SURROGATE ACTORS AND FORCES IN INTERNAL WARFARE. 1
In December 2007 US, British and Afghan National Army (ANA) troops fought a week-long
battle to recapture the town of Musa Qala from the Taliban. The initiative from this operation
came from the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, who claimed to have been in contact with a
local Taliban commander. ‘Mullah Salaam’ promised to desert to the government side along
with a substantial force of tribal fighters, so Karzai decided that a Coalition/ANA offensive
was required to support him. However, by the time US and British troops went into combat
on 7th December, Salaam’s anti-Taliban rising had failed to materialise, and the mullah even
refused the assistance of a small militia that the Afghan President had raised on his behalf.
The debacle surrounding Mullah Salaam’s abortive defection shows how governments
fighting insurgencies – whether on their own soil or in a colonial or intervention scenario –
continually attempt to recruit indigenous support and ‘turn’ erstwhile adversaries. It also
demonstrates that these efforts can go awry.2
One perennial feature of military history is the ability of states waging wars of
territorial or imperial aggrandisement to recruit conquered peoples to fight in their armies, as
demonstrated by the Indian Army of the British Raj.3 Colonialism is an anathema in Western
societies today, but in the context of US-led intervention missions in Afghanistan (2001
onwards) and Iraq (2003-2011) the importance of raising or re-establishing effective local
security forces has been of paramount importance for the occupiers; indeed, one of the
contributory factors to the outbreak of insurgent violence in post-Baathist Iraq was the
decision by the US occupation authorities to disband the army in May 2003.4 Both American
and British military doctrine on counter-insurgency (COIN) and ‘stabilisation’ stresses the
vital importance of training and equipping indigenous armies and constabularies so as to
enable interventionist forces to progressively disengage from COIN operations and to
eventually withdraw.5 The UK’s occupation of Southern Iraq (2003-2009) – and the
contentious circumstances behind the British Army’s withdrawal from Basra and handover to
the Iraqi Army (2007-2009) – shows that this process is often a convoluted and difficult one
to manage.6
Yet the establishment of regular security forces by an interventionist state or coalition
can be undermined by the weakness of the host nation government (which is often dependent
on foreign aid, and which can be afflicted by corruption, factionalism and other debilitating
problems) and its security forces. In Afghanistan, the national police (ANP) are prone to drug
abuse, predatory behaviour against the civil population, and also collaboration with the
Taliban. The ANA is reported to have a better reputation, although in its operations in the
Pashtun South it is hampered by its dominance by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, and is
therefore as ‘foreign’ to the local populace as any NATO contingent.7 Some analysts have
therefore argued that the best means of combating the Taliban is to rely on traditional tribal
security structures, in particular the community defence forces (arbakai) that traditionally
kept the peace in Pashtun areas under the Afghan monarchy.8 Following the apparent success
of the ‘Al Anbar Awakening’ and the creation of the ‘Concerned Local Citizens’ self-defence
groups in Iraq, US military officials clearly hope that a similar approach can be employed to
stabilise Afghanistan.9
Yet for critics of Western interventionism (notably the US academics within the
‘Network of Concerned Anthropologists’), the enlistment of indigenous forces in COIN –
whether regular or auxiliary – is at best a pretext for legitimising military operations against
weaker states and their citizenry, and at worst a means of promoting vicious internecine
conflicts.10 With reference to the Iraq war, there is also a tendency amongst opponents of
Operation Iraqi Freedom to treat any indigenous collaboration with the American and British
forces as ‘collaboration’, with all the hostile connotations associated with this phrase.11 Even
1
in less contentious operations, the decision to arm local auxiliaries can be criticised on ethical
grounds. In contrast with the Iraq war, the British military intervention in Sierra Leone in
2000 received widespread international and indigenous support. However, human rights
campaigners were perturbed by the fact that the British were arming pro-government
formations which included child soldiers.12
The aim of this chapter is to examine the employment of surrogates in COIN and
other internal conflicts. They are defined here as third parties (either individual actors or
paramilitary units) that are not formally part of the government side’s security forces, but are
nonetheless assisting them either directly in combat operations, or indirectly (most notably
through the provision of intelligence).13 While surrogates have been employed by
governments waging their own campaigns against domestic terrorism and insurgency, this
chapter focuses on cases where external powers are supporting a third-party against
indigenous armed opposition, or where states are involved in COIN or counter-terrorism
within their own borders. While most of these examples discussed in this chapter involve
Western countries, some are taken from semi-authoritarian states (such as Russia and Turkey)
and also the racial oligarchies of apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia, as they demonstrate
potential problems involved in employing surrogate forces. Surrogates have been employed
by the government side in ‘imperial policing’ and wars of decolonisation during the 19th and
20th centuries, Cold War interventions (such as the USA in Vietnam from the early 1960s to
1973, or the Soviets in Afghanistan from 1978 to 1989), and the current campaigns associated
with the post-9/11 ‘war on terror’ or ‘long war’. The author defines the roles that surrogates
perform in such conflicts, and discusses both their utility for the governments and security
forces that employ them, but also the potentially negative political, strategic and ethical
implications associated with their use.
Definitions:
For the purposes of this chapter, terrorism is defined as the use of lethal violence by an armed
irregular group which is intended to intimidate its target(s) (a government, a collection of
states, or a particular national or ethnic community) into acceding to its political demands.
Terrorism can be employed as part of a wider tactic of insurgency, namely a paramilitary and
subversive campaign waged by one or more irregular armed factions to overthrow a state’s
government, to effect territorial secession from a state, or even (in the case of Hamas and
other Palestinian rejectionist groups against Israel) to destroy a state. Insurgencies can also be
fought to liberate a nascent state from colonial rule, in response to the seizure of power by a
radical or revolutionary regime (such as revolt against the Afghan Communists following
their coup d’etat in April 1978), or to expel a foreign military occupation.14
In a variety of campaigns imperial powers, superpowers, emerging states,
democracies, dictatorships and weak states have all employed surrogates to augment their
military and police forces in COIN and counter-terrorism.15 Surrogates have featured in a
variety of non-conventional conflicts waged by Britain, France, Portugal, Germany, the USA,
the USSR (against the Central Asian Basmachi guerrillas in the 1920s,16 as well as the Afghan
mujahidin seventy years later) and Russia (during the Second Chechen war from 1999
onwards),17 Israel, the self-declared state of Rhodesia (1965-1980), Turkey (in its response to
the PKK insurgency), South Africa and Spain. These scenarios range from comparatively
low-intensity counter-terrorist operations (such as in Northern Ireland, the Basque province,
and the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) to major civil wars. In all
these cases, the surrogates can be subdivided into actors – individuals who offer specific
services to police, military and intelligence services – and forces – armed groups acting as
auxiliaries, rather than enlisting in indigenous security forces (although these formations may
wear uniforms or other similar insignia). They can be further sub-categorised as follows.
2
Actors include interpreters, trackers, informants and agents. Forces incorporate home guards,
militias, counter-gangs and pseudo-gangs.18
The conceptual challenge of COIN and counter-terrorism:
COIN theory stresses that in essence there are two approaches by which a state (and its
external supporters, if it has any) contend with any armed indigenous opposition. The enemycentric response treats insurgents and terrorists as foes that should be destroyed militarily.
