RWANDA PARLIAMENTARY
ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRAMME (PAP)
2012/13 – 2015/16
DFID RWANDA BUSINESS CASE
May 2012
Project Intervention Summary
Title: Rwanda Parliamentary Accountability Programme (PAP)
What support will the United Kingdom (UK) provide?
1. The UK will provide £3.25 million over a period of four years (2012/13 – 2015/16)
Why UK support is required:
2. UK support to the Rwandan Parliament, and in particular the recently-formed Public
Accounts Committee, will help to underpin DFID Rwanda’s provision of general and sector
budget support by ensuring greater scrutiny of government spending. Funding to Parliament
takes forward UK commitments to support Rwandan initiatives to strengthen accountability both between different parts of government, and between the state and its citizens. Support to
parliament will also contribute to making UK aid more effective by improving transparency and
value for money.
3. Rwanda’s Parliament is a relatively new institution operating in a country that lacks a strong
parliamentary history and which is still addressing the legacy of genocide. The Rwandan
Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee (PAC), for example, was only created in April 2011
(by comparison, the UK’s PAC was created 155 years ago in 1857). The programme will span
a vital period for parliamentary development. Members of Parliament’s upper house (the
Senate) have recently completed their eight-year term and will have been completely replaced
by the end of 2012. Parliamentary elections for Rwanda’s Chamber of Deputies (lower house)
will take place in 2013.
4. Parliament needs to play a more effective role in overseeing the Executive, debating and
passing laws, and representing the interests and concerns of Rwandan citizens. A stronger
parliament will reinforce the foundations of democratic politics in Rwanda and help to
consolidate and sustain Rwanda’s impressive development progress.
Expected results:
Impact: Government of Rwanda more accountable to Rwandan citizens
Outcome: Greater Parliamentary autonomy, transparency and effectiveness in overseeing
public spending and engaging Rwandan citizens
5. The programme will include targeted support to Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee and
Budget Committee. This will strengthen Parliament’s contribution to ensuring an effective and
open budget process (including in terms of DFID budget support). It will also help to ensure
value for money and robust accountability for public spending in Rwanda. This focus will
amplify the impact of the UK’s £4.5m support programme to the Office of the Auditor General
which relies on the Public Accounts Committee to ensure that Government implements its
recommendations. The programme will also focus on raising parliament’s public profile and
making parliament more open and transparent to Rwandan citizens. Finally, the programme will
support parliament’s ability to plan and deliver its own strategic objectives.
Examples of specific results include:
 Stronger Parliamentary contribution to ensuring an open and effective budget process
(improved scores in at least three sub-indicators).
 Increase in the proportion of media and civil society groups stating they have attended
parliamentary hearings and/or accessed parliamentary reports in the past 12 months (%
increase to be established according to baseline data commissioned as part of the
programme).
The outputs attributable to UK support are:
 Improved capacity of Public Accounts Committee and Budget Committee to fulfil their roles
 Improved parliamentary transparency and public engagement
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
Enhanced institutional capability to plan, manage, deliver and report against strategic
objectives
How we will determine whether expected results have been achieved:
6. At impact-level, indicators will measure:
 The Government of Rwanda's commitment to open and transparent governance How far
Rwandan citizens agree that they have space and opportunities to influence those that
make the laws of the country.
 The strength of legislative scrutiny of external audit reports.
 % of Rwandans who agree that they have 'space and opportunities to influence those that
make the laws of the country'.
7. At outcome-level, indicators will measure:
 The strength of Parliament's oversight of the Executive branch of Government and wider
Parliamentary transparency and accessibility.
 The strength of parliament’s contribution to ensuring an effective and open budget process.
 The extent to which media, civil society groups and trade unions attend parliamentary
hearings and access parliamentary reports.
8. Sources used to verify progress will include: Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
(PEFA) assessment scores; Open Budget Index scores; Institute of Research and Dialogue for
Peace (IRDP) public opinion survey data; Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer public opinion
survey data; Parliament’s own reporting; survey data commissioned specifically for this
programme; Reports of the Office of the Auditor General.
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Strategic Case
Context and need for a DFID intervention
9. Supporting parliament will help to underpin DFID Rwanda’s provision of general and
sector budget support. DFID’s revised approach to budget support underlines that the
commitment of partner countries to improving domestic accountability will play a much greater
part in determining when and whether DFID provides budget support. The new approach
highlights Parliament’s crucial accountability role and underlines the role of parliamentary
scrutiny for strengthening public financial management and value for money. Supporting
Rwanda’s Parliament will take forward DFID’s Business Plan commitment to spend an amount
equivalent to five percent of Budget Support to strengthen domestic accountability institutions
The Clerks of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate have written a joint letter to DFID
requesting UK support.1
10. Supporting parliament directly addresses recommendations in DFID’s 2011 Fiduciary Risk
Assessment (FRA) of general budget support as well as recommendations from 2011 sector
FRAs focused on the education and health sectors.2 More specifically, the FRAs identify
support to the PAC and Budget Committee as mitigation measures to reduce fiduciary risk
associated with General and Sector budget support.
11. Support to parliament is part of DFID Rwanda’s Operational Plan and closely
complements other areas of DFID’s programme: Support to parliament forms part of the
VFM rationale and accountability focus of DFID Rwanda’s country programme.3 It also
complements DFID’s funding of the Office of the Auditor General and is part of delivering
‘effective parliamentary oversight of government finances’ in DFID Rwanda’s Results
Framework.4 The programme also complements DFID Rwanda’s support to citizen and civil
society scrutiny of government and their engagement in evidence-based policy dialogue and
advocacy.5
12. The Rwandan Parliament has a mandate to improve accountability both between
different parts of government, and between the state and its citizens. In both these areas,
it has the potential to strengthen the accountability provisions that Rwanda needs to reinforce
the legitimacy of its political system and to consolidate and sustain development progress.
DFID-Rwanda’s Operational Plan notes the potential risks associated with overly-centralised
power and the need to encourage greater state accountability to citizens and more open and
inclusive politics.6 Similarly, the 2011 World Development Report emphasises that building
legitimate institutions and public confidence in political systems is fundamental to breaking
cycles of conflict and violence.7 The programme will reinforce processes of state-building and
peace-building and is consistent with efforts to help Rwanda to transcend the legacy of conflict
and fragility.
13. Background: Rwanda’s Parliament is a young institution operating in a complex
governance environment in a country recovering from genocide and without a strong
parliamentary history to draw on. Prior to 2003, and following the genocide of 1994, Rwanda
was governed through transitional arrangements under which a Transitional National Assembly
(parliament) played a marginal role. Under the 2003 Constitution however, Parliament was
1
Parliament financing request received by DFID-Rwanda Head of Office, 11 January 2011.
Donor Fiduciary Risk Assessment of General Budget Support in Rwanda, prepared by REPIM on
behalf of DFID Rwanda, Draft Report, July 2011, p. 47. Also: Rwanda 2011 Education FRA Analysis,
p.35 and Rwanda 2011 Health FRA Analysis, p. 44.
3 DFID-Rwanda Operational Plan 2011-2015, p.5.
4 DFID-Rwanda Results Framework, Governance and Security Pillar.
5 Specifically, the programme complements DFID’s ‘Support to Civil Society Capacity Building and
Engagement in Public Policy Information, Monitoring and Advocacy’ (PPIMA).
6 DFID Operational Plan 2011-15: The UK’s Development Programme in Rwanda, February 2011.
7 World Development Report 2011, Conflict Security and Development, Overview, The World Bank,
Washington D.C.
2
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established as one of the three arms of government and acquired new powers and structures.
This included a shift from appointed to largely elected MPs8; a move to a bicameral
parliamentary system (a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate); a large increase in the number of
MPs, particularly women; and legislative autonomy for parliament.
14. Parliament and Rwanda’s political system: The Constitution prioritises national unity and
consensus-building over competitive, pluralistic politics. This is partly due to fears that political
competition may slow efforts to drive through a transformational development agenda. There
are also concerns that political competition could encourage renewed divisions in Rwandan
society and potentially undermine Rwanda’s political settlement and reconciliation process.
