THE OTTOMAN AND TURKISH ECONOMIES AND THEIR INTEGRATION INTO
EUROPE. 1453-2006.
Dr. Gerrit De Vylder, Associate Professor Lessius Hogeschool, Antwerp, Belgium; Affiliated
Researcher Leuven University, Belgium
Object of study
In a publication for the 40th Annual Meeting of the World Bank at Seul, Korea, in 1985, Turkish Prime
Minister Turgut Özal of Turkey summed up some objectives for the year 2000 under the title “It’s not a
dream” (Turkey in the 2000’s, 1985). And he included the possibility that Turkey would have become
a full member of the EEC in the year 2000. He assumed that application would be made in 1986-1987
and that Turkey was to assume its place in Europe by 2002 at the latest. We now know that this
remains a dream. Only in 1999 in Helsinki, the EU finally decided to accept Turkey’s candidacy for
membership. But still the EU countered that democratic and economic deficiencies in Turkey’s
institutions and practices disqualified it from membership. Again in November 2000 the EU announced
a list of the conditions Turkey has to meet before it can start negotiations to join the EU (The
Economist, November 4th 2000). Among others the EU expressed worries about Turkish economic
performances. In December 2000 the situation became apparent when in December 2000 the
International Monetary Fund agreed on a $10bn loan for Turkey. In return Turkey’s Prime Minister
Bulent Ecevit promised to speed up privatisations and reform of the crisis-hit banking sector. Yet again
in February 2001 the Turkish Lire lost about one third of its value and foreign capital started leaving
the country. The new government of the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by
Prime Minister, R.T. Erdogan, continued to find a balance between demands of, on the one hand, the
EU (which Turkey obviously still wanted to join) and the IMF (with which it had a vital stand-by
agreement), and, on the other, an increasingly nationalist lobby at home. In October 2005 Turkey and
the EU finally started accession negotiations. Despite monetary and other reforms in order to leave the
country better prepared to face external shocks, inflationary tensions, a serious debt burden and a large
current-account deficit continued to challenge the economy. However, some economic indicators also
showed that Turkey was performing better then the economies of other EU-member candidates. The
question arises whether Turkish application for EU-membership was or should be considered
differently from other applications? (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005).
We argue that the idea of “Europe” itself is the result of “Eurocentric” thinking and that concepts like
democracy, market economy or rationalism moved around in an “Eurasian” world for millennia and
belong to mankind in general. Too often Europeans consider themselves as the only heirs of such
traditions thereby pushing away many Moslim and other communities who start considering
themselves as “not belonging to the club”. Moreover we argue that the Ottoman or Turkish sphere
contributed significantly to this exchange of ideas, concepts, techniques, products, capital and people.
In order to assess this we consider the subject not in the usual way of analysing contemporary
economic and social performance, but from a broad socio-economic and historic perspective that may
give us an insight into the very structures of Turkish society and economy and its relations with
Western Europe. Like Winston Churchill stated: “The further backwards you look, the further forward
you can see” (Andrew, 2002, xi). This will also provide us insights into whether it is justifiable to treat
the Turkish application in a different way from other applications. It should also be taken into account
that quite often the “historical argument” is used as an argument against Turkey’s EU membership.
From a Polish Point of View
One of the milestones of Polish history is Sobieski’s defeat of the Turks at Chocim in 1673. This
episode is usually referred to by eurocentered historians emphasizing the West-European,and Catholic
nature of Polish identity. Poland-Lithuania was the “Bulwark of Christendom”. Indeed Poland’s
Catholicism determined that all her elected rulers (kings) came from the West and the main axis of
Polish commerce lay westwards on the roads to Germany or on the Baltic sea lanes to Holland, France,
and Spain. Yet, Poland-Lithuania’s adjacence to the Moslim world and Poland’s overland trade on the
Black Sea route should not be ignored. Poland’s long wars with the Turks did not discourage a stronge
taste for Persian and Ottoman rugs and oriental fashion. Nor did the multiple confrontation with the
Tartars prevent the Polish nobility from dressing in a Tartar, Oriental style or cultivating Tartar
horsemanship. The Polish gateway to the West, Gdanks or Danzig, remained after all a predominantly
German-speaking area. The real inland Poland remained for a very long time oriented towards the
South-East. The depth of the rejection of Poland’s rejection of her Russian neighbour made a weakened
Turkey eventually an ally. Whenever Poland was hard pressed by the Habsburgs, or by the Muscovite
Russians, the Poles would fervently pray for a Turkish campaign in the Balkans or on the Black Sea
coast. The Ottomans provided the only regular counterbalance to Poland’s more immediate eastern
neighbours, and increasingly the only hope of relief (Davies, 2001, 300-305).
The Ottomans: Economic Growth or Stagnation?
We argue that historically the Turkish Ottoman empire was an integral part of European economic and
material civilization and culture. More specifically, the Turkish Ottoman empire always acted as the
“bridge of the world”. The so-called “Turkish menace” was in reality a means of diffusing Asian and
Arab technologies into Europe.
However, somewhere from the late 17th century onwards a myth was created that the Ottoman empire
was a backward area. The English economic liberals of the 17th and 18th centuries, such as the
philosopher John Locke, argued that the first requisite for national economic growth was the protection
of private property, for unless the right to property was sustained the incentive to work was reduced
and the production of wealth would decrease (Fusfeld, 1994, 19-22). A favorite illustration of this
principle was a comparison of the wealth of the English and the poverty of the Turks. In ancient times,
liberals pointed out, the domain of the Turks was the wealthiest in the world, with flourishing cities,
prosporous agriculture, large exports, and world-famous manufactures. But a despotic and arbitrary
government seized wealth without justification, imposed confiscary taxes, and operated both justice
and government through a system of bribery. These actions brought an end to prosperity. The Turk
languished in poverty thereafter, unwilling to work, to produce, or to accumulate capital because it
would be seized or destroyed by a corrupt government. Happy and prosperous England, on the other
hand, was growing wealth because individual initiative was protected by a rule of law that preserved
for the individual the wealth he or she produced and saved.
However, according to Frank (1998, 78) the European view that the Ottoman empire was a world onto
itself and “virtually a fortress” (Braudel, 1995, 69-92) is more ideological than factual. Moreover, the
“traditional” Eurocentric put-down of the Ottomans as stuck-in-the-mud Muslim military bureaucrats
only reflects historical reality insofar as it is an expression of the very real commercial competition that
the Ottomans posed for European commercial interests and ambitions. The famous French historian
Braudel (1995, 69-92) claimed that “Turkey’s real greatness, denied for a long time in Europe, is now
gradually re-emerging through research by historians”.
