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Contention 1 – Sexual Abuse
The military presence in East Asia requires masculinity and this spills over - they train and utilize sexist
and hyper-masculine culture to justify the sexual abuse of women
Gwyn Kirk and Carolyn Bowen Francis, Kirk - Ph.D. is visiting faculty in Women’s and Gender Studies at University of Oregon
(2009-10) and a founder member of Women for Genuine Security, Francis- one of the founding members of Okinawan Women Act
Against Military Violence, “Redefining Security: Women Challenge U.S. Military Policy and Practice in East Asia” Berkeley
Women's Law Journal 15 Berkeley Women's L.J. (2000)
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/berkwolj15&div=11&g_sent=1&collection=journals#247 EmiW
Many of the problems created by U.S. military presence in East Asia stem from the sexist attitudes and hyper-masculine
culture that pervade the military. Different branches of the U.S. Armed Forces have developed this hyper-masculine culture
to varying degrees, with the Air Force at the lower end of the spectrum and the Marines at the higher end." This
phenomenon has had far reaching effects in places such as Okinawa, where Marines account for sixty percent of the U.S.
troops.” Young boys in the United States, as in many parts of the world, develop their masculine identity during early
childhood through a combination of adventure stories, comics, cartoons, competitive team sports, war toys, computer
games, news reporting, ads, television shows, and films.” This routine gender socialization is taken further in basic military
training where new recruits are pushed to the limits of their strength and stamina and are trained to follow orders without
question, no matter how nonsensical or humiliating." As part of military training, servicemen learn how to use highly
sophisticated weaponry and equipment; they are socialized as warriors. A key aspect of this training and socialization
process is the way recruits are insulted and reviled by drill sergeants as “women” and “queers” as part of the military
promise “to make a man” of them." According to feminist scholars of military systems and international relations,
militarism depends on a clearly gendered division of labor and the maintenance of hierarchy, including sexism and violence
against women.” Military socialization involves the construction of a militarized masculinity that emphasizes heroism,
physical strength, emotional detachment, the capacity for violence and killing, and an appearance of invulnerability.” This
view of masculinity involves the construction of male sexuality as assertive and controlling," and results in three
consequences: the need for the institutionalization of military prostitution, U.S. military abuse of women in host
communities, and sexual abuse of women in the military.
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The military requires a dehumanization of women and children and only sees them as objects of sexual
exploitation, transferring diseases and leaving thousands of Amerasian children to suffer from stigma
Kirk, Cornwell, Okazawa-Rey, 1996 [FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, “Women and the U.S. Military in East Asia” Written
by Gwyn Kirk, (Kirk - Ph.D. is visiting faculty in Women’s and Gender Studies at University of Oregon (2009-10) and a founder
member of Women for Genuine Security), Gwyn Kirk and Margo Okazawa-Rey are founder-members of the East Asia-U.S. Women's
Network Against U.S. Militarism. Rachel Cornwell is Program Assistant for the Demilitarization and Alternative Security Program of
the Asia Pacific Center for Justice and Peace. Edited by Martha Honey (IPS) and Tom Barry (IRC),
http://www.lightparty.com/Politics/ForeignPolicy/WomanInMilitary.html, EmiW]
Negative effects of U.S. militarism on women and children in East Asia include sexual exploitation, physical and sexual
violence, the dire situation of many Amerasian children, and health hazards of pollution caused by military operations. - To
maintain its capacity to fight two regional wars at the same time, the Pentagon plans to maintain 100,000 troops in the AsiaPacific region for the foreseeable future. - The concept of security is too militarized and does not include the human rights
of women and children and the protection of the physical environment. The Pentagon's objective is to be capable of fighting
two regional wars at the same time. For planning purposes these are assumed to be in the Middle East and the Korean
peninsula. This scenario assumes that 100,000 U.S. troops will continue to be based in East Asia for the foreseeable future.
Currently there are 37,000 U.S. military personnel in Korea and some 60,000 in Japan, including 13,000 on ships homeported there. The islands of Okinawa, the southernmost prefecture of Japan, house 39 bases and installations (75% of all
U.S. bases in Japan) although Okinawa is only 0.6% of the country's land area. 30,000 troops and another 22,500 family
members are stationed in Okinawa. There were extensive U.S. bases in the Philippines until 1992, when the Philippine
Senate voted against renewal of their leases. The U.S. subsequently proposed a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) to cover
situations when U.S. troops are in the Philippines for joint exercises or shore leave. The VFA would give access to
Philippine ports and airports on all the main islands for refueling, supplies, repairs, and rest & recreation (R & R)potentially far greater access than before, but under the guise of commercial arrangements and without the expense of
maintaining permanent workforces and facilities. The VFA has to be ratified by the Philippine Senate before going into
effect. It is currently under discussion. Sexual violence, sexual exploitation, thousands of fatherless Amerasian children,
and health problems linked to environmental contamination are some of the damaging effects of the U.S. military presence
in East Asia. Research conducted by a group called Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence shows that U.S. troops
in Okinawa have committed more than 4,700 reported crimes since 1972, when Okinawa reverted to Japanese
administration. Many of these were crimes of violence against women. In Korea, too, the number of crimes is high. A
particularly brutal rape and murder of a barwoman, Yoon Kum Ee, in 1992 galvanized human rights advocates to establish
the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea in order to document these crimes and help
victims claim redress. Violence against women is seriously underreported, due to the victims' shame and fear or their belief
that perpetrators will not be apprehended. Women who work in the bars, massage parlors, and brothels near U.S. bases are
particularly vulnerable to physical and sexual violence. The sexual activity of foreign-based U.S. military personnel,
including (but not exclusively) through prostitution, has had very serious effects on women's health, precipitating
HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancies and unsafe abortions, drug and alcohol dependency, and
mental illness. In Korea, Japan, and the Phillipines, Amerasian children born to women impregnated by U.S. troops are a
particularly stigmatized group. They are often abandoned by their military fathers and raised by single Asian mothers. They
live with severe prejudice and suffer discrimination in education and employment due to their physical appearance and their
mothers' low status. Those with African-American fathers face even worse treatment than those having Caucasian fathers.
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Militarism ignores the ongoing war being waged against Okinawan women and their environment
C.J. Cuomo 01/09/09 (“War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence”
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121580133/HTMLSTART)
Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and
specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military
institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices
and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman
entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing
military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among
the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic
glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems.
Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of
life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to
resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because
they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and
oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the
false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those
whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain
this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of
resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real"
violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond
in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually
keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily
embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening
nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state.
Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of
relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms
of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the
relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political
imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways
in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and
corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of
excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of
violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing
hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical
and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded
militaristic campaigns. I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a
crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations
of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, technocratic states.2 Feminists
should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and
militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in
contemporary life we need not neglect the importance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared
military conflicts. But the dramatic nature of declared, large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military
violence pervades most societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of military
institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality. Philosophical discussions that focus only on the ethics of declaring
and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declared military conflicts are often
experienced as omnipresent horrors. These approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral
judgement in the face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism. Just-war theory is a prominent example
of a philosophical approach that rests on the assumption that wars are isolated from everyday life and ethics. Such theory,
as developed by St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius, and as articulated in contemporary dialogues by many
philosophers, including Michael Walzer (1977), Thomas Nagel (1974), and Sheldon Cohen (1989), take the primary
question concerning the ethics of warfare to be about when to enter into military conflicts against other states. They
therefore take as a given the notion that war is an isolated, definable event with clear boundaries. These boundaries are
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significant because they distinguish the circumstances in which standard moral rules and constraints, such as rules against
murder and unprovoked violence, no longer apply. Just-war theory assumes that war is a separate sphere of human activity
having its own ethical constraints and criteria and in doing so it begs the question of whether or not war is a special kind of
event, or part of a pervasive presence in nearly all contemporary life. Because the application of just-war principles is a
matter of proper decisionmaking on the part of agents of the state, before wars occur, and before military strikes are made,
they assume that military initiatives are distinct events. In fact, declarations of war are generally overdetermined escalations
of preexisting conditions. Just-war criteria cannot help evaluate military and related institutions, including their peacetime
practices and how these relate to wartime activities, so they cannot address the ways in which armed conflicts between and
among states emerge from omnipresent, often violent, state militarism. The remarkable resemblances in some sectors
between states of peace and states of war remain completely untouched by theories that are only able to discuss the ethics of
starting and ending direct military conflicts between and among states. Applications of just-war criteria actually help create
the illusion that the "problem of war" is being addressed when the only considerations are the ethics of declaring wars and
of military violence within the boundaries of declarations of war and peace. Though just-war considerations might
theoretically help decision-makers avoid specific gross eruptions of military violence, the aspects of war which require the
underlying presence of militarism and the direct effects of the omnipresence of militarism remain untouched. There may be
important decisions to be made about when and how to fight war, but these must be considered in terms of the many other
aspects of contemporary war and militarism that are significant to nonmilitary personnel, including women and nonhumans.
In a recent Hypatia article, Lucinda Peach argues that just-war theory, which she takes to be more realistic and useful than
pacifism, can be strengthened with feminist insights and analyses. Drawing primarily on the work of Sara Ruddick and Jean
Bethke Elshtain, she reconstructs feminist responses to traditional just-war approaches, and illustrates how a more thorough
application of feminist principles might lead to "a more careful and considered appraisal of when the use of armed force is
morally justified" (Peach 1994, 167). Though she agrees with their criticisms of traditional just-war approaches, Peach
finds Elshtain's and Ruddick's alternatives practically and theoretically lacking. Nonetheless, her faith in just-war theorizing
is unwavering: The feminist criticisms discussed do not suggest a need to develop radically new or different criteria for
assessing the morality or engagement in armed conflict from those offered by traditional just-war theory … feminist
criticisms and counterproposals suggest a number of specific proposals for modifying the practice more than the theory of
the just-war approach to armed conflict. (Peach 1994, 164) Peach states that one of the problems with nonfeminist critiques
of war is their failure to address the fact that "women remain largely absent from ethical and policy debates regarding when
to go to war, how to fight a war, and whether resorting to war is morally justifiable" (Peach 1994, 152). But a just-war
approach cannot successfully theorize women's roles in these events because formal, declared wars depend upon underlying
militaristic assumptions and constructions of gender that make women's participation as leaders nearly impossible. The
limitations of Peach's analysis make clear some aspects of the relationships between peacetime militarism and armed
conflicts that cannot be addressed by even feminist just-war principles. Her five criticisms of just-war theory, discussed
below, are intended to both echo and revise appraisals made by other feminists. But each fails to successfully address the
complexity of feminist concerns. 1) Peach finds just-war theory's reliance on realism, the notion that human nature makes
war inevitable and unavoidable, to be problematic. She believes just-war theory should not be premised on realist
assumptions, and that it should also avoid "unduly unrealistic appraisals" of human and female nature, as found in
Ruddick's work. Peach rightly identifies the pessimism, sexism, essentialism, and universalism at work in just-war theorists'
conceptions of human nature. Nonetheless, she fails to see that just-war theorists employ ossified concepts of both "human
nature" and "war." Any interrogation of the relationships between war and "human nature," or more benignly,
understandings and enactments of what it means to be diverse human agents in various contexts, will be terribly limited
insofar as they consider wars to be isolated events. Questions concerning the relationships between war and "human nature"
become far more complex if we reject a conception of war that focuses only on events, and abandon any pretense of
arriving at universalist conceptions of human or female "nature." Feminist ethical questions about war are not reducible to
wondering how to avoid large-scale military conflict despite human tendencies toward violence. Instead, the central
questions concern the omnipresence of militarism, the possibilities of making its presence visible, and the potential for
resistance to its physical and hegemonic force. Like "solutions" to the preponderance of violence perpetrated by men
against women that fail to analyze and articulate relationships between everyday violence and institutionalized or invisible
systems of patriarchal, racist, and economic oppression, analyses that characterize eruptions of military violence as isolated,
persistent events, are practically and theoretically insufficient. 2) Peach faults just-war theory for its failure to consider
alternatives to war, stating that "the failure of most just-war theorists to seriously contemplate alternatives to war is …
radically deficient from the perspectives of pacifist feminist and others opposed to knee-jerk militaristic response to civil
strife" (Peach 1994, 158). She argues that feminist just-war theorists, including Elshtain, should also pay more attention to
pacifist arguments. When Peach discusses "alternatives to war," she is clearly referring to alternatives to entering into war,
or to participating in "the escalation of conflicts." The avoidance of eruptions of military violence is certainly important,
and Peach is correct that feminist insights about conflict resolution could present significant recommendations in this
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regard. However, feminist moral imagination cannot end there. In thinking of alternatives to war, we need to continue to
imagine alternatives to militaristic economies, symbolic systems, values, and political institutions. The task of constructing
such alternatives is far more daunting and comprehensive than creating alternatives to a specific event or kind of event.
Pacifist writers as diverse as Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Barbara Deming have emphasized the fact that pacifism
entails a critique of pervasive, systematic human violence. Despite its reductionist tendencies, there is much to learn from
the ways in which pacifists conceive of war as a presence, as well as the pacifist refusal to let go of the ideal of peace.
Characterizing pacifism as motivated by the desire to avoid specific events disregards the extent to which pacifism aims to
criticize the preconditions underlying events of war. 3) Following several influential moves in feminist philosophy, Peach
rejects just-war theory's reliance on abstraction—of the realities, or "horrors," of war; of enemies as one-dimensional evil,
killable Others; and of the ethical responses needed to address the morality of war, such as a privileging of justice and
rights over love and caring. Following Elshtain, she believes that feminist just-war principles should be more particularized,
contextualized, and individualized. But the abstraction of the particularities of war depends on an abstraction of war itself.
The distance of such abstraction is created in part by willingness to think of war without considering the presence of war in
"peaceful" times. Wars becomes conceptual entities—objects for consideration—rather than diverse, historically loaded
exemplifications of the contexts in which they occur. In order to notice the particular and individual realities of war,
attention must be given to the particular, individual, and contextualized causes and effects of pervasive militarism, as well
as the patterns and connections among them. 4) Like other feminists, Peach criticizes the dualisms and dichotomies that
underlie war and the other evils of patriarchy, including dichotomies between male and female, combatant and noncombatant, soldier and citizen, ally and enemy and state and individual which have dominated just-war thinking. Rather
than relying on traditional dichotomies, a feminist application of just-war criteria should emphasize the effects of going to
war on the lives of particular individuals who would be involved, whether soldier or civilian, enemy or ally, male or female.
