The Cooperative Organization of Land Tenure in

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The Cooperative Organization of Land Tenure in Urban Harare,
Zimbabwe
[REMOVED BY EDITOR]1
Abstract
This paper discusses cooperative organization of land tenure in urban Harare, the capital of
Zimbabwe, focusing on the politics of public goods provision around the city. Engaging the
literature on non-state provision, the paper highlights new non-state actors and the variation in
types of housing settlements occurring in urban Zimbabwe. The narrative links with the broader
literature on the politics of public housing. Non-state providers have originated from the
political, social and economic context of opportunism and state failure, the inadequacy and
failure of state and private-based housing provision due to lack of supplies and an unsupportive
economic environment that characterized Zimbabwe between 1990 and 2008,. Most projects by
housing cooperatives are found in the peri-urban zones because there is still ‘fresh’ land
convertible for urban development. Living in this area is considered by the cooperative members
are ‘cheap’ relative to the already developed places (for example, neighborhoods near the city
centers) where cost of living is higher especially in terms of rental levels. This description
typifies new peri-urban settlements around Harare. The paper interrogates why such
developments are occurring at this particular time or why they are occurring in different ways in
different peri-urban locations of the city.
Introduction
The first housing cooperatives were in France in 1720. This development soon spread to
other countries in Europe like Sweden, the Netherlands and Britain (Fu, 2007). Mossing and
Salter (2007) observe that the British Columbia, for example, experienced an expansion in
housing cooperatives in the 1970s and 1980s. Politics plays a major role in the efficacy of
housing cooperatives, both between cooperatives and the government or other actors, and within
cooperatives as well. There are multiple variables that impact this political landscape. Overall,
urban housing provision is a major problem in Africa generally and Zimbabwe in particular.
Traditional policies and practices by the state to address the problem have always proved a major
challenge. This is largely due to urban population upsurges that the government has not prepared
itself to grapple with in terms of addressing the demands of such increasing population. For
Zimbabwe (Figure 1), the period soon after its independence in 1980 was marked by a socialist
approach in managing human affairs. According to this approach, the state was the major
provider of basic services, housing included. Thus, during these formative years, the voluntary,
community and private sectors were little involved as champion in dealing with the provision
basic human needs of the population.
By the year 2000 (twenty years later), there was a realization that the state could not go it
alone, and, hence the need to open up space for more actors, especially self-help initiatives. This
recognition explains the recent attempts to redress the past housing policy failures by providing
room for national debates during the constitution-making process that has seen Zimbabwe
adopting a new national constitution in May 2013. The matter has also been tackled in several
[REMOVED BY EDITOR]
1
major government policy initiatives, beginning with the Draft National Housing Policy of 1999
and ultimately the new National Housing Policy launched beginning of 2013. The
constitutionalization of the matter and the inclusion of new actors outside of the state
(particularly the private sector and the voluntary sector like housing co-operatives) have
cemented past efforts by these actors to gain legitimacy from the state. These developments have
been quite timely, when the state has been struggling to respond to the housing backlog that is
pegged well above one million units at the national level. Such a serious backlog in Zimbabwe,
being a country of 13 million inhabitants according to the 2012 National Census, means a
significant proportion of citizens are without adequate shelter.
Figure 1: Map of Zimbabwe Showing Major Towns and Cities
The increase in population in the urban areas has meant declining functional and aesthetic
values of the urban areas of Zimbabwe. This is the reason why some residents, particularly those
who do not own houses, have moved to the peri-urban areas. Peri-urban housing is defined as
shelter production and maintenance occurring at the edges of cities and usually having both
semi-rural and semi-urban qualities in terms of land-use, materials used and the characteristics of
the inhabitants using the shelter.
A wave of peri-urbanisation in Zimbabwe has set in; it can be estimated that more than
two million, around the country of urban-core dwellers have moved to the peri-urban areas in the
past ten years or so. Nevertheless, life at the urban edges remains unpredictable for most of the
peri-urban dwellers. Most wish to be central Harare residents. For example, eighty-seven (87)
percent of the respondents to the survey by the author in 2012 subscribed to this notion that they
wish to be included as part of the city but were comfortable living in the peri-urban because it
was relatively cheaper there in terms of cost of living. Yet the city’s doors remain closed,
2
shutting these peri-urbanites out of the city. The institutional set-up in the country explains this,
given its bureaucratic and inhibitive approach to any development. Overall, non-state actors in
the housing sector include private, for-profit companies, as well as voluntary associations that
are focused on shelter provision. Cooperatives in Zimbabwe are self-administered institutions;
legal and autonomous entities with powers to select their own administrative bodies, for
example, composition of the management and supervisory committees. The Co-operative
Societies Act Chapter 24:05, the byelaws and the Co-operative Development Policy of 2005 are
the legal instruments used by co-operatives in administering their affairs. At the same time, the
proposed Land Developers Bill seeks to protect the interests of co-operative members. There is
also the Draft National Housing Policy providing for the registration of housing cooperatives.
