CON LAW MAP Intro: Marbury – SC’s role of judicial review; con is law, cts. role is to interpret the law; thus, if statute is in conflict w/ con, cts must strike it down - framers’ intent, text, general structure and purpose of con, and emphasizes that the con has written limits. McCulloch – con not static; existence of implied fed powers: nec/prop clause (A1§8) – ends must be legit (an enumerated power) & means appropriate & plainly adapted to end; rationally-related test still used today (motive is usu irrelevant) Dred Scott – used framers’ intent to rule that slaves/ blacks noncitizens; used 5th A sdp argument to deem Missouri Compromise uncon. COMMERCE CLAUSE (A1§8) Gibbons (1884) – commerce incl all commercial intercourse; congress can reg all matters (incl intrast) that have a commercial connection w/ another st; no area of interst commerce is reserved for st control. 1880-1937 – Court restricts commerce clause Econ Regulations - direct logical relationship test (EC Knight, 1895) – only incidental and indirect relationship b/w manu and interst commerce; thus, fed can’t reg manu. - subst econ effects test (Shreveport, ‘14) – can reg activities that have a close & subst effect on interst commerce; qualitatively subst effects is key; manu vs commerce boundary still alive. - stream of commerce test (Holmes, Swift & Co., ‘05) – if activity is viewed as being ‘in’ commerce or part of the current of commerce, can be fed regulated. Police/Moral Regulations - Lottery case – fed can ban interst shipment of tix since shipping is interst commerce (and lottery = evil); rationale extended to prostitution (Hoke) and bad eggs (Hipolite) w/ the latter upholding fed power to seize items after it arrived at destination. - Hammer v. Dagenhart (‘18) – fed can’t prohibit interst transport of child labor goods; goods not evil although child labor is; child labor relates to production & is not commerce & is solely w/ st power New Deal Barriers (1935-6) - Schechter Poultry (‘35) – fair comp codes (wage/hr rules) of NIRA was uncon; effect on interst commerce was too indirect as D only bought & sold locally. - Carter Coal (‘36) – EC Knight test; fed max hrs/min wage for coal industry uncon; must be direct logical connection b/w object of reg and interst commerce; production has only indirect effect. Modern Trends (1937 - ) Economic Regulations - Substantial effect test: Jones & Laughlin (’37) – fed labor practices reg is con; manu/commerce & direct/ indirect distinction rejected (EC Knight); labor dispute could burden or obstruct commerce subst’lly - Cumulative effect test: Wickard (’42) – high pt of commerce power; acts which alone would have a min impact on interst power (i.e., home-grown wheat), but in their aggregate have a subst econ effect on interst commerce (20% of nat’l wheat mkt made up of home-consumption wheat) can be reg. Police Power Regulation - Darby (’41) – overrules Hammer; fed can ban goods produced by non-min-wage workers; motive for reg is irrelevant as long as activity affects com; test: means reasonably adapted to the attainment of a permitted end. Civil Rights Legislation - Heart of Atlanta (’64) – racial discrim in public accoms burdens interst commerce by impeding interst travel; rational basis test passes - Katzenbach v. McClung (’64) – rational basis test passes even w/o legislative evidence; BBQ got ½ food from interst travel; cumulative effect applied to BBQ. Lopez and Limits on Commerce Clause Lopez (’95) – Gun Free School Act struck down; does not pass substantial effects test; gun possession is not commercial & no fed findings that said it affects comm; did not ban guns moved in interst travel but all guns (statutes must be drafted to fall w/i A1 powers); slippery slope/federalism worries; dissent: passes rational basis test; no distinction b/w commercial and noncommercial (education is commercial anyway). Significance of Lopez: 1. Ct will take “subst’lly effect test” very seriously – will evaluate the magnitude on the econ effect more closely (lot more evidence required) 2. Ct’s may focus on the quality (not the magnitude) of what’s being regulated; i.e., commercial vs. non-commercial distinction 3. Ct may begin to judge what is truly nat’l and what is truly local (but how?) Summary of Modern View of Commerce Clause - 3 broad categories which Congress can reg: 1. Channels of IC – i.e., roads, waterways 2. Instrumentalities of IC – i.e., trucks 3. Substantially affecting IC – test w/ bite! a. Magnitude of impact is key; if activity is non-comm, need a strong connection; few limits for commercial activities b. Less fed deference to rational basis test c. Traditional domain of sts will be left to them unless the activity reqs a nat’l solution. d. Evidence/findings: much more for local or non-commercial activities. 