The Case for Growth. 16th and 17th Centuries.
So, what did happen in the Ottoman empire in the 16th and 17th centuries? The Ottoman Turks were
indeed responsible for a remarkable re-emergence of islam from the 15th century onwards aided by a
general recovery of the world economy. Their rapid military victories began well before their conquest
of Constantinople in 1453. Constantinople had developed as and lived off its role as a major NorthSouth and East-West crossroads for a millennium since its Byzantine founding. That also made it
attractive for conquest by the Ottomans, who renamed it Istanbul. By the sixteenth century the
Ottomans had made Turkey one of the great powers in the Mediterranean. They were the new masters
of Byzantium and of the Arabian holly places. Soon they more or less restructured the whole of Islam.
From an economic point of view the Ottomans took over the merchant’s role of the Arabs and
Byzantines. They did indeed occupy the geographical and economic crossroads between Europe and
Asia, and they sought to make the most of it. The East-West spice and silk trade continued overland
and by ship through Ottoman territory. With a population of 600,000 to 750,000 in the 16 th century,
Istanbul was by far the largest city in Europe and West-Asia and nearly the largest in the world (Frank,
1998, 12 & 78).
The Ottoman empire drew an important part of its public revenues and silver stocks from the silk and
other trades with Europe. Apart from the relations with Europe there was the very important trade
Eastwards with Moghul India and Safavid Persia, using the Asian land routes. Of course, because of
the geographical position, the transit trade was of particular importance. The Ottoman court and others
had their own resources and transcontinental trade connections, to import large quantities of distant
Chinese goods, such as porcelain. The wealth of the Ottoman empire also derived from substantial
local and regional production and commercialisation, interregional and international specialization,
division of labour and trade. Evidence of private, public or semipublic enterprises involved in silk,
cotton and their derived textiles, leather and its products, agriculture in general, as well as mining and
metal industries (Frank, 1998, 78-82). A very special product that Turkey gave Europe and the world
was the tulip. Possibly, Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, Ferdinand I’s ambassador to the court of Süleyman
the Magnificent in Istanbul, was responsible for introducing it. Busbecq or Busbeke (1522-1591) was
one of a long series of Flemish ambassadors who represented the Habsburg emperors in Istanbul and
sent plants and other curiosities back to their patrons. Busbecq wrote: “The Turks cultivate flowers
with extreme zeal, and though they are careful people, do not hesitate to pay a considerable sum for an
exceptional flower”. Cargoes of bulbs started arriving in Antwerp from Istanbul in 1562 long before
they were shipped into Amsterdam. But by their industry and application in growing and selling bulbs,
the Dutch ensured that they were the last, triumphant survivors in the tulip trade (Pavord, 2000).
Already during the so-called “Tulip-period”, from 1718 to 1730 the trade reversed: Dutch tulips were
than exported to the Ottoman empire (Bakker, Vervloet en Gailly, 1997, 106).
Furthermore, the Ottomans’ territory expanded further both westward and eastward. This expansion
was motivated not only politically and military but also, indeed primarely, economically. Like
everybody else, be they Venetians, French, Portuguese, Persians, Arabs, or whatever, the Ottomans
were always trying to divert and control the major trade routes, from which they and especially the
state lived. Thus the Ottoman Mulims sought to displace the Christians in the Balkans and the
Mediterranean, where economic plums were to be picked, including the control of the trade routes
through the Mediterranean and the timber and dye wood of the Balkans (Frank, 1998, 78-82). On the
other hand, the Ottoman empire could not participate in the “American experience” because its territory
did not extend to the Atlantic coast and the straits of Gibraltar were an effective barrier to keep out
Ottoman traders. In the long run this proved to be disastrous for capitalistic development in the empire.
“El dorado” did not reach the Ottomans and they became relatively capital extensive compared to
Western Europe which gradually became more capital intensive.
But until the end of the 18th century the balance of trade with Western Europe remained in favour of
the Ottoman empire. In this way the empire indirectly did profit from the flow of Latin American
precious metals to Western Europe. The few European exports to the Ottoman empire were curiously
enough dominated by the slave trade. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the main source of
supply was in southeastern Europe, where the advance of the Ottoman jihad brought a steady and
ample supply of Albanian, Slavonic, Wallachian, Hungarian and other Christian slaves. Some were
recruited by the famous devshirme, the levy of Christian boys from the subject populations of the
empire; others were captured. Great numbers of Balkan Christian boys entered the Ottoman military
and bureaucratic apparatus, which for a while even came to be dominated by these new recruits to the
Ottoman state and the Muslim faith. Many of them rose to the highest offices in the Ottoman state
(Lewis, 1994, 190-91).
After conquest no longer provided an adequate flow of slaves to meet the needs of the empire a
substitute was found. The Tatar Khans of the Crimea, an autonomous Muslim dynasty recognizing a
loose Ottoman suzerainty, developed a vast apparatus of slave raiding and slave trading. They captured
slaves from Russian, Polish and Ukrainian populations and brought them to the Crimea, where they
were sold and shipped to Istanbul for further distribution through the slave markets of the Ottoman
empire. Unlike the recruits of the devshirme, they rarely penetrated the Ottoman ruling élite, but served
instead in humbler and often menial capacities. Apart from forms of service in households and harems,
they were also employed in plantations and in mines mostly operated by the government, and were as
such used for economic purposes (Lewis, 1994, 190-91).
Already in the 15th century, also the trade in weapons was very extensive and included vital raw
materials. The Vatican and different European governments were concerned about the supply of war
materials and military skills to the Turks by rival European powers. In the late 16 th and early 17th
centuries, the Catholic powers frequently accused the Protestants, and especially the British, of
supplying a wide range of war materials, and especially tin (Lewis, 1994, 185-200). On the other hand,
the Ottoman empire itself was the very site of various technological revolutions, especially in the field
of military technology, many of which diffused across to Western Europe (Hobson, 2004, 186-189).
Apart from slaves and war materials, Europe seems to have had little to offer that would interest the
Ottoman purchaser. There was, however, one exception; that was British cloth, already famous in
Western Europe in the High Middle Ages (Lewis, 1994, 185-200).
