HILL AGRICULTURE RESEARCH PROJECT (HARP), NEPAL:
LESSONS FOR THE POLICY, INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES DIMENSIONS OF THE
SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS APPROACH
Web-site materials drafted by:
Karim Hussein
Research Fellow, Rural Policy and Environment Group, ODI
Overseas Development Institute, Portland House, Stag Place, London SW1E 5DP
E-mail: k.hussein@odi.org.uk
and
Sarah Montagu
Assistant Sustainable Livelihoods Officer, Sustainable Livelihoods Support Office
Department for International Development, 94 Victoria Street, London SW1E 5JL
E-mail: s-montagu@dfid.gov.uk
Study Details
Co-ordinators
Overseas Development Institute (Karim Hussein) and DFID
(Sarah Montagu)
Collaborators
Hill Agriculture Research Project (John Abington,
Sudarshan Mathema, Peter Rood and Bill Stewart-Jones)
Funder
UK DFID
Duration
March-June 2000
Region / Countries studied
Nepal, South East Asia
Acknowledgements
These materials have been prepared solely by the authors, with significant editing from Sylvie
Cordier at ODI. However, they have received constructive critical comment from the HARP team in
Kathmandu. The authors are deeply grateful for the degree of assistance provided by the HARP
office during their visit. HARP staff (John Abington, Bill Stewart-Jones, Peter Rood, Sudarshan
Mathema and Duncan Barker) spent many hours talking through issues with interest and introducing
the team to key actors. While responsibility for the analysis rests with the authors, without this
support and assistance this study visit would have been impossible.
Final version: September, 2000
1
HILL AGRICULTURE RESEARCH PROJECT (HARP), NEPAL:
LESSONS FOR THE POLICY, INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES DIMENSIONS OF THE
SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS APPROACH
Summary
Effective agricultural services (agricultural research, technology development and dissemination) are
vitally important to rural development and change. In countries dependent on agriculture, without
appropriate and improved agricultural technologies and practices, and wider sharing of agricultural
knowledge improvements in living standards and reductions in poverty will be hard to achieve.
In developing countries across the globe, a number of processes have resulted in a new division of
roles between public bodies, the private sector, civil society organisations and farmers in the areas of
agricultural research and extension. The most important processes common to many countries, and
promoted by donors, are: the State ceasing to provide certain services; economies opening up to the
market; structural adjustment; and the creation of decentralised and locally accountable political and
administrative bodies. At the same time, rural development research and practice have shown the
merits of increasing competitiveness in the research and extension systems so that agricultural
services become more relevant to diverse development needs. In this context, competitive funds have
recently been promoted by a number of donors as a route to supporting institutional change in the
way agricultural services are delivered and as a way of involving a wider range of state and non-state
actors (NGO’s, private sector etc) in service delivery. Such changes are thought to increase the
efficiency and development relevance of agricultural research and extension through funding
conditions that require rigour, a demonstration that research responds to demand, and that it produces
clear, development-oriented outputs (i.e. improved technologies that are widely adopted by the poor).
This study draws lessons from an on-going project funded by the UK’s Department for International
Development (DFID) on the relationship between the policy context and institutional setting and its
contribution to achieving sustainable livelihood objectives. In this case, the project analysed is the
Hill Agriculture Research Project (HARP) and one of its components, the Hill Research Programme
(HRP). It also draws lessons about the broader development and implementation of the sustainable
livelihoods approach.
Key activities in the study included:

literature review and e-mail survey of Nepal rural development specialists;

two visits to Nepal to interview a wide range of stakeholders, including one case study of a
research project; and

feedback to key stakeholders (HARP, NARC and DFID-Nepal).
Key issues the study sought to understand include:

the interaction between the national political, policy and institutional setting and the project;

the role that competitive funds can play in improving livelihood impact of agricultural research;

the aims of HARP and the specific institutional and organisational change processes that the
project seeks to foster in collaboration with its partners and the means by which these aims are
being pursued;

how HARP’s aims and work undertaken so far contribute to the creation of sustainable
livelihoods and the degree to which research projects are practically relevant to livelihood needs,
development-oriented, and demand led;

lessons from a case study on how a research project supported by the HRP, and the staff
involved, have managed to develop new approaches to their work;

the strengths and weaknesses of the change process so far.
2
LINKS TO KEY PAGES
Summary
1. Relevance of the study to sustainable livelihoods
2. Livelihoods context and summary data: Nepal
3. Political setting
4. Macro economic and agricultural policy context
5. DFID policy and approach to development assistance in Nepal
6. The Nepal Agricultural Research Council (NARC)
7. HARP - The project and the process
8. HRP- funded project case study: Combined rice-fish farming in the hills
9. Emerging issues: how does the political and institutional setting influence the achievement
of SL objectives?
10. Key sources and further reading
Glossary & Acronyms
Annex 1: HARP Timeline and Processes
Annex 2: Programme for Nepal Visit
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1. RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY TO SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS
Agricultural services and improved livelihoods and poverty reduction
Effective agricultural services (agricultural research, technology development and dissemination, etc)
are vitally important to rural development and change. Without appropriate and improved agricultural
technologies and practices, and wider sharing of agricultural knowledge improvements in living
standards and reductions in poverty will be hard to achieve in countries still heavily dependent on
agriculture such as Nepal. However, it remains difficult for agricultural research providers to take on
the multidisciplinary poverty reduction agenda as they feel a need to focus on working with farmers
that both have the capacity and resources to engage with them effectively. Such farmers are rarely
among the poorest.
Policy, institutions and processes
Gaining access to the assets needed to create a sustainable livelihood depends on policy measures (at
the local and national level), institutions (formal and informal organisations, customary rules such as
resource tenure and legislation) and processes (the dynamic relations between these) (link to DFID
SL Guidance Sheets 2.4). These operate at all levels, from the household to the international, and in
public and private spheres. They determine:

access (to social, physical, financial, natural and human capital, to livelihood strategies and to
decision-making bodies and sources of influence) (see SL Guidance Sheets 2.3)

the terms of exchange between different types of capital; and

the returns to a given livelihood strategy.
Policy, institutions and processes are key determinants of livelihood outcomes. The work presented
here illuminates and unpacks some aspects of the “black box” of policy, institutions and processes in
the livelihoods framework, providing concrete examples of how these operate to help or hinder the
improvement of rural livelihoods, particularly with regard to agricultural production.
Relevance of this study to the policy, institutions and processes aspects of the SL approach
The study sought to understand:

the aims of the Hill Agriculture Research Project;

the means by which these aims are being pursued;

the specific institutional and organisational change processes that the project seeks to foster in
collaboration with its partners;

internal and external evidence as to strengths and weaknesses of this change process so far.
Particular attention was paid to the Hill Research Programme - the competitive research funding
instrument of HARP - and the changes that this has brought in its short period of existence.
Specifically, the study focused on how HARP-supported interventions affect key policies and
institutions that shape people’s livelihood options and also how the policy context and institutional
environment shape the achievements of the project. In this as in many other cases, it is clear that the
policy and institutional context present very real constraints on HARP contributing to improving
livelihoods for the poor.
4
2. LIVELIHOODS CONTEXT AND SUMMARY DATA: NEPAL1
Background
Agricultural services in Nepal are faced with a complex context that conditions and shapes the
effectiveness of their work and the options that can be taken in trying to promote agricultural
development. Some aspects of the context are summarised below.
People and population
According to current estimates, about 22 million people live in Nepal in 75 districts. The highest
concentration of people live in the Kathmandu Valley and over 90% of the population is rural. Nepal
is a very heterogeneous society with a complex ethnic mix. This heterogeneity is overlaid by great
disparities in social and economic opportunities. The poor and very poor are located predominantly in
the mountains and very remote areas, in the mid and far west districts and also dispersed throughout
rural areas. Causes of poverty are diverse.
Poverty and vulnerability
According to the 1996 Nepal Living Standards Survey, 42% of Nepal’s population lives under the
poverty line – and the poorest live in the remotest areas. Rural populations are vulnerable to natural
calamities such as floods, landslides, soil erosion and the particularly harsh environment of the
mountain regions; in addition the escalating civil conflict due to Maoist insurgency is disrupting
livelihoods in poorer, remoter rural districts.
Human capital
Human capital is weak, indicated by: average national illiteracy rate of 64% (twice as high in rural as
in urban areas); high infant, child and maternal mortality and malnutrition: nearly 50% of young
children are underweight and have stunted growth.
Natural capital
Access to adequate natural capital - land, water and common property resources - is constrained:

less than 20% of rural households are landless, but land fragmentation, dual ownership and size
(2/3 of landholdings are less than 1ha) hinder productivity;

water is abundant, but access to drinking and irrigation water is unequal; only 44% of the
population has access to safe, clean water and the physical infrastructure that exists has been
poorly managed;

forest resources are critical, supplying 90% of total fuel, 50% of livestock fodder and potentially
highly valuable non-timber forest products (e.g. medicinal herbs);

about 45 out 75 districts in the country are in food deficit and of these, about 13 mountain and
hill districts have less than 6 months’ food sufficiency most years.
Physical access
This remains a serious constraint to the 14 districts without roads and in the context of a challenging
mountainous environment where many settlements may only be accessible by several days’ walk.
Lack of roads also poses significant problems for farmers to access markets for the purchase of
essentials and sale of produce. Few have access to sanitation or electricity.
Financial capital
Access to financial capital through formal channels is restricted to 15% of borrowers, owing to
limitations in the capacity of institutions to deliver services to the rural poor and the wider policy
environment. However, pensions and remittances are important sources of financial capital.
Political leadership and instability
The continuing lack / instability of political leadership and weak commitment to change creates a
difficult policy environment.
Patronage
1 Much of this section is adapted from data collated by DFID-Nepal – with permission. See also section on Sources for further
information.
5
Political patronage, afno manche (one’s own people) and associated inequities in gender, caste,
ethnicity and age limit access to resources and opportunities. Social capital, networks and trust as
well as user groups are essential to people’s livelihood strategies.
Caste
There are at least four different caste groups and 36 different ethnic groups in Nepal. Indisputably,
caste is an important issue in gaining rights to resources. Policy-making posts in Government or
NGOs and international organisations tend to be held by people from relatively wealthy, high caste
backgrounds from the Kathmandu area. Scheduled castes (or dalits), who constitute some 20-25% of
the population, have little access to resources education and to influential posts.
Tenant farmers
Through the addia system, tenant farmers have limited rights to control natural resources. Under this
regime, tenants must usually give half of their production to the owner of the land as rent. These tend
not to make enough surplus to cover the use of inputs and hence are the least interested in new
technologies that require inputs. Research and extension therefore have difficulty in working with
this group.
Bonded labour
Despite being illegal, bonded labour, or kamaiya, is a form of virtual slavery that has been especially
prevalent in western regions of Nepal. Essentially, in return for a what is usually a small loan,
farmers have had to repay interest to landlords by living and working on the landlord’s land. The
landlord provides a share of food crops. The capital is rarely repaid and hence labourers are in reality
frequently “bonded” to their creditor indefinitely. This bond can be inherited and so does not end
upon the death of one generation. While often being very poor, bonded labourers have not usually do
possessed their own land; hence it has not been easy to directly target agricultural services to them.
In July 2000, the government proposed legislation to “free” all bonded labourers and is now in the
process of establishing a resettlement scheme for them – providing small plots of land to the many
that have already left the employment of their landlords. However, confusion remains as to who will
be liable to pay remaining debts. The changing situation should permit agricultural services to
identify more opportunities to involve them in development-oriented research and technology
generation processes (see section 8 - case study).
Gender
 Men outnumber women in urban areas. This pattern is influenced by the bias in employment and
education that favour men, resulting in large male out migration from rural to urban areas. Nepal
also has had a long history of male emigration with regional variation
 40.4 % of women and 59.6 % of men over the age of 10 are considered economically active. This
indicates a lower participation by women as compared to men. This is due to the fact that
activities such as weeding and harvesting, kitchen gardening, livestock, poultry rearing, and fuel
and water collection, which are almost exclusively performed by women, are not considered as
economic activities and hence excluded from surveys
 Sometimes only men participate in user groups set up for women as they are the only ones with
the time
 The literacy rate for women is only 25 % and this compares with 54.5% for men.
Development achievements over last two decades
Despite these statistics, many improvements have been observed over recent years showing
development interventions to be having some significant impact:

increased access to drinking water

improved communications and more access to electricity supply

life expectancy increasing to 57 years

the advent of democracy after the 1990 people’s uprising against autocratic rule.
6
3. POLITICAL SETTING
Nepal has a long history of autocratic rule, with most of the political power concentrated in the centre
and with the monarchy. After restoration of democracy in 1990, strengthening of local selfgovernment became a basic policy for decentralisation. The current legal framework for
decentralisation (1997 Act and 1999 Local - Self governance Act) potentially gives more voice to the
poor in local decisions and emphasises the participation of local people with the preparation and
implementation of district development plans.
Decentralisation
To some extent it can be said that decentralisation, in the sense of sharing “public power” vertically
through “interventions” from outside the state apparatus, has occurred. The Local Self-governance
Act, 1999, provides local institutions with executive, legislative and judicial powers in order to
establish them as local governments and make them accountable to local people. The role of central
government is limited to policy formulation. All responsibilities for planning, resource mobilisation,
allocation, monitoring and evaluation have been handed over to the local institutions and to newly
created representative village and district level organisations: Village Development Committees
(VDCs) and District Development Committees DDCs).
However, devolution in Nepal has rarely been understood as a mechanism of sharing political power
among the central and local levels of governance. Elected local bodies are often put together with the
field offices of the line agencies, both taken simply as an arm of central authorities designed to
execute their decisions. Elected bodies therefore tend draw their legitimacy from, and are accountable
to, the centre rather than local electorates. This undermines the potential to make demands on the
centre, and for the centre to respond more appropriately to local livelihood needs.
However, the experiences of many developing countries show that without the democratisation and
decentralisation of state institutions, it is not possible to build self-reliant and self-determining local
entities capable of responding to the increasing demands of diverse groups in a polity. This is highly
relevant in a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious society such as Nepal. Hence, while there
are problems, decentralisation is has still been important in empowering many sections of the
population of Nepal.
Public Sector Institutions
External factors limiting the performance of public sector institutions in Nepal include:

an absence of effective systems for relating expenditure programmes to outputs, such as targets in
the development plan;

management systems that emphasise management controls on the distribution and use of
resources;

organisational culture that rewards obedience (to rules and to superiors).
Patronage
It is frequently argued that Nepalese institutions, both within and outside government, are dominated
by patronage. This refers to practices such as the promotion of like-minded supporters to key posts,
the replacement or relocation of many civil servants after a change of leadership, and so on. This
context of patronage is characterised by:

informal connections rather than transparent rules governing behaviour;

personal connections often being the most important factor in decision-making;

politicians working within networks of bureaucratic and political clients to gain influence and
authority within and outside government.
Attempts to change this system are few. Expectations are that government and civil institutions will
continue to support privileged access and opportunity, and in consequence strategies pursued by less
advantaged groups tend to focus on working with the patronage system rather than seeking
fundamental change. A manifestation of the patronage system within government includes frequent
changes in senior government personnel, resulting in a lack of continuity.
These constraints have prevented public sector institutions from responding to the policies (in
successive development plans) calling for accelerated development. Policies are ambitious, but
7
institutions are unable to implement the changes necessary to deliver them. Accountability, in terms
of the delivery of effective services, is weak. Under these circumstances many poor people have little
effective control over their lives. Furthermore, more powerful groups have an interest in maintaining
the status quo.
Political instability
The expression of democracy and the removal of the King’s authority over policy have had both
positive (democratic elections have empowered the people to have a voice in selecting and changing
their leaders; press freedoms are cherished; decentralised institutions have been established) and
negative implications (instability; changing officials).
Frequent changes in the government, a crisis of confidence among political parties, unwillingness of
the bureaucracy to delegate power to local levels, and problems in budget allocation from the centre
to the regions have all held back power-sharing. Frequent changes in government result in frequent
staff changes in public sector institutions. Government staff members are not in their posts for long
enough to do anything effective, least of all take on board the livelihoods and poverty reduction
principles or are transferred before they can implement change. Political instability also contributes
to corruption as some officials try to reap the benefits of their position before they are moved on.
In this context, development practitioners can take on the role of institutional memory - being more
stable than staff in national institutions.
Maoist insurgency
There has been increased Maoist activity in the mid-west and western areas of Nepal, with violence
being reported regularly. The situation became so serious that the government briefly activated the
National Defence Council in May 2000. This simmering conflict poses significant problems for all
development initiatives in rural areas, especially as the poorest tend to live in these areas. NGOs are
beginning to down-scale their activities in these areas and in some cases are withdrawing to safer
areas. Banks and police posts are also closing in the rural areas and moving back to district
headquarters, making them less accessible to rural people. Extension workers are also naturally
reluctant to visit such areas.
Lessons on decentralisation in Nepal for SLAs




The Local-Self governance Act (1999) constitutes a major transformation in the local
development process. However, central government is reluctant to transfer power to the local
institutions.
Democratisation and decentralisation have resulted in the establishment of community based
organisations, VDCs and DDCs, holding their own development budgets. They provide a good
environment and a real opportunity for agricultural service providers to work in partnership with
farmers and in response to their requests which could encourage demand-led research and
extension.
Local institutions can only manage a fraction of the tasks assigned to them given the resources
and manpower available to them. Hence, UNDP-funded Programmes such as the Participatory
District Development Programme and Local Governance Programme focus on human resource
development at DDC level.
Under these circumstances many poor people do not yet have effective control over their lives –
though there is much potential for this to change now that the local political institutions have
been established.
8
4. MACRO ECONOMIC AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY CONTEXT
Ninth Development Plan (1997-2002)
The Ninth Development Plan aims to substantially reduce poverty within 20 years, with a view to
empowering people economically and socially by integrating them into the mainstream of the
development process. The Government puts emphasis on significantly increased economic growth
(agriculture led) - Nepal has become a net importer in terms of food -, better service provision and
improved access to basic services by the most vulnerable. The goal is to reduce poverty incidence
from 42 % to 32 % by the end of the Plan period.
Several aspects of the Ninth Plan (1997-2002) attempt to remove constraints related to policy,
institutions and processes:

policies to promote macro-economic stability

initiatives to equip and empower the local bodies making them the focal point of rural
development through decentralisation

increasing GDP by an annual average rate of 6 % during the Plan period, mainly through growth
in agriculture, agro-based industries, small-scale industries, tourism and construction

employment generation, lowering unemployment and underemployment rates to 4% and 35%
respectively.
Agriculture Perspective Plan (1997 - 2016)
According to the APP, the necessary preconditions now exist in Nepal to trigger sustainable high
growth. Priorities include:

increasing agricultural production

irrigation: well-controlled, year-round water supply

fertiliser: meeting the demand for fertiliser and accelerating its use over time, by creating a
favourable policy environment and developing institutional structures in the private sector

increased specialisation: need for low transaction costs, for which both improved rural transport
systems and technology are crucial

research and extension services: need to focus on efficiency in use of fertiliser and irrigation,
commodity programmes specific to a limited number of lead and target commodities, animal
nutrition and veterinary services, and marketing and processing.

improved access to rural areas and their electrification
The APP priority sectors include livestock, mainly dairy animals; high value crops; agri-business; and
forestry. While the APP sets clear priorities for rural development there is no effective strategy to
implement these. However, the APP does support subsistence farming and food production by
prioritising the four main staple food crops: rice, wheat, maize and potato, relating to the terai, low
and mid-hills, and high hills for technology generation and dissemination.
Development priorities in the hills
The need for a commodity focus differentiates the APP’s hill-and-mountain strategy from that for the
terai. In the terai, the strategy mainly consists of bringing together previously separate elements of
infrastructure and research that already existed. The APP strategy acknowledges that much of the
flight from the countryside to Kathmandu is a result of the lack of income generation opportunities,
plus a skewed distribution of that income in the hills and mountains. The hill and mountain growth
strategy is based on a limited number of priorities designed to maximise economic productivity.
These include:

more focused agricultural research and extension with increased funding from government and
groups of donors;

co-ordinated construction of roads, irrigation, and hydroelectric investments around strategically
selected geographic growth nodes;

processing and marketing (e.g. in India to take advantage of high pre-season prices) of six leading
crop commodities and one leading livestock commodity through partnerships with the private
sector;

co-ordination of government, people’s, and private institutions to support these priorities;
9


develop improved earning potential on farms of all sizes
attracting those who will decide to move out of agriculture to expanded commercial centres in the
hills – not just Kathmandu.
The common objectives of all these components of the APP include:

output growth and export promotion;

income generation for better distribution of income and well-being;

diversification of commercial centres;

income and food security;

the conservation of ecological resources.
Land reform
Land reform has been significant in defining agricultural production in the hills. The 1964 Land Act
enforced a ceiling of 2.5 ha in Kathmandu, 4.07 ha in the hills and mountains and 16.93 in the terai
for cultivated land. The Act recognised the rights of tenants and fixed rents at 50 % of the main crop
grown in one year. The fourth amendment of the Act abolished the dual system of ownership
throughout the country and during the current Ninth Plan period, ownership has to be provided to all
tenants.
However, the current Agriculture Perspective Plan relies too much on growth as the engine for
addressing poverty, with few direct poverty reduction measures being taken, and has proved difficult
to implement.
Do Nepal’s policies support livelihoods and poverty orientation of agricultural services?