10th Amendment & Commerce Clause Generally applicable fed legislation Absolutionist/Definitional Approach - Nat’l League of Cities (’76) – fed min wage/overtime reg for st and muni workers uncon; fed can’t regulate integral st functions Political Process Approach - Garcia (’85) – same reg applied to mass-transit system but upheld; unless there’s a failure in the political process, Ct should not kill a fed reg of st functions; Ct should not line-draw b/w traditional functions and non-traditional – too subjective; st sovereignty protected by inherent procedural safeguards in representative govt Balancing Approach (Blackmun) - balance the degree to which fed interests are vindicated w/ the degree to which st automony is infringed upon Plain Statement Rule - Gregory v. Ashcroft (’91) – st judges are not incl in fed age discrim statute since Congress did not explicitly mention them; if fed wants to intrude upon a st’s traditional functions, it must make it’s intent clear in the statute. Fed legislation directed at the states Financial Incentives - South Dakota v. Dole (’87) – use of spending power to condition st hiway funds based on drinking age is con; Congress has authority to impose conditions on fed funds to incentivize sts to follow nat’l guidelines (that are reasonably related to general welfare/fed purpose; not too coercive; can’t violate const). State Govts As Fed Regulators - NY v. US (’92) – Congress can’t req sts to reg an industry in a particular manner; can’t directly force the st to enact and enforce a fed reg program; Congress can reg indivs directly, but can’t directly regulate sts. - Printz (’97) – Congress can’t compel st law officials to perform certain duties (i.e., do background checks); fed can’t commandeer st officials unless reg is generally applicable or fed jud superiority being exercised over st cts. Summary of 10th Amendment & Commerce Power - fed can pass generally applicable law and if a st is reg as well as pvt entities, then no 10th A limits. - fed can’t force st govt to enact legislation or regulate in a particular way or perform even ministerial functions. - fed can ‘regulate’ thru incentives/tax & spend powers - Lopez limits not that strong; Congress still has the last say - §5 of 14th A can override federalism limits 2. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 3. - Calder v. Bull (1798) – purpose of govt is to protect natural rights (i.e., property); ct finds probate law uncon based on natural law. - Barron v. Baltimore (1833) – Bill of Rights do not apply to the sts, only fed govt; any limits on st power can only be found in st const. SDP Before 1934 (Economic/Social Regulation) - Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) – narrow reading of 14A & 13A; 14A applies only to blacks; P/I of 14A refers generally to US citizens indy of P/I of indiv sts; sts retan power to govern P/I of their own citizens; 14A interpreted based on its history. Liberty to Contract and Laissez Faire - Allegeyer v. LA (’05) – in-st insurance req uncon b/c it interferes w/ freedom to K and right to live/work; first use of SDP to strike down a st statute Lochner Era (’05 – ’37) - Lochner v. NY (’05) – st law limiting # of baker hrs worked uncon; deprives baker of his liberty; motive of st was not health/safety, despite st’s findings; law must have legit objectives and direct relationship b/w means & legit ends; redistributing econ/bargaining power is not legit end). - Muller v. Oregon (’08): 10 hr day for women statute OK; means reasonably related to legit ends – Bunting v. Oregon (’17): max hrs. law for both men & women OK (relied on extensive findings to demonstrate link b/w means & ends) - Adair v. US & Coppage v. Kansas: ban on yellow dog Ks are uncon - Adkins v. CHOP (’23) – min wage for women uncon as it violated freedom to K; wages aren’t suff’ly related to the health/protection of women - Buck v. Bell (’27) – forced sterilization of imbeciles is con and doesn’t violate sdp of law; legislature decided this was in the public interest so we must give it deference. Decline of the Lochner Era SDP - Nebbia v. NY (’34) – as long as statute is not arbitrary or capricious & means selected have rat’l relationship to ends, then OK; Lochner test but more deference to legislature - West Coast Hotel (’37) – Adkins overruled; min wage law for women con; protecting women’s health & redressing econ exploitation/inferior bargaining power are legit ends; wages have relationship to these ends - Carolene Products (’38) – min rational basis test; full deference to legislature even w/o explicit findings; as long as the facts don’t preclude rat’lity, con’ality will be presumed; means/ends test abandoned - Lee Optical (’55) – full deference to legislature; any rational basis, even if hypothesized and not the true basis, seems to be legit. SDP and Fundamental Rights - Rochin v. CA (’51) – police broke into home, pumped his stomach; laws can’t offend fund. trad’s of decency and fairness - O’Connor v. Donaldson (’75) – π committed for 15 years, never got treatment; mere intol. or animosity can’t const’lly justify deprivqtion of personal lib. - Washington v. Glucksberg (’96) – suicide not a fund. right Summary of Approach to SDP - no st econ reg has been struck down on sdp grounds since ‘37 - reg must fall in the very broad police power of st; have a minimal rational relation to ends (this is presumed); and not be arbitrary or irrational. - jury awards given less deference than legislatures; if there is a gross disproportion, ct will apply a stricter rat’l-basis test, but will presume rationality as long as procedural protections exists and there was no bias (TXO (’93)) - Carolene Products F4: Cts should give less deference to legislature, when a law: 1. facially conflicts w/ explicit con text 2. restricts political processes 3. prejudicial to discrete & insular minorities - cts will intervene where: 1. conflict w/ Const. text exclude means where types of coercion offend trad. notions of decency exclude ends where gov. uses public animosity THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE - rat’l rel. (presum of const.) where no susp. class or fund. right - cts give deference to leg. in defining obj. - EPC of does not apply to fed. gov., but since Bolling, cts have read the 5th to include eq. pro. w/ the DPC - Railway Exp. Agcy v. NY (’49) – leg. prohib. evils of ads on cars not req. to rid all ads to comport w/ EPC (1 step @ time) - USDA v. Moreno (’73) – food stamp prog. only for households (rel’d persons) uncon.; bare Cong’l desire to harm pol. unpop. group not legit gov’t interest - US RR Ret. BD v. Fritz (’80) – grandfather clause in dual ben. stat. ok; cts will not intervene where plausible reasons for Cong. act (conceivable basis std) Equal Protection and Race - Strauder v. W Va (1880) – exclusion of blacks on juries uncon. (discriminatory purpose) - Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) – city denied laund. permits to 200 Chinese & 1 white; EPC applies to non-US citizens too (discriminatory application of facially neutral law) - Plessy v. Fergie (1896) – separate but equal not viol. EPC; sep. rail carriages was legit because promote order & pub. peace; soc. equal. not goal of 14th - Korematsu (’44) – imminent danger of war, compelling need to prev. spying, & mil. matter justify internment (rigid scrutiny w/ race laws, but here urgent pub. nec’y satisfied ends) The Brown Revolution - Brown I (’54) – sep. schools for black & white uncon; separate is not equal; badge of inferiority (adduced from expert test’y) - Bolling v. Sharpe (’54) – sep. schools in DC; uncon. under 5th A. - Brown II (’55) – implement Brown w/ all deliberate speed - Loving v. VA (’67) – miscegenation law uncon; protecting racial integrity not a permissible st. obj. (freedom of marriage) - Palmore v. Sidoti (’84) – cannot remove child from custody of parent b/c of racial considerations (parental rights) Effect Theory - Guinn & Beal v. US (’15) – literacy req’ment to vote, but grandfathered white illiterates; uncon. b/c impact would deprive blacks right to vote - Hunter v. Erickson (’69) – law required maj. approval before fair housing ordinance could be amended; uncon. b/c impact minorities that needed the ord. by making more diff. to use it - Griggs v. Duke Power (’71) – emp. test barred most blacks; ct used 3-part test: 1) there were disc. consequences; 2) emp. test not related to job capabilities; 3) π’s interest strong; absence of disc. intent does not justify procedures - Lau v. Nichols (’74) – 1000 of 2800 Chinese students given supp. eng. classes; uncon. b/c unavail’ty of eng. class has disc’y effect Purpose Theory - Washington v. Davis (’76) – racially disproportionate impact of emp. test relevant, but not dispositive in finding const’ty; invidious qual. of a racially disc’y law must be traced to a racially disc’y purpose; facially neutral laws use rat. rel. test, not s/s - Evidence of intent: Arlington Heights (’77) – suburb’s refusal to grant rezoning const.; official action not uncon. solely b/c results in rac’ly disproportionate impact; need to show disc’y purpose: a. historical background b. spec. sequence of events c. departures from normal procedures d. substantive departures e. leg. history f. members burden shifts back to Δ once invidious intent shown - Mass v. Feeney (’79) – pref. to vets on civ. ser. positions const.; ask if facially gender-neutral law was passed “because of” or “in spite of” neg. impact; “because” invalid, “spite of” valid - Voting schemes: Rogers v. Lodge (’82) – at large elections dilute black votes; facially neutral, but if operated as purposeful device to further rac’l disc., then uncon.; use clearly erroneous std to determine if invidiously motivated - Hunter v. Underwood (’85) – moral turpitude crimes barring right to vote uncon.; where racial motivation or racially disc’y impact is shown, use Arlington standard - Stats to prove intent: McClesky v. Kemp (’87) – capital sentencing proc. rac’ly administered; showing of disc. on an aggregate basis insuff.; must prove no conviction but for race Summary of Modern Approach - in abs. of explicit classification (which is s/s), EPC requires: a. invidious intent b. it can be inferred c. it is a matter of fact – clearly erron. std d. Δ must prove that would have made same dec. absent intent – but for test Benign Classifications and Gerrymandering - 2 facts for rac’l gerrymandering: 1) rep. done on geographical basis; 2) certain political outcomes - Gomillion v. Lightfoot (’60) – square dist. transformed into 28sided dist. uncon; appearances matter; redist. would remove all but 4 black voters from city, depriving them of municipal vote - Mobile v. Bolden (’80) – at large voting dist. const’l although no blacks ever elected; must show more than all white result - Rogers v. Lodge (’82) – see supra - Shaw v. Reno (’93) – reapportionment plan resulted in hook shaped dist. w/ black maj. uncon.; facially irrational distr. scheme to segregate voters by race uses s/s.; viol. colorblindness, and reinforces perception that persons from same race think and vote alike, regardless of other factors - Miller v. Johnson (’95) – bizarrely shaped dist. is evid. that race was predominant motivating factor - Bush v. Vera (’96) – s/s applies w/ showing that race was predominant factor in districting Affirmative Action - Regents of U.C. v. Bakke (’78) – 16 of 100 slots to UC reserved for min. apps; to justify use of suspect class. must show: 1) substantial & const’ly permissible purpose; 2) nec. to accomplish purpose; b/c UC could not show Bakke would not have gotten in but for program, ct orders his acceptance; still allowed UC to take race into account in admissions; (Powell – s/s for any racial class.: compelling interest and necessary to accomplish; diversity of stud. body is compelling int.; also, aff. action only where particularized injury shown) - Fullilove v. Klutznick (’80) – 10% fed. funds set aside for min. businesses const.; deference to Congress, b/c Cong. doesn’t need to be colorblind - Richmond v. Croson (’89) – city plan to set aside 30% to MBE uncon.; no direct evid. Richmond had discr’d, & 30% was much greater than 10% & not the fed. gov’t involved (Fullilove); racebased gov. action must be nec. to achieve compelling interest, presump. of uncon.; only gov’t obj. that passes is redressing clear past discr. - Metro Broadcasting v. FCC (’90) – minority pref. policies of FCC const.; ct applied intermediate scrutiny, means chosen by FCC subst. rel. to important gov. interests—reducing 98% white ownership in industry; i/s appropriate when whites disc. against - Adarand v. Pena (’95) – add’l comp. for gen. contractors who hired min. businesses, remanded; all gov’t racial class. subject to s/s (overruled Metro’s i/s, and Croson’s city gov. action distinction); s/s is not strict in theory & fatal in fact—narrowly tailored to address lingering effects of racial disc. justifies race based methods Summary of Affirmative Action and Race Quantum Theory of Equal Protection - Bottom level: EP=similar treatment to similar circumstances a. rational relation to legit. state end b. almost everything meets rat. rel - Highest level: racial classifications are inherently suspect a. s/s (compelling st. int., nec. to accomplish) b. comp. int.