeached and removed
from office if convicted of treason bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
The rest of the Constitution deals with the other powers of the government, but all the
president’s stuff is listed here.
Forrest McDonald: The American Presidency: An Intellectual History
Chapter 7: The Convention
Though deriving their views largely from a common set of
theorists
and
experiences,
the
delegates
at
the
Constitutional Convention held widely divergent views with
respect to executive power and how it should be distributed
within the new government.
The collection of delegates
supporting a strong executive was both larger and more
prestigious than the collection against one, but the group of
delegates that came to the convention undecided outnumbered
the two sides combined. The undecided delegates were open to
the opinions of either side so long as the abstract principle
came attached to a specific plan for an executive with
sufficient strength to implement required duties and
sufficient restraint to avoid the trap of tyranny.
The details of the executive office considered during the convention revolved
primarily around three issues: the method of selection, the structure of the office, and the
powers granted to the office. The confusion present in the decision of any one issue was
aggravated by the fact that each issue was a qualifying factor in the appropriate resolution
of another. For this reason, some delegates wanted to delay the consideration of one
problem until another had been resolved, and all early solutions were reconsidered many
times as the context provided by the shifting outline of the constitution changed over the
course of the convention. To further complicate matters, a similar interdependence of
decisions also existed between the general design of the executive branch and the other
components of government.
With respect to the issue of executive selection, major considerations included the
body that would choose the executive, the length of the term, the method of removal, the
line of succession, and the possibility of reelection. On the issue of the form of the
executive office, the primary concerns were whether it was better to have one executive
or several and what sort of executive council might exist alongside the main executive.
Concerning the delegation of powers to the executive, the central line of debate was to
what degree executive authority or federative powers ought to be distributed between the
executive office and the senate, and to a lesser extent, other components of government.
Discussions about the executive office took place primarily in early June, mid
July, and late August of 1787 with cascading changes in proposed policy occurring just
as frequently. At the end of August the proposed government placed congress at the clear
center of power and left the executive in a position far weaker than in the final draft of
the constitution. At that point, a solution to the nagging concern of election was offered
in the form of the Electoral College. From this idea sprung a final shift in the planned
structure of the executive office, and by mid September it took the form finally released
for ratification.
Chapter 8: Ratification
Due to the wild swings in proposed governmental form during the Constitutional
Convention and the suggestion of the finalized version so late in the process, the debates
between the delegates are not particularly useful tools in the interpretation of the
constitution at the time of its inception. A more meaningful resource in such
interpretation is provided by the debates surrounding the ratification of the constitution in
the months following the convention. These debates applied exclusively to the finished
product of the Constitutional Convention and drew from a wide body of people interested
in finding all possible strengths or weaknesses in the constitution consistent with
contemporary interpretation and depending on whether or not they supported its
ratification. The ratification process as a whole draws further authority as a source of
constitutional interpretation from the fact that the interpretation of the ratification
delegates is what the people considering a new government actually believed they were
accepting or rejecting.
The two defining camps in the ratification debates were the federalists who
supported the constitution and the anti-federalists who tried to prevent its ratification.
The debate primarily involved the anti-Federalists attacking the constitution and
Federalists countering the attacks. Since the Federalist arguments were largely reactive,
most supporters of the constitution were relatively passive in the early stages of the
ratification process when a series of state conventions easily ratified the constitution. As
a result, the debate was initially dominated by well-organized anti-Federalist propaganda
under George Clinton. When general support began to falter one state short of the nine
required to activate the constitution, the Federalists increased the intensity of their
responses and thus rounded out the analysis of the constitution available from the time of
its ratification.
Arguments against the constitution held it to be flawed in variable and sometimes
opposite directions depending on the specific detractor and audience. As a case in point,
it was argued both that the Senate would become a weak group of presidential minions
and that that the president would become a mere puppet of the Senate. Regardless of the
particular shift in power, it was widely believed by anti-Federalists that the distribution of
executive and federative powers between the president and Senate combined with the
power of the Senate to remove the president or not and the power of the president to
pardon anyone not being impeached including senators would naturally lead to a
treasonously tyrannical cabal with these two groups at the center. Even without this
concern, the fact that attacks focusing on specific presidential powers were used to
separately describe the presidency as both too strong and too weak resulted in a rhetorical
out flanking of the Federalist positions. In addition to these attacks, separate but equally
concerning objections, with a particular focus on the lack of a bill of rights, were raised in
an attempt to discredit the constitution.
Briefly put, the Federalist defenses focussed on a discrediting of the applicability
of historical failures in partially similar systems of government such as the British
monarchy by focusing on key differences such as the election of and removability of the
highest executive. Specific concerns such as the Senate wielding undue influence
through impeachment were addressed with equally specific technical counters such as the
necessity of charges being introduced by the House. General support of the plan was
tricky because of the rhetorical flanking, but there were a few strong cases of this such as
in Hamilton’s Federalist Papers. Hamilton ultimately emphasized the need for the
executive to have wide leeway in taking action on behalf of the country, thus attributing a
broad interpretation to the general statement in article two of the constitution: “The
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”
William Leuchtenburg: "The Twentieth-Century Presidency"
A VERY condensed history of the presidencies from McKinley to Clinton (mainly a
history article, not an idea/theory article). Broadly looks at how the office has become
more powerful during the century. Notes powers of presidents have been expanded most
in this century by its wars, particularly World War I and II. Notes presidential prestige
peaking in 1965. In fact, presidential scholars completely shifted courses in 1970s, and
went from lauding the forcefulness of the FDR presidency to warning of "imperial
presidency.@ Led to declining expectations of presidency in final 25 years of century.
Yet still an institution which looms large and will continue to do so in the 21st century
(not going to diminish significantly).
The Two Constitutional Presidencies
Essentially the main point of this article is that
presidential action is restrained by and presidential
behavior
shaped
by
two
“constitutions.”
The
first
constitution is the original Constitution, which set up the
core structures of the presidency and remains more or less
unchanged.
The second constitution involves the change in
the way the president and the public understand the
constitutional system, and the president’s role in it.
Central to this second constitution is tension with the
original constitution and direct opposition to the founder’s
view of the office of the president.
Backed by the
proliferation of primaries and a dramatic increase in the
power of the media, the second constitution puts a premium on
active and continuos presidential leadership of public
opinion.
The Federalist papers were looked at to describe the founder’s and original
constitution’s view of the presidency.
A. Demagoguery = leadership that attempts to sway popular passions
1. The Founders worried especially about the danger that a powerful executive might
pose to the system if power were derived from the role of popular leader.
2. They attempted to narrow demagogues avenues of attack by founding a stable
government, and to mitigate their effects by forcing them to go through the
institutions they created. It isn’t terribly clear, but that’s what the author said.
B. Representation
1. The founders had a distrust of “direct” or “pure” democracy.
2. Felt there were two requisites to good government, attention to the desires and
interests of the citizenry, and deciding how much weight to give popular opinion.
3. Came up with four devices to accommodate those requisites.
a. They established popular election as the basis of the Constitution and the
government’s legitimacy.
b. They established different lengths of term for various offices depending on the
office’s assumed proximity to the people. House members were to be elected
every two years, the pres. every four etc.
c. The formal power of institutions derived ultimately from the people, but
immediately from the Constitution.
d. They envisioned that the sheer size of the nation would insulate gov. officials
from shifts of public opinion.
4. All of this was done to keep the “passions” of the people away and allow the
“reason” of the people to be in charge.
C. Independence of the Executive
1. To “withstand the temporary delusion” of popular opinion the executive was ade
independent.
2. The office was to draw its power from the Constitution rather than from another
branch of the government.
D. Separation of powers
1. Powers were separated and structures of each branch differentiated to allow each
branch to perform different tasks.
2. Each branch would be superior, but not omnipotent in its own sphere and in its own
way.
3. The purpose of the separation was to make effective governance more likely.
I.
Woodrow Wilson’s critique of The Federalist is used to explain the 2nd
constitution’s view of the presidency. (things are looked at in a different order
from the first part)
A. Separation of powers
1. For Wilson separation of powers was the central defect of American politics.
2. He was the first and most prominent guy to call it a system of checks and balances.
3. Felt that Congress was too powerful, and was no longer a “deliberative” body.
4. Called for presidential leadership that would force Congress to be a more
deliberative body.
5. Basically he disagreed with the founders, because he thinks strong presidential
leadership is necessary for Congress to be a deliberative body.
B. Representation
1. Wilson gives more weight to public opinion that the Founders did.
2. Favored interplay between representative and constituent that would educate the
constituent.
3. Leadership was supposed to focus on “interpreting” the public’s desires even if the
public didn’t know what they were.
4. Activities of the government would be more open leading to a more interested and
involved citizenry which would lead to even better government.
C. Independence of the Executive
1. Wilson wanted people to view presidents as receiving their authority through a
mandate from the people.
2. The leader was supposed to sift through the various and contradictory views of the
people, and then interpret what exactly the majority wanted even if it wasn’t aware
of what it wanted.
D. Demagoguery
1. His views lead to the problems of demagoguery.
2. A number of questions about the likelihood of demagogues under his system arose
so he thought of three ways in which they would be prevented.
a. His doctrine had an “ethic” that could be passed on to future leaders, basically he
wanted to redefine politicians’ ideas of “success.”
b. He trusted the people’s ability to judge character.
c. He felt the natural conservatism of public opinion would prevent trouble because
it opposes any innovation that moves too quickly.
3. None of his answers are terribly convincing.
II.
Both constitutions were supposed to support an energetic presidency, but they differ over
the sources and virtues of popular leadership. The Founders believed presidents drew
their energy from their authority, which rests on their independent constitutional position.
Woodrow Wilson saw power as being conferred directly by the people. The second
constitution has not replaced the first but has been superimposed over it, altering without
obliterating it.
September 22: Presidential Power: An Imperial Presidency?
Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents page 1-90
Intro
Neustadt defines power as personal influence that has an effect on governmental action
 different from formal power
Theme of Presidential Power = presidential weakness: the gap between what is expected
of the president and the “assured capacity to carry through.”
Neustadt sees expectations and clerkly tasks rising while support weakens (foreign
alliances loosening and political parties decreasing). Moreover, the central weakness that
Neustadt identifies is:
President’s power is shared, and “to share is to limit” so
the president’s power is dependent on the consent from
others, and he must use the power of his reputation and
prestige to make policy.
Neustadt sees says that presidents must be forward-looking (“maximize prospective
influence”) and strategic about their power to be more effective. “The pursuit of
presidential power, rightly understood, constitutionally conditioned, looking ahead,
serves purposes far broader than a President’s satisfaction.”
CH 1
The strength or weakness of a president “turns on his personal capacity to influence the
conduct of the men who make up government.” (4)
Neustadt looks at the strategy of presidents, at how they can maximize their influence.
Neustadt terms Truman and Eisenhower the “mid-century presidents, and describes midcentury as a time when emergencies of past years become commonplace [what was once
exceptional is now routine]. Innovation caused rapid changes and confusion became a
commonplace part of politics, parties weakened, personality became emphasized, world
events changed rapidly, public mood also changed rapidly, and “ticket splitting.”
Neustadt constantly refers to the presidency as a clerkship. President’s clerkship reflects
pressure from “executive officialdom, from Congress, from his partisans, from citizens at
large, and from abroad.”
Key point: The strong behavior of our past presidents in economics, foreign policy,
legislation, mass communication, is now a requirement.
Meanwhile: “The same conditions that promote his leadership in form preclude a
guarantee of leadership in fact.”  because he is obligated to everyone and he alone has
that vantage-point, he becomes limited by the weight of his obligations.
Translation: pressure and expectations on the president have increased steeply while his
personal ability to carry out policy and changes has decreased.
CH 2
Key phrase of chapter: “Presidential power is the power to persuade.”
–originally said by Truman, but emphasized multiple times by Neustadt.
His “’Powers are no guarantee of power; clerkship is no guarantee of leadership.”
Neustadt discusses 3 cases: the MacArthur case (Truman and Korean War), the steel
seizure (Truman, Wage stabilization board, T seizes mills ad orders employees to work as
gov employees, strikes), and the Little Rock case (Eisenhower, Faubus, school
integration).
These three cases are examples of when the President’s orders brought immediate action:
“self-executing.” Five reasons why this apparent ‘self-execution’ occurred: 1)
President’s involvement was unambiguous (they were his personal orders), 2) his orders
were unambiguous, 3) orders were widely publicized, 4) men who received orders had
full capability to carry them out, & 5) they didn’t doubt his authority to give them those
orders. When these factors do not occur in combination, there will not be automatic
execution of the task.
These three cases are also each examples of costly last resorts: the failure of attempts to
gain an end by softer means. Neustadt makes clear however that these drastic actions,
while costly, are necessary and appropriate in some situations.
Conclusion: “Truman was quite right when he declared that presidential power is the
power to persuade. Command is but a method of persuasion, not a substitute, and not a
method suitable for everyday employment.”
CH 3
Constitutional convention of 1787 created a government of separated institutions sharing
powers (not separate powers). Executive power is shared/checked by Congress,
Federalism, the Courts, the Bill of Rights, the Press.
Persuasive power is more than charm and reasoned argument, it is reinforced by the
status and authority of the President’s office: those in government realize that their jobs
and future ambitions may depend on the President; this fact benefits the President in
negotiations/decisions.
Meanwhile, his power is checked by theirs, because it is a relationship of mutual
dependence.
Ex. Prez and congress: dependent on each other to get things accomplished: constant
negotiation.
Know and understand this sentence: “Power to persuade is the power to bargain.”
Even within executive branch, relations with cabinet members, etc., there is give and
take… “Real power is reciprocal and varies markedly with organization, subject matter,
personality, and situation….The probabilities of power do not derive from the literary
theory of the Constitution.”
People in government often act as if they are in business for themselves, not part of a
team, depending on what their responsibilities are [This somewhat contrasts Porter’s
comments in lecture about everyone being behind the President.]. Outside the executive,
loyalty to the Prez “may often matter less [emphasis his].” Congressmen act in
accordance with what they think they have to do to get reelected. Therefore, Prez must
induce others to believe that what he wants is what their interests and responsibilities
require to do.
Even when politicians agree on the ends to achieve, they differ and negotiate on the
means to achieving it—how will it be done, who gets credit, etc. Ex. Truman and the
Marshall plan: “Truman, in effect, lent Marshall and the rest the perquisites and status of
his office. In return they lent him their prestige and their own influence.” The result: a
massive 1948 European aid program.
Presidents can maximize prospects for effectiveness and minimize chances that he will
fail to persuade others by guarding his power prospects in the course of making choices.
Truman’s past actions had led the way for his current bargaining: “his power was
protected by his choices.” “A President’s own choies are the only means in his own
hands of guarding his own prospects for effective influence. He can draw power from
continuing relationships in the degree that he can capitalize upon the needs of others for
the Presidency’s status and authority.”
CH 4
President’s persuasiveness depends on the opinion that the
men he aims to convince hold about whether he has the skills
and will to use his bargaining advantages (whether they
expect him to be able to and to have the tenacity to follow
through).
“Reputation itself does not persuade, but it can make persuasion easier, harder, or
impossible.”
Negative example: Eisenhower’s second term = way in which reputation should not be
guarded.
Professional reputation of Prez is made by him—this an opportunity or risk. It is not
made by one move—it is changed through a pattern of action [example= Eisenhower]. A
president’s “general reputation will be shaped by signs of pattern in the things he says
and does”—the choices he makes every day.
CH 5: Public Prestige
Reputation (and therefore effective bargaining) also depends on President’s standing with
the public outside Washington: “Popular prestige.” Reputation and prestige both affect
the Prez’s power through the mechanism of anticipated reactions: for prestige,
Congressmen will go along with a plan more readily if they think that the public’s
reaction to what the Prez proposes will be positive. The Prez’s public standing sets a
tone for what Washingtonians will do for him.
The president’s options are reduced, his opportunities diminished, his freedom for
maneuver checked in the degree that Washington conceives him unimpressive to the
public.” If he is unpopular, he will have to rely more on vetoes. In terms of both trying
to gain votes and trying to get “special publics” to follow a course of action that he
wants, the president works within the boundaries that his prestige sets for how much the
public will respond to his appeals.
Nice quotation: “Presidential standing outside Washington is actually a jumble of
imprecise impressions held by relatively inattentive people.”
Neustadt only deals with the domestic angle of the Prez’ public prestige because “even
though a President’s position overseas affects all sorts of judgments made in Washington,
his standing with home publics is a matter of more moment to most Washingtonians.”
Personality factors into prestige, but is rather static—people form a public image of the
Prez when they first perceive him as President, and rarely change their image of him
afterward. As Neustadt writes, “an image of the office, not an image of the man, is the
dynamic factor in a President’s prestige.”
Neustadt talks about gallup polls changing a lot early in 1951 and in the spring of 1958.
In both of these times it fell because government action was associated with large
disturbances in the private lives of Americans. This demonstrates that as private
prospects are upset, men’s expectations of the president increase, and their appraisal of
his performance follows accordingly. “The moving factor in prestige is what the people
outside Washington see happening to themselves.”
In this way, events in which the President plays no part can affect what his constituents
think and therefore affect his power (in a very meta kind of way).
Presidential teaching is a way for Presidents to avoid the negative effects that bad events
can have on his prestige. Presidential teaching 1) is aimed at students who are habitually
inattentive, 2) only gets attention when what he is teaching about is on the minds of his
students for reasons other than his talking about it, 3) he teaches by doing more than by
telling, and 4) his prior actions figure into how this doing is perceived.
Actions are always stronger than words, however, so Neustadt talks about how Truman’s
efforts to teach in 1950 were undermined by his own prior words and actions.
Key idea: the prestige of the President depends on what the public thinks it wants, and
what they think they got. Therefore, beyond his self-executing orders, the President’s
influence is regulated by his choices of objectives, of timing, and of instruments, plus by
what he chooses to avoid.
September 27: Presidential Power: The Three Presidencies
Presidential Leadership in Political Time-Stephen Skowronek
Three general dynamics evident in presidential history:
1. Constitutional separation of powers-struggle over definition of institutional
prerogatives
2. Modernization of the Nation-evolutionary sequence ending in "modern
Presidency"
3. Changing shape of political regimes that organize state-society relations and links
presidents at junctures in "political time"
Periods are marked by the rise of a new political coalition, one of which exerts a
dominant force on the federal government. From the outset, conflict among interests
within the dominant coalition threaten to cause political disaffection and may weaken
regime support. The longer a regime survives, the more its approach to national affairs
becomes encumbered and distorted.
Leadership situations can differ within a historical period whether one is a regime
outsider (nixon) or an insider (JFK), or after some time (FDR and Carter). Analysis of
three pairs of Presidents: FDR and Andrew Jackson; JFK and James K. Polk; Jimmy
Carter and Franklin Pierce. All were democrats and affiliated with the dominant coalition
of their time, none took a passive view of the office, each aspired to great national
leadership.
CONSTRUCTING A NEW REGIME: Roosevelt and Jackson
Both presidencies were launched after a major political unheaval. The old ruling party
suffered a stunning defeat, and lost both Congress and the Presidency. Social conflicts
had increased since the panic of 1819, and Jackson gained greatly from the 1824 corrupt
bargain election. 1828 he launched a campaign against "corruption of manners" in
Washington. Great Depression was the major impetus for FDR in 1932. The president as
regime builder grapples with the fundamentals of political regeneration--institutional
reconstruction and party building. Success is hardly guaranteed.
Jackson "republican renewal": Determined to get rid of political and institutional
corruption, he purged incompetance from the Civil Service, initiated fiscal retrenchment
in national projects, and revived federalism for state based government. Jackson appealed
for a return to Jefferson's ideas on government and was careful to yield his opposition any
ground. He created his position as the nation's crusader in reform. Wanted to reform the
Bank of the United States (BUS), but decided to wait until after reelection in 1832.
However, Biddle and Clay joined forces and pressed the issue of the BUS; Jackson
vetoed extending the life of the BUS and appealing to the "common man" won reelection.
He wanted to move funds from BUS to state banks (pet banks) and succeeded after
undertaking a major grassroots party-building effort in the midterm elections of 1834.
The infusion of federal deposits in pet state banks led to a speculative boom and
threatened major financial collapse. Institutional ties between state and society emerged
as the weak link in the new order.
Roosevelt "the more I learn about Andy Jackson, the more I love him": 1934-5 he was
faced with mounting discontent among the old order. Challenged with either
reconstructing the political and institutional foundations of the national government or
abandoning the initiatives he had sustained in his early years in power, FDR adopted the
role of bipartisan national leader reaching out to all in a time of crisis. He restructured
institutional relations between state and society by reaching out to the radical and zealous
congress ('35-'37) and offering it direction. After reelection in '36 he tried to neutralize
the remaining threat in the government (as jackson had--the bank) by packing the
Supreme Court. The scheme failed, but the court capitulated, so in '38 at the midterm
elections, FDR failed in major party building. The creation, however, of the EOP closed
the New Deal with a fitting symbol of the new state of affairs.
Opposition from the favored interests of the old order and their supporters forced these
presidents from an original program to meet the crisis at hand and place institutional
relations between state and society on a new footing. After a second election, both moved
to consolidate the new order by eliminating institutional opposition and forging a better
base of party support.
MANAGING AN ESTABLISHED REGIME: Polk and Kennedy
Regime builders leave a more constricted universe for political leadership. Polk and
Kennedy promised to reaffirm the commitments and revitalize the program of the
dominant regime; what they lacked in deep political loyalties they made up for with their
freedom to cultivate widespread support. They endorsed their party's most divisive issues
and didn't lose support (texas annexation, and civil rights).
Polk: Pledged not to run again to build party unity. Opened his administration saying he
knew no divisions within the democratic party. Reached out to north and south with
lower tariffs and land price reform. Supported Manifest Destiny. Pledge to get all of
oregon failed and radicals turned on him. The war with mexico seemed to some a
conquest for the south west. Polk got peace, California, Texas, Tariff revision, an
independent treasury, warehouse storage system, and Oregon. But the failure of interest
management led to political disaster for the democratic party.
Kennedy: Promised to "get the country moving again." He courted both northern liberals
and southern conservatives, and his New Frontier gave him the high ground as an
individual with a truly national vision. Avoided Polk's tactics and decided to be more
cautious in pursuit of initiatives. Put minimum wage, housing, aid to education, mass
transit , health care on agenda. Left off civil rights initially. However he pushed civil
rights and wanted to wait until the right time for legislation. He isolated Wallace as
radical right and sent civil rights legislation to congress. At his death, he had to deal with
conservative reactions, party schism, and the need to hold a base in the south.
Leadership was circumscribed by a political test of aggressive maintenance and dilemmas
of interest management. They set in motion a pivotal turn toward sectarianism.
LEADERSHIP IN AN ENERVATED REGIME: Pierce and Carter
Dark horses, each was a minor figure far removed from centers of party strength and
interest. Neither could find secure ground on which to make a stand and limit the political
unraveling that comes with executive action. What began in expedience simply dissolved
into irrelevance.
Pierce: Unraveling began with Pierce's offer to forget the free soil heresy of 1848 and
provide all factions with some presidential favor. Within months of inauguration, Pierce's
strategy for establishing his credibility as a leader was in shambles. In his first legislative
decision-kansas nebraska bill-- he was told to disregard his electoral pledge not to reopen
the issue of slavery. Pierce lost credibility in 1854 after passage of K-N act. Northerners
turned on him, southerners had no use for him. After this, Pierce seemed to gain sense of
purpose...he appealed to the nation to reject treason in Kansas, wrapped the party in
Constitution, and cast its enemies as disunionists bent on civil war. Democrats took up
his charge but hastened to bury the man who had articulated it.
Carter: Called attention to moral degeneration in government and tried to fix the
bureaucrativ inefficiency that left the people estranged from government. The 1977 Bert
Lance affair put Carter's leadership in shambles. After mixed success with congress, in
'79 he appealed to nation on the crisis facing it. He embraced the repudiation of an entire
political institutional order but the party revolted against his sentiments.
MOE and HOWELL – Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory
One of the distinctive features of the modern presidency is
the president’s formal capacity to act unilaterally and make
law on his own. The authors suggest that this power stems
from the fact that the Constitution is ambiguous in regards
to unilateral action.
Furthermore, the president has
incentives to pursue this power and Congress and the Courts
are unlikely to stop him.
-presidents can and do make law without the explicit consent
of Congress
-the Constitution is (purposefully) ambiguous – the actual
powers of the 3 branches must be determined from the ongoing
practice of politics  thus there is a struggle over the
allocation of power and the right to exercise it
-presidents are always, at their core, seekers of power
-this is especially true in the modern presidency – b/c of
weakened parties, b/c stand as symbol of national leadership,
b/c the public holds presidents more accountable
Congress
-The president is not Congress’ agent – he has independent
authority
- President as executor has the operation of the government
in his hands – manage, coordinate, respond “when presidents
feel it’s in their pol. interests, they can put whatever
decisions they like to strategic use”
- Presidents have tremendous resources available, and greater
opportunities for aggrandizement
- Presidents are ideally suited to be first movers and to
reap the agenda powers that go along with it
-- if other branches don’t respond effectively or quickly,
the president wins by default
-the Constitution virtually invites presidential imperialism
-Congress is burdened by collective action problems and heavy
transaction costs
-statutory constraint on presidential action can exist, by
virtue of specific words and requirements
-yet doesn’t work so well on unilateral action
-often, legislators prefer broad delegations of authority,
giving P discretion to act unilaterally
-presidents have veto power, and Congress takes this into
account when drafting bills (more aligned w/ P)
-Congress can’t really ensure that presidents stick to
restrictions or execute laws
- President is empowered by the proliferation of statutes
over time –
b/c increase P’s total
responsibilities and
give him formal basis for extending his authority, also
create more ambiguity over “take care” clause
-Congress consists of many members with different agendas
-thus
when
president
acts
unilaterally,
Congressional
response will be rooted in constituency
-Congress unable to take coherent, forceful action
 thus Congress will usually take no action
-President gains power and agenda control by taking
unilateral action and shifting status quo more towards his
goals
-yet presidents must be careful when they want to act
unilaterally
–
on
issues
that
don’t
have
strong
constituencies
-foreign policy is a better area to take unilateral action
-Congressional trump card  Congress has the constitutional
power to appropriate money
The Courts
-Supreme Court has the right to say what the Constitution
means, to resolve ambiguities
-S.C. has the autonomy to act according to own ideologies and
agendas,
also to protect their prestige by responding to
public opinion and the political environment  thus will
enhance prestige by declaring unpopular unilateral actions as
unconstitutional
and
declaring
popular
actions
as
constitutional  the Courts are a wild card
-on the whole, S.C. more likely to support and legitimate
presidential imperialism
-b/c presidents appoint justices with similar ideologies
-b/c Courts must rely on executive branch to enforce its
decisions – S.C. has incentives to choose cases and decisions
with reference to whether and how well they are likely to be
enforced
 their decisions are attuned to the politics of the
executive, have incentives to be friendly to presidents
-S.C. more capable of limiting power of unilateral action
than Congress, yet most likely will support P expansionism
Conclusion
Moe and Howell take an institutional approach to presidential power (not focusing so
much on personality, skills, experience). They assert that this power stems not just from
formal powers, but also significantly from structural ambiguities. Presidents have
incentives to expand their institutional power – these are heightened by ambiguities and
by the presidential resources and opportunities. Congress has only a weak capacity to
stop unilateral action b/c of collective action problems, and the S.C. is unlikely to want
to stop presidential actions. Presidents move strategically and moderately to promote
their imperialistic designs.
II.
The Road to the White House
September 29: Getting Nominated
Michael G. Hagen and William G. Mayer, "The Modern Politics of Presidential
Selection: How Changing the Rules Really Did Change the Game," in William
G. Mayer, ed., In Pursuit of the White House 2000, (Chatham House, 2000) pp.
1-43.
Argument: the delegate selection ruled and campaign finance regulations enacted in the
early 1970s had a very significant impact on the nature of the presidential nominating
process: changing the rules really did change the game.
Question: What really is distinctive about the current era in presidential nominating politics?
McGovern-Fraser initiatives (requirements for state parties to have candidates at 1972
convention):
have “explicit, written rules”
forbid proxy voting
forbid the use of the unit rule
ensure that party meetings were held on uniform dates, at uniform times, and in public
places of easy access
ensure adequate public notice of all meetings involved in the delegate selection process
prohibit the ex-officio selection of delegates
conduct the entire process of delegate selection…within the calendar year of the
Convention
Federal Election Campaign Act (1974)
Passed by Congress
Established contribution limits of $1,000 for individuals and $5,000 for political action
committees
Provided federal matching funds to candidates who met minimum requirements
Aimed to take political contributions from back room into the public spotlight
Have created more bureaucracy with campaign accounts charged with keeping
everything legal
Critics:
blamed new rules for weakening of political parties
increasing power of special interest groups
nomination of candidates who were ideological extremists or who lacked governing
experience
increasing tension between the legislative and executive branches
declining voter turnout
central role in nomination politics played by the news media
Major differences between the Presidential nominating process of 1953-68 and that of
1972-96
Pre-Reform
Limited
1.
Use of primaries
2.
Nonprimary
selection procedures
3.
Favorite son
Common
candidates
When most
In the election year
candidates announce itself or the final
months of the
preceding year
When most
After the end of the
candidates withdraw primary season
Primary calendar
Back-loaded
4.
5.
6.
Party-controlled
Post-Reform
Predominant mode
of delegate selection
Public: open to
anyone who wants
to participate
Nonexistent
More than a year
before the
convention starts
Shortly after the
primaries begin
Front-loaded
Richard Pious, "The Presidency and the Nominating Process: Politics and
Power," in Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System, pp.
195-218.
Argument: in the primaries-dominated process, those who emerge with the nomination lack
national executive experience. Need to restore some peer review and a greater role for party
professional and members of Congress – the same groups that dominated earlier nominating
processes – to yield more qualified presidential nominees.
Transformation of the Nominating Processes
King Caucus: Nomination by Congressional Party
1800-1824
Party members in Congress would meet after the congressional session was over, with
Federalists in one party caucus and Republicans in another
Each caucus would endorse a contender by plurality vote of those present and send word
of its endorsement to state parties.
Result: President often had experience in Congress. Would promise cabinet position to
prominent congressional party leaders or friends. Developed into cabinet
government with officials with own followings in Congress.
Result: President had to get cabinet support for most of his decisions. Made for weaker
government.
Nominating Conventions: nomination by State Party Organizations
1824: Andrew Jackson did not win the congressional caucus endorsement, but did win
pluralities of the popular and electoral college votes.
In contingency election that followed, House chose John Quincy Adams, who also had
not won the congressional caucus endorsement. Adams picked House Speaker
Henry Clay to be his secretary of state and thus presumed successor. Jackson
claimed that deal between Adams and Clay had denied him the White House
1928: Jackson ran again. Did not try to win endorsement from King Caucus but instead
accepted endorsements from some state conventions and state legislatures. Jackson
was elected.
Result: downgraded the cabinet because no need to have congressional leaders in it to
win nomination. Expanded presidential powers.
1836: all the candidates of major parties were nominated by the convention system.
Not democratic expressions of people’s will: bosses bargained
Delegates favored nominees of mediocre ability who often lacked national government
experience but whom state party bosses knew to be reliable team players.
Governors and senators dominated the field
The Primary and Caucus System: Nomination by the Party in the Electorate
1968-1972: Democrats transferred the power to decide on the composition of a state’s
convention delegation from the state party organization to its supporters in the
electorate
Primary contest – a vote within a party to determine the preferences of its members
McGovern-Fraser commission: state parties required either to hold primaries to select
delegates to the national convention or to hold open caucuses (meetings at which
any registered Democrat could participate) to select delegates to state conventions
that would choose delegates to the national convention.
Under current system, political can run for president without the backing of state party
leaders by appealing to voters directly in primaries and caucuses.
Need for cash
Exhausting campaigns
Candidates often don’t have experience in national government, particularly within
executive branch or in conducting foreign or economic policy
Primary electorate is unrepresentatively skewed toward voters from higher
socioeconomic groups. Also, does not represent the racial diversity of the
population, as Iowa and New Hampshire are disproportionately white. These states
winnow the field, and they disadvantage voters from states with more minority and
urban voters that hold contests later. Also ideological distortions: Democratic
primary voters are more likely to be liberal, Republican primary voters more
conservative.
Result: front loading
National Conventions function by creating platforms and approve the candidate’s choice
of a running mate. Also, win over national television audience.
October 4:
Getting Elected
Andrew Kohut, “The Long and Winding Road to the Presidential Election,”
Miller Center Report, vol. 20, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2004), pp. 35-40.
In his article The Long and Winding Road to the Presidential Election, Andrew Kohut
gives a perspective on how voter attitudes were different in 2004 than they have been in
previous election seasons.
1. First, a few observations:
a) The voters decide who the candidates will be, not the press, pundits or
pollsters (i.e., Voters shot down Dean despite his support in the press and polls.)
b) The electorate is polarized more than ever in 2004.
i) Democrats disapproved of Bush in 2003 as strongly as
republicans disapproved of Clinton in 98.
c) The default position of the American Public is always to stay the
course, not to change horses.
i) this is especially the case with second term elections when
people ask, “Does the president deserve his job?” i.e., Bush.
d) The new concept of terrorism makes the 2004 election unique.
i) In terms of security issues, the incumbent always has a stature
advantage over the challenger.
ii) Voters always come to the side of the President when they see
their troops under attack (Iraq).
e) Deficit’s have become associated in the public’s mind wit deeper
problems in the economy.
i) Bush had an uphill battle in 2004.
f) Although people believe that legalizing gay marriage is unacceptable,
they draw the line at a constitutional amendment – Americans don’t like the
constitution to be changed!
g) At the time Kohut wrote the article, he viewed Bush as falling and
Kerry as rising; however, he notes that the election will hinge on perceptions of
the conditions of Iraq, the economy and social issues in the months closer to the
election. He also concludes by making the point that the American public has
begun to view the media in much more partisan terms. The public wants an
independent media, not one that chooses sides.
John H. Aldrich, John D. Griffin, and Jill Ruckershauser, “The Presidency and
the Election Campaign: Altering Voters’ Priorities in the 2004 Election, in
Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System, pp. 219-234.
The summary at the beginning of the chapter (which does a reasonably good job) reads:
“Presidential campaigns “are consequential,” argue John H. Aldrich, John D. Griffin, and
Jill Rickershauser. Most scholars agree that the campaigns the candidates wage help to
shape the policy agenda in Washington for the following four years. But some have
expressed doubt that what the candidates say and do has much effect on the outcome of
the election itself. Instead, these scholars argue, economic and political conditions
prevailing before the campaign even begins determines [the winner]. This chapter
disputes this argument. The authors show that prevailing conditions only have
electoral meaning if the candidates discuss and debate them. … [The authors]
describe how each candidate tried, with considerable skill, to focus the voters’ attention
on the issues that were most favorable to him and his party.”
I will attempt to refrain from repeating facts above, but other important information
includes:
Shaping Priorities
Although the candidates are unable to change the minds of voters, they are
frequently able to alter the public’s perception of what is important in the election. By
choosing to focus on specific issues, the candidates can “shape voter’s priorities” by
forcing those issues to become more prominent in the election.
Within issues, candidates frequently highlight those parts of the issues that are
most beneficial to their campaign. In the 2004 election, this was seen predominantly
within the issues of terrorism, the economy, and Iraq.
The candidates tend to be more successful when they highlight “party strengths”
or attributes which the public readily associates with a given party.
Issue Ownership
According to issues ownership theory, “the goal [of a campaign] is to achieve a
strategic advantage by making problems which reflect owned issues the programmatic
meaning of the election and the criteria by which voters make their choice.” Ie. Parties
will tend to play to their strengths within issues “owned” by particular voting blocks.
In this view, the a priori conditions of an election are not determinative—they
merely provide the raw materials the candidates must utilize.
This view also implies that campaign strategy is determined by the views of the
voters before the election, as candidates select issues that will speak (and largely to their
base, though perhaps also to targeted voting blocks and independents).
However, in the 2000 election, this situation rarely arose—in fact, 2/3 of the most
prominent issues belonged to independents (healthcare and education). The authors
concede that the 2000 election was unusual—both Bush and Gore were relatively
unconstrained in the issues they could select both because neither was a president seeking
reelection, and there were no “obvious issues.” The authors therefore turn to the 2004
election as a much more sensible test.
In 2004, there were obvious issues. Terrorism was on the radar screen, the
economy hit a severe downturn earlier in Bush’s administration, and the US was engaged
in Iraq. Beyond this, Bush was not popular enough to make the campaign completely
asymmetric (as Reagan has done in 1984).
Examining the Voters
Data reveals that voters make their minds up fairly early in the election—less than
1/5 make their decision within 2 weeks of the election. Partisans, as expected, tend to
decide earlier than independents. By collecting data from the 2000 and 2004 elections,
we learned that there were fewer undecided voters for Bush and Kerry to court than there
were in 2000, but more of those voters were independents than partisans.
Therefore, an “issue ownership” approach would suggest great incentives for
Bush and Kerry to target issues owned by Independents.
2004 Data
Early in the 2004 election, voter surveys established that the most important
issues were the economy (D), unemployment (D), terrorism (R), national security (R),
and the war in Iraq (D). These issues in turn were “owned” entirely by Republicans and
Democrats (see letters next to each issue).
Towards the end of the election, however, these priorities had shifted. The study
was repeated, and it showed that all three groups of voters were less concerned with the
economy, and more concerned with Iraq and Terrorism.
Coding Speeches
There are some neat graphs in the book (pp. 227-231) that reveal the
individualized data—if you’re interested, you can look there. I will only summarize the
conclusions.
The authors looked at the candidates speeches and looked at 14 issues. Looking
at the percentage of the candidates’ rhetoric devoted to each issue, and comparing that to
voter priorities, the authors made two conclusions:
Candidates’ emphasizing particular issues strongly corresponded with those issues
voters identified as the most important issues.
As the candidates altered rhetoric and focused on different issues, the voters’
priorities shifted. For example, in September, both candidates emphasized
healthcare, when the candidates turned away from the issue in October and
November, however, so did the voters. Similarly, Bush’s consistent rhetoric on
the economy eased concern among republicans that there was a problem. Kerry’s
“more erratic attempts” were less effective.
Conclusion
Even though the 2004 election was constrained by the pre-selection of particular
issues, and to a degree by the president’s tenure to that point, the candidates maintained
room for strategy through reshaping voters’ priority issues.
Patterson: OUT OF ORDER. Chapters 1-2.
Thesis: in the last 100 years the press has come to take the place of political institutions,
and it is not up to this role
Chapter 1
 The role of the press in politics, especially since the advent of television, has been
greater than intended by the Framers.
 Journalists have usurped the role of party leaders in assessing electability, fitness for
governing; now performs screening for potential candidates; e.g. Jimmy Carter not
meeting party leaders, but meeting journalists in 1975—before he met them he was a
longshot, but because of his good impression he rose to be the party’s contender
 Some journalists have taken the role of advocate instead of objective observer; e.g.
Henry Luce and Wendell Willkie in 1940, Jimmy Carter and NYTimes story in 1975
 Press used to be watchdog, conduit for candidates expressing opinions; now press
molds voters’ minds
 Press doesn’t have necessary capabilities to create electoral opinion: can’t see larger
picture, isn’t accountable, isn’t able to see the interests guiding it
 Presidential election system has become unpredictable; e.g. Sen Edmund Muskie in
1972: after commanding lead, he wins the NH primary—press brings him down every
step of the way to raise George McGovern up; nominating phase especially volatile
 In the middle of the campaign, most rank-and-file voters from each party don’t know
where their party’s candidates stand
 Grueling campaign schedule eliminates candidates who are still in another office
serving out the term; is the system screwy for eliminating good candidates or is it
competitive for screening out people not vigorous enough for the campaign?
 Without parties, candidates need support from interest groups for early commitments
and early money
 “Journalistic values and political values are at odds with one another, which results in
a news agenda that misrepresents what is at stake in the choice among the candidates.
 “Journalistic values, though supposedly neutral, introduce an element of random
partisanship into the campaign, which coincidentally works to the advantage of one
side or another.
 “Election news, rather than serving to bring candidates and voters together, drives a
wedge between them.” (all from page 52)
Chapter 2
 Voters care about policy issues, competency, and intelligence and want to consider
these factors when they vote; the press cares about the campaign, strategy, and
personality—people do not get what they want
 Voters want politicians to solve their problems and be world leaders, whereas the
press wants someone to win
 Press mixes fact with interpretation in most articles