The Ninth Plan (1997-2002) focuses on reducing poverty through significantly increased
economic growth, better service provision and improved access to basic services by the most
vulnerable. APP is given top priority as the main strategic plan to alleviate poverty through
accelerated growth in agriculture and expand employment opportunity.
While the APP (1997-2016) focuses on the development of both the terai and the hills over time,
the initial emphasis is on the development of the terai which has greatest production potential, in
order to ensure national food security. This encourages national agricultural research and
extension agents to give priority to the terai over the hill farmers.
The APP suggests that the government should concentrate on factors that have prevented markets
and social institutions from increasing and promote partnerships with the private sector for
processing, storage and marketing links.
As regards to the hills, APP prioritises the production of high value commodity crops to stimulate
increased economic activity. Agricultural services are thus mandated by the Plan to work more on
technologies that increase high value commodity crop production in the hills. If successful, this
could provide significant gains.
APP acknowledges that much of the migration from the countryside to Kathmandu is a result of
the lack of such income generation opportunities - plus a skewed distribution of that income - in
the hills and mountains. It seeks to develop improved earning potential on farms of all sizes, and
attract those who do move to do so towards expanded commercial centres in the hills
A weakness of the APP is that it does not address the weak linkage between research and
extension. While this needs to be addressed if appropriate technologies are to be developed and
disseminated, it may have been a deliberate gap in the knowledge that the World Bank was to
fund the Agricultural Research and Extension Project (AREP) which has a strong emphasis on
linkages between research and extension.
As the attraction of working in the terai is still strong, schemes that empower economically weak
groups may be needed if they are to remain in the hills.
10
5. DFID POLICY AND APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN NEPAL
In line with international development targets, the UK DFID believes that with the right policies and
interventions, the incidence of poverty can be significantly reduced in Nepal within 10-20 years. In
order to support this process, DFID aims to create a context in which pro-poor policies and effective
sector programmes are implemented effectively by key stakeholders (government, donors, nongovernmental actors…) in a coordinated way.
Addressing what it sees to be the root causes of poverty, DFID seeks in particular:

support for broad-based economic growth through better infrastructure and more effective
management of natural resources;

improved governance and accountability of government (institutional pluralism and the rule of
law) and more empowered communities;

more co-ordinated donor effort in health and education, focusing on the rural poor;

improved opportunities for rural livelihood and enterprise development through effective
implementation of the Agriculture Perspective Plan (APP), and better exploitation of off-farm
income and revenue opportunities in key areas of growth potential;

to mainstream gender concerns throughout the programme, aiming at enhancing women’s status.
Rural Livelihoods
DFID, in collaboration with Government and donors, seeks:

to reduce institutional, technical and social blockages in agriculture, in collaboration with the
Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, through effective implementation of the APP, and
of the Hill Agriculture Research Project (HARP) and Seed Sector Support Project. It is trying to
raise understanding of social constraints in agriculture (e.g. land holdings and labour practices)
and is working on a draft rural livelihoods strategy for Nepal;

through the Nepal UK Community Forestry Project (NUKCFP), to enhance the contribution of
community forestry management to sustainable rural livelihoods, building on lessons from the
existing community forestry project: encouraging government to adopt a more co-ordinated
approach; exploring communal management of other assets;

to improve Nepalese capacity to carry out integrated social development work and tackle deep
seated social problems such as bonded labour;

to improve access to off-farm income through small-medium scale enterprise development;

to improve access to services and markets in remote areas incorporating selected feeder roads and
local infrastructure, and in co-ordination with other donors (e.g. through the Rural Access
Project).
UK support to natural resources research in Nepal through the bilateral programme is long-standing.
Traditionally, support has been focused on the hills, partly for historical reasons and partly because
farmers in the hills tend to be poorer than those in the terai, or low-lying plains. Of special
significance, these regions were recruitment areas for Gurkha soldiers and areas where the British
army supported Gurkha reintegration programmes after service. However, given national priorities to
increase food production in high potential areas in the context of a chronic national food production
deficit, a careful balance must be struck between support for poor hill farmers in less productive areas
and support for increased overall production in areas of high potential, across income groups.
Nepal is a country that depends on the national production of rice (the key staple food consumed in
the terai) and maize (the staple in the hills). However, the balance between import and export of
food, and specifically rice, has shifted with Nepal’s failure to produce enough food for its own needs.
In this context, agricultural research and extension are vital to improving productivity through the
development of appropriate technologies, and through this reducing poverty and improving
livelihoods and rural development in Nepal. HARP, a key plank of DFID support to the agriculture
and natural resources sector in Nepal, responds to this priority in the poorest areas with low and
variable productivity (the hills) by providing incentives to encourage the increased development
orientation of research and extension. HARP aims to establish new arrangements for long-term
support to hill research, and create an effective and sustainable research system that can meet
demand.
11
6. THE NEPAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (NARC)
History and structure of NARC
The government-funded Nepal Agricultural Research Council (NARC) is the main autonomous
agricultural research institution in Nepal, created in 1991 with strong encouragement from a key
funder of agricultural research and extension - USAID. It employs some 350 scientists and over 200
technical officers. NARC has four regional agricultural research stations and some 18 agricultural
research stations across the country.
Constitutionally NARC operates independently of the Ministry of Agriculture, although in practice
the two work closely together with the Minister of Agriculture presiding over NARC’s ruling body.
Before 1991, Agricultural Research and Extension used to both be located under the Ministry of
Agriculture. Many argue that less priority is given to development-oriented research since the
separation of research and extension in 1991.
NARC’s mission includes:

conducting research on problems in the agricultural sector

providing appropriate technologies to farmers and other clients to raise agricultural production
and productivity, thus contributing towards improving the standard of living of the Nepalese
population.
There is a long history of substantial donor support to the structures and systems of NARC. USAID
has been one of the major donors supporting agricultural research in Nepal over several decades It
provided seven years of intensive technical support to NARC under the Agricultural Technology and
Support Project (ATSP) with the aim of strengthening the organisation’s ability to generate new
technologies and transfer them to farmers by means of improved management systems. The World
Bank and Asian Development Bank have provided strong support to research management and
research-extension linkages - with the World Bank currently funding an Agricultural Research and
Extension Project (AREP), which supports NARC research in the terai, two NARC hill stations
(ARS Paripatle (citrus) in Eastern Region and ARS Bandipur (Goat) in Western Region. AREP also
supports NARC linkages with extension.
Many argue that a fundamental problem for NARC developing a consistent and strategic approach to
development-oriented research lies in NARC having no effective strategy as an institution. Despite
the existence of numerous policy and strategy documents - often carried out with donor support there is a weakness in implementing decisions that change institutional rules and practices. This is
perhaps because these strategy documents tended to be required (as with the World Bank / AREP) in
order to gain donor funding rather than strategies owned by the NARC. This makes it difficult to
achieve institutional changes that support livelihoods-oriented research.
Hill research and poverty reduction are not seen as NARC priorities as compared with the more
populated and productive lowlands (terai). There is little apparent interest in devoting significant
resources to hill research or focusing research on the poorest farmers. For example, NARC has only 9
scientists in the West and Mid-West Regions of the country - some of the poorest and remotest areas.
The majority of NARC research scientists and staff are based in the centre (Khumaltar in
Kathmandu) and as careers progress, scientists tend to move from field locations to the centre. Senior
scientists are relatively cut off from the work carried out by scientists in stations and when they do
visit researchers, they do not tend to give technical guidance or take an interest in the technical
aspects of the project. Thus, those making decisions on resources are seen not to be responding to the
practical needs of scientists in the stations, and addressing the needs of the poorest is not high on
NARC’s present agenda.
12
Internal issues and problems
The mode of decision-making
Decision-making is still said to be centrally-driven although at the same time it seems that it is not
clear who will take responsibility for taking decisions on removing disincentives, changing structures
and procedures, rewards and incentives. In NARC, seniority (age and number of years service) often
takes precedence over performance when it comes to promotion - this would no doubt affect
communication between the different levels of staff. This is coupled with limited delegation of
authority (see case study - Section 8) and rare visits of senior scientists to those research stations
located in the remote and hence most poverty stricken areas.
Incentives and motivations for good performance amongst field staff: a key to improving the
relevance of research outputs to development needs
On research projects funded by NARC, rewards and incentives for researchers are generally seen as
inadequate leading to less effective research outputs.
The independent status of NARC, and its freedom from civil service constraints on staff remuneration
and budget management, in theory allows the possibility for improving rewards to scientists and
technicians and increasing budgets to provide adequate motivation for quality research that is geared
to resolving development problems and producing development-oriented outputs. However, the
opportunity of giving increased rewards and incentives and adequate equipment budgets to bring
research projects to a satisfactory conclusion has not yet been implemented by NARC management. It
is politically difficult as other agriculture-related civil servants (such as extension workers) think that
they too should have access to such incentives. Further, for NARC funding, separate proposals must
be submitted to cover operational costs of a research project: hence a project may be approved, but
the accompanying costs may not be covered. HARP - with its Hill Research Programme - does step in
here by providing significant and generally appreciated financial incentives to NARC researchers and
stations running HRP projects. However, only some NARC scientists benefit from these projects.
Other institutional disincentives for research of any kind, and particularly where a shift in focus
towards poverty reduction and livelihoods is hoped for, include the following:
 seniority often takes precedence over ability and skills promotion opportunities;
 there is little motivation for researchers to spend more time carrying out work in rural areas due to
inadequate operating budgets on many NARC projects;
 penalties against poorly performing researchers are difficult to implement - decisions to dismiss
staff will almost inevitably be challenged in the Supreme Court and are frequently reversed
through court action.
Recognising these problems, and as recommended by a DFID Output to Purpose Review of HARP in
early 2000, NARC is now undertaking an extensive review of the incentive scheme provided by
HARP (and supported by donors) through an external consultancy commissioned using funds
provided by HARP. It is hoped that NARC will, as a result, be able to implement a common system
of rewards and sanctions throughout NARC stations – one which will be utilised by all donors.
Research Capacities & Training
NARC employs very few social scientists. In order for scientists to have the capacity to undertake
multidisciplinary, poverty-focused and livelihoods-oriented research, which is participatory and
demand-led, it is often necessary to have a core of trained social scientists in agricultural research
institutions. While NARC does have agricultural economists and socio-economists, the one available
to the project in the Western Region is held on a HARP contract that runs only until July 2000. Two
NARC socio-economist posts exist in the region, but have remained vacant since 1998. This can be
partly explained by the NARC requirement that scientists must have a BSc in Agriculture - de facto
excluding many trained social scientists.
Despite the fact that NARC has a number of scientists with experience in participatory technology
development, the vast majority of researchers do not have social science training. Indeed, many
13
technical staff have received no professional training in the last 10 years and training opportunities
for research scientists are rare unless donor funded.
External issues and problems
Political influence over staff appointments
Patronage and political instability have resulted in a very high turnover of senior staff. This has
caused a lack of continuity compounded further by the practice of placing appointees in various posts
or transferring them for non-technical reasons. This means that staff do not sometimes have the skills
or motivation necessary to undertake quality research. Further, some argue that NARC’s hasty
establishment, encouraged by some donor organisations at time of political turmoil during the
restoration of democracy, has resulted in the government’s commitment to NARC being half-hearted.
Research and extension linkages
There is a feeling that researchers do not have to be responsible for the technology once they have
developed it. They see their role as generating the technology and then handing it over to extension to
distribute and ensure that it is adopted.
Since the creation of NARC, observers have noted that the separation of research and extension has
had the unintended effect of weakening linkages between research and extension - especially at the
more senior or central policy-making level. While researchers and extension agents do often work
together in a constructive way at the local level, there is reluctance for researchers to think in terms of
uptake pathways as they feel this is the job of extension. Further, extension feels that incentives
should also be paid to them and that it is unfair that they go to research only - and this does not
contribute to a stronger relationship.
This situation is gradually changing. The Hill Research Programme is assisting this process. In order
to get HRP funding, scientists have to demonstrate that there is demand for the research and define an
uptake pathway for the technology.
Relations with client groups and organisations
Participatory approaches to research and extension coupled with strong relationships between
agricultural service providers and farmers’ representatives are widely seen as critical to render
services demand led. In Nepal, farmer groups exist - and are growing in number with the support of
international organisations, but these tend to be created around specific commodities or activities.
Groups are set up by researchers and extension workers to address specific agricultural themes rather
than being instigated by the community. NARC is starting to accept that NGOs and others have a role
to play in research. HARP is encouraging this process by providing funding for research to NGOs as
well as NARC. It could also introduce a new category for HRP funding: research projects undertaken
by civil society organisations working in collaboration with NARC or other providers.
Opportunities
The above issues are important, but there are important changes taking place in NARC that should
improve NARC’s impact on improving livelihoods in the coming years:
 with the emergence of thousands of civil society organisations since democracy and the gradual
acceptance of the importance of institutional pluralism, there is a growing recognition in NARC
of the need to involve civil society organisations in research to make it demand led and
development-oriented - a change that is of course assisted by the fact NARC now has to compete
with them for funds since HARP’s recent opening up of the HRP to institutions outside NARC;
 interest and commitment to establish a national Nepal Agricultural Research and Development
Fund (NARDF) - a competitive fund to replace the HRP at the same time as there is talk of
establishing a National Poverty Fund;
 an increasingly forward-looking approach that recognises the need for change.
14
7. HARP – THE PROJECT AND THE PROCESS
Project set up and institutional links
A detailed timeline of UK support for agricultural services in Nepal and the process of establishing
HARP can be found in Annex 1 (link to annex 1). The bilaterally funded Hill Agriculture Research
Project (HARP) was formally agreed between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (HMGN), and the
British Government in September 1996. The UK Overseas Development Administration (sic) agreed
to provide £11.661 million and HMGN £1.122 million, over the period September 1996 to September
2001 to give a total funding of £12.783 million. This period is currently being considered for
extension to 2004 so that HARP can follow through all research projects for which funding has
already been agreed and work with other agricultural service providers on the establishment of a
national competitive grant system (CGS). In any case, a new call for concept notes for projects to
begin in 2001 has been just issued. This will require some sort of continuation of HRP until 2004,
unless a national CGS that could satisfactorily take over management of HRP projects is established
before then.
The two main project components
1. Support for the institutional strengthening and change necessary for Nepal Agricultural
Research Council (NARC) to take over professional, administrative and financial
responsibility for Lumle and Pakhribas (handed over to NARC in July 1998 when the expatriate
Directors were succeeded by Nepali Heads of Station). TCO support to the two stations
continued as the two HARP Research Advisers use these important establishments as their
operational base. Their role was to support the five Hill Research Stations covered by HARP and
extended to cover all research providers in the country.
2. The development of an improved hill agriculture research system which would have a greater
impact on farmers. The core objective of this was to separate the provider of research services
from the purchaser - to increase efficiency and performance - and to introduce more competition
among a greater number of actors providing research services. This was a new concept in Nepal.
The main tool to achieve this was a Hill Research Programme (HRP) involving competitive
contract research. The conceptual framework and much of the procedures for implementation of
this competitive research funding draws on previous experience of DFID’s Renewable Natural
Resources Knowledge Strategy. Major funding for this programme commenced in July 1998.
While it should be recognised that HARP was never explicitly designed as a livelihoods or
poverty reduction intervention, any agricultural service intervention implicitly addresses the
livelihoods of the poor in countries like Nepal where agriculture is the main source of income and
where farmers still constitute a large proportion of the poor. Indeed, although the purpose of
HARP has always been to establish a sustainable and effective hill agriculture research system, it
is now taking place under DFID’s overarching livelihoods umbrella and its ultimate aim is now
accepted to be to have an impact improving livelihoods.
It was envisaged that the injection of substantial funding through the HRP would lead to significant
changes in the working practices of all hill stations.
The institutional support package to NARC concentrates on:

research management (planning, programming, projectised budgeting, monitoring and
evaluation);

the definition of mandates for hill stations other than Lumle and Pakhribas;

information flows (reporting, documentation, feedback mechanisms and dissemination; access to
relevant literature, linkages within NARC and with national and international organisations).
It also included provision for a Change-Management Specialist to facilitate workshops with NARC
and others in order to define work programmes more precisely. The approach also involves a system
of sanctions (stopping projects if rules of implementation are broken). There is also a degree of
inflexibility: researchers are not allowed to alter the purpose or outputs of their projects; they can
however change activities within the overall budget.
15
Institutional links
The major institutional stakeholders for HARP are DFID (main source of funds with HMGN
contribution), NARC, Ministries of Agriculture and Finance, and the National Planning Commission.
The main clients for research are the Departments of Agriculture and Livestock Services and NGOs.
Since the 1999 call for proposals, NGOs IAAS and the private sector can also become research
providers as well as consumers.
Institutional arrangements for HARP
The HARP has a steering committee, whose role is to guide the implementation of the main project
and its constituent Hill Research Programme (HRP), and to monitor the progress made against the
milestones in the Project Memorandum. The Steering Committee, chaired by the Secretary of the
Ministry of Agriculture, decides the priorities for agricultural research (based on the national
agricultural development policies for the hill districts of Nepal contained within the Agricultural
Perspective Plan) to be funded through the HRP. It is supported by a Technical Sub-Committee
which approves appropriate project proposals (already recommended by an anonymous peer review
group recruited by the HARP Secretariat / Director) and the allocation of agreed resources in
accordance with the priorities set by the steering committee, and its own established criteria.
Importance of special history of Pakhribas and Lumle agricultural centres
UK support in the hills of Nepal included some decades of involvement in the Agricultural Centres at
Lumle and Pakhribas, which for many years had been almost entirely funded by the then Overseas
Development Administration. The research stations began as a way of supporting pension and social
reintegration programmes for ex-Gurkha soldiers who had served the British Army, then gradually
evolved into research stations from the mid-1970’s—directly managed and funded in by the British
Government and totally separate from the HMGN (His Majesty’s Government of Nepal) although
NARC did contribute to basic salaries as agreed after the point of handover and an increase in
incentives (July 1998).
These institutions used their large budgets and resources (by comparison with Nepali institutions) to
carry out pioneering work in the area of linking research and extension activities, maintaining staff
based in more remote outreach sites and adopting more participatory research methods which could
all be seen as factors leading to a positive impact on the livelihoods of the poor. However, as a result
of their British-run legacy, Nepalese institutions have developed little sense of ownership of these
stations and the work they were doing. Further, the Nepalese government had no intention nor the
means, of picking up the bill for funding such grand research bodies (attracting up to £1.5 million
each at the peak in the early 1990s) - a sum judged inappropriate for a poor developing country. This
has had serious ramifications for the hand-over of their staff, assets and activities in the 1990’s.
Issues and problems
Hand-over process
The hand-over of Lumle and Pakhribas was originally envisaged to take place over a ten year period.
This was subsequently curtailed by agreement to five years and then, by unilateral decision, to a
period of eighteen months as a result of direct intervention of DFID-London. This meant the process
was rushed and did not allow for sufficient preparation and adjustment to be made in NARC for the
absorption of these two stations. Further, severe downsizing and staff layoff prior to hand-over
affected staff morale and confidence in British management, creating a sense of ill-feeling. This
damaged the likelihood of an emerging innovative model of close research-extension-farmer linkages
being continued even though still relevant today. Indeed, the process did not encourage government
to invest in maintaining the centres. This process did not seem to take account of the institutional
context in Nepal. However, as so few of the former staff remain in the current research stations, there
is a new opportunity for current management to motivate staff towards positive change and research
staff seem keen to move forward with the competitive research fund approach, but this will depend
on NARC changing its administrative approach.
Lack of ownership of Lumle and Pakhribas
From establishment to hand-over, the Lumle and Pakhribas agricultural centres were not Nepali
owned and therefore it should not be surprising that there was reluctance on behalf of the
16
Government of Nepal to take on these Centres. While they are significant assets for NARC, they have
received far greater investment than could ever be sustained within the Nepali research system. There
is some natural resentment within NARC towards Lumle and Pakhribas for the above reasons and, in
addition, because they were always held up as shining examples of how NARC should run its own
research stations. This lack of ownership was reinforced by some aspects of the process of handing
over the two Centres and the process and establishment of the HARP - although the HARP team have
made impressive efforts to build shared ownership anew in the years that have followed (see Annex
1).
Standards in Lumle and Pakhribas
At hand-over, NARC faced a choice: to allow Lumle and Pakhribas to fall in operational efficiency
by reducing levels of funding to the level received by other stations or build on their work to inspire
others. For example, Lumle and Pakhribas have been carrying out 60-70% of their research offstation in direct contact with the farming communities - a figure that is much higher than that for
NARC stations generally. This is widely recognised as improving the relevance of research, notably
in ensuring a concern for the socio-economic context of the work as well as engaging farmer
contributions in developing research ideas and the dissemination of new technology. However,
despite significant experience of researchers in participatory technology development, the NARC
ethos remains largely on-station and concerned with technical improvements.
Hence, some government officials have argued that if the UK had wanted them to continue with the
same volume of work the UK had an obligation to sustain direct funding. This, however, did not fit
with London’s changing approach to development assistance and emerging emphasis on partnership,
local “ownership” and diversifying agricultural service providers.
Staff losses from Lumle and Pakhribas at hand-over
Since handover, staff have left due to a combination of uncertainty (absence of a firm recruitment
timetable), reduced income and rewards and because certain qualifications and experience were not
recognised by NARC, and fears of a deterioration in the professional working environment (including
more frequent transfers and an incentive system that was less directly related to performance). This
has constituted a serious loss of institutional memory. The obligatory change in terms and conditions
of employment also meant that some of the better staff who could attract good salaries in the nongovernmental sector did not apply for recruitment to NARC. Lumle and Pakhribas research stations
still do not have the agreed full quota of research staff and a satisfactory incentive scheme adequate
to attract, retain and motivate hill research staff has yet to be achieved. Meanwhile, HARP is
providing one avenue for staff to gain well-rewarded research contracts, but this is helping to
maintain a bias within the NARC system towards the Lumle and Pakhribas stations, as these possess
better resources to respond to the challenge of demand-led competitive research.
The decision to establish a competitive grant system (CGS)
A number of problems surround the decision to establish the Hill Research Programme as a CGS.
HARP staff have subsequently had to address these in trying to achieve project objectives. The key
issues are that:

it was the result of a decision by the centre (London) rather than a result of consensus with
Pakhribas and Lumle staff (who were consulted, but whose suggestions were essentially ignored )
or other key actors in Nepal;

there is no proven link between the establishment of a CGS and an increased impact on poverty
reduction and improved livelihoods through development and dissemination of more appropriate
technologies;