Such adversaries are often indistinguishable from the civilian population, and as a
consequence the government side and its security forces (indigenous or foreign) adopt
overwhelmingly coercive and draconian tactics which incorporate curfews, population
control, extensive ‘cordon and search’ missions, the internment and detention of suspected
terrorists and insurgents, and punitive measures such as the destruction of property. At their
most extreme, an enemy-centric strategy can lead to systematic human rights abuses,
massacres, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide. The most egregious examples include Nazi
Germany’s Bandenkrieg against partisans in occupied Europe during the Second World
War;19 the Soviets in Afghanistan;20 Baathist Iraq’s onslaught against the Kurds in the late
1980s (Operation al-Anfal);21 and the mass eviction of Kosovar Albanians by the Serbian
security forces in March-April 1999.22 Yet even democracies have succumbed to the
temptation to wage enemy-centric campaigns against insurgents and terrorists. Notable
examples include France and the Algerian war of independence (1954-1962);23 Britain in
Kenya (1952-1957),24 and the early phases of both the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960)25
and the ‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland (1969-1998);26 and the USA in the first years of the
occupation of Iraq.27
In contrast, the population-centric response stipulates that the ‘population is the
prize’. Theorists and practitioners expounding this approach stress that the priority of the
security forces is the protection of the civil populace. Armed forces should (1) be
subordinated to civilian authority, (2) act in accordance with the legal framework, and (3) also
employ ‘minimum force’, exercising the utmost discretion possible to ensure that military
actions do not cause unnecessary civilian casualties or destruction of the local infrastructure.
The population-centric approach also stipulates that military and police operations support
socio-economic and political reforms aimed at alleviating popular grievances which
insurgents and terrorists use to rally support for their cause.28 Such theories also incorporate
efforts to seek a compromise with those that David Kilcullen terms ‘accidental guerrillas’. In
Afghanistan and Iraq these include indigenous fighters who are not necessarily motivated by
Islamist extremism or fanatical support of Osama bin Laden’s goals, but by more parochial
concerns (such as resentment over disenfranchisement, poverty or corruption) and indignation
over the presence of ‘infidel’ troops in their country. The COIN effort should therefore
incorporate measures to persuade ‘accidental guerrillas’ to change sides, and to reconcile
themselves with the new political order that Western forces are attempting to establish.29
While this proposition sounds naïve, historical experience demonstrates that Western
militaries and their indigenous allies from Oman in the 1970s to al-Anbar thirty years later
have been able to successfully ‘turn’ the bulk of their fighters and persuading them to align
with the government of the host nation.30
‘Turning’ insurgents and ‘hearts and minds’ operations do have their limitations – the
latter are futile if the government side lacks the military and police forces needed to protect
the civilian population from insurgent violence, while even if some insurgents can be
persuaded to defect the ‘true believers’ will invariably fight to the bitter end.31 Yet
overwhelming power in the absence of indigenous support is not necessarily a guarantor of
success, particularly for a liberal democracy. Kilcullen points out that in Cyprus (1955-1959)
the British Army and colonial security forces outnumbered EOKA insurgents by 110:1, far
exceeding the usual force ration (10:1 against the insurgent) deemed necessary for victory in
3
COIN. Yet the British still lost, because the majority of Greek Cypriots supported EOKA.32
Indigenous support, in particular from surrogates, is therefore important for the following
reasons:
Intelligence – a general rule of COIN is that the side which dominates in human
intelligence (HUMINT) terms has an overwhelming advantage over its adversary. The British
theorist and practitioner General Frank Kitson noted that for any government pitted against
terrorist or insurgent groups ‘the problem of defeating the enemy consists very largely of
finding him’. The challenge for the government side is to identify the personnel, organisation
and aims of the adversary; to understand the political and cultural characteristics of the
indigenous society (particularly important for any external military personnel involved in
COIN); and – most importantly – ensuring that insurgents and terrorists are not able to
penetrate your own security forces. One problem evident in both colonial-era cases and also
current operations is the ability of insurgents to infiltrate indigenous militaries and
constabularies, and to recruit spies within their ranks.33
Force numbers – COIN and counter-terrorism is often labour intensive. In Northern
Ireland from the mid-1970s onwards the Provisional IRA (PIRA) consisted of a mere 300-400
active members, but it required around 10,000 British troops and a further 15,000 local
security force personnel (in both the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Ulster
Defence Regiment, or UDR) to suppress PIRA as well as other Republican and Loyalist
groups. In cases where insurgents possess more substantial numbers it is often necessary to
recruit auxiliary forces to perform low-level tasks (such as neighbourhood patrols and checkpoint duties) that enable better-trained troops and police to conduct more offensive
operations.34
A political solution – if the government side can persuade substantial numbers of its
foes to change sides, this can foster the prospects of reconciliation, particularly if the former
fulfils is promises regarding offers of an amnesty, or of socio-economic reform and
employment of defectors. In the Philippines during the 1950s the Defence Minister Ramon
Magsaysay and his US military advisors rewarded Hukbalahap guerrillas who voluntarily
surrendered by giving them land to farm. In Oman after June 1970, Sultan Qaboos bin Said
gained considerable popular goodwill by pledging to spend oil revenues hitherto hoarded by
his father on social development programmes. His offer of an amnesty also split the insurgent
movement (PFLOAG) in Dhofar, which was already divided between tribal traditionalists and
hard-line Marxist-Leninists.35
Surrogate actors:
Given the paucity of Arab, Dari and Pashtun linguists amongst Western forces, interpreters
proved to be of crucial importance for Coalition troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq,
particularly in terms of basic interaction with local civilians. Trackers have traditionally been
employed as guides in rough terrain, notably the Sarawak Rangers enlisted by the British
during the Malayan Emergency. Even in an age where the counter-insurgent has GPS,
satellite reconnaissance and unmanned aerial vehicles to aid him, indigenous expertise can
still prove essential. When a patrol of British soldiers was captured by the ‘West Side Boys’
in Sierra Leone in August 2000, kamajor hunters helped locate the hostages and their
captives, thereby facilitating the rescue mission mounted by the British on 10th September
2000.36
For any insurgent or terrorist group, informants (civilians prepared to provide tip-offs
to the police or army about forthcoming attacks, or the locations of weapons caches or safehouses) and agents (security force spies within an insurgent/terrorist group) represent a mortal
threat, which explains why these individuals are subjected to savage violence if they are
4
compromised. PIRA’s internal security cell (dubbed ‘the nutting squad’) was notorious for
torturing and murdering with any of its ‘volunteers’ – as well as civilians – suspected of
providing intelligence to the British Army, the RUC Special Branch, or MI5.37
Surrogate forces:
Home guard formations are usually recruited from the local adult male population for the
static defence of villages, hamlets, or urban neighbourhoods. The British recruited ‘town
guards’ in the Cape Colony during the Boer War of 1899-1902,38 and also raised similar
formations in Malaya and in Kenya (the Kikuyu Home Guard, or KHG).39 The French
established civil defence groups in Indochina during the war against the Viet Minh (19461954).40 In South Vietnam during the early 1960s the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem raised a SelfDefence Corps, which the Americans equipped.41 Its successor, the Popular Force, was
augmented by the Combined Action Program (CAP) run by the US Marine Corps (USMC)
between 1965-1971, which involved mixed platoons of marines and Vietnamese villagers.
The effectiveness of such groups is variable. CAP platoons were particularly efficient – the
USMC in Vietnam committed a mere 4% of its manpower to these formations, which
inflicted around 30% of the Viet Cong’s losses during the war.42 In contrast, many home
guard formations have historically been poorly-armed, inadequately trained, and vulnerable to
insurgent attacks. Furthermore – as both the Boer ‘town guards’ and the KHG demonstrated –
recruits were often forced by the authorities to join these formations.