News coverage of politicians during campaigns used to focus on facts, with block
quotes from speeches and separate sections for ‘news analysis’, where the journalists
would focus on campaign strategy
The game used to be a means to an end—now it is the ends
The press’ reporting of stories tends to seem strategic—as if the press picked a
candidate at the beginning of the season and then made the rest of the stories to mimic
that
Part of the shift toward coverage of the strategy element of a campaign came from the
deterioration of the role of the political parties in electioneering—more of that power
came to candidates themselves
Also came from “celebrity” journalists who wanted to frame and create the news, not
just report on it; they wanted to ask and answer the questions; bolstered by Watergate
More emphasis on narrative journalism
Opinion polls and advances in statistical technology has also increased the game
element of campaign coverage
Upon hearing coverage of the game aspects of the campaign, voters lose interest and
become resigned at the behavior of the politicians
Possible Ids:
Schema—a cognitive structure that people use when processing new information and
retrieving old information; governing schema and game schema
Stephen J. Wayne, “Reforming the Electoral System” Ch9 in The Road to the White
House, pp. 303 – 330
Introduction
Current Electoral Process
Pros
more democratic than ever
more people involved at nomination stage
lesser-known candidates have opportunity to demonstrate competence, endurance,
leadership, etc..
Cons
too long, costly and burdensome
dulls voters and candidates which results in mudslinging and soundbites
too little substantive debate
Changes in Party Nomination
Party Nomination Rules
Election Reform(1968)— McGovern-Frazier Commission
Moved selection process from party conventions where nominees were voting on
by delegates who were mostly controlled by the party leadership to popular
primaries which chooses the delegates
designed to encourage grassroots participation
designed to broaden the base of representation
resulted in lengthening nominating process
resulted in more expensive campaigns
resulted in candidate-based campaigns
resulted in weakened influence of state and local party leaders
resulted in loosened ties between parties and nominees (conventions are
coronations)
Striking balance between party leadership and rank-and-file
rank-and-file want more primaries which select more delegates so there are more
pledged delegates at the convention
party leaders want opposite
this can be achieved with soft money and by giving all federal funds to party
committees
eliminate crossover voting—so not allowing nonpartisans(Independents and
members of opposing party) in primary elections, forcing candidates to
remain truer to the party
Delegates allocated by proportional or winner-take all
Proportional is in favor of citizenry, but may delay consensus of nominee, thus
weakening chances in general election
Time of nomination campaign
Critics maintain the current time is too long—turns public attention to campaign
news rather than government issues
Frontloading
Early primary elections with extended media coverage give disproportionate
weight to votes in NH and Iowa because the field narrows as time goes on
and the nominee is pretty much a forgone conclusion by the time states
like Hawaii and Alaska have their primaries—so states move their
primaries to the earliest possible date
Helps nationally recognized and well-financed candidates, not upstarts
Moves start of campaign further from convention, so hurts those who want a
more democratic approach to nominations, because by the time the
majority of the electorate tunes in, the decision is pretty much made
Little incentive for public to remain attentive or even vote in later
primaries
Possible Options
primaries by size
Group states into 4 groups by size
primaries over 4 month period
Smaller states go first, larger states last
But opposition by larger states which feared loss of influence by going last
Some saw increased reliance on mass media thus helping those with national
name recognition and lots of money
Tries to offset advantage of numerous delegates in large states by making
them go last
Rotating regional primaries
Primaries over 4 month period
Region that begins voting is rotated
Candidates can focus on regional concerns
Attempts to create more equity among the states
Ensures broad geographical support which is needed in general election for
the candidate
But again favors national recognized candidates and those with large coffers
National Primaries
Held in late spring or summer before conventions
Whoever won majority would automatically receive nomination
Consistent with “one person, one vote”
Possibly increase turnout
Possibly would accelerate a nationalizing trend
Results would be unambiguous
Again this would also strongly favor candidates with national reputations and
a large treasury
Also winner might not be party’s strongest candidate in general election
Finance laws
Reform in 1970s
Aimed to take political contributions from back room into the public spotlight
But have created a lot more bureaucracy with campaign accounts charged with
keeping everything legal
Aimed to improve accountability, reduce spending, subsidize nominations, and
fund the general election
Loopholes
Nonprofit organizations can raise and spend unlimited and unreported
amounts of money as long as they don’t advocate a particular candidate
Limit on amount people can donate to individual candidates(hard money), but
not on amount given to the party’s soft money account(which is the money
the party can spend as it chooses)
Sets spending limits on those receiving federal funds, thereby limiting those who
do not have the resources to campaign without the aid of government
matching funds
Failed to reduce or control spending
Rising expenditures on polling, media, fund-raising, and other campaign activities
has increased the amount of money campaign organizations believe they need
to compete effectively
Combined with contribution limits, candidates must now spend a lot more time
fundraising
Unintended consequences of finance reform (i.e. loopholes, more fundraising, etc…)
have undermined public support for the electoral process and public financing
system
Possible changes
Eliminate soft-money
But parties would have to find other ways of getting money
Much less issue oriented advertising
Increase amount of individual or group contributions during nomination phase
Helps because purchasing power has decreased since limits were set
But wealthy would gain greater influence
Force TV to give free air time to candidates
But TV won’t sell time to other political groups(NRA, AFL-CIO, etc) if they
have to give it free to the candidate
24 hour news cycle already gives plenty of coverage to candidates
some say more money is needed
only $30 dollars per voter was spent in federal elections
Problem of Political Action Committees
Not very independent since often party suggests where and how PAC should
spend its money
Buckley v Valeo –equates free speech with campaign donations
Also those that control the legislation about PAC and campaign finance are the
ones who benefit most from it (established Democrats and Republicans)
News Media Coverage
Essentially free publicity for candidates, but at the same time the media is free to
choose who, when , and how its going to cover the candidates
With streaming news, often approaches politics as a game and analyzes campaign
strategy rather than policies put forth
Enhancing Electoral Choice
Voter Turnout
In 1996 more than half of eligible voters chose not to vote
In 2000 51% chose not to vote
“decline in intensity of party allegiances, the shift from party-centered to candidatecentered campaigns, growing levels of mistrust and lower confidence in public
officials, and then weakening sense of efficacy on the part of many people have
all contributed to lower turnout and produced a ‘disconnect’ between American
citizens and their political system”
Possible solutions
Legislation to ease registration(automatic registration)
Make election day a national holiday
Extended voting period
Downside is fear of fraud
Penalties for those who do not vote(legal requirement to vote)
Those who do not vote as frequently: “the poorer, less educated, less fortunate, and
younger”
Electoral College Reform
Automatic Plan
Forces members of electoral college to submit votes for the states popular vote
winner
Removes problem of faithless college members, but would do little to change
current system
Proportional Plan
College votes would be the same proportion as the popular vote
Removes disenfranchisement of losing party voters
Encourages more campaigning by parties that historically lose there under the
winner take all system
This would decrease influence of competitive states and increase influence of
states where voters tend to be more homogenous
Could strengthen other parties
District Plan
Two electoral votes would be allocated (corresponding with the two Senate seats)
the rest of the votes would be allocated by popular vote in each congressional
district(corresponding to the Representatives’ districts)
Loser would be larger states, in particular the cohesive, geographically
concentrated groups within the states
Winners would be small states
Direct Election
Direct popular vote
Eliminates the college
Party competition would increase
Bigger states would lose some electoral clout
Might also weaken the two-party system
III.
Organizing the President's Domain
October 6: The President and the Executive Branch
Andrew Rudalevige, “The President and the Cabinet,” in Michael Nelson, ed., The
Presidency and the Political System, pp. 533-556.
Main argument: Cabinet govt. is a fiction, but govt. can’t function without cabinet.
Washington relied on cabinet to help with enormous job.
Truman claimed cabinet was fundamental to policy formulation
While there are exceptions, cabinet mostly does not do too much.
Evolution of the cabinet
Cabinet anticipated, though not explicitly, in Constitution. In part, to put a check on
single executive.
State, War, Treasury, and AG in1789 by Congress. More through the years.
These form inner cabinet. The only ones that still have any real contact with the
President.
Cabinet Government
Some say cabinet not “institutionalized,” since role and power varies from President
to President.
Rudalevige says cabinet as institution has deep roots and broad scope.
Into mid 20th century, many cite cabinet as crucial for functioning government.
Every modern president claims he will get cabinet more involved.
A promise rarely kept.
Reasons for cabinet weakness
Cabinet is often selected as political favors.
Nominees must secure Senate confirmation.
Presidents cannot compel anyone to join their cabinets.
Once all of these accounted for, may not have President’s trust.
Even without all these problems, cabinet still has structural problems.
Cabinet is too big for detailed conversation.
Too diverse a group for productive debate.
Cabinet members don’t want others commenting on their problems.
Presidents have to consider divided loyalties of secretaries.
Constituencies, Congress, courts, and “national interest.”
Much more attractive than cabinet is presidential and exec office staff.
More loyal, fewer complications, less personal ambition.
Conclusion: Presidents like cabinet government in principle but not practice.
“Cabinet Government” in the Modern Presidency
Andrew Card: advise president and implement his decisions.
Cabinet members are either
Specialists, substantive stuff.
Generalists, managerial stuff.
Liaisons, political attributes.
The Representative Executive.
Cabinet used to please different constituencies.
Regional diversity.
Recently racial and gender diversity.
Cabinet symbolizes openness and inclusivity.
The Cabinet as Lightning Rod.
Cabinet members rarely vocal. Not often good when they are.
Can be used by presidents to give out bad news, deflect blame.
“presidential lightning rods.”
“Real Loyalty”: The Quest for Bureaucratic Control
Nixon valued loyalty so much that he put low profile people in positions, relying on
their loyalty and lack of personal ambition.
Some presidents have been more controlling than others in terms of appointing
cabinet assistants.
The President’s Program: Formulation, Passage, Implementation
President’s staff relatively small compared to rest of executive branch.
Needs cabinet resources and manpower.
Departments play important role in forming ideas for policy.
Have expertise.
Cabinet councils have been used to try to deal with overlapping issues.
Effective when small.
Gave depts. Real voice.
Conclusions: “Creative Confrontations” and Presidential Governance
Cabinet destined for failure as decision-making body.
Still, some write off cabinet as not being useful, which is not true.
White House staff cannot replace cabinet’s implementation.
Cabinet meetings are generally not useful, but councils can be.
Keeping communication channels with cabinet open is important for President.
Cabinet crucial for creating constructive conflicts, and as a result, giving President
good advice
Presidential Decision Making: The Economic Policy Board, pp. 5-29:
“Organizational Challenges” 1980 – Roger Porter
Introduction
The communications revolution has focused increased attention on the President as the
single most powerful figure.
A president’s capacity to meet the unrealistically high expectations that are placed upon
him is directly related to how organized he is to make decisions.
Why study economic policy? 1. Both foreign and domestic policy has become
increasingly important since FDR, and consumes large amounts of his time (read:
organization is key to success) and 2. Has received relatively little attention from
scholars.
The Interrelatedness of Issues
Three reasons for recent increased complexity and interrelatedness of policy making:
 1. Expansion of Gov. activity (domestic spending: 9% in 1929, 17.5% in
1960, 1976: 28%)
o Result: increased demands on the president; fewer problems fall within
a single agency or department’s province.
o Result: President responsible for administering the increasing number
of problems, and also for resolving expanding conflicts between their
objectives and priorities.
 2. Sheer growth in number of issues to understand and organize.
o i.e. environment, energy, consumer interests
 3. Blurring of traditional distinction between domestic and foreign economic
policy since the 1950s.
o Businesses are increasingly multinational, and thus global.
 Thus nat’l economies (incl. US) are more concerned with the
economies of their trading partners, which results in increased
openness of the US economy.
 + openness+interdependence+vulnerability
 Thus, domestic economic policy must involve foreign
economic policy, and as such, they are now increasingly
intertwined.
 An example is agricultural policy: at once foreign (sanctions,
imports) and domestic (import activity affects farming, general
food supply).
Issue interrelatedness means that departments and agencies are less likely to be aware of
all of the overlapping elements of problems. Thus, OMB and WH staff are increasingly
useful for identifying interrelationships b/w issues and interests.
A Fragmented Executive Branch
 “A many splintered thing” (Stephen Bailey)
 Presents an organizational challenge: People who do not know each other
across the fragmented top layers of the branch are less likely to be able to
coordinate operations, information, planning, etc. Thus mutual
understandings of issues are much more difficult.
Departmentalism
 For efficiency purposes, decentralization is key. However, some aspects of
departments different than the Presidency:
o More parochial view, by definition of being departmentalized.
o Department staffers narrow-mindedly aim to protect and progress their
respective department, issues, etc.
o Relationships b/w interest groups and agencies/departments extend
beyond a single presidency.
 Professionalism has maintained departmental influence.
o Bureaucratic core of departments are experts and professionals in
particular fields.
o Harold Seidman’s Iron Triangle of political power: these
professionals, interested legislators (i.e. subcommittees), and
spokesmen for groups benefiting from relevant gov’t programs.
 Mutual dependence (constituency groups on departments) encourages mutual
support (departments supported by constituency to increase authority in the
executive branch)
o Departments represent specialized constituencies rather than holistic
American ideology. Ex: Ag. for farmers.
 Career bureaucracy: unlike UK, most servants remain in same department.
o Specialized expertise, but narrow perspectives
o Career civil servants depend on the health of their department, so they
are biased to preserve their institution, and expand its autonomy.
 Unity across horizontal lines of leadership is hampered since each is loyal to
their department before the whole administrative team.
The Cabinet Secretary at the Crossroads
New cabinet secretaries typically face career bureaucracies resistant to change, yet must
manage departments that contain multiple conflicting viewpoints.
 Most secretaries have short tenures (average of 4 mos. from 1933-1965, 18
mos. during Nixon)
Three main pressures on secretaries:
 1. Advocating their departments and programs
o Charles G. Dawe remarks that because of this, “the members of the
Cabinet are a President’s natural enemies.”
 2. Having close ties with constituency. Ex: Ag must have ear and more to
farm community.
o This is most often the overriding attribute in selecting secretaries: the
likelihood of them meshing with their respective constituencies.
 3. Having a good relationship with Congress.
o Congress confirms secretary, passes her legislation, oversees
administrative performance, appropriates funds, etc.
Independence: while conflicting pressures present crossroads w/in Departments,
secretaries are afforded independence, which means that he can single-handedly
influence anything that applies to his Department.
How secretaries spend time: largely administrative tasks, meetings to push programs and
policy, little time for reflection, and seldom confronted by peers.
The View from the White House
Has a unique role in the American political system:
 National constituency  broader policy perspective than cabinet.
 Congress and the nation expect initiative and direction from POTUS.
 The national public status and following gives POTUS more leadership,
bargaining, and persuasion resources than anyone.
 Because of the breadth of his role, 2 key organizational interests:
o 1. Integration of policy: with diffused power, a unified message is
efficient but difficult to achieve.
o 2. Balancing competing forces and interests in the major policy areas:
results in better informed policy advice
Two prescriptions for overcoming or transcending departmentalism:
 1. Consolidating departments
 2. Cabinet government: held less for issue-oriented discussion, but for
exchanging information and getting direction from the President. Most
secretaries lobby WH staff because they know the President rarely seeks
policy advice from the secretaries, mostly because he knows their views, and
knows them to be too narrow for his broader responsibilities.
Organizational Alternatives
1. Adhocracy
 President distributes assignments and selects who he listens to and when.
 Involves few regularized channels
 Frequently results in jurisdictional quarrelling, chaos.
 Typically used in transitional periods, figuring out who will do what.
 Still exists, though less random than in FDR’s time: now, OMB, NSC, and
other WH offices check and balance such tasks.
2. Centralized Management
 Heavy reliance on WH staff and EOP, to filter ideas, proposals, and
recommendations before they reach the President.
 Grounded in desire for advice from advocates.
3. Multiple Advocacy
 Relies on an honest broker to ensure a full and balanced debate on issues.
 Based on commitment to competition of ideas as best method of policy
development.
 Such honest brokers are supposed to insure
o Due process: everyone with an opinion gets a fair shot
o Quality control: the information fed to the President is high-quality,
relevant, and structured.
Rarely are only one of these approaches implemented, usually it is a combination of two
or all three or simply variations.
Porter supports multiple advocacy the most:


It’s theoretically promising, but largely unexamined in practice.
Theoretically, it provides all points of view, bridges the gap between policy
formulation and implementation, and allows the expansion of the President’s
influence: he can tap a plethora of individuals in the Executive Branch for
advice. Thus multiple advocacy is the most inclusive of the three.
 However, it is difficult to implement because it depends on officials playing
nice and working together in groups. For example, the NSC.
o Such “fixed membership superstructures” have 5 operational problems
according to Francis Bator:
 1. Substance is watered down because secretaries, etc.
represent many people. 2. Such groups never stop growing,
reducing each member’s share of facetime and productivity. 3.
Subordinates tend to replace heads in such meetings. 4. Leaks
common 5. Most real bargaining gets done outside the
boardroom, in informal, interpersonal interactions.
 Porter also adds that most often, a single personality dominates
the discussion although on paper everyone gets a fair shot.
The Economic Policy Board, according to Porter, circumvents all of these problems
because it actually achieves the theoretical goals of multiple advocacy.
October 11: The President's Domain I: White House Organization
James P. Pfiffner, “The White House Staff and Organization,” chapter 3 in The
Modern Presidency, 4th edition (Wadsworth, 2005).
White House staff system is one of defining characteristics of modern presidency
Argues that WH needs the firm control of a chief of staff, but too domineering
approach to job will result in trouble
Evolution of White House Staff
very small during early years of country, paid for by President.
Dramatic shift under FDR and birth of modern presidency
Huge staff needed for New Deal
Brownlow Committee  proposed that president should be center of control
in the executive branch
Seen as power grab by Congress, approved two of its proposals with
provisions creating positions for 6 administrative assistants to the
president.
Committee Report would have major repercussions over the years as it
articulated justification for an active staff to serve president and laid
foundation for growth in numbers and power of the WH staff in the
modern presidency.
WH staff has grown from relatively small staff of FDR to more than 500 in
the 1990s.
How Presidents Managed their Staff
FDR
Gave out assignments on an ad-hoc basis (adhocracy)
Legendary for manipulation of his staffers, thrived on conflict in his staff and
used it be a more effective decision-maker.
Truman
Uncomfortable with personal conflict
Did not give out overlapping assignments or encourage conflict/disagreement
on his staff
Truman WH began trend toward functional specialization that has come to
characterize modern presidency.
Layering of WH staff began in Truman WH as a result of this specialization
Eisenhower
Institutionalized the presidency
Most important and lasting contributions to organization of presidency was
the office of chief of staff
JFK
Took more active role than Ike, eliminated chief of staff
Set up president at hub of the wheel for his WH
JFK used loose organizational approach but increased centralization and WH
capacity.
LBJ
Similar approach as JFK’s. Jealous of staff publicity, would cut them down to
size.
Nixon
Wanted to give more power to cabinet/other agencies in executive branch
because he wanted them to focus on running the country while he could
focus on domestic issues.
Changed strategy while president; brought the work of the deperatments and
agencies in the WH.
Isolated himself and WH
Ford
Started off with spokes-of-the-wheel approach
Didn’t work, needed a strong chief of staff to filter out people/issues
Carter
Did not want a chief of staff; thought he could do it himself.
Eventually admitted that a chief of staff was necessary
Ford and Carter presidencies proved that the modern WH cannot function effectively
without a chief of staff
Reagan
Passive, liked to delegated a lot of responsibility to his staff,
Because of that, his staff was crucial to his presidency in a way that was not
true of FDR, JFK, or Bush I.
Bush
Strong chief of staff but kept lines of communication open with cabinet, other
members of executive branch/administration
Conclusion
WH staff and organization will faithfully reflect president, but should strive to
counter presidential weaknesses
WH needs a chief of staff; someone short of the president must be in charge
No president has successfully run WH without a chief of staff since 1969, and
since 1979 no president has tried.
Chief of staffs must be honest broker and coordinator of administration policy.
Cannot be soft but nor can they be tyrannical, arbitrary, and egotistical.
Ultimately, there is no salvation from staff. Buck stops with President.
John P. Burke, “The Institutional Presidency,” in Michael Nelson, ed., The
Presidency and the Political System, pp. 383-409.
Overview
John Burke argues that the size and complexity of the modern presidential staff have
caused the White House itself to take on the character of a bureaucratic
organization. In this chapter, he chronicles a number of strategies presidents have
adopted to make good use of their staffs.
Introduction
The White House staff is made up of around 2,000 employees in significant policymaking positions and can serve as an organizational context that can set limits on
what a president can do and sometimes thwart even the best of presidential
intentions
It is necessary to now recognize the American executive as an institution – a
presidency, not merely a president, and in doing this we can better understand the
office, how it operates, the challenges it faces, and how it affects our politics
The Institutional Presidency
The concern of this chapter is to understand the organizational character of the
presidency – its growth in size, the complexity of its work ways, and the general
way in which it resembles a large, well organized bureaucracy
Complex Institution:
The first aspect of the complexity of this institution is the increase in size
which can be seen by comparing the White House staff of FDR to that of
Clinton’s or Bush’s.
One of the primary causes of growth has been the addition of these units:
Office of Management and Budget (formed as Bureau of the Budget in
1921), the Council of Economic Advisors (1946), the National Security
Council (197), the Office of the US Trade Representative (1963), the
Office of Policy Development (1970), the Council on Environmental
Quality (1970), the Office of Science and Technology Policy (1976), the
Office of Administration (1977), and the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (1989).
In the institution of the presidency, there is the presence of a central authority
that coordinates the contributions of the institution’s functional parts – the
Chief of Staff.
Differentiation from Environment:
The complexity of the presidency and its reliance on expert advice have given
the institution a unique place in the policy process, differentiating it from
its political environment. One way this has occurred is through increased
WH control of new policy initiatives
Those seeking to influence national politics try to cultivate the people who
have the most to do with policy proposals: the White House
The second aspect of the presidency that differentiates it from the surrounding
political environment is the way parts of the staff are organized explicitly
to manage external relations with the media, Congress, and various
constituencies.
The Effects of an Institutional Presidency
Do the presidency’s institutional characteristics, as opposed to the individual styles,
practices, and idiosyncrasies of each president matter? It is the personality, character, and
distinctive behavior of each of these presidents that have generally attracted the attention
of press and public
However, since the institutionalized daily workings of the presidency transcend the
personal ideologies, character, and idiosyncrasies of those who work within it (esp the
president), it makes sense to analyze the presidency from an institutional perspective.
External Centralization: Presidential Control of Policy Making:
The large presidential staff ahs centralized much policy-making power within
the presidency, and this has both positive and negative effects
Positive: centralized control can protect the programs that the president wishes
to foster  new political initiatives usually not received well in DC
Negative: WH control of the policy process can cause the institution to
diminish or even exclude other sources of advice
Internal Centralization: Hierarchy, Gatekeeping, and Presidential Isolation
The centralization of policy-making power by the WH staff has been
accompanied by a centralization of power within the staff by one or two
chief aides, which also affects the way the institutional presidency
operates, providing both opportunities and risks for the president.
Positive: this can ensure clear lines of responsibility, well-demarcated duties,
and orderly work ways. FDR’s staff is an example of the problems that
can arise from lack of effective organization. It can also protect the
president’s political standing by giving the highly visible staff member a
significant amount of authority which acts as a lightning rod, handling
politically tough assignments and deflecting political controversy from the
president to himself or herself (Eisenhower’s presidency was like that)
Negative: Corruption and the abuse of power (when Sherman Adams under
Eisenhower was accused of accepting gifts from a New England textile
manufacturer). Also, a highly visible assistant with a large amount of
authority can act as a gatekeeper, controlling and filtering the flow in
information to and from the president (Jordan under Carter and Regan
under Reagan were criticized for limiting access to the president and
selectively screening the info and advice the president received). Another
downside is that presidents can find themselves isolated, relying on a
small core group of advisers. If that occurs, the information the president
gets will already have been selectively filtered and interpreted, and
discussions and deliberations will be confined to an inner circle of likeminded advisers (Pres. Bush has been criticized of this).
Bureaucratization:
 As the top levels of the WH staff have gained authority and political
visibility, the rest of the staff has taken on the character of a bureaucratic
organization.
 What develops as a substitute for work satisfaction or personal proximity
to the president are typical patterns of organizational behavior: WH staff
members often compete for assignments and authority that serve as a
measure of their standing and prestige on the staff and ultimately with the
president. They also care about how they are perceived by outsiders, ie the
press, Congress, lobbyists, and other political influentials.
Politicization
 In response to this bureaucratization, presidents are increasingly
politicizing the institutional presidency meaning they are attempting to
make sure that staff members heed their policy directives and serve the
president’s political needs rather than their own. To advance their goals,
presidents need broad agreement among their aides and assistants with
their political programs and policy goals.
 Excessive politicization can limit the range of opinions among the staff
and can weaken the objectivity of the policy analysis at the president’s
disposal.
 The Office of Management and Budget has been the most politicized part
of the president’s staff.
Putting the President Back In

Since its inception under FDR, the institutional presidency has undoubtedly offered
presidents some of the important resources they need to meet the complex policy task and
expectations of the office.
 As we have seen, however, the by-products of an institutional presidency –
centralization of policy-making in the WH staff, hierarchy, bureaucratization, and
politicization – have detracted from as well as served the president’s policy goals.
 Although the presidency is an institution, it is an intensely personal one, which can
take on a different character from administration to administration – presidents and
their staff are by no means hostages to the institutions.
 The most obvious management task a president faces is to recognize on first being
elected that organizing and staffing the WH are matters of highest priority
 Beyond striking a good balance between loyalty on the one hand and DC experience
and policy expertise on the other, the presidents must also be aware of strengths, and
especially the weaknesses of the various ways of organizing the staff members they
have selected.
 Presidents can also take steps to deal with the bureaucratic tendencies that crop up in
their staffs
 All presidents also have the capacity to choose how they will act and react within a
complex political context populated by other powerful political institutions, processes,
and participants. Too much politicization weakens any special claims of expertise,
experience, and institutional primacy that the president might make in a particular
policy area. Too much centralization eclipses the role of other political actors in a
system that is geared to share, rather than exclude, domains of power; it may also set in
motion a powerful reaction against the president.
 Presidents need to know that the character and intended audience of persuasion must
be tailored not just to the requirements of legislative bargaining and enhancing popular
support but to the institutional character of the presidency itself.
October 13: The President's Domain II: The Executive Office of the President
Price, “The Institutional Presidency and the Unwritten Constitution”
*Price
supported
the
establishment
of
EXOP
and
its
objectives, but argues that it has turned for the worse, not
because of a failure to follow the plan, but because of the
science of administration and power distribution – under the
“unwritten Constitution”
- Executive Office of the Presidency has lost original principles
- set up in 1939 – before, Congress thought prez didn’t need more than a few
secretaries
- Brownlow Committee decided prez needed help: EXOP would have 6 personal assist.,
Bureau of Budget, and institutions for planning and managem’t
- Original objectives have been lost
Obj. 1: must stay small…But: doubled since WW2
Obj. 2: members can help prez, but have no authority…But: they try to use
authority over cabinet members
Obj. 3: only dept. heads have direct access to prez…But, many people have
access
Obj. 4: career and merit staffing…But, many non-career appointees in EXOP
Obj. 5: only work on Pres. issues that can’t be delegated…But, Congress throws
unwanted work to EXOP
The practice does not equal the theory
- Need: Institutional presidency with system of organization and professional personnel,
and coherence and continuity of policy
-Brownlow’s objectives of business efficiency and separation of policy and admin.
Backfired:
1. Purpose of gov’t reorganization became eliminating duplication of jobs, not
policy
2. BoB – negative and restricted outlook
3. Career officers concerned with policy, not detail
4. Lack of generalist staff for broad policy development
Why didn’t it work?
1. managerial efficiency does not change economy
2. special interest groups were using influence in EXOP
3. Congress gained more influence over EXOP
4. Prez compensated by appointing more non-career appointees
5. Reform groups supporting EXOP have conflicting platforms (legalism, scientism,
nonpartisan reform)
What to change?
Need accountability. And, stop talking about sep. of powers and acknowledge
integration and lack of independent authority.
Need to consider:
1. Number of legislative checks
2. Legal or political checks (formal or informal)
3. Procedures for initiative – veto right for congress/ prez
4. Distinction btwn discussion and determination of policy
- When is accountability excercised?
5. Political and Career Staff – Who is accountable? (Need less appointees.)
6. Size of EXOP – small, so they know the prez or big, so they can respond to
more questions from Congress
In Sum, the executive office of the President, the core of the intuitional Presidency, has
turned out to be much bigger than its inventors expected, but at the sacrifice of its basic
principles.
- Before it was set up in 1939 Congress did not believe that the President’s duties
as chief executive justified the establishment of an official staff for policy
planning and of managerial control over the Exec Dept. and agencies.
- However, in 1939 the Brownlow Committees recommendation changed this and
set the Executive Office up by Reorganization Plan in 1939.
- Brownlow report was based on the following principles: 1) the exec. office
agencies were to help the President, but not to have any authority in their own
right, nor to be in a chain of command b/w the president and the heads of exec
depts. 2) they were to deal only with issues of such importance to the President
that they could not be delegated 3) the dept. heads, and not the members of the
exec office were to be the principal political lieutenants of the President, and
accountable to Congress 4) the Exe office except for a small number of political
aides in the White House office and the heads of the institutional staff agencies
like the budge bureau was to be staffed on a career and merit basis.
- Unfortunately in “all of these respects things have gone wrong” – personnel in the
office has doubled
- Price then asks on what basis and for what purpose should we devise a new set of
principles or reaffirm the old?
- Brownlow’s committees sales pitch depended on two ideas: 1) efficiency and
economy in govt. are important and should imitate private business 2) a desire to
reorganize the distinction between policy, the preserve of the legislature and
administration, which should be left to the executive .
- These two lines of argument – business efficiency and the separation of policy
from administration led to distortion of the original principles of the executive
office in several ways: 1) the purpose of govt. reorganization resulted in the
elimination of overlapping and duplication in an effort to achieve economy – yet
the complexity of modern economic and social systems has forced an interlocking
-
-
-
-
and interdependence of govt. agencies – we shouldn’t focus on separating their
function rather making sure that there is a ‘coherent meshing’ 2) the old Bureau of
the budget was committed by these ideas to tend, in most of its parts to a negative
and restricted outlook. 3) the implicit distinction b/w administration, as something
to be left to career officers, and policy, which should be the province of political
appointees may well have discouraged the development of a strong career staff
w/a good institutional memory. 4) most conspicuous of all the emphasis on
business principles restricted the development of a career generalist staff with an
aptitude for broad policy development.
After the original conception of the executive office as an institution it became
clear that the original principles of the brownlow and Hoover reports were
progressively made more obsolete by successive presidents. Why did this happen:
1)economies were not to be effected by managerial efficiency 2) Exec Office staff
agencies had no real power but they had a great deal of influence – special
interests in Congress used this to their advantage. 3) As congress attempted to
exert control over the internal structure of the office the president compensated by
increasing the number of political appointees.
Price states “ I believe that the exec office could not be made to conform to its
original principles, not because they were wrong but because of fundamental
contraction b/w the principles – these ideas, in caricature, were the beliefs in
legalism, scientism, and nonpartisan reform.
In conclusion, the “main problem is not with our written Constitution but our
unwritten constitutions, which Congress may change if it wishes – the first step in
the right direction will be to quit talking about Constitutional separation of powers
and acknowledge that in all major issues of management both Congress and the
president are involved in the direction and control of depts. and agencies.
In order to determine the status and role of the executive office we have to ask our
selves a number of questions related to number of legislative checks, legal or
political checks, procedures for initiatives, distinction b/w discussion and
determination of policy, Political and Career staff, and the size of the executive
office.
Lecture 8
Super Brief summary – Bold terms are possible ID’s
-In this lecture we discuss the Staff secretary – very important determines who gets to
see the president
- Goes into detail regarding the care and feeding offices related to the president.
- There is a third set of offices known as packaging and selling.
- The myth regarding WH staff is that it has grown too much – myth is far from
reality.
- He then ends the lecture discussing vertical coordination w/in the offices and
concludes that horizontal coordination is far more difficult.
Roger B. Porter, "Presidents and Economists: The Council of Economic
Advisers," American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No. 2 (May 1997), pp.
103-106.
In this article Porter just examines the history and growth
of the CEA and whether it is still needed today. Since the
CEA was created by congress (in the Employment Act of 1946,
holding the President liable for the employment and general
prosperity of the Union) and not even really wanted by
President Truman, its survival is remarkable given the large
mortality rate among EOP departments.
It has lasted for four reasons, according to Porter.
First, it has maintained a small staff, making it relatively
innocuous for those wanting to streamline government
agencies. Second, the CEA offers a professional, non-partisan
staff. Third, the economists
focus strictly on what they do
best,
without
a
desire
to
oversee
the
operational
responsibilities or become a bureaucratic threat to other
departments. Lastly, the CEA provides the president with the
kind of economic analysis he needs on a day-to-day basis,
avoiding long-term studies and overly academic reports.
When it was created it had a monopoly on providing
economic analysis in the executive branch. Now that every
department seems to have its own group of economists, some
might argue the CEA is no longer needed. However, with so
much advice coming from different sources, the need for the
consistent and sound economic analysis provided by the CEA is
still needed today. The economists are vital in shaping
economic policy, and resolving differences that arise among
the increased number departmental economic staffs. In this
sense, the greater number of economic analysts within the
departments has created a larger role for the CEA, as a
central and competent source of guidance for the President.
Having found its place in the Executive Office and developed
a close working relationship with the President, Porter
concludes “the experiment has proved a success.”
Possible Ids: CEA
-
The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) was created by congress in the
Employment Act of 1946.
Four key reasons why the CEA has survived as an important part of the executive
office
o It has maintained modest size comparable to other executive offices
o The CEA has maintained a professional, nonpartisan staff with a reputation
for high-quality analysis
o The CEA has avoided operational responsibilities (stayed advisory only) and
has thus concentrated on what they do best- the CEA has not tried to exceed
its responsibilities
o The CEA has concentrated its energies not on long-term studies or detailed
reports, but on the steady stream of day-to-day economic decisions
-
-
-
One of the primary reasons why the CEA has remained important and relevant
throughout various administrations is the fact that the information they provide
has remained consistent over the years.
Examples of positive functions the CEA has facilitated:
o Deregulation of industries
o the clear air act of 1990
o the collecting and disseminating of economic statistics
Pretty much all presidential administrations have had positive relations with the
CEA; most chairman and top advisors in the CEA have had close working
relationships with the president as well
James P. Pfiffner, "OMB: Professionalism, Politicization, and the
Presidency," in Colin Campbell and Margaret Jane Wyszomirski eds.,
Executive Leadership in Anglo-American Systems, (University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1991), pp. 195-217.
Summary: Examines the development of the Office of Management and Budget
(formerly Bureau of the Budget until 1970) with respect to Professionalism, Politicization
and the Presidency. BOB created in 1921 and brought to the Executive Office of the
President in 1939, at the request of the Brownlow Committee. Comprised of career civil
servants, OMB was intended to be an objective institutional staff resource that advised
the President on all budget issues.
Professionalism- Traditionally, the OMB/BOB was intended to be an “impartial,
impersonal and nonpolitical” aid to the president. In recent years it has received some
criticism that it is too responsive to individual presidents instead of the best interests of
the presidency as an institution. It derives the majority of its power from its control of the
executive budget. It has become increasingly involved with getting the budget through
congress. While the career staff of the OMB used to shy away from advocating policy,
they now share a more active role in advocating the budget. The control the OMB has
over the budget makes it an important tool for the President in controlling the executive
branch.
Secondly, the OMB is responsible for government-wide management issues. OMB sets
procedural programs, creates initiatives, and can be charges to streamline the cost of
administration in this increasingly politicized era.
Last, OMB handles legislative clearance, ensuring that all proposals sent to Congress can
be funded and are consistent with the program and policies advanced by the President
Politicization: In recent years many have criticized the OMB for having grown politicized
in such a way that harms its intended role as a presidential staff agency. Essentially the
increased advocacy and political sensitivity of the OMB as a result of more political
appointees and public visibility has endangered the office’s credibility as a source of
professional objective analysis.
Presidency: These changes in the OMB have been part of a broader trend in the executive
branch where the president has tried to centralize power closer to the White House. The
OMB has just had to adapt to the changing needs of the president, serving more as staff
advisors than institutional and objective analysts.
Possible IDs: OMB, Professionalism, Politicization
-
-
-
-
-
The Bureau of the Budget was formerly the Treasury Dept. However, the BOB
gained importance and presence in becoming part of the Executive Office of the
President in 1939.
The Bureau of the Budget was renamed the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) in 1970.
The BOB’s official responsibility is offering nonpartisan service to the President
in the pursuit of economy and efficiency; they are also the most important
political body in terms of ensuring that the transition between changing
administrations runs smoothly
The OMB has undergone extensive criticism for the fact that they have been too
responsive to individual presidents and their personal political agendas
The OMB’s primary power is its control over the budget of the executive branch.
The OMB’s power is based on their familiarity with agency budgets and
requirements
The OMB (primarily in the 70’s and 80’s) became more concerned with saving
money than with effectiveness
The OMB has become much more involved over the years in getting the
president’s budget pushed through congress
The OMB is given “central legislative clearance” whereby all agency proposals
for legislation that may have a bearing on the treasury (or funds) has to be cleared
by them.
The OMB has been effective in maintainin its role in presidential management
through its regulatory review process, however has fallen short in the
organizational planning and help necessary to help other agencies. (pg. 243)
There are three main ways in which the OMB has become more politicized over
the years, thus facilitating the president’s agenda;
o The transition from institutional to personal staff in the agency
o The creation of the positions of Program Associate Directors (PAD’s);
these presidential appointees are directly in charge of examining divisions
in an attempt to make the OMB more directly responsive to presidential
political priorities
o The third element of OMB politicization is its increasing public
advocacy and visibility; the OMB has adjusted information in its attempt
to support the president, and has downsized its permanent “career” staff.
It’s role in supporting the president has basically become more blatant
-
IV.
The OMB has continued to expand its role in adapting to the needs of the
president; furthermore, presidents have become more interested in centralized
control of the executive branch, than with governance (pg. 250)
Presidential Decision Making
October 18:
Presidential Decision Making Approaches and Models
Presidential Decision Making, Appendix
Eisenhower – highly structured, less involvement with detail
FDR – loosely structured, much detail work, micromanagement
-Presidents need to know the vital information while avoiding the inconsequential details,
they need to know the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action. The three
decision making models outline methods for achieving these results.
Adhocracy
-president himself distributes assignments, decides whom he will listen to, and when
-competitive/transition/traditional adhocracy – diff’t types.
-most presidents have a transitional adhocracy for a while, but traditional is the conscious
choice, while competitive involves one-on-one meetings with different staff assigned to
the same problems
-multiple bilateralism = competitive adhocracy
[note: departmental or staff groups make prez aware of potential problems, then prez
himself assigns people to work on them]
ADVANTAGES: flexibility, confidentiality, quick response, commanding image
DISADVANTAGES: randomness, unevenly treated issues, heavy burden on prez’s time
1. does not gather knowledgable people together in stable relationships
2. requires many individual contacts between prez and advisors
3. prez must make many more decisions, major/minor issues are undifferentiated\
4. may accidentally exclude relevant parties
Centralized Management
-heavy reliance on staff of EOP with hope of avoiding advocacy from departments
-objectivity of EOP may be an illusion, since they may become advocates
-decreases morale among departments
-should provide prez with a loyal and competent resource that will respond quickly
Multiple Advocacy
-prez listens to diff’t views and opinions simultaneously. Supposed to allow him to
consider all options evenly
-promote genuine competition of ideas and quality control
-difficult to successfully operate
-“the most formidable debater is not necessarily the best informed, and the most reticent
may also be the wisest” – Theodore Sorensen
-“Multiple advocacy maximizes the use and participation by departments and agencies
and minimizes the role played by the White House staff. Centralized management
reduces dependence on departments and agencies and emphasizes the role of White
House and EOP staff in developing policy alternatives.” (252)
-“President should not opt exclusively for only one of these models; rather, he should be
versatile and adaptive in making intelligent use of all theree from time to time.”
- [note table: p250]
The Three Presidential Decision Making Styles:
Adhocracy
 Not a formalized system
 Relies heavily on delegation and prioritization by the President
 President assigns responsibilities to advisers or “Experts”
 Two types:
o Transition Adhocracy:
 Typifies decision making during early monthes of presidency
 Characterized by newness
 Relies on individuals over institutions
o Traditional Adhocracy:
 Can occur at any time in an administration
 Can involve competing assignments (Roosevelt)
 Few regularized channels
 Assignment can be given to interagency groups responsible only for specific
tasks
 Open jurisdictional boundaries
 More likely to settle issues bilaterally
o Can also turn into “multiple bilateralism”
 President personally assigns the problems to someone or the
problems are raised by his advisers
 Then creates multiple advocacy situation by seeking advice
from other interested parties
 Leaves President final decision maker
o Image of President as “Commander in Chief”
 Strengths:
o Flexibility
o Increased confidentiality
o Ability to respond quickly
o Image of President in command
 Weaknesses:
o Heavy demand on president’s time
o Burden on president to integrate policies
o Fails to differentiate between major and minor issues
o Potentially excludes major interests
o Lacks provisions for comprehensive policy examination
o Scope for 1 on 1 pleading with the president
Centralized Management
 Heavy reliance on the White House Staff and Executive Office to filter ideas,
proposals and recommendations before they go to the President
 Indicates desire for advice and analysis from those who share the president’s
political views and know him best
 Ordered and Rational
 Driven by white house staff