Under this model, the Rwandan Patriotic Front is the preeminent party. Registered political
parties work collaboratively and their policy agendas are broadly aligned around the national
development vision driven by the President and the Rwandan Patriotic Front. In this context,
parliament is yet to fully establish a strong and independent ‘watchdog’ role over the executive
and MPs are expected to demonstrate strong and consistent commitment to government
positions and policy.
15. Rwanda has prioritised decentralisation in order to bring government closer to citizens and
to strengthen voice and accountability.9 Significant progress has been made in this area but
recent public opinion survey data suggests that further efforts are needed in order to move
beyond a centralist political culture – including in terms of engagement between MPs and
citizens.10
16. Rather than being directly elected and rooted in local constituencies, MPs (Deputies) are
chosen by political parties and are national representatives who, following elections, are
affiliated with districts.11 Rather than being directly elected by the population, Members of the
Senate are selected by a mixture of indirect elections (through Provincial and Sectoral Councils
and other channels) and by Presidential appointment. Direct interaction between MPs and
citizens is limited, although some measures have been put in place to address this.12 One
recent assessment, noted that there was a ‘disconnection between the elected and the
elector’.13
17. Parliament’s potential for playing a prominent and assertive part in Rwandan politics is also
related to the wider political context – notably the challenges and constraints faced by
opposition political parties, media and civil society.14 There is limited public and media
awareness, expectation and engagement vis-a-vis MPs and parliament overall. Parliament is
further constrained by limited financial and administrative autonomy – for example in relation to
revenue-raising and determining staffing structures and salaries.15 Rwanda’s parliamentary
8
Fifty-three out of the 80 MPs in the Chamber of Deputies are directly elected.
Joint Governance Assessment, 2008, p. 62
10 Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP), p.41, 70, 72.
11 In parliamentary elections, Rwandans vote for parties rather than directly for individual MPs. The
number of MPs per party depends on the proportion of the vote for that party. IRDP states that Rwanda’s
‘closed list’ system for electing Deputies means that parliamentarians feel ‘more accountable to the
individual and the political force which has the ability to put him on the list rather than to the citizen’
(IRDP, Citizen’s Participation for Democracy in Rwanda, September 2010, draft, p.69).
12 For example, Parliament has decided that every last Saturday, at
least 20 members of parliament should visit the districts to participate in community work (umuganda)
and to listen to citizens’ concerns (IRDP: p. 53).
13 IRDP: p.69.
14 JGA, p.18.
15 Best practice suggests that to assure parliamentary independence and autonomy, parliaments should
be able to determine their own budgets (rather than relying on the Executive) and have the power to
determine their own staff structures and terms of employment (Towards the Development of International
Standards for Democratic Legislatures, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2007).
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budget per capita is half that of Uganda and over a third lower than Kenya’s.16 It is 16.5% lower
than the African average (adjusted for purchasing power parity).17
18. Progress and opportunities: Such challenges suggest that any increases in Parliament’s
leverage are likely to be gradual over time. Nonetheless, there are opportunities for achieving
important short term gains whilst enabling longer- term institutional development and improved
transparency and openness. There are particular opportunities related to the establishment of a
Public Accounts Committee. There is strong political commitment in Rwanda to effective and
pro-poor public financial management (e.g. allocating resources in line with poverty reduction
priorities). Parliament’s role in scrutinising public spending is well-aligned with this agenda. The
recent creation of the PAC, together with wider reforms to standing committees, presents clear
opportunities for strengthening Parliament’s oversight function. As demonstrated during the
PAC’s scrutiny of the 2009-10 Audit Report, the PAC’s creation is especially significant in terms
of parliament’s ability to work with the Office of the Auditor General to demand accountability
and value for money.
19. More broadly, Parliament has made progress in establishing the necessary institutional
systems and infrastructure. Its standing committees have begun to call Ministers to account
and to subject them to robust questioning. Both parliamentarians and parliamentary staff
demonstrate strong drive to acquire new skills and competencies. The fact that Rwanda has
the highest percentage of female parliamentarians in the world (at 56%) represents
opportunities in terms of Parliament’s role in advancing gender equality. In March 2012,
Parliament launched a radio station (101.5 FM with 80% national coverage) to inform the
population of developments and debates at Parliament and to receive direct audience
feedback.18
20. Parliament has produced a new Strategic Plan for 2010-2014, which specifies key areas
to strengthen if it is to play a greater role in shaping legislation, channelling citizens’ concerns
and holding Government to account. The Strategic Plan includes areas such as:



Strengthening provisions and opportunities for parliamentary oversight of government
action.
Improving parliamentarians’ direct and indirect contact with the population, the private
sector, civil society, the media and trade unions.
Strengthening the effectiveness of parliamentary services and systems.
Evidence and analysis demonstrating the need for intervention
21. The evidence base and metrics for parliamentary performance and impact are
underdeveloped and robust data for Rwanda are particularly scarce. Available evidence and
analysis is set out below:
22. Parliament, Rwandan citizens and civil society
 Nearly two thirds of Rwandans say that they have never been consulted by Deputies on the
adoption of new laws and that, outside of election campaigns, Deputies rarely engage with
local communities.19
16
Global Parliamentary Report, Inter-Parliamentary Union and UNDP, 2012, excel data annex.
For Africa, the average parliamentary budget per capita is $3.71 million. For Rwanda it is $3.1 million.
Global Parliamentary Report, Inter-Parliamentary Union and UNDP, 2012, p.p. 98-100. As a
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percentage of the state budget, the budget of the Rwandan Parliament is very slightly above
the African average but slightly below the average for least developed countries (For Africa, the
average is 0.77% of the state budget; for LDCs it is 0.89%; for Rwanda it is 0.82%. Global
Parliamentary Report, Inter-Parliamentary Union and UNDP, 2012, p.p. 98-100.
18 The creation of this radio station was funded by UNDP and DFID under the PSGG programme.
19 IRDP, p.52.
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A third of Rwandan citizens disagree that they have ‘space and opportunities to influence
those that make the laws of the country’.20
Parliamentary engagement with civil society is limited. Constructive cooperation with one
NGO network (CLADHO21) in relation to budget scrutiny stands out as a rare example to be
built upon.
23. Standing Committees and parliamentary oversight
 There are no specialist staff attached to standing committees to equip them with the
necessary technical expertise to perform effectively. Each Committee’s rapporteur has to
serve the function of administrator, logistical officer, report writer, procedural adviser and
subject-specialist.22 Addressing these capacity constraints represents ‘an important
opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of parliamentary committees and the
accountability that they bring’.23
 Committees have very limited resources to undertake field visits or detailed research on
particular aspects of policy and implementation.24
 DFID’s 2011 Fiduciary Risk Assessment of Parliament concluded that the Budget
Committee had ‘insufficient technical support to discharge its role effectively’ and further
recommended that the PAC receive equivalent support.25 The national-level FRA also
underlined the need to support the Budget Committee and the PAC.26
24. Parliamentary services and institutional capacity
 Parliament is understaffed. There is one member of parliamentary staff per parliamentarian.
This is significantly below the African average of 1.62 staff per parliamentarian. For
Rwanda’s lower house (the Chamber of Deputies), the ratio of staff to MPs is less than one
(0.77).27
 Parliament has created a Research Unit with six researchers but the unit is not yet able to
meet parliamentarians’ needs. Parliament’s planning unit and M&E function is also
underdeveloped. In many cases, the person responsible for management functions in areas
such as human resources and procurement is also the sole person for executing these
functions.28
 Parliamentary elections will take place in 2013. High levels of MP turn-over at elections
means a heavy training and induction workload for Parliamentary staff.29 In the Upper
House, Senators serve one non-renewable term of eight years and all 26 Senators will have
been replaced by the end of 2012.
 Senior management and leadership capacity need to be reinforced in order to provide
greater strategic direction and to focus on improving institutional performance.30
20
Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, 2010, p.38. From
these data, the NURC concludes that ‘boosting citizen participation in decision-making’ is an urgent
priority (p.40). Joint Governance Assessments (2008 and 2010) also underline the need to raise the
population’s understanding and awareness of the role parliament plays in national governance (JGA,
2010: p.45). At the same time, citizen trust in parliament appears to be high: 90% of Rwandan
respondents expressed either ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of trust in parliament (RRB: p.35), although the
authors of the survey report note the challenges of obtaining robust data on such issues.