(Peach 1994, 166) As should now be obvious, though Peach rejects several relevant dualistic hierarchies, a stark ontological
distinction between war and peace remains basically intact.3 Thus Peach's rejection of dualisms is undermined by her own
failure to question a stark ontological distinction between war and peace. In considering the ways in which violence shapes
women's realities, feminists might be better served by analyses of war as part of enmeshed continua or spectra of statesponsored and other systemic patriarchal and racist violence. 5) Peach believes just-war theory privileges state authority
and the good of the state over individual autonomy and well-being. Instead, she states that just-war theory should include
"reformulated understandings of the proper relationships between the individual and the state," considering "both the
impact of war on individuals as well as the obligations of both men and women to defend the nation" (Peach 1994, 167). In
raising questions about the relationships between individuals and states, Peach fails to question liberal, modernist
conceptions of either. But if individual persons are socially constituted, often in conflicting ways, how can membership, or
appropriate loyalties, be determined? If the state is always inevitably a military, patriarchal, racist state, how ought
alternative collectivities that will promote the well-being of individuals be conceived without creating or relying on military
presence? Feminists concerned with resistances to war need to consider how the pervasiveness of militarism in the
construction of the contemporary state implies the need to question nationalism when theorizing critically about war. To
give one very clear example of the ways in which just-war evaluations of wars as events fail to address feminist questions
about militarism, consider the widespread influence of foreign military bases on gendered national identities and
interactions. In Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (1990), Cynthia Enloe
illustrates how, while decisionmaking and economic power are held primarily by men, international relations and politics
are inevitably played out on women's bodies in myriad ways, propagating racist, nationalist, and colonialist conceptions of
femininity. One chapter, "Base Women," is devoted to a discussion of the ways in which local and global sexual politics
shape and are shaped through the constant presence of thousands of military bases worldwide—in the symbol of the soldier,
the introduction of foreign conceptions of masculinity and femininity, the reproduction of family structures on military
bases, and through systems of prostitution that universally coexist alongside military bases. Enloe writes, "military politics,
which occupy such a large part of international politics today, require military bases. Bases are artificial societies created
out of unequal relations between men and women of different races and classes" and, one might add, different nations
(Enloe 1990, 2). The constant, global presence of these bases is an example of the mundane givenness and subtle
omnipresence of military violence. Most bases have managed to slip into the daily lives of the nearby community. A
military base, even one controlled by soldiers of another country, can become politically invisible if its ways of doing
business and seeing the world insinuate themselves into a community's schools, consumer tastes, housing patterns,
children's games, adults' friendships, jobs and gossip. … Most have draped themselves with the camouflage of normalcy.
… Rumors of a base closing can send shivers of economic alarm through a civilian community that has come to depend on
base jobs and soldiers' spending. (Enloe 1990, 66) Just-war theory—even feminist just-war theory—cannot bring to light
the ways in which the politics of military bases are related to the waging of war, how militarism constructs masculinity and
femininity, or how international politics are shaped by the microcosmic impacts of military bases. It therefore cannot
address some of the most pressing ways in which militarism and war involve and affect women.
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The Negatives impacts ignore the ongoing war going on between the women and US troops- this will just
re-entrench the impacts of the 1AC and make all negative impacts inevitable in a world where we don’t
solve for patriarchy.
Ha Poong Kim,
1)
’87 (Ha Poong, Philosophy Department, Eastern Illinois University, USA Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 18, No.
Peace denotes a nonwarring condition. This condition may be consequent upon a particular human relation
committed to nonviolence, as is the case with a relation between family members or between friends. On the other
hand, peace may be simply accidental to an interplay between forces of violence, as is the case with peace
imposed upon the vanquished by the victor, peace following a cease-fire between two enemies, or peace
maintained by a balance of nuclear terror. I call peace inherent in a relation committed to nonviolence
positive peace, and peace merely accidental to an interplay of forces negative peace.' Generally, the solidness
of positive peace between two parties is dependent on the degrees of their mutual confidence in each other's commitment to
nonviolence. The stronger their mutual confidence, the less likely that they resort to violence. And vice versa. Here we see
a happy circle of mutual trust and nonviolence. By definition, positive peace is incompatible with armament . On the
other hand, negative peace is not only compatible with armament, but it actually stimulates armament.
Obviously there is no mutual trust in a relation of negative peace. And this results in a vicious circle of fear
and armament. In the absence of a commitment to nonviolence, a relation of negative peace is entirely
subject to a mechanical interplay of forces and impulses, both physical and psychological. Although a relation
of peace necessarily rejects any act of violence, it may be possible to speak, in an extended sense, of a relation of
positive peace in which violence may break out from time to time, as long as there is a general commitment to
nonviolence. And similarly we may speak of a relation of negative peace in which peace somehow prevails
despite occasional out bursts of violence. Here we may do well to remember Hobbes' comparison of a state of war to
foul weather. Noting that the nature of weather involves 'the notion of time', he says that 'the nature of foul weather lies not
in a shower or two of rain but in an inclination thereto of many days together'.' A state of positive peace may be
compared to fine weather, which may include occasional sprinkles and even thunderstorms. Analogously, we
may compare a relation of negative peace to cloudy, threatening weather, which may or may not break into
actual showers or storms. Once a relation of positive peace is understood in its extended sense, it is clear that
such a relation is observable practically everywhere, wherever people live or come togethe r – for example,
between members of the same family or of the same country, and even between individual citizens of two enemy nations.
The relation of positive peace is thus not at all a utopian one: it is a relation humanity is fully capable of.
Systemic impacts must be weighed over any other impact.