=1) imminent invasion in time of war; 2) remediating racial disc.; 3) all other means avail. fail c. almost everything fails s/s - Middle Level: Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun a. important gov’t int., substantially related means b. remediating societal disc. is important interest c. Metro meets this standard - Justice Stevens: impartiality standard a. gen. notion of impart’y to protect EP b. judge indiv. as indiv. GENDER DISCRIMINATION - can analogize race & gender: 1) both immutable; 2) class. often unrelated to leg. pub. purposes; 3) visible diff.; 4) hist. of exclusion from power; 5) hist. of stigmatization - Bradwell v. Ill (1872) – license to pract. law refused to married woman; ct held P/I does not cover women as citizens to engage in any occupation; ct used stereotypical and archaic assumptions - Reed v. Reed (’71) – unarticulated heightened scrutiny; sex cannot be sole classifcation - Frontiero v. Richardson (’73) – male service-members had auto. dependency allowance for wives, females had to prove husband’s dependency; ct viewed gender as susp. class. w/ s/s - Craig v. Boren (’76) – prohibition sale of alc. to under 21 males, and under 18 females; ct used i/s instead of Fronteiro’s s/s—class. by gender must serve imp. gov’t obj. and be substantially rel. to achievement; archaic and overbroad generalizations fail - Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan (’82) – male denied admission into women’s coll.; ct’s new i/s w/ exceedingly persuasive justification; Univ. failed to show imp. obj. - US v. Virginia (’96) – female denied admission to VMI; ct reiterated exceedingly persuasive justification std and found no imp. obj.; Scalia dissent: VMI’s adversarial sys. is legit; should use only i/s Real Differences - Geduldig v. Aiello (’74) – preg. not included in disability; ct held that abs. showing that preg. used to discr. against one sex, legis. free to include or exclude preg. on reasonable basis, just like any other physical disability; because deemed facially neutral, rat’l test used - Michael M. (’81) – males and not females punished in stat. rape found const’l.; ct used i/s; leg. may not make overbroad generalizations based on sex; under EPC, diff. things can be treated diff’ly—sexes not similarly situated in certain circumst. - Rostker v. Goldberg (’81) – selective service is const’l.; men & women diff’ly situated b/c of combat retrictions; gov’t has imp. gov. int. in raising an army Summary of Modern Approach - ’81-’97: ct began w/ rat. rel. (Reed), then moves to i/s - since ’97, ct moved to exceedingly persuasive justification (US v. Virginia) - cannot base sex disc. on overbroad & archaic generalizations - ct is drawn to idea of similar treatment - once classified as neutral, rational relation is appropriate test - where sexes diff’ly situated, sex based distinctions ok OTHER LEVELS OF EQUAL PROTECTION Wealth and Education - San Antonio Ind, Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez (’73) – use of local tax base results in rich & poor schools; no susp. class., no s/s; education not a fund. right, no s/s; Alien Status - Plylar v. Doe (’82) – stat. denied free educ. to illegal aliens uncon.; aliens not susp. class, but more than ration’y needed: children not vol. aliens, educ. important, penalize children for parents’ crime; preservation of st. $ not a subst. st. interest Mental Retardation - City of Cleburne v. CLC (’85) – zoning ord. req. retards to get special permit for grp home uncon; use rat’l basis test Homosexuality - Romer v. Evans (’96) – st. provision protecting homosexuals repealed in amend.; uncon. b/c st. can’t classify grp of ind.’s to make them uneq. to everyone else; use rat’l relation Fundamental Interests - fund. right=independently & explicitly guar. by Const. or important & implicitly granted by Const. - fund. interests=not Const’ly nec.; positive rights; though imp., cts won’t intervene if st. decided to deprive them all - category of fund. int. allows flexibility in SC; by looking at the benefit or burden placed on a class, cts can gauge level of scrutiny to correspond to importance of benefit or burden (instead of simply looking at whether there is classification) Right to Have Offspring - Skinner v. OK (’42) – sterilization of habitual criminals uncon; fund. right gets s/s Right to Vote - Harper v. W. VA (’66) – annual poll tax uncon; right to vote is fund. so s/s - Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. (’69) – vote in sch. dist. election only if own property in dist. or parent of child in school; uncon. under s/s b/c exclusion of franchise to non-prop. bachelors was not narrowly tailored Welfare Benefits - Dandridge v. Williams (’70) – AFDC prog. had max. grant limit regardless of family size or std of need was ok; ct used rat’l