According to the Zimbabwe National Association of Housing Co-operatives (ZINAHCO), the
apex body for housing co-operatives in Zimbabwe, Harare has 2,050 registered co-operatives
(Share, 2012).
From the outset, we must point out that the 2005 Operation Murambatsvina was a
landmark event in which the government destroyed informal housing and businesses that had
emerged in the urban centers of the country.2 The intolerance was ruthless and the impacts deep.
In the same year (2005) of Operation Murambatsvina, the government embarked on a remedial
program called Operation Garikayi/Hlalani Kuhle (OGHK). It was an ambitious program that did
very little to resolve the root problem. Surprisingly, seven years after that massive destruction,
households have re-organised themselves, in most cases in the same sites where destruction
occurred. Peri-urban developments, largely, have become synonymous with informal
development. The thrust of this paper is to try to answer the question: how and in what forms
does politics shape the provision and maintenance of peri-urban housing by non-state actors?
The author’s half-decade of fieldwork study points to evidence, from especially around the city
of Harare, that a multiplicity of explanations exist to explain the rise of the phenomenon of periurban housing development for a example, the role of the land reform, patronage and the
incapacity of formal structures to provide support to home seekers. There is great evidence about
the variation in these housing cooperatives in Harare. The principal dimensions of this variation
include the history and origin of each cooperative, the internal dynamics of cooperation
(including gender and employment status of the members) and the cooperative interacts with
outside players including politicians and potential funders. This paper interrogates why such
developments are occurring at this particular time or why they occur in different ways in
different peri-urban locations of the city is the crux of this discourse. By definition, peri-urban
areas are those places outside the formal city boundaries and having characteristics of semi-rural
living. There is not strict definition of what these are in terms of distance from the city centers. In
Zimbabwe, some of these areas like Epworth and Ruwa are just nine and twenty-three kilometers
from the city centre (in this case Harare). The paper seeks to describe and discuss the cooperative
organization of land tenure in urban Harare in which there is marked unevenness in the provision
of housing as a public good. It engages with the literature on the non-state provision of public
goods, examining the providers of the different good in different sets of circumstances that have
created new non-state actors and new types of housing settlements (cf. Enache and Enache,
2012). The narrative also links with the broader literature on the politics of public housing. For
Pismanab, Verbeeka, Allaerta (2009), the whole concept revolves around lifestyles. Unlike
inner-city and urban housing, where processes of housing production have been reduced to
2
cf. Helmkeand Levitsky, 2004: 725-740.
3
maintenance and re-development principally, in the peri-urban space, and in the context of
developing countries, there is much on organization and mobilization or resources and people
(especially the low-income earners and homeless in the context of developing countries) to have
the houses constructed. The paper is organized under the following headings: cooperative
organization and the question of land tenure: a theoretical framework, cooperative housing,
tenure and peri-urbanization in Zimbabwe: a context analysis, cooperative organization of land
tenure in urban and peri-urban Harare, and conclusion and policy direction
Cooperative Organization and Land Tenure: A Theoretical Framework
Non-state provision may pose more political challenges than proponents recognize, but
its effects are ultimately contingent on the types of relationships between state and non-state
providers. It is particularly urgent to explore the political consequences of non-state provision in
the contemporary period. In much of the Global South, the welfare state either was never
institutionalized to a significant extent, or was at least partially dismantled in the course of
neoliberal state retrenchment since the 1980s. In this context, non-state providers (NSPs) are all
the more critical in facilitating access to social welfare, including housing. However, what are
the political implications for states and citizens when social services and benefits are received
through the direct provision or intermediation of NSPs? Ultimately, state and non-state provision
are not mutually exclusive. Rather, NSPs may substitute for or complement public welfare
functions. The importance of state regulatory, administrative and fiscal capabilities for the
overall welfare regime, underscores interdependent relationships between public institutions and
NSPs.3 These dimensions of state capacity are certainly essential for the effective delivery of
public services but are equally if not more critical for the operation of welfare regimes with
extensive non-state actors. Where non-state providers dominate the welfare landscape, state
regulatory capacity is particularly critical in ensuring access to services, mandating and
enforcing quality standards, encouraging economies of scale in welfare provision, and avoiding
duplication of services and relevant technology.