a CGS may not be a practical model in Nepalese political culture given the pervasiveness of
political patronage.
These issues could have implications for the long term sustainability of the project. However, through
demonstration of how the system can work effectively, the HARP team have achieved a major
success and are succeeding in persuading Nepali actors of the benefits of a CGS. This example has
contributed to serious negotiations between a variety of actors to establish a National Agricultural
Research and Development Fund to replace HRP. Further, research scientists have appreciated the
17
benefits of more thorough project planning required by HRP and there is a desire for improving
methodologies. Through HRP they receive training in project cycle management and problem tree
analysis.
Internal procedures within NARC
NARC has not been able to make full use of its autonomy provisions and they have not been
translated into operational flexibility at HQ or in the stations, largely due to the concern not to act
against the political authorities that supervise NARC. Financial rewards are low and new freedoms
(e.g. those associated with selection of research, improving technical support, increasing individual
research budgets…) are not being effectively used. Planning arrangements are weak and there is an
insufficient focus on strategy and priorities. Work in progress on improvements to the budget and
financial systems and procedures have only been partially implemented. There is little delegation of
authority at any level especially with regard to funds and budgets.
Instability within NARC
NARC has also suffered instability through frequent changes in its governing bodies- Minister(s) of
Agriculture, Agriculture Secretaries, Executive Director (s), Directors, Station Chiefs etc. This has
weakened the process of agricultural research and management outputs and, indeed, the effectiveness
of HARP as the government interlocutors constantly change: agreement on ways forward may be
made only to be questioned by new post-holders.
Role of Technical Co-operation Officers (TCOs)
In this complex context, the role of experienced TCOs in the change process has been critical: they
constitute an institutional memory (for example, of the way the old LAC and PAC operated); their
knowledge of the institutional, political and historical setting enables them to operate effectively with
partners; some speak Nepali; and, if they stay in Nepal in the longer term, they are more likely to
have the patience to accompany institutional actors in a complex change process. They have an
extremely important role in a project of institutional change given the social and political context and
this role should be continued over time so as to build confidence with national counterparts and
researchers within the system.
Monitoring and Evaluation System
The monitoring and evaluation system currently being established will examine, among other things,
the impact of research projects funded by HRP - including uptake of technologies and the impact of
research on livelihoods and poverty reduction. An effective M&E system will provide data on the
success of HARP and the CGS. It could therefore provide an important source of information to
justify continuation of support for hill research and the establishment of a national CGS (NARDF).
The process of establishing an M&E system has included a review of baseline information available
at NARC outreach sites in the hills, discussions with selected researchers and officials of NARC and
HARP, the design of an impact survey and selection of completed projects/sites for pilot impact
evaluation.
The long term success of the M&E system will depend on it being sustainable (i.e. of a scale and
scope that can be supported by NARC after the end of HARP, and that can be managed by local staff)
It will also depend on using an appropriate, consultative and participatory methodology and approach
to the collection of data and the identification of key indicators of change. However, M&E planning
documents indicate that an ambitious system is being designed, relying heavily on collecting detailed
baseline data nationally using pre-designed questionnaire survey forms for all key actors - scientists,
dissemination agency, village organisations and households (including 6-page farm household
questionnaires and 13 page village organisation questionnaires). The draft surveys cover issues from
health, education, income sources to community decision-making processes and agricultural
technology use so as to assess impact across a wide range of potential areas from increased food
security to increased income and reduced vulnerability and increased livelihood options. While these
themes are important, and clearly aim to satisfy donor interest in multidimensional nature of rural
livelihoods, using this methodology to collect data on all these variables would imply a substantial
cost over time. This is particularly the case in Nepal, given that HRP projects are dispersed
18
throughout across the country and as social, environmental and agricultural conditions are so diverse.
Ultimately, there is a risk that the resources will not be available to analyse the data collected.
From interviews conducted during this study visit, it seems that rather less effort has been devoted to
consulting researchers based in the regions on the type of system they find manageable, relevant and
sustainable, and the identification of a small, manageable and generally agreed set of impact
indicators. Further, there is little evidence of consultation with NGOs and civil society organisations,
or of participatory surveys being undertaken to identify key indicators of change and technology
uptake with farmers - the intended ultimate beneficiaries of research outputs. Finally, the use of
simplified participatory techniques to identify wealth categories and analyse impact (e.g. impact
matrices) is absent. This is all the more significant as it is now generally accepted that reliable
information on technology uptake and impact requires a participatory approach.
In order to be manageable, sustainable and relevant, the M&E system will need to focus on a core set
of, say, 5-10 reliable proxy indicators of poverty reduction and improvement in livelihoods that have
clear causal links with research and extension activities. These should be identified in consultation
with HARP staff, key stakeholders and scientists undertaking projects, and complemented by a brief
participatory farmer survey. On-going data collection could focus initially on areas where several
HRP projects are clustered and could draw in the participatory model set by the UNDP in its local
governance projects or by ActionAid Nepal: both involve local people in a continuous process of
reflection on the effects of project interventions. Farmers working with agricultural services could do
the same. This is very important in the case of the NARDF as the national body that eventually takes
over the M&E system is bound to have more limited resources than are currently available to HARP.
Indeed, the M&E team’s support for involving civil society and private sector organisations in impact
studies, in addition to NARC and HARP, should contribute to sustainability in the face of
institutional weaknesses in NARC. The key issue is to build a system that is participatory,
manageable and sustainable and one that can be handed over in the long term.
Hence, while being rigorous in a classic M&E sense, current plans for the M&E system are perhaps
too formalised and too ambitious to be sustainable after outside intervention ends. The problem is
mainly one of approach. The design of the system would be improved if participatory consultation
with farmers were undertaken alongside an open-ended consultation with NARC and its scientists on
the nature and type of M&E system they want. (Link to lessons box over the page)
19
Lessons for implementation of SLA in agricultural service projects

A sudden, centrally-driven donor withdrawal strategy curtailing a negotiation process for handover that had already been agreed is not conducive to the effective absorption of stations into a
national research system. Such processes need time and need to be based on real consensus
building – proceeding at the pace of local and national partners and keeping to agreed schedules.
NARC lost many highly competent research scientists and experienced technical support staff in
the hand-over.

Research scientists must apply for funding for NARC and HRP funded projects. They find HRPfunded projects more attractive than NARC-funded ones (due to incentives and guidance). This
has resulted in manpower being drawn away from working on NARC projects which may
eventually weaken NARC institutionally. In recognition of this, a study to look into a new system
of rewards and sanctions has been commissioned by NARC using HARP funds.

A criteria for HRP funding means that projects should fit with the priorities of the APP. This
means that an overt poverty focus is not a priority for research. However, it is important that
funding of projects does not run counter to the government’s own priorities.

It is hoped that the M&E system being set up for HARP will help to establish this, but significant
additional efforts to increase levels of participation and consultation in the process of establishing
the M&E system will be required if it is to be relevant, affordable and successful. In the context
of HRP being phased out after 2004 and possibly being subsumed by a national CGS (the Nepal
Agricultural Research and Development Fund) it is key that the M&E system is of an appropriate
size that can be managed with limited resources.

It is possible that the project life of HARP is too short to support sustainable institutional change
especially in a context of political instability. At least 10-15 years is required to achieve
successful processes of institutional change.
20
8. HRP-FUNDED PROJECT CASE STUDY: COMBINED RICE-FISH FARMING IN THE
HILLS
Agricultural Research Station (ARS)-Pokhara (Fisheries) won a Hill Research Programme (HRP)funded project in August 1999, to look at the growth and production performance of rice and fish
under an integrated rice-fish culture system in the hills. It is a two year project with an expected
completion date of June 2001. The project leader is Suresh K. Wagle with 5 collaborators from ARSLumle and extension services: an agronomist, entomologist, soil scientist, socio-economist, and a
biometrician. Additionally, there is a collaborator in ARS-Trishuli (fish) where work previous work
on rice-fish production had been undertaken.
Problem identification
The Department of Agriculture (DOA) launched the Rice-Fish Programme in 1964. Rice-fish farming
is practised on a small-scale in the hills on terraced fields. Rice-fish projects were promoted by the
National Planning Commission, as part of national fish development policy, and by Japanese
volunteers in 1984/5. These initial projects showed the existence of markets and demand by farmers,
but failed after donor support was withdrawn. In 1992/3 and 1996/7, there were 56 and 58 ha,
respectively, under rice-fish culture in the country as a whole. However, although immense scope and
potential for the development of rice-fish farming exist in Nepal, the technology for undertaking
integrated farming has not been taken up or developed and disseminated effectively.
Research scientists in ARS-Pokhara initiated this project after identifying an economic opportunity in
introducing rice-fish farming in middle hill ecologies: farmers with irrigation could produce two rice
crops in one year (the first irrigated; the second rain-fed in the main rainy season) at the same time as
producing fish. Scientists also felt that the research would respond to farmer priorities and constraints
drawn informally from on-going contact in outreach sites and annual village level workshops.
In 1992-3, research scientists from ARS-Pokhara, conducted rice-fish culture experiments on
farmer’s fields in the Kaski district (the area surrounding the station) in order to study its technical
feasibility in hill areas. Initially, between 15 and 20 farmers were involved in the trials but others
have since adopted the technology. It was found that rice-fish production was particularly suited to
use by small farmers and in hill areas where flooding and therefore loss of fish into neighbouring
fields was not such a risk as it is in the terai.
In 1999, research scientists carried out a questionnaire survey of approximately 100 farmers spread
over 4 districts to assess the constraints they had experienced with previous attempts at rice-fish
culture. These were found to be a lack of:
(i) a dependable irrigation source (excessive flooding is a problem)
(ii) technical support in identifying appropriate pesticides which do not harm fish as they are needed
for the high yielding rice varieties used
(iii) an adequate supply of fingerlings of the right size
(iv) proven technology packages to distribute to farmers.
Selection of farmers and trial sites
Scientists selected suitable areas for rice-fish production and selected farmers according to:

relevant experience;

willingness to try the technology

resources available, usually selecting middle wealth farmers, who could afford to invest in the
project but did not have enough surplus income to invest in non-farming activities or livestock .
They then made a final selection based on the technical suitability of the field site for rice-fish
culture.
Trial site at Baradi, Tanahun District
The farmers visited here were of the Gurung ethnic group and lived along the roadside at Baradi. The
family perceived themselves as being of middle wealth status and were able to produce sufficient
food to feed family. Both the father and an older brother were in the Indian Army sending remittances
and there was a daughter at University. They had access to irrigation hence were able to produce two
21
rice crops per year. Neighbouring farmers visit the trial and have already expressed an interest in
trying the technology next year.
Box 1: Combined rice-fish farming under the integrated rice and fish farming in the hills
Project Objectives




To develop and improve the rice fish farming system suitable for hill regions in Nepal
To increase nutritional status of hill farmers by increasing the fish supply and promoting the growth
of a high value commodity which will be an important source of income for small farmers including
women
To generate two income sources from one plot of land and livelihood diversification opportunity
To provide additional employment opportunity opportunities in the hills
Funding amount
1,597,000.47 Rs (circa £ 16,000) HRP-funded (NARC pay staff salaries and part of allowances)
Beneficiaries
Ultimately, male and female farmers in the hills of Nepal. Currently, direct benefit accrues only to middle
income farmers selected to take part in field trials
No. farmers
involved
16 farmers in 3 sites for early rice; and an additional 10 farmers in another site for the main season rice
Partners involved



Methods for feeding
back farmer needs to
research
Farmers approach the District Agriculture Development Office with their problems. These are either
solved by office or reported to ARS Pokhara for research, if appropriate.
Upstream /
downstream issues
addressed?
Upstream: addressing the supply of fry and fingerlings – research station currently produce fry and
fingerlings and supply free, but are looking for farmers to take on the role of raising fingerlings from fry
Downstream: no formal market survey but scientists observed through knowledge of area that fish is
eaten by all ethnic groups and demand for fish always exceeds supply in local markets (trade amongst
individuals and families)
Farmer views on:



usefulness of the
production system
One scientific officer and four technical officers from ARS Pokhara
District Agricultural Development Office (extension advice and field monitoring)
No traditional institutions or CBOs appear to exist in the village due to the heterogeneous nature of
the village and its recent formation (20 years). However, 3 village level farmer groups have been
recently created around specific themes: buffalo, vegetables and a women’s group. Research has not
yet been interested in working with them.
Farmers had an interest in fish already - demonstrated by an attempt to rear fish previouslyin a pond
Conscious of constant demand for fish in local markets: local supply is never sufficient
Expect to earn 3-4,000 Rupees from the experiment from selling the fish (100 Rs/kg)
Project addressing
livelihood needs
Contact farmers identified no negative implications of the initiative for their livelihoods and were very
pleased at the prospect of gaining some 3-4000 Rs from the sale of grown fish at the end of the
experiment
change in
relationship with
agricultural service
institutions
No change observed as this is the first time that this household has worked with research. However, there
is a history of researchers from Lumle Agricultural Centre working closely with farmers in the area
through their outreach sites. Farmers expressed satisfaction with the way that researchers were working
with them now.
benefits from
collaboration



fingerlings, pesticide, rice seed (new variety), and initial fish food provided free from scientists
by collaborating with researchers they can potentially get two incomes from one field
social prestige: neighbours come to see the trial and they receive visits from outsiders (like this
research team)
Research staff
perceptions on:

Technicians have not received training in 10 years; training for scientists has been very rare and
solely focused on technical issues.
No staff at the station have socio-economics training
No training in participatory research methods however, researchers do attempt to have a genuinely
collaborative approach: village level workshops to identify problems, regional technical meetings
with extension and NGOs; regular visits to outreach site.
- skills mix
effects on
livelihoods


While it is too early in this project to judge impacts on livelihoods, it appears that this project does
address livelihood diversification needs of at least middle wealth status farmers in the middle hills.
Further, on-going monitoring by the HARP team should pick up problems in implementation coupled
with the close working arrangement with extension services which are likely to improve relevance and
eventual uptake of technologies.
22
Farmer participation at different stages of the research process
The farmers cultivated their land as usual but were asked to dig a metre-wide trench which reduced
area planted with rice to a small degree—a risk that could be hard for poor farmers to take. ARSPokhara provided approximately 400 fingerlings (10 grams each), rice seed (new variety) and fish
food. Farmers were trained by scientists at the start of the trials and need to weigh and feed the fish
regularly. Extension agents monitor weed populations regularly and research scientists visit farmers
monthly to check the growth of the rice and check the fish feeding regime. At the end of the trial, the
farmers will be able to use the fish as they wish (consumption, sale etc). Researchers also provide
training once a year in rice-fish farming
Now researchers are moving on to identify a small number of farmers to nurse the fry themselves and
act as fingerling suppliers to their neighbours. This would give them a source of income also and it is
a practice that does not require possession of land - troughs/or buckets are the only requirements and
these may be supplied. In theory such a practice would be suitable for the landless or very poor
farmers, thus it could widen the beneficiary group to include the poor and very poor, if the
researchers do indeed choose to target these groups2.
Box 2: Differences in working on HRP-funded projects and NARC-funded projects
NARC-funded projects
HRP-funded projects
Proposals
Project concept notes are needed but
appreciated by researchers
Costs
 Capital and operational costs kept separately
 All project related expenses under the same
Actual costs not covered by field and travel
allowance
 Funding is on a one year basis
 Project funded until its completion
 10% incentive available to researchers
 overheads element to the Station up to 25% of the
Financial
incentives
Technical
issues
 No additional incentives to research staff in
Same guidelines as NARC, with in addition details of:
activities
personnel requirements
work plan
beneficiaries risks and assumptions
outputs
purpose and demonstration of the best way of
disseminating the technology






budget.
core project costs
addition to this individual earnings
incentive
 3 incentives: station-wide, field staff in team,
 NARC rarely provides feedback on
technical issues during project
implementation
 the HARP office provides helpful feedback to
 project concept notes are not needed
 whilst visits do occur they rarely address
technical issues
individual research leader
scientist on technical issues at regular intervals
 two HARP Research Advisers visit project leaders
in their stations on a rotating basis
 HRP requires trimestral progress reports
 HARP carries out work assessment visits
 only an implementation report for NARC
Conclusions
Main strengths of the project

The technologies appear to be appropriate to the farmers’ environment and the economics of
production have been considered.

The project fits with the priorities of the APP as it increases productivity per unit of land area.
2
However, see Lewis et al (1996) for a less than encouraging account of an actual process of promoting poor
landless people as merchants of fingerlings for fish farming in Bangladesh. In this case, the tables were turned as
fingerling sellers became excessively dependent on the purchasers.
23




It provides two sources of income from the same plot - which should reduce risk and
vulnerability for medium-scale farmers.
Linkages between researchers and extension agents at the field level seem to be strong – contrary
to the general perception at the national level that research and extension do not work well
together. This is a positive sign and may be encouraged by the HRP’s insistence that proposals
should specify the uptake pathways for any new technologies developed.
There is genuine farmer interest in the technology. The family visited at Baradi indicated that if
successful, they would carry out rice-fish farming in their other fields even if the inputs were not
supplied for free.
Women farmers were chosen for the trial and this complies with the intended beneficiaries as
stated in the project proposal.
Main weaknesses

This is a researcher-led experiment where there is a risk that if farmers wanted to comment on
changing the research process or suggest adapting the technology, scientists could resist due to
the perception that they need to stick rigidly to the activities, time-scale and budget set out in the
research logframe. While HARP accepts changes in activities if justified, it does not accept
changes in reporting deadlines or the overall size of the budget.

The research team lacks skills in participatory and socio-economic methods. While the project
can benefit from collaboration with a Lumle socio-economist (currently the only NARCemployed socio-economist available in the Western District) it is currently unclear what
contribution he has been able to make to the project so far. In any case this socio-economist is
contracted by HARP as part on the hand-over of Lumle to NARC and if NARC does not change
its selection criteria for scientific staff then it is likely that there will be no socio-economists to
draw on in the foreseeable future. This is likely to limit the extent of farmer participation in needs
identification and problem diagnosis. In this project scientists did not use classic participatory
techniques and did not respond to demand even if they did respond to interest expressed by some
farmers through informal contact. It also emerged during discussion that farmers were not usually
involved in regional technical meetings.
The use of standard participatory methodologies such as PRA, while useful, are not always necessary
for research in support of livelihood diversification and improvement. However it is necessary to:
carefully assess the technical feasibility of a project; seriously consider upstream and downstream
issues; establish that a theme responds to the needs of farmers; and to maximise farmer participation
at all stages of decision-making. If scientists are visiting the community regularly, holding village
meetings through outreach sites, and have a good link with extension to feed back farmer problems
and requests, this is already a good start for effective technology development.



Only middle farmers have been selected for trials and the poorest farmers are not directly
involved in the project. As an important aspect of the rice-fish system lies in the timely supply of
fish for the farmers to grow, it may be difficult to involve poor farmers. Early season rice farmers
have the best access to limited water. They are therefore likely to be those farmers of “middle”
wealth status. Fingerlings can be grown on their land in the first rice season, under conditions of
great risk, to a weight of some 50g. These fish are the ones that could then act as advanced seed
fish for any farmer wishing to grow fish during the main season, when water availability is no
longer a critical issue. It may be, therefore, that poorer farmers will more likely benefit most from
the main season of rice-fish farming after fingerlings have been reared.
There has recently been a problem of poisoning and theft of the fish in some of the test fields.
This could be attributed to the recognised value of the fish or to spite and jealousy of neighbours.
However, it is also possibly due to a combination of not preparing the community well enough in
the first place with a thorough explanation of research objectives and process. In the future,
researchers could learn from this and explain the research to farmers more thoroughly.
It is also possible that casual field workers will not undertake their work effectively if they
continue to receive inadequate field expenses.
24

The sustainability of the technology can be questioned: currently the research project provides all
resources free except land and labour to build the trench (advice, fertiliser etc.). Whether in the
end a significant number of farmers will be ready to pay is yet to be seen.
In summary, it is too early to assess sustainability and impact of this project on farmer livelihoods.
Farmers of a middle wealth status are very likely to benefit directly. Otherwise, impacts and
sustainability will depend on a number of factors internal and external to the project:

success of the breeding and survival of fish for sale;

availability of inputs at affordable cost;

local farmers being willing to take on the rearing of fingerlings;

sufficient resources and incentives for researchers and extension workers to continue support and
advice to farmers, that farmers take up the technology and take on the provision of fingerlings;
and

continuing close collaboration with extension agents in the DoA.
Lessons for Sustainable Livelihood Approaches

Researchers do not always feel that they can effectively develop technologies with the poorest
farmers as these farmers do not possess the time or resources required to participate and cannot
afford to take risks, and this would jeopardise the results of the research.

Direct impact on the poorest farmers is weak. However, it is possible that poor farmers will
ultimately benefit from the trials with better off farmers if the technologies are seen to be
successful and the costs of inputs remain low.