Militias are larger, mobile, and more autonomous formations which are often raised
independently. In the case of the Montagnards (the aboriginal tribes of the Vietnamese
Central Highlands recruited by US special forces during the early 1960s), they can be
recruited on tribal and ethnic lines.43 They can also consist of former insurgent groups which
defect en masse. During World War II the Serbian Chetniks and the Albanian Balli Kombetar
aligned with the Axis occupation forces in Yugoslavia and Albania in order to destroy the
Communist partisans led by Marshal Tito and Enver Hoxha respectively.44 In the latter phases
of the Angolan war of independence (1961-1975) UNITA sided with the Portuguese military
against its rival, the MPLA.45 Further examples of militias include two Vietnamese
syncretistic religious sects – the Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo – and the Binh Xuyen organised crime
syndicate (enlisted by the French to fight the Viet Minh during the late 1940s),46 the Afghan
militias employed by the USA during the early phases of Operation Enduring Freedom
(2001-2002),47 the pro-Moscow auxiliaries raised by the Russian authorities during the second
Chechen War (1999 onwards),48 and of course the al-Anbar Awakening in Iraq.
A counter-gang involves a small, lightly-armed group – at platoon-strength or less in
conventional military terms – which either consists of loyalist indigenous personnel or former
insurgents who have been turned. They operate in a manner similar to the plain-clothes
formations maintained by some armies (including the British Special Reconnaissance
Regiment, the US ‘Intelligence Support Activity’, and the Israeli Defence Force’s MistaAravim).49 Their roles involve reconnaissance, the tracking down of insurgent cells, and
surgical strikes intended to kill or capture enemy personnel. Examples include the Philippines
Constabulary raised by the US Army during its COIN campaign against Filipino rebels in the
early 20th century,50 the Special Night Squads (mixed British-Jewish commandos) recruited
during the Arab insurgency in Palestine (1936-1939),51 the ‘Q Patrols’ of loyalists and exEOKA fighters employed by the British during the Cyprus insurgency, the ‘counter-gangs’
raised by Frank Kitson and other British Army and Special Branch officers in Kenya (in
which former Mau Mau were inducted to track down their comrades),52 and the Provincial
Reconnaissance Units (many of whom were ex-Viet Cong) established by US special forces
and the CIA in the latter phase of the Vietnam war (1968-1972). More recently the Turkish
gendarmerie (Jandarma) ran a clandestine intelligence cell (JITEM), which turned captured
PKK guerrillas and used them to assassinate their former comrades.53
5
The terms ‘counter’ and ‘pseudo-gang’ are often used interchangeably, partly due to
the fact that Kitson employed both terms in his memoir of his service in Kenya.54 In practice,
counter-gangs (such as ex-Mau Mau in Kenya, and the Q Patrols in Cyprus) did pose as
insurgents for a temporary period, but these tactical acts of deception can be distinguished
from those of a pseudo-gang, defined as a state-sponsored formation which either poses as
part of an insurgent or terrorist group over a prolonged period of time, or which presents itself
as a supposedly independent ‘third-force’ formation.55 Examples include the fake mujahidin
groups run by the KGB and its Afghan counterpart (KHAD) during the 1980s,56 the Selous
Scouts in Rhodesia,57 the Vlakplaas squad run covertly by the South African police during the
1980s and early 1990s,58 and the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL) established by
the Spanish authorities to assassinate suspected ETA (Euzkadi to Askatasuna) terrorists and
activists within Herri Batasuna (ETA’s political wing) between 1983 and 1996.59
Some surrogates defy easy categorisation. During their African wars (1961-1974) the
Portuguese raised formations – notably the the Trupos Especiais (1,200 former insurgents
used in the Angolan enclave of Cabinda), the ex-guerrilla Grupos Especiais who fought in
Angola and Mozambique, and the flechas recruited by the Portuguese security police (PIDE)
from the Bushmen of Eastern Angola – which had the characteristics of both militias and
counter-gangs.60 The same was evident with the firqat forces in Dhofar (1970-1975), which
performed home guard duties, and also provided HUMINT for the Omani government and its
British military advisors; a tip-off from two firqat fighters led to the unravelling of a
PFLOAG network in Northern Oman by security forces in December 1972-January 1973.61
Pseudo-gangs can also evolve into death squads which can also – as the example of the Shia
factions in Iraq in 2006-2007 demonstrates – be beyond the control of the government.62
Scholars examining the employment of surrogates also face reticence and secrecy on
both sides of any COIN or counter-terrorist conflict. State intelligence agencies are loath to
discuss historical activities which may have a contemporary resonance, and not surprisingly
the identities of informants and agents are rarely disclosed. In cases where the state employs
illegal means (notably pseudo-gangs), officials will deliberately conceal any links between
the government and its surrogates in order to disguise the former’s complicity in the latter’s
actions. It is only thanks to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa’s case
and the investigation undertaken by the Spanish judiciary during the late 1990s that the
activities of Vlakplaas and GAL respectively are public knowledge.63
Insurgents, terrorists and their sympathisers may also allege that security forces are
committing atrocities as part of a ‘false-flag’ strategy; after an attack on a village in SouthEastern Turkey in October 2007 in which 12 loyalist Kurds were killed, the PKK implied that
the Turkish army had conducted the attack.64 In Rhodesia and Afghanistan the Selous Scouts
and the KHAD pseudo-gangs did pose as guerrillas in staging attacks which could either be
blamed by the populace on the insurgency, or to incite internecine violence within
(respectively) the Zimbabwean chimurenga and the Afghan mujahidin. Yet scholars should
be aware that claims of ‘false-flag’ activity can be made in order to exculpate insurgents and
terrorists from responsibility for attacks which kill and maim civilians.65 Conversely,
insurgent leaders may be unwilling to acknowledge that their ‘own’ people can align with an
‘infidel’, ‘imperialist’ or ‘puppet’ state. The EOKA leader Colonel George Grivas claimed
that the Q patrols consisted of Turkish ‘gangsters’; he could not admit even retrospectively
that even a handful of Greek Cypriots were prepared to collaborate with the British
authorities.66
6
Strengths:
Surrogates enhance the local knowledge of counter-insurgent forces and their awareness of
the cultural nuances of the society they operate in. This can be particularly important even in
domestic conflicts, where the local community can be as unfamiliar to police and military
units as that of a foreign country, as was the case with the British Army amongst Northern
Irish Catholics and Protestants. Even in cases where there are profound ethnic, religious or
racial differences between the counter-insurgent and its adversaries (not to mention the
indigenous population), the former have in repeated campaigns still managed to recruit
informants and agents to serve their HUMINT requirements. This was as true of the British
Army’s Force Research Unit (FRU) in Northern Ireland as it was of the Americans in
Vietnam, and indeed the Israeli security service (Shin Bet) with reference to the Palestinians
today (one of the more notable Shin Bet agents being Mosab Hassan Yousef, the son of
Hamas’ co-founder Sheikh Hassan Yousef).67 The effect of both types of actors on
conspiratorial organisations is often debilitating. The mere suspicion of treachery can be
enough to encourage a group’s leaders to authorise a paralysing ‘mole-hunt’, and to weaken
the morale of its members.68
Surrogate forces can also interact more effectively with indigenous communities –
and can be more successful in gaining the latter’s trust and support – than regular military or
constabulary personnel. In Dhofar during the early 1970s the irregular firqat fighters were
more effective at policing and security the jebeli nomads than troops from the Sultan’s Armed
Forces (SAF).69 Likewise, Afghan arbakai are nominated by their own tribes and accountable
to them, which means that they tend to have a less predatory relationship with their
communities than the ANP.70
Counter-gang formations have a clear appeal to security forces, as they offer a precise
means of locating and neutralising small guerrilla groups, and a more discriminate means of
killing and capturing irregular adversaries than conventional combat tactics. While British
Army sweeps through the Aberdare district of Kenya during 1953 failed to locate Mau Mau,
the counter-gangs raised by Kitson and other colonial officers subsequently proved to be more
lethal to the insurgency. A good example of the precision which formations of ‘turned’ and
loyalist personnel can offer is that of the Philippines Scouts, consisting mainly of Macabebe
tribesmen. The Scouts’ effectiveness can be gauged by their role in capturing the leader of the
nationalist insurgency, Emilio Aguinaldo, in March 1901.71
If circumstances are favourable, surrogate forces can also have strategic utility,
widening fractures within an insurgency and also providing a means of conflict termination.