While emphasising the economic successes of the Ottoman empire we should also consider the fact that
the Ottoman empire, like Moghul India and Safavid Persia, was indeed a cash-taxing empire. Fiscal
pressure is normally considered an obstacle for economic growth. But these taxes could not exist
without flourishing internal and external trade. The interests of the state and the economy were in a
certain way identical. Brummett summarises that the Ottoman state could be compared to European
mercantilist states on the bases of ambitions, commercial behaviours, and claims to universal
sovereignty (Frank, 1998, 78-82). It is also interesting to mention Franks’ observation that the shifting
tactical diplomatic, political, and military alliances and competitive maneuvering or outwright war in
pursuit first and foremost of commercial advantage belie the myth of alleged common fronts and
interests between the Christian West on the one hand and the Muslim East on the other. Muslim
Mamluks, Ottomans, Persians and Indians fought with each other, and they forged shifting alliances
with different European Christian states, all in pursuit of the same end: profit. So only when it was
convenient the use of religious rhetoric was a strategy employed by all contenders for power in the
Euro-Asian sphere.
Also studies like the one on the Egyptian merchant Isma’il Abu Taqiyya by Hanna (1998) shed new
light on the economic performances of the Ottoman empire during the 16th and 17th centuries. There
were certainly benefits to be gained from belonging to the Ottoman commercial space. Commercial ties
were intensified between the different regions. Syria, Anatolia and Egypt were not only major trading
partners with eachother, but also major consumers of eachothers’ products. Syria and Anatolia
consumed Egyptian sugar and textiles. The traditional trade routes from North Africa, black Africa, the
Red Sea, Sinai, and the Mediterranean Sea which had long been in use, were not abandoned.
By the end of the 16th century some weakening of the Ottoman structures at the top gave merchants a
chance to boost their positions in relation to the power structure. Less state intervention in commerce
meant they could have a freer hand in running their affairs. It should also be taken into account that
Turkey was a forerunner of introducing free trade which is considered to be a characteristic of the birth
of capitalism in 19th century Western Europe; Western Europe, even in the 19 th century, never matched
the low import tariff levels found in the Ottoman empire during the 17 th and 18th centuries (Hobson,
2004, 287-289).
However, it is true that changes taking place did not revolutionize the social structures at the time. At
the top of the hierarchy, the Ottoman military still dominated the power structure; merchants and
scholars still had a lower position. The adjustments that merchants made and the mechanisms that they
used were those offered by a traditional society. Merchants were using the legal tools and commercial
structures and institutions that had, for the most part, existed for a long time. In spite of the restrictions
that these structures imposed, these were far less rigid than we tend to think. Hanna (1998, 43-69)
suggests that rather than viewing these structures only as obstacles to any initiative, we can understand
the situation better by considering them as frameworks within which different forms of action were
sanctioned.
But these frameworks also imply that most investments of merchants in trade and industry were
undertaken within certain limits. A merchant never involved himself in a long-term commitment. The
amounts of money he invested were never too large to be irretrievable, mainly because they were shortterm investments. If the following year, trends changed, he could transfer his investment elsewhere
with no great loss. Likewise, merchants had to spend some money for political purposes, sometimes
sharing their trade with individuals in power or advancing them loans.
Keyder (1991, 157-180) emphasizes that basically production was still organised in a traditional way,
monopolised by the guilds whose role in society was important. In addition to restrictions of a
corporate nature and control over quality and prices, which they shared with their counterparts in
Western Europe, Ottoman guilds also served the purpose of administrative control and taxation, and
contributed to the compactness of the social order.
According to Goodwin (1999, 121-129) Turks with any pretensions were rentiers through and through,
and always hoping for promotion and rewards. They used their money to attain positions enabling them
to carve off a slice of the wealth that was being created under their noses. Unlike the aristocracies of
Western Europe, who ultimately moved into trade, finance and production, the Ottomans still saw
wealth as plunder. The economy served the war. Especially minorities invested in trade, production and
even land. They were people who by definition had no role in the political process.
Nevertheless as far as the 16th and 17th centuries is concerned the overall situation was not significantly
different from Western Europe where a similar situation existed and similar changes were taking place.
One very important observation in this regard, finally, is that the Ottoman Turkish standard of living
and real wage rates never fell behind those of the West-Europeans at any point before the 19th century,
despite the standard “Eurocentric” claim (Hobson, 2004, 74-79).
Mixed Blessings in the 18th and 19th Centuries
Ottoman economic expansion seems to have peaked in the late seventeenth century when succesful
European economies, receiving silver and gold from the new American colonies, started being a new
engine of growth for the world economy. In Europe mercantilism started to give way to a more liberal
capitalism. Gran (1999, 3-34) argues that this capitalist transformation also took place during a first
phase in the Ottoman Empire. He studied the Egyptian economy where this transformation was
introduced by Muslim merchants and Mamluk rulers in the eighteenth century. The changing role of
the state was crucial to this evolution. As in Europe, at the end of the 18 th century a weaker state
allowed groups such as merchants to reemerge and play a more prominent role, both economically and
socially. Gran (1999, 111-131) observes Mamluk grandees in Egypt involved in the lucrative
commercial activities of merchants. Mohammed Ali, the famous Pasha of Egypt, threatening the
central power in Istanbul with the strong centralized Egyptian state he developped, was an interruption
from 1807 to 1849. Subsequently, the military intervention of European powers, much more politically
centralized than they had earlier been, changed the situation in their and the Ottoman sultan’s favour.
However, in the Ottoman empire the relatively weakness of the central government meant that more
and more merchants involved themselves in business with West-European countries which, at that
moment, were developing comparative advantages in the industrial field. Without a strong and
centralized state supporting initiatives to narrow the technological gap these merchants would only
produce raw materials and import finished products, thereby contributing to the de-industrialization of
their country.
Another new reality was that European discoveries had been turning the Eastern Mediterranean into a
backwater, and the lines of trade and wealth which had converged on Istanbul now seemed to be
moving away (Goodwin, 1999, 121-129). The opening and development of the Oceanic routes
bypassing the Middle East, and even the Persian silk trade, which had been important as a source of
raw materials and tax revenue to Turkey, was increasingly diverted and to a large extent controlled by
West European merchants. Most importantly, Europe’s new industrial capacity at last gave European
merchants something substantial to offer to Middle Eastern customers (Lewis, 1994, 185-200). As a
result the Ottoman economy became gradually weaker during the first half of the eighteenth century
and decline accelerated in the last third of the century. Then also Ottoman political power began to be
threatened by the Europeans at the turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries, following
Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt.
Already throughout the eighteenth century, Ottoman foreign trade as a whole stagnated and therefore
declined as a share of growing world trade. In particular trade with Western Europe declined. Moreover
the composition of this trade was being reversed. Where once Europe had imported cloth from the
Ottoman empire it now imported raw materials. In reality the production and export of agricultural and
other raw materials increased only slowly. However their share of total exports increased rapidly, as
cotton textiles and manufacturing exports decreased (Frank, 1998, 78-82).