A second critical dimension of the consequences of non-state provision relates to equity,
or the degree to which citizens have relatively equal access to social welfare. In assessing levels
of inequality in a given society, standard measures prioritize the distribution of income and asset
levels, which are important factors in and of themselves because they shape poverty directly.
However, access to basic social services is a critical channel by which people improve their wellbeing and, hence, constitutes an additional dimension to the structure of societal inequality.4
Non-state provision of housing has serious governance implications. The failure by the public
sector or state to provide housing for the citizens invite various factors such as NGOs, CBOs and
other international Agencies. Another challenge is how to maximize coverage and quality of
housing through the non-state sector and minimize unwanted side effects.5
There has been a paradigm shift towards urban tenure given the trendiness of
urbanization. For a long time, theorists concentrated on the understanding of rural land tenure.6
The manner of land holding and the set of relationships of how people use land and its products
3
Cammett, 2011
Cammett, 2011
5Penthens, 2006.
6
Payne, 1996.
4
4
is what define land tenure.7 Groups or individuals often have stakes (which may include, but not
limited to, access, use, development and transfer) in that land or property. This defines what
scholars call property rights. The notions of organization of land tenure particularly an
assessment of the tenure options as they apply in the context of increasing urbanization in
developing countries anchor the analytical and theoretical framework of this. Dynamics in urban
land markets have given way to cooperative housing. The story of peri-urban dwellers, their
migration to the peri-urban land and the seemingly non-recognition by the state exposes them to
uncertainty and fears buttress the understanding of land tenure and property rights. The Maputo
case justifies the incremental approach. Incremental approach is a systematic yet piecemeal
process approach in which the builder develops the houses as and when they can mobilize
finance and materials resources to build. This is different from the project approach in which, by
a stipulated time-frame houses and attendant services are produced and occupied.8 With
incremental housing, the builder may already be staying on plot (in-situ) and they take a process
to build.
Unlike in most African cities, like Lusaka, Lilongwe, Accra9 and Maputo10 where the city
immediately adjoins with customary held land under local chiefs and other traditional leadership
institutions, the land around Harare is unique. This land is formerly farmland under freehold title.
Zimbabwe negotiated for its independence from Britain. Between September and December
1979, the negotiators were locked up to discuss predominantly the land question. Eventually,
they reached an agreement called the Lancaster House Conference Agreement. It spelt how to
manage the transition to black government after independence. A constitution was made on the
basis of this agreement and became known as the Lancaster House Constitution. The 1979
Constitution made it a point that should the government want land, it had to be acquired on a
‘willing-buyer-willing seller-basis” with full compensation. Politically, land was a sacred cow. It
is unfortunate that though the FTLRP -‘nationalized’ land in the most recent years, issues of
compensation to the former peri-urban landholders continue to haunt the government.
Urbanization and Urban Land Markets in Developing Countries
Doebele (1987) identifies and explains five eras in history (the era of laissez-faire, of
perceived threat, demolition and public housing, of transforming urban migration into a positive
process, and, of commercialization) explaining the association of urbanization and land tenure in
developing countries, showing the public sector responses to urbanization effects (cf.Odum and
Ibem, 2011). The era of laissez-faire (the 1930s and 1940s) marked the earliest stages of
urbanization in which land was largely in the hands of tribal chiefs. Squatting was a solution to
housing the arrivals from rural areas, coming is quest for opportunities in the urban areas
(Brueckner and Selod, 2008). There are cities in African countries, like Zambia, Malawi,
Botswana and Ghana in which land is still in the hands of traditional leadership (cf. Odum and
Ibem, 2011). For Zimbabwe, land alienation by the white settlers and the introduction of modern
institutions of governance like the land and water courts saw the gradual stripping of the powers
of ruling that traditional leaders had hitherto enjoyed (cf. Manzungu, 2001).