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Dr. Robert Gilman, ’83 Ph.D. President of Context Institute Founding Editor of IN CONTEXT, A Quarterly of Humane
Sustainable Culture One of the articles in The Foundations Of Peace (IC#4) Autumn, Page 8,
http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:p_T2jwNn8g4J:www.context.org/ICLIB/IC04/Gilman1.htm+nuclear+war+%22structural+viole
nce%22&hl=en
THE HUMAN TENDENCY
toward, and preparations for, open warfare are certainly the most spectacular obstacles to peace,
but they are not the only challenges we face. For much of the world's population, hunger, not war, is the pressing issue, and it
is hard to imagine a genuine peace that did not overcome our current global pattern of extensive poverty in the midst of
plenty. Hunger and poverty are two prime examples of what is described as "structural violence," that is, physical and
psychological harm that results from exploitive and unjust social, political and economic systems . It is something that most of us
know is going on, some of us have experienced, but in its starker forms, it is sufficiently distant from most North American lives that it is often hard to get
a good perspective on it. I've come across an approach that seems to help provide that perspective, and I'd like to describe it. How significant is
structural violence? How does one measure the impact of injustice? While this may sound like an impossibly difficult question, Gernot Kohler and
Norman Alcock (in Journal of Peace Research, 1976, 13, pp. 343-356) have come up with a surprisingly simple method for estimating the grosser forms
of structural violence, at least at an international level. The specific question they ask is, how many extra deaths occur each year due to the
unequal distribution of wealth between countries ? To understand their approach, we will need to plunge into some global statistics. It will help
to start with the relationship between Life Expectancy (LE) and Gross National Product Per Person (GNP/p) that is shown in the following figure. Each
dot in this figure stands for one country with its LE and GNP/p for the year 1979. All together, 135 countries are represented (data from Ruth Sivard's
World Military and Social Expenditures 1982, World Priorities, Box 1003, Leesburg VA 22075, $4). Kohler and Alcock used a similar figure based on
data for 1965, and I'll compare the 1965 data with the 1979 data later in this article. Except for a few oil exporting countries (like Libya) that have unusual
combinations of high GNPs and low Life Expectancies, the data follows a consistent pattern shown by the curve. Among the "poor" countries (with
GNP/p below about $2400 per person per year), life expectancy is relatively low and increases rapidly with increasing GNP/p. Among the "rich"
countries, life expectancy is consistently high and is relatively unaffected by GNP. The dividing line between these two groups turns out to also be the
world average GNP per person. The value of the life expectancy curve at that point (for 1979) is 70 years. Thus, other things being equal, if the world's
wealth was distributed equally among the nations, every country would have a life expectancy of 70 years. This value is surprisingly close to the average
life expectancy for the industrial countries (72 years), and is even not that far below the maximum national life expectancy of 76 years (Iceland, Japan, and
Sweden). Kohler and Alcock use this egalitarian model as a standard to compare the actual world situation against. The procedure is as follows. The
actual number of deaths in any country can be estimated by dividing the population (P) by the life expectancy (LE). The difference between the actual
number of deaths and the number of deaths that would occur under egalitarian conditions is thus P/LE - P/70. For example, in 1979 India had a population
of 677 million and a life expectancy of 52 years. Thus India's actual death rate was 13 million while if the life expectancy had been 70, the rate would have
been 9.7 million. The difference of 3.3 million thus provides an estimate of the number of extra deaths. Calculating this difference for each country and
then adding them up gives the number of extra deaths worldwide due to the unequal distribution of resources. The result for 1965 was 14 million, while
for 1979 the number had declined to 11 million. (China, with a quarter of the world's population, is responsible for 3/4 of this drop since it raised its life
expectancy from 50 in 1965 to 64 in 1979.) How legitimate is it to ascribe these deaths to the structural violence of human institutions, and not just to the
variability of nature? Perhaps the best in-depth study of structural violence comes from the Institute for Food and Development Policy (1885 Mission St,
San Francisco, CA 94103). What they find throughout the Third World is that the problems of poverty and hunger often date back
hundreds of years to some conquest - by colonial forces or otherwise. The victors became the ruling class and the landholders, pushing the vast
majority either on to poor ground or into being landless laborers. Taxes, rentals, and the legal system were all structured to make sure that the poor stayed
poor. The same patterns continue today. Additional support is provided by the evidence in the above figure, which speaks for itself. Also, according to
Sivard, 97% of the people in the Third World live under repressive governments, with almost half of all Third World countries run by military dominated
governments. Finally, as a point of comparison, Ehrlich and Ehrlich (Population, Environment, and Resources, 1972, p72) estimate between 10 and 20
million deaths per year due to starvation and malnutrition. If their estimates are correct, our estimates may even be too low. Some comparisons will help to
put these figures in perspective. The total number of deaths from all causes in 1965 was 62 million, so these estimates indicate that 23% of all deaths were
due to structural violence. By 1979 the fraction had dropped to 15%. While it is heartening to see this improvement, the number of deaths is
staggeringly large, dwarfing any other form of violence other than nuclear war . For example, the level of structural violence is
60 times greater than the average number of battle related deaths per year since 1965 (Sivard 1982). It is 1.5 times as great as the
yearly average number of civilian and battle field deaths during the 6 years of World War II. Every 4 days, it is the equivalent of another
Hiroshima. Perhaps the most hopeful aspect of this whole tragic situation is that essentially everyone in the present system has become a
loser. The plight of the starving is obvious, but the exploiters don't have much to show for their efforts either - not compared to the quality of life they
could have in a society without the tensions generated by this exploitation. Especially at a national level, what the rich countries need now is not so much
more material wealth, but the opportunity to live in a world at peace. The rich and the poor, with the help of modern technology and weaponry, have
become each others' prisoners. Today's industrialized societies did not invent this structural violence, but it could not continue
without our permission. This suggests that to the list of human tendencies that are obstacles to peace we need to add the ease with which we
acquiesce in injustice - the way we all too easily look in the other direction and disclaim "response ability." In terms of the suffering it supports, it is by far
our most serious flaw.
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Okinawan Bases destroy local communities – military activities have completely devastated the
environment
Laura Hein and Mark Selden 03 [Islands of Discontent: Military Destruction: Effects on Local Residents, 2003]
With the construction and maintenance of military bases and preparation for war by the U.S. military have devastated village life.
Indeed, they have destroyed nature itself, both the land and coral reefs in the surrounding area. At present, U.S. forces conduct
live ammunition exercises in eighteen areas of Okinawa at the Torishima Firing Range, Idesuna Firing Rage, Icumejima Firing
Range, Ukibaru Training Area, Tsukenjimarung Area, Kobisho Firing Range, Sekibisho Firing Range, and Okiaito Firing
Range. It is possible to watch military exercises from Tonaki, parts of which are designated as danger zones by the U.S.
military. Each time low-flying military aircraft fire live ammunition; there is a blast and white fumes rise in the air. Under
this continued assault, the topography of the island has transformed, leaving no trace of its features. The areas of Tonaki
designated by the U.S. military as danger zones are close to villages, and over the years many houses have been damaged
and destroyed by fallings and debris. Torishima is another now unpopulated island that is exclusively used firing range. In
1995, soldiers there inadvertently used depleted uranium bullets. The American government delayed notification of the accident
to the Japanese government for a full year after it occurred, and neither Okinawan prefectural government officials nor the
general Okinawan public were informed by the Japanese government until one month after that. This reveals how
marginalized Okinawa is by both the U.S. and Japanese governments. The Status of Forces Agreement prioritizes military
matters, while such matters of human concern as the devastating health effects of depleted uranium bullets on the people
of Okinawa are ignored. This is one example of the physical and psychological damage caused by military exercises that have
continued for more than fifty years. Before the war, the people of Idesuna cultivated watermelons and mulberry trees and raised cattle.
The island was surrounded by coral reefs as known as a good area to catch prawns, luminous turban shells, octopi and to gather sea
weed. Nowadays, fishermen cannot survive off the sea. They go to sea only on Sundays, when no military exercises are scheduled.