But it was clear that exports of agricultural products could not make up for the loss in exports of
manufactured products. Both coffee and the sugar to sweeten it had first been introduced to Europe
from the Ottoman empire. Coffee, which originally came from the southern end of the Red Sea,
probably from Ethiopia, was brought to the Eastern Mediterranean lands during the sixteenth century
and spread from there to Europe. By the second decade of the 18 th century, the Dutch were growing
coffee in Java for the European market and the French were even exporting coffee, grown in their West
Indian colonies, to the Ottoman empire. Colonial coffee brought by West European merchants was
cheaper than that coming from the Red Sea area and greatly reduced its share of the market. Sugar was
first refined in India and Iran and than imported by Europe from Egypt, Syria, and North Africa, and
transplanted by the Arabs to Sicily and Spain. From there it was taken to the New World. Here again
West Indian colonies provided an opportunity which was not missed. In 1671, the French built a
refinery in Marseilles from which they exported colonial sugar to the Ottoman empire. Consumption in
Turkey increased enormously when the Turks took to sweetening their coffee, perhabs as a
consequence of the bitterer flavor of the West Indian bean. So far they had relied largely on Egyptian
sugar. West Indian sugar, being produced by slave labour, was cheaper and soon dominated the
Ottoman market (Lewis, 1994, 185-200; Pendergrast, 1999). As Lewis (1994, 195-96) puts it: “By the
end of the 18th century, when a Turk or an Arab drank a cup of coffee both the coffee and the sugar had
been grown in Central America and imported by French or English merchants. Only the hot water was
of local provenance”. Much the same story applies to the cheaper cotton that came from North America
and began to displace that from Anatolia (Frank, 1998, 78-82).
Especially after 1760 the weaving and export of cotton cloth declined. Gradually the import of WestEuropean, especially British, manufactured textiles and other products increased. The fact that Turkey
was a forerunner of introducing free trade, already implementing low import tariff levels in the 17th
century, precisely allowed cheap industrial imports from the UK to destroy pre-capitalist and protoindustrialist structures (Hobson, 2004, 287-289). Simultaneously, Ottoman state control weakened as
the strength of its central institutions waned, and regional decentralization grew. The Ottomans were
not able, or at least were less able, to benefit from a renewed international growth phase at the end of
the 18th century, while the West-Europeans did (Frank, 1998, 78-82).
According to Keyder (1991, 157-180) the restructuring imposed on the Ottoman economy by its
incorporation into the European economy accelerated the destruction of some forms of production and
led to the growth of others.
Unlike India, historical research in eighteenth-century Anatolia has not yet revealed incontrovertible
evidence of a significant increase of manufacturing activity outside of the traditional venues found in
administrative town centres. Yet the evidence for the workings of a new centrifugal dynamic are clear.
Until the early nineteenth century, the ascendence of local notables was unstoppable, and this
ascendence depended precisely on the ability of such usurpers to retain more of the (mostly
agricultural) surplus at the expense of the political centre. This notability were called ayan. They
controled the urban-economy of Anatolian towns and created a new demand for manufactured goods,
mainly from the traditional urban guilds.
Thus, the eighteenth century was also the zenith of urban guild organisation. However, guilds did not
grow in size; rather they were subdivided to an absurd extent such that there was a different guild for
each identifiable product. This involution resulted in a proliferation making no economic sense. This
resulted from the guilds’ role in society: in addition to restrictions of a corporate nature and control
over quality and prices, which they shared with their counterparts in Western Europe, Ottoman guilds
also served the purpose of administrative control and taxation, and contributed to the compactness of
the social order. More economic activities meant more subdivisions to be able to coope with this role.
Another major drawback for the guilds was the absence of full rights to property. The alienability of
the urban shop under guild control remained problematic, and the inheritance regime only permitted the
transfer of usufruct to the master’s children. Furthermore accumulation potential was sacrificed to
within-guild mutuality and social security.
It seems clear that these institutional limitations explain why during the nineteenth century cheap
European manufactures drove local products out of the market. Other factors contributing to a deindustrialisation are the collapse of the guilds out of their own brittleness, the high cost of
transportation within a primitive infrastructure and also the recentralisation of the Empire at the
expense of local nodes of economic and political power.
Also new forms of export-oriented proto-industry were very vulnerable all through the 19th century.
They depended entirely on foreign demand, and could be the subject of “de-industrialisation” when
economic fortunes turned, when tastes changed, or when technology discovered a substitute. Secondly,
because its success depended on cheap labour and low capital intensity, the activity could be shifted to
another region or country if local conditions yielded less profit, i.e. if wages rose. Thirdly the
organisation of the trade depended greatly on the capital advanced by foreign merchant houses located
in port cities, which had a minimal intention of re-investing their profits in the local economy. Turkey
now got a typical “peripheral” and dependent profile.
Little by little, however, an urban industry outside of guild restrictions, catering to the increasing urban
population, also came into existence. Its capital was provided by local inhabitants. Craft guilds only
continued to exist in a formal fashion while declining sharply in significance. Ottoman manufacturing
became characterized by a large variety of organizational forms (Quataert, 1993, 80-104). Urban
industry steadily increased its scope during the century, accumulating capital and labour, becoming the
principal force behind the formation of a bourgeoisie and a proletariat. The postponement of its
success in the post-Ottoman context was due not to a lack of transformatory potential but because the
developing bourgeoisie identified with urban industry was heavily dominated by non-Moslim groups in
the society.
Quataert (1993, 80-104) reveals a dynamism in textile manufacturing in homes and small workshops,
throughout the 19th century, that refutes traditional notions of a stagnating Ottoman economy. He
demonstrates that manufacturers adopted a variety of strategies to confront European competitors,
protect their livelihoods and retain or regain both domestic and international customers. These
strategies usually involved reducing production costs through a combination of cheap technological
innovations and decreased wages, often involving women and children.
Meanwhile, hardly any changes occurred in the agricultural sector. The new strength of the state in the
19th century coupled with the saveguarding of its tax base resulted in the permanence of the agrarian
structure characterised by household usufruct rights. This feature explains the absence of an agrarian
transformation until the twentieth century.
Despite the overwhelming European economic dominance from the beginning of the 19 th century only
very few Ottoman Muslim scholars show awareness of this. According to Lewis (1994, 295-308) not a
single work of economic content was translated into Turkish, Arabic, or Persian until well into the 19 th
century. Other scholars (Watson, 2005, 589-605) do not agree; during the 18th century the isolation of
the Ottoman lands from Europe was reduced by the emergence of a new category of visitor: “experts”
were now offering specialist services to Islamic employers. Before only captives and few diplomatic
envoys had picked up “Western” ideas and concepts while travelling Westwards. The change in
attitude was obvious: many Muslims accepted that they might learn from Christians. There was also
more travel from East to West. A mathematical school was introduced for the Turkish military in 1734,
initiated by a Frenchman, and a printing press was started in 1729, under the guidance of a Hungarian.