In the 1950s and 1960s, during an era of perceived threat, demolition and public housing,
urban elites began to worry about the misery associated with squatters around them. This sparked
7
Payne, 1996
Kihato, Royston, Raimundo and Raimundo. 2011.
9
Mends, 2006.
10
Kihatoet al, 2011.
8
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anti-squatting attitudes by these urban elites in the form of a ‘not-in-my-backyard’ (NIMBY)
syndrome (cf. Pruijt, 2011; Wade, 2011). The poor new arrivals and urban homeless embarked
on innovative, self-help housing initiatives that disregarded the proper planning of settlements.
They were at risk of disease, precariousness in settlement and general poverty. Governments,
now, mooted demolition of the poor structures constructed by the poor and then tried public
housing as an alternative. State-driven housing processes were not without own challenges as it
proved later that the Basic Needs Approach (Mamba, 2007; Chandrasekhar and Montgomery,
2010) was burdensome to the state. The housing approach by government was largely sites-andservices.
The era of transforming urban migration into a positive process (the 1970s) ushered in a
perspective of seeing squatters as not the problem per se and part of the solution. One solution to
the housing of the urban poor was to adopt and regularize informal settlements and upgrade
tenure status. This, largely, is the philosophy shared by Hernando De Soto (2000; 1989). As
argued by De Soto, “…the main problem of development is not that the poor in the third world
lack capital, but that many lack the legal title to assets they already hold. Giving them legal title
will unleash this “dead capital” so that it can be used as collateral for loans to fund new
businesses or expand homes. “They have houses but not titles; crops but not deeds; businesses
but not statutes of incorporation. This explains why people who have adopted every other
Western invention, from the paper clip to the nuclear reactor, have not been able to produce
sufficient capital to make their domestic capitalism work” (IMF, 2003: 8). De Soto believes that
“…poor countries stayed poor not because of capitalism but because capitalism had not been
developed sufficiently” (IMF, 2003: 8). Yet Brueckner and Selod (2008:2) have observed with
respect to squatting, that local governments “…may be unable to enforce the property rights of
owners, or they may simply tolerate squatting, either because evictions are too politically costly
or because of a desire to ensure some degree of tenure security for squatters.”
The era of commercialization (the 1980s) ushered in the emergence of a landed class that
seek to acquire profits and income from the land and properties that it has acquired for sale or
letting. Both formal and informal land and housing markets are in operation (Odum and Ibem,
2011). The informal land and housing markets have produced especially slumlords mainly in the
outskirts of cities in most developing countries. Overall, the unfortunate thing with most urban
centers in the developing countries is that they have been inundated with huge populations while
they have not geared up to manage this huge influx (cf. Shlomo et al, 2010) Most of the solutions
depict fire-fighting amid challenges of increasing corruption and bad public sector management.
As a self-help initiative, a number of households have formed housing cooperatives. In the
process, there is urban informality has been marshaled in most developing countries – Africa,
Asia and Latin America. Biderman and Smolka (2012: 2) contend, thus, informality is
“…typically associated with housing inadequacy bearing on at least three realms: the public,
relating to access to urban infrastructure and services; the private, pertaining to investments in
physical improvements to the house (such as durable materials); and the institutional, as it
defines tenure status, including legal protections and/or rights.”
Organization of Land Tenure- Tenure options
There is a direct link between urban population growth and the range of land tenure
options. As the urban population increases, tendencies towards freehold title diminish. With
greater population density, creative ways of managing space have to be adopted leading to a
multiple mix of tenure types. Overall, there is a host of tenure arrangements. Carey et al
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(2004:34) assert that land tenure is “…the social relationship defining the rights and obligations
of individuals or groups towards a piece of land. “ This land tenure can be formal or informal.
Land tenure more likely to be informal in communities where cooperatives have developed from
the bottom up as opposed to being state-led projects. In South Africa, for example, formal tenure
options comprise rental tenure in which a private property owner, a municipality, an employer or
a social housing institution are the owners of the land, rent-to-buy (also referred to as installment
sale from a social housing institution). There is also communal ownership, which includes
cooperative arrangements and is mainly for people in the low-income bracket. There is sectional
title. This combines individual ownership of units with communal ownership of communal
property and individual ownership also known as the freehold title (Carey et al, 2004). On the
other hand, informal tenure has been noted as often involving squatting, “…where households
occupy a parcel of land that belongs to someone else while paying no financial compensation”
(Brueckner and Selod, 2008:2).