The US Camps are destroying the coral reefs – pushing many species towards extinction
Center for Biological Diversity, et al. 2010 [ Center for Biological Diversity, Earthjustice, American Friends Service
Committee, Animal Welfare Institute, Big Wildlife, Endangered Species Coalition (on behalf of more than 400 organizations, see
below*), Environmental Protection Information Center, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Greenpeace, Humane Society of the U.S. and
Humane Society International, International Marine Mammal Project of the Earth Island Institute, Natural Resources Defense Council,
No Nukes North, Rainforest Action Network, Sea Turtle Restoration Project, Turtle Island Restoration Network, Western Nebraska
Resources Council, The Whaleman Foundation, Wild Equity Institute, Xerces Society, Biological Organizations, 2010,
http://cop10.org/issues/military/106-henokodugongs]
The island of Okinawa has been called the “Galápagos of the East” because of the incredible variety of marine and
terrestrial life it supports. Unfortunately, a joint military project proposed by the U.S. and Japanese governments threatens
to destroy one of the last healthy coral-reef ecosystems in Okinawa, pushing many magnificent species to the brink of
extinction. You have the power to protect these unique and priceless creatures. Under a 2006 bilateral agreement, U.S. and
Japanese governments agreed to relocate the contentious U.S. Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station to Camp Schwab and
Henoko Bay. This shortsighted plan does not take into consideration that the relocation will destroy a valued ecosystem,
including the nearly 400 types of coral that form Okinawa’s reefs and support more than 1,000 species of fish. It will also
hurt imperiled sea turtles and marine mammals. Current plans call for construction of the new military base near Henoko
and Oura bays in Okinawa. But the habitat this project would destroy supports numerous endangered species — animals
protected by American, Japanese, and international law for their biological and cultural importance. These species include:
Okinawa dugong: The critically endangered and culturally treasured dugong, a manatee-like creature, relies on this habitat
for its very survival in Okinawa. Japan’s Mammalogical Society placed the dugong on its “Red List of Mammals,”
estimating the population in Okinawa to be critically endangered. The U.S. government’s Marine Mammal Commission
and the United Nations Environmental Program fear the project would pose a serious threat to this mammal’s survival. The
World Conservation Union’s dugong specialists have expressed similar concerns and have placed the dugong on its Red
List of threatened species. The Okinawa dugong is also a federally listed endangered species under the U.S. Endangered
Species Act. The Okinawa dugong has extreme cultural significance to the Okinawan people, and only about 50 dugongs
are thought to remain in these waters. The base construction will crush the last remaining critical habitat for the Okinawa
dugong, destroying feeding trails and seagrass beds essential for dugong survival.
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The destruction of the environment and the objectification of woman are equivalent – only ecofeminism
liberates all oppressed and marginalized subjects
Greta Gaard, Assistant Professor of Composition and Women's Studies at the University of Minnesota, Duluth Jan 93, Ecofeminism
Living Interconnections with Animals and Nature. Contributors: Janis Birkeland, Lori Gruen, Stephanie Lahar, Linda Vance, Ellen
O'Loughlin, Josephine Donovan, Carol J. Adams, Chaia Heller, Marti Kheel, and Huey-li Li, and the editor.
www.ocis.temple.edu/tempress/chapters/948_ch1.pd Noel
Another connection between feminism, animal liberation, and environmentalism has been made by documenting the effects
of environmental pollution and degradation on the lives of women and animals. Many writers note that toxic pesticides,
chemical wastes, acid rain, radiation, and other pollutants take their first toll on women, women’s reproductive sys- tems,
and children .9 These hazardous chemicals are often initially tested on laboratory animals to determine levels of toxicity;
this practice, together with the enormous environmental costs of factory fanning and meat eat- ing, demonstrate the linkages
between environmental degradation and the oppression of nonhuman animals (speciesism). The racism and classism
inherent in First World development strategies, built on one ethic for eco- nomic production at “home” but another ethic for
the Third World, have resulted in tremendous hardships for women, who are frequently the major providers of food, fuel,
and water in developing countries.” By docu- menting the poor quality of life for women, children, people in the Third
World, animals, and the environment, ecofeminists are able to demonstrate that sexism, racism, classism, speciesism, and
naturism (the oppression of nature) are mutually reinforcing systems of oppression. Instead of being a “single-issue”
movement, ecofeminism rests on the notion that the libera- tion of all oppressed groups must be addressed simultaneously.
It is for this reason that I see coalition-building strategies as critical to our success. For if one thing is certain, it is that
women alone cannot “save the earth”-we need the efforts of men as well.
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The discourse of potential danger fosters violence by preferring national security over human security,
allowing sexual injustice to occur – the exclusion of feminist viewpoints in mainstream discourse
maintains conflicts, only a revelation of marginalized subjects and their security can alter such cycles
Maria Stern, PhD, Goteborg University, Sweden, lecturer and research fellow in the Department of Peace and Development Studies
at the University of Goteborg, Sweden. She teaches at the Department of Gender Studies at the University of Goteborg, currently
directing a research project “Gender in the Armed Forces: Militarism and Peace-building in Congo-Kinshasa and Mozambique, 2006
[“Feminist Methodologies for International Relations” edited by Brooke A. Ackerly: Assistant Professor in the Department of Political
Science at Vanderbilt University, Maria Stern: Lecturer and Researcher at the Department of Peace and Development Research,
Goteborg University, and Jacqui True: Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Auskland, New
Zealand, 2006, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pg. 196, EmiW]
In revisiting my original aim, I find myself resisting the question "What has my research on Mayan women's (in)security
narratives brought to the study of IR?" This question seems to concede that focusing on Mayan women's (in)security must
be somehow justified as a valid subject for research relevant to understanding security and global politics (see Zalewski,
this volume). However, as Zalewski implies, resisting the move to justify or legitimate the boundaries of the discipline need
not entail refusing to engage with it at all; instead, it may mean both disturbing and destabilizing its dominant stories. One
way of doing this is by taking seriously Mayan women's narratives as valid texts on security - texts which transform the
knowledge of the discipline, and reveal its scaffolding as constructions that need not take the form they do. My research
does this in at least four ways. First, it is clear that the Mayan women I interviewed are indeed valid political subjects
whose (in)security is not located outside of global politics. Those processes traditionally considered relevant to security
studies also constitute their lives and struggles, thereby revealing how global politics are already gendered and, in many
instances, include subaltern women by their very exclusion and silencing (cf. Pin-Fat and Stern 2005). Secondly, reading
Mayan women's narratives also exposes the limitations of the accepted understandings and practices of security; their
(in)securities cannot be reduced to a location, level, or category ultimately determined by the logic of state sovereignty. For
instance, their narratives disrupt the familiar relationships between domestic and foreign, inside and outside, Us and Them,
protector and protected, citizen and enemy, that provide many of the building blocks for our understandings and practice of
politics, political community, identification, and conceptions of (in)security. Indeed, the very attempt to reduce their
(in)security to the familiar category of, for example, "individual in state" can be read as complicit in the violence that has so
greatly punctuated their lives. Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, the intricate and inseparable relationship between
(in)security and identity explored in post-structural security studies is cast in a different light when one pays attention to
marginalized security discourses. The identities articulated in Mayan women's security narratives - as well as the
(in)securities that were co-constructed along with these identity positions - were multiple and complementary; they
informed each other, and at times even implied contradictions. Mayan women's (in)security narratives underscore the
complexity, hybridity, and contingency of security (as an ontological condition of identity) and draws attention to the often
violent conflict and marginalization that occur at the intersection of identities and in attempts at securing identity positions.
