Mason & Stephenson: Chapter X
Criminal Justice
MAPP V. OHIO (1961) (419)
367 U.S. 643
FACTS: (see text)
QUESTION: Is the appellant deprived of “due process of law” under the 14th amendment and
the 4th amendment’s protections against “unreasonable searches and seizures” when
evidence illegally searched for and seized by state law enforcement officers is not
excluded from his criminal trial?
ANSWER: Yes!
REASONING: Clark delivers the O.C. for the 6-3 majority:
The case deals with a unique feature of American Fourth Amendment interpretation—
“the exclusionary rule.” The Mapp case extends the exclusionary rule, which was
established in federal criminal cases in Weeks v. U.S. (1914), to state criminal
proceedings as well. In doing so, the Court overturns its earlier decision in Wolf v.
Colorado (1949), which had said that the 4th A. protections applied to the states under the
14th A., but the “exclusionary rule” remedy was not required of the states.
Clark’s explains the shift. [READ 1:419-420 & 2:420]
The case is the embodiment of “selective incorporation” in that whatever BoR protections are
incorporated to the states under 14th A. D.P have the same rules for the states as apply in
federal courts.
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Exclusionary Rule: Evidence taken in violation of the 4th A. must be excluded from the Court
and all other proceedings.
Why are coerced confessions universally excluded, and evidence taken in an
unreasonable search not? Coerced confessions are untrustworthy, unreasonably
seized evidence is just as trustworthy as reasonably seized evidence. Other
nations accept all trustworthy evidence. A criminal should not go free because
the constable has blundered, according to most systems. But how do you enforce
the 4th A. without an exclusionary rule? The USSC has searched and found no
other practical way.
OLMSTEAD V. U.S. (1928) (419)
277 U.S. 438
FACTS: (see text)
QUESTION: Is the appellant deprived of “due process of law” under the 14th amendment and
the 4th amendment’s protections against “unreasonable searches” when evidence illegally
searched for and seized by federal law enforcement officers by means of wire taps
secured w/o a warrant and in violation of state law is not excluded from trial?
ANSWER: No!
REASONING: CJ Taft delivers the O.C. for the 5-4 majority:
[In this case we are dealing with a new type of search, which the framers could not
possibly have foreseen—wiretapping.]
The Court said that the 14th Am. Did not apply to wiretapping because wiretapping was
neither a search nor a seizure, both of which deal with tangible objects [READ
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2:430, col. 1, 1st para. and also READ 1:430, col. 1, 2nd para. (first 2 sentences
& last 2 sentences)].
The majority ruled that a warrant was not needed for a wiretap if it is made without
entering the home. If the home had been entered, then it would have constituted
an unlawful search.
Brandeis dissents daying that this is not the way to interpret the Constitution. You must
look past the mere words to the purpose of the Constitution. The framers were
only familiar with the search and seizure of tangible objects, but they wanted to
protect against all invasions of the individual’s home and surroundings [READ 4:
431, col. 1, 1st complete paragraph].
[In Holmes dissent (not in M&S), he says that he’s unsure whether wiretapping violated
the 4th Am., but the conviction should be thrown out because a state statute had
been violated by the federal agents. He also says a violation of state law should
always involve the exclusion of the evidence obtained through the violation.]
[Olmstead was not directly overruled until 1967 in Katz. After Olmstead Congress passed
a law which the Court construed as outlawing wiretapping. The Court did not
need to overrule Olmstead until electronic eavesdropping that didn’t interfere with
telephone wires was developed, since this was not covered by the 1934 statute.]
KATZ V. U.S. (1967) (432)
367 U.S. 643
FACTS: (see text)
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QUESTION: Is the appellant deprived of “due process of law” under the 14th amendment and
the 4th amendment’s protections against “unreasonable searches and seizures” when
evidence illegally searched for and seized by federal law enforcement officers using an
electronic listening device is not excluded from his criminal trial?
ANSWER: Yes!