test Access to Courts - Griffin v. Ill (’56) – st. must provide indigent crim. w/ trial transcript; ability to pay bears no rat’l rel. to guilt or innocence; st. not req’d to provide app. review, but can’t exclude based on prop. once it does - Douglas v. CA (’63) – st. must appoint counsel for indigent crim. on his first appeal; uncon’l line drawn b/t rich & poor - Boddie v. CT (’71) – st. can’t deny access to cts for divorce b/c inability to pay; due process denied b/c cts the only means of resolving conflict—dissolving marriage - M.L.B.v. S.L.J. (’96) – paying in advance fees for appeal on termination of parental rights uncon; fund. right at issue Summary of Fundamental Interests - ct. unwilling to extend heightened scrutiny outside access to courts, voting, and reprod. rights - welfare/housing/educ.=rat’l basis - ct. severely limited fund. int. doctrine to limited classifications STATE ACTION - modern cts: state action is prerequisite to assertion of rights under Amend’s 1-8 and 14; sts are the primary guarantors of rights, and fed. gov’t may protect rights only when st. fails Early Interpretation of State Action - Civil Rights Cases (1883) – CRA of 1875 provided equal prot. to enjoyment of public places; ct. held that 14 th A applied only to state action; Cong. could not reg. private conduct under 14th The Rise of State Action - Shelley v. Kraemer (’48) – property covenant restricting purchase by blacks & Mongols; black purchased, lower ct. enjoined; ct’s action ruled uncon. b/c actions of state cts are state actions w/in meaning of 14th - broad reading=anytime person’s decision to discr. enforced or left undisturbed by st’s legal system, then state action exists; ends private/public distinction - narrow reading=state action where a ct is asked to affirmatively use its power to enforce discr’y law Symbiotic Relationship - Burton v. Wilm. Parking Auth. (’61) – restaurant refused to serve black man; parking garage owned by st; ct held st action was present b/c restaurant essential to operation of the garage Nexus Relationship(Created, Coerced, or Encouraged) - Moose Lodge v. Irvis (’72) – private club w/ st liquor license refused to serve blacks; ct held granting license not st action; gov’t was not significantly involved w/ invidious disc. Public Functions Test - Jackson v. Metro. Edison (’74) – elec. serv. terminated w/out notice/hearing; ct held that mere fact that business was subj. to st regulation does not=state action; no suff’ly close nexus - Flagg Bros. v. Brooks (’78) – warehouseman sold goods entrusted to him; ct held that his sale of bailed goods under UCC not a public function; public functions analysis will only apply w/ functions trad’lly w/in exclusive control of gov’t Decline of State Action: The Modern Retreat - ‘30s-‘60s: ct expanded reach of action under Const.; contracted after ‘60s - st normally can be held responsible for priv. decision only when exercised coercive power or has significant encouragement (overt or covert) such that choice is deemed that of the state - Rendell-Baker v. Kohn (‘82) – priv. sch. using publ. funds discharged certain employees; not st action b/c similar to corporations w/ contracts w/ the gov’t - Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Sec. Sch. Ath. Assn. (2001) – interscholastic athletic assn enforced rule against member sch.; ct held there was state action because of significant “entwinement;” 84% of members of assn are public schools; board members allowed to use retirement prog.for st employees; dissent: “entwinement” is departure from precedent; st action should only be where there was symbiotic rel’shp, nexus, or public function CONG’L POWER UNDER THE RECONSTRUCTION AMEND’S - 1930s-1960s”: fed. gov’t legally paralyzed; limited commerce clause, so no reaching into priv. sector; politically, couldn’t use 13-15 A’s b/c “Solid South” entrenchment The 13th Amendment - Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. (’68) Congress’ Power to Modify Constitutional Rights - 15th A – SC v. Katzenbach (’66) – - 14th A – Katzenbach v. Morgan (’66) – - §2 of 15th A – Oregon v. Mitchell (’70) – - expansion of the 15th A – City of Rome v. US (’80) – - substantive changes – City of Boerne v. Flores (’97) – Return to Substantive Due Process Early Non-Economic Cases - education – Meyer v. Nebraska (’23) – - child rearing – Pierce v. Society of Sisters (’25) – Sexuality - Bowers v. Hardwick (’86) – Reproductive Autonomy - Griswold v. CT (’65) – - Eisenstadt v. Baird (’72) – - Roe v. Wade (’73) – - Doe v. Bolton (’73) – - Planned Parenthood v. Casey (’92) –