Fourthly, discourses of danger and the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion that foster violence in conflicts over national
securities and identities also resound in security discourses in marginalized sites (such as was expressed in the need for
cohesion in the Mayan pueblo in the face of its enemies). Exploring how these potentially violent mechanisms work in
these sites also discloses openings for possible resistance, such as the way certain narrators resisted the pinning down and
circumscribing of who they were and for what they struggle. For example, when speaking of her identity, one narrator,
Manuela, said: "How are we going to construct something on the basis of exclusions and auto-exclusions, if on one side you
exclude, and on the other you try to homogenize? It's a big contradiction . . . My work implies a permanent revision, a
permanent study of myself and what I am doing." These lessons are relevant not only for marginalized subjects of security,
but also for how to conceive of security and its concomitant subject positions more generally - even in terms of the
traditional subject of the state. In sum, my intention has been to challenge the limitations of political imaginaries that
exclude from IR the articulations of insecurity of the Mayan women I interviewed because they represent impossible
political subjects in their capacities to write IR-valid (in)security discourses. I hope to have brought to the fore some
subjects of security that do not comfortably reside in the homes of IR. Although their "subjugated" knowledges may not
provide better or more objective solutions to critical questions of politics, they might be able to help those working in these
fields to begin reformulating their imaginaries, and to be open to the possibilities of conceiving of (in) security differently.
Global politics that are based on a view of the world and the relevant actors in it that excludes women and the feminine
from the picture (ye implicitly locates them in veiled sites that legitimate their absence). A I noted in the introduction to this
chapter, experiences of (in)security like those articulated by Mayan women do not make up the body c empirical "data"
upon which security is theorized and policy is formulated. Feminist theorizing around processes of identity formation
which takes into account not only the workings of particular discourses but importantly, a collusion of distinct relations of
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power (such as sexism racism, classism) led me to look for articulations of (in)security in (fc IR) unlikely and often
silenced sites. These sites (such as the ones where Mayan women dwell and struggle for both agency and security)
occupation the realm of the feminine in the gendered codings of the dominant readings of both IR and the praxis of global
politics. My research question, then - informed by feminist theories' attention to the workings of gender discourses implied that the methodology of security studies in IR could not adequately serve to address the question I set out to
explore. The ontology underpinning the assumptions in how1 security is conceived reflected a notion of politics that
necessarily ignore attention to gender and to the multiple violence implicated in the conception. Therefore, in order to
address my question, I began research process that resulted in the methodology and method outline above. Hence, although
my method may not be specific to feminism feminism (in all of its unlimited diversity) has provided many of the guideposts
for my methodological journey - a journey that, in its own way, challenges the authority of those who purport to know what
security means for all peoples in all contexts, without ever asking many them.
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The Japanese State exploits its women to satisfy the desire of the US military, mobilizing women as tools
to maintain power relations - a manifestation of the patriarchal state
Lie 1997 [John, Professor of sociology and Dean of International and Area Studies at the University of California, Berkeley “The
State as Pimp: Prostitution and the Patriarchal State in Japan in the 1940s” The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring, 1997),
pp. 260 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Midwest Sociological Society, EmiW]
The Japanese state organized and promoted sexual work in the 1940s. During World War II, the military was instrumental
in recruiting Japanese and Korean women into "comfort divisions" to serve officers and soldiers within and outside of
Japan. After Japan's defeat, the state organized Japanese women to serve the occupying American soldiers sexually. In
short, the Japanese state functioned as a pimp in the l940s. The activities of the Japanese state in the 1940s suggest that it is
problematic to separate the discussion of political power from the issue of sexuality. This study also demonstrates that
prostitution does not occur simply from men's sexual desires or “deviant” women’s willing- ness to offer sex for money but
because of the underlying structural conditions and concrete organizations. The prerequisites of modem, organized
prostitution include the regulating or administrative state, urbanization and the commodification of social life, and the
concomitant end of feudal sexual relations. More concretely, prostitution usually entails organizations-be it the state or
private sexual entrepreneurs-to sustain relations of sexual exchange between prostitutes and their clients. In this sense, the
study of prostitution must be placed in the analysis of power relations, that it is in the realm of political and sexual
economy. Patriarchy is not an all-encompassing principle of power in society. Men do not control women but rather a
particular group of men control a particular group of women. Just as (predominantly fanning and working) women from
colonized Korea were mobilized by the Japanese state, some Japanese women were mobilized when Japan was “colonized”
by the United States. International and internal power relations were critical to the formation of prostitution organizations.
The Japanese state as pimp is but an extreme manifestation of the modem patriarchal state. The quest for power and wealth
justified in terms of protecting “innocent” women legitimates the colonization of not just another country but its own
women as well. In so doing, the state creates alliances across nations, classes, and genders; it is not outright coercion but
hegemony that makes the rule of the modem state effective. The modem patriarchal state, as well as patriarchal social
structure, are ensembles of overlapping power relations, not instances of simple gender hierarchy and domination. The road
to understanding the power of patriarchal ideologies and institutions lies in tracing the concrete operations of power
relations.
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US imperialism is a tripartite combination of imperialist thought, and racial and sexual inequalities
which justify the repeated sexual oppression in Japan – the hyper-sexed stereotype of Japanese women
allows servicemen to justify their rapes as consensual
Woan 2008 [Sunny, a J.D. of Public Interest and Social Justice Law at Santa Clara University, 2008, “White Sexual Imperialism: A
Theory of Asian Feminist Jurisprudence,
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/walee14&div=17&g_sent=1&collection=journals#283, pg. 286-7, EmiW]
Despite significant improvements in racial and sexual equality over the last few decades, U.S. servicemen’s treatment of
women is Asia has failed to progress. In the mid-80’s, international controversy flared over a Japanese incident in Japan in
which two U.S. marines and a U.S. Navy seaman gang-raped a twelve year old Japanese girl in Okinawa, Japan. They
ambushed the girl after watching her enter a stationary store. The two Marines bound the girl with tape, pulled her shorts
and underwear down to her ankles, and after the three men raped her, remarked that the girl looked like she enjoyed it. To
filter an analysis of the Okinawa incident through the lenses of either sexual inequality or racial inequality exclusively, fails
to convey fully why this twelve year old girl suffered. While many scholars see the convergence of sex and race stereotypes
as the root cause of the incident, examination of only these two components is insufficient. To comprehend the gravity of
harm caused by sexual-racial disparities between White men and Asian women demands a tripartite inquest. This inquest
must conjoin colonial history along with that of sex and race related forces. First, the legacy of imperialism explains why
the U.S. servicemen occupied Japan. After the allies defeated the Axis powers in World War II, the United States decided
to meddle in East Asian political affairs: Namely by regulating Japan to prevent it from engaging in imperialism. A sense of
White supremacy meant the world could fall complacent to the idea that White imperialism was somehow “better” than
Asian imperialism. Thus, while Japanese military presence in East Asia posed a world threat, American presence would
not. Second, the prevailing attitude that Asian women occupy an inferior position to White women and more directly, to
White men, in turn appeased the consciences of these three servicemen enough to rape and express belief that she enjoyed
the sexual conquest. This underscores the idea that in the eyes of White men, Asian women seem to exist solely for their
sexual gratification as hyper-sexed and unconditionally submissive creatures.” The stereotype of Asian women always
consenting to sex allowed the three servicemen to deny the act as a rape. It is this potent tripartite combination of
imperialist thought, racial inequality, and sexual inequality that perpetuate violence against Asian women by White men.