In HRP projects certainty of the level of funding and continuity encourage the effective
completion of research projects right through to the delivery and testing of technologies. This is
often not assured in NARC funded projects – where funds may have to be re-applied for each
year.
25
9. EMERGING ISSUES: HOW DOES THE POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
INFLUENCE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SL OBJECTIVES?
HARP achievements
While it is difficult to separate the impact of HARP from other interventions, it appears that the
project has had some key successes in demonstrating ways in which institutional change can be
achieved in agricultural research and technology development in Nepal:
 Recognition of the need to involve many actors in research: institutional pluralism
 Providing an incentive framework and continuity of funding to scientists to carry out more
development-oriented research into agriculture
 Through the establishment of a competitive grant system, researchers are drawn to be more output
oriented (i.e. produce a relevant and useful technology that is adopted by farmers), to ensure that
there is demand for the research or technology being developed and to specify the target group
 Reforming the research planning process (structure for technical review of research proposals to
meet fund objectives)
 Helping scientists plan research projects effectively and providing technical support for
implementation
 Encouraging increased research in farmers’ fields
However:
As the project, and especially the research fund, are young it is still unclear how HARP and the HRP
are specifically contributing to the production of more appropriate technologies, increased farmer
participation and better livelihood outcomes. Further, promoting institutional change has deep
political and cultural ramifications that are beyond the capacities of one short term project to address
alone. Various issues emerge and these can be broadly divided into internal (to HARP and NARC)
and external.
PIP INFLUENCES ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SL OBJECTIVES: INTERNAL FACTORS
Historical issues
Due to the historic relationship with Gurkhas, while deciding to cease managing PAC and LAC
directly, the UK did not want to stop support to hills in Nepal: hence political issues determined the
UK’s need to support the change process in agricultural research in Nepal. The rapid hand-over of
Lumle and Pakhribas was problematic as it was driven by the donor to a large degree, as was the
decision to establish a CGS as the best mechanism for sustainable funding of the Nepali research
system. Proof that a CGS improves livelihoods or reduces poverty did not exist at the time it was
proposed. Further, as a CGS was the brainchild of the donor as the favoured way to continue
supporting research and extension, it is taking time for NARC and the Ministry of Agriculture to get
a sense of ownership of the project. By observation many more people are seeing the benefits but this
will take time and will take a longer commitment by people they trust. The usefulness of CGS then
had to be demonstrated and the HARP team have been doing this effectively. In 1999, HARP also
sponsored a visit by senior, NARC HMGN, IAAS and extension officials to Australia to look at a
successful, functioning CGS in Australia. This has contributed to interest in establishing a Nepali
CGS in the long term. However, as the Australia visit was shortly followed by a general election,
some participants have been assigned new positions and there have been difficulties in establishing
procedures and deciding which department or individuals will manage the Nepal Agricultural
Research and Development Fund impartially.
Institutional change takes time and care
LAC and PAC were unique projects in the British aid programme – with funding provided over some
20-30 years for agricultural research and technology development, which emerged from a
rehabilitation programme. This led to a complex and lengthy phase out or hand-over strategy, which
aimed at sustaining some of the benefits of the long term support. HARP was set up specifically to
26
support this process with a clear agenda for institutional change. The specificity of these projects and
the change agenda bring out a particularly interesting set of issues relating to PIP.
It is necessary to frankly assess what can and cannot be achieved realistically in terms of goals of
influencing institutional change in a particular context. In the deep-rooted political culture and social
setting of Nepal, changes will not occur overnight – a long term commitment, patience and
sensitivity/subtlety are required in engaging with authorities. In this context, the knowledge and
continuity represented in long term TCO personnel is a critical asset to the success of institutional
change interventions.
Institutional change requires long term commitment. Here, the HARP team provide this continuity
and have built a long term relationship with scientists at the local level. All researchers appreciate the
incentives, the proposal planning structure, the project concept note and the technical oversight and
monitoring, personal visits (specifically regular TCO visits). However, as HRP incentives have only
gone to NARC researchers in the hills and not in the terai it will in any case be difficult for Nepal to
take on the system as it stands. In an attempt to address this, NARC has recently commissioned an
external consultancy (using HARP funds) to look into establishing a common incentive programme
for all NARC stations.
Internal structures and rewards are key to achieving institutional change
Changing internal structures and rewards within research institutions are key to achieving the
institutional change required for increasing livelihoods and poverty focus. For example, rewards can
be used to provide material incentives to researchers to consult farmers on their priority needs and
ensure that relevant technologies are developed in a collaborative and participatory way by obliging
researchers to use participatory methods and also plan technology uptake pathways.
Poverty focus
NARC and HARP operate within the framework of the APP. HRP projects must comply with the
APP. However, while it does prioritise food production and support subsistence farming, the APP
does not really focus on addressing the needs of the poorest. In addition, neither HRP-funded
projects, nor NARC-funded research projects are specifically designed to directly address the needs
of the poor. It is argued that the main reasons for this include: the need to address the overall
development priorities of the state as a whole, and as part of this, focus on increasing agricultural
productivity. This focus automatically leads to prioritising accessible and higher potential areas.
While such priorities are understandable at the national level, in order for it to be developmentoriented, agricultural research needs to devote at least some resources to addressing the constraints
faced by the poorest, most marginal farmers. One option would be to set aside a proportion of both
NARC and HRP funds (say 10%) for those projects that address the needs of the poorest farmers
(land-owning or not) in remote areas.
Exclusion occurs in at least three ways:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
physical isolation, due to the inaccessibility and the remoteness of the areas in which they
live (affects access to markets, supply of inputs). This physical remoteness also makes it
more expensive for researchers and extension workers to reach them. They argue that if they
tried to they would have to do so at the expense of others (roads built to serve the needs of
the powerful not for the sake of the poor communities);
inability to participate as they are either concentrating all their efforts on getting enough food
on a day to day basis; cannot afford to take the risk, do not have sufficient resources to
undertake the practices are being developed or are landless (some projects may generate
activities which could be undertaken by the landless)
caste: difficulty in reaching scheduled castes
The poorest groups are effectively self-excluded from activities with agricultural service providers
due to their lack of time, investment capital and access to productive resources. This clearly inhibits
the capacity of research and extension to contribute to sustainable livelihoods and have a poverty
27
focus. Furthermore – since the government’s central objective in rural development is to increase
levels of production, the most efficient way to do this is through working with middle or rich farmers.
Indeed, some feel that working with poor farmers, and focusing on poverty alleviation, is simply a
luxury the government can not afford when the country has a food deficit.
Participatory approaches and uptake pathways
90% of HRP-funded projects are on farmers’ fields. This should ensure that adoption of the
technology is more likely. Further, HRP guidelines require: proper consultation (address needs and
that there is ownership by the farmers); uptake pathways to be addressed. There seems to be good
relationship between farmers and researchers. However, this is not necessarily something new,
particularly in locations close to the stations. At ARS - Bandipur, farmers sometimes come directly to
the station with queries. Farmers also seek advice from the District Development Office, which
passes the problems onto the researchers if they are unable to solve them themselves.
M&E system
The M&E system has a broad remit including assessing research projects that produce outputs of an
intermediate nature (e.g. constraints analysis…) through to the analysis of uptake of technologies.
However, here our concern is to highlight that it is critically important for the M&E system to show
whether a CGS does effectively improve the poverty reduction and livelihood impact of research.
Observers in Nepal fear that current plans for the M&E system, while being thorough, are perhaps
too ambitious. There is a risk that the system proposed will require the existence of a large, qualified
team to implement it, analyse data effectively and hence demonstrate the value of the research
supported.
M&E systems for CGS impact on livelihoods need to be practical, based on a few general
(nationwide) priority indicators alongside a group of project-specific indicators. These indicators are
best developed in consultation with HARP staff, scientists and field workers undertaking HRP
projects, key informants and farmers (using some brief field level participatory appraisals where
possible to confirm the appropriateness of indicators). The requirement in the HRP project proposal
system for researchers to identify indicators in a participatory way helps to address this need, as does
the extensive work being undertaken by the HARP M&E team to identify existing sources of data and
approaches to data collection. However, this could be complemented by broader consultation and
participatory survey work at this early stage of designing the system and key indicators.
The implications of these points are:
- modification of the current M&E plans to develop a simpler system, based on principles of
participatory M&E and broad stakeholder consultation;
- increase the use of participatory and consultative approaches (e.g. 3 week PRA and Agricultural
Knowledge and Information Systems (AKIS) rapid surveys) to establish an appropriate and
evolving system and key indicators for measurement from key actors in and outside the project as
well as incorporating local perceptions;
- synthesis of existing data rather than collecting new data and consulting key staff within and
outside HARP and NARC.
PIP INFLUENCES ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SL OBJECTIVES: EXTERNAL FACTORS
Policy
While the government of Nepal has a set of priorities for rural development that are consistent in
many ways with poverty reduction and SL objectives (the APP) there is no clear strategy or plan for
implementing this policy.
Sustainability of project benefits
HARP and the Hill Research Programme are still heavily dependent on direct DFID support. NARC
provides between 15-20% of project costs. Hence, if donor funds were to cease now, it is unlikely
that the HRP could continue in its current form and the institutional changes it has encouraged – seen
28
by many as positive – may fade away. It is therefore critical that the project has time to demonstrate
the utility of a CGS and the practices it aims to promote (e.g. in terms of more relevant outputs and
better researcher working practices) to the Nepalese agricultural research system until the
establishment of a viable NARDF. If this is not possible the CGS will simply not be sustained. The
recent decision to extend HARP until 2004 seems to recognise this.
Social and political setting
Features of the social and political setting have a significant impact on the likelihood of a project
being able to encourage a shift in research and extension towards serving livelihoods objectives.
Patronage, degree of decentralisation, and degree of political stability and peace are key issues.
Decentralisation
The increased voice of civil society organisations, increased numbers of community based
organisations, increasing local initiatives for development and the improvements in local democracy
in Nepal since the early 1990s all indicate that there are greatly increased opportunities for CBO's
and local government institutions to engage with a wide variety of development partners – including
public and private research and extension providers. Local people also have a growing capacity to
make stronger demands and even to commission services from a range of providers – which could, if
agricultural service providers are responsive, lead to closer linkages and more demand-led service
provision. However, while it is true that elected decentralised authorities – Village Development
Committees and District Development Committees - have brought decision-making processes and
allocation of financial resources closer to the people, these authorities sometimes derive their
legitimacy from central government and national political interests rather than their local electorates.
Patronage
Patronage is exhibited through the presence of political appointments at every level. Even the
Executive Director of NARC has difficulty in attempting to transfer or dismiss certain staff members.
Frequent changes in government and as a result, also in senior staff in the civil service and NARC
(compounded by patronage), results in a lack of continuity that harms the ability to implement
strategic decisions. When there are changes in government, new officials in positions of authority
tend to replace existing personnel with their supporters. Thus decisions on staffing are often not
based on technical merit, but on the basis of allegiance. Hence, HARP is a difficult project to
implement as the more transparent HRP funding mechanism impinges on many actors’ vested
interests.
Maoist insurgency