Overall, Zimbabwe has a “multi-form tenure regime” (Rukuni, 2012:1; 1994). This
regime comprises a number of instruments. These include the traditional usufruct on state land
for communal areas, freehold title for some large-scale commercial and some small-scale
commercial farms, and short-term leases for some small-scale commercial farms, and some
large-scale farms. Moreover, it includes 99 -Year leases for a few so far of the A2 resettlement,
Offer letters for most A2 resettlement hoping to qualify for a 99-Year Lease, and Permits for
Model A Old Resettlement and for A1 Fast Track resettlement. Rukuni further classifies rights,
explaining their administration and enforcement. The rights thus, include”…use rights which are
rights to grow crops, trees, make permanent improvement, harvest trees and fruits, etc; transfer
rights that include rights to sell, give, mortgage, lease, rent or bequeath and exclusion rights
which are rights to exclude others from using or transferring“ Rukuni (2012:3). There are also
enforcement rights that refer to “the legal, judicial, institutional and administrative provisions to
guarantee use, transfer, and exclusion rights and to resolve disputes” (Rukuni, 2012:3).
In its historical context, formal tenure has been the prime tenure arrangement defining the
incremental urban development process in the developing countries after John Turner’s 1972
urban development model (Carey et al, 2004). Low-income households usually seek to stay
closer to their employment stations. For example, as argued by Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport.
(2008), most prefer to live within the 25 miles radius from the central business district (CBD). In
addition in colonial Africa, the white settlers used to locate the housing for the black laborers
within average distances of 5 miles which these labors could afford to walk to work (cf.
Zinyama, Tevera and Cumming, 1993). This trendy towards locating the workers to employment
may, however be shifting as there is much peri-urbanization of the same as observed, for
example in Latin America (Raphael and Stoll, 2010). Over time, the poor seek to consolidate
their stay in a place, a development that involves the commodification of housing and land hence
a transformation from mere property value to market value. Provision of formal tenure helps the
land and home possessors to become owners. As owners, they can enjoy removal of possible of
capricious eviction, provision of assets to a household, which the same can use as collateral for
credit (cf. De Soto, 1989; 2000; Enache and Enache, 2012). Thus, the property becomes a
tradable asset. In addition, there is provision of space for the household’s home-based economic
activities, provision of comfort and personal security to a household. Moreover, there must be
some accepted minimum conditions for community building that anchor residents for security of
tenure in housing. In turn, this improves the governability of residents hence arrest of social
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vices by the authorities, (‘at least people have physical property addresses’) (cf. FarvacqueVitkovic, 2005). Authorities are able to charge fees and taxes to users of services and paving way
for greater investment by households in housing (Carey et al, 2004). Though ownership is the
most desired and opted for tenure by households, it can be very inflexible, complex and
expensive with respect to registration and transfer processes (Enache and Enache, 2012; Carey et
al, 2004). For this reason, rental and communal tenure in certain cases become better desirable.
Nevertheless, the poor often detest rental housing because it is deemed a ‘money waster’ relative
to home ownership (Clark et al., 2004). The poor and homeless have, thus been seeking to move
from rental housing to homeownership by seeking forming cooperatives which them allow them
to negotiate for land and also mobilize resources for building, jointly. Local authorities would
rather listen to a cooperative than motley of individuals seeking housing land. In keeping with
the cooperative land tenure arrangement, Clark et al., (2004:35) have fervidly argued that
communal tenure “...can be suitable for cohesive groups, as it can facilitate social networks and
builds on the collective nature of informal tenure processes. The operating costs of communal
tenure bodies can mean that communal tenure options are significantly more expensive than
individual ownership, though, and communal tenure rights are also generally not as secure as
individual ownership because the rights depend upon the soundness of the institution.”
Housing, Tenure and Peri-urbanization in Zimbabwe: A Context Analysis
Housing the urban poor in Zimbabwe is an issue of pressing concern that should be
examined through the lens of past and present policies and practices by both state and non-state
actors, respectively. Epworth stands out as a prototype of informal settlements in Zimbabwe.
Although certain slums did actually emerge in city edges (Epworth being the most resilient since
1892), they never received positive attention from the state. The response of the state at several
points has been to disrupt and disband informal settlements.The history of Epworth dates back to
1892 when the Wesleyan Methodist allowed, on philanthropic grounds, some homeless families
to settle on its farm. In 1986, with the settlement’s continued demographic swell, the church
handed over the settlement to the Government of Zimbabwe, which established a local board to
oversee the regularisation process of the settlement and management under a Local Government
officer called a Commissioner. Upgrading efforts did not go very far. Funders pulled out.