The sultan dispatched students to Paris, London and other West-European capitals. Of course, they
were primarily after military know-how, but this involved learning French, English or another WestEuropean language. These envoys were free to read or discuss whatever came their way. While the
Christian religions were completely ignored as merely being earlier forms of revelation, economics and
politics were very popular. Political ideas of nationalism and economic ideas of self-reliance appealed
to younger Ottoman politicians, who realised that Ottoman patriotism might unite the varied
populations of the empire. However, the observation that Ottomans started to look to Western Europe
for wisdom, reflects that Turkey indeed had become the sick man of Europe lacking real capitalistic
incentives. Yet, from the above we conclude that this was only the case since the 19 th century and that
even than in many segments of Ottoman society individual capitalist behaviour was existing.
The 20th Century: From an Etatist Economy to a Market Driven Economy?
The end of the Ottoman empire came with the catastrophic military defeat of the First World War.
After the War of Independence from 1920 to 1922 war hero Mustafa Kemal Atatürk became the leader
of the new republic of Turkey. Atatürk’s system was based on a single party and a étatist economy.
The Republican People’s Party, the vehicle of Kemal Atatürk’s political ideology, adopted “secularism,
étatism and reformism” as a systematic social and economic policy. The armed forces remained the
largest organized body in Turkey, just as they were in Ottoman times, and became the so-called
guardians of the constitution. Atatürk certainly left behind him a secular and modernizing heritage.
From an economic point of view, however, his legacy was a rigid government controlled economy that
did not relate to the free market driven economies that emerged after the Second World War in Western
Europe. One of Atatürk’s resounding themes had been the need to prevent the “plunder” of the nation
by foreign exploiters. Pettifer (1998, 51-68) points out that this issue is today as resonant in the islamic
movement as it was among the Nationalists seventy years ago. Nevertheless, the Kemalists built
Turkish industry on an Ottoman foundation. The achievements of the industrialists in Ottoman times
have been downplayed by most Turkish historians, partly because the traditional iron and steel industry
had largely been developed by ethnic Greeks. In the 1930s, and to a lesser extent more recently, the
suggestion that the Ottoman empire had made some industrial progress in Turkey in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries was considered as heretical. Atatürks’ response to the so-called “plunder”
was close to some economic policies of the Soviet Union: widespread nationalization, the development
of state-owned firms and holding companies, and restrictions on foreign involvement in the economy
(Pettifer, 1998, 51-68).
Indeed, by 1931 almost all the policy tools for controlling the external economic relations of the
national economy, including a very high average nominal tariff protection rate of 46 per cent, were
fully established. On the other hand free play of the market forces within the limits of the internal
market was respected. However, reacting to the crisis of the 1930s, a monopoly of public ownership
was introduced in heavy industry, military production and a few other branches. The writers of the First
Five Year Industrial Plan had made a number of interesting observations on the effects of the crisis on
both the imperialist centres and the periphery. The weakening of the imperialistic centres due to the
crisis of world capitalism had created a historical opportunity for industrialisation and development in
the backward areas of the world economy. This is why the First Five Year Industrial Plan emphasized
the necessity to establish an industry without any delay. This sense of urgency derived from the
perception that when the crisis was overcome, the industrialized countries would once again join forces
to subject the agricultural countries to a permanent status of primary producers. As a result of this
urgency, a situation was created in which advantages, such as favourable price and cost structures
created for the benefit of state industry were shared by private enterprises in the same branches. In
many sub-sectors state enterprises existed side-by-side with private industry. There was also a wide
area of industrial activity with no public sector at all. Apart from this intra-branch co-existence, there
was also the sphere of complementarity between the public and private sectors: a fruitful relationship
for certain sections of the bourgeoisie, particularly for government contractors or small industrialists
providing inputs for the modern productive sectors. Boratav (1997, 165-190) concludes that in
Turkey’s economic étatism the state as such functioned as a strategic agent for private capital
accumulation.
In this sense, despite corporatist rhetoric influenced by the prevailing fascist mood of the 1930s, the
Kemalists denied any real affinity with fascism. Unlike the regimes in Rome and Berlin, Ankara
accepted liberal economic principles and the 19th century idea of progress. The Kemalist regime
continued to be transitional in character, preparing the ground for a liberal political and economic
system which would replace it in the near future. Indeed, after 1945 multi-party politics and a mixed
economy were established. The infant bourgeoisie, nurtured by Atatürk, had grown strong enough to
challenge the ruling party and defeat it in the first general election. The Democratic Party, under the
leadership of Adnan Mederes, took power and started slowly and carefully liberalizing the economy
especially in order to benefit from US Marshall Aid. Thereafter the bourgeoisie class continued to
grow, enlarging both the commercial and the industrial sector of the economy, creating at the same
time the other class of capitalist society, the proletariat. But basically both classes were still very much
protected by the state through protectionism (Ahmad, 1997, 145-164; Bakker, Vervloet en Gailly,
1997).
And whenever the country ran into a structural crisis – as in 1960, 1971 and 1980 – the interim regime
which seized power invariably spoke of returning to the path of Kemalism. According to Ahmad (1997,
145-164) this suggests that post-War Turkey has lacked firm ideological foundations. After 1960
import substitution went hand in hand with again higher protective tariff walls. Despite these policies
in the 1970s Turkey’s trade balance remained negative and a military coup in 1980 paved the way for
Prime Minister Turgut Özal (1927-1993) to start a policy of new liberalisation and budget cuts
(Bakker, Vervloet en Gailly, 1997).
According to Hayashi (1997, 221-234), comparing Turkish economy to Japanese economy, Turkey was
a potentially rich country whose resources were hardly known when the republican government took
power, whereas Japan had only the minimum resources needed to begin modernisation. None of
Japan’s resources were sufficient to withstand the intensification of international competition.
Therefore, in order to catch up with the powerfull advanced nations, Japan made every effort to save
the capital it needed for investment. This was done through the intensive gathering and meticulous
examination of technical information. In other words, Japan tried hard to imitate advanced industrial
techniques. The aim was to ensure the growth of domestic production and substitute Japanese goods for
imported ones.