COIN practitioners stress that turning insurgents is not only more economical than killing
them, but that every adversary who defects or surrenders voluntarily represents a net gain for
the government side, and a proportionate loss for the insurgency.72 Amnesties and pledges of
reconciliation provide a practical demonstration of the willingness of the authorities to rectify
grievances and to reincorporate former foes into civil society. This does naturally depend on
the former showing the same degree of enlightened self-interest demonstrated by Magsaysay
against the Hukbalahap and Qaboos against the PFLOAG. They also provide a potential ‘exit
strategy’ for any external participants in a COIN campaign. With reference to the Al-Anbar
Awakening and the rallying of thousands of ex-Sunni Arab insurgents to the government’s
side in 2006-2007, an implicit bargain was struck between the US military and the more
nationalistic leaders of the muqawamah (‘resistance’). The eventual withdrawal of American
troops was dependent upon an end to Shia-Sunni sectarian violence, the suppression of alQaeda in Iraq and affiliated groups, and reconciliation between the muqawamah and Nuri alMaliki’s government. The ‘awakening’ was therefore a precondition for the end of the
American occupation of Iraq, scheduled for late 2011. In Afghanistan Karzai is clearly
attempting to negotiate with his adversaries (notably Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb i-Islami),
7
although in this case US officials are concerned that offers of peace talks are premature, and
will be interpreted by Afghan insurgents as a sign of weakness.73
The firqat forces in Oman epitomise the potential benefits of raising surrogate forces.
The Dhofari tribal fighters did have their limitations. As the British General commanding the
SAF noted in April 1974, ‘[you] cannot order a firqat to do anything. You encourage, discuss
and cajole and it needs endless patience and really good Arabic’. SAS personnel involved in
raising and training the firqats therefore had to be diplomatic in dealing with their somewhat
truculent indigenous allies.74 A further problem was that regular SAF soldiers (including the
British loan service officers) often did not trust the firqats; many of the latter were exinsurgents, and their loyalty was still considered suspect.75 Their autonomous nature also
meant that they were not suitable for conventional combat operations, of the type which the
SAF and the Imperial Iranian task force were waging against the PFLOAG in Western Dhofar
in 1974-1975. Firqat forces were therefore employed according to their characteristics and
capabilities, being used as a rear-echelon security force to support civil development projects
while regular SAF and Iranian troops swept the PFLOAG out of Dhofar across the South
Yemeni border.76 The Sultan’s offer of an amnesty certainly weakened the PFLOAG;
between 1970 and 1974 797 Dhofari guerrillas voluntarily surrendered, many of whom joined
the firqat forces.77 Yet Qaboos and his British advisors were careful to ensure that the firqats
did not turn their guns against the SAF. Firqat forces were not issued with heavy weapons,
and although they were retained as a territorial defence force after the war’s end they were
outnumbered and outgunned by the Sultan’s regular military forces (the latter exceeding the
former by 21,500 to 5,000 in 1985).78 The Dhofari irregulars were therefore left in no position
to threaten the Omani state in the aftermath of the PFLOAG’s defeat.
Problems:
COIN and counter-terrorism case studies all have their unique characteristics, and it is clear
that methods that worked for the government side in one campaign were not necessarily
successfully applied elsewhere. For example, while Israeli intelligence services have
infiltrated Palestinian militant groups in the occupied territories, Mossad, Shin Bet and IDF
military intelligence lost the HUMINT battle against Hezbollah during the occupation of
Southern Lebanon (1982-2000), failing to recruit informants and agents in any significant
number.79 Even when surrogate actors and forces have been recruited, their employment can
pose both immediate and long-term problems for the government side, and these weaknesses
(which are often interconnected) are as follows.
The first concerns reliability. Turned insurgents and terrorists can opt to change sides
again, although the prospect of being executed as a traitor by former comrades can act as a
deterrent. The ‘Fred’ (PIRA informant) who betrayed British Army undercover operations to
Gerry Adams in October 1972 was motivated by a combination of remorse and a naïve belief
that he would be forgiven for his initial betrayal. In other cases, the enlistment of surrogates
can be exploited by insurgents as part of a ‘sting’. In Algeria in 1956, the French believed that
they had raised an effective indigenous COIN unit in the Kabyle mountains known as ‘Force
K’. In fact, Force K was heavily infiltrated by the FLN and subsequently defected, after
killing several loyalist Algerians.80 The risks of falling into an adversary’s counterintelligence trap were demonstrated with the suicide bombing in Khost, Afghanistan, on 31 st
December 2009. The bomber was a Jordanian member of al-Qaeda who the CIA assumed was
their agent; instead he ended up killing 7 CIA operatives and one Jordanian intelligence
officer.81
Informers and agents may not necessarily be double-agents in order to inflict harm in
a COIN or counter-terrorism scenario. In Afghanistan, US and NATO forces have been
tricked into launching air-strikes against local civilians because of malicious tip-offs
8
motivated by tribal rivalries or other internecine squabbles. Internal conflicts provide an
opportunity for the individuals involved to settle personal scores either through delation (false
denunciations to the security forces) or by other means (for example, pro-government
militiamen in a number of conflicts have been known to inflict revenge on civilians with
whom they have a personal grudge). The government and its security forces face the clear risk
that they can be exploited by surrogates to inflict retribution against non-combatants
unconnected with insurgent or terrorist violence.82
One problem with employing auxiliaries is the risk of dependency, as governments
that sponsor them may neglect to strengthen regular military and constabulary forces. For
example, both the Soviet military and the regime of Mohamed Najibullah became reliant on
militia formations in the latter phases of the war against the mujahidin (from 1986 onwards).