Population influx into the settlement continued and the settlement has over-spilled into land that
was formerly for farming. Even during the colonial rule, there was ruthless pulling down of
informal settlements.11
Urban housing and land tenure in Zimbabwe: a historical context
Zimbabwe has strong roots in British human settlements’ planning system that
emphasizes order, amenity and function12. The colonial system made it very clear. It divided and
distributed the country’s land on racial lines13. For example, the 1931 Land Apportionment Act
demarcated the land between areas for only Europeans only and for African tribes. Africans
owned land on a collective basis in the rural areas. At its initiation, such legislation saw Africans
being disposed of the land they lived for generations. The crafting of the National Registration
Act and Native Passes Act (of 1936 and 1937, respectively) aimed to control the movement of
Africans and forced them to carry their passes with them wherever they went. There was
prohibition of Africans into European areas without permission. The 1969 Land Tenure Act
11
Tibaijuka, 2005.
Chaeruka and Munzwa, 2009; Tibaijuka, 2005; Davison, 2002:187-204
13
Chirisa and Dumba, 2012: 1-13.
12
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replaced Land Apportionment Act and made provision for the transfer and exchange of land
between European and African areas. However, European preferences and priorities took
precedence over anything. The land question, favouring the white minority sparked the 19661979 war of liberation. The 1979 Lancaster House Conference that negotiated over the
independence of Zimbabwe lasted four month of which the land question was the dominant
issue. In terms of spatial planning, the colonial planning system was never tolerant of any slum
development within cities. It continues to be so.14
Post-Independence Housing in Zimbabwe
After the black government of Zimbabwe took over in 1980, it adopted a socialist
approach to housing15. Resource constraints were a major contributor to the failure of this
approach in allocating houses to the people of Zimbabwe. Around 1995, the veteran nationalist
leader and leader of ZANU Ndonga, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole settled some homeless urban
dwellers of Harare on his Churu Farm to build structures and stay, some few kilometres away
from the city. To the settlers or refugees that way a place cheap and accessible to their work
places in the city. The ZANU PF government rubbished this move as a ploy by Sithole to get
votes by clientilism. The government deployed the army and police to fight such ‘a coup plot’.
The other moves by government have been that of achieving ‘smart and clean cities’ with Harare
being ‘dubbed’ the Sunshine City. For instance, several people who were homeless were in 1991
dispatched to a place outside the city, Porta Farm because Her Highness, the Queen of England
and Wales, Elizabeth II was coming to official open the 1991 Commonwealth Heads of
Government Meeting (CHOGM) in the city. Their removal was with speed. They were relocated
onto a peri-urban farm, far from what the queen could see. Such is the extent the government has
made towards ‘gentrifying’ the urban space. In the urban gentrification literature (for example,
Brueckner and Selod, 2008), the poor are always at the mercy of government or the wealth that
can ‘forcibly push’ or ‘buy them out’, respectively.
In 2000, Zimbabwe embarked on a fast-track land reform program (FTLRP). The same
program provided an opportunity for land re-organisation and redistribution, mainly in the rural
areas. Yet, spatial changes also did occur to most urban areas in which it became possible for the
homeless to claim land for housing construction, which formal channels of land banking and
incorporation had failed to deliver. It so happened that at the height of the 2000 land seizures
from the white farmers, some groups of war veterans that participated in the liberation struggle
of Zimbabwe (1966-1979), took the lead in turning what began as a rural land reform agenda to
become an urban agenda for land for (peri)urban housing. This provided a ‘touching base’ for
those hordes urban households that had been struggling to have housing land16. This might point
to a convergence of somewhat two diametrically opposite agendas – rural demand for land for
farming and urban demand for land for housing17.
The urban demand for land is a direct response to the pressure of urbanization in the
country. Sam Moyo has contributed greatly to the discussion of land reform in Zimbabwe in the
past three decades18. In much of his contribution and discussion, he has largely emphasized the
land reform as a vehicle for rural development. However, he notes that in the years around the
14
Chaeruka and Munzwa, 2009.