Shields president from raw decisions over policy—distills the information he
receives
 Concentrates power in 2 or 3 individuals who can become advocates
 Departments and agencies play secondary role
 Strengths
o May have issues brought to his attention that would not otherwise see
o Loyal and competent resource dedicated to him alone
o Increases likelihood of controlling timing and announcement of new
policies and initiatives
 Weaknesses
o Alienates departments and agencies, reducing their morale
o Objectivity of staff can be an illusion
o Small resources
o Does not reflect diversity of concerns or opinions
o Enormous burden on Chief of Staff
o Decisions will be made before some things get to the President
o Widens gulf between implementation and formulation
o Widens gulf between departments/agencies and white house
staff/President
Multiple Advocacy
 “Open system based on inclusion.”
 Competing viewpoints presented to the president to expose him to a wide
variety of opinions by advocates and frequently hear them argue in front of
him
 Relies on honest broker to make sure all sides are represented and process
runs smoothly
 President hears all sides, asks questions and weighs options before making
decisions
 Executive director and staff ensure “due process” and “quality control”
 Consistency amongst advisers
 Strengths
o All points of view represented and considered
o Improves quality of alternatives and of supporting arguements
o Bridges gap between formulation and implementation
 Decision less likely to be undermined if had say in making the
decision.
 Quality of decisions improves with more info
 Increases support for president in executive branch
o Mirrors forces in Washington
o Strengthens presidential influence
 Give power to cabinet officials who can then influence
 Sensitizes officials to broad range of interests
 Weaknesses
o Difficult to operate
o Disparities in resources and talent may distort
o No guarantee all viable options will be represented
o
o
o
o
o
o
Agencies can withhold info
Group ideology may emerge
Full participation takes lots of time
Leaks likely
Forces decisions to the top
Weakens ability of senior executives to deliver on commitments to
constitutents
Models can be used together
Three fundamental differentiating characteristics
 Continuity
 Individual responsible for organizing information president receives
 Participation pattern of white house staff, agencies and departments
Wide variations in execution of all styles, and wide room for flexibility
October 20:
The President and National Security Policy
Summary of Kessel’s Presidents, the Presidency, and the Political Environment
Chapter 4: Foreign Policy
- Presidents must be concerned with foreign policy because the United States is so
involved in the outside world
- Even presidents who come into office wanting to focus on domestic affairs, like Ford
and Clinton, must immediately become involved with foreign affairs
- Presidents also become more attentive to foreign policy as their term progresses
Guardians of American Interests
- The National Security Council
NSC is composed of senior officials and chaired by president
NSC staff is composed of foreign policy experts under direction of the national
security assistant
NSC was created in 1947 by National Security Act, along with Department of
Defense and the CIA
NSC has 4 statutory members—the president, VP, secretary of state, and secretary
of defense—and 2 statutory advisers—the chairman of the joint chiefs and the
director of the CIA
Presidents have used the council in many different ways. Some, like Eisenhower
and Nixon, have made it dominant in foreign policy decisions. Others, like
Kennedy and Johnson, have used it only informally.
Some national security advisers have been highly visible, like Kissinger, and
others have been low-key, like Scowcroft under Bush.
In short, the office is malleable: the president can use it as it suits him
- The Department of State
Much larger than the NSC staff
State implements policy, while NSC is somewhat abstract
State is made up of FSOs (foreign service officers), who are usually more attuned
to foreign interests and long-term interests than the NSC staff because the
FSOs are far removed from the president and the political scene
FSOs usually carry out policy much as military people would carry out an order,
so they can be trusted by president
There is a lot of mobility between the State Dept. and the NSC: people often
move between agencies
The Secretary of State often acts independently of the rest of the department and
tends to deal only with the president
- The Department of Defense
Created in 1947 to help unify armed services
Consists of Depts. of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, is all overseen by secretary
of defense, and is alongside the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Has more independence than State Dept., because it is often tough to argue with
the secretary of defense or his staff because the issues are so complex and
important to the country
Chair of Joint Chiefs of Staff became more powerful after passage of GoldwaterNichols Act in 1986: made the chairman the chief military adviser to the
defense secretary and the president
- Central Intelligence
CIA is still evolving; Director has not yet gained prominent status like that of
Chairman of Joint Chiefs
CIA gathers most of its information through technology (aircraft, satellites)
Must cooperate with Defense Dept. to get funding
The analysis of intelligence by the CIA ranges from very good (U-2 photographs
in JFK’s term) to very bad (didn’t think that Gorbachev would cause major
changes in Russia)
- Coordination among these groups can be produced in three ways:
National Security Council Meetings
For example, Eisenhower formed policy by letting everyone debate during NSC
meetings
Coordination through Committees
Many administrations have created organizations to substitute for the NSC in
coordination
This helps delegate responsibility away from the president
Avoiding the NSC
Many presidents use informal approaches/adhocracy to keep policy business away
from the NSC
Johnson used Tuesday lunches; Carter used Friday breakfasts
This approach can be used to exclude a certain member of the NSC, like VP
Humphrey under Johnson
Foreign Policy Activities
- Custodian
Many people think that the national security assistant should avoid becoming an
advocate and should instead be “a neutral guardian of the decision-making
process”
Eisenhower’s national security adviser, Robert Cutler, followed this model
- Policy Advocacy
National security assistant can also have role as an advocate, because the advice
of the departments might be unwise, or because he may be in the best position
to suggest alternatives due to his coordinating responsibilities
It can help for national security assistant to give the president an independent
perspective, as Brzezinski did under Carter
- Planning
Under Eisenhower, all policy had to be planned extensively before it could even
be considered
Nixon and Kissinger began planning even before Nixon was inaugurated
- Negotiation
National security assistants are often sent on negotiating missions
Kissinger was the best example of this: went to Vietnam and China
Problems can arise if the national security assistant undercuts the efforts of
foreign service officers
- Symbol Manipulation
National security assistants devote varied amounts of time to publicity
Kissinger and Brzezinski were constantly involved with the press, while others
like Scowcroft and Powell were not
If national security adviser focuses on publicity, he or she can control public
opinion to some extent
- Defending the President
“The fates of the national security assistant and the president are bound together.”
National security assistant can maximize his abilities by helping the president
- Foreign Economic Policy
Used to be decided to a large extent by the State Dept. or the NSC, but is now
mostly handled by economic groups like the Treasury Dept., the US trade
representative, and others.
- Information Gathering in Foreign Policy
Presidential decision making is often done with much uncertainty because
sufficient information is lacking
Due to modern technology, information coming to the president may come too
fast or be too fragmented to allow the president to make a good decision.
Sometimes, “new” information turns out to be old info that has been overlooked.
Advisers to president must therefore have a comprehensive understanding of
foreign policy, know how their president likes to work, and try to give
meaning to fragmented information
- Decision Making in Foreign Policy
President can never take decisions lightly because so many lives can be at stake in
making foreign policy.
Presidents must often make decisions in crises, ranging from wars to economic
collapses.
Policy is constantly changing, so decisions are constantly being made.
Decisions can be shaped on many different levels depending on their importance,
but the ultimate decisions are made by the president.
- Exerting Influence in Foreign Policy
It is difficult to exercise influence overseas
President can actually meet with foreign leaders on important issues. Otherwise,
emissaries can be sent to hash out details, etc.
In order to have influence on a foreign country, the US must convince them that it
is in their interest to do what we want them to do, which is normally quite
difficult
John P. Burke, “The Neutral/Honest Broker Role in Foreign-Policy Decision
Making: A Reassessment,” Presidential Studies Quarterly (June 2005), pp. 229-258.
The case for the Broker Role
George – 6 tasks required of managerial custodian:
o
Balancing actor resources within policymaking system
o
Strengthening weaker advocates
o
Bring in new advisers to argue unpopular options
o
Setting up new channels of information
o
Arranging independent evaluation of decisional premises and options
o
Monitoring the workings of the policymaking process
What is Neutral/Honest Broker?
o
At minimum encompasses narrow notion of policy administrator eg
o
NSA – briefing president, representing departmental proposals and
viewpoints, scheduling matters for presidential decisions, monitoring
NSC directives
o
Neutral =/= honest broker
o
Neutrality – ensuring quality and coherence of decision making
process – quality control
o
Honesty – ensuring all relevant views represented – due process
o
1960s – policy advocacy came to fore from NSC adviser
Why the Broker Role Matter
o
Positive contributions of the role to presidential decision making
o
How decision making process would suffer without it
o
Contrast
Eisenhower's decision not to intervene in Indochina in 1954
NSC assistant Cutler moved in positive direction, not
a policy advocate, effective broker
LBJ's decision to escalate forces in Vietnam in 1965
Absent an affective broker, poor resultant
decision
o
Janis – criteria for ranking decision making
Correlations between quality of decision process and success
of decision – suggests success where brokerage is present
Brokerage Problems: Iran-Contra
o
Machinations of NSC staff and NSC advisers out of control
o
Tower – problem where NSC had operational control
o
Tower - NSA responsible for duties to all of NSC not just President
Brokerage Problems: George W. Bush National Security process
o
Brokerage needed – GWB had little foreign policy experience and
cabinet and advisers all old hands and powerful – no dominant leader
or clear presidential direction
o
Rice
Drives towards clarity, Bush decides on the consensus
But she acted as advocate – counseled and advised GWB
Interpersonal tensions between principals – her job to resolve
these
o
Decision to go to war "slipped into" – not clear was well structured
debate and whether, not how, to go to war
Is the Broker Role Outdated?
o
Presidents find needs best served from within WH
o
Organization and structure of decision making has varied by President
and appointments – individuals matter
o
Different roles for different NSC advisers
o
"where you stand depends on where you sit"
o
NSC adviser best to institute brokerage
Expanding the Broker Role
George says should not be categories about to mention b/c of role conflict
and overload
Policy advocacy
o
Brokerage and advocacy difficult and combustible mix – personal
advocacy may compromise adviser's neutrality among principals
which is central to effective brokerage
o
The two can coexist, although honest brokerage is the more
fundamental
o
Appropriate if
Effective brokerage generates trust and confidence in process
Competing views fairly and fully represented
Participants have right of appeal
NSC adviser not perceived as pursuing wholesale policy
agenda
Advocacy is discreet
Advocacy seen as representing President's unique, broader
strategic interests
Visibility
o
Differing opinions – passion for anonymity v spokesperson
o
Appropriate if
Secs of state and defense are administrations principal
spokesmen
Other principals comfortable with NSC adviser's role
Reality of media requires multiple spokespersons
NSC adviser is effective public presence
Public activities carefully orchestrated within broader
communications strategy
Political Watchdog
o
George – political calculations belong to others than the NSC adviser
o
Appropriate if
NSC adviser uniquely positioned to offer certain forms of
political counsel
Issues dealing with political impact not presented by counsel
of others
More public activities directed at explaining/defending
administration's positions
Implementation and Operations
o
Tower – implementation strength and responsibility of agencies – cant
be honest when implementer
o
May require some degree of involvement in oversight though
o
Could compromise claims to executive privilege and shield from
congressional scrutiny
o
Limited activities feasible if
Directed at monitoring and oversight
Result from special circumstance such as foreign govt
expectations rather than routine practice
Avoid freelancing and principals are informed about and
agree with actions
Actions carefully weighed against brokerage role
Broader Contextual Fit
Broker role and presidential needs and expectations
o
NSC staff must mould selves to personality and desires of president –
need a good fit
o
Open leaders (thrive on advice and information) v closed leaders
(more comfortable in restricted setting)
o
Broker role largely concerned with quality not quantity of information
Broker Role and Types of Advisory Structures
o
Organizational structure largely up to president – formal hierarchical v
informal collegial
o
Individuals matter greatly, as do institutions and structures
Leverage, effectiveness and Presidential Responsibility
o
Super-custodian = largely powerless, ie pure broker will lack
bureaucratic leverage
o
Needs presidents confidence
o
Leverage depends on will of President
Conclusions
Significant expansion of broker's role since Ike
Broker role might be expanded to a degree, but should remain bedrock of
responsibilities
Effective brokerage requires interpersonal trust and confidence in the
integrity of decision making process that allow introduction of some policy
advocacy, public visibility and other activities.
I.M. Destler: A Government Divided: The Security Complex and the Economic
Complex.
Destler describes the separation between the foreign economic policy complex and the
national security complex that has evolved in the White House. Bush’s two groups were
so detached from each other that people often said that there were “two George Bush’s.”
Destler also warns that this separation is dangerous because it has led to major decisions
in the past that were “taken in one sphere without sensitivity to their implications to the
other.” Some exaples he gives include Carter’s initiation of a grain embargo on the
Soviet Union after they invaded Afghanistan and Bush’s penchant for ignoring economic
advice when deciding on sanctions to be placed on Iraq. Destler then goes on to describe
both the Security Complex and the Economic Complex. America’s Security Complex
dates back to the National Security Act of 1947 which created the NSC, the CIA, and
coordinated the military under the secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Together with the State Dept. these became the preeminent institutions of postwar foreign
policy making. The NSC since then has risen commensurately in influence since then.
The Economic Complex dates to The Employment Act of 1946 which made prosperity an
explicit government goal by creating several institutions to help achieve it (like the CEA
and the Joint Economic Committee or JEC). The CEA focused on fiscal policy but
played no operational role. Instead, its chair worked closely with the director of the
Bureau of the Budget and the Secretary of the Treasury thus giving rise to the “Troika”
which later expanded to the “Quadriad” when they were joined by the chair of the
Federal Reserve Board. During the first two decades of the postwar era international
influences on the economy were not significant factors and thus foreign economic policy
was placed in the domain of the security complex. This changed during the 70’s when
trade became much more important; foreign economic policy was now, out of necessity,
placed under the realm of the economic complex. Destler contends that it is striking to
see the degree to which both complexes operate independently and autonomously.
Another striking feature is the fact that the security complex is typically much more
centralized. The economic complex is quite fragmented, driven by institutional and
policy subgroups covering trade, finance, macroeconomics etc. In both complexes shortterm coping has taken precedence over long-term strategy—a tendency that has been
particularly true for the economic complex. The security complex receives more press
coverage and coverage in campaigns, debates etc. and also usually prevails when the two
complexes collide on issues. Destler describes this interplay between the two complexes
as “competitive interdependence.” Clinton recognized the dangers of the separation of
the spheres and chose to create the Economic Council, parallel to the NSC, to deal with
both domestic and foreign issues. There is still a necessity to bridge the gap between
economics and security in this system and Destler contends that this can be done by: the
President himself becoming more engaged in the economic complex than his
predecessors instead of favoring the security sphere, by the Chief of Staff coordinating
the coordinators of each sphere to meet and discuss issues, or by creating an overlap
between the two spheres by placing economists in the NSC and some national security
experts in the Economic Council.
October 25: The President and Economic and Domestic Policy
Kessel Chapter 5: Economic Policy
Employment Act of 1946: this basically made it the President’s responsibility to “use
all practicable means to promote maximum employment, production and purchasing
power”.
The Major Players:
Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA)
Treasury
Federal Reserve – independent from presidential control
But remember that economic issues involve many departments/agencies, for example:
Commerce Department
Labor Department
Agriculture Department
Treasury Department:
Large department with 160,000 employees and $300 billion budget (which is the
second largest cabinet budget)
Responsibilities center around tax and financial policies, ie: tax collection,
disbursement of funds for federal government, debt management, international
trade
Good secretaries of treasury have corporate or financial backgrounds b/c they need to
be in touch with the financial markets
OMB:
Created with the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 – originally named the Bureau
of the Budget and was a part of the Treasury Dept.
1939 – Bureau of the Budget moved into the Executive Office of the President
Bureau’s power was based on 3 functions:
Development of president’s annual budget
Responsible for legislative clearance
If White House staff is small, the OMB has no institutional rivals dealing with
economic and domestic policy
1970 – Ash Commission recommended that the Bureau do more managing and the
Bureau of the Budget became the OMB
OMB has gone back and forth struggling to get a balance between budgeting and
managing
OMB has become more of an advocate, tending to support the president more than
providing a neutral competence – part of this is due to the fact that the director is
a political appointee
OMB staff has about 500-600 staffers
Council of Economic Advisers:
Created as a part of the Employment Act of 1946
CEA has about 40 employees – about 12 economists, 3 council members, and
younger economists (smallest of the economic units)
President appoints the chairs of the CEA – chairs come from major universities,
current CEA members, or economists from business world
Few defined responsibilities: writes annual Economic Report of the President,
transmits economic data to the president, analyses economic effects of different
policies
CEA’s power/influence depends on whether the president is interested in economics
and if he trusts the CEA
Ex. Eisenhower met with his CEA director every week and he guided the
President through the 1954 recession, Bush didn’t pay attention to his
director and the economy in 1992 was a mess
CEA members are academic economists – tend to favor policies that will reduce
unemployment and stimulate growth
Federal Reserve Board:
1913 – created by Congress to regulate supply of money and credit
Chairman is the voice/face of the Fed – the dominant figure – must be able to assess
economic circumstances and current political forces and make a coherent
monetary policy
About 200 economists in size
Fed insulated from politics in 3 ways:
Governors’ terms don’t coincide with president’s – chairman has 4 yr. Term,
the seven governors of Federal Reserve have 14 yr. Terms
Policies must be approved by majority of governors, some by Federal Open
Market Committee too
Fed is self-financing
Coordination:
Tensions occur btwn. Treasury and CEA – Treasury prefers low taxes/low interest
rates, CEA prefers economic growth/low unemployment rates
Fed and the Treasury work closely and usually have the same views
Kennedy created a lasting system for coordination – the Troika (Sec. of treasury,
OMB director, CEA chairman) and quadriad (troika plus Fed chairman)
Many variations and additions to Kennedy’s system: Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon –
troika and quadriad; Carter - Economic Policy Group (troika plus domestic staff
head, undersecretary of state for economic affairs, and Henry Owen, an expert on
international economic affairs); Reagan - Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs
for 1st term and then a group of well known heavyweights (ex. Baker, Regan,
Shultz, Volcker) for 2nd term; Ford – Economic Policy Board (EPB); Clinton –
National Economic Council (NEC)
Economic Activities:
Fiscal Policy –spending and revenue or budgeting and taxation
Budgeting Timeline: Summer – agencies prepare budget requests; September/October
– OMB reviews agencies’ requests; November – OMB director reviews requests;
December – President reviews director’s recommendation
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 – created
Congressional Budget Office, which means that now budgeters must consider
congressional actors
More people involved in budgeting + limited funds due to budget deficits = perpetual
negotiations over budgets
Taxation – episodic, not continuous like budgeting
Policy makers need more revenue but are reluctant to raise taxes – try to increase
taxes on less visible things like gasoline or cigarettes
Problems with fiscal policy:
Hard to adjust taxation and spending in a coordinated way
Large lag time – takes long time to pass a tax bill or go through appropriations
process
Only 1/3 of the budget is not already appropriated
Great resistance to raising taxes
Monetary Policy – controlled by the Fed
Fed controls money supply in 3 ways:
Buys and sells government securities
Sets the discount rate (the interest rate at which banks borrow money)
Sets the reserve rate for banks
Less of a lag than fiscal policy and it’s independent of politics (although many of its
members are bankers
Problems with monetary policy:
Hard for it to work without congruent fiscal policy – can’t do the job by itself
if there is too much pressure against it
Hard for monetary policy to cure a recession
Forecasting:
Hard to accurately forecast because everything depends on hypothetical situations
Administrations with clear economic ideologies:
Eisenhower – orthodox capitalism, balanced budgets, low govt spending
Kennedy – Keynesian (using fiscal and monetary policies) very textbook
Reagan – cut taxes and domestic spending, greater independence for the market
(Not having a clear policy can be more pragmatic but can make president the pawn of
party demands and election cycles)
Political Business Cycles: presidents deflate economy early (keeps inflation low but
increases unemployment), and then inflate it right before an election (increases income
and decreases unemployment) to win support of the people
- the problem with this theory is that it assumes that the president has the tools to
accurately induce this type of cycle
Decision Making:
President’s biggest problem is reconciling economic and political advisors
Ex. Bush who had to deal with a long-term deficit and a short-term recession
and a political promise no to raise taxes
Hard because many economic prescriptions are politically unpopular
If presidential aides are included in the decision-making process they will usually
support the result (multiple advocacy argument)
President can make economic decisions but 93% of economic decisions are made by
other parties, 82% of which are made by the private sector – therefore President
might have to persuade other economic actors to cooperate, must appeal to their
self-interests
Kessel: Presidents, the Presidency, and the Political Environment; Chapter 6
Katherine Rose (kdrose@fas)
Domestic Policy
Coping with Complexity
Domestic policy is a very complex business, it must incorporate Agricultrue, Interior,
Energy, Commerce and Labor, Dept. of Healt and Human Services, Education, Justice,
Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Transportation Dept. and all
their resource needs. Kessel contrasts domestic policy with foreign and economic policy
stating that there is a “core knowledge” that is shared by all economic policy experts, but
the expertise needed for domestic policy is incredibly diverse, necessitating different
kinds of expertise. This problem of complexity is made worse by the fact that the Pres.
doesn’t have as much time for the cabinet members of “outer cabinet” (everyone except
sec. of state, defence, treasury, attorney general, and senior white house staff). Also,
outer depts can all of a sudden take center stage (e.g. Exxon Valdez) making the pres’
staff learn quickly about it.
Kessel presents 3 (of course) questions regarding dom. policy:
Should decisions be made in the White house or should they be left to the departments?
What kind of expertise is required of those who formulate domestic policy?
Can the presidential staff maintain any control over such a complex area as domestic
policy?
The Locus of Decision Making
Basically the debate is whether decisions should be made in dept or in the white house.
For departments: the white house staff does not have enough information to make
informed decisions, have to many problems to deal with and therefore act too quickly.
For white house: issues often involved more than one dept. and they’re not very good at
talking to each other, white house can coordinate them; president needs to review
decisions himself—must be looked at from presidents view, can only be done in white
house; white house gives “political twist.”
Summary: “the greater expertise and larger staff in the departments is contrasted with the
greater sensitivity to presidential wishes and political currents in the white house.
Generalists or Specialists
Domestic policy advisors are often lawyers because if the white house is to weigh what
the departments says with what the president needs, their analytical skills are beneficial.
However, not all are, example being Roger Porter.
The Danger of Disorder
Doemstic policy can degenerate into chaos easily in administrations that don’t spend a lot
of time on it or when responsibility is spread very thin.
The Evolution of Domestic Staffing
This section just discusses how a distinct domestic advisor started in 1943 under
Roosevelt who only had one advisor. This pattern of one or two domestic policy staff
continued until LBJ who increased staff and had a policy making team in the white
house. This brought domestic decision making into the White house. Under Nixon the
Domestic Council was created which was supposed to be like the NSC for dometic
affairs. Under Reagan, chaos erupted in domestic policy—he had too many players
involved. When George Bush took office he used the idea of the “honest broker” and
chose our very own Roger Porter as his economic and domestic policy advisor. He was
used to make sure everyone who should be involved was at the table, to make tentative
decisions for the pres and to report to the pres the views of involved parties.
Coordination
Most issues that need the president’s involvement pertain to multiple departments. The
white house should be a neutral turf where constiuency whishes have no effect. Fights
between agencies often break out while trying to protect their own agenda. If the
disputes can’t be worked out, then the pres is involved.
Coordination through Decision Processes
Because presidential decisions are binding across all government, it is very important that
right decision is made. Thus all the players involved must be able to express their view.
This is sometimes achieved through task forces composed of members from the different
agencies and a domestic council staff member in charge. (these tasks forces can also
operate within the council itself). If pres needs to make decision they try to narrow the
decision and provide him with a lot of info (e.g. from OMB, economic advisors,
legislative liason office etc.) This makes the DC staff into gatekeepers.
Domestic Policy Activites
Monitoring the Departments
Because the white house controls domestic policy, they must know what is going on.
This contact between WH and the depts is handled by assistant secretaries. They reserve
involving the secretary for big issues. It is impossible for the DC staff to monitor
everything, they focus mostly on issues the pres is interested in. What happens to the rest
of the stuff departments are doing? The OMB monitors that. DC says, “We watch out
for the things the president has told us to watch out for, and they [OMB] watch out for
the whole government. OMB is much large therefore easier to effectively moderate, but
in comparison with staff of depts is very small, so monitoring is never complete.
Fire Fighting
This section was dumb. It talks about how white house staff members have to control
many issues before they get to large to control, and this must be done without involving
the cabinet. Apparently they do it a lot.
Information Gathering in Domestic Policy
Important: “The domestic staffers form the junction between the presidnet and all the
domestic agencies.” They need to take all the info they get, decide what is important, and
present it to the president in a clear consise form. A head of the domestic council whom
the president trusts is essential to the system working properly. If the pres trusts them,
he/she will study the info, if not, may overlook it.
Decision Making in Domestic Policy
Policy making is like a triangle. The large part, at the bottom is a large number of people
involved in the formulation. It narrows until just prior to the decision the pres is meeting
with his cabinet officers. This way of making policy provides stability of the decision.
As it moves up, everyone is aware of pros and cons, so a decision is less likely to be
challenged.
Some policy is made without president, often if the players all agree, not necessary to
involve pres.
Exercising Influence in Domestic Policy
Once the pres makes a decision, it must be implemented. Inside white house, his decision
is a command, but outside, must pursuade agencies to support decision. “Several
techniques are used to ensure agency support of an administration policy. The most
important is to include the agency in the determination of the polic” Another strategy is
bargaining…”if the policy has been modified so as to make it easier for the deparment to
deal with its constituency, the dept is going to…[administer] the policy.” Sometimes
have to start calling people and banging on their desks to make them act. Dealing with
congress is different. Top domestic assistants must be involved because they can discuss
the detail of the legislation in relation to larger program.
Stuart E. Eizenstat, "Economists and White House Decisions," Journal of
Economic Perspectives VI, (Summer 1992), pp. 65-71.
Context: Stuart Eizenstat served in the Carter administration as the Assistant to the
President for Domestic Affairs and Policy. While he himself is a lawyer, here he reflects
back upon the role that economists played in the Carter White House. He asserts that
government has not yet provided economists with a suitable niche, and that many of the
Carter administration’s greatest mistakes could have been avoided had the role of
administration economists been more clearly defined.
The Question: “What is the appropriate role for economists in the White House? What
can they realistically be expected to do?”
The Answer:

The Council of Economic Advisors is perhaps the most valuable arrow in the
President’s economic quiver, for the following reasons:
1.) It serves as a “counterweight for the competing, interest driven
recommendations of the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch.
2.) It drives constantly for economic efficiency in government operations…
something that individual departments aren’t inclined to do.
3.) It gives the President a realistic sense of where the economy is headed in the
long-run, and how his policies will effect its course.

While the CEA is good, it is not the end-all solution to Presidential economic
problems for the following reasons.
1.) Often, administrations set out to fulfill campaign promises before they attain a
grasp of what it takes to manage the national economy.
2.) Economists have a set of “imperfect tools” that they must utilize to the best of
their abilities, but these tools do not give them economic clairvoyance.
3.) The President’s economic decisions will invariably reflect his own personal
political inclinations (duh)

The following lessons can be drawn from Carter’s economic mistakes:
1.) Administration economists must be “team players”
2.) The White House needs a economic policy coordinator “to integrate economic
policy and politics for the President,” (p 69).
3.) The President needs to REALLY REALLY like and trust his Secretary of the
Treasury, because (s)he is the President’s spokesperson for all things
economic.
4.) Economists should concentrate less on tinkering with the economy, and more
on identifying broad trends.
5.) Economists should be involved in every level and type of administration
policy making.
6.) Economists cannot effectively “stand in” for a President who is not interested
in economic affairs.
Porter: “Economic Advice to the President from Eisenhower to
Reagan”
Article Structure: First, the article reviews the creation of three entities which give the
President economic advice. Second, the article discusses three broad issues that confront
the President when he makes economic policy, and recommends ways in which these
problems can be addressed.
Part I: History and Structure of Economic Advisory Entities:



The Council of Economic Advisors: This three-member panel was created by
The Employment Act of 1946. Its members are typically academic economists
who serve short (approx. 2 year) terms. It is served by a “highly qualified”12-20
person staff. The CEA is wonderful because its only constituency is the
President, and it can thus give him sound economic advice without catering to
anyone else’s agenda.
Interdepartmental Committees: Porter traces the history if interdepartmental
economic committees from the Eisenhower White House to Reagan on pages 6067 of Packet #3. These committees have ranged from structured, official bodies
(under Eisenhower) to completely ad-hoc informal advisory groups (Kennedy).
These committees tend to be problematic because they don’t survive from
administration to administration, and because they often lack sufficient contact
with the President himself. Porter points out that these problems reflect the need
for an economic committee that would be equal in stature to the National Security
Council. (Clinton created such a council, presumably after this article was
written…).
A White House Assistant for Economic Policy: The first person to fill such a
role was Arthur Burns in 1970 under Nixon. Republican Presidents have tended
to opt for Assistants for Economic Policy, while Democrats have shied away from
creating such a position. (See below for issues related to the merits of this
position).
Part II: Issues in Economic Decision Making

Developing Coherent Economic Policies: Porter asserts that the CEA is
awesome, but that it is too small to facilitate interdepartmental coordination and
integration of economic policy. He proposes four potential ways that this
integration could be brought about.
1.) Creating a Super-Department consisting of the current Departments of Labor,
Commerce, Agriculture, and Transportation.
2.) The (perhaps unofficial) appointment of a “Czar of Economic Affairs” to
oversee all economic policy in the executive branch. Nixon’s Secretary of the
Treasury, John Connally, essentially played such a role.
3.) Creating a National Economic Council staff that would follow Porter’s
“centralized management” model. This would consist of 40-50 individuals
who would work in the White House specifically on economic policy- similar
to the staff that served the Nixon/Kissinger National Security Council.
4.) Establishing a Cabinet-level economic policy group that would follow
Porter’s “multiple advocacy” decision-making model.

Coordinating Foreign and Domestic Economic Policy: Foreign economic
policy is becoming increasingly important, and there is mounting support for the
creation of a separate advisory body for the President that would deal exclusively
with foreign economic affairs. It might, however, be difficult to differentiate
between “domestic” and “foreign” economic policy.