The Ottoman empire had been essentially a rich and gigantic empire. Consequently, various
components of the society had to rely on an ethnic division of labour. However, this type of division of
labour, based on ethnicity, left each ethnic group in a decisively disadvantageous position after the
empire went into decline. When the empire was divided, each ethnic group was economically deprived
of the power to organise a nation-state on its own. The alternative was a type of nationalism which
introduced strict economic development plans in order to create a basis of industrialisation. In 1932
large-scale industrialisation took off when iron manufacturing started. Some of the Turkish iron mills,
as well as many other factories in various sectors, have been subsidised by the government from the
beginning. Also, the étatist organisation was the sole source from which experienced, skilled engineers
were drawn. In the end, a new type of entrepreneur and specialist emerged from the policy of étatism.
One should take into account that the later a nation comes to industrialisation, the more significant
becomes the role of the state, which is especially pertinent in reforming the infrastructure (Hayashi,
1997, 221-234). In this way industrial latecomers are characterised by entrepreneurs who have a more
intensive relationship with the government, both financially and emotionally, and lack the fighting and
innovating spirit of the Japanese entrepreneur.
Since decolonization after the Second World War, programmes to increase industrial production
similar to that of Atatürkist Turkey have been adopted by socialist, revolutionary and anti-imperialist
movements and governments throughout the world. Until the 1970s Turkish economic policies owned
much to the traditional left, if left means state planning and a directed economy. Until the 1980s a
central tariff system protected various sectors from international competition by making European
imports extremely expensive.
Finally, in the 1980s, Turkey under Prime Minister Turgut Özal was seen as a model of Western
economic development, with high growth rates, a liberal and open economic policy based on a good
inflow of foreign investment and developing stockmarkets, through which Turks and foreigners could
share in the growing prosperity and strength of Turkish industry. Yet, according to Pettifer (1998, 7186) the big Turkish combines were happy to appear open to the outside world when business was going
well, but when their position in Turkey was threatened in any way, they were ruthless in defence of
their own interests and quick to seek the protective umbrella of the Turkish state. Another leftover from
both Ottoman and Atatürkist times was the army that could maintain its crucial position in both society
and economy (see also next chapter).
Since the early 1990s, certain doubts have begun to emerge about some aspects of the apparent
progress and modernization. The Turkish economy became crippled by high inflation and
unemployment and burgeoning public debt. As the real intrests of politicians, bankers and big
bussinesses were virtually the same, selection of credit beneficiaris reflected the concentration of
political and financial power. Investments did not lead to much productivity growth. Many
privatisation programmes were delayed and foreign capital started to leave the country. All this went
hand in hand with the rise of Islam as a political force in Turkish society. The Islamic Refah (Welfare)
party grew quickly and underground Islamic groups were established. The environment came under
attack by unplanned industrial development and the ever-expanding cities were sometimes running
short of water and were suffering gross overcrowding, a rising birth rate, and public health problems.
Contemporary Turkey: Problems and Opportunities
By the end of the 20th century and the beginning of 21st century there were both signs of hope and signs
of failure. To assess Turkey’s present economic chances and its relations with the EU we should
analyse its manufacturing and export performances. In certain areas of agriculture and in traditional
manufacturing industries such as carpet-making, Turkish products can compete favourably. Also the
development of some new industries such as car manufacturing and electronics is positive. Turkey has
intensified its lucrative commercial and financial ties with Europe and has come to be considered one
of the world’s ten most promising emerging markets by the U.S. government (Rouleau, 2000).
Moreover, some steps have been taken towards the development of closer Greek-Turkish economic
relations. This may be the most important element in the long-term improvement of relations between
Turkey and Greece and as such with the EU. The powerful Koc and Sabanci groups already have some
dealings with Greece in the cement trade. Yet, economic relations have not taken off to the extent one
would expect given the markets and relatively cheap goods available on either side. Kurop (1998)
favours a strong business relationship with Greece because this would encourage Turkish business
leaders to press for better political relations with their neighbour. Finally, bordering the oil fields of the
Middle East, at the edge of the ex-Soviet Turkic republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia (some of
which are also rich in oil), and linked to its Ottoman past with the Balkans, Turkey has huge potential
to play a stabilizing role in a turbulent region, not only on the political scene but also on the economic
scene (Rouleau, 2000).
However, according to Pettifer (1998, 36-50) the dynamism of the new Turkey is, however, partly
based on exploitation of labour. As in many emerging markets cheap flexible labour supply contributes
to economic growth. Labour ethics are on a low level. It is not surprising that this contributes to the
success of the Islamic and anti-Western political parties and movements. The inhumanity and
anonymity of life in big cities such as Istanbul has resulted in a strong critical attitude among the poor,
with unpredictable long-term social, economical and political consequences. But in this respect Turkey
is not much different from most East and Central European countries, and other emerging markets all
over the world.
According to Rouleau (2000, 100-114) the dynamism is also partly due to the role of the military. A
study from Bosphorus University investigated the importance of military-controlled industries at the
end of the 1990s. The most important holding, OYAK, is a vast conglomerate comprising some 30
enterprises in sectors as diverse as cement works, automobile manufacturing, pesticides, food
processing, tourism, petroleum, insurance, real estate, banking, supermarkets and high technology.
These enterprises employ more than 30,000 people. All this resulted from the integration of the
business community into OYAK’s activities. One of the most important companies of the group is
OYAK-Renault, which has an annual production capacity of 160,000 French-designed vehicles.
OYAK’s partners also include the powerful holding companies of the Koç and Sabanci families –the
emperors of Turkey’s industry and trade- as well as the private banking baron Kazim Taskent.
OYAK is also one of the most profitable large holding companies in Turkey. The reason may be that
the group is exempt from duties and taxes. So, other big businesses put up with what could be
described as unfair competition. For that matter, all big businesses co-opt retired senior officers to
serve on their boards, not only as compensation for services rendered but to maintain links with the
current army élite (Rouleau, 2000, 100-114).
Also OYAK’s sister firm, TSKGV (Foundation for the Strengthening of the Turkish Armed Forces),
should be mentioned. TSKGV is devoted exclusively to arms production. Benefiting from the same
privileges as OYAK, TSKGV comprises some 30 companies and generates tens of thousands of jobs
(Rouleau, 2000, 100-114).
This phenomenon is certainly linked to a time-honored tradition that parliament approves the military
budget drawn up by the army general staff, without debate and by acclamation, before presenting it to
the chief of staff along with its congratulations and good wishes. In Turkey, it is the chief of staff, not
the prime minister, cabinet or parliament, who oversees arms production and procurement. Also the
military budget is not included in the state budget. It seems that civilian resistance to this situation is
dangerous; among the socalled “crimes” perpetrated by former Prime Minister Erbakan that led to his
downfall was his refusal to release funds requested by the chief of staff beyond the budget already
approved by parliament (Rouleaux, 2000, 100-114).
