Aerospace Current Events 2 June 2011
Edited by:
Paul Golick, Capt, CAP
Aerospace Education Officer, Raleigh-Wake Composite Squadron
Contents:
Aerospace Current Events 2 June 2011 ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
a1. AF 447: Pilot role is focus of investigation ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
a2. AF 447: How did it happen? ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 5
a3. AF 447: Was it a deep stall?.............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 7
b1. Swift fuel moves forward with ASTM standard ................................................................................................................................................................................ 9
c1. GPS at risk with LightSquared 4G ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10
d1. General aviation flight information to be made more public ........................................................................................................................................................... 11
e1. InFO 11011: Part 91 operators other than 91K do not require FAA authorization to use EFBs .................................................................................................... 12
f1. SAIB CE-11-36: Frayed aileron cables in Cessna 172S.................................................................................................................................................................. 14
g1. SAIB CE-11-37: Possible interference between oil cooler hose and oil filter in 172R and 172S .................................................................................................. 15
See http://www.capmembers.com/cap_university/online_courses__exams.cfm for “AEPSM Exam (Yeager Award)”, an online, open-book exam. After logging in
to eServices, https://www.capnhq.gov/CAP.eServices.Web/Default.aspx , you may use the “AE Downloads and Resources” page to access Aerospace: The
Journey of Flight that contains most answers to the questions on the AEPSM Exam.
a1. AF 447: Pilot role is focus of investigation
Source: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/27/uk-france-brazil-crash-idUSLNE74Q03620110527
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e1.en/pdf/f-cp090601e1.en.pdf
By Tim Hepher and Gerard Bon
PARIS | Fri May 27, 2011 11:42am EDT
(Reuters) - Pilots wrestled with the controls of an Air France airliner for more than four minutes before it plunged into the Atlantic with its nose up,
killing all 228 people on board, French investigators said on Friday.
Aviation industry sources told Reuters pilots appeared to have acted contrary to normal procedures in raising, rather than lowering, its nose in
response to an alert that the plane was about to lose lift or, in technical parlance, 'stall'.
But they said information from black boxes hauled up from the Atlantic floor earlier this month was still incomplete.
The 2009 emergency began with a stall warning two and a half hours into the Rio-Paris flight and nine minutes after the captain had left the cockpit
for a rest period.
Shortly before, a junior pilot had told flight attendants to prepare for a "little bit of turbulence"
The Airbus (EAD.PA) A330 jet climbed to 38,000 feet and then began a dramatic three and a half minute descent, rolling from left to right, with the
youngest of three pilots handing control to the second most senior pilot one minute before the crash.
The timeline was described in a note by France's BEA crash investigation authority, which said it was too early to give the causes of the crash ahead
of a fuller report in the summer.
"These are so far just observations, not an understanding of the events," BEA director Jean-Paul Troadec told reporters.
The captain returned after "several attempts" to call him back to the cockpit but was not at the controls in the final moments, according to information
gleaned from black boxes.
By the time the 58-year-old returned, just over a minute into the emergency, the aircraft was plunging at 10,000 feet a minute with its nose pointing
up 15 degrees and at too high an angle compared to the onrushing air to provide lift.
The BEA said the reading of the black boxes suggested the crew were not able to determine how fast the plane was flying.
That echoes earlier findings which suggest the pitot tubes or speed sensors on the plane may have become iced up.
The airline said in a statement that the crew had demonstrated a "totally professional attitude". France's pilots union declined to comment.
"It's very emotional to see the unrolling minute by minute or second by second at some points of what happened," said John Clemes, vice president of
the families' support group.
"You automatically think of your family member and how they were living through this. It's the events that caused the deaths of 228 people so it's
traumatic and moving.
France's BEA crash investigation agency said pilots pulled the nose up at crucial moments as the aircraft became unstable and the aircraft generated
an audible stall warning.
"The inputs made by the pilot flying were mainly nose-up," the BEA said in a timeline based on initial examination of the cockpit voice and data
recorders.
A top aircraft industry safety consultant said the standard guidance in the Airbus pilot manual called for the pilot to push the control stick forward to
force the plane's nose down in the event of a stall, which can lead to a loss of control.