21 Collectif des Ligues et Association de Defense des Droits de l’ Homme
22 ‘Revised Project Plan’, Parliamentary Centre, unpublished, 2009.
23 Joint Governance Assessment (JGA), 2008, p.40-41. The JGA reports that the Committee on Budget
and National Patrimony has operated ‘with only seven Deputies and one supporting consultant charged
with scrutinising the budgets of all public agencies, checking budgetary performance, responding to the
Auditor General’s report and other tasks essential to the oversight of public finances.’
24 JGA, p.40-41.
25 Fiduciary Risk Assessment of the Parliament of Rwanda, conducted on behalf of DFID, 2011, p. 11.
26 Donor Fiduciary Risk Assessment of General Budget Support in Rwanda, prepared by REPIM on
behalf of DFID Rwanda, Draft Report, July p. 47.
27 Global Parliamentary Report, Inter-Parliamentary Union and UNDP, 2012, excel data annex.
28 ‘Revised Project Plan’, Parliamentary Centre, unpublished, 2009, p.16.
29 Approximately 65% of MPs were replaced following 2008 parliamentary elections.
30‘Revised Project Plan’, Parliamentary Centre, unpublished, 2009.
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Box 1: International indicators and scores for Parliament’s effectiveness in specific
areas
Open Budget Index scores:
Overall rating of Parliament’s contribution to ensuring an effective and open budget
process: 53/10031
Do legislative committees that hold public hearings release reports to the public on these
hearings? D (‘no, the committees do not release reports or do not hold public hearings) 32
Scores from the most recent Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
assessment:33
Legislative scrutiny of the annual budget law:
(i) Scope of the legislature’s scrutiny: B
Legislative scrutiny of external audit report:
(i) Timeliness of examination of audit reports by the legislature: B
(ii) Extent of hearings on key findings undertaken by the legislature: B
(iii) Issuance of recommended actions by the legislature and implementation by the
executive: B
25. Previous UK support and other donors: The programme will succeed previous UK
support to parliament under the 2007-2011 ‘Programme to Support Good Governance,
managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’.34 Overall, donor support to
Rwanda’s parliament remains modest and ad hoc. UNDP is providing Parliament with £210,000
as part of a ‘bridging project’ between the support that ended in 2011 and a five-year
programme to commence in 2013. It is not clear at this stage whether the five-year programme
will include support to parliament. The European Union (EU) is providing £420,000 over five
years (2011/12 – 2015/16) focused on support to oversight committees and parliamentary
outreach.
26. The UK’s support will add significant value beyond what other donors are already
doing. Under EU and UNDP programmes, Parliament constitutes one small component of
broad programmes that are supporting numerous institutions. Where other donors have
provided support, this has been very small-scale and activity based (e.g. support by the United
States International Development Agency (USAID) to strengthen legislative drafting skills in
Parliament). A well-resourced, Parliament-specific DFID programme therefore represents a
level of commitment and investment in parliament that is currently absent and which will
significantly raise the potential for achieving an overall institutional impact that goes beyond
output-level results. The modality of DFID’s support – programme funding – is also distinct from
existing donor approaches and will help to strengthen Parliament’s own systems and
procedures as well as reducing transaction costs and increasing Parliamentary ownership.
27. Donor coordination: Coordination between DFID and UNDP will be facilitated partly by
sharing a single Programme Coordinator, based in Parliament (see Management Case below).
DFID has initiated consultations and discussions with other parliamentary donors to ensure that
UK support will complement, and be coordinated with support from other donors. It is the
intention of DFID and of Parliament that in future such meetings will be Chaired and led by
Parliament itself. DFID has not suggested further coordination arrangements at present as it is
anticipated that the creation of a Single Project Implementation Unit (see paragraph 77 below)
will perform this function.
28. Consequences of not intervening:
31
The Open Budget Survey 2010, data tables, International Budget Partnership, p.22.
International Budget Partnership, Open Budget Questionnaire, Rwanda, September 2009, p. 82
33 PEFA 2010, p. 27.
34 Parliament was one of seven beneficiary institutions and received £1m. One of the lessons learned for
future support was focus on a smaller number of beneficiary institutions and to focus more closely on
developing appropriate management arrangements for support.
32
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Parliament is a cornerstone institution for domestic accountability. By not intervening, DFID
would fail to take forward the Departmental Business Plan commitment to supporting
accountability institutions in contexts where we provide budget support. This would also
miss an opportunity to reduce fiduciary risk associated with UK provision of general and
sector budget support to the Government of Rwanda.
Not supporting Rwanda’s new PAC would mean missing a key and timely opportunity to
strengthen public financial accountability. The right kind of support, during what is likely to
be a formative period, could have a significant impact on the PAC’s trajectory and could
help to lay strong foundations for future years. An ineffective PAC would potentially
increase the fiduciary risk of UK budget support and miss opportunities to improve the
overall economy, efficiency and effectiveness of public spending in Rwanda.
DFID is providing support to the Office of the Auditor General (OAG). Given the mutual
dependence between the OAG and the PAC, not intervening would mean missing
opportunities to amplify the impact and value for money of UK support to the OAG.
29. Contribution to poverty reduction: Rwanda’s development progress is impressive but it
is also fragile. Recent research commissioned by the World Bank underlines that ‘peace is
most likely to endure if Rwanda’s political space is gradually opened up to allow formal state
institutions to establish greater autonomy from the current regime’.35 Strengthening the role of
Parliament is therefore highly relevant to this process. Reinforcing Parliament’s ability to
robustly oversee how public funds are managed and spent will contribute positively to the value
for money of public spending – thereby potentially channelling increased resources towards
achieving poverty reduction results (see ‘Theory of Change’ at paragraph 39 for further details).
30. Links to HMG/DFID strategic priorities:
 Structural Reform Priority 2 (‘Make British aid more effective by improving transparency and
value for money’).
 Commitment that up to 5% of budget support should go to accountability institutions (DFID
Business Plan 2012-15).
 Ministerial emphasis on Empowerment and Accountability: ‘Access to information enables
citizens to engage meaningfully with accountability mechanisms’.
 Renewed emphasis on strengthening domestic accountability as a partnership principle for
providing budget support.36
Appraisal Case
Feasible options that address the need set out in the Strategic case:
31. Option 1: Targeted Accountability Focus
Outputs:
1. Improved capacity of Public Accounts Committee and Budget Committee to fulfil their roles
2. Improved parliamentary transparency and public engagement
3. Enhanced institutional capability to plan, manage, deliver and report against strategic
objectives
32. Option 2: Cross-cutting Support
Outputs:
1. Administrative and technical support services to all Select Committees expanded.
2. Parliamentary ability to initiate and draft legislation improved.
3. Improved parliamentary transparency and public engagement
4. Improved engagement between Rwandan MPs and citizens
Rwanda’s Exit Pathway from Violence: A Strategic Assessment, Omar McDoom, World Development
Report 2011 background case study, 2011, World Bank, p.3.
36 Implementing DFID’s strengthened approach to budget support: Technical Note, DFID, July 2011.
35
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5. Institutional capability to plan, monitor and evaluate achievement of strategic objectives
enhanced.
6. Review and reform of core institutional structures, systems, processes and management
arrangements.
Option 3: Targeted Accountability Focus ++
33. As a variation of Option 1, this option would include the same outputs as Option 1 but with
scope for future expansion of support to additional Select Committees besides the PAC and
Budget Committee. Annual Reviews will specifically consider whether a shift towards a broader
approach will represent good value for money (based on a deeper understanding of potential
opportunities and risks).
34 .Distinguishing features of the two main options (options 1 and 2): The options differ in
terms of the type and number of outputs that will enable the achievement of the purpose.
Option 1 places particular emphasis on public financial accountability as part of its support to
parliamentary oversight. Option 2 is broader in scope in that it includes support to all 13 of
Parliament’s select committees (nine in the Chamber of Deputies and 4 in the Senate) and to
the legislative role of parliament. Unlike Option 1, it includes reform of core institutional systems
and processes (for example, human resources, procurement, the roles of senior management).