A White House Economic Policy Assistant: This role has existed mainly in
Republican administrations, and there is still disagreement about its merit. Some
critics point to the potential for tension between the chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisors and an Economic Policy Assistant. Ultimately, the value of
such a position depends upon the structure of each particular administration.
Presidential Decision Making Ch 3: EPB Operation, Organization, Functions
The Economic Policy Board: Operation, Organization, and Functions
--The EPB’s primary function was organizing the flow of information and advice
to the President for his decisions on economic policy issues. The Executive
Committee also
 produced and cleared presidential speeches and messages
 exchanged information among the leading economic officials
 coordinated presentations to congressional committees
 resolved disputes
 served as place where major White House policy-making entities
met to coordinate their activities.
Meetings and Operations
 Daily (3-4 times a week) executive meeting held at 8:30 A.M.
 Far more active than the other four presidential councils (OMB, NSC, Domestic
Council, Energy Resources Council)
Executive Committee meetings were restricted to members, allowed one staff person
to assist you in meeting but no one else (to reduce leaks to press)
1. When issues affecting your department were in question, you could attend
Exec. Comm. Meetings
 Agendas released one week prior to the meeting, and the process was very smooth
 Minutes were later approved by Executive Director (ED) for public dissemination
 Purposes of Minutes:
1. Insure appropriate follow-up on Committee Decisions
2. Acted as definitive record for disputes
3. Primary information source for exec branch economic comm.
4. Clarified outcome of certain decisions
 Agenda items originated from a number of sources:
1. Any member department or agency could request the EC to consider an
issue
2. The EC had a dozen task forces, on various issues, submit issues
3. Requests from the ED to a dept. to report on a subject
4. Issues from Polling results from surveys taken every 3/6 months
Full Board Meetings
 Initially they were held monthly, but later moved to 3-4 times a year
 Served two functions: to inform and to explain
 Included a general discussion of likely major proposals, but was not a forum for
making decisions
Economic Policy Reviews and Special Sessions
 EC also organized two types of meeting to supplement the daily sessions:
quarterly economic policy reviews and EC special sessions
 Quarterly reviews: assessed overall economic outlook, last 2-3 days
1. Brought in 10-12 non-governmental economists for their outlook on the
economy and possible mechanisms to enhance economic performance
2. Troika II group presented a forecast of the economy, discussing
macroeconomic policy as well as considering problematic sectors
3. Scrutinized particular problems, planning began 8-10 wks ahead of time
4. Attended by Chairman of Fed
 Special Sessions: focused on a single issue; allowed further discussion
Presidential Meetings and Paper
 During 1974-1975, EPB met with the President more than once a week
 Briefing sent to President which contained:
1. Issues the EC had considered in the past week and action taken
2. Activity summary of task forces that had reported
3. Major upcoming agenda items
4. – Succinctly summarized the most recent developments in prices,
employment, certain key economic sectors
EPB Organization
Consisted of:
1. Quasi-informal subcabinet groups convened by EC
a. Members selected by individual expertise to represent a dept.
b. These people were close to dept. head, could mobilize people
2. EC established six permanent sub-cabinet level committees, each responsible
for a policy area or range of issues
a. Troika II
b. EPB/NSC Commodities Policy Coordinating Committee
c. EPB Subcommittee on Economic Statistics
d. EPB Task Force on Small Business
e. Food Deputies Group
3. EC formally created a large number of interagency committees and task forces
to develop policy alternatives on specific issues. (Nearly 20 created, such as
“task force for improving government regulation” or “task force for
“Questionable Corporate payments abroad”





All committees or task forces represented a primary interest in the subject matter,
not by the White House
Representatives of dept. were almost always assistant sec. or higher
The permanent EPB committees reported biweekly or monthly
Work plan was created by the EC for each committee or task force each quarter
Helped generate an agreed upon data base and analysis of policy issues, shaping
alternatives
The Executive Director
In his dual capacity, William Siedman (1974-1975) performed ten basic roles:
1. Clerk – Responsible for day-to-day operation of EPB
2. Policy Manager – Perhaps the most important function – insured that all
interested parties in the executive branch were included in discussing issues.
Decided which issues went to President.
3. Catalyst – Initiated study on numerous topics. Since his interest in an issue was
interpreted as a president’s interest, he was effective in getting a response
4. Implementor – Responsible for seeing presidential decisions implemented.
5. Mediator – Many disputes, although minor, were resolved through him
6. Arbitrator – Reluctant role, when mediation did not work. Decision could be
appealed by the President, but rarely done
7. Presidential Sentinel – Kept President informed on economic developments with
periodic memorandums assessing key economic indicators. Worked with
Chairman of CEA to keep president informed.
8. Presidential Guardian – Protected the integrity of the work that went out under
the President’s name. Checked all reports out from White House.
9. Presidential Representative – Addressed issues that the President had not gotten
to
10. White House Link to the Outside World – Worked to enhance link with other
government administrations and corporations
 Did NOT act as an advocate or spokesman for any issue
Staff
 Remained small (10 people) despite numerous efforts to increase the size
 Why? For three reasons:
1. Concerned about influence on staff size and honest broker role
2. Fear of large staff being viewed as competitor to other groups
3. It would be easier to increase staff than decrease it, he thought
 Supplemented by Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP), but not
joined together
 Staff worked very fluid and well together
Functions of the EPB
The EPB’s primary function was organizing the flow of information and advice to
the President for his decisions on economic policy issues. The Executive
Committee also
 produced and cleared presidential speeches and messages




exchanged information among the leading economic officials
coordinated presentations to congressional committees
resolved disputes
served as place where major White House policy-making entities
met to coordinate their activities.
Scope of Activities
 Responsible for overseeing the formulation, coordination, and implementation of
all U.S. economic policy, foreign and domestic, was a quite broad mandate
 EPB was unique among economic policy entities in the level of its activity and the
breadth of its mandate:
1. Devoted continuous attention to a wide range of policy areas
2. Addressed special problems or crisis issues
3. Undertook long-term studies and projects
Regular Policy Areas
 Not only considered domestic and foreign economic policy issues, but others
o Procedural issues, including organizational questions
o Agricultural policy issues
o Tax Policy Issues
o Employment and Unemployment issues
o Governmental Regulation issues
o International Investment Issues
Special Problems and Crisis
 The EPB did not spend large amounts of crisis management, but was involved in
many special problems that had an economic impact
Long-term Projects and Studies
 Organized several long-term projects, such as railroad reorganization, multilateral
trade negotiations
Met 520 times regarding 1,539 issues in 2 and one quarter years of existence.
Met with the President nearly 100 times, had much access to him.
Exercised responsibility for both domestic and international economic policy.
October 27: Styles and Advisors
Neustadt: Presidential Power, ch. 7
-Presidency’s clerkship can’t be performed without the staff support the President now
gets
-President needs help performing chores, seeing personal stake in his acts of choice
-biggest need is information—details and a frame of reference
-priorities aren’t set by relative importance, but relative necessity (i.e. deadlines: dates,
events)
-self-imposed deadlines are helpful to make sure important things get done
-FDR’s competition (Porter’s competitive adhocracy)—more than one person gathering
the same info, competitive personalities in competing jurisdictions
-Eisenhower’s “staff system” (like Porter’s centralized management)—danger: staff
becomes only source of info and issuesdelegations are irreversible
-FDR as politician seeking personal power vs. Eisenhower as hero seeking national unity
-Eisenhower sees himself as good man above politics—doesn’t focus much on political
issues, but big on “peace with honor both at home and abroad”—everything else he
leaves to advisors
-Truman: personalities over jurisdictions, improvised solutions rather than fixed
procedures, liked to make snap decisions
-Truman—protective of what he sees as his duties
-Eisenhower—see his place as above the struggle
-FDR—best at protecting personal power
-in short: “his power is the product of his vantage points in government, together with
his reputation in the Washington community and his prestige outside.”
Porter: Gerald R. Ford: A Healing Presidency
-focus on two aspects of Ford’s leadership that come with every Presidency: transition to
Oval Office, and organization of administration’s policy development
-came into office w/o campaign promises, debt
-task for transition: provide stability, hasten recovery (from Watergate, economic crisis),
differentiate himself from Nixon
-Ford’s 4 member transition team: need to elevate role of dept and agency officials,
reduce seemingly dominant role of White House staff
-changes personnel slowly to maintain sense of continuity
-symbolic changes to establish difference—change portraits, etc
-theme of administration: “accessibility and openness”
-no chief of staff at first—interim staff organizer instead
-gives Cabinet members more power
-explanation of three kinds of presidential decision-making models:
adhocracy—policy shaped on case-by-case basis
centralized management—responsibility concentrated in a few hands, usually in
EXOP
multiple advocacy—consciously includes dept and agency officials in
deliberations
-Ford adopted different decision making techniques for national security, domestic
policy, and economic policy:
-National Security policy: Ford works very closely with Kissinger
-Domestic policy: delegates responsibility to VP. Ad hoc approach.
-Economic policy: creation of Economic Policy Board as the only formal vehicle
for economic policy advice. In general, used multiple advocacy to get most out of
economic advisors
Porter:
I.
II.
Presidential Decision Making ch. 8: Organizing the
White House for presidential decision making
Organizing the White House for Presidential Decision Making
A. Growth, Complexity of Government, interrelatedness of many important
issues, competing demands for scarce resources, and high expectations for
presidential performance have contributed to renewed interest in
organization, particularly in the White House.
1. This study concerned with organizational arrangements,
procedures, and process.
2. There are two dangers with this emphasis.
i.
Concentrating on the process by which decisions are
made and advice is organized may overemphasize the
importance of procedures and underemphasize the
importance of people.
ii.
Second is assuming that structure is decisive, that if one
could just get things organized properly, then good
decisions would automatically follow. Thus, good
organization does not guarantee good decisions.
Structural Principles for Multiple Advocacy
A. Multiple Advocacy was the characterized by the Economic Policy Board’s
structure and operation. Multiple Advocacy in theory is a potentially
successful arrangement for systematically advising the President if certain
conditions are met.
B. What organizational principles can one distill from the EPB experience as
guidelines in organizing multiple advocacy?
1. A White House policy council’s effectiveness depends on its
having the President’s imprimatur. President must demonstrate
by the way he makes decisions that he relies on the policy
council.
2. The policy council must meet and operate at the cabinet level.
Must operate at cabinet level so that the participants can speak
authoritatively for their department or agency.
III.
3. The honest broker should control the policy council’s operations.
Whoever is in charge of the multiple advocacy entity must be
seen as an honest broker. The honest broker should not have
other responsibilities that would prevent him from devoting
sufficient time to managing the policy development process. The
honest broker must be free from any institutional tie that would
compromise his position or represent a conflict of interest. He
must be intelligent and capable enough to be accepted as a peer
by the other members of the council. He must have all the skills
of an effective advocate, yet consciously eschew that role and
genuinely accept the role of honest broker. The honest broker’s
effectiveness also requires that he enjoy the President’s
confidence. He must be perceived as close to the President.
Finally, the successful broker must be willing to function as an
advocate if the discussion is not sufficiently balanced and the
President needs to hear an underrepresented point of view.
4. The policy council staff should be small and consist of
generalists. Larger groups developed specialized areas and thus
this would lead specialists to advocate one particular point of
view. A small staff has the advantage as not being viewed as a
competitor by member departments. Finally, a large,
independent staff attached to the manager makes it possible for
him to end run the system himself. On balance, then, the
advantages of a small staff of generalists outweigh the benefits of
a relatively large staff independent of member departments or
agencies.
5. The policy council should have responsibility for advising the
President over a broad policy area, such as economic policy or
national security policy. This helps ensure coordinated policies.
This also helps insure that the policies will be comprehensive.
Fragmenting responsibility among several departments or groups
weakens accountability.
6. The policy council’s deliberations should include all departments
and agencies with a legitimate interest in an issue. Legitimacy
of a process depends on it reputation for fairness.
7. The size of the core group or executive committee of the council
should be kept reasonably small. Small groups are generally
more flexible and efficient that large ones.
8. The policy council should be established by executive order and
should function as a nonstatutory body.
White House Organization: The Quest for Integration.
A. Several scholars have urged the establishment of cabinet level
interdepartmental entities-some new in scope and composition, some
modifications of existing arrangements.
B. There is an interest in integrating international and domestic
considerations by combining specialized councils and committees into a
single entity.
C. Three questions underlie any proposal to organize the White House for
presidential decision-making.
1. How many channels for policy advice should report to the
President?
2. What policy areas should they cover and what should be their
composition?
3. What relationship should they have with one another?
IV. Organizing for Presidential Decision Making: A Proposal
A. One major consideration in organizing the White House is policy
integration.
B. Second Structural consideration is what policy areas should policy
councils cover?
1. One should avoid divisions that are likely to produce consistent
overlaps and jurisdictional battles.
2. The more closely a policy council’s work is tied to a regular
workflow, the more easily its members will develop a sense of
collective responsibility.
C. Thus, Porter recommends a fourfold division-Budget, national security,
economic, and social policy.
Taking the Reins - Presidential Transitions
Neustadt: Ch. 11--Hazards of Transition
--The hazards of transition rise as “atomization” proceeds
--atomization-- 1) Congress is more dispersed—i.e. there were two times
the number of subcommittees in Johnson’s time as in Truman’s
2) increase in the number of president’s senior
officials—i.e. a larger administration, with turnover every other year
3) proliferation of interest groups that have increasing
permanence, as well as an increase in single-interest groups
4) increase in staffs everywhere
--Transitions: Carter
--put a lot of money in, but had problem with parallel staffs—i.e.
totally separate campaigning and transition teams, which led to friction
--should have kept it informal and anonymous before election, the begun
by organizing initial staff with the assistance from white house veterans
after the election
--Transitions: Kennedy—Bay of Pigs, an example of ignorance
--after every campaign, the election imparts the sense of hubris: they
couldn’t do it, but we will!
--emphasizes the importance of television skills for candidates: the
president should utilize those skills to turn viewers into lobbyists
possible term: contrived consensus: a consensus (among the populace) that
arises without crisis (his example is the 1960s).
Porter: paper on Neustadt: Of Hazards and Transitions (this is the one to
read)
--transitions are frequent and of greater import than ever due to media and
public scrutiny
--Neustadt believes the presidenct involves much experiential learning—the
eleven weeks between election and inauguration is too short
--presidential aspirant should: keep transition planning informal and
anonymous before election, spend timewith stagg before inaugural and organize
and insulate the staff soon thereafter
--ambitious economic and domestic policy is characteristic of presidents soon
after they take office
--“keepers of the campaign promises”—yougn staffers who worked on the
campaign have much influence at the beginning of the term, explaining the
commitments made to groups during campaign. White house veterans also have a
say.
--3 hazards of transition: Neustadt: ignorance, haste, hubris; and Porter’s
fourth: overreaching
1) ignorance: Bay of Pigs for JFK—a new president faces the momentum of
a plan already in motion, and isn’t prepared to deal with it.
--3 forms of ignorace: limited knowledge of DC; limited understanding
of the nuances of foreign policy; limited understanding of the nature and
nuances of the executive branch capabilities, sensitivities, inclinations,
routines and relationships (particularly in foreign affairs)
2) hubris: failure to learn from those leaving; failure to learn from
those who remain; superiority belief that previous adminsitrations ignored
important problems and the new administration must raise ethical standards
(i.e. they think they’re so much better than predecessors)
3) haste: jumping in unprepared, essentially
4) overreaching: overloading the agenda
--the desire to launch a host of new initiatives seems overpowering
(Carter was a victim of this); this results in lauching many proposals
simultaneously and thereby overloading Congress, and in refusal to identify
priorities
--Neustadt believes in learning on the job, so why not proceed cautiously at the beginning? -----Pfiffner
thinks the first few months is the most powerful time
--Porter says: transitions ar a time of great opportunity. They may be
crucial in building a president’s professional reputation and public prestige.
--3 areas of transition deserve attention: symbolic actions, organizational
arrangements, legislative initiatives
--symbolic actions: Reagan inviting the Democrats to dinner, how and
where he spends his time, and with whom—all make an impression, and early
impressions of everything, including work habits and priorities, are
particularly important for the public and Congress
--organizational arrangements: the way a president organizes ought to
reflect hhis personal style, habits and decision making preferences
--legislative initiatives: transitions are a time of great legislative
opportunities. Presidents rarely have as much leverage with Congress as they
do at the outset of their term. Members of the president’s own party are
anxious to help him succeed and want him to be viewed as successful.
--members of Congress want to maintain good relations wiht the White
House during the crucial early months, while appointments and such are going
on.
--declining presidential leverage results from reality kicking in and disappointments inevitably cropping up.
Porter mentions again the cycle of decreasing influence from Paul Light.
--transitions are a time for caution, yes. And they are also a time of great
opportunity, not only for presidents to select officials who will work well
together but to organize them and relations between officials in executive
departments and on the white house staff. Transition offers the chance to
advance a focused legislative program that can build momentum for a new
president. Presidents want and need to strengthen their professional
reputation and public prestige during this time, and to do so requires
avoiding hazards but also seizing opportunities.
Martha Joynt Kumar, George C. Edwards III, James P. Pfiffner, and
Terry Sullivan, "Meeting the Freight Train Head On: Planning for the
Transition to Power," in The White House World, edited by Martha Joynt
Kumar and Terry Sullivan (Texas A&M University Press, 2003), pp. 5-23.
This article outlines an approach that incoming administrations can take to ease
their transition to power. The authors assert that the opening days and months of a
Presidency are perhaps the most crucial, and that certain key steps must be taken
early on in order to take full advantage of the opportunities presented to any
administration at the beginning of its tenure. Their advice is as follows:



During the campaign, quietly begin planning the process that will be used to
fill the most important transition posts in the administration. How will the
campaign effectively deal with the thousands of job applications that will
begin to stream in after Election Day?
Also during the campaign, avoid making promises that will constrain your
administration during its early days. Clinton’s promise to cut the size of the
White House staff by 25% is a prime example of such an unnecessary
constraining promise.
Once an election has been won, the President-elect needs to focus all of
his/her attention on filling the top White House staff positions. Filling these
positions will help with later appointments, and will allow the administration
to quickly become unified and coherent. These six posts are:
-Chief of Staff: Without one, there will be constant unproductive
jockeying for power among new appointees.
-Personnel Director: This person will spearhead the administration’s hiring
effort. The job is particularly tough because the personnel director faces
the biggest flood of work right at the beginning of his/her term.
-Legislative Affairs Coordinator: Presidents-elect usually meet with
congressional leaders soon after the election, and getting off to a good
start with them can help to determine the administration’s early legislative
success.
-Counsel to the President: The President needs a good lawyer early on to
plan the details of the screening process for important nominees, create
record-keeping guidelines for the new administration, and advise the
President-elect about the legality of any early executive orders that he
might be planning to give.
-Press Secretary: From day one, the President-elect needs someone to
speak for him or her.
-Office of Management and Administration: Handles the nitty-gritty
details of filling lower-level positions, determining who gets what office,
and making sure that everyone gets paid.


The incoming administration needs to do as much as possible to learn from
predecessors in order to avoid repeating their mistakes. Incoming administration
members should talk to their counterparts in the outgoing team. Moreover, some
staffers should be brought in who have past Washington and White House
experience. Finally, career staffers should not be forced out of their posts, as they
are a valuable source of institutional memory.
Once key staffers are in place, the administration should go about creating an
overarching strategic plan for advancing some of its policy proposals. These
should be handpicked to be important enough to garner attention, but not
controversial enough that they are likely to lose. The administration’s long-term
success depends upon its perceived effectiveness at advancing its agenda during
the early days and months.
If these steps are taken, the authors assert that the new President will be well
positioned to fully seize the opportunities presented by a new term.
Paul Kengor, "Cheney and Vice Presidential Power," in Gary L. Gregg
II and Mark J. Rozell, Considering the Bush Presidency (Oxford University
Press, 2004), pp. 160-174.
This article outlines the Vice President Cheney’s powerful position in the Bush
administration, and contrasts it against the historically negligible role of Vice
Presidents. Through the Vice Presidency of Harry Truman under FDR, the Vice
President had little formal responsibility. John Adams complained: “My country has
in its wisdom contrived for me the most insignificant office that ever the invention of
man contrived.”
Harry Truman’s experience of being kept in the dark about foreign and defense
policy developments during WWII encouraged him to make the Vice Presidency a
more active office. Truman had not known about the important secret talks between
Churchill, Stalin, and FDR, which were to determine how to partition Europe, and
under Truman’s watch would come to define the initial conditions of the Cold War.
Truman had also been kept in the dark about the development of the atomic bomb.
Under Truman’s watch, the Vice President gained several important official
duties, most notably a seat on the National Security Council. Eisenhower continued
the trend of expanding the importance of the Vice Presidency by sending Nixon on
numerous foreign emissary missions, most notably a meeting with Khrushchev.
Since then, individual Vice Presidencies have varied in importance, but the past fifty
years have certainly seen an overall rise in the prominence and importance of the
office. The Vice President is usually seen as a high ranking “generalist,” but
Cheney’s time in the office has been quite different from that of other Vice
Presidents. Here are some points that the article highlights:







Cheney is by far the most accomplished person to have filled the Vice
Presidency. He was Minority Whip in Congress and chairman of the
Republican National Committee. He also served as Secretary of Defense
during the first Gulf War.
Rather than serving to garner votes from a particular region, Cheney was
invited onto the Bush ticket specifically because of his skills and expertise.
Post 9/11, Cheney has served primarily as a “Secretary of War,” filling a
much more focused, specific, and powerful role than any other Vice President
in history.
The article highlights Cheney’s time as Secretary of Defense, and his
chairmanship of the energy company Halliburton, as reasons that he is perfect
to conduct wars and counterterrorism operations in the Middle East.
Cheney was the driving force behind the Department of Homeland Security.
Cheney already had personal relationships with many Middle Eastern leaders
because of his involvement in orchestrating the first Gulf War. After 9/11, he
spearheaded many diplomatic missions to the Middle East to discuss the war
on terrorism with those same leaders.
All of the above factors make Cheney’s Vice Presidency completely unique in
history, and one wonders if his example will be repeated by future Vice
Presidents.
Shaping the National Agenda
Roger B. Porter, "The President and the National Agenda," in James P. Pfiffner, ed., The Managerial
Presidency, pp, 319-333.
Heightened expectations – increase in size and complexity of government has put focus on President to
develop a comprehensive and coherent agenda, campaign promises as a source for expectations, past
success of presidents has caused us to expect success, revolution of communications has made it possible
for him to influence more people
3 Kinds of Issues (possible IDS)
- Electoral Issues - campaign promises, these commitments play a powerful role, but over tie, the electoral
mandate fades, and people forget, so a President must act fast if he wants any campaign commitments to
see fruition ( as long as you don’t promise to not do something i.e. “read my lips no new taxes”)
- Maturing Issues – these are issues that are debated over an extended period of time, crucial to act on
these once they hit the end of their “gestation periods” (possible ID), example Tax Reform Act 1986 that
Porter negotiated for Reagan
- Crisis Issues – definition of crisis “crisis issues aer issues where advocates for change are able to
demonstrate convincingly that failure to act immediately will result in a significant deterioration in the
underlying situation” these issues are very few, especially domestically
CONC – the central task of the president is less one of advancing fresh, imaginative approaches to
problems, and more one invlovling definition timing and the building of coalitions
James P. Pfiffner, The Strategic Presidency: Hitting the Ground Running, 2nd edition, chapter 6, pp.
111-127.
Moving the President’s Legislative Agenda
- presidential success is determined by factors not under the president’s control (such as partisan
majorities in each house) and that presidents can exert very little influence on Congress as a result
- early mistakes can hurt a president in Congress
-
-
Reagan has shown that you can overcome a large partisan disadvantage in one house
The importance of a fast start – blunders by Carter in legislative liaisons by Frank Moore caused
irreversible damage, whereas Reagan had a professional liaisons division
Reagan included congress in pre-election and pre-inauguration activities
highly specific and focused (he had rifle strategic choices, rather than the shotgun approach of
Carter which caused all his bills to get bottlenecked and nothing got done) legislative agenda,
another thing Carter did not have
Must create an atmosphere of cooperation and service with favors to politicians
Using public: must stick to your guns once you proclaim something publicly, also can use public
support for a mandate, don’t use it as a threat before veto (delicate
“The President, Congress, and Trade Policy” by Roger B. Porter, p.165-184
- Three characteristics of how congress and the President shape trade policy: divided institutions,
democratic participation, and deliberative processes
- Divided institutions: differences between federal and state and local trade habits (analogous to
trade under articles of confederation, but much less exaggerated)
- Constitution originally envisioned congress having primary trade policy role
- Increasing role of US in international economic affairs since WWII has shown that deliberation in
congress is crippling to effective and timely decisions
Democratic Participation – role of press as public has knowledge of what is going on, and interest groups
ability to influence decisions
Deliberative processes – “we are drowning in law”
There are also persistent tensions that have a stake in what the president ultimately does:
- micro and macro-economic management
- national security and economic policy considerations
- trade as a foreign policy tool (embargos, boycotts, sanctions)
- Different Criteria and Divergent mandates
- Institutional bias (some agencies tend to do some things before others, i.e. congress not concerned
with cost of new policy)
- Ways Congress and President View one another
Ebb and Flow of Policy – has caused extensive delegation of power from congress to President
CONC – allows for decisions over a large array of issues with lots of consideration from various groups,
with extensive analysis. Also, policy formulators have ample scope (and limitations)
Pfiffner The Strategic Presidency pp. 111-127
-New president in ideal position if: wins by landslide, runs ahead of most members of Congress, has large
partisan majority in Congress, and maintains hi levels of public approval once in office
-Changes in Congress recently have made it more difficult for pres to win approval of legislative programs
-Congress more assertive since Vietnam and Watergate
-increased fragmentation
-decreased political party strength
-increased number of interest groups
-Factors of presidential success:
1. quick start: early legislative action
-sets the tone so for ex. if pres gets along with congress in the beginning, it is likely this relationship
will carry over
-pres must move quickly to take advantage of a “mandate” from the voters people…because of “The
policy cycle of decreasing influence”
-pres popularity will decline with time and they will lose seats in house too
-therefore much better to introduce legislation early on, and in order to do this must have established
priorities early on… “pre-inauguration planning”
2.
Setting up legislative liaison Operation (i.e. Establishing relations with Congress)
-must be done early on
-pres must designate director of lefislative liaison and set up a team that will regulate communication
between pres and congress
-early organization is necessary because of the flood of communications that require immediate
attention
-Need experienced people
-Reagan had well-organized legislative operation: experienced staff, organized along political issues,
WH selected the heads of legislative liason in cabinet departments
3.
Courting Congress
-This entails creating an atmosphere of cooperation and service
-Doing favors, so that later they will be returned
-Creates a friendly atmosphere…the “little things” count:
-E.g. Raegan made small talk with congressmen, invited them to dinner, visited the Capitol
-Bad e.g. Carter had an air of superiority, showed disdain for politics and threatened Congress if they
disagreed
4.
The Rifle or the Shotgun
-must make choices regarding the range and volume of issues to be included in the agenda
-Carter used the shotgun approach: took on too many issues and did not prioritize
he should have introduced legislation in careful and spaced out phases instead of in such a rush
Carter’s water projects: eliminated 19 water projects in his budget proposal in the first month of his
adminstration…he did this in order to show the congress who was in charge, and by doing so alienated
a huge percent of congressmen
- the problem was that C had little advising on this decision and little support
- he knew the congress would oppose this
- in the end he didn’t stick to his guns and adhered to congress’ idea
Reagan – rifle approach…he focused his efforst on economic program
-early on he approached congressmen and talked to them about his plans
- -his actions were characterized by their speed and focus
- also he personally involved himself in these programs
- his first year he spen more time on congressional affairs than at any other of his reponsibilities
- he was better able to bargain with congress, because he only stuck to his guns on narrow
range of his priorities
also successful because he included members in preelection activiites
November 15:
The President and the Congress: Who Leads?
John H. Kessel, Presidents, the Presidency, and the Political Environment, chapter 2, pp. 21-52.
There are several factors that affect a president’s ability to deal effectively with Congress:
1. Public Support for the President:
a. The size of a president’s victory is a poor predictor of congressional success. What is
more important is whether or not a president’s victory increases his party’s standing on
Capitol Hill, thereby affecting the partisan balance in Congress. On average, a
president’s party can expect to gain eight seats in the House and one seat in the Senate,
which on the whole means very little. Reagan in ’80 and Johnson in ’64 are rare
examples of parties making huge gains in Congress when it won the White House.
b. Public approval ratings are important for a president’s legislative success. When
approval ratings drop off, lawmakers are more likely to oppose the president.
2. Party Support in the House and Senate
a. Recall that of the 24 Congresses since 1952, 13 have been controlled by the party
opposing the president.
Most presidents get approximately the same degree of backing from their own party. On
average, presidents could expect the votes of 66% of their fellow partisans in Congress
from 1953-80 and 75% from 1981-1996. Consequently, presidents usually do better
by increasing the size of their party than by trying to woo the opposition.
c. Along with size, the party’s composition is also important. Kessell says that
Congressional parties are coalitions of “issue groups” which may not always agree.
Congruence of the Presidential Agenda
a. Presidential persuasiveness depends on the congruence between his policy
preferences and those of the issue groups on Capitol Hill. If the president’s party has
a decided majority, then the “preference structure” within that party will be the most
important consideration. If not, he needs to pay attention to what the opposition wants.
Kessell cites Carter as a failure here
b. Scope and novelty of agenda: a president’s agenda may consist of large new, large old,
small new, and/or small old programs. Small old=safest and easiest to push through.
Only if the legislative terrain is favorable can the scope and novelty of a president’s
program increase.
The Legislative Leaders
a. Kessell accords a great deal of power to House and Senate leaders, claiming that the
president and his aides must work through them.
b. Two-way communication is important—president should give leaders advance notice of
his plans, and leaders ought to give pres accurate vote counts so he can plan accordingly.
b.
3.
4.
Who are the players in the executive branch that interact with the Congress?
1. The White House Legislative Liaison Office: these are the agents who speak most directly for the
president and who are most concerned with his high-priority legislation.
2. The Departments: The departments maintain their own Congressional liaison offices to look
out for bills that are of particular interest to the departments they represent. Each department
has an assistant secretary in charge of legislative liaison who advises the secretary in
legislative affairs.
3. Office of Legislative Reference: judges all legislation to determine whether or not it is in
accord with the president’s overall program, and tracks it thereafter. Also compiles the views
of all the agencies on whether or not a president should sign or veto a bill sent to the White
House by Congress.
How are the key players coordinated?
1. Regular White House meetings between president and key congressional leaders to coordinate
White House and congressional strategy at the top.
2. Tuesday Meetings: where president’s chief legislative assistant coordinates efforts between
his/her staff and the departmental legislative offices.
The Responsibilities of Congressional Liaisons:
1. Make sure the president and his administration are aware of the legislators’ proposals.
2. Channel their requests for projects, patronage, money, etc. to administration decision makers.
3. Help members obtain campaign help
4. Maintain members’ goodwill towards the administration
5. Help with the head counts that are crucial for helping the president and congress to decide
whether to try to pass a bill or give it more time. Also help bargain with specific members for
votes to push a bill through.
Presidential Decision Making in Congressional Relations:
1. How a President chooses to organize the people he entrusts with legislative affairs can and
does vary from president to president. Reagan had a “legislative strategy group” (LSG),
composed of his chief of staff, cabinet secretary, and senior troika, with cabinet members
invited to join meetings. The president’s chief of staff has been very involved in
congressional relations in recent presidencies.
Exercising Influence in Congressional Relations:
1. Virtually all presidents make direct appeals to congressmen. But don’t want to overuse the
“direct appeal,” or else members may be unwilling to deal with anyone other than the
president.
2. Presidents can also exert influence on Congress by working with interest groups and by
appealing directly to citizens.
“House Democrats Under Republican Rule: Reflections on the Limits of
Partisanship” by David E. Price
main point-increased partisanship in the House has created the opportunity for
manipulation. Partisan control drives most actions.
-members began to see pluses in strengthening parties in order to achieve goals b/c of:
-1958, ’64, ’74 elections that brought large numbers of liberal Dems into House
-“black enfranchisement and party realignment in the South”
-major changes: took committee-assignment capability away from Ways and Means
Dems and gave it to Steering and Policy Committee and gave Speaker power to nominate
chair and Dem members of Rules Committee
-“The effect, in any event, was to strengthen the party involvement of younger members
and to engance the role of the leadership, even as the actual decisions of the caucus were
helping atomize congressional power.” (p. 22)
-increase inter-committee tasks forces, but decreased “deference paid” to committees
-importance of 1987-1988 100th Congress
-“most productive since Great Society” b/c of strong leadership in the House
-Gingrich manipulation committee assignments so people indebted to him were in key
positions-ignored seniority-big no-no
-election of George W. in 2000 “brought further consolidation of power in House GOP
leadership”
-Bush governed from “right in” not “center out” and House followed
-White House and House wanted to start from as far right as possible w/Senate
-“has exacted a high price in terms of party polarization”
-focusing leadership efforts in keeping Repub maj in line
-chart on p.24 shows-“the upward trend since the mid 1970s reflects increased party
polarization in the electorate and among party elites, together with redistricting practices
that have given members safer partisan seats.”
-dedistributive-coined by Paul Light-policies that don’t redistribute or distribute, but b/c
they have to cut back by increasing taxes and/or reducing benefits, imposing costs and
lowering expectations
-partisanship
-even if everyone knows they have to act, remove decision from Congress and
scrutiny to bipartisan committee
-example of ’98 impeachment hearings
-what DeLay did-page 25
-how Bush has taken “tactics of partisan control to a level unprecedented in modern
history of the House:”
1) pres. agenda on the right
2) narrow Repub maj.
3) conservative Repub Conference
4) assumed role as counterbalance to Senate, even after Repubs got maj.
-ex of Repub roll call tactics
-“The Republicans had better hope that the Democrats never regain the majority”
-Senator John McCain, late 2003
-questions of fairness and House being able to address issues and concerns of the parts of
the country they represent
8
Matthew Dickinson, "The President and Congress," in Michael Nelson, ed.,
The President and the Political System, pp. 455-480.
“The President and Congress” by Matthew Dickinson in The Presidency and
the Political System
main point: “Presidential influence in Congress-always problematic in the
American system of government-has become even less effective than before. This
development is largely due to the growing ideological polarization of the political
parties, especially since 1992 (p.458-459 of the 7th edition).”
“The Bush Presidency: A Tepid and Short-Lived Honeymoon”
-President and Congress examined through Pres. Bush’s presidency
-Sen. Jeffords of Vermont left for Dem. Party b/c he thought Repub party was too
conservative---Repubs lost maj in the Senate- Bush’s short honeymoon
-Dems became more “confrontational” b/c thought Bush wasn’t interested in a
more “bipartisan governing strategy”
-belief that Bush had no real electoral mandate
-then, no one wanted to compromise b/c everyone concerned with 2002 midterm
elections
-September 11th happened, but still partisan conflict concerning domestic issues
“Congress, the President, and Political Parties, 1789-1960”
-House more responsive to “prevailing political passions” b/c elected every 2 years
-Original Constitutional plan for Congress and Pres had some problems:
-Pres. selection system didn’t give pres. strong enough electoral base to resist
“Congressional encroachment”
 solution=political parties
“parties rescued the office from its dependence on Congress
“The Era of Incumbency and Insulation, 1960-1900”
-candidate centered campaign replaced party centered campaign
-primaries weakened party leaders’ traditional role of “gatekeeper to
nominations”
-higher incumbency effect
-legislator’s started to use casework to “bolster” their name recognition and get
support from constituents
-by 1980s-pres and congress really separate again- solution=return to strong political
parties
-population shifts:
-from East and Midwest to West and South
-moderate Repub base moved to conservative South and Rocky Mt. areas
-hypothesized that people not happy with “partisan and ideological tone” of debates, so
less people voting
“Politics, Partisanship, and Presidential Influence in Congress: Speak Softly and Carry
a Big Veto”
-to draw attention to their agendas, Pres can make public appearances
-ex of Reagan’s tax and spending bills in his first term
-Bush’s desire to not wanting to lose his conservative base often stands in opposition to
negotiating with Congress to get things done
-veto might be his best option
-in reaction, Congress passes omnibus legislation
-other option-convince legislators that it is in their best interest to “pursue
a politics of accommodation and compromise”
-so as not to anger electorate
The President and the Congress: Mutual Oversight
Louis Fisher, "Congress as Co-Manager of the Executive Branch," in James P. Pfiffner, ed., The
Managerial Presidency, second edition, pp. 300-318.
Congress is denounced for being too involved with executive branch
decisions, but if they were less so they would be accused of failing to
supervise agencies. So, the rest of the article discusses why Congress
remains involved, and to what extent. I’ve outlined the main points:
· A good case can be made that the framers did not want Congress involved in
administrative details. However, Congress has always had ample means to
hold executive agencies, especially in cases of corruption.
· Since 1932, legislative vetoes have been an important means of reconciling
legislative and executive interests. "The executive branch wants to retain
access to discretionary authority; Congress wants to control some of those
discretionary decisions without having to pass another public law" (308).
· However, in the 1980s, Chadha held that the legislative veto was an
unconstitutional means of influencing the executive branch. Similarly,
Bowsher v. Synar (1986) announced a much stricter separation of powers in a
case concerning the budget. Despite such rulings, though, legislative veto
has remained an integral part of the governing process.
· Congress is involved in the executive branch for both constitutional and
policy reasons, such as: constitutional responsibility to oversee public
funds, responsibilities to constituents, to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed (e.g. Grand Jury in Iran-Contra affair).
· In reference to Iran-Contra, Reagan never notified Congress that arms had
been sent, and they were unaware as long as the public—until they read about
it in the newspaper about ten months later—this was a violation of the
clause instructing the President to notify Congress in a "timely" manner of
covert activities—catalyzed change in wording to the more specific "within
48 hours."
· Limits on intervention that Fisher touched upon were the bribery statute
and the speech or debate clause.
In summation, Fisher’s main point is encapsulated in this quote: "Workable
government requires that Congress maintain a strong interest and involvement
in the executive process" (317).
G. Calvin Mackenzie, "The State of the Presidential Appointments Process,” in Innocent Until
Nominated edited by G. Calvin Mackenzie (Brookings Institution Press, 2001), pp. 1-47.
Introduction
Thesis: America is unique in its political makeup, allowing non-government workers to rise to the highest
positions and completely changing the top government officials every 4 years. Across the rest of the world,
“Government is the business of professionals.”
 4 of 5 last presidents from outside Washington.
 Vincent Fox of Mexico, Alberto Fujimori in Peru. Both from private sector but accompanying
them were many experienced civil servants.
Why do we use this form of government? The framers of the Constitution considered several models of
appointment but never truly discussed the executive branch. As government grew, no re-evaluation took
place to remove the pressure of appointment of these new officials from the executive branch.
Benefits of system? Allows fresh ideas and fresh blood to the system, changing mindset of those “inside the
beltway” every four years. Allows presidents top gain power over hostile bureaucracies. Appointment
process sparks public motivation in politics.
Conclusion: no real movement to re-organize the process. “Few defenders, few attackers.” But does
process really work, does it do a good job completing the job?
Changing Context: Political Appointments are political, but the government has changed over two centuries,
by:
1) expanding role of government, increasing number of positions to fill
2) deterioration of political parties, eliminating the parties usefulness in nominating
candidates
3) news explosion, supplying more information to the public regarding the process and
causing higher scrutiny onto each candidate
4) growth in special interests groups and move to Washington, causing more
congressional time spent on interest groups, and interest group persuasion and power
into the appointments process
5) diminishing trust in government (Vietnam, Watergate, causing Ethics and
Government Act of 1978), causing increased inspection of candidates by FBI and
legal restrictions on post-government employment of most appointees
A History in Five Acts: The appointments process evolves
Appointment process has changed rapidly over the past three decades of the twentieth century.
1789-1800 – “the governing elite,” the government of run by a very small group of men in the upper class.
1800-1950 – “the patronage”, political parties began to emerge and appointments became contentious
between senators and presidents, and choices became to be chosen to avoid shaky Senate confirmation.
1820 Four Years Act limited the term of appointees to four years, increasing Senate power because it
allowed senators to make more appointments in their career. Intense politicization of appointments marked
this time. Jackson first to appoint friends, but “narrowed gap between people and government.”
1958-1974 – “nascent corporatism” appointees became better trained from the private sector, and required
more experience to run a changing government, economy and world. Eisenhower began the push to
restructure appointments process and create a personnel management or appointments position to the White
House
1975-1987 – “scandal proofing and divided government” divided government became more of a reality and
congress needed a way to increase power. Where budget must be finished for example, appointments
became a place where executive-legislative fights could reside. At same time, senate was being accused of
“rubber-stamping” nominations. The Ethics Acts passed earlier also started to have more significance.
After 1987 – “the Battleground,” beginning with Reagan’s nomination of Bork, Supreme Court nominee.
Due to 5 reasons listed above, but also deteriorating central control in Senate (harder to guarantee party
votes)
Characteristics of the Contemporary Appointments Process
Everybody fights: presidential appointments are not necessarily just about the nominee, but a stage for
political arguments. This has also been the case, but “Sunshine movements” which opened up the ledger of
congressional votes up to public scrutiny made fights more open. This has been countered through the
following tactics of congressional opposition to nominations: (1) filibustering, (2) holds, (3) packaging, and
(4) delays. (all defined on page 31-36).
The Process keeps Growing and Growing: four times as many appointees in 2000 as in 1960.
The Process is Visible, Transparent and Permeable: earlier in history, votes in appointments were rarely
recorded. Today, things rarely get to a vote, because each vote is so public that problems are dealt with
before reaching a vote on the congressional floor. The number of people involved in appointments is also
increased. By increasing the process before the vote, confirmations more regularly pass and avoid conflict
The Process is Thick and Slow: started as an artifact of FBI checks during the McCarthy era, but today’s
FBI check is much more intensive. Delay in confirmation weaken the power of the president to work with
his team early in the administration however.
Conclusion: Appointments process needs overhauling
Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power, chapter 12, pp. 269-294.
This chapter focused on the Reagan administration, and was largely an
account of Reagan’s treatment of the Iran-Contra affair. However, Neustadt
devoted the first part of the chapter to discussing unique aspects of
Reagan’s personality.
He said that:
1. Reagan was the last "Roosevelt Democrat" we’ll ever see as President,
despite being a Republican. Reagan prioritized popularity, influence, and
initiative.
2. Reagan was the first President to be trained as an actor and a televised
spokesman. He had an ability to take full advantage of the rises in
communication technology. Reagan drew much confidence and satisfaction from
positive audience reaction.
3. Reagan embodied a unique combination, of a lack of intellectual
curiosity and absence of attention to detail, paired with strong convictions
without evidence.
4. Reagan’s combination of strong resolution formed without attention to
detail was extremely risky, because while it often worked on the surface, it
exaggerated the threat of imperfect information. According to Neustadt,
Reagan’s combination of "ignorance with insistence," was manifested in the
Iran-Contra affair.
After explaining these points, Neustadt then devotes the vast majority of
the chapter to a very dense account of the Iran-Contra affair. I’m going to
try to write as brief a summary as possible, after first stating that
Neustadt seems to tell the story to make the point that Reagan’s failure to
pay attention to details was the chief cause. (probably why the title of
the chapter was "A Matter of Detail"). He also mentions that Reagan’s
reputation, while temporarily damaged, recovered successfully in the long run.
Okay, so here’s the Iran-Contra stuff:
Only fourteen years after the Nixon scandals, more bigger and enduring
covert operations developed under Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North.
William Casey, director of Central Intelligence (and Reagan’s campaign
manager in 1980), "helped to install and virtually direct North’s
activities, so North had testified, including arms sales to Iran. Casey did
so even though the secrecy of those sales could be blown at any time by any
of the factions in Tehran, as indeed it was, exposing all of North’s
affairs. Thereupon public opinion assigned Reagan both responsibility and
knowledge…" (Neustadt 280). North testified that Casey was in strong favor
if the idea of arming Nicaraguan Contras, even though it was illegal to use
public funds from profits on arms sold to Iran. Casey was admired by many
and trusted by Reagan, so when he hid his role in North’s activities, he was
not questioned. It seems that Reagan did not worry about what North was
doing because he assumed that if Casey knew he didn’t have to worry about
it. In other words, Reagan was not paying attention to the details.
The rest of the chapter is primarily a step-by-step account of the entire
Iran-Contra affair, followed by Neustadt pointing out the lack of
well-researched decisions in modern history.
David A. Yalof, "The Presidency and the Judiciary," in Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency
and the Political System, pp. 481-507.
David A. Yalof - The Presidency and the Judiciary
This reading talks about the divide in government between congress and the president.
Before President Nixon there was never really a “divided government” where the party of
the presidency was split from the party that controlled congress. Having to deal without a
“united party government” was a real challenge for President Nixon. Yalof shows that
divided government also had a great impact on the politics of judicial appointees. Before
1968 judicial appointees were chose mostly from the political arena, since then they have
come exclusively from the ranks of sitting jurists. Yalof finds that a court dominated by
justices without extensive political experience have been less willing than high courts in
the past to defer to congress and the president on matters of constitutional and political
importance.
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Justices votes are consistent with their political leanings, notwithstanding the
words of statues, constitutional text, or judicial precedents that they support to be
interpreting.
Bush V. Gore – so politically significant because the decision boldly proclaimed
the ascendancy of a new relationship between two of the three branches of
government. The courts willingness to enter the national political thicket
jettisoned all popular notions that as an institution the Supreme Court transcends
politics. The partisan cliques that emerged among the justices were simply too
neat to be dismissed as a matter of coincidence.
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Since warren court, Supreme Court has intervened in sensitive state political
matters, but the workings of the government and especially the presidency has
been off limits.
Even in case in the past with Truman and the steel mill and Nixon and the tapes
the Supreme Court was still very cautious.
Before the 60’s the majority of the members of the Supreme Court were political
insiders usually coming directly from the legislative or executive branch of the
federal government.
Nixon changed this all by electing federal circuit judges he barely knew instead
of his stalwart republican friends.
This new Supreme Court made up of past jurist has given the president and
congress opposition over the past and has not defended it as was usually done in
the past.
Presidential Campaigns and the Judiciary
Judicial issues can be very significant during campaigns – Alien and sedition act
(Thomas Jefferson), Dred Scott (Abraham Lincoln) Roe V. Wade (Reagan).
Issues are very sensitive and presidents can use them to sway voters.
“Like a bolt of lighting?” Presidential appointments to the federal judiciary
“ Selection to the Supreme Court has been likened to the spin of a roulette wheel
or a bolt of lighting that can strike anywhere without warning”
The selection process is a matter of chance
Someone who gets appointed it usually someone who has very good political
acumen. They have the ability to maneuver and gain the trust of many
individuals.
Appointments used to be a private affair handled just by the president and
advisors – GW worked alone after his inauguration to figure out who he should
put in the Supreme Court.
Factors that have transformed the process of recruitment of supreme court
candidates
Growth and bureaucratization of the justice department – the justice department
has grown into a mammoth enterprise. Office of legal council (OLC, created in
1939) was conceived as a bureaucratic resource for the attorney general.
Presidents have relied heavily on the OLC to generate lists for candidates of the
federal judiciary. This has made the white house more involved in the litigation
that flows to the Supreme Court.
Growth and Bureaucratization of the white house staff – the White house staff
has gown dramatically and now president rely on in house lawyers for advice.
Growth and size and influence of the federal judiciary – Congress’s creation of
new federal judgeships during the 20th century have affected the process because
president have the ability with the 862 federal judges to rely make an imprint on
judicial policy making.
Divided party government – with all the politics involved it is very difficult for a
appointee to get approved with divided government
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13
Increased participation by interest groups, including the organized bar, in the
selection process – negative or even unenthusiastically positive recommendation
by interest groups can damage a nominee substantially
Increased media attention before and during the Supreme Court nomination –
amount of media attention can affect a candidate in positive or negative ways.
Campaign for and against will be launched for the whole country to see.
Advances in legal research technology – programs such as lexis/ nexis have been
able to research a judicial appointees past to try and find glitches in past
voting records
All of the process have changed the way that candidates are nominated and
eventually selected or rejected.
In 1985 under the Reagan administration a justice of department’s officials was
formed to define the criteria’s of an ideal candidate for the supreme court
position.
“awareness of the importance of strict justifiability and procedural requirements”
“refusal to create new constitutional rights for the individual”
“Deference to states in their spheres”
Appropriate deference to agencies”
“Commitments to strict principles of nondiscrimination”
“Disposition towards less government rather than more”
“Recognition that the federal government is one off enumerated powers”
“Appreciation for the role of free Markey in our society”
“Respect for traditional values”
“Recognition of the importance of separation of principles or president authority”
“Legal competence”
“Strong leadership o the count / young and vigorous.”
Presidential Influence on the Judicial Process
Mark Galanter – executive branch is a “realist player”- it is a litigating actor
engaged in many similar cases over time
The government had “bargaining power” and the “ability to play the odds” for
advantages that may accrue only in later cases.
Joseph A. Pika and John Anthony Maltese, "Judicial Politics," in The Politics of the
Presidency, revised sixth edition, pp. 257-291.
This article is basically a summary of the President’s relationship with the judiciary. The main
areas of discussion are President’s Role in Judicial Appointments, President’s Role in Supreme Court
Decisions, President’s Role in Enforcement, and Judicial Influence on the President.
President’s Role in Judicial Appointments
The article opens with a description of Clarence Thomas’ appointment. Scandal surrounded the process,
especially after the Anita Hill sexual harassment story came out, and when Thomas was finally confirmed,
it was on a Senate vote of 52/48, the narrowest confirmation in US history.
The relationship between the President of the United States (POTUS) and the judiciary depends on the
Founding Fathers’ intent for the branches. There aren’t a lot of differences between the roles lined out for
the executive branch and the judicial, although the judicial is supposed to be more based on “judgment”
than on “force or will.” The question of the final interpretation of the Constitution is left open, which has
led to some controversy in the past.
Presidential appointment power is the greatest impact POTUS can have. Courts are divided into upper and
lower courts, with lower being federal district courts and appellate courts, and upper being the US Supreme
Court. The power for district courts is very state-based, with much leverage and consideration given to
senators and judges from the nominee’s states.
Senatorial Courtesy: The Senate will traditionally refuse to confirm a candidate who doesn’t have the
support of the senator of the President’s party from that state. Few senators invoke senatorial courtesy, but
the power is there nonetheless.
POTUS generally delegates lower court appts, having lots of other things on his mind. He has a bigger
hand in appellate decisions because they have more national impact. Reagan, Carter, Bush, and Clinton
have all made large numbers of judicial appointments.
Reagan really started using courts to further his political agenda. He raised Rehnquist to Chief Justice and
appointed SD O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy.
Bush appointed David Souter and Clarence Thomas
Clinton appointed Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer, made effort to increase diversity by
appointing people who weren’t white males (Carter did the same, Reagan apptd the first woman, and
Bush the second African American)
Similarities in lower court judges include that they are all lawyers (although this isn’t a requirement) and
are generally involved in politics. Many have held court-related positions, working for city or state courts,
etc.
Voting Along Presidential Appointment Lines
Studies show justices tend to vote along the political lines of the POTUS who appointed them, although
Johnson was the last POTUS to know his appointees closely.
In upper courts, the candidates themselves and party leaders have very little say. Lower courts have a small
amount of campaigning for the jobs and some party influence, but in the Supreme Court, the “Post should
seek the person,” and so there’s less influence. The American Bar Association has a Standing Committee
on the Federal Judiciary who is consulted depending on how much the sitting president likes them.
The Senate must confirm all appointees, and they reject about 30% of nominees. Rejections are more
common in pre-election years when the Senate is trying to save spots for the next POTUS, and also when
nominees have been involved in controversial politics.
Supreme Court justices are lawyers, come from the executive branch, state courts, lower fed. Courts,
elected officials, and private law firms. Some spots have been tagged as “Catholic,” “Jewish,” and “Black.”
¾ of the time, the POTUS gets what he expects from his confirmed nominees (voting along ideological
lines, etc) according to research by Scigliano. Stuart Nagel says justices apptd by POTUS are more likely to
support his decisions. When justices do unexpected things, it’s generally because the POTUS didn’t take
enough time to familiarize himself with their ideology, or their political views/ judgment changed over
time.
Solicitor General
The solicitor general is like the government’s lawyer. He decides which of the cases the government loses
in lower courts are going to get appealed, and what arguments will be made when they are appealed. He
also decides when to file Amicus Curiae briefs. AC briefs (Friend of the Court) are filed on behalf of one
party when the government is not directly involved in the case. The government mostly wins the cases it
takes on because they have lots of experience in court, they tend to have a good reputation with the Courts,
and more often than not they agree with the justices. The Solicitor General is an employee of the Exec
Branch, not Judicial, so he can be strongly influenced by POTUS (Reagan first to use S.G. to further his
political agenda).
President’s Role in Supreme Court Decisions
POTUS can affect number of judges by influencing Congress to reduce or increase the number of justices.
The number has changed over 10 times, mostly when POTUS felt threatened by the possibility of losing his
cause in the Supreme Court. POTUS can also use Congress to change the SC’s jurisdiction over a situation
to suit himself or his pet causes; he can also use veto power to overrule Congressional decisions that were
made based on SC rulings.
President’s Role in Enforcement
The POTUS can choose to ignore SC rulings or enforce them. Rarely are they ignored, although Lincoln
chose not to give someone a trial even though it had been ordered. Tradition, especially recently, is to
enforce SC decisions.
Judicial Influence on the President
Only 4 POTUS’s have been invalidated in their actions by the SC. 3 of them (Lincoln, Truman, and FDR)
were about executive privilege in war/national crisis/extraordinary times. Each of these was disputed and
eventually overturned. The only unanimous decision was against Nixon, who attempted to invoke Exec.
Privilege in general without extraordinary circumstances. The court ruled that the immediate need for trial
evidence (Tapes) was more overruled general Exec. Privilege.
SC has declared presidential action unconstitutional in only 11 cases in over 200 years. They are generally
reluctant to do so, especially during war. Other options they have taken include supporting the POTUS,
postponing adverse decisions until after the crisis has passed, or simply declaring a matter political and not
judicial (like Truman and the atomic bomb).
SC ruled that POTUS has absolute immunity from damages resulting from Presidential actions, like getting
sued for firing someone on security grounds. This doesn’t apply to nonpresidential actions, so
Clinton/Whitewater, etc don’t count. He’s on his own for that.
Reagan was most ambitious in his court strategy, attempting to use the courts to further his ideology. Bush
screened for ideology as well, although Souter ended up being more liberal than expected. Clinton,
according to this article, had no agenda other than promoting diversity in the courts. Right.
November 22: Presidents, Parties, and Interest Groups
14
Daniel J. Tichenor, "The Presidency and Interest Groups: Allies, Adversaries, and
Policy Leadership” in Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System,
pp. 311-340.
Presidential wariness of organized interests is accentuated by the fact that
entrenched Washington lobbies frustrate the president’s programmatic goals. Gaining
access to the Whitehouse can be tough for lobbyists because of enormous constraints on
the time and attention of presidents and their advisers. Relationships with congressional
members and federal bureaucrats with interest groups are longer lasting and more reliable
because there are more members.
Interest groups provide money, organized support and votes for presidential
hopefuls during their primary.
Presidential interest groups relations explore election campaigns, party politics,
executive appointments, judicial nominations, executive orders, major legislation and
related issues.
More than a few organized interests in the Progressive Era perceived the rise of
the modern presidency as potentially important opportunity to advance their agendas.
One way to generalize about the interactions between presidents and interest groups is to
focus on two factors that help structure presidential-interest group politics:
1) the relationship of interest groups to the presidents party
2) the relative opportunities for presidential policy leadership.
- collaborative breakthrough politics involves Whitehouse sponsorship and cooptation of interest group allies.
- Adversial breakthrough politics places interest groups opponents in the difficult
position of challenging presidents who have enormous political capital.
There are examples of Presidents and the different types of relationships they have w/ IG
-Roosevelt and Industrial Unionism; Collaborative Breakthrough Politics
-Reagan and the Christian Right: Collaborative Breakthrough Politics
-Roosevelt and the American Liberty League: Adversial Breakthrough Politics
-Reagan’s assault on Liberal Citizen Groups:Adversial Breakthrough Politics II
-Bush Centrist Reform and the Competitiveness Council: Collaborative Politcs as usual
Conclusion:
-by studying presidential-interest group relations in light of executive leadership
opportunities and the partisan and ideological affiliations of interest groups, we can draw
comparisons and recognize patterns.
-Interest groups are most rewarded for collaborative relations with the WH during those
rare historic moments when breakthrough presidents dominate American governance.
Haynes Johnson and David S. Broder, The System: The American Way of Politics at the Breaking Point (Little,
Brown, 1997), chapter 10, pp. 194-224.
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Special Interest Groups and Washington (specially during Clinton’s administration)
The article primarily uses the defeat of Clinton Healthcare plan as example of the how much influence
special interest groups can have on government policies.
Players:
Bill Clinton – President – proponent for Healthcare Reform
Hillary Clinton – First Lady – proponent for Healthcare Reform
Bill Gradison – President of the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) – against Healthcare
Reform, former House Representative
Chip Khah – Gradison’s side-kick
Ira Magaziner – spokesman for Clinton, assigned to speak with Gradison to reach a compromise on the
Reform
Harry and Louise – names of the characters who acted as a middle-age couple against the Healthcare
reform in television ads, this was financed through the HIAA
John Motley – chief lobbyist for the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) – against
Healthcare Reform
Jack Faris – President of NFIB
Johnson and Broder introduce the chapter by discussing how sophisticated special interests had become and
the power they brought to Washington. They use the war on Clinton’s Healthcare Reform to demonstrate
how powerful special interest groups were. Up to the time of the article the lobbying against healthcare cost
was the most ever spent on the part of special interest groups, estimated between $100 million and $300
million. And this money was not only spent on buying politicians’ time but on grassroots efforts to get the
American public to support their war against universal healthcare. The organizations most against it were
the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) because they didn’t want to lose control over the
market. And the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) didn’t want it because they didn’t
want to have it to be mandatory for small business owners to provide health insurance to their employees.
HIAA at first tried to speak with Hillary to see how they could work out a plan together, but she refused to
meet with them. So they began ad campaigns to get the public to stand behind them and against universal
healthcare. They used two characters, Harry and Louise, to depict middle-class Americans who questioned
the actual benefits of the Healthcare policy. This in turn left questions in the mind of American television
watchers who didn’t want the government to take something over it may not do well. Hillary was extremely
upset about these commercials and openly attacked HIAA for telling lies to the public. This only got HIAA
even more upset and determined to win their battle.
Another large special interest group involved in defeating Healthcare was NFIB. They didn’t like universal
healthcare mandates because it would mean hurting small business owners who would not be able to afford
it. Clinton was more open to speak with members of NFIB and gained the opportunity when Faris asked
him to speak. But the members were unimpressed. Furthermore, Motley initiated a successful movement of
small business owners in Montana, a state with a large percentage of small business owners to back him up.
Then he carried this into Louisiana, Washington, Georgia, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Florida.
With the strong support of special interest groups against Health Care Reform (Clintoncare), Clinton and
Hillary lost their battle.
Sidney Milkis, "The Presidency and the Political Parties," in Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and
the Political System, pp. 376-413.
Thesis: The modern presidency has led to a weakening of political parties beginning with FDR and
continuing with Nixon and Johnson, while Reagan and Bush have tried to revamp parties to give them
more strength, with limited success.
FDR: While Wilson suggested that the parties would lose influence with a stronger president, he didn't put
this into action very well, however FDR did. FDR filled the positions around him with "New Deal" people
versus strictly Democrats and never organization Democrats. He also let a wide scale campaign to unseat
Conservative Democrats in 12 states. However, he was only successful in 2 of those 12 states and had
difficulty fighting the party establishment. By being a strong president he weakened party control and
destroyed party unity. The administrative reform bill of 1939 (a compromise of the failed version of the
bill in 1938) "represents the genesis of the institutional presidency" by creating the Executive Office of the
President including the White House Office and strengthening the Bureau of the Budget.
LBJ: There was fear in the Johnson White House that the Democratic Party could not be trusted to convey
the message of the Great Society to the American people. Humphrey thought they weren't intellectually
equipped to handle the explanations. Johnson attempted to de-emphasize the traditional role of the party
and severely attacked the Democratic National Convention, slashing its budget and eliminating several of
its important programs. He even left an ineffective leader but put the White House liaison in control of the
new, scaled-back activities. Johnson also increased the power of the presidency by creating task forces
made up of academics outside of politics in virtually all areas of public policy. These reports later made up
the majority of the Great Society.
Nixon: Continued separating the presidency from party politics though with a conservative bent but
especially through the Watergate scandal disassociating the party from the president.
Reagan: Brought the party back to the presidency by playing a large role as the leader of the party. He
fund-raised and reversed much of the institutional legacy of the New Deal. He was so popular that he used
that to rally support for the Republicans and get them seats in Congress and funds. His conservative
movement was a forceful political movement that became part of the Republican Party due to the
institution already set up versus anything Reagan really tried to do.
Bush: Continued to try and get Republican support and strengthen the party. Put his chief advisor as RNC
chair instead of in the White House and led aggressive party political campaigns. However, the difficulty
he had in rallying support showed how hard it is to have a President as a strong party figure.
Clinton: Perot's showing of 19% showed how much the Pres was separated form the party system. Clinton
tried to bring the party back and get support of the party-president relationship but had some trouble early
on getting support for his programs and made it a bitter partisan fight over some issues. However as time
progressed he did a better job of getting strength for the party and shifted the Democratic Party toward the
middle with moderate programs aimed at making parts of both parties happy.
Conclusion: Clinton may have forged a common ground as a moderate but the scandals that plagued the
end of his presidency have led to a reversion to the party distancing themselves from the president so the
author says he's not sure what the legacy will be.
Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, chapters 1-2, 4-5; pp. 1-64 and
1-2
Kernell’s thesis: a change in the degree of going public and inferring a change in the character of
leadership.
Going public: strategy whereby a president promotes himself and his policies in Washington by appealing
to the Amer. people for support
strategy:
(1) place president and his messages before the Amer. people in a way that enhances his
chances of success in Washington.
(2) force compliance from Washingtonians by going over their heads to appeal to their
constituency.
(eg) televised press conference, address to the nation, speech, visit, White House ceremony.
RARE pre-1960: Teddy Roosevelt’s “bully pulpit,” Woodrow Wilson’s whistle stop tour of the country on
behalf of his League of Nations Treaty, FDR’s radio “fireside chats.”
Going public violates Neustadt’s president “power to bargain.”
---superficial compared with substance of traditional political exchange.
---fails to extend benefits for compliance, but freely imposes costs for noncompliance.
---to the extent that it fixes the president’s bargaining position, public posturing makes subsequent
compromises with other politicians more difficult.
---*undermines the legitimacy of other politicians.
Explanation for the rise of going public
(1) Technology: advances in transportation and communication
(2) Reformed system of nominating candidates through primaries produces presidents with tremendous
campaigning/public relations experience, BUT weak party ties and little Washington experience.
Rather than negotiate with Congress, post McGovern-Frasier pres. will go public as he did to get elected.
(3) In recent era of divided government, going public offers better prospect of success.
more difficult to bargain when party controlling Congress opposes the pres.
ID “institutionalized pluralism” (Kernell)
Stable bargaining state of Washington institutionalizes informal rules (such as reciprocity) that regulate
behavior and reduce uncertainty.
Within framework of institutionalized pluralism, the president is in a uniquely well-suited position to
construct coalitions across the broad institutional landscape of Congress, the bureaucracy, interest groups,
courts, and state governments. President within framework of “separated institutions sharing power”
(Neustadt) checks and is checked by relationships of “mutual dependence.” (Neustadt)
The ideal president is one who seizes the center of the Washington bazaar and actively barters with fellow
politicians to build winning coalitions.
Institutionalized pluralism decayed because of the decline of political parties inside and outside of
Washington, which meant the erosion of friendly relations among political elites within and across
institutions that made bargaining easier and occasionally unnecessary.
Decline of parties, president must depend on looser, more individualistic political relations—go public.
Presidents from Carter through Clinton have all had White House pollsters taking continuous—weekly,
even daily—readings of public opinion.
Before recommending a policy course, they assess its costs in public support.
Neustadt’s importance of public prestige:
Because most members of the Washington community depend on the public to support them or their
interests, Washingtonians anticipated reactions of how the public views the President influences their
willingness to give the President what he wants.
Reforms changed Presidential Nominations.
1972 Democratic convention adopted the proposed reforms of the McGovern Frasier Commission.
Effect of the reforms has been to transfer the nomination of the party’s candidate from the party leaders at
the convention to the mass electorate in primary elections and caucuses. Erode parties’ presence:
From 1960 to 1980, the percentage of Democratic senators attending their party’s convention fell from 68
to 17 percent, and for representatives, from 45 to 11 percent.
CHP 4
I. Intro
- The more recent the president, the more often he goes public.
- Often presidents will go public to solicit support for a legislative program stalled in
Congress or to define US position in an international crisis.
- “public relations”- the routines by which presidents go public; public relations
perform the homeostatic function of maintaining public support for the President. Examples of
public relations include: public speaking, political travel, & appearances before special
constituencies outside Washington.
II. Trends in going public
A. Public Addresses
-Appeals for support to constituencies outside Washington are the core activities
of going public.
-2 types of public addresses: major and minor; major- when president speaks
directly to national audience over radio or television; minor-when president
speaks to a special audience either in person or via some broadcast medium.
B. Public Appearances
-At times visual images can convey messages more effectively than talk
-Appearances can be distinguished by locale-the number of public appearances outside
DC generally reflects the president’s non-Washington origins and divided party control of
government.
C. Political Travel
- Travel abroad to appear presidential more and more common.
- Ex. Nixon’s visit to China-networks broadcast over 41 hours of the 7 day trip
III. Incremental Growth in Going Public
A. “Rise of going public has proceeded more or less incrementally w/ each president
taking advantage of the precedents & extensions of the public activity offered by
his predecessors.” Reasons for this growth:
1. Technology: Continuous technological advances in transportation &
mass communication during past 6 decades
2. Growth as a function of politics: decline of party & institutional
leadership in Congress & the rise of divided gov’t have made the DC
community more susceptible to public opinion & forced presidents to
go public.
3. Resistance to Innovation in Going Public: has led to incremental
versus dramatic increase because in DC people like stability &
presidents must be cautious in the way they choose to use new
methods of going public.
IV. Conclusion
The style of leadership in the White House is changing. Modern presidents rely upon public
opinion for their leadership in Washington. Every President since Teddy Roosevelt had used public
opinion & drawn on the precedents and departed only marginally from the public acts of his predecessors.
During the past half century trends in presidents going public-from political travel to public addresses and
appearances have moved steadily upward.
CHP 4 (repeated)
I. Intro
- The more recent the president, the more often he goes public.
- Often presidents will go public to solicit support for a legislative program stalled in
Congress or to define US position in an international crisis.
- “public relations”- the routines by which presidents go public; public relations
perform the homeostatic function of maintaining public support for the President. Examples of
public relations include: public speaking, political travel, & appearances before special
constituencies outside Washington.
II. Trends in going public
A. Public Addresses
-Appeals for support to constituencies outside Washington are the core activities
of going public.
-2 types of public addresses: major and minor; major- when president speaks
directly to national audience over radio or television; minor-when president
speaks to a special audience either in person or via some broadcast medium.
B. Public Appearances
-At times visual images can convey messages more effectively than talk
-Appearances can be distinguished by locale-the number of public appearances
outside DC generally reflects the president’s non-Washington origins and
divided party control of government.
C. Political Travel
- Travel abroad to appear presidential more and more common.
- Ex. Nixon’s visit to China-networks broadcast over 41 hours of the 7 day trip
III. Incremental Growth in Going Public
A. “Rise of going public has proceeded more or less incrementally w/ each president
taking advantage of the precedents & extensions of the public activity offered by
his predecessors.” Reasons for this growth:
1. Technology: Continuous technological advances in transportation &
mass communication during past 6 decades
2. Growth as a function of politics: decline of party & institutional
leadership in Congress & the rise of divided gov’t have made the DC
community more susceptible to public opinion & forced presidents to
go public.
3. Resistance to Innovation in Going Public: has led to incremental
versus dramatic increase because in DC people like stability &
presidents must be cautious in the way they choose to use new
methods of going public.
IV. Conclusion
The style of leadership in the White House is changing. Modern presidents rely upon public
opinion for their leadership in Washington. Every President since Teddy Roosevelt had used public
opinion & drawn on the precedents and departed only marginally from the public acts of his predecessors.
During the past half century trends in presidents going public-from political travel to public addresses and
appearances have moved steadily upward.
CHP 5
President Reagan and His First Three Budgets: A Classic Case of Going Public in Action
-As president, “when presented at critical moments with the choice to deal or to go public, he preferred to
go public-sometimes exclusively, other times in combination with bargaining.”
-“Ronald Reagan’s first three years contained all the variation in prestige and legislative accomplishment
necessary to study the downside as well as the upside of public leadership. Success came early and in
heaping portions, but it did not last. By the beginning of his third year, with his popularity spent, the
president struggled to preserve the earlier budgetary achievements of real growth in defense expenditures,
reductions in social programs and, and a 25 percent cut in income taxes…The politics that ensued in each
of his first three budget seasons differed greatly, however. And yet they did so in a manner altogether
consistent with the theory of individualized pluralism”
Reagan as an Outsider
-Previous career in movies, television and public affairs
-Spokesman for General Electric traveled across the country giving speeches and personally meeting with
employees.
-1967 starts career in politics as governor of California
“He skipped those formative experiences that take place mainly in legislatures- city councils, state
assemblies, and Congress-and that expose a politician to bargaining and to Compromise.”
-Extensive campaign experience as a presidential candidate
-Political ideology further distanced him from Washington-Republican conservatism
The Great Communicator-Reporter Lou Cannon described Reagan using this term. He wrote, “with the
forum of national television available to the President, Reagan was certain that his own communicative
skills were sufficient to persuade Congress and the country to do whatever it was that was asked of them.”
Reagan’s Three Budgets
-Initially Reagan found great success pushing planks of his campaign platform: budget reductions,
increased military spending, and a massive three-year tax cut.
-1981, Reagan faced low approval ratings after unveiling his package of tax cuts and spending reductions.
However, after the assassination attempt in March approval ratings rose and Reagan took advantage of the
opportunity and strategically conducted his economic program as a national political campaign.
-Sent party officials to the South to stimulate grass-roots pressure on Democratic representatives whose
districts had gone heavily for Reagan in the November election –grass-roots campaign.
-Increased popularity within Congress and with the public-legislative successes
-Dramatic public appeals within a week of House votes
-In order to push the Kemp-Roth Bill (Massive tax reductions which would cause huge decline in
government expenditures) Reagan went public, giving a speech that caused wavering representatives to
side with the president.
-By 1982, however his standing in Washington and in the country had weakened and after his Social
Security and budget-cutting proposals received criticism inside and outside of Washington, his popularity
began a descent that would continue through 1982.
-“When the president unveiled his economic program in the spring of 1982 before the lawmakers who had
the previous year given him a rousing greeting, it was clear to everyone in the audience…that contrary
forces of political economy were at work…The president’s budget found few takers”
-He set off on another public appeal, scheduling himself for major television addresses and live radio
broadcasts, and sent his lieutenants to engage in budget negotiations with the House Democratic and Senate
Republican leadership and used their failure to try and provoke public support… “For a president who goes
public, failure at the bargaining table may be rewarded with success in the public arena”
-However, President Reagan exerted far less influence over the budget in 1982-both its substance and
politics- than over the preceding year…”In large part this change in fortune must be credited to his reduced
political capital with Congress. The further he cut domestic spending, the fewer the number of natural allies
that remained. Budget politics in 1982 reflected the president’s decline in public opinion. High interest
rates and unemployment rates and swelling projected deficits had sapped his popularity.”
-By 1983, even after again trying to use public appeals to influence Congress, Reagan failed to sway the
98th Congress and “for the first time since Ronald Reagan had entered office, the Democrats would take to
conference a budget of their own making”
-“By the close of the 1983 budget season, President Reagan had assumed a defensive posture, threatening
vetoes and promising public appeals at least on those issues where even an unpopular president might be
able to elicit a favorable public response.”
The Lessons of Reagan’s Budgets
-Radically altered the strategic routines of presidential leadership
-Preferred going public to bargaining, but occasionally bargained on the side
-When he remained popular, going public rewarded Reagan (97 th Congress), but his second budget in 1982
was not nearly as successful as unemployment and the deficit both increased, and by 1983, partly because
of his diminished popularity, his rallies for public support failed to help him in dealing with Congress.
-Conduct of office resembled a campaign-heavy political travel, numerous appearances before organized
constituencies, and extensive use of television.
-Policy questions become overly simplified and stylized to satisfy the cognitive requirements of a largely
inattentive national audience.
-He established presence with the 97th Congress in 1981, exhausted his popular support by 1982, and yet
still in 1983 he went on to win his reelection campaign.
-Volatility of a marketplace driven by public opinion
1) Can’t go public too often
2) Cannot do it in places where approval is low
a) Cannot say different things to different people
3) The Congress has become more fragmented in its power
4) What conditions is going public effective?
5) Why do you bargain? When?
6) Operational code
7) Takeaways
a)
Marc Bodnick, "Going Public Reconsidered: Reagan's 1981 Tax and Budget Cuts," Congress and the
Presidency, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 13-28.
Abstract
“This paper examines the thesis of the public presidency. In light of the success of Ronald Reagan, many
revisionist scholars have criticized traditional models of presidential politics. Whereas traditional views
emphasized the bargaining presidency, these recent scholars now argue that, today, the politics of rhetoric
dominate the politics of bargaining. This paper examines the central case study of the going public model,
Reagan's 1981 tax and budget cuts, a critical case because it represents Reagan’s central legislative success
and because many scholars and pundits have credited this success to Reagan’s frequent televised public
appeals. The case reveals that a strong bargaining dynamic played a part in the 1981 process, and that
going public strategies were not as dominant as previously thought.”
This article directly attacks the arguments presented by Jeffery Tulis (Rhetorical Presidency) and Kernell
(Going Public) and specifically counter-argues their theories. He argues that going public was simply not
as important to the passage of the 1981 tax and budget cuts, as revisionist view would believe. Rather,
traditional bargaining was almost always the primary tool, and going public largely a secondary tool, used
principally to reinforce preexisting coalitions. This agrees with Neustadt in that nothing replaces
bargaining, and this bill and all legislation are formed through a process of bargaining.
John H. Kessel, Presidents, the Presidency, and the Political Environment, chapter 3, pp. 5390.
Working with the Media
 John H. Kessel, Presidents, the Presidency, and the Political
Environment, chapter 3, pp. 53-90.
 For summary, see pages 89-90
Voices of the Presidency
 The Press Secretary:
o Origins of the office
 Contact between the press and the president have
existed for a long time
 Growth of the press in late 1800s meant contact
between press and President more organized
 Presidents only had one secretary to assist them
 By 1900 reporters had work space in the white
house, received news regularly, and could
corroborate reports
 Theodore Roosevelt was able to use the press to
help transform the office of the presidency and
become more activist
 George Akerson referred to as Press Secretary in
1929 under Hoover
 Stephen T. Early was the first person to be
formally appointed to the office in 1933
 James C. Haggerty
 Eisenhower’s press secretary
 Appointed in 1953
 Defined responsibilities
 Issued press releases
 Gave daily press briefings
 Alerted president to questions that
could come up in news conferences
 Dealt with crises
 Handled logistics for reporters
traveling with president
 Had a staff of seven: one assistant,
one personal secretary and five
stenographers
o Vietnam and Watergate
 Changed the way the press viewed the presidency
 Made the relationship more adversarial
 Relationship symbiotic: both sides need each
other but have different goals
 The president wants a favorable story
Press wants all the information, even when
unfavorable
 White house press corps became much less
trusting after Pentagon Papers and Watergate
 Press became more prosecutorial than inquisitive
o Growth of the Press Corps
 Press corps have grown a lot recently
 15-20 covered White House under Roosevelt
 100 covered Carter
 1,700 cover White House today
 Size means more formal briefings are necessary
 Reasons for expansion
 Rise of TV
 Increasing importance of federal govt
 Interest of foreign media
 Desirability of beat
 White House press staff has grown as a result
o The Modern Press Office
 Upper press office- located on first floor of West
Wing
 Lower press office- adjacent to area where White
House based reporters work
 Answers routine questions, makes info
available, schedule, etc.
 News summary
 Originated in Nixon administration
 Summary of major TV newscasts, wire
stories and stories in papers across the
country
 Prepared overnight
 Press advance office
 Handle logistics for media
 Photo office
 Supplies photographers
 Press corps’ judgment still rests on having
confidence of president, being well informed
about events and attending to reporters needs
well
The Office of Communications
o Created at the beginning of the Nixon administration
o Herbert Klein first communications director
o Responsibilities of communications director vary
o Depend on skills and power structure in white house
o Office of Media Relations