In the process, the Kabul government’s own security forces atrophied. While militias such as
the Uzbek Jowzjani were efficient fighters, their effectiveness depended upon Najibullah’s
ability to pay them. Once the money ran out in late 1991, these auxiliaries deserted and joined
the mujahidin, precipitating the fall of the Communist government in April 1992. 83 A similar
problem was evident in the first year of Enduring Freedom, when US forces were reliant
upon anti-Taliban militias. Not only were such formations unaccountable to the Karzai
government (which the Americans were ostensibly committed to support), but when it came
to the encirclement of al-Qaeda’s remnants at Tora Bora in December 2001 Afghan
militiamen accepted bribes to let bin Laden and many of his followers through, thereby
confirming the adage that ‘you cannot buy an Afghan, you may only rent him’.84
The Russian Federation’s second war in Chechnya (1999 onwards) illustrates the
problems of factionalism, particularly because in order to fight separatist and radical Islamist
guerrillas Moscow subcontracted military operations to Chechen loyalists, including exnationalist rebels from the first war (1994-1996). The Russian authorities’ use of surrogates
has minimised Federal military and security force casualties, and has also enabled Moscow to
declare in April 2009 that Chechnya has been successfully ‘pacified’ under its President,
Ramzan Kadyrov. Such an approach has encouraged internecine violence between Kadyrov
and his rivals (notably the Yamadayev family) and their respective paramilitary formations. In
March 2009 Sulim Yamadayev – the exiled commander of the Vostok battalion – was
assassinated in Dubai, presumably on Kadyrov’s orders. The likelihood that feuds between
ostensibly pro-Russian Chechen leaders over power and the division of spoils may actually
destabilise Chechnya should not be discounted.85
There is also the risk (evident in Chechen feuds) that surrogate forces may become
involved in organised crime. In Basra from 2003-2007 the British military authorities
recruited substantial numbers of Shia militiamen – from the Badr Corps, Fodila and the
Mahdi Army – into the police, facilitating in the process the take-over of Iraq’s second city by
local mafias.86 With reference to Turkey’s war against Kurdish separatism, JITEM officers
are suspected of involvement in arms and drugs trafficking.87 In this case, the use of
surrogates may well have corrupted state institutions entrusted with responsibility for law and
order.
The use of surrogates can also exacerbate ethnic, tribal and social tensions,
contributing to future instability. One clear risk with the Al Anbar Awakening and the
rallying of ex-Sunni Arab insurgents is that the eventual result may either involve sectarian
violence between Sunni militia groups and the security forces of the Shia-dominated Iraqi
government, or ethnic warfare with the Kurds, notably over the disputed city of Mosul. In
Angola thirty-five years earlier the Portuguese authorities discovered that co-opting UNITA
to fight the MPLA had dire consequences for their efforts to form a national unity government
in 1975. The MPLA’s bitterness over UNITA’s collaboration with the Portuguese army
precluded efforts to establish a stable post-colonial order, contributing to decades of civil
war.88
9
There are also ethical consequences of employing surrogates which need to be
recognised, particularly as far as the norms of liberal democratic states are concerned. As was
demonstrated in Northern Ireland, the recruitment of agents within Republican and Loyalist
terrorist groups by the FRU, MI5 and the RUC was highly controversial, particularly as the
agents concerned continued to conduct terrorist acts while in the employ of the British state.
In COIN or counter-terrorism, agents need to remain active for the sake of self-preservation,
and in order to be of continued utility to their handlers. The moral and legal dilemmas
involved are evident.89
A secondary issue concerns the prospect that the authorities may incite war a
l’outrance between ‘turncoats’ and ‘true believers’. In Kenya during the 1950s, the British
colonial authorities deliberately provoked a civil war within the Kikuyu tribe, using the KHG
as a deniable means of both eliminating suspected Mau Mau sympathisers, and also of
intimidating undecided Kikuyu into obedience. Even in cases where the government side does
not have a ‘divide-and-rule’ approach, the demands of self-preservation often lead surrogates
to take extreme measures. During the Malayan Emergency, ex-insurgents who surrendered to
the British had a clear interest in eliminating their former comrades at the earliest opportunity,
in order to protect their relatives from retribution by ‘Traitor Killing Squads’.90
In cases where external powers are involved in COIN conflicts – whether in a
colonial or interventionist context – the stakes for foreign military and security force
personnel are comparatively limited. For example, the British Army has faced a series of
setbacks and defeats from Palestine to Basra, but with the exception of those killed or injured
in active service the soldiers involved in these campaigns did not really suffer the
consequences of failure – the losing side simply packed their kit and went home. But for local
loyalists, defeat can mean either exile or extermination for themselves and their families, as
demonstrated by the plight of the Algerian harkis after 1962. Governments that place
surrogates at risk have a moral duty to protect them, although the British government’s
shabby treatment of Iraqi interpreters seeking asylum in the UK demonstrates that such an
obligation can be neglected for expediency’s sake.91
The use of pseudo-gangs – as defined above – not only represents moral bankruptcy
on the part of governments that exploit them, but also strategic myopia. ‘False-flag’ attacks,
assassinations and other assorted dirty tricks undermine the legitimacy of the state which
employs them, and also yield few results beyond the tactical satisfaction of killing
adversaries. The mythology surrounding the supposed effectiveness of the Selous Scouts as a
counter-guerrilla force overlooks the fact that the Rhodesian authorities lost the chimurenga.
Likewise Vlakplaas and other mysterious ‘third force’ formations in South Africa may have
fuelled a bloody civil war between the ANC and Inkatha in the early 1990s, but the thousands
of deaths which ensued did not prevent the end of apartheid and democratisation.92 The GAL
scandal in Spain in the late 1990s provided ETA and its sympathisers with the opportunity to
proclaim that the Spanish state had not changed since General Francisco Franco’s death.93
KGB/KHAD pseudo-gang operations in Afghanistan during the 1980s did little to strengthen
the Kabul government’s cause, but what they arguably did achieve was the exacerbation of
the feuds within the mujahidin which led to a ruinous civil war from April 1992 onwards,
with all the ensuing consequences with which we are familiar.94
Conclusion:
Surrogate actors and forces have been employed by states both in enemy-centric and
population-centric campaigns against terrorists and insurgents. At face value, they offer utility
insofar as they enhance the awareness of government security forces both of the social and
cultural characteristics of indigenous societies, and in gathering HUMINT on an irregular
10
adversary. They can potentially be employed as a politically and socially-acceptable means of
policing communities, and of fostering conflict resolution and reconciliation between the
government side and some of its adversaries, with Dhofar in the 1970s representing the prime
example. They can also offer any external actors involved in COIN or counter-terrorism with
a means of ensuring that strategic goals are met, without the potentially destabilising
implications which can occur with the employment of a substantial number of foreign troops.
Furthermore – as is evident with American hopes over the Al Anbar Awakening and related
developments – it can potentially offer a means of disengagement from a politically
contentious, economically costly and militarily debilitating campaign which would otherwise
involve the prolonged deployment of one’s armed forces in a protracted COIN campaign.
Surrogates therefore have their utility, and with the exception of pseudo-gangs their
employment can be contemplated by democratic governments. The latter do, however, need
to consider whether the use of surrogates can undermine strategic objectives by contributing
to social tensions, by empowering organised criminal groups, or by exacerbating either the
fragmentation of governmental authority or the promotion of internecine violence.
The use of surrogates should not be considered as a panacea, as enlisting local
support does not guarantee success for governments fighting insurgents and terrorists. As one
British diplomat noted in November 1967, the UK’s efforts to establish the Federation of
South Arabia founded because of strategic incoherence on the British side, and the feebleness
of its indigenous allies. Once the Labour government announced in February 1966 its
intention to withdraw from South Arabia, the local population (including security forces
personnel) ceased to co-operate with the British and sought to accommodate itself with their
enemies.95 These observations remain pertinent as far as Afghanistan and other COIN
campaigns are concerned; governments and armed forces that enlist surrogates risk equipping
potential enemies who will turn against them if their defeat appears likely.