It also includes an output to improve engagement between Rwandan MPs and citizens. Both
main options include support directed at improving parliamentary outreach/communications and
at improving parliament’s ability to plan and deliver strategic objectives.
35. As a variation on Option 1, Option 3 includes the same components but allows a degree of
flexibility for expansion should it become clear that there are significant opportunities for
progress with wider institutional strengthening.
36. Assessing the feasibility of the options
Criteria for assessing feasibility:
 Option takes full consideration of the political context surrounding parliament and the
internal institutional environment shaping the behaviour of parliamentarians and
parliamentary officials.
 Option takes as its departure point the existing level of institutional capacity in Parliament
and the scope for building this capacity further.
 Option addresses key accountability challenges in Rwanda.
 Implementation of the Option is ‘manageable’ in terms of breadth and maximises value for
money (VFM).
 Option builds the trust and carries the support of Parliament’s senior management.
37. Comparing Option 1 and Option 2: Option 2 has more outputs and is more ambitious in
that it includes core institutional reform of Parliament. However, it is currently not clear whether
the political and institutional context is right for a broader and more ambitious approach. Option
2 also carries the risk of diluting programme impact by seeking to address a large number of
new areas simultaneously - rather than prioritising a select number of areas and focusing on
delivering them. Parliament has limited institutional and administrative capacity to absorb and
administer reform on several concurrent fronts. A wide-ranging programme would therefore be
poorly suited to the capacity criterion set out above. Option 2 also has the drawback of being
significantly more demanding in terms of DFID inputs and transaction costs – which will already
be significant given that the programme is entirely new.
38. In contrast, Option 1 is focused on strengthening the PAC and Budget Committee – both of
which are especially well positioned to further strengthen accountability and value for money
public spending in Rwanda (including in relation to UK budget support). Parliament’s letter to
DFID identified this area specifically as one where support would be welcome. Option 1 allows
for DFID to build relationships with parliament and to deliver results around a focused and
shared agenda. Unlike Option 2, Option 1 also carries less of a risk of overloading existing
Parliamentary capacity. Instead, Option 1 allows for the programme to grow and broaden in
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step with improvements to Parliamentary capacity (including the capacity built through the
programme). Option 1 therefore performs better than Option 2 against the above
feasibility criteria.
39. Comparing Option 1 and Option 3: An advantage of Option 3 over Option 1 is that a
decision on whether to broaden the programme focus could be taken once the programme has
established a track record and built further trust with Parliament (e.g. following first annual
review). This approach has downsides in terms of creating some uncertainty over final
programme budget and logframe. But this disadvantage is potentially outweighed by the fact
that, by focusing on the PAC and Budget Committee to the exclusion of other Select
Committees, Option 1 may miss opportunities to advance parliamentary scrutiny and
accountability in relation to key areas of policy-making. Pursuing Option 3 will enable a
decision about adopting a broader approach to be informed by a better understanding of the
potential opportunities and risks, taking into consideration Parliament’s institutional environment
and the broader governance context. On this basis, Option 3 is the preferred Option and the
other two should be discounted.
Theory of Change
40. Summary: Parliaments operate at the meeting point of accountability relationships between
different branches of government (the Executive and the Legislature) on the one hand and
between citizens and the political leaders on the other. The overarching theory of change for
the programme is that UK funding will contribute to parliament’s ability to play its oversight and
accountability roles more openly and effectively. Taken together, programme outputs will
enable parliament to be more autonomous, effective and transparent in overseeing public
spending and engaging with Rwandan citizens (outcome). If Parliament is stronger and more
open in demanding and securing accountability for public spending and if parliament
encourages and delivers engagement with the public and other stakeholders, then, overall, this
will help to achieve the programme’s impact of making the Executive branch of Government
more accountable to parliament and also more accountable to Rwandan citizens.
Box 2: Unpacking the theory of change in terms of programme outputs
Output 1: Improved capacity of Public Accounts Committee and Budget Committee to fulfil
their roles: The programme is focussed on two parliamentary committees in particular: The Budget
Committee and the Public Accounts Committee.37 The Budget Committee is vital because the budget
process is one of the most regular, predictable and systematic ways of scrutinising government
conduct and for reflecting and implementing policy priorities.38 The Public Accounts Committee also
has particular significance because it assists in the process of public audit (through its relationship
with the Office of the Auditor General) at the same time as helping to ensure that parliament holds
government account on behalf of the electorate for its use of public money.39
Improving the technical and administrative capacity of the PAC (both in terms of its members and the
Committee’s support services) will enable it to ensure that the findings it receives from the Office of
the Auditor General are converted into concrete improvements in the value for money of public
spending. The PAC will do this by questioning accounting officers, issuing recommendations and
following up on whether the Government has implemented these recommendations. Similarly,
strengthening the Budget Committee (both in terms of its members and the Committee’s support
services) will enable it to scrutinise the budget to ensure that revenue and spending measures are
fiscally sound and match the needs of the population with available resources.40
37
Both committees can serve as an important entry point for civil society groups, think tanks and
academics to engage with parliament – including by providing oral and written evidence.
38 Wehner, Joachim, cited in Strengthening Parliaments in Africa: Improving Support, Africa All Party
Parliamentary Group, UK Parliament, 2008, p. 64.
39 Enhancing Accountability for the use of Public Sector Resources, ODI, 2008
40 Back from the Sidelines? Redefining the contribution of legislatures to the budget cycle, World Bank
Institute, 2004.
10
Output 2: Improved parliamentary transparency and public engagement
Independent assessments such as the Open Budget index currently score parliament poorly in terms
of enabling public engagement and making information publicly available. By strengthening
parliamentary communication, outreach and availability of information, the programme will improve the
visibility of parliament and help demonstrate the relevance of its role and its work to the Rwandan
media, NGOs, civil society groups, trade unions and members of the public. In doing so, the
programme will create entry points for greater public engagement, influencing and accountability.
Output 3: Enhanced institutional capability to plan, manage, deliver and report against
strategic objectives
Parliament’s experience with its previous Strategic Plan (2006 – 2010) underlined that parliament’s
institutional ability to manage for results needed to be strengthened. 41 Parliament’s 2010-2015
Strategic Plan offers a broad framework for parliamentary development but assistance is needed to
ensure that the necessary systems, processes and forums are in place to ensure that parliament can
monitor and deliver against its institutional priorities.
41. The assumptions underpinning the above theory of change are fully elaborated in the
programme logframe. Critical assumptions include:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
Overall political space for parliament and MPs to play an active role in Rwanda’s
political system does not deteriorate.
The 2013 parliamentary elections do not leave Parliament compromised.
GoR (remains) responsive to PAC/Parliamentary demands for follow-up on audit
recommendations.
Institutional leadership and management within Parliament do not deteriorate.
The Office of the Auditor General provides PAC with increasingly robust and userfocussed information.
DFID is able to maintain and further develop strong and constructive dialogue and
working relations with Parliament.
No significant deterioration in levels of demand, capacity and space for civil society, the
media and trade unions to engage more closely with parliament and to draw on
parliamentary findings.
42. The “do nothing” counterfactual: Previous DFID support to parliament has ended so the
‘do nothing’ counterfactual is to have no DFID funding relationship with parliament. This would
reduce the impact of DFID’s programme of support to the OAG – given that the PAC provides
much of the OAGs political weight and backing. Doing nothing would also miss an opportunity
to strengthen a vital aspect of accountability in Rwanda at a critical phase in the development
of Rwanda’s political system and of Rwanda’s Parliament specifically (particularly given
parliamentary elections in 2013). DFID consultations with other donors have confirmed that
DFID funding to parliament would not be displacing potential funding from other donors.
Parliament’s own budget is almost entirely consumed by recurrent costs and there is a gap with
respect to programmes to strengthen and reform parliament.42
Assessing the strength of the evidence base for each feasible option
Evidence rating for Option 3: Limited
43. Evidence from previous interventions in Rwanda: There is limited evidence of impact
from previous support to Rwanda’s Parliament. Donors have not invested significant resources
in parliamentary support and, partly as a result, have placed less emphasis on demonstrating
41
Parliament of Rwanda, Strategic Plan, 2010-2015, p. 11
The Parliamentary Clerks have asked DFID to assist with designing mechanisms so that Parliament
can better coordinate multiple small donor programmes and thereby reduce transaction costs on alreadystretched institutional capacity. Were DFID to ‘do nothing’ this would therefore also prevent potential
gains in terms of donor coordination.