"The BEA is now going to have to analyze and get to bottom of how crew handled this event," said Paul Hayes, safety director at Ascend Aviation, a
UK-based aviation consultancy.
"The big question in my mind is why did the pilot flying (the aircraft) appear to continue to pull the nose up," he said.
"I must stress we are commenting and speculating on preliminary factual information, which will need analyzing."
ADVICE TO PILOTS
The BEA report was strictly factual and did not allocate any blame or cause of the crash on June 1, 2009.
"These are so far just observations, not an understanding of the events," BEA director Jean-Paul Troadec told reporters.
In a passage likely to attract scrutiny, the BEA said the pilot "maintained nose-up inputs" when a fresh stall warning went off 46 seconds after the
autopilot disengaged itself.
The BEA declined to say whether this was the correct action to take and the information given so far does not give a complete picture of the
information displayed to the crew.
But the response contrasts with the latest advice to pilots contained in an Airbus training seminar in October last year, according to a document
obtained by Reuters.
In large red capital letters, the document says that in the event of a stall warning, pilots should "APPLY NOSE DOWN PITCH CONTROL TO
REDUCE AOA (ANGLE OF ATTACK)".
Two aviation industry sources said the drill in force at the time of the accident was to apply full thrust and reduce the pitch attitude of the aircraft,
which means lowering the nose.
Later guidance calls for pilots to push the nose down and adjust thrust as necessary, they said, asking not to be named.
The crew's response will be added to what is already known about probable icing of the aircraft's speed sensors, which Air France identified as the
most likely cause of the crash.
Airbus said the report upheld earlier evidence which was based on automated maintenance messages relayed from the plane.
An aerodynamic stall is a loss of lift due to a high angle of attack, or angle between the plane and airflow. Pushing the control stick forward and
lowering the nose adjusts for this.
It does not refer to a stall of the engines, which the BEA said had operated and responded throughout to crew actions.
The BEA dampened speculation that the jet may have been engulfed by a freak equatorial storm.
Pilots had decided without apparent stress to alter course slightly to avoid turbulence shortly beforehand. But the junior pilot told flight attendants to
prepare for a "little bit of turbulence"
"In two minutes we should enter an area where it'll move about more than at the moment; you should watch out," he told cabin staff. "I'll call you
back as soon as we're out of it."
[BEA is the abbreviation for “Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité del’aviation civile”.]
a2. AF 447: How did it happen?
Source: http://www.avweb.com/eletter/archives/avflash/1920-full.html#204730
The pilots of Air France Flight 447 flew the aircraft into deep stall at 38,000 feet, never verbally acknowledged or corrected that condition, and the
aircraft fell for more than three minutes at nearly 11,000 feet per minute into the Atlantic, killing all aboard, investigators said Friday. The jet
maintained a nose up attitude -- along with an angle of attack greater than 35 degrees -- throughout a descent rate that translates to more than 122
miles per hour of vertical drop. "At no point" on the cockpit voice recorder "is the word stall ever mentioned," Chief Investigator Alain Bouillard said
in an interview. The autopilot and auto-throttle disengaged and the pilots recognized failure of the Airbus A330's speed sensors. The pilots took
manual control and the aircraft climbed. A stall warning sounded as the jet ascended rapidly from 35,000 to 37,500 feet and by 38,000 feet three stall
warnings had activated. Less than two minutes after the autopilot disconnected, the aircraft was at approximately 35,000 feet, with full takeoff thrust
selected; the angle of attack had exceeded 40 degrees and jet was falling at about -10,000 ft/min.
The captain was not present in the cockpit as the incident began. The flight deck crew was flying at night over the ocean near storms where they
expected turbulence. What they faced was an aircraft that suddenly disengaged both the autopilot and auto-throttles, and cockpit displays that
delivered mismatched and rapidly changing airspeed values that ranged from at least 275 to 60 knots. Within seconds, the non-flying pilot stated, "So
we've lost the speeds." Then he said, "Alternate law." Those two words mean, among other things, that the aircraft's angle-of-attack protections have
been shut down. Before the captain entered the cockpit, the pitch and angle of attack of Flight 447 had both reached 16 degrees as it was hand-flown.