Endnotes:
The topics covered in this chapter are examined in more detail in Geraint Hughes & Christian Tripodi, ‘Anatomy
of a surrogate: historical precedents and implications for contemporary counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism’,
Small Wars & Insurgencies 20/1 (2009), pp.1-35. The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in
this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the JSCSC, the Defence Academy,
the Ministry of Defence (MOD) or any other UK government agency.
2 Stephen Grey, Operation Snake Bite (London: Penguin Books 2010), pp.55-60, pp.73-74, pp.174-177. Salaam
subsequently became governor of Musa Qala after its recapture. Jerome Starkey, ‘Former warlord blames UK for
breakdown in security’, The Independent 9th June 2008.
3 Hughes & Tripodi, ‘Anatomy of a surrogate’, p.6.
4 Ibrahim al-Marashi & Sammy Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces: An Analytical History (Abingdon: Routledge 2008),
pp.201-205. Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in Iraq (London: C. Hurst 2006), pp.92-99.
5 JDP3-40, Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution (London: MOD 2009), Section 5. FM3/24,
Counterinsurgency (Washington DC: Department of the Army 2006); this has also been published by the
University of Chicago Press in 2007.
6 James K. Wither, ‘Basra’s not Belfast: The British Army, ‘Small Wars’, and Iraq’, Small Wars & Insurgencies
20/3 (2009), pp.611-635.
7 Brian Brady, ‘Drugs and desertion: how the UK really rates Afghan police’, Independent on Sunday, 28th March
2010. ‘Get out of the way’, The Economist, 13th February 2010.
1
11
Seth G. Jones, ‘Community Defense in Afghanistan’, Joint Forces Quarterly 57/2 (2010), pp.9-15. Stephen Grey
noted in March 2010 that ‘it is far from clear that either the police or the [ANA] are up to the job, or even the right
force, to restore order amongst these unruly [Pashtun] tribes’. ‘Capturing Taliban leaders: covert Afghan war’, C4
News, online at http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/politics/international_politics/capturing+talib...
9 Mohamed Osman Tariq, Tribal Security System in Southeast Afghanistan (Crisis States Research Centre, London
School of Economics and Political Science: Occasional Paper No.7 2008). Joshua Foust, ‘Tribe and prejudice:
America’s ‘new hope’ in Afghanistan’, The National, 11th February 2010, online at
http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100211/REVIEW/702119988/1008.
10 The NCA expresses the concern that US COIN tactics in Afghanistan could incite Taliban attacks on villagers
(http://sites.google.com/site/concernedanthropologists/faq). Its website does not explain its membership’s attitude
towards internecine violence in Afghanistan prior to October 2001.
11 When the plight of Iraqi interpreters who had assisted the British Army in Basra became a political issue in the
summer of 2007, one British journalist spitefully asserted that they deserved to be left to their fate. Neil Clark,
‘Keep these quislings out’, The Guardian/Comment Is Free, 10th August 2007, online at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/aug/10/keepthesequislingsout. Julian Assange, the editor-in-chief
of Wikileaks, is also quoted as stating that if Afghan civilians who provide intelligence for NATO forces ‘get
killed [by the Taliban], they’ve got it coming to them. They deserve it’. David Leigh & Luke Harding, Wikileaks:
Inside Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy (London: Guardian Books 2011), p.111.
12 Alex Duval Smith, ‘British guns handed out to the boy soldiers of Freetown’, The Independent, 25th May 2000.
13 Hughes & Tripodi, ‘Anatomy of a surrogate’, pp.2-4.
14 These definitions are compiled from Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (NY: Columbia University Press 2006,
2nd Edition), pp.1-41; FM3/24, 1-1/1-29; AFM1/10, Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational
Guidelines) Revised Edition (London: MOD 2007), A-2-1, B-3-1; Charles Townsend, Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press (OUP) 2002), pp.114-39; & Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State
Response (London: Frank Cass 2003), p.1.
15 The Ethiopians have raised home guards to fight the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF); ‘The Ogaden’s
trickling sands’, Africa Confidential, 48/19, 21st September 2007, pp.6-8. Michael Horton, ‘Causing affront:
Ethiopian insurgent group strengthens position’, Jane’s Intelligence Review 22/4 (2010), p.12. During the 1990s
the Ugandan government recruited Acholi militias to fight the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA); Anthony Vinci,
Armed Groups and the Balance of Power. The international relations of terrorists, warlords and insurgents
(Routledge 2009), p.91. A particularly notorious example involves the ethnic Arab janjawid in the West Sudanese
province of Darfur. Jean-Philippe Remy, ‘Darfour: Les Arabes dans le piège janjawid’ (‘The Arabs in the janjawid
trap’), Le Monde, 13th July 2007.
16 Alex Marshall, ‘Turkfront: Frunze and the development of Soviet counter-insurgency in Central Asia’, in Tom
Everett-Heath (ed.), Central Asia: Aspects of Transition (London: Curzon Press 2003), p.17.
17 Adrian Blomfield. ‘In the front line of Putin’s secret war’, The Daily Telegraph, 27th March 2007. ‘The warlord
and the spook’, The Economist, 31st May 2007.
18 Hughes & Tripodi, ‘Anatomy of a surrogate’, pp.4-5.
19 Philip W. Blood, Hitler’s Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe (Dulles VA: Potomac
Books 2007).
20 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2002), pp.37-56, pp.154-159.
21 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002, 2 nd Edition), pp.243-248.
22 Tim Judah, Kosovo. War and Revenge (New Haven CT: Yale University Press 2000) pp.239-254.
23 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace. Algeria 1954-1962 (Basingstoke: Macmillan 2002).
24 David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged. The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicholson 2005).
25 Huw Bennett, ‘‘A very salutary effect’: The Counter-Terror Strategy in the Early Malayan Emergency, June
1948 to December 1949’, Journal of Strategic Studies 32/3 (2009), pp.415-444.
26 Rod Thornton, ‘Getting it Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes made in the Early Stages of the British Army’s
Deployment in Northern Ireland (August 1969 to March 1972)’, Journal of Strategic Studies 30/1 (2007), pp.73107.
27 Thomas Ricks, Fiasco. The American Military Adventure in Iraq (London: Allen Lane 2006), pp.232-239,
pp.278-280, p.315.
28 David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Pall Mall Press 1964), pp.7-8,
pp.87-135. Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber and Faber 1977); & Low Intensity Operations (Faber &
Faber 1991, 2nd Edition). Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (London: Chatto & Windus 1972).
29 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla. Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (C. Hurst 2009),
pp.1-38.
30 Geraint Hughes, ‘A ‘Model Campaign’ Reappraised: The Counter-Insurgency War in Dhofar, Oman, 19651975’, Journal of Strategic Studies 32/2 (2009), pp.271-305. Austin Long, ‘The Anbar Awakening’, Survival 50/2
(2008), pp.67-94.
31 Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs (Routledge: Adelphi Paper No.379, 2006), p.84.
John McCuen, The Art of Counter-revolutionary War (Faber & Faber 1966), p.56. An obvious example here is the
continued – if intermittent – attacks by hard-line Republicans opposed to the Northern Ireland peace process.
‘Shadow of the past’, The Economist, 12th March 2009.
8
12
Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla, p.181. Panagiotis Dimitrakis, ‘British Intelligence and the Cyprus Insurgency,
1955-1959’, International Journal of Intelligence & Counterintelligence 21/2 (2008), pp.375-394.