Handles out of town press
Holds news conferences for local press on the
road
 Invites out of town press to events at the White
House
o Television Office
 Formally created in 1971
 Helped give president advice on how to look good
on TV
 Remake president’s tv image
o Speechwriters
 Part of white house staff since Harding
administration
 Multiple speechwriters
 One usually chief
 Coordination
o Degrees of Control
 Coordination of press relations in 1950s carried
out by press secretary
 Facilitated coordination, but left assistants
unknown
 Pierre Sallinger (JFK’s secretary) open beat
 LBJ and Nixon- greater control
 Reagan – open beat first term, closed beat second
term
o “Line of the Day”
 Developed by Nixon White House
 Coordination mechanism
 Control news media by giving single theme to
write about
 Not used by Carter and Bush I, but used by Ford,
Reagan and Clinton
o Meetings and the Chief of Staff
 “Line of the Day” signaled greater concern with
public relations and the emergence of the chief of
staff in communications strategy
 When Chief of Staff makes decisions,
implementation handled by Press Secretary
and/or Communications Director
 1990s- things complicated by 24 hour news cycle
 Need to comment on just breaking news
 Clinton administration used morning meets
to coordinate pr with policy
Media Liaison Activities





Press
o
o
o
Briefings
Principal means of disseminating information to media
Times of press briefings vary by administration
Nixon- one midday press briefing instead of two
 Single briefing gave less opportunity for reporters
to ask questions
 New larger briefing room
 More formal setting
o Begin with statements by press secretary, outline of
president’s schedule and announcements
o Reporters questions fill most of briefing
Press Conferences
o From Harding to Eisenhower, generally published in
third person
o Haggerty allowed transcripts of press conferences to be
printed and allowed the use of direct quotations
o By 1955, print stories were supplemented by television
coverage on the news
o Live TV coverage began in 1961
 Pro: Kennedy could speak directly to American
people
 Con: addressing multiple audiences could lead to
miscommunications
 Kennedy held live press conferences every other
week
 No one else did
o Preparation for press conferences varied by president
 Extensive preparation began with General
Marshall during WWII
 Reagan required the most preparation
o From 1969 on, the frequency of press conferences has
declined
 Discouraging
 Important way for President to gain information
and knowledge about what is going on
Speeches
o When should president give a major speech?
 If speaks too often, lose effect
 If speaks too rarely, loses opportunity
 Decision to speak depends on topic
 Presidents tend to speak when approval rating
has changed or when military crisis is receding
 Presidents do not tend to speak during times of
inflation or high unemployment rates



o Different kinds of speeches
o Major policy speeches:
 Initial draft circulated, comments gathered,
recirculated and eventually sent to the president
 Presidents vary in participation
 Complexity of the speech is a consideration
 If very complex, agencies compete for
coverage
 If short, individual agency will do much of
the work
 Conflict between memorable imagery and
prudence
 Ideal: graceful phrases that will not conflict
with political needs
Coping with Crises
o News crisis develops when unintended event develops
and is important enough to become a major news story
 Press secretary and press corps lack information
 Press wants information immediately
o Sometimes the facts are not known
o Other times, issues of national security may lead to a
need for things to be kept secret
Information Gathering in Media Relations
o Must gather lots of information and know what talking
about
o Briefers must be knowledgeable about developments
and able to anticipate questions
o If misinformation provided, will be held responsible.
o Presidents can call stories to press secretary’s attention
o Spokesmen’s standing amongst staff members is
important in gathering information
 Particularly important when secret matters are
being discussed
 If there is trust, the press secretary will have
access
 In other cases, he is shut out
 Access to information is very important as is the
ability to sit in on meetings
Decision Making in Media Relations
o Administrations must decide what information to
release
o Presidents have the right to withhold information in
cases of national security
 What constitutes national security?
Wartime best case for secrecy
Confidential negotiations with foreign power
another case for secrecy
o Also need to not compromise privacy of an individual
(for example, in appointments)
o President’s health is another difficult case
o Should a press secretary reveal policy alternatives?
o Should a press secretary say anything until policy has
been definitively decided upon?
o “To whom should information be released?”
o Press secretary in difficult position: if reveals too much,
can damage president. If reveals too little, loses
credibility with reporters who must trust him if he is to
be successful
Exercising Influence in Media Relations
o White house has some ability to influence reporters but
cannot command that story be told in a particular way
o The press secretary is not the only link to the media
o Different resources—media decides on its own which
stories IT thinks are important
o White house controls visual content, but reporters have
more control over verbal content
o Both sides believe reacting to one another and that
neither being manipulated
o Limits to White House’s ability to manipulate the media
o White House advantage: President
 President is news
 If the president reports on something, it will be
covered
 How statement received depends on how
president’s perceived. Is he honest?
o Other options for White House to get stories out if they
are not important enough for the president to
announce.
o Complex stories
 Substantive policy proposals
 Reporters don’t usually have necessary
background
 Officials may brief
 Reporters get fact sheet
 Walked through and given clarifications
 Reliance on experts
o Often works through press corps structure



Some news organizations more important than
others
 Particular attention to them
o Influence TV coverage by providing pictures
o Can the White House prevent coverage of unfavorable
stories?:
 Release information when unlikely to get covered
 If president or aides are candid, reporters may kill
a misleading story
 White House can appeal on behalf of national
interest
 Can offer another story to try to detract attention
from coverage of other story

Lawrence R. Jacobs, “The Presidency and the Press: The
Paradox of the White House Communications War”





Jacobs gives an account of health care reform and Social Security reform during
the Clinton presidency to demonstrate that adversarial strategies of dealing with
press don’t necessarily work as well as cooperative strategies
Clinton’s reaction to hostile media coverage in the first six months of his
presidency was “to launch a ‘communications war’ that would ‘use the power of
the White House to control the message’ through presidential speeches and
actions to dominate press reporting and drown out critical commentary by
journalists and political opponents.”
This communication’s war—what Jacobs calls “pounding the press”—has 3
major objectives:
o bring media attention to specific areas and divert attention away from
other areas (in Clinton’s case, to health care reform and away from the
middle class tax cut and Whitewater);
o encourage the media to use presidential “friendly sources,” usually
members of the administration and friends of the president;
o get the media to cover substantive policy, not the horserace or political
strategizing.
Instead of accomplishing these objectives, “the flaw in the White House strategy
is a radical underestimation of the costs—namely, expansion of the media’s
coverage of these strategies and of oppositional viewpoints—and an unrealistic
confidence in its own ability to ‘get away with anything.’”
Reporters, aiming to increase audience size and increase profits while delivering
non-partisan news to the public, work within “standard organizational routines
and operations that structure the subject, sources, and flow of news reports.” (i.e.
news “beats”)

The White House has more journalists assigned to cover it than most other
“beats” and therefore is the subject of more press reports. Reporters, attempting
to cover all sides of an issue, inevitably go to the opposing sources who are eager
to share their views.
 Also, while the president intends to draw more attention to the substance of a
contentious issue by pounding the press about it, his actions have the opposite
effect of drawing attention to the motivations and incentives of the different
policy advocates. (i.e. the “horserace”)
 Jacobs uses two examples, Clinton’s health care reform package and his Social
Security policy to demonstrate different consequences of the communication’s
war approach and its alternative, respectively.
o Clinton faced “strong political counteraction” to his efforts to ‘hammer
home his message” on health care; however, on Social Security he
“pursued an accommodating strategy” that was better received by the
press.
The Health Care Wars
 Clinton’s health care reform plan was introduced by an intensive media campaign,
beginning with a nationally televised speech in the House of Representatives, and
a constant stream of press reports and additional speeches.
o This ignited “counterstrategies” from all sides in the Congress and among
interest groups.
o Finally, while the president could not sustain his media campaign (an
inevitable occurrence according to Jacobs) because of other pressing
foreign and domestic emergencies and issues (Somalia/Whitewater), “his
critics remained ‘on message’ and eager to take advantage of his absence
to hammer his plan and outline their alternative plans.”
 Clinton’s attempt to rekindle his media campaign in his State of the Union in
1994 (threatening to veto any plan with less than universal coverage) were met
with then Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole’s counterclaim that there was no
health care crisis. Eventually, the campaign lost momentum again because the
plan got caught up in Congressional Committees and the CBO. Finally, the plan
died in the Senate, never even coming to a vote.
 “Little in the health care reform episode resembles the elaborate step-by-step
white House plan for presidential dominance of press coverage. The White
House consistently underestimated the media’s tendency to cover controversial
presidential initiatives by increasing their use of critics or distracting independent
voices as sources and their focus on political conflict and strategy.”
The Search for Common Ground on Social Security
 Social Security and health care reform were both contentious issues that Clinton
wanted to address. However, “what distinguished Clinton’s actions on Social
Security is that he started by acknowledging and attempting to accommodate the
viewpoints of a diverse set of political actors who had already expressed interest
in reforming the program.”
 The key to Social Security was “compromise” as opposed to health care reform in
which Clinton essentially gave his own plan as an ultimatum.