The horizontal stabilizer had passed from 3 to about 13 degrees nose-up. The throttles had been set at full takeoff thrust and the aircraft had stalled. It
was less than two minutes since the autopilot had disengaged.
As the captain entered the cockpit, the aircraft's systems received airspeed values they deemed invalid, leading the airplane's systems to automatically
shut off the stall warnings. The aircraft was still in full stall with the nose up, falling at -10,000 ft/min. Almost one minute into the stall, the pilots
reduced engine thrust and temporarily made nose-down inputs that were not enough to break the stall. As the jet continued to fall, it rolled at times up
to 40 degrees and turned more than 180 degrees to the right. Data shows that the pilot flying held the sidestick at the full left and nose-up stops for
the entirety of one 30-second span, and that the airliner remained stalled until impact.
There were as many as three pilots in the cockpit through the majority of the descent. The pilot flying as the event unfolded was the least experienced
of the crew, with 3,000 hours of flight time. He was right-seat at the time. The flight's captain had almost 11,000 hours of experience. He was not in
the cockpit as the incident began. The cockpit crew attempted to call him to the flight deck several times during the first minute after the airspeed
sensors failed. He joined them less than two minutes after the autopilot disconnected. A second pilot, flying left seat, was given the controls in the
flight's final minute. Aside from that information, BEA, the investigating agency, did not publish any cockpit conversation that took place during the
last minute of the flight.
The aircraft impacted the water at 16.2 degrees nose-up with a roll angle of 5.3 degrees to the left. The aircraft heading was 270 degrees (nearly
opposite the planned route of flight) and the ground speed was 107 knots. The last recorded vertical speed was -10,912 ft/min.
a3. AF 447: Was it a deep stall?
Source: http://www.flyingmag.com/news/air-france-447-was-it-deep-stall
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Deep_stall.svg
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atmospheric_entry#Feathered_reentry
By Peter Garrison / Published: Jun 01, 2011
The release of preliminary flight data and cockpit voice recorder data from the miraculously recovered "black boxes" of Air France Flight 447
opened the floodgates of press and online discussion. Amid all this chatter, the term "deep stall" often popped up.
Did Flight 447 experience a deep stall?
The short answer is no. It was deeply stalled, but it was not in a deep stall.
Although deep stalls go back to the dawn of aviation, the term gained currency in the 1960s when aft-engined jet airliners began to have T tails. If the
wing reached a sufficiently high angle of attack, its stalled, turbulent wake might envelop the horizontal stabilizer. Deprived of energetic airflow, the
stabilizer and elevator were unable to pitch the airplane nose-down, and it could continue to the ground in a stable, stalled attitude. A deep stall is
different from a normal stall because recovery is not possible by normal means -- that is, by use of the pitch control. Sometimes wing rocking and
yawing works, but the best bet is not to get into a deep stall in the first place. Stick pushers were developed for just that reason.
T-tailed transports are not the only airplanes that can experience deep stalls. Some canard designs have crashed when both the wing and the canard
stalled, depriving the pilots of pitch control. Some fly-by-wire fighters have a deep-stall mode, typically caused by long noses and shrunken "relaxedstability" tail surfaces. The "feather" re-entry mode of Burt Rutan's SpaceShipOne is a deliberate deep stall; when the tail surfaces return to their
normal position, the spaceplane recovers.
During most of its long descent into the Atlantic, Flight 447 was in a stalled glide. Its pitch attitude was about 15 degrees nose up and its flight path
was around 25 degrees downward, giving an angle of attack of 35 degrees or more. Its vertical speed was about 100 knots, and its true airspeed was
about 250. It remained in this unusual attitude not because it could not recover, but because the pilots did not comprehend, in darkness and turbulence
and amid a tumult of conflicting warnings of mysterious system failures, the actual attitude of the airplane. They held its nose up. So far as we now
know, there is no reason to think that if the crew had pushed the stick forward, held it there, and manually retrimmed the stabilizer, the airplane
would not have recovered from the stall and flown normally.
Far from a deep stall, this seems to have been a conventional stall in which the airplane displayed exemplary behavior: It responded to roll inputs,
maintained the commanded pitch attitude, and neither departed nor spun. The only thing it failed to do well was to make clear to its pilots what was
going on.