33 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, pp.95-96. During the Palestinian revolt in 1936-1939, British officials realised
that Arab and Jewish constables in the police could not be counted upon to act against militants within their own
community, and were often in league with them. Memorandum from G. D. G. Hayman (War Office) to F. G. Lee
(Colonial Office), 14th February 1939, WO106/5720(National Archives of the United Kingdom, hereafter cited as
NAUK). In Northern Ireland, the presence of Loyalist sympathisers within the RUC was noted as far back as the
early 1970s. Lt Colonel D. Ramsbotham, Visit by CGS to Northern Ireland, 28th September 1973,
DEFE13/990(NAUK).
34 Kitson, Bunch of Five, pp.294-295. Colonel Richard Iron (British Army), ‘Britain’s Longest War. Northern
Ireland 1967-2007’, in Daniel Marston & Carter Malkasian (ed.), Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (London:
Osprey 2007), pp.167-184. The commitment of British troops peaked at 28,000 in 1972 and then decreased,
oscillating around the 10,000 mark until the conclusion of the Good Friday Accords in 1998. Although committed
purely to internal security duties, the UDR was part of the British Army, and was therefore not a surrogate force. It
was formally disbanded in 1991, and its soldiers incorporated into the Home Service Battalions of the Royal Irish
Regiment.
35 Anthony James Joes, ‘Counterinsurgency in the Philippines 1898-1954’, in Marston & Malkasian,
Counterinsurgency, p.51. Hughes, ‘Dhofar’, pp.281-282.
36 Edgar O’Ballance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-1960 (Faber and Faber 1966), p.133. Damian
Lewis, Operation Certain Death (London: Random House 2005), pp.402-403. A Sierra Leonean soldier was taken
hostage as well.
37 These definitions differ from British Army terminology, which classes an agent as a member of the security
forces ‘authorised or instructed to obtain or to assist in obtaining information for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes’, and an informant as ‘any individual who gives information’, while an informer is ‘normally
connected with criminal activities, can be directed and receives payment for his services’. Martin Dillon, The Dirty
War (London: Arrow Books 1990), p.309. Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2008), p.177. Matthew Teague, ‘Double Blind’, The Atlantic Monthly, April 2006.
38 Charles Townshend, Britain’s Civil Wars. Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century (Faber & Faber 1986),
p.179.
39 Karl Hack, ‘Extracting Counterinsurgency lessons: The Malayan Emergency and Afghanistan’, Autumn 2009,
online at the RUSI web-page, http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4B14E068758F1/. David Anderson,
‘Surrogates of the State. Collaboration and Atrocity in Kenya’s Mau Mau War’, in George Kassimeris (ed.), The
Barbarisation of Warfare (Hurst & Co. 2006), pp.159-174.
40 Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy (NY: Schocken Press 1972), p.180, p.184.
41
David Kaiser, American Tragedy (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 2000), p.152. Neil Sheehan, A
Bright Shining Lie (London: Pan Books 1990), pp.183-184, p.308.
42 Mark Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey. Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam (Lincoln NE:
University of Nebraska Press 2007), pp.159-160. Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion. The History and
Politics of Counterinsurgency (Lexington KY: The University Press of Kentucky 2006), pp.114-116.
43 Christopher Ives, US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam (Routledge 2007).
44 Roderick Bailey, The Wildest Province. SOE in the Land of the Eagle (London: Vintage 2009), pp.87-89,
pp.285-315. Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern Approaches (London: Jonathan Cape 1950), pp.335-337. Telegram from
SOE mission to General Mihajlovic to Foreign Office (no date, sent in March 1943), HS5/929(NAUK).
45 Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions. Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill NC: University
of North Carolina Press 2002), pp.239-241.
46 Jacques Dalloz, The War in Indochina, 1945-54 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1990), pp.109-111.
47 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: How the war against Islamic extremism is being lost in Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Central Asia (Penguin 2009), pp.97-98, pp.125-144.
48 Mark Franchetti, ‘Going in hard with the guerrilla hunters of Chechnya’, The Sunday Times, 15th May 2005.
Anna Politkovskaya, ‘Karatel’nii Sgovor’ (‘A Punitive Agreement’), Novaya Gazeta, 28th September 2006.
49 ‘Special forces regiment created’, 5th April 2005, online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4412907.stm. Jeffrey
Richelson, ‘“Truth Conquers All Chains”: The US Army’s Intelligence Support Activity, 1981-1989’,
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 12/2 (1999), pp.168-200. Rotem Giladi, ‘Out of
Context: ‘Undercover’ Operations and IHL [International Humanitarian Law] Advocacy in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories’, Journal of Conflict & Security Law 14/3 (2010), pp.393-349.
50 John J. Tierney Jr, Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History (Washington DC: Potomac
Books 2007), pp.128-129.
51 Simon Anglim, ‘Orde Wingate and the Special Night Squads: A Feasible Policy for Counter-terrorism?’,
Contemporary Security Policy 28/1 (2007), pp.28-41.
52 Dimitrakos, ‘Cyprus Insurgency’, p.388. Frank Kitson, Gangs and Counter-Gangs (London: Barrie and Rockliff
1960).
53 Moyar, Phoenix, pp.108-110, pp.166-169. Bill Park, ‘Turkey’s Deep State: Ergenekon and the Threat to
Democratisation in the Republic’, RUSI Journal 153/5 (2008), pp.54-59.
54 Kitson, Gangs and Counter-Gangs, passim. Kitson was describing the tactics he employed, rather than defining
terminology that successive academics could agree on.
32
13
Hughes & Tripodi, ‘Anatomy of a surrogate’, p.5. Colonel Paul Melshen (USMC) uses different terminology in
Pseudo Operations: The Use by British and American Forces of Deception in Counter-Insurgencies (Cambridge:
PhD thesis, 1995).
56 Vasili Mitrokhin, The KGB in Afghanistan (Washington DC: Cold War International History Project Working
Paper No.40, 2002), p.140.
57 The former Commanding Officer of the Selous Scouts, Ron Reid-Daly, provides an apologia in Pamwe Chete.
The Legend of the Selous Scouts (Blairgowrie, RSA: Covos Day Books 2000).
58 James Sanders, Apartheid’s Friends. The Rise and Fall of South Africa’s Secret Service (London: John Murray
2006), pp.198-219. Kevin O’Brien, ‘The Use of Assassination as a Tool of State Policy: South Africa’s CounterRevolutionary Warfare Strategy 1979-92, Part II’, Terrorism & Political Violence 13/2 (2001), pp.113-122.
59 Paddy Woodworth, Dirty War, Clean Hands. ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy (Cork: Cork University
Press 2001)
60 John P. Cann, Counterinsurgency in Africa. The Portuguese Way of War, 1961-1974 (Westport CT: Greenwood
Press 1997), pp.96-102.
61 Colonel Hugh Oldman (Defence Secretary to Sultan Qaboos) to Brigadier John Graham (Commander, Sultan’s
Armed Forces – CSAF), 9th January 1972, Graham Papers, GB165/0327 (Box 2, File 1), Middle East Centre
Archive (MECA), St Antony’s College, Oxford. Major-General Tim Creasey (CSAF) to Qaboos, 4th January 1973,
DEF11/759(NAUK).
62 Andrew Hubbard, ‘Plague and Paradox: Militias in Iraq’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 18/3 (2007), pp.345362.
63 Kevin O’Brien, ‘Special Forces for Counter-Revolutionary Warfare. The South African Case’, Small Wars &
Insurgencies, 12/2 (2001), pp.79-80. Woodworth, Dirty War, passim.