Had these components not come together under White sexual imperialism, the Okinawa incident probably would not have
occurred. Asian and diasporic Asian women face higher risks of racial and sexual harassment than their White female
peers. One of the main theories behind this is that the Asian experience cannot escape the stain of sexual imperialism, a
stain which simply does not apply to the White woman’s experience.” Although the theory of intersectionality between race
and gender alone cannot fully articulate Asian and diasporic Asian women’s lives; rather, the concurrent operation and
interactive mutual dependency between race, sexuality, and dimensions of colonialism expound on their subordination.”
This section comments on the present-day ramifications of White male exploitation and domination of Asian women and
the feminist issues raised by the grievous legacy of White sexual imperialism left in both Asia and Asian America. The first
part surveys Joo v. Japan,” a recent court decision where Asian women, who were the victims of atrocious war and sex
crimes, brought suit in U.S. courts. The omission of an analysis through White sexual imperialism may explain why the
court ruled against the women. The second part then shows how White sexual imperialism provides a compelling rationale
for several contemporary issues of sexual-racial inequality facing Asian and diasporic Asian women.
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The Imperialist ambitions of the United States will lead to endless cycles of wars and holocaust
(John Bellamy Foster, Professor of Sociology at University of Oregon, April 2004, “The New Age of Imperialism”, Monthly
Review vol. 55 no. 3, http://www.monthlyreview.org/0703jbf.htm)SH
At the same time, it is clear that in the present period of global hegemonic imperialism the United States is geared above all
to expanding its imperial power to whatever extent possible and subordinating the rest of the capitalist world to its interests.
The Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea Basin represent not only the bulk of world petroleum reserves, but also a rapidly
increasing proportion of total reserves, as high production rates diminish reserves elsewhere. This has provided much of the
stimulus for the United States to gain greater control of these resources—at the expense of its present and potential rivals.
But U.S. imperial ambitions do not end there, since they are driven by economic ambitions that know no bounds. As Harry
Magdoff noted in the closing pages of The Age of Imperialism in 1969, “it is the professed goal” of U.S. multinational
corporations “to control as large a share of the world market as they do of the United States market,” and this hunger for
foreign markets persists today. Florida-based Wackenhut Corrections Corporation has won prison privatization contracts in
Australia, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Canada, New Zealand, and the Netherlands Antilles (“Prison Industry Goes
Global,” www.futurenet.org, fall 2000). Promotion of U.S. corporate interests abroad is one of the primary responsibilities
of the U.S. state. Consider the cases of Monsanto and genetically modified food, Microsoft and intellectual property,
Bechtel and the war on Iraq. It would be impossible to exaggerate how dangerous this dual expansionism of U.S.
corporations and the U.S. state is to the world at large. As IstvE1n ME9szE1ros observed in 2001 in Socialism or
Barbarism, the U.S. attempt to seize global control, which is inherent in the workings of capitalism and imperialism, is now
threatening humanity with the “extreme violent rule of the whole world by one hegemonic imperialist country on a
permanent basis...an absurd and unsustainable way of running the world order.”* This new age of U.S. imperialism will
generate its own contradictions, amongst them attempts by other major powers to assert their influence, resorting to similar
belligerent means, and all sorts of strategies by weaker states and non-state actors to engage in “asymmetric” forms of
warfare. Given the unprecedented destructiveness of contemporary weapons, which are diffused ever more widely, the
consequences for the population of the world could well be devastating beyond anything ever before witnessed. Rather than
generating a new “Pax Americana” the United States may be paving the way to new global holocausts.
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The U.S. occupation of Okinawa, in particular, creates space to understand imperialism – power
structures in Japan perpetuate colonial dominance and act as testing grounds for militarized masculinity
Ginoza 5 (Ayano, September, of Women’s Studies at Washington State University “American Village as a Space of Militarism and
Tourism: U.S. Militarism, Gender Hierarchy, Class, and Race in Okinawa”, MX)
Yumiko Mikanagi, a feminist political scientist, argues that this specific rape case is ascribed to “gendered power
hierarchies in society and socially sanctioned masculinities based on violence against women” (98). In another word, places
like this are spaces where violence against women is socially sanctioned, and where women paradoxically attain not only
freedom from traditional Okinawan gender roles, but also freedom of sexual expressions that militarism relies on, exploits,
and controls. Also, places like this is a militarizing term which trivializes the militarization process of the American Village
and of how women’s bodies are sexualized by veiling power inequalities. Throughout the paper, I have tried to explore the
problematic concept of natural and the process of naturalizing militarization in Okinawa with a case of the American
Village. The space is a symbol for the anxieties and illusions of attaining higher class, and Japanese/ American life. This
examination of the U.S. occupation of Okinawa helps us understand current imperialism. The imperialism is mediated
through gender and race. It is also in pursuit of the natural, historical, and current practice of satisfying the military’s need
for metaphorically subjugating sexually and racially, as though the military is the man 16 acting naturally. The American
Village exists as the most powerful cultural construction that reshapes contemporary Okinawan women’s sexualities toward
Okinawan nature and culture. To naturalize is to trivialize the dynamic structure of sociopolitical maneuvers. The landscape
of the American Village for younger generations of Okinawans is an escape from the old tragic war history, a place where
they fulfill their desire for a higher social class and cross racial lines by dating and marrying GIs. On the other hand, some
GIs manipulate the space as a testing ground for their masculinity on Okinawan women. This indicates the perpetuation of
colonial dominance in the American Village. In a society where power is highly valued and embraced as the highest
pleasure, we tend to understand the power structure and hierarchy as natural and women as sexual. In order to fight against
the militarization of the Okinawan natural and social landscape, and the exploitation of women’s sexuality, it is
indispensable to analyze the dynamics of naturalizing and trivializing processes.
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Thus we present the following plan: The United States federal government should close all United States’
military bases in Japan.
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Contention 3- Solvency
Militarization happens step by step, rejection at each step key
Ferguson and Mironesco 2008– Kathy E. Ferguson is a professor of gender studies at the University of Hawai’i, Monique
Mironesco is a professor of Women’s Studies at the University of Hawaii (2008, Ch 16: Environmental Effects of U.S. Military
Security, in Gender and Globalization in Asia and the Pacific . MX)
Militarism often seems to stand outside of globalization because wars and armies are generally activities of states (although
nonstate terrorism complicates this understanding) and because violence seems to separate people and places, while global
flows connect them. Yet global flows of violence, arms, soldiers, mercenar- ies, contractors, strategies, environmental
destruction, and bellicose gendered imaginaries are part and parcel of globalization. Militarization, and by implica- tion
demilitarization, is a complex process with a long history and many layers. Militarization happens step by step, through
dense networks of microdecisions about how we live, work, and think as well as through obvious public policies, vi- olent
colonial histories, and visible macrodecisions through which elites orga- nize the world and use its resources. Militarization
also marks sites of struggle, contests over not just how to militarize but whether to do so.