Paradza (2010)
16
Murowe and Chirisa, 2006
17
Marongwe, 2003; 2002
18
Moyo, 2000: 73-82; 2011: 493-531; Moyo, 1995.
15
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2000, a group of elites (politicians) began to show interest in getting land to the peri-urban zones
of several towns in the country. In Moyo’s terms, these groups were after the benefits of that
come with networking with urban centres. Although Moyo has examined peri-urbanisation from
an elitist ‘window’, other critics like Marongwe and Toriro have examined it from the viewpoint
of what the urban poor we doing, shifting to the peri-urban as they saw an opportunity in housing
cooperatives19.
The National Housing Program of 2003 observed that government plans for housing fell
short of the 162,000 units between 85,000 and 2,000 units with annual production ranging
between 15,000 and 20,000 units per annum. By 2002, only 5,500 plots had been serviced
compared to the estimated 250,000 units. Today, the country has a backlog over a million
housing units of which the problem rife in the urban centers, in general, and Harare, the capital
city in particular. Problems besetting housing delivery include finance and land. However,
Matonho (2012) opines that housing schemes, predominantly in the peri-urban areas, are
negatively affecting urban farming. In the past five years (2009-2013), the country has been
undergoing a constitution-making process in which stakeholders in housing also tried to rope in
the housing issue in this noble agenda of making the supreme law of the land (Chatiza, 2010).
For Chatiza, constitutionalizing housing “…creates a basis for adopting a rights-based approach
to human settlement development and management. This will replace the traditional top-down
approach used in the sector allowing application of participatory processes throughout the
development cycle and contributing to sustainable human settlements, which is the national
vision.” Although by the end of 2012, the constitution-making process had not yet yielded any
positive result, stakeholders in the housing process had made inroads, at least pushing for the
1999 Draft Housing Policy for the country.
Incremental housing involves negotiating the periods for settling on designated plots. The
government, donors and church organizations assisted in their construction of 200 square meter
stands and these were successfully completed. Of those who failed to receive their assistance,
20% of people are still on ground level, 24% have used self-help are on the excavation stage,
26% have two rooms completed and 32% have completed their houses20. The Ministry of
National Housing and Social Amenities has accepted CBOs in the provision of low-income
houses through an incremental approach. The City of Harare provides on-site and off-site
services. CBOs have been lobbying for in situ building. This idea is on seeking to cut costs such
as rent on those building. With respect to Hatcliffe, the peri-urban settlers who were uprooted
from PortaFarm, Churu farm as well as Dzivarasekwa benefited from the housing savings’
schemes. In Hatcliffe, CBOs have embraced all sorts of innovations including alternative
technology for conventional water and sewer systems like sky loos. However, those sections of
the community that have managed to install the conventional water and sewer pipes, they remain
dry and boreholes and conventional sewer pipes have been proposed.
Housing Cooperatives and Savings’ Schemes in Zimbabwe
The Zimbabwe National Association of Housing Cooperatives (ZINAHCO) is the apex
organization of Zimbabwe’s housing cooperatives, representing over 150 co-operatives with over
7,200 members throughout the country. By their nature, most housing cooperatives are
community –led. Zimbabwe National Association of Housing Cooperatives (ZINAHCO) is the
apex for housing cooperatives operating in Zimbabwe. It is a non-profit Community Based
19
20
Marongwe, 2003;Toriro Percy, 2006; 2007
Nevhunjere (2011)
10
Organization. The organization was formed in 1993 and registered on 2001 under the
Cooperative Societies Act Chapter 24:05. A Board Committee governs it. Its programs are
implemented by the secretariat that has members specialized in various disciplines like town
planning, land surveying, civil engineering, to name these few. Housing cooperatives are
typically formed around groups of workers from a single company or industry, or of people from
the same geographic location. Cooperative members pool their resources together, ensuring that
all members benefit and can improve their living conditions. People of the same socio-economic
class usually form housing cooperatives. They contribute resources towards housing
construction, infrastructural development and other services. Housing cooperatives in Zimbabwe
come in different types. There are two types of housing cooperatives namely, work based and
community based housing cooperatives. A group of workers from a single company forms work
based housing cooperatives. The employee is the member of the co-operative. People from the
same geographic location tend to form community-based housing co-operatives.
The key characteristics of the Zimbabwean housing co-operatives affiliated to ZINAHCO
are mostly urban and peri-urban. The average size of a co-operative is around 50 members.