[The following image is from Wikipedia.]
b1. Swift fuel moves forward with ASTM standard
Source: http://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/SwiftFuelMovesForwardWithASTMStandard_204706-1.html
By Mary Grady, Contributing editor
Swift Enterprises, which is working to create an alternative aviation fuel to replace 100LL, said this week it has
taken "a large step" forward in the approval process. ASTM International has published a new fuel specification for
Swift's UL102 high-octane unleaded test fuel. "This will allow us to test every batch of a fuel to a standard, and
verify that it is all the same," PJ Catania, the head of fuels certification for Swift, told AVweb on Monday. That
consistency is important for completing the next phase of testing, he said. It also will enable the company to test the
fuel in standard airplanes, rather than only experimental aircraft, which will make it easier to gather large amounts
of data, Catania said. However, that phase of testing the fuel in standard airplanes is still at least six months away.
First, the company must get the okay from engine manufacturers to use the Swift fuel, he said. They are now in discussions with Lycoming,
Continental, and Rotax, as well as some smaller manufacturers. The "biggest thing" about this week's announcement, Catania said, is that it shows
the company is continuing to make positive progress with the ASTM process, even though it's slow. He said the FAA's creation earlier this year of an
Aviation Rulemaking Committee to address the transition to unleaded avgas will help to define the path forward. A public forum with that
committee, scheduled for EAA AirVenture Oshkosh this summer, should help clarify how new fuel alternatives can move through the process from
the testing phase to offer a commercially available lead-free avgas.
c1. GPS at risk with LightSquared 4G
Source: http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/05/27/357268/experts-gps-at-risk-with-lightsquared-4g.html
By John Croft
A government/industry panel will warn the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in a 3 June report that the expected interference from a new 4G
ancillary terrestrial broadband network will cause "complete loss" of GPS receiver functionality.
RTCA special committee 159 (SC-159), which includes representatives from 4G provider LightSquared, Airbus, Boeing, navigation system
providers CMC, Honeywell and Rockwell Collins, as well as the FAA and Transport Canada, composed the report following several months of
analytical and actual test measures. The work is part of a broader six-month technical investigation called for by the US Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) in its conditional approval of the 4G network in January.
LightSquared's approval will allow the company to re-transmit L-band satellite signals (1525 - 1559MHz) from a network of 40,000 ground
transmitters to provide wholesale mobile and broadband services across the continental US. Interference can occur in GPS receivers that operate in
the 1559-1610MHz band due to several factors, including the high relative power of the LightSquared ground transmitters compared to the GPS
signal, and FAA-approved design parameters of the GPS receivers themselves.
LightSquared is planning a three-phase rollout of its service, initially using a 5MHz slot (1550-1555MHz, called Phase 0), followed by the addition
of a lower frequency 5MHz slot (1526-1531MHz, Phase 1) and lastly, the implementation of two larger bands (1526-1536MHz and 1545-1555MHz,
called Phase 2).
Along with analytical calculations, the RTCA group tested four brand name airborne GPS receivers in the vicinity of LightSquared ground
transmitters.
All four GPS units were able to handle significantly more interference than the minimum levels set out by the FAA, and could function normally
with only the lower portion of Phase 1 deployment (1526-1531MHz) operating.
Performance worsens as the frequencies go higher: Officials say GPS receivers would have a "small margin" for tracking with LightSquared's 4G in
the 1526-1536MHz range only (the lower portion of the Phase 2 signal) but that locking in the GPS signals initially could be a problem. With the
frequencies above 1536MHz active however, the group will report that they expect "complete loss" of GPS functions. "From an aviation perspective,
operations at Phase 0, 1 and 2 spectral deployments, the upper channel should not be permitted," the report will read.
"Further study is recommended to make sure we have found the worst case operational scenario; to confirm we are properly modeling receiver
susceptibility, and to make sure path loss is done appropriately," the group concludes. While the report is written as a consensus position, views of
members who did not concur with certain points are included.