42
11
clear and quantified results than for larger areas of spend. Most donor support has been shortterm project support with activity-level results reporting (e.g. number of workshops held etc.).
Results from USAID support43
USAID’s Rwanda Parliament Support Project (Sept 2003-Dec 2004) is one of the few programmes that
sets out quantified results achieved. Attribution of these results to USAID’s project is not explored in
detail but these results include:
 Fifty per cent increase in the number of plenary sessions devoted to executive oversight/questioning
of Ministers.
 Over twenty per cent increase in Parliament’s operating budget and over 10% increase in its
operating budget as a percentage of total GoR budget.
 Fifty per cent increase in the amount of public information available on Parliament’s website.
44. Wider evidence: The lack of systematic evidence on the outcomes and impacts of
parliamentary strengthening in Rwanda is consistent with the broader dearth of evidence on the
effectiveness of parliamentary assistance.44 Whilst there is an established literature on
democratisation processes, there has been little rigorous study of democracy assistance in its
own right, and even less that is specifically focussed on parliamentary strengthening work.45
45. Lessons learned from previous UK support in Rwanda: Jointly with UNDP, DFID
provided support to parliament through a 2007-2011 ‘Programme of Support to Good
Governance’. DFID provided £1m towards the £2m total for the programme’s parliamentary
component. The programme was managed by UNDP and ended in June 2011. The Project
Completion Report identified various activities that helped to strengthen parliament.46 At the
same time, shortcomings with the programme’s monitoring and evaluation (M+E) framework
and insufficient attention to establishing clear and timely baseline data made it difficult to
confidently specify quantified results.
46. What is the likely impact (positive and negative) on climate change and environment
for each feasible option?
Option Climate change and environment risks Climate
change
and
environment
and impacts, Category (A, B, C, D)
opportunities, Category (A, B, C, D)
1
C (low)
C (low)
47. Impact on Climate Change and the Environment: An independent ‘climate change
screening’ of DFID-R’s portfolio (as set out in the Bilateral Aid Review offer) concluded that
43
Rwanda Parliament Support Project, Final Report submitted to USAID by ARD Inc., March 2005.
pp.28-31.
44 See, for example, Support to Legislatures, NORAD Evaluation Department Synthesis Study, Report
2/2010 p.vi, p.9. Also: Strengthening Parliaments in Africa: Improving Support, 2008, Africa All Party
Parliamentary Group, UK Parliament; Approaches to Parliamentary Strengthening: A Review of Sida’s
Support to Parliaments, 2005, Sida Evaluation 05/27; Parliamentary strengthening in developing
countries, 2007, Overseas Development Institute. One of the few quantitative studies in existence is an
independent cross-national assessment covering 165 countries (see, Effects of US foreign assistance on
democracy building: Results of a cross-national quantitative study, USAID, Vanderbilt University and
University of Pittsburg, 2006). The study did not disaggregate the US assistance in terms of
parliamentary support specifically and instead focussed on broader pillars of US democracy support. The
study concluded that: spending on the promotion of democracy, in the period 1990-2003 helped to
increase democracy above the levels that would have been achieved based on all other factors that
could reasonably be expected to have mattered (ibid, p.26). There does not yet exist a critical mass of
similar findings that would enable greater confidence regarding causal relationships and our ability to
directly attribute outcomes to development assistance.
45 See for example: Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge through Evaluations and
Research. Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, National Research
Council, 2008, p.26.
46 These activities include: An oversight mission by MPs, focusing on the Vision 2020 Umurenge
Programme; establishment of a Research Unit which has helped strengthen analytical capacity in
parliament; developing a legislative drafting manual to guide parliamentarians and support staff;
preparation of the Parliament Strategic Plan 2006-10, and more recently, the 2010-15 Strategic Plan.
12
climate and environment-related opportunities and risks for the governance and security pillar
were very limited.47 However, support to parliament could bring indirect environmental and
climate change benefits, for example by strengthening overall provisions for oversight of the
Executive.
What are the costs and benefits of each feasible option?
48. Costs: The direct cost of the programme is assumed to be the total programme budget –
i.e. £ 3.25m 2012/13 – 2015/16.
49. Direct benefits: Direct benefits will result from the PAC’s recommendations and its
engagement with the Executive to ensure follow up on the audit findings of the Office of the
Auditor General. It is expected that the PAC will increase the extent to which the Executive
takes action to address financial leakages and sub-optimal use of public resources. This
includes steps to address fraud, wasteful expenditure and expenditure deemed not compliant
with public procurement laws. It also includes steps to improve value for money based on the
findings of OAG performance/value for money audits.
50. Indirect benefits: The indirect benefits are potentially much larger. Through greater
scrutiny of public expenditure decisions and greater pressure to ensure follow-up, it is
reasonable to expect the indirect benefits to include a more efficient use of scarce financial
resources. There may also be improved fiscal discipline resulting from the improved public
financial management to which the PAC and Budget Committee will contribute.
51. Further indirect benefits relate to strengthening citizens’ ability to hold government to
account and to strengthening the legitimacy of Rwanda’s political system. Evidence from
the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report suggests that in order to transition away
from cycles of violence and make development progress, fragile states need to build
confidence between the states and society and establish legitimate institutions that are
accountable to citizens.48 Given that Parliament is one of the three arms of government in
Rwanda, popular perceptions of Rwanda’s Parliament are likely to shape wider attitudes
towards the legitimacy of Rwanda’s political system. Assisting Rwanda’s Parliament to make
greater progress in meeting its mandate will therefore contribute positively towards state
legitimacy in the eyes of Rwandan people, and therefore to addressing the legacy of conflict
and fragility. These indirect benefits are difficult to quantify and have not been factored into the
cost-benefit analysis below.
52. Calculating direct benefits: The most readily quantifiable direct benefits will result from
the programme’s support to the PAC. Improved PAC effectiveness will increase follow up to
tackle fraud, wasteful expenditure and expenditure not compliant with public procurement rules.
To arrive at an estimate of the direct benefits, it was assumed that DFID’s funding to the PAC
would increase by 15% the size of the direct benefits resulting from DFID’s support to the Office
of the Auditor General.49 The assumption is reasonable given that the role of the PAC is partly
47 Climate
Change Screening of DFID Rwanda’s Portfolio, Harewell International Ltd and the Global
Climate Adaptation Partnership, 2010, pp. 38-39.
48 World Development Report 2011, Conflict Security and Development, Overview, The World Bank,
Washington D.C. The report asserts that the more citizens perceive the political system and institutions
as fair and representative and contributing to their own prosperity, welfare and security, the more likely
they will be to support these institutions and to contribute positively to national development and peace.
49 To estimate the direct benefits of DFID’s OAG funding, reported levels of fraud, wasteful expenditure,
and expenditure not compliant with public procurement rules from the most recent four audit reports were
collated to derive the average value of such incidences per audit (best thought of as the ‘output per
audit’). This output per audit was then used to estimate the marginal benefit of this intervention based on
the difference between the number of audits with and without UK support. Furthermore, the benefits
attributed to DFID’s OAG support are in proportion to DFID’s share of total funding of OAG and are
adjusted for the fact that the OAG reports that approximately half of its recommendations are acted upon.
13
to ensure that potential benefits from OAG findings translate into concrete follow up actions by
the Executive branch of Government.50
53. This is a conservative approach to calculating the benefits of DFID’s support to parliament
because it assesses whether the entirety of the programme costs can be justified by the
benefits resulting from only one of the programme outputs: support to the PAC. The approach
is also likely to underestimate benefits because it considers the ‘PAC multiplier effect’ only in
relation to the benefits attributable to DFID’s OAG support rather the multiplier effect on all of
the benefits associated with the work of the OAG.