From an economic point of view, the army is clearly an obstacle to a true and genuine free market
environment with free competition guarantees. It is also clear that many existing interests from many
parts of society and the economy are already involved which makes it extremely difficult to introduce
changes (Rouleau, 2000, 100-114). And if the economic conditions do not improve the army may well
be the only way of preventing genuine fundamentalists to take over.
Connected to the problem of the army is the difficult development of what might be called an
enterprise culture, with a real finance capital sector of the economy. From our analysis we can already
conclude that the richest business people in Turkey had attained their position already in the times of
Atatürk through their political and military connections in Ankara. The rest of the economy was still
very much based on the old local guild organisations from the Ottoman times as also explained earlier.
This explains why Turkish “capitalism” today is relatively small-scale: people running a restaurant, a
tannery or a corner shop. A lack of capital is the major characteristic of this part of society which is
extremely important both from an economic and an employment point of view. There is little prospect
of these people becoming anything other than small businessmen. As in most emerging markets a part
of the population clearly loses when the economy is suddenly exposed to the international economy.
Pettifer (1998, 71-86) puts it “Business is accepted as part of everyday life, in a Greek sense, but the
idea of business as a new liberating ideology, in the Thatcherite sense, is remote”. In Turkey there was
no large class of slightly constrained and dissatisfied skilled workers, as there was in Britain in 1979,
who saw the possibility of a new position in society as a result of privatization and free-market
economic reforms. Turkey was still very much a typical dualistic economy and the existing middleclass was still relatively small.
But wasn’t all this the case with most emerging markets? Even in Europe Thatcherian entrepreneurship
remained very much limited to the UK and maybe the new “Celtic Tiger”, Ireland. Thatcher only came
to the UK at the end of the 1970s and was a radical example which the rest of the EU had problems to
follow. The role of the government and the army in General Franco’s Spain or the ex-communist
planned economies of Eastern and Central Europe was and still is to some extent obvious.
The mass migration to the cities and the associated pressure on the environment is another key issue.
Shanty towns have grown up on the outskirts of Istanbul, especially on the Asiatic side of the
Bosphorus, where living conditions are sometimes appalling. According to some researchers like
Pettifer (1998, 36-50) living conditions are closer to Calcutta than that of a country seeking EUmembership. Deseases such as hepatitis, tuberculosis, pneumonia and occasionally cholera result in
human and economic costs. However, the comparison with Calcutta is not justified and today most
Turkish big cities look more like their East European counterparts.
Finally there is a last prequisite for economic growth: law and order. The police are sometimes not
respected and considered to be inefficient and corrupt by a certain number of people. There are
examples how the police hardly took notice of complaints from the poor. Mass immigration into the
cities has given rise to different kinds of local mafioski based on kinship, ethnic groups and religious
adherence. Local bosses, such as factory owners, sometimes put themselves above the law. Not
surprisingly some of the strongest supporters of military intervention in civilian life have come from
the poorest strata of society (Pettifer, 1998, 71-86). As far as Women’ rights are concerned it is
indicative that more women than men have voted for the Refah party in the 1995 election. Of course a
lot of progress has been made from the social conditions that Atatürk inherited from the Ottoman
empire. Yet, progress has been limited in some respects like illiteracy which is still more prevailing
among women (Pettifer, 1998, 41-60).
But again one should not forget that Turkey is no exception. Shanty towns still exist and have even
expanded throughout Eastern and Central Europe and even Italy’s economy is still strongly influenced
by mafia and corrupt politicians who combine political and financial power. Turkey’s economy
actually continues to expand. Its average per capita income of $ 3,360 (in 2004; in PPP terms around $
7,000) is still behind those of the rest of the OECD, but higher than that of Bulgaria and Romania (two
more potential candidates for EU membership), and is continuing to rise. There is no doubt that Turkey
will become an attractive export market for European goods. Turkey is already one of the top ten
emerging markets and if the EU does not secure its access to Turkish markets, other countries will.
In addition Turkey offers a relatively skilful and disciplined work force to supplement Europe’s
dwindling and aging population. This work force will be flexible and return to a great extent to its
country of origin as soon as development opportunities occur locally. This issue is however a hot item
among political parties in Western Europe. And unfortunately the issue is influenced by the existing
Turkish minorities in Western European countries which are characterized by a certain traditionalism
that is actually gradually disappearing in many parts of Turkey itself. This may have to do with their
origins; most of them originate from a low-class environment in the least developed Eastern parts of
the country. At the same time statistics show that the Turkish minorities do integrate relatively easy
into the labour markets of their new countries. In one generation a relative backwardness as far as skills
and education is concerned had quite often disappeared, something that many low class families of the
original population took many generations to achieve.
Finally there is the fear for a fundamentalist islam which, once in power, may want to implement
Islamic economic principles contrary to the free market principles of Western Europe. Even if an Islam
oriented party takes power, which is actually the case now, there is little danger that this would
influence economic policies. Actually, theoretically, Islamic (including Turkish Islamic) economic
thinking is not substantially different from Christian economic thinking. As such it also contains free
market and solidarity principles, similar to those of Europe’s Christian-democratic, liberal and socialist
traditions (Norris and Inglehart, 2004, 133-158, 169-172; De Vylder, 2006, 244-246; 2004, 49-54).
Moreover in Turkey a very moderate and liberal interpretation of Islam has always been very strong.
Turkish Sufi-tradition has always been friendly towards business, moderate, open-minded, peacefull
and spiritually-oriented while also emphasizing the need for a peaceful coexistence with other
religions, which was so necessary in order to maintain unity in the Ottoman empire. M. Fethullah
Gülen (2004), a Moslim preacher, expressed his disappointment that madrassas got rid of Sufism,
which he considered to be Islam’s spiritual life. Moreover, the need for spirituality goes hand in hand
with the need for development. Gülen argued that: “Ignorance can be defeated through education,
poverty through work and the possession of capital, and internal schism and separatism through unity,
dialogue, and tolerance” (Gülen, 2004, 199). Gülen also radically opposed terrorism in the name of
Islam: “One of the people whom I hate most in the world is Osama Bin Laden, because he sullied the
bright face of Islam. He has created a contaminated image. Even if we were to try our best to fix the
terrible damage that has been done, it would take years to repare… A real Moslim, one who
understands Islam in every aspect, cannot be a terrorist” (Gülen, 2004, 187). Gülen also refered to a
long historical tradition of tolerance within the Ottoman empire, initiated by Sultan Mehmet II, the
Conqueror, who befriended the Orthodox Patriarchate in the new city that had become Istanbul. Gülen
emphasized that within the empire Armenians, Greeks and Moslims respected and tolerated eachother.