REASONING: J. Stewart delivers the O.C. for the 7-1 majority:
In this case the Court overruled Olmstead, adopting Brandeis’s dissent in that case. The
Court expands the perimeter of the 4th Am. Beyond the home. The Fourth
Amendment is expanded to cover areas where an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy at a location where he also has a legal right to be. [READ
1:432, col. 1, 1st para.] & also [READ 2:432, col. 2, first complete para.].
Stewart concludes that searches conducted without a warrant (without judicial process)
are unreasonable per se and the evidence must be excluded from criminal
prosecutions unless they fit into one of the very few well-delineated exceptions to
the rule [READ 3:433, 2nd col, lines 6-18 & the final para.].
Black’s dissent: The Court is stretching the words of the Constitution too far into areas
the framers could not have imagined [READ 1:434, 2nd col., 1st para.] & also
[READ 2:435, both cols.]
UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT (1972) (696)
407 U.S. 297.
Facts: During a pretrial hearing the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan ordered
the government to disclose to the defendant, all information gathered as a result of
electronic surveillance (conducted without a warrant) of his conversations with others.
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The government applied to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for a
writ of mandamus ordering the District Court to vacate the disclosure order. The Court of
Appeals denied the government request and once again, the court limited the exercise of
the president's inherent powers with regard to domestic affairs. The government's cert.
petition was granted by the USSC.
Question: Is there an inherent power in the President to authorize domestic electronic
surveillance without securing prior judicial approval in the form of a search warrant?
Answer: NO!
Reasoning: Justice Powell delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court (8-0):
The Court notes that this is not a completely new practice. [READ 697:1]
What is the basis of the challenge? The Fourth Amendment [See p. 713]
The Court rules that the executive branch had violated the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure when it conducted
electronic domestic security surveillance, without congressional authority
or a judicially issued search warrant! [READ 699*]
Later Congress passed an act requiring that the executive branch obtain a search
warrant when it needed such information in the future.
Right to Counsel:
POWELL V. ALABAMA (1932) (450)
367 U.S. 643
FACTS: (see text)
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QUESTION: Is an accused deprived of “due process of law” under the 14th amendment and the
6th amendment’s promise of “Assistance of Counsel for his defence” “in all criminal
prosecutions” when denied effective assistance of counsel during critical periods of time
before and during a criminal trial for capital offenses in a hostile environment?
ANSWER: Yes!
REASONING: J. Sutherland delivers the O.C. for the 7-2 majority:
He summarizes the trial court’s manner of providing “counsel” [READ 1:450-451].
He then outlines the problem presented [READ 2:451], and moves to the Court’s
conclusion [READ 3:451-452]. Butler dissents (joined by McReynolds).
In Betts v. Brady, Betts (1942) was convicted of robbery in a bench trial after the trial judge had
denied his request for court appointed counsel paid by the state (due to his indigence).
Betts petitioned the Supreme Court claiming a denial of his constitutional right to
“assistance of counsel for his defence.” Justice Roberts rejected Betts’ argument and
affirmed the conviction in a 6-3 OC. Justice Black dissented in this case and began his
long battle promoting total incorporation of rights of the accused on 14th Am. grounds.
GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT (1963) (452)
372 U.S. 335
FACTS: (see text)
QUESTION: Is the appellant deprived of “due process of law” under the 14th amendment and
the 6th amendment’s promise of “Assistance of Counsel for his defence” “in all criminal
prosecutions” when as an indigent defendant, he is denied a court appointed counsel (paid
for by the state) in a trial for any felony?
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ANSWER: Yes!
REASONING: J. Black delivers the O.C. for a unanimous Court:
Black reminds us of Betts [READ 1:452], and spends much of the opinion recounting
details of his dissent in that case. In applying “the correct tests” to Gideon’s case
the Court overrules Betts and reverses Gideon’s conviction in striking Black’s
language [READ: 2:453]. After 20 years, Black gets his vindication on Betts..
Harlan’s concurrence denies that this is a reflection of total incorporation’s victory and
also denies that it requires state paid for counsel for indigents in all felony trials.
Douglas and Clark both challenge Harlan’s contention in separate concurrences.
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