54. Calculating indirect benefits: Indirect benefits relate to improved efficiency of public
expenditure and improved fiscal discipline. For the economic appraisal of DFID support to the
OAG, it was estimated that improving the capacity of the OAG would enable financial resources
to be better allocated to areas that improve social well-being. The value of this improved
allocation of scarce resources was estimated to be equivalent to 1% of public expenditure for
the 10th year of a 10-year period.51 The second approach used to calculate the indirect benefits
of OAG support assumed that greater accountability for spending decisions would induce the
GoR to better match expenditure with fiscal revenues resulting in a reduction of the primary
fiscal deficit by 1% (also realised at the end of year 10).
55. In line with our assumption that support to the PAC will amplify by 15% the benefits of the
OAG support programme, the indirect benefits for both improved efficiency of public
expenditure and improved fiscal deficit are increased from 1% to 1.15%
56. Cost benefit analysis52. Calculations based on the above approach and assumptions
produce discounted benefits of £5.4m and discounted costs of £2.3m. This results in a positive
Net Present Value (NPV) of £3.1m. In other words, once the programme costs and benefits are
adjusted to enable comparison over time, the benefits minus the costs still produces a positive
value of £3.1m. This creates a cost-benefit ratio of 2.4. I.e. every £1 that DFID spends on the
programme will deliver £2.40 of benefits.
57. Sensitivity tests: Sensitivity analysis was conducted whereby the parameters of the costbenefit analysis were varied to see how these variations affected the benefit-cost ratio. These
sensitivity tests included varying the extent to which the PAC support would amplify the benefits
of DFID’s OAG support programme (i.e. the % of the increase in benefits that the PAC
programme would deliver over and above the benefits of the OAG support programme).
58. The sensitivity tests applied and the consequent variations in benefit-cost ratios are
included in the table below.
50
In making the original calculations of direct benefits from DFID funding to the OAG, it was assumed
that fraud, wasteful and non-compliant expenditure are “costs” to society of equal value, rather than
economic transfers, hence any reduction results in an increase in economic well-being. In the “donothing” scenario for the OAG appraisal, the capacity of the OAG is assumed to reduce due to the
ending of Dutch-Swedish donor support, resulting in 10% fewer audits compared to levels currently
realised. A further assumption in calculating the additional benefit of DFID support to the PAC is that the
working relationship between the PAC and the OAG is sufficiently strong and strategic to enable benefits
to be realised. An exchange rate of GBP1 : RwF 900 has been assumed, with a three percent
depreciation in the value of the Rwandan Franc each year.
51 This 1% figure is in line with DFID draft guidance on undertaking Cost-Benefit Analysis of PFM-related
projects. See: ‘Draft interim guidance on undertaking Cost-Benefit Analysis of Public Financial
Management Projects’, DFID internal document (Quest no 3048693 as above).
52 A 10-year appraisal period and a 10% discount rate were adopted.
14
Sensitivity assumption
Base case, assuming that PAC support
produces a 15% improvement on OAG
programme benefits
Improvement of 12%
Improvement of 8%
“Breakeven” point : 6.3%
Remove “ reduction in fiscal deficit”
from the benefit streams of the base
case scenario
“Breakeven” point when “reduction in
fiscal deficit” not included into benefit
streams: 7.5%
12% discount rate under base case
scenario
8% discount rate under base case
scenario
Net
Present
Value
Benefit to cost ratio – i.e.
£1 DFID spend = £X
benefit
£3.1m
2.40
£2.0m
£0.6m
0
1.90
1.27
1
£2.25m
2
0
1
£2.6m
£3.7m
2.20
2.50
59. The table shows that, under base case assumptions, the PAC investment needs to improve
the effectiveness of the Office of the Auditor General investment by 6.3% in order for the
investment in the PAC to pay for itself.53
60. Opportunities and risks involved in implementing the intervention: Risks and
opportunities are elaborated in specific sections below. Headline opportunities and risks are:
61. Opportunities:
i.
Newly-created Public Accounts Committee and revised select committee
responsibilities (as elaborated above).
ii.
Increasing effectiveness of the Office of the Auditor General offers strong
underpinning to the new Public Accounts Committee.
iii.
New influx of Senators and Deputies – Replacement of all Senators by end 2012 and
anticipated new Deputies following 2013 parliamentary elections presents opportunities
in terms of training new parliamentarians and shaping their approach to meeting their
responsibilities.
iv.
Recently completed Parliamentary Strategic Plan (backdated to 2010-2015)
provides opportunity for DFID to align support and dialogue around Parliament’s
strategic priorities.
v.
Recently launched Parliamentary Radio Station (March 2012). This represents a
major potential opportunity in terms of raising public awareness of Parliament and its
role and facilitating public engagement.
62. Risks: See Risk Matrix at Section 6, below.
What measures can be used to assess Value for Money for the intervention?
63:
 Financial value of Parliament’s spending on procurement that is not compliant with
procurement procedures (as recorded in reports of the OAG). If this value goes down, then
this will provide assurances that Parliament is reducing potential for fraud and wastage.
 Value of savings realised: If the value of savings realised (as a result of the PAC securing
follow-up actions from the Executive) is greater than the PAC’s operating costs then the
PAC more than pays for itself.
53
Taking a different and less conservative approach to potential benefits, if we assume DFIDs
investment in the PAC results in 15% more audit recommendations being implemented (and a
corresponding improvement in the efficiency of public spending) then the present value of benefits rises
to £10.7 million, resulting in a Net Present Value of £8.5 million and a benefit: cost ratio of 4.8.
15

Amount of money recovered as a result of PAC pressing the Executive for follow up on
fraud identified by the OAG.
Summary Value for Money Statement for the preferred option
64. Under the preferred option, it is reasonable to conclude from the Cost-benefit Analysis
(CBA) that the returns from supporting the PAC are likely to exceed the cost of the entire
programme. The cost-benefit ratio in the base case suggests that every £1 that DFID spends
on the programme will deliver £2.40 of benefits. On this basis, and taking sensitivity tests into
account, it is reasonable to conclude that the intervention represents good value for money.
3. Commercial Case
A. Why is the proposed funding mechanism/form of arrangement the right one
for this intervention, with this development partner?
65. The funding type is ‘Non Budget Support Financial Aid’. DFID will sign a bilateral MoU with
GoR (using ‘MoU between DFID and Partner Government’ template). Parliament has
expressed strong preference for this arrangement. It enables close alignment with Parliament’s
plans and priorities; will build Parliamentary ownership of the programme and will maximise
scope for working with the Parliament’s own procedures.
66. This funding mechanism represents VFM in that it avoids the financial costs associated with
setting up and funding a project implementation unit or management agent located outside of
Parliament. This approach is consistent with the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness; the Accra Agenda for Action and; the Government of Rwanda’s Aid Policy. The
MoU will include specific commitments on maximising the value for money of development
partner support, including through procurement (see below).
B. Value for Money through procurement
67. Parliament adheres to national guidelines on procurement. These guidelines stipulate
open, free and fair competition in order to promote value for money. Opportunities are widely
advertised in local, regional or international media, using standard bidding documents.
Bidders are debriefed on evaluation decisions and appeals mechanisms give opportunity to
challenge procurement decisions before contracts are awarded. Both parliamentary chambers
prepare an annual procurement plan that begins with needs identified under each department
and is based on the annual action plan. Procurements are conducted for purchase of goods
and services as well as for capital expenditure.
68. DFID’s FRA of Parliament, drawing on the most recent report of the Auditor General, noted
various instances of non compliance with procurement procedures.54 These included instances
of unplanned procurements, use of inappropriate procurement methods, unavailability of tender
documents and inadequately supported expenditure. These concerns relate primarily to the
Chamber of Deputies rather than to the Senate. The need to address procurement weakness
has been built into the programme as an activity under Output 3 (‘Enhanced institutional
capability to plan, manage, deliver and report against strategic objectives’). Specifically,
immediately upon Business Case approval, a six-month ‘foundation phase’ for the programme
will begin. This will include a consultancy of approximately 45 days to assist Parliament to
strengthen its financial management systems and internal controls – including related to
procurement (see section D, below). DFID will procure directly for this consultancy, in line with
DFID procurement procedures so as to ensure fair competition and value for money.
4. Financial Case
54
Rwanda Parliament Fiduciary Risk Assessment, DFID, December 2011, pp. 20-21.
16
A. What are the costs, how are they profiled and how will you ensure accurate
forecasting?