This is not to say that there are no fundamentalist tendencies in today’s Turkish society. But there
certainly is a genuine Moslim alternative with a large following which originates from Turkish soil and
deserves much more attention from the EU and the rest of the international community. The reaction to
the Al Qaeda-inspired attacks on Istanbul in November 2003 showed that Turkish public opinion was
against terrorism and violent extremism of all kinds.
Of course, a possible accession to the EU should remain conditional exactly in the same way as in the
case of other candidates: Turkey should continue to watch an onerous debt burden and a large currentaccount deficit which may deter foreign investors; Prime Minister Erdogan’s ruling AKP Party should
radically renounce increasingly nationalist and fundamentalist tendencies at home; the government
should apply democratic principles to manage its ethnic and religious minorities and give special
attention to these minorities and their regions as far as development initiatives is concerned. In addition
structural problems like the role of the military in the economy and the existence of a shadow economy
should be tackled. However, there is no reason to believe that the existence of a shadow economy poses
a bigger problem than in other EU membership candidates or even in some existing EU-member states.
And all other problems Turkey shares with most present-day Eastern and Central European countries.
European Discrimination Against Turkey?
Finally, we elaborate on Turkey’s complaint that for many years now it is being discriminated against
as a Muslim nation by the EU being an exclusively Christian club. There were frequent references in
the Turkish press to a controversial speech made by Jacques Delors, then EC president, in Strasbourg
1989, in which he stated “Europe was a product of Christianity, of Roman Law and of Greek
humanism”. He was seen as excluding a Muslim country like Turkey, however ostensibly secular, from
the European Community on an indefinite basis. Delors’ speech came with the end of the Cold War
when Turkey was becoming less important to Western defense and security (Pettifer, 1998, 155-168).
There are certainly extreme movements within the EU that would like to keep Islam out of the EU.
Whether the EU itself unconsciously or consciously would consider a membership application from an
Islamic country different from that of a non-Islamic East- or Central-European country is not very
clear. To answer this question more research is necessary. The issue will be very crucial when Central-
European countries with strong Islamic majorities or minorities like Albania, Bosnia and possibly
Kosovo apply for EU membership. In this context it may be worthwhile mentioning that Maltese, the
official language of present-day EU-member Malta, is a semitic language, very close to Tunisian
Arabic.
There is on the other hand no doubt a lack of general knowledge of the role played by Islam in
European culture and history. Where would Europe be today without the treasures of the literature of
Ancient Greece which only made their way into the socalled Western world through Arabic
translations preserved by Arab scholars in Spain, to take just one example? Even if we leave aside the
passing on of the Greek patrimony that has survived in the West European world due to their
preservation in the Arab-Moslim culture, what about the very original contributions of the Arabs
themselves: philosophers like Averroes, Avicenna and the rest of the Moslim-Arab intellectuals, the
mathematicians, physicians, astronomers, historians, poets – all of whom testify to a very advanced
civilisation and culture? The most obvious example is the use of Indo-Arabic or “Muslim” numerals in
favour of Roman or “Christian” numerals all over Europe. This, together with the use of the concept of
“zero”, which also had Indo-Arabic origins, enabled Europe to engage in mathematics and science. So
in a way, the Moslim presence in Europe is something to be proud of.
Be that as it may, Europe, and in many ways also the Moslim world, still have to go through this
catharsis. And this acceptance. Europe has to acknowledge the historical reality that much of what it is
today it owes to the Islam world. And the Moslim world has to acknowledge that it is not so much
different from European civilization because it is actally at the roots of it. As Braudel (1995, 41-54)
said commerce and trade were the “raison d’être” of Islam during its Golden Age from the 8 th to 12th
century, but also again during the first centuries of the Ottoman empire. A strong tradition of Islamic
commercial capitalism preceded West-European capitalism and, during the Ottoman period, co-existed
with West-European capitalism.
In the US many agree with Brzezinski (1997, 50-64), that the US should use its influence in Europe to
encourage Turkey’s eventual admission to the EU, and make a point of treating Turkey as a European
state, provided internal Turkish politics do not take a dramatically Islamist turn. They feel that if
Turkey feels like a European outcast, it will become more fundamentalist and less likely to cooperate
with the West in integrating Central Asia into the world community. Here the issue is to determine
whether the outlawed Rifah (Prosperity) Party, its successor the Fazilet (Virtue) Party, and the ruling
AKP party should be considered as “fundamentalist” parties or rather “Muslim Democrats”, like
“Christian Democrats” in European politics (Rouleau, 2000, 100-114). This discussion we leave to
more politically oriented studies of todays’ situation in Turkey.
Conclusion
However, we may conclude that much of the described characteristics of today’s Turkish economy may
be an indication of structural differences with the West-European economies. Nevertheless, as far as
democratising the economy is concerned, originally many present-day member-economies of the EU
were much worser-off than Turkey is today. One should not forget what Greece, Portugal and Spain
were twenty years ago. Even more one should never forget what Germany and Italy were in the 1930s.
And it is a fact that Greece still spent anually about $3 billion on defense in 1997, mostly in the
Aegean, the most per capita of any NATO member, including Turkey (Kurop, 1998). It is time that the
EU emphasizes that it wants Turkey to fulfill basic requirements for EU membership as soon as
possible because it absolutely wants Turkey to be integrated in the EU. So far it sounded as if these
conditions were designed to stop Turkey to become a member. It is high time that the EU gets this
right.
At the same time, both the EU and Turkey, should realize that there may be other countries outside the
geographical boundaries of Europe which fulfil the conditions of EU membership. The EU, and Turkey
too, should acknowledge that the idea of “Europe” itself is the result of “Eurocentric” thinking and that
concepts like democracy, market economy or rationalism moved around in an “Eurasian” world for
millennia and belong to mankind in general. As stated before, too often Europeans consider themselves
as the only heirs of such traditions thereby pushing away many Moslim communities who start
considering themselves as “not belonging to the club”. The outcome in the very long run should be that
the EU, by incorporating new members and by merging with other free trade areas, makes itself
dispensable. In this respect Turkey cannot claim to be more “European” than its Arab or Iranian
neighbours. And the EU and other already existing free market areas should consider as their ultimate
goal to create an international common market in which certain levels of social conditions are
maintained everywhere in the world.
If Turkey and also other countries continue their efforts to fulfil their obligations as EU-membership
candidates, the EU rejecting Turkey, and other similarly developed countries in the future, would
foment Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” on grounds which are not supported nor by historical
facts, nor by present-day ralities. From this perspective only European populists, Islamic
fundamentalists and other extremist groups would benefit from this. It may be that the EU, or rather
European public opinion, is not ready for Turkey, even though Turkey may be ready for the EU.
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