This has emerged as a key obstacle to development initiatives in poorer, remote rural areas recently
as it has become dangerous to work in them. This will not encourage increasing use of participatory
methods by scientists or extension agents.
Role of donors
It must be recognised that donors have an important role in shaping development contexts. Indeed,
articles in Nepali newspapers and reviews often criticise donors as contributing to corruption and
patronage by using aid resources to wield influence over policy. Donors and NGO’s are also
criticised for paying salaries that are too high and hence for drawing skilled staff away from
government services. Hence, they themselves need to increase the transparency of their own decisionmaking processes on interventions they wish to fund (for example – DFID never justified why it felt
that a CGS was the best way to fund agricultural research and extension in Nepal). They also need to
provide more information in-country on the internal structures and different funding mechanisms that
govern their engagement with national institutions. Otherwise donors can themselves be placing
obstacles in the way of implementing SLA or poverty reduction approaches.
However, in addition to their financing role, donors are recognised to have a positive role to play in
encouraging the rule of law, drawing on lessons from colonial experience, and in promoting good
governance more generally. However, HARP is, de facto, often in the position of trying to influence
the way in which general policy processes are taking place. Action in this area may sometimes be
29
better supported by DFID-Nepal, a donor, leaving HARP to focus on the technical work of building a
functioning CGS.
DFID also has an important role in trying to address PIP constraints at the national policy level on the
HARP project achieving positive impacts on livelihood outcomes through its dialogue with Nepali
decision-makers.
Conclusion
It will be important to observe the response of other donors to the planned creation of the NARDF as
a national CGS. If it is created on the basis of a successful model (HRP), and if there is - as planned a parallel process of reform in the way Nepal’s civil service operates so that incentives for
performance exist, the effects of HARP could go much further than the agriculture sector alone
To improve the livelihoods / poverty reduction focus of HRP-funded projects and NARC,
HARP could consider:
 Including relevance to sustainable livelihoods alongside poverty reduction and participation in
the selection criteria for HRP projects
 Proposing to DFID and Nepal’s government an increase in project life-span to 10-15 years
 Continuing the support role of TCOs (in technical aspects of projects and in institutional change,
such as setting up the NARDF) - but perhaps with clearer links with counterparts in Ministry of
Agriculture / NARC so that the likelihood of sustainability will be improved
 Establishing a functioning M&E system that focuses on pertinent key indicators identified and
monitored in a participatory way, using an approach adapted to available resources and thus
sustainable
 Being proactive in maintaining a continued close relationship with NARC and the Ministry in the
common objective of reducing poverty, increasing production and improving the performance of
development research. In addition to feeding back to the HARP steering committee (which
includes representatives from NARC and the Ministry of Agriculture) there needs to be continued
proactive personal contact. Perhaps they have to consider working jointly with a government
counterpart to ensure sustainability (buy in). However, this is a paradox, as developing close
relations are difficult due to political instability and patronage.
30
10. KEY SOURCES AND FURTHER READING
Documents
Afful, K., 2000. “Foreign Aid: Contribution to Development” in The Organisation: Development
Paradigms – Retrospective and Perspectives, Vol.3 Issue 2, April-June.
Bista, D.B., 1994. Fatalism and Development: Nepal’s Struggle for Modernization. Orient Longman,
Calcutta.
CIAT, 1999. Does Research Reduce Poverty? Growing Affinities: A Bulletin About Cupertino in
Agricultural Research. December
DFID, 1998. Country Strategy Paper: Nepal. Department for International Development.
FAO, no date. Women in Agriculture, Environment and Rural Production. Fact Sheet Nepal.
Gauchan, D., Joshi, M., and Biggs, S., 2000. “A Strategy for NARC Participatory Technology
Development: A Discussion Paper with examples from livestock and fishery”. Paper presented in the
Fourth National Livestock and Fishery Workshop held in Pakhribas, Nepal, April 25-27, 2000.
Organised by NARC.
Lewis, David J., Wood, G.D. and Gregory, R., 1996. Trading the silver seed: local knowledge and
market moralities in aquacultural development. ITDG.
Mathema, S.B., 1999. Strategy of Sustainable Rural Livelihoods and Social Exclusion for Nepal: A
Review of the Literature. Report commissioned by DFID-Nepal. November.
Turton, C. and Shepherd, A., 1999. A Strategy for Rural Livelihoods and Social Exclusion: DFID,
Nepal. December 1999.
UNDP, 1998, Nepal Human Development Report.
UNDP, 1999, LGP Annual Report 1999: People Centred Development. Local Governance
Programme – MLD/NPC/UNDP/NEP/95/021.
Upadhyaya, H.K., 1999, Poverty, Food-Security and Agricultural Research in Nepal. CEAPRED,
Kathmandu.
World Bank, 1992, Natural Resource Management in Nepal: 25 Years of Experience, Operations and
Evaluation Department, Report No. 10330.
31
Internet sources
 NARC (Nepal Agricultural Research Council)
http://www.narc-nepal.org
 CEAPRED (Centre for Environmental and Agricultural Policy Research, Extension and
Development)
An NGO established in 1989 by a group of Nepali agricultural development professionals, it now has
some 250 staff (including 60 professionals) and works in 17 of Nepal’s Districts.
Contact :
info@ceapred.wlink.com.np
 Organisation Development Centre (ODC)
This organisation publishes a useful quarterly journal entitled: The Organisation
See especially Vol.3 Issue 2, April-June 2000
http://www.odcentre.org
 Participatory District Development Programme (PDDP) supported by UNDP
http://www.nepali.net/undp
 Local Governance Programme, supported by UNDP in collaboration with His Majesty’s
Government of Nepal
A participatory local governance programme that has involved the establishment and capacity
building of elected village and district development committees (since 1995, managing their own
local development funds) and information on participatory monitoring and evaluation.
www.yomari.com/lgp
 FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN)
FAO-NPL@field.fao.org
 Hill Leasehold Forestry and Forage Development Project
hlffdp@wlink.com.np
 USAID
For information on USAID’s past support (up to 1996) to the national agricultural research system in
Nepal, including its involvement in the establishment of an independent NARC
http://www.dec.org
32
GLOSSARY & ACRONYMS
AKIS:
APP:
ARS:
AREP:
CEAPRED:
CGS:
DDC:
DOA:
DFID:
FAO:
HARP:
HMGN:
HRP:
KHARDEP:
IAAS:
LAC:
M&E:
NARC:
NARDF:
NGO:
PAC:
PDDP:
PIP:
PRA:
SEADD:
SL:
SLA:
TCO:
terai:
UNDP:
USAID:
VDC:
Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems
Agriculture Perspective Plan
Agricultural Research Station
World Bank funded Agricultural Research and Extension Project
Centre for Environmental and Agricultural Policy Research, Extension and
Development
Competitive Grant System
District Development Committee
Department of Agriculture
UK Department for International Development
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
Hill Agriculture Research Project
His Majesty’s Government of Nepal
Hill Research Programme
Koshi Hills Agriculture Research and Development Project.
Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science
Lumle Agricultural Centre
Monitoring and Evaluation
Nepal Agricultural Research Council
Nepal Agricultural Research and Development Fund
Non-Governmental Organisation
Pakhribas Agricultural Centre
Participatory District Development Programme
Policy, Institutions and Processes
Participatory Rural Appraisal
DFID’s South East Asia Development Division
Sustainable Livelihoods
Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches
DFID Technical Co-operation Officer
Lowlands
United Nations Development Program
United States Agency for International Development
Village Development Committee
33
ANNEX 1: HARP TIMELINE AND PROCESSES
DATE
1968
1972
1975
Early
‘80s
1982 &
1986
1986
1989
1990
1991-2
1993
1994
EVENTS AND PROCESSES
Lumle established by Ministry of Defence to reintegrate Gurkhas into rural areas
Pakhribas established by Ministry of Defence to rehabilitate Gurkhas
Responsibility for Lumle and Pakhribas handed over to ODA as Gurkha rehabilitation
but broadened to include all farmers in surrounding areas, started training then added an
extension component
Centre priorities: research, extension and training.
UK government tried to negotiate hand over of the stations to the Government of Nepal
without success
Research component became more important, scientists sent to UK for postgraduate
degrees
Technical integration of Lumle and Pakhribas into NARS
Pakhribas extension activities handed over to the Department of Agriculture and
KHARDEP
Annual expenditure for each centre peaks at £1.5 million with up to 20 scientists abroad
for further education.
SEADD3 (UK Overseas Development Administration) initiate consultation with LAC4
and PAC5 staff on vision and options for future (all options proposed: hand-over,
privatisation, international centres… Integration into NARC was deemed a low priority)
Bebbington visits: long term (10 year) hand-over period envisaged
1995
Lumle extension activities handed over to Department of Agriculture.
Negotiations began for next phase of hand-over.
August workshop on future of research stations: hand-over period reduced to 5 years with
agreement between HMGN6 and SEADD; staff compensation package proposed by staff
but not accepted by SEADD.
December workshop with LAC and PAC staff: SEADD took strategic decision that the
centres had to be reduced in size to be ready for hand-over to the Nepali government. 2
year hand-over imposed by UK Overseas Development Administration in package
including establishment of a competitive funding system. August workshop proposals
totally overridden. New proposals never formally agreed by HMGN or NARC.
1996
January-May: HARP formulated and approved to facilitate hand-over and provide
alternative funding arrangement for Nepal’s research system. Abington appointed to
manage HARP In March.
- Staffing levels to be halved at PAC and LAC by July 1996
- Hand-over of PAC and LAC be complete by July 1998
- Competitive fund to be established by July 1998
Staff reduction process completed rapidly with severance package offered as part of
phase-in of HARP. Most ex-Gurkhas left centres.
Negotiations between Lumle and Pakhribas and NARC focused on staffing issues and
NARC recognition of staff qualifications as otherwise few would be eligible to remain.
Staffing levels at PAC and LAC agreed to remain around 150 scientists/technical support
staff for each, but:
- January 1998: NARC agreed 146 staff (LAC) and 145 staff (PAC) and agreed to
recognise qualifications of existing staff and ex-Gurkhas
- March 1998: NARC unilaterally reduced staffing to 120 (LAC) and 119 (PAC)
- NARC unilaterally ignored agreement on qualifications in recruitment process and
ex-Gurkhas excluded
1996-98
3
South-East Asia Development Division
Lumle Agricultural Centre
5
Pakhribas Agricultural Centre
6
His Majesty’ Government of Nepal
4
34
DATE
early
1998
July
1998
Aug
Sept
1998
1998
Jan 1999
Feb 1999
July
1998Nov
1999
March
2000
EVENTS AND PROCESSES
 Senior staff left the two stations in large numbers. Many joined NGOs and
international development agencies.
 Junior staff left as they did not have the entry qualifications required by NARC
Hand-over of LAC and PAC completed on time with staffing levels very much reduced.
HARP continued to support and pay for nearly 50% of staff at both Centres.
Nepali Lumle Director-Designate assigned greater degree of autonomy in last two
months to manage the station with the assistance of the sitting Director than the DirectorDesignate for Pakhribas.
UK Ex-Directors of PAC and LAC leave
HRP launched: originally confined to only 5 NARC research stations.
HRP opened up - with NARC’s agreement the NARC centres eligible to bid for HRP
projects was increased by 5 to include fisheries, goat, ginger, temperate pastures and
horticultural research in the hills.
Second UK Output to Purpose Review Team recommend opening HRP to all-comers,
including non-NARC actors’. This included all NARC hill stations, commodity
programmes etc. This was done in agreement with senior NARC management.
Subsequently, new NARC management team voiced opposition.
NARC funded staff slowly increased at the research stations under pressure from
DFID/HARP until ultimatum in November 1999.
UK OPR Team recommended extension of HARP until 2004, or to completion of
projects funded under 2000 call for proposals, subject to conditionality.
35
ANNEX 2: PROGRAMME FOR VISIT TO NEPAL BY K.HUSSEIN (ODI) AND S.
MONTAGU (DFID): 25 APRIL-6 MAY 2000
Date
Tues, 25 April
Wed, 26 April
Thurs, 27 April
Fri, 28 April
AM
Travel UK-Nepal
Arrive Nepal
- John Abington (Director,
HARP), and Sudarshan
Mathema (Programme
Manager, HRP)
PM
-
-
Sam Bickersteth, (RLD
Adviser, DFID-Nepal)
-
-
-
Sat, 29 April
Travel to Pokhara with Peter
Rood (HARP Research Adviser)
Sun, 30 April
Visit: ARS Pokhara Fisheries
(Begnas)
-
Mon, 1 May
Date
Tues, 2 May
Wed, 3 May
Mr Ram Bista (Station
Chief)
Dr K.B Shrestha (Deputy
Director General
(Administration), DOA)
Marcy Vigoda (Assistant
Director, CARE) and
Gobinda Rajbhandari
(Programme Co-ordinator)
Bhola Pradhan (DirectorPlanning and Coordination,
NARC) & Dhruva Joshy
(Executive Director,
NARC)
Tek Gurung (Programme
Officer, Environment,
Natural Resources &
Cultural Heritage, UNDP)
Meet Farmers involved in ricefish farming field tests (Badari)
Arrive Pokhara
Visit: ARS Lumle
- Dr Ram Sah (Station Chief)
- Bill Stewart-Jones
(Research Adviser, HARP)
- Peter Rood (Research
Adviser, HARP)
Visit: ARS (Goat) Bandipur
- Dr Ganesh Pd. Khakural
(Senior Scientist) and
station visit
AM
- R.C. Mishra Agricultural
Specialist (World Bank)
- S.K. Shrestha (Joint
Secretary – Planning MoA)
Travel to Kathmandu
-
Prepare key issues for NARC
-
Mr L. Gautam, Senior
Programme Officer, FAO
Report writing and reading
PM
- Dr Ram Prakash Yadav
Program Director and
Country Representative,
Winrock International
- Sribindu Bajracharya,
Program Specialist, Office
of Agricultural & Rural
Development, USAID
36
Thurs, 4 May
-
-
Mrs Bimala Rai Puadyel
(Manager, Impact
Assessment & Programme
Linkage ACTIONAID)
Dr H. Upadhyaya and Dr
B.B. Niraula (DirectorPrograms, Centre for
Environmental and
Agricultural policy
Research, Extension and
Development)
Fri, 5 May
Reading and report writing
Sat, 6 May
Sun, 7 May
KH departs for UK
SM departs for India
NARC seminar: Presentation of
SLA and PIP work
Informal feedback to Sam
Bickersteth (DFID-N) and
HARP team
Report preparation
37