Unlike in the health care situation, the White House did not attempt to dominate
and control the press over the debate on Social Security: “The press was drawn to
Social Security before Clinton’s States of the Union address [in 1998] by real
world events (namely, the brightening budgetary outlook for Social Security) and
by the actions of a diverse group of influential government officials—members of
Congress, Greenspan, CBO officials and others.”
 Clinton merely helped guide the discussion as a “convener of major players”
rather than as “communicator-in-chief.” The press responded to this cooperative
approach, reporting on the substance of the policy, rather than on conflict and
political strategizing.
The Campaign to Privatize Social Security
 GWB declared the kind of communications war on social security reform which
Clinton had on health care reform.
 Hope for reform pinned on saturating airwaves and rallying Americans to reform
– key to success was seen as media blitz to inundate public through press with
carefully sculpted speeches from administration. 3 steps to strategy:
o Convey a sense of urgency and induce reporters to treat proposals as
necessity
o Saturate Americans with carefully chosen words while downplaying
others – keep large scale details out of equation
o Organize powerful coalition of allies to reinforce public communications
 WH felt approach successful – “The third rail is dead” but
 Communications was ignited critical reaction from Rs, Ds and Interest Groups –
Republican Congressmen split – one issue was size of private accounts, another
was assessment of size of risk of electoral backlash
 R doubts magnified by ferocious D criticism – press reported and highlighted
partisan divide
 GWB increased volume of coverage but also that of criticism – critics claimed
need for change modest not urgent and highlighted costs of reform
 GWB appreciated press’s tendency to focus on political strategy and so
highlighted substance
Collaborative Presidential Leadership
 Jacobs finally argues that presidents should “reconsider one particular leadership
style (communications warfare) in favor of another—institutionally-based
cooperative leadership.”
 He defines cooperative leadership as resting “on a philosophy of shared
governance, common institutional interest, and a focus upon issues already of
interest to other government officials.”
- Leading cooperatively, presidents will actually accomplish the goals they
set out to achieve, but eventually frustrate by launching a
communication’s war. (For a great summary of Jacobs’ argument, read
the brief section entitled “Collaborative Presidential Leadership”--bottom
of p. 323-325)
December 6:
The Presidency and the Press
Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership 3rd edition, (Congressional
Quarterly Press, 1997), chapter 3, pp. 65-103.
The FDR style of handling the press is illustrated by an incident where one New York editor ran a story
questioning Roosevelt’s health. The information was known by most in the immediate press family, but
FDR had told them “off the record”, a phrase that used to be powerful enough to keep stories out of the
newspaper.
“institutionalized pluralism requires continuous face-to-face negotiations among partison participants and
inculcates strong norms of propriety. Cordial relations are functional.” (66) the press is no different. Waldo
was chased out of the National Press Club by his colleagues who sided with the president to avoid suffering
a similar fate. “Roosevelt enjoyed a more productive relationship with the press corps, than any president
before or since.”(67)
Why was press important? Shaped and measured public opinion before polling existed.
Uses of press coverage: “By making an issue newsworthy, he can force other negotiators to deal with
it.”(67) Can also enhance his own position on any issue. Press can serve as an unofficial means of
communication between the White House and the Congress and often precedes official meetings.
Roosevelt’s success may have stemmed from his need to enlist many different persons to help with the
New Deal. Negotiation was a key part, and thus the press was played a critical role in “selling” the New
Deal. Roosevelt also understodd reporters’ professional interests, and thus reciprocity was born out of
mutual back-scratching.
History of DC Press: Increased professionalism can be explained both by the growth in the number of
reporters and the lower turnover—veterans were valued more for their connections, and the stability of
relationships contributed to professionalism that developed from the 1860’s through Roosevelt’s time.
Reporters also started working for more than one newspaper, began to be less partisan so they could be
hired by different newspapers: had to be flexible.
Early relations: Johnson started doing interviews (mostly to defend himself during the impeachment trials).
McKinley gave out his speaking schedule to reporters. T. Roosevelt gave more access in exchange for
more control over the stories. Closest reporters were the most controlled. First to create insiders vs.
outsiders. Wilson opened his weekly meetings to everyone, but had to abandon it later when his off-therecord stories leaked.
Coolidge, hid behind his spokesperson alit, began to take heat from the press. Hoover makes the press
angrier by reusing the insider-outsider tactics of T. Roosevelt. President criticized by the press more often.
More FDR: With FDR the press got unprecedented access, along with openly conveyed hard news.
Roosevelt strengthened the importance of the press conference. “Never let the reporter go home empty
handed.” Treated critics fairly, blamed editors instead of reporters. Used press conference instead of private
interview almost exclusively. First ever Press Secretary (Stephen Early). “President and press needed each
other to accomplish their respective tasks.” FDR understood this reciprocity better than anyone.
Truman, Eisenhower: Use the press less frequently, fewer conferences. Appeal through radio and
television instead. Reliance on “Media”
JFK: Publicly active president emerges. Uses rhetoric extensively. First live broadcast of president
speaking on television. Televised press conferences puts pressure on reporters.. Loses favor with the press
because he believes in speaking directly to the people. No more private press conferences. Conferences
also less frequent and less important. Started to fail to produce “hard news”. Kennedy also invited regional
papers to the White House, and used private interviews to get more control over the stories. Kennedy
accused of replacing negotiation with public pressure in Washington circles. Many thought his use of
media was “corrupt”.
However, the presidents after Kennedy have basically followed his model of president-press relations.
More use of local television coverage. Allows president to segment the market, and local tv is also more
likely to be docile compared to the Washington press. Each president had his own style. Johnson had
studio set up in the White House. Carter used town meeting settings a lot. Reagan used the radio.
Bush was not good on television, so he went back to using the press a little. Most were short notice so tv
crews couldn’t assemble. Used the informal approach over the formal, prime-time press conference.
Summary:
“With presidents increasingly going public and with a more assertive press, contention over control will
remain a fixture of the modern system… Modern presidents are clearly opting for more controllable means
to communicate their views to the American public… Presidents are also enlisting techniques that do not
require the direct participation of reporters. [They now use] television and speeches to gatherings of
special constituencies.” 96.
Presidential Style and Character
Michael Nelson: “The Psychological Presidency” –Summary
Michael Nelson examines James David Barber’s theories on the psychological elements of the presidency
and the need for political journalism to consider psychology in its coverage of presidential elections.
Psychological Perspectives on the Presidency:
Constitutional Perspectives—
-framers wanted to limit power of any single man
-framers vested executive power in a single person, in spite of potentially ruinous ambition,
because (1) they knew Washington would be the first president, and “his personal character would ensure
[the presidency’s] republican nature” (2) they provided for the election of a president by his peers (electors,
House members) who would know his character, and (3) they believed the Constitution allowed the
removal of “mad or wicked presidents” before they could do much damage
Scholarly Perspectives—
-now, framers’ defenses against President with defective character are gone
-post-FDR, scholars (i.e. Neustadt) were unconcerned with destructive ambition—they exalted not
only presidential power but ambitious presidents
-scholars recognized people’s attitudes towards presidents were psychological as well as political;
nationalistic emotions were directed toward presidency (not monarchy)
Example: Kennedy’s assassination provoked strong feelings of personal grief
James David Barber and the Psychological Presidency: presidency is an institution shaped by individual
personalities and public feelings about the office
Presidential Psychology—
-psychological constitution based on worldview (adolescence-born politically relevant beliefs),
style (“habitual way of performing 3 political roles: rhetoric, personal relations, and homework”—formed
in adulthood), and character
-character: enduring orientation toward life
-formation of character produces self-esteem: if high, person is “active-positive” = ideal for
presidency (FDR, Carter, Ford, Truman, Jefferson, Clinton)
-insecurity has three forms, each producing a personality type
1) affection seeking: passive positives (Madison, Taft, Harding, Reagan)—enjoy office, but not
hard-working
2) finding usefulness through duty: passive negatives (Washington, Coolidge, Eisenhower)—
duty propels them into politics
3) dominance seeking: active negatives (Adams, Hoover, Johnson, Nixon, Wilson)—throw
themselves into work compulsively, without satisfaction, and pursue disastrous policies
because unwilling to lose control by conceding error
-rarefied, courtlike atmosphere of presidency allows presidents to seal themselves off from harsh
political reality
Criticism:
-psychology may not be everything; healthy political personality is no guarantee of success in office, and
unsuitability does not correspond to failure
-philosophy and skills can explain behavior as well as personality
-subjective criteria—no clear standards against which to measure presidents
The Psychological Presidency: 212-220
Michael Nelson
Nelson dedicates this portion of his essay to three different aspects of James David Barber’s work:
1) Public Psychology; 2) Person, Public Mood, and the Psychological Presidency; 3) Barber’s
Prescriptions.
The first of these segments, Public Psychology, is focussed on Barber’s book, The Pulse of
Politics: Electing Presidents in the Media Age. The novel theory in Barber’s book is that presidential
elections of the twentieth century follow a 12-year cycle, one characterized by three different public
moods: conflict, conscience, and conciliation. According to this schema, an initial conflict-election, in
which the public yearns for a “blood-and-guts political contest”, is followed four years later by a
conscience-election where the public seeks to restore high-minded principles to the country and the
presidency. In the subsequent election, the public seeks to mollify the strains of four years spent devoted to
moral and political stringency. This conciliation-election, in which the public seeks tranquillity above all
else, is then followed by another conflict-election, and the cycle repeats itself.
According to Nelson, Barber sees the “psychological pulse” (conflict-conscience-conciliation)
found in modern elections as an extension of elemental human psychology. The Freudian terminology of
ego, superego, and id are supposed to reflect the three distinct public moods found in modern elections.
Moreover, each mood in the cycle is supposed to cause (in psychological terms) the next one, thus
explaining why the cycle recurs throughout modern elections.
Nelson criticizes Barber’s theory for two reasons. One, Barber does not include any sort of
scholarly citation to back up his weighty psychological claims. And two, the theory itself does not account
for the actual character of elections. (For instance, the acrimonious election of 1988 was supposed to be a
conscience election according to Barber’s theory.)
The second segment, Person, Public Mood, and the Psychological Presidency, examines both sides
of Barber’s model: the character of the president and the mood of the public during the election cycle.
According to Barber, each of the three public moods finds resonance with one of his distinct psychological
characters laid out for the modern presidents. Thus the conflict-election calls for a president with an activenegative psychological character, the conscience-election for a passive-negative, and the conciliationelection for a passive-positive. Barber’s fourth psychological type, the active-positive, finds resonance in
all public moods, and is considered a “president for all seasons”.
However, Nelson points out that there is a very poor correlation between the public mood during a
given election and the psychological type of the president elected, thereby further undermining Barber’s
theory.
The final segment of this essay, Barber’s Prescriptions, finds Nelson approving Barber’s ideas for
reforming the electoral system. Though Nelson rejects much of Barber’s psychological framework for
presidents and the election cycle, he agrees that media coverage of presidential elections should put greater
emphasis on the candidates. According to Barber, if the media focused less on the horse-race aspect of
elections and more on the characters of the candidates involved, the result would be a more informed and
more interested electorate. Barber sees this step as an entirely pragmatic step with respect to the business
of the media, which is to sell stories. More attention on individuals, their attributes of character, and their
views will garner greater readership for media sources, according to Barber. Nelson agrees.
James David Barber “Answering the Critics” (in The Presidential Character: Predicting
Performance in the White House)
Barber, in his influential book, The Presidential Character, categorizes Presidents based upon
psychoanalytic analysis into 4 categories (Active-Positive, Active-Negative, Passive-Positive, and PassiveNegative), which are summarized by Michael Nelson in “The Psychological Presidency” (The Presidency
and the Political System).
In this article, Barber responds to those who have critiqued his original thesis along the following lines:
1. Bias - Some critics have argued that Barber only presents those facts that fit his theory. He
responds by saying that the facts about presidential character and subsequent performance are all
in public view and he encourages those who have alternative theories to test them against the facts.
Personalism – Other critics blame Barber for focusing too much on the psychology of the
individual Presidents but he counters that by the very nature of the American political system it is
“an extraordinarily personalized office.” In reality, even the bureaucracy of the Executive branch
(EXOP and WHO) and the press are all focused on this one person.
3. Citizen Shrinks? Scholars have argued that Barber has written too much for the public, and not in
the language of social scientists, and therefore his work can not be serious. He believes that it is
harder to write for the public, but that this is who must be addressed since the reality is that they
are forced to make character judgments. Through his work he hopes to improve public
deliberation and choice by encouraging better journalistic analyses of character and style, rather
than merely focusing on the horserace and the issues.
4. Psychoanalytic mumbo jumbo? Barber feels that in the nuclear age, the need for a non-psychotic
President is essential, however he believes the campaign self-selects these individuals. He
disagrees with the over-interpretation of small errors by candidates but rather argues that citizens
must look for discernable patterns, as psychoanalysts do, in order to evaluate a candidate’s
character.
5. Iron Box Barber’s critics contradict one another in their views as to whether Barber overgeneralizes or gets too wrapped up in the specifics. He believes that the similarities between
different presidents can lead to generalization and abstraction, which allows him to categorize
them. Although each person exhibits some traits that contradict their category, he focuses on the
dominant characteristics.
6. Fake active-positives? Some critics believe that Barber’s work has encouraged candidates to seem
“energetic and optimistic” during the campaigns when they are not this way in reality. Barber
believes, however, that campaigning and governing are very different and therefore one must look
beyond how a candidate behaves during a campaign to longer-term patterns of character traits and
behavior.
7. The Mechanists Barber dislikes the move towards mechanical research and modeling by political
scientists.
8. Change in adulthood Although American culture values change, Barber believes that individuals
are rarely transformed and therefore he emphasizes continuity and an individual’s character over
change.
9. Downplaying world view Barber focuses more on character and style than a President’s world
view because he says that this is the most likely to change since our political system values
pragmatism over ideology.
10. Inside my head Some critics believe that Barber stole his theory from another scholar but they
disagree as to from whom. He counters that it was the process of many years of research and
study that helped him develop it, as opposed to a single individual.
2.
Conclusion: Barber aims to improve the chances for a better Presidential choice by shifting the focus of
both political journalists and the public to the importance of a candidate’s character, style and worldview in
predicting their performance as President. He believes that the future will continue to be a “Presidential
era.”
Evaluating Presidents and the Presidency
Michael Nelson, "Evaluating the Presidency," in Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the
Political System, pp. 3-28.
-Nelson examines the way in which 5 different groups evaluate the presidency: scholars, journalists, the
public, congressmen, and bureaucrats
 Scholars: Strength Amid Confusion
 Scholars in the 1950’s and 60’s looked most of all for strength and the desire to be strong in
presidents




 This included ability to battle successfully against Congress and the Supreme Court
They also held the president in a somewhat religious view
 “Savior” model: the president should be strong, omnipotent, and benevolent
 Said president had a lot of power and that this was good
Scholars in the period immediately following the Johnson and Nixon presidencies used the
“Satan” model
 Thought that president had too much power and that this power has harmful
 Some, like Barber, explained this theory through psychology, blaming it on “active-negative”
personalities
 Others blamed it on the growth of the office
After weak presidencies of Ford and Carter, scholars switched to Samson model
 Said that pres. didn’t have enough power, which was bad
 Said there was a gap between expectations and actual abilities of pres., due to weakness of
parties, decentralization of Congress, fragmentation of bureaucracy, growth of media, etc.
Despite the differences between all of these theories, they all seem to have the basic notion that
strength in the presidency is a good thing (even the Satan model)
 Journalists: Strength Amid Cynicism
 Basic idea: Journalists are cynical of president, but like scholars, they encourage presidential
strength
 Cynicism has two origins:
 One is the period involving Vietnam and Watergate, in which reporters were lied to
 The other is “status frustration,” which occurs because the members of the White House press
corps are very important, highly paid, etc., but they still have to follow the president around
and rely on him to give them the news
 Press coverage often becomes negative when the president’s credibility is in doubt (Nixon in
Watergate, Clinton in Lewinsky scandal)
 Most presidents get generally positive news coverage, though
 They usually get even more positive coverage from the press when they show strength and
decisiveness and other leadership qualities
 The media is often forced to rely on the president for stories, and this constant coverage of the
president increases his prestige and apparent strength
 Media also examines issues in terms of winning and losing, which makes strong presidents look
like good presidents
 Citizens: Strength Amid Contradiction
 Public’s expectations of president are contradictory because they want the president to be the chief
of government and the chief of state
 Want him both to get things done and to be above the fray
 Public also expects president to get many contradictory policies done
 In theory, Americans are “philosophical congressionalists,” which means that in the abstract, they
would prefer that Congress run the country
 In practice, though, Americans are “operational presidentialists,” which means that they like
strong, forceful presidents who take the lead over Congress
 Americans are also “emotional presidentialists,” which means that almost all of their political
heroes are presidents
 This emotional attachment helps give the presidency strength
 Members of Congress: Strength amid Constituency Centeredness
 Congressmen want to be reelected, so they must focus on pleasing their constituencies
 They therefore propose bills that sound good but won’t pass, and they also focus on programs
that benefit interest groups and campaign contributors
 This would make it seem difficult for a president with a large national agenda to be held in high
favor with Congress, but this constituency centeredness in Congress actually increases presidential
strength in 3 ways: the power to initiate, the power of popularity, and power in foreign policy



Power to initiate
 Since 1932, Congress has given the president more and more responsibility to initiate
legislation in order to get things done, especially with regard to the economy (Employment
Act of 1946 required pres. to monitor economy and fix it in times of distress)
Power of popularity
 In order to be reelected, congressmen will often follow the president if he is considered
popular by the public
Power in foreign policy
 By focusing on domestic issues, Congress leaves foreign policy realm to Pres.
 Bureaucrats: Strength amid Careerism
 Career civil servants are often motivated by self-interest, which would seem to make them less
influenced by presidential leadership
 Civil servants often do respond to presidential leadership, however, because doing so can often
help them to get ahead and move up in their agencies if the president rewards them
 Conclusion
 All of these groups appreciate strength in the presidency, although they may not always want to do
so
 Two cautionary notes, though:
 Each group has a slightly different idea of strength (i.e. public often sees unifying ability as a
strength, while press sees defeating political opposition as a strength)
 When presidents focus more on being strong than on their true duties, it is bad for the country
Possible ID’s:
1) Savior model of presidency: scholarly theory from 1950’s and 60’s that the president should be
something like a Christ figure- strong, omnipotent, benevolent, etc.
2) Satan model of presidency: scholarly theory from 1970’s that the presidency was too strong and
was therefore harmful
Samson model of presidency: scholarly theory following Ford and Carter presidencies
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Rating the Presidents: From Washington to Clinton," Political Science Quarterly,
Vol. 112 (Summer 1997), pp. 179-190.
Schlesinger gives a fun, breezy rundown of how presidents have been rated in the past half-century and
what major factors lie behind historians’ rankings of them.
 Modern ratings of the presidents began when Schlesinger’s father asked 55 leading historians how they
rated the American presidents in 1948, garnering much interest and much controversy. When Schlesinger
repeated his poll in 1962, it received the same response.
 In 1996, Schlesinger Jr. replicated the poll for The New York Times Magazine. Presidents were rated
Great, Near Great, Average, Below Average, and Failure, and were judged on their performance while in
the White House, not on lifetime achievement.
 Schlesinger then wanders off into a long discussion of why historians have the right to judge presidents in
the first place—for many presidents, only presidents (those who have done the job, and completely
understand it) are qualified to judge other presidents. As Coolidge wrote in an “unwonted lyrical outburst,”
describing how it is to be president, “Like the glory of a morning sunrise, it can only be experienced—it
cannot be told.” For other scholars, the Schlesinger polls were too subjective—but their longer, more
complex polls yielded essentially the same results. Writes Schlesinger:
“There have been nine Greats and Near Greats in nearly all the scholarly reckonings. Lincoln,
Washington and F.D. Roosevelt are always at the top, followed always, though in varying order, by
Jefferson, Jackson, Polk, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, and Truman. Occasionally John Adams, Cleveland
and Eisenhower join the top nine. The Failures have always been Grant and Harding, with Buchanan,
Pierce, Fillmore, Taylor, and Coolidge always near the bottom.”
The best and worst presidents have remained fairly stable through the years, Schlesinger says; presidents in
between fluctuate much more in the polls. John Quincy Adams, Buchanan, Andrew Johnson, and
Cleveland have declined noticeably more recently, while Eisenhower has steadily risen from 22nd in
Schlesinger’s 1962 poll to ninth in a Chicago Sun-Times poll in 1996.
 When historians are rating presidents, Schlesinger says, they face a few major dilemmas. First, some
presidents are “schizoid”—Nixon with his brilliant foreign policy and disastrous Watergate dealings, LBJ
with the impressive series of Great Society legislative victories and, at the same time, his Vietnam debacle.
Second, he implies, they must rate the presidents based on a thorough knowledge of American history, not
giving in to popular considerations. Polk’s high ratings—given for accomplishing the presidential
objectives he set out to do—are usually not understood by laymen, while Harding was an exceedingly
popular president while in office but is now universally derided by historians (think the Teapot Dome
scandal).
 Schlesinger then gives a few concrete criteria for what make great presidents Great in the scholarly polls.
First, they must have “an instinct for the dynamics of history”; “Great presidents have a deep connection
with the needs, anxieties, dreams of the people.” Second, presidents must have a goal and must convince
Congress and the public of the rightness of their course. Crisis gives presidents a chance to be great, but
only if they are great will they rise to the occasion, as Lincoln and FDR did, and not falter, as Buchanan
and Hoover did. Of national crises, war is the most common, and all of the top ten presidents except for
Jefferson were involved in war before or during their presidencies. Finally, Great presidents cannot be
middle-of-the-roaders. Writes Schlesinger, “Every president would like to be loved by everyone in the
country, but presidents who sacrifice convictions to a quest for popular affection are not likely to make it to
the top”; they must make decisive choices in pursuit of their ideals. “Judge me,” FDR said, “by the enemies
I have made.”
 Schlesinger ends by analyzing what Clinton, then entering his second term, needed to do to make his
mark on history. His analysis of Clinton’s strengths and weaknesses is perceptive, but more importantly, it
underscores the lost potential of Clinton’s second term. “To make a mark on history,” Schlesinger writes,
“Clinton must liberate himself from polls and focus groups. Let him put his first-rate intelligence to work
on the hard problems.” But Clinton’s lack of self-discipline, as we all know, cost him much of the political
capital of his second term, preventing him from even having the chance to tackle the hard problems—and
for that he is destined to remain a very middling Average.
Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power, chapter 9, pp. 167-182.
Ch.9 was the first new chapter added for the second edition of Presidential Power. In it, Neustadt
lists his criteria for appraising a president and clues to answering them. His criteria contains four
questions: What were his purposes and how were they relevant to his time? What was his “feel”, his
operating style? What was his stance under pressure in office? What was his legacy? Neustadt argues that
the third, fifth and sixth years of a presidency are the most crucial for appraising a president. He explains
why the other years are less indicative of a president’s success. Throughout the entire chapter, he uses JFK
as his prime example and goes through the four questions and their respective “clues” to identify where
JFK was successful and where he was not.
Gienapp, William. “Abraham Lincoln and Presidential Leadership”
I.
Introduction: Despite all the trials and tribulations that a President faces, the
presidency “remains the focus of the American political system and the most
important source of national leadership.” Because of its importance, historians and
political scientists have attempted for decades to determine a formula for evaluating a
II.
III.
IV.
V.
President. The main conclusion that can be drawn from these studies is that there is
no such formula. Gienapp believes the task of evaluating presidential leadership can
be divided into 5 categories – the President as the leader of his administration, his
party, the government, the military, and the American people.
Because he made some of the most significant decisions during a major national
crisis, many historians believe that Abraham Lincoln is the greatest President in
American history.
A. Yet Lincoln’s contemporaries, even members of his own party, did not share this
opinion.
B. Still, Gienapp believes that Lincoln’s pre-presidential career, while it seemed
undistinguished, showed that he had the skills to be a great President.
C. From the very beginning of his presidency Lincoln’s main goal was to preserve
the Union. After the attack on Fort Sumter, Lincoln decided that military force
was necessary to maintain the Union. “That he succeeded was his greatest
accomplishment as president.”
Lincoln as the leader of his administration
A. Throughout his political career, Lincoln made crucial decisions completely on his
own. Lincoln made decisions by gathering advice from various people, listening
to opposing viewpoints, and then thinking about the issue and making up his
mind in solitude.
B. Lincoln appointed his major rivals for the 1860 Republican nomination to his
cabinet, making it one of the more distinguished cabinets in history. He
appointed his rivals because he intended to rely on his own judgment; the cabinet
was never a policy-making body under Lincoln. Lincoln even made the decision
to issue the Emancipation Proclamation completely on his own.
Lincoln as the leader of his party
A. He knew how to keep good personal relations with individuals and paid close
attention to organizational details
B. The patronage system was very important to him and he therefore devoted a lot
of attention to federal appointments
C. He was respectful of party critics, which helped hold the Republican party
together during the war even when members were divided over the issues of
slavery, war policy, and reconstruction.
D. He could handle severe criticism and never became intimidated.
E. He was easily renominated by the Republican convention in 1864.
Lincoln as a leader of the government
A. His relationship with Congress:
1.
Lincoln left it mostly to Congress to make important legislation –
He would recommend general policies but normally did not submit
legislation to Congress
2.
Lincoln did take an active role on legislation that involved slavery
because this was part of the Union war aims. ( He put a lot of effort
into getting the 13th Amendment, which abolished slavery, passed)
3.
Because Lincoln found Congress difficult to deal with , his most
decisive actions occurred while Congress was not in session, such as
the initial call for troops, the institution of the blockade, and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
4.
Still, Lincoln’s tactful approach to Congress made sure that the
relationship never completely broke down
B. Lincoln lacked diplomatic experience and therefore took little interest in foreign
affairs.
VI.
VII.
C. Lincoln’s relationship with the military: Despite not having much prior
experience with the military, Lincoln took an active role during the war, both in
the selection of commanders and in the determination of strategy. He had a keen
insight into military strategy:
1.
recognized importance of the navy
2.
realized that his army had to take advantage of the North’s
numerical superiority
3.
displayed “a considerable amount of tact” with his military
commanders; how much he intervened with their plans depended on
how much faith he had in them
Lincoln as the leader of the American people
A. amazing ability to read the public mood
B. However, Gienapp believes that Lincoln should have made more speeches to
gain popular support for his policies. Instead, Lincoln relied on written speeches.
1.
Although he was mostly self-educated, Lincoln was a “literary
craftsman”
2.
Gettysburg Address, the most famous presidential speech, clearly
stated the meaning of the war
3.
The Second Inaugural, delivered just after victory, is known for its
humility and compassion
C. had a remarkable ability to reach out to the common people in his speeches –
probably more popular with the people than with leaders of his own party
D. very good sense of political timing, as demonstrated by his eventual adoption of
emancipation as a war aim
E. held onto what war was really about – an effort to preserve democracy in the land
of opportunity
Conclusion
A. Contemporaries did not view Lincoln in such a positive way because of his
undistinguished political career beforehand, his policies were controversial at the
time and naturally offended many people, the increasing cost of the war and his
failure to end the conflict for some time, and many just could not get passed his
physical appearance.
B. Historians, however, know the outcome of events and the significance of
Lincoln’s decisions are captivated by his tragic death, understand the military
difficulties he faced, and are fascinated by the power of his words.