The FCC has set 15 June as the final date for LightSquared and industry to issue a final report on the potential impacts for operating the 4G network,
including technical and operational steps to avoid the interference and possible mitigation strategies.
d1. General aviation flight information to be made more public
Source: http://www.militaryaerospace.com/index/display/avi-article-display/6779390551/articles/avionics-intelligence/news/2011/5/general-aviation_flight.html
Posted by John McHale
WASHINGTON, 30 May 2011. Federal aviation officials announced that they make flight plans and other general aviation information available to
the public on-line. FAA officials will affect the change 60 days after the Federal Register is published.
General aviation operators will not be able to use privacy as a reason to block Internet sites from showing their flight information such as registration
number, flight path, departure point and destination, and flight length for all aircraft operations over the U.S. In the future, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) will block public viewing of this information only after the operators certify that they have a valid security concern. As
before, neither the sites nor the aircraft owner or operator will disclose the identity of persons on the flight, the purpose of the flight or the reason for
the security concern.
In the past corporations that own and operate aircraft, carriers, professional aviation organizations and government agencies have had access to the
real-time flight information of both airlines and general aviation through the Aircraft Situational Display to Industry (ASDI) and National Airspace
System Status Information (NASSI) websites. Other members of the public have been able to subscribe to this information with the data delayed five
minutes for security reasons. While commercial air carriers' schedules are available to the public, the operations of general aviation aircraft cannot be
tracked except through one of these electronic systems.
In the future, the only way operators and owners of general aviation aircraft will be able to block displays of their flight information is by providing
the FAA written certification that revealing this to the public would pose a valid security threat.
The amendment finalizes a March 1 proposal.
e1. InFO 11011: Part 91 operators other than 91K do not require FAA authorization to use EFBs
Source: http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info/all_infos/media/2011/InFO11011.pdf
Subject: The Apple iPad and Other Suitable Tablet Computing Devices as Electronic Flight Bags (EFB)
Purpose: This InFO provides information about the use of the iPad and other suitable tablet computing devices as EFBs. In addition, it provides
information about EFB use and the Flight Standards Information Management System (FSIMS) process that may be helpful to operators seeking
authorization to use an EFB.
Background: Recently, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) authorized a certificated operator to use an iPad as a Class 1 EFB. In this
particular case, the operator is using the iPad with the Jeppesen Mobile TC App to display approach plates, terminal procedures, and airport
diagrams. This operator worked closely with their certificate holding district office, Jeppesen, and Apple during the application and evaluation
process.
Applicable Guidance:



FAA Order 8900.1, Flight Standards Information Management System, volume 4, chapter 15, section 1, Electronic Flight Bag Operational
Authorization Process, and volume 3, chapter 18, section 3, OPSPEC/MSPEC/LOA A061, USE OF ELECTRONIC FLIGHT BAG.
FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 120-76A, Guidelines for the Certification, Airworthiness, and Operational Approval of Electronic Flight Bag
Computing Devices. Note: This AC is currently being revised to harmonize with the FSIMS sections cited above.
FAA AC 91-78, Use of Class 1 or Class 2 Electronic Flight Bag (EFB), has information for those conducting operations under Title 14 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 91.
Hardware: The iPad is commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) electronic hardware that is not approved or certified by the FAA. However, it can be
authorized for use by a principal operations inspector if it meets the EFB criteria discussed in FSIMS, volume 4, chapter 15, section 1 and AC 12076A. For certificate holders and 14 CFR part 91 subpart K (91K) program managers, operation specification or management specification
(OpSpec/MSpec) paragraph A061 must be issued to authorize the use of EFBs. For part 91 operators other than 91K, FAA authorization for use is
not required. However, installation and airworthiness requirements specified in AC 120-76A are still applicable.
Software: The Jeppesen Mobile TC App displays approach plates, terminal procedures, and airport diagrams and is defined as a Type B software
application per AC 120-76A. The display of en route chart aeronautical information was not part of this particular evaluation or authorization. To be
used in critical phases of flight, an EFB displaying Type B software must be secured and viewable. A kneeboard is one way to accomplish this.
Note: Class 1 EFBs with Type B software must not display the aircraft’s position, also referred to as “own-ship position,” in accordance with current
policy (see AC 120-76A, paragraph 7c, and Appendix B). The Jeppesen Mobile TC App inhibits own-ship position.