64 Patrick Cockburn, ‘Turkey reluctantly prepares for attack on Kurds’, The Independent on Sunday, 28th October
2007.
65 A statement attributed to Mullah Omar, dated 25 th November 2009, implies that suicide bombings against
Afghan civilians have actually been committed by NATO forces to discredit the ‘mujahidin’
(http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefa_mullahomar1109.pdf). After three suicide bombings in
October 2009 in Peshawar – which killed nearly 200 people – the Tehrik-Taliban Pakistan claimed that the attacks
were carried out by Pakistani military intelligence and US contractors from Blackwater (or Xe Services, as they
are now known). Jack Barclay, ‘Collateral Damage. Propaganda defends Muslim casualties’, Jane’s Intelligence
Review 22/5 (2010), pp.21-22.
66 General George Grivas, Guerrilla Warfare and EOKA’s Struggle (London: Longman 1964), p.42. Richard
Aldrich, The Hidden Hand. Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (John Murray 2002), pp.574-578.
67 James Hider, ‘Son of Hamas founder spied for Israel to stop bombers’, The Times, 25th February 2010. For the
factors behind their recruitment, see Hughes & Tripodi, ‘Anatomy of a surrogate’, pp.7-8.
68 Freedman, Transformation of Strategic Affairs, pp.90-91. Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (Penguin
2002), pp.332-336, pp.458-459.
69 Ken Connor, Ghost Force. The Secret History of the SAS (Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1998), pp.156-157.
Memorandum by P. Westmacott (Middle Eastern Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 29 th January
1973, FCO8/2022(NAUK).
70 Susan Schmeidl & Masood Karokhail, ‘The Role of Non-State Actors in ‘Community-Based Policing’ – An
Exploration of the Arbakai (Tribal Police) in South-Eastern Afghanistan’, Contemporary Security Policy 30/2
(2009), pp.318-342.
71 Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, pp.257-269, pp.284-290. Tierney, Chasing Ghosts, pp.137-139. Robert M.
Cassidy, ‘The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency’, Parameters 36/2 (Summer 2006)
pp.47-62.
72 Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla, pp.180-181. One SAS officer who served in Dhofar noted in his memoirs that
‘[persuading] a man to join you is far cheaper than killing him. Words are far less expensive than bullets, let alone
shells and bombs. Then, too, by killing him you deprive the enemy of one soldier. If he is persuaded to join the
Government forces the enemy again becomes one less, but the Government forces become one more, a gain of
plus two’. Major-General Tony Jeapes (British Army), SAS Secret War (London: Greenhill Books 2005), p.39.
73 Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla, pp.176-185. ‘When Barack met Hamid’, The Economist, 3rd April 2010.
74 D-OPS/5, Record of the Final Meeting with the Iranian Forces Delegation Held at the Headquarters Dhofar
Brigade, 16th April 1974, Annex B, DEFE11/655(NAUK).
75 LM/MO2/210/76, Notes on Visit to Oman by Col GS MO2 20-24 January 1974, Col. W. J. Reed (British Army),
30th January 1974, DEFE24/573(NAUK). P-OPS/4, Record of CSAF’s Audience of His Majesty the Sultan on 5th
November 1974, 7th November 1974, DEFE11/658(NAUK).
76 DO9, CSAF’s Assessment of the Military Situation in Dhofar as at 14 February 1972, 17th February 1972,
GB165/0327 (Box 2, File 1), MECA. D-OPS/5, Record of the Meeting held at Headquarters the Sultan’s Armed
Forces on Saturday 13th April 1974, 14th April 1974, & Supporting Annexes, DEFE11/655(NAUK).
77 Minute by H. Blanks (MOD), 3rd June 1974, DEFE11/737(NAUK). On the latter phases of the war see Hughes,
‘Dhofar’, pp.284-289.
78 A-OPS/4, CSAF to Brigadier J. Akehurst (CO, Dhofar Brigade, SAF), Guidelines, 21st August 1974,
DEFE11/656(NAUK). M. E. Yapp, The Near East Since the First World War (Longman 1996), p.375.
79 Ronen Bergman, The Secret War with Iran (Oxford: Oneworld Publications 2008), pp.76-89.
55
14
80
Peter Taylor, Brits (London: Bloomsbury 2002), pp.133-137. Moloney, IRA, pp.118-125. Horne, Savage War,
pp.255-257.
81
‘Afghan
CIA
suicide
bomber
‘fooled
family’’,
5th
January
2010,
online
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8442371.stm.
82 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p.106. Kalyvas, Civil War, passim.
83 Alex Marshall, ‘Managing Withdrawal: Afghanistan as the Forgotten Example in Attempting Conflict
Resolution and State-Building’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 18/1 (2007), pp.68-89. Antonio Giustozzi, Empires
of Mud. Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan (C. Hurst 2009), pp.53-56.
84 Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Auxiliary Force or National Army? Afghanistan’s ‘ANA’ and the Counter-Insurgency
effort, 2002-2006’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 18/1 (2007) pp.45-67. Hilary Synnott, Transforming Pakistan:
Ways out of Instability (Adelphi Paper No.406, 2009), p.116.
85 Mark Franchetti, ‘Rival on run after standoff with Chechen president’, The Sunday Times, 27th April 2008.
‘UAE jails two over slain Chechen’, 12th April 2010, online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/europe/
8615054.stm.
86 Michael Knights & Ed Williams, The Calm before the Storm. The British Experience in Southern Iraq
(Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus Paper No.66, 2007).
87 Gareth Jenkins, ‘Susurluk and the Legacy of Turkey’s Dirty War’, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor
6/9, 1st May 2008. Andrew McGregor, ‘Turkey’s Gendarmerie: Reforming a Frontline Unit in the War on
Terrorism’, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, 6/22, 25th November 2008.
88 Martin Chulov, ‘Iraq disbands Sunni militia that helped defeat insurgents’, The Guardian, 2nd April 2009. ‘Too
late to keep the peace?’The Economist, 12th February 2010. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, pp.253-254.
89 Two FRU veterans – Rob Lewis and ‘Martin Ingram’ – offer conflicting accounts of military intelligence
activity. Lewis insists that the FRU’s actions saved lives in the long-term, while Ingram believes that its operations
were unethical. See Rob Lewis, Fishers of Men (London: Hodder & Stoughton 1999); & Martin Ingram & Greg
Harkin, Stakeknife. Britain’s Secret Agents in Northern Ireland (Dublin: The O’Brien Press 2004).
90 Anderson, ‘Surrogates of the State’, passim. O’Ballance, Malaya, p.126.
91 This is a point Bernard Fall makes in his introduction to Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare (NY: Frederick
Praeger 1964), p.viii. The author can confirm from his own service in Iraq in 2004 that while British soldiers
commit themselves physically and mentally during their pre-tour training and deployment, this sense of
commitment ends once they are flown out of theatre. See also Robin Neillands, A Fighting Retreat. The British
Empire 1947-97 (Hodder & Stoughton 1996), pp.374-375.
92 J. K. Cilliers, Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia (London: Croom Helm 1985), pp.118-131. Sanders, Apartheid’s
Friends, pp.255-279.
93 Woodworth, Dirty War, pp.44-46, pp.91-96, pp.177-187, pp.382-399, pp.423-424.
94
Christopher Andrew & Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World (Penguin 2006),
p.419.
95 Memorandum by D. J. McCarthy (Foreign Office), 20 th November 1967, FCO8/41(NAUK).
15