69. The UK will provide £3.25 million over a period four years (2012/13 – 2015/16)
FY 2012/13: £430,000
FY 2013/14: £900,000
FY 2014/15: £1,025,000
FY 2015/16: £895,000
An approximate budget breakdown is included below.
Output 1 Improved
capacity of PAC and
Budget Committee
Output 2 Improved
parliamentary
transparency and
public engagement
Output 3 Enhanced
institutional capability
to plan, manage,
deliver and report
against strategic
objectives
Programme
Coordination
DFID
managed
reviews and studies
(mandatory
and
discretional)
Total
FY1
FY2
£180,000 £380,000
FY3
£495,000
FY4
£375,000
Total
£1,430,000
£60,000
£120,000
£125,000
£100,000
£405,000
£80,000
£250,000
£250,000
£265,000
£845,000
£80,000
£130,000
£130,000
£130,000
£470,000
£30,000
£20,000
£25,000
£25,000
£100,000
£430,000 £900,000
£1,025,000 £895,000
£3,250,000
70. Adequate funding is available. The programme and budget are included in DFID-Rwanda’s
Operational Plan for the current Spending Round. For 2015/16 spend (i.e. beyond the end date
of DFID Rwanda Operational Plan and the Spending Review period), the Divisional Accountant
for the region has been informed in order to ensure compliance with Treasury requirements.
B. How it will be funded: capital/programme/admin?
71. Funds will come from programme resources.
C. How funds will be paid out?
72. The financial payment type is non-budget support financial aid. In addition, a short-term
technical assistance consultancy will start to mitigate fiduciary risks during the programme’s
six-month foundation phase. Funds will be disbursed on a 6-monthly basis into a bank account
set up for receipt of DFID funds. Disbursement will linked to approval by the Technical Steering
Committee (see Management Case below) of an annual workplan and budget for the
programme as well as progress and financial reports from the previous period (in keeping with
MoU commitments and provisions). During the programme’s 6-month foundation phase, and
during the recruitment of a Parliament-based Programme Manager, the DFID Lead Adviser and
Deputy Programme Manager will exercise close oversight of financial arrangements and the
annual workplan and budget.
D. What is the assessment of financial risk and fraud?
17
73. Parliament uses national public financial regulations and prepares quarterly expenditure
reports and annual financial statements which are audited by the Office of the Auditor General.
Parliament has received unqualified audit opinions in the last two years (FY 2009 and 2010)
and the audits identified no cases of fraudulent activity within Parliament. The external audit
report following the end of the DFID-UNDP support was also clean. Parliament has put in place
payroll controls to ensure that clear procedures and adequate controls exist around payroll
processing. In addition, Parliament has put in place procedures and controls over non-salary
expenditures.
74. At the same time, audits have identified areas of fiduciary risk. Following discussions with
Parliament, in late 2011 DFID undertook a fiduciary risk assessment of Parliament. The
assessment concluded that the overall level of fiduciary risk was ‘substantial’. The overall
summary of fiduciary risk levels and the trajectory of change is provided in the table below:
Category
1. Credibility of the budget
Risk level
2011
Moderate
2. Comprehensiveness and transparency
Moderate
3. Policy based budgeting
Low
4. Predictability and control in budget execution
Substantial
5. Accounting, recording and reporting
Substantial
6. External scrutiny and audit
Trajectory of
change
Moderate
↔
↔
↔
↔
75. The ‘substantial’ risk rating for predictability and control in budget execution relates largely
to instances of noncompliance with procurement procedures (as discussed at above) as well as
deficiencies in internal audit (primarily the vacant post for the Chamber of Deputies’ internal
auditor).55 The ‘substantial’ risk rating for ‘accounting, recording and reporting’ relates largely to
problems with piloting new financial management software package. As noted in the FRA, the
risk rating for this area is likely to reduce significantly as new software is introduced to offer
additional safeguards while IFMIS piloting problems are addressed. In consultation with
Parliament, DFID has agreed to directly provide technical assistance to strengthen Parliament’s
financial management and controls. This consultancy will commence as a matter of priority. It
will address the weaknesses identified in the FRA and will give particular attention to any
fiduciary risks relating to the provision of programme funding by development partners.
E. How will expenditure be monitored, reported and accounted for?
76. Development partner projects have not been included in budget and financial reports on
Parliament’s budget execution – thereby creating the risk that direct donor funding may not be
subject to the necessary audit scrutiny. However, this is because Parliament has not previously
received direct financial aid from development partners. Parliament has agreed that DFID
expenditure will be on-budget and will be monitored through review of Parliament’s financial
statements, internal audits and external audit by the Office of the Auditor General. The
programme’s foundation phase and financial management consultancy will include ensuring
that Parliament takes the necessary steps to strengthen these areas – for example by
implementing the Ministerial instruction that all budget agencies put in place an independent
audit committee. Follow up on audit recommendations and FRA action points will be included in
55
This position is currently vacant (Jan 2012) and Parliament is in discussion with Ministry of Public
Service to fill the post.
18
regular progress review meetings. These provisions will give DFID the necessary assurance
that this programme’s funds will be used for their intended purposes.
5. Management Case
A. What are the Management Arrangements for implementing the intervention?
77. The programme will be managed on a day to day basis by a Programme Coordinator,
based in Parliament. The Clerks will be responsible for overall management and coordination
on behalf of Parliament. DFID has agreed with Parliament and UNDP that a Programme
Coordinator of donor support who is already working in Parliament (paid for through a UNDP
programme) will also serve as Programme Coordinator for DFID support. This arrangement is
the strong preference of Parliament and will help avoid recruitment delays. The scope of work
for the Programme Coordinator will be amended to reflect additional responsibilities in relation
to DFID support. UNDP will continue to cover the Coordinator salary. DFID was involved in the
competitive recruitment of the Coordinator as part of a previous joint DFID-UNDP parliamentary
support component. The Coordinator will continue to report to the Clerks of Parliament, in close
liaison with UNDP and, going forward, with DFID.
78. This arrangement is a transitional one, pending the operationalisation of a Single Project
Implementation Unit (SPIU). In February 2011, the Rwandan Cabinet endorsed the creation of
an SPIU for every budget agency. This unit would coordinate development partner engagement
and promote alignment with Parliamentary priorities, systems and processes. Parliament is in
discussion with the Ministry of Public Service and Labour (MIFOTRA) to ensure that an SPIU is
incorporated into Parliament’s organisational structure. Once this is agreed, Parliament will
operationalise the SPIU – including competitive recruitment for all positions. DFID will ensure
that the Programme’s management arrangements are consistent with and contribute to
Parliament’s plans for implementing an SPIU.
79. The programme will be overseen by a Technical Steering Committee (TSC). There will be
six TSC meetings per annum.56 The TSC will be chaired by the Clerks of Parliament and will
include representation from the offices of the PAC and Budget Committee as well as the
Programme Coordinator, and DFID-Rwanda advisory and programme management
representatives. As far as possible, decisions will be made by consensus. Further details of
oversight arrangements will be finalised during the programme’s foundation phase (and these
arrangements will be reviewed as part of programme reviews). The TSC will discuss and sign
off annual workplans and budgets for the programme. The TSC will report to Parliament’s highlevel Programme Steering Committee which is responsible for the overall implementation of
Parliament’s strategic plan, including approving Parliament’s annual workplans and budgets.57
80. DFID Project Management: Three staff in the DFID Rwanda Governance Team will be
involved in ensuring sound project implementation. The Project Officer will have core tasks for
ensuring compliance with corporate requirements on financial management, procurement,
implementation progress and completion reviews and payments. The project Lead Adviser will
be in charge of dialogue on programme plans and budgets, submissions, results, relationships
and for ensuring synergies with the overall PFM and accountability support and dialogue. The
Governance Team Leader will be responsible for quality assurance and accountability to the
Head of Office. Mechanisms to monitor and address potential poor performance on the part of
the Parliament will be elaborated in the MoU between DFID and GoR.
81. DFID-funded Strategic Adviser to Parliament: Whilst the Programme Coordinator will
manage day to day programme management, the DFID programme will also include provision
for a Strategic Adviser to Parliament. Parliament has requested such a position in order to
advise on the overall strategic direction of parliament and to improve internal coordination and
56
During the six-month foundation phase, the TSC will meet monthly.