Operator Authorization: The authorization process the FAA uses for certificate holders and program managers is contained in FSIMS, volume 4,
chapter 15, section 1. Although the iPad is a relatively new computing device, when using it as an EFB it is treated the same as any other COTS
device, subject to the authorizations and limitations applicable to portable Class 1 or 2 EFBs. OpSpec/MSpec A061 is used to authorize EFB devices.
Non-standard text can be added to document an evaluation period. At the end of a successful evaluation period, the operator is authorized to use the
iPad as an EFB to replace certain required paper products.
Operators that desire to use the iPad or any other suitable tablet computing device as a substitute for paper products, including aeronautical
information such as approach plates, terminal procedures, and airport diagrams, must show compliance with the guidance in FSIMS and/or AC 12076A. Each authorization process is considered unique, because of differences in each operator’s aircraft types, training programs, operational
procedures, intended function of the EFB, etc.
For part 91 operators other than 91K, the use of an EFB in lieu of paper is the decision of the aircraft operator and/or the pilot in command. AC 91-78
and AC 120-76A contain guidance on replacing paper products, including aeronautical charts, with an EFB. Operators transitioning to a paperless
cockpit should undergo an evaluation period during which the operator should carry paper backups of the material on the EFB. During this period,
the operator should validate that the EFB is as available and reliable as the paper-based system being replaced. Part 91, subpart F operators must
ensure compliance with 14 CFR part 91, § 91.503 at all times. All part 91 operators should also document compliance with § 91.21, Portable
electronic devices.
Contact: Questions or comments regarding this InFO should be directed to Steve Morrison, Future Flight Technologies Branch, AFS-430, at (202)
385-4936.
f1. SAIB CE-11-36: Frayed aileron cables in Cessna 172S
Source: http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library%5CrgSAIB.nsf/%28LookupSAIBs%29/CE-11-36?OpenDocument
This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin advises owners, operators, and maintenance personnel of an airworthiness concern, specifically the
possibility of frayed aileron cables on Cessna Model 172S airplanes.
At this time, this airworthiness concern is not considered an unsafe condition that would warrant an airworthiness directive action under Title 14 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), part 39.
Background
A flight school has been reporting wear of the aileron control system cable, which is being found during routine inspections. This wear is occurring at
the following three locations:



Pulleys in the cabin overhead
Rub strip on the wing ribs
Fairlead near the roll autopilot servo
The reported condition is not a result of improper construction or a deviation from approved type design. The average part hours reported to Cessna
is approximately 2,100 hours. The July 2010 issue of Advisory Circular 43-16A (“Aviation Maintenance Alerts”) highlighted the issued of frayed
aileron cables and provided excellent pictures of what to look for during the inspection.
Cessna is aware of the perception that these stainless steel control cables are wearing prematurely and has been working on a change to type design to
improve the life of the cables. A recommended service bulletin will be published prior to September 2011 for operators who wish to implement it.
Recommendations
Chapter 27 of the Model 172 Maintenance Manual contains instructions that are very thorough in describing how to inspect these cables. The FAA
recommends following these existing instructions every 200 hours, as listed in the aircraft maintenance manual.
g1. SAIB CE-11-37: Possible interference between oil cooler hose and oil filter in 172R and 172S
Source: http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library%5CrgSAIB.nsf/%28LookupSAIBs%29/CE-11-37?OpenDocument
Recommendations
The FAA recommends that owners, operators and maintenance personnel do the following on these aircraft and engines at the next opportunity, but
not later than the next oil change:




Check to see if interference exists or could exist between the oil filter housing and the oil cooler hose assembly.
If interference is found, reposition the oil cooler hose assembly in accordance with manufacturer’s data by qualified maintenance personnel to
ensure clearance is present and no interference exists prior to further flight. Lacking any manufacturer’s clearance data, the FAA recommends
that a minimum of 0.125” clearance exist between an installed oil filter and the closest feature of the oil cooler hose or related oil cooler hose
fittings.
Correct all unsatisfactory conditions found during inspection prior to further flight.
File a Malfunction or Defect Report or Service Difficulty Report (SDR). The SDR system is available at http://av-info.faa.gov/sdrx/.