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Gender intersects more than any other category
Shields, Department of Psychology at Pennsylvania State University, 2008 (Stephanie A., “Gender: An intersectionality
perspective,” Sex Roles, 59:301-311) EmiW
Some research questions may be more usefully addressed by an intersectionality model than others. We should
not, however, expect that the processes underlying systems of inequality will be equivalent when examined at a
structural level. Risman (2004), for example observes that race and socioeconomic status, for example, always
intersect as axes of domination, but the social processes that create and maintain them are not necessarily
identical. This is true for gendered intersections as well: Gendered images support racial domination, but racial
domination can hardly be attributed to gender inequality. For example, Black men’s inferiority gets promoted
through constructions of hypersexuality (Collins 2004), and Black women’s inferiority gets promoted through
sexualized images such as Jezebel or welfare queen (Collins 2000). Similarly, Asian American men’s autonomy
and even citizenship rights were abrogated by constructions of effeminacy (Espiritu 1997). Yet it is implausible to
argue that racial domination is nothing but a product of gender oppression. (Risman 2004, pp. 443–444) In other
situations, forms of intersectionality create unique situations of disadvantage and marginalization, yet gender may be a
significant explanatory through-line. For example, different mechanisms may be at work to depress the wages of working
poor women compared to men, and women professionals compared to men, and the experience of marginalization may be
quite different for the two groups of women. The end result of different local mechanisms, however, is the fact that
women across occupations are paid, on average, less than men of comparable training, skill, productivity, and seniority. As a
social structural institution, gender constructs and maintains the subordination of women as a group to men as a group across
time and culture (Lorber, 1994). This is the primary reason that we use gender as the starting point in our analysis of
intersectionality in this special issue. We do not suggest that gender is always and everywhere the most important social
identity, but it is the most pervasive, visible, and codified
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Only demilitarization in the form of full withdrawal can solve gendered violence in Japan
Fukumura and Matsuoka 09(Yoko Fukumura and Martha Matsuoka, ed. Janice A. Radway, doctoral student at UC Santa
Cruz and assistant professor of Urban and Environmental Policy at Occidental College respectively, 2009, “Redefining Security:
Okinawa Women’s Resistance to US Militarism” from American Studies, an Anthology,
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=3D9FE-UfYxEC&oi=fnd&pg=PA49&dq=okinawa+base+gender&ots=1dLmyvBHD&sig=TouTH24YgdHc0rq_ODOlYqAw5k4#v=onepage&q=okinawa%20base%20gender&f=false)SH
The visibility of the issues of women and children in the reemergence of antimilitarism was due to the active leadership role
of Okinawan women, and in particular Okinawa Women Act Against Militarism (OWAAMV). Since its formation,
campaigns and activities have reflected a perspective on militarism that recognizes women’s rights as human rights and the
military as an affront to human society. Keiko Itokazu, co-chair of OWAAMV and an elected member to the Okinawa
Prefectural Assembly, says: “Our campaigning is not anti-U.S., but against military forces. The Japanese forcibly involved
women in Okinawa in that wheel of destruction. During the war, not just women from Okinawa and the mainland but all
over the region, Taiwan and Korea, were all called in to serve the requirements of the military. The military always forces
women into this unproductive process of destruction; that is what their existence and logic is all about. Only with that sort
of logic, war logic, could the destruction of our natural environment and the denial of women’s human rights be possible.”
(Itokazu 1996, 11) In a report to the International Conference on Violence against Women in War and Armed Conflict
Situations OWAAMV argued that (1) even in times of “peace,” the long term military presence results in violence against
women, (2) military facilities represent sites of violence, illustrated by deployment of US military forces from Okinawa to
engage in conflict in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf; (3) training facilities used by military personnel expose
residents and civilians to physical and psychological domination and risk to safety; (4) the extent of violence against
women is related to the attitudes of the host government, reflecting the status of women, human rights, and the legal system
that is in place to protect the status of women in society; (5) violence against women and the violation of their human rights
is related to the economic relationships between the country deploying the military presence and the country receiving the
military presence; and (6) the military is a male-dominated structure that maintains constant war-making readiness,
domination, and violence (Takazato 1997a). Japanese feminist scholar Yayori Matsui (1998) further notes that
OWAAMV’s activism is drawn from a framework of alternative security. “Okinawan women challenge the very concept of
security by asking whose security it is if women and children are raped and harassed by military men and put under fear
and threat. They forcefully call for people’s and women’s security, not security of the state. They claim that violence
against women cannot be prevented without confronting and doing away with U.S. military dominance and without
achieving demilitarization in the Asia-Pacific region. They emphasize that the army itself is a mechanism of violence. They
also broadened the concept of violence against women from war and armed conflict situations to cover the situations of
long-term military presence, because women near military bases are constantly victimized by sexual violence, even if there
is no war or armed conflict.” (61)
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The Okinawans struggle can speak to all forms of marginalization, its resistance will be connected to
global struggles. Removing troops is a rallying cry against masculine frameworks in military institutions
and develops new forms of international security
Tanji 2003 (Miyume, Ph.D, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Sophia University, Australian National
University, and Murdoch University, "THE ENDURING MYTH OF AN OKINAWAN STRUGGLE: THE HISTORY AND
TRAJECTORY OF A DIVERSE COMMUNITY OF PROJECT", http://wwwlib.murdoch.edu.au/adt/pubfiles/adtMU20040510.152840/02Whole.pdf, pgs. 19-20,. MX)
Chapter 8 focuses on the peak and the downturn period following the rise of the third wave of 'Okinawan Struggle'. The
contemporary community of protest is characterized by the co-existence of plural social movements. Differences and
internal divisions within the community of protest, I argue, indicate the co-existence of qualitatively different kinds of
social movements, although they are all related in some way to the inequality and marginalization related to the continuing
dominance of US military bases in Okinawa. A distinctive contribution of this thesis is to understand the Okinawan protest
experiences in the world that are studied more widely and profoundly, for example, the civil rights movement, anti-nuclear
movements and women at Greenham Common. It contributes to opening the black box of 'Okinawan protesters' represented
as a collected victim of an invincible US international security policy, of Tokyo's political economy of compensation, and
marginalization of a minority group in Japan. It attempts to look at who the protestors are, what they want, how they strive
to get it, and why. Overall, it contends that the myth of an 'Okinawan struggle' has survived, and will survive increasing
diversification of protest actors and changing reform agendas in Okinawa because of its flexibility in being harnessed to a
myriad of shapes and forms of campaigns against marginalization. This dissertation reveals that through the post-war
period, the myth - described variously as an 'Okinawan struggle', the 'Okinawan Struggle', or the 'Okinawans' movement' has become less rigid in the way it is incorporated into notions of collective identity or rationales for specific protests and
organizations thereof. Yet it is precisely this capacity of the myth to speak to so many different interpretations of
marginalization - involving different struggles and experiences at different periods in time - that means it is still a powerful
and attractive one. It continues to be an effective source of inspiration and mobilization for divergent groups by providing
strategies and ideas of protest derived from past experiences, and to be a source of self-expression. Another attraction of the
idea of an 'Okinawan struggle' is its ability to provide a base for individual struggles, from which to connect with common
experiences of marginalization taking place in other parts of the world, thus promoting developing networks with social
movement actors in global civil society.
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