This grouping is equivalent to a parliamentary reform committee and is composed of parliamentarians
and senior parliamentary administrators.
57
19
results focus. The Strategic Adviser will report to the Clerks of Parliament and will assist the
work of the Steering Committee which monitors the implementation of Parliament’s overall
Strategic Plan. The Strategic Adviser will also work with the Internal Committee of each
chamber.58 The position of Strategic Adviser will be advertised internationally. Recruitment will
be managed by Parliament, in collaboration with DFID.
B. What are the risks and how will they be managed?
82. Due to Cabinet’s instruction that Parliament creates an SPIU, Parliament’s own institutional
arrangements for coordinating and overseeing development partner support are in transition.
The risk is that uncertainties regarding SPIU implementation make it difficult for DFID to
align with parliament’s own management/institutional arrangements and that this
compromises implementation momentum. However, the creation of the SPIU represents a
significant opportunity for Parliament to use development partner support more strategically
and effectively, including to reduce transaction costs and, potentially, to transition to basket
funding in the future. To mitigate SPIU-related risk, DFID will support the transition process and
establishment of the SPIU. This falls under Output 3 of the programme (‘enhance Parliament’s
institutional capability to plan, manage, deliver and report against strategic objectives’). DFID
will also continue to engage with other donors that support parliament – principally the EU and
UNDP to ensure coordination during the transition to an SPIU.
83. Further risks are elaborated in the Risk Matrix at Section 6, below.
C. What conditions apply?
84. As part of the programme’s six-month foundation phase, a financial management and
fiduciary risk consultancy will provide additional assurances and oversight of DFID’s first
disbursement to parliament. At the same time, the consultant will work with parliament to
improve financial controls. Disbursements after the end of the foundation phase will occur only
upon verification and agreement between DFID, the consultant and Parliament that systems
and procedures have been sufficiently strengthened and that the trajectory of change is
positive. Specific priority reforms/conditions will be mutually agreed at the outset of the
consultancy.
D. How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated?
85. There will be a stocktake review at the end of the six-month foundation phase. This review
will assess the extent of progress against agreed indicators and timelines for priority reforms to
financial management and controls. The findings of the review will determine whether DFID can
be confident in making future programme disbursements. The review will also consider
progress regarding the establishment of the SPIU. The programme will be monitored jointly with
Parliament’s Monitoring and Evaluation Unit as part of annual reviews of progress and results
linked to Parliament’s annual workplan. These reviews will be approached and designed so as
to build the capacity of Parliament’s monitoring function, as well as to deliver robust findings.
Independent external consultants will form part of the review teams.
86. Progress will be measured using a combination of independent international indicators and
local sources. Sources of international indicators built into the programme logframe include
data from the Open Budget Partnership and Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
(PEFA) reports. Local sources for measuring progress will include independently produced
public perception survey data from the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP).
New survey data will be needed to establish a baseline for the following indicator: ‘% increase
in proportion of media, trade unions and civil society groups stating they have attended
parliamentary hearings and/or accessed parliamentary reports in the past 12 months.’ New
surveys will also be commissioned to generate data from within parliament and from external
According to Parliament’s Strategic Plan, the Internal Committee ‘is composed of, as
appropriate, the Bureau of the Chamber of Deputies or by the Bureau of the Senate, the Clerk
and the Deputy Clerk and Directors General of the services from the concerned Chamber.’
58
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stakeholders on perceptions of parliamentary effectiveness and openness.59 This survey work
will be commissioned during the programme’s foundation phase.60
87. As reflected in the attached logframe and at other points in this document, there exist
sufficiently credible and reliable data sources and baselines from which to monitor progress
against milestones and to assess project impact. Monitoring information will feed into decisions
on programme delivery through TSC discussions and approval processes for annual
programme workplans. It is anticipated that an independent impact evaluation is unlikely to be
necessary for this programme. This is because the programme is not of high financial value
(i.e. is below £5 million) and the cost and complexity of evaluation is unlikely to deliver
sufficiently proportionate benefits.61 There may be stronger justification for carrying out a
combined evaluation DFID’s support to the OAG and Parliament, given the interdependent
nature of the PAC and OAG and the ways in which the two programmes are closely
complementary in their thematic focus. Issues around the purpose, key evaluation questions,
planning and methodology of a potential combined evaluation will be reviewed in greater detail
during the foundation phase and a final decision reached by the end of this phase.
6. Risk matrix
88. Principal risks (P = probability; S = significance):
Risk
1. Parliament and/or MPs do not
fully exercise and assert
increased technical capacity
2. Donor involvement/funding
perceived to be compromising
parliamentary
independence/sovereignty
3. Programme
underachievement due to slow
spend resulting from institutional
bottlenecks, limited absorptive
capacity within Parliament, and
lack of specificity regarding
strategic priorities and
monitoring and implementation
4. Conduct surrounding 2013
parliamentary elections
compromises the standing of
MPs and of Parliament
5. Disagreement between DFID
and Parliament regarding design
or implementation of governance
and management arrangements
for the programme
P S Prevention/Mitigation
M M Programme design and implementation factors in
incentive structures which shape the conduct of
MPs and parliamentary officials; joint DFID-FCO
analysis of contextual and institutional dynamics
affecting parliament.
L H Parliament clearly in ‘driving seat’ (e.g. strong
alignment of donor support to Parliament’s
priorities, strong ownership on the part of
parliamentary officials); involvement of MPs in
programme oversight.
H H This risk has been internalised to the programme
and will be addressed under Output 3
(strengthening institutional capacity); improved
donor coordination will minimise risk of support
from multiple donors tying up scare parliamentary
capacity.
L
L
H
UK-GoR and wider dialogue between GoR and
international partners around 2013 elections and
the implications for support of any concerns that
may arise.
M Learning of lessons from previous rounds of donor
support; clear setting and management of
expectations
during
design
and
early
implementation; clear and well-drafted ToR for
Parliamentary Strategic Adviser and Programme
59
A pre-existing survey template developed by the Inter-Parliamentary Union will be used. This will help
to maximise value for money.
60 This activity will be funded as part of Output 3: Enhanced institutional capability to plan, manage,
deliver and report against strategic objectives
61 See DFID Q&A on Embedding Evaluation, Q.15.
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6. Parliamentary independence
and autonomy significantly
curtailed and/or weak GoR
follow-up on audit OAG/PAC
recommendations
7. OAG fails to provide
parliament with the timely and
high quality information upon
which the PAC relies
8. Funds not used for intended
purposes or not properly
accounted for.
9. Parliament’s autonomy and
impact held back due to weak
supporting environment (e.g. re:
environment for media, political
parties and civil society; public
expectations of parliament).
11. Uncertainties and delays
regarding implementation of
Single Project Implementation
Unit (SPIU) compromise
implementation momentum
Coordinator; Parliament in the lead for recruitment
of Strategic Adviser.62
Issues of independence/autonomy of parliament
and follow up linked to overall policy dialogue with
GoR (including through EU-GoR ‘Article 8’
discussions).
L
H
L
M DFID support programme to the Office of the
Auditor General (2011-2015).
L
H
Fiduciary Risk Assessment conducted as part of
programme design; immediate technical assistance
to help strengthen systems for financial
management and controls; quarterly and annual
financial reports and funds will be subject to audit
by the OAG; follow up on audit recommendations
and DFID FRA priority actions will be included in
regular progress review meetings.
M M Both through programming and dialogue, DFID and
FCO to encourage building of effective and
strategic relationships between parliament, civil
society and the media.
M M DFID engagement with Parliament to help expedite
establishment of SPIU and to clarify requirements
and timelines (including through liaison with Public
Service Commission).
89. Residual risk: On the basis of the above, the residual risk is judged to be high. For the only
risk with a ‘high’ probability and a ‘high’ significance rating, mitigation measures have been built
into the programme itself. Three risks with ‘high’ significance ratings have low probability
ratings.
62
Appointee to be jointly agreed with DFID. Job specification to emphasise core competencies of
relationship management, strong communication skills etc, alongside technical competency areas.
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