However, the membership ranges from 10 members to 407 members. Development is typically
done incrementally. In most cases, a co-operative purchase land and building materials and,
build the houses for its members. The actual construction of the houses is done using different
modes, usually with some combination of self-help and small builders, and in some cases, larger
builders taking on some or the entire project. Co-operatives can access land that is already
serviced and with title deeds from the local authorities. Nevertheless, they can do the servicing
and the house development at the same time in those instances when they get un-serviced stands.
Servicing the land involves engineering designs, roads and water systems hence the housing cooperativesmust allocate financial resources that could otherwise be used to build more houses.
This is difficult for housing co-operativesand they do not receive much help from the local
authorities. The houses are jointly owned by the co-operative until they are transferred to the
individual members. Thus, members “rent” the houses until all houses are built for all members.
Rules of the game must be agreed upon before the beginning of the project to avoid favoritism
and other problems. The titles are transferred to the individual members only when the entire
project is completed and all loans are paid. It is a requirement that beneficiaries (members)
register on the Council’s housing waiting list. Once the construction is complete and every
member has been housed as guided by the by-laws, the co-operative’s first mandate is complete.
The co-operative may dissolve but the members may re-visit the byelaws to determine how best
they can continue to use the co-op to their other benefit, for example in income generation
ventures or community service provision. Housing co-operatives are financed by the
contributions from members; the income generated though other activities, and the financial
assistance from partners. The monthly contributions from members are democratically decided,
based on the members’ available income. Once the amount of contributions is established, the
co-operative is designed in the optimal way, given the financial resources available. If the
member resigns from the co-operative, the contribution is reimbursed. Housing co-operatives
also use income generated by other activities to invest in housing. Many of the low-income
earners may not be formally employed, and co-operativesengage in income generating projects
(IGP) to fund their development. ZINAHCO helps with the training of the IGPs, especially those
that are construction-related. Manufacturing of building materials is done to reduce the cost of
the project. ZINAHCO provides loans to housing co-operatives to build core houses gradually
11
for each of their members. Every member of the co-op helps to make the monthly payments back
to ZINAHCO, whether or not they have received their house. The interest rate charged (5.4%) to
the co-operatives is very affordable compared to that charged by banks and finance houses
pegged between 20 and 30% (Share, 2012). With continued success, ZINAHCO will be able to
roll the loans over into more and more projects. Two important features of this program are: the
loans are made to the housing co-operatives, not to the individual members, and every member
must contribute to the repayment of the loan even if their own houses are not yet built. Co-op
members who occupy completed core houses pay a higher monthly rate than those still waiting.
ZINAHCO provides training in loan management and construction to the co-operatives,
developing their capacity and ensuring the sustainability of programs.
There are a number of legal instruments for the co-operative housing sector in Zimbabwe.
The major one is the Cooperative Societies Act (Chapter 24:05). It sets out the rules and
regulations on forming and operating co-operatives, housing cooperatives included. There are
also by-laws, which are rules and regulations that guide the conduct of the co-op members.
Moreover, there is the Cooperative Development Policy, revised in 2005, which derives its
standards of operation from the Cooperative Societies Act. The Land Developers Bill is not yet
adopted, but when it is, it will help in providing guidelines on how to develop the land. Other
instruments include the Labor Relations Act (1985) which is helpful in the regulation of the
secretariat’s conduct and the National Housing Policy, which provides the framework and
strategies for co-operatives to work together.
Dialogue on Shelter for the Homeless in Zimbabwe Trust, with the Zimbabwe Homeless
People’s Federation initiated housing saving schemes in Harare21. Zimbabwe Homeless People’s
Federation is a network for the poor seeking to improve their living conditions through their own
means. It comprises the urban poor who have lived in squatter settlements such as Hatcliffe, Pota
Farm and Mbare hostels. Housing savings’ schemes allow for the involvement of intended
beneficiaries in plan making, collection and analysis of data and decision on future outcomes.
They have, within their structures, two treasures, one collector and ordinary members. The bulk
of the members are mere passive players and think their ideas are never captured by the now
‘elite’. A survey by Chimanya in six of the saving schemes in 2004 revealed that 55,6% of the
members participated in the schemes by contributing finance towards income generating projects
and housing projects. Of these, 27,7% contributed through labor during molding and
constructing houses and 16,7% through technical expertise during house modeling exercises.
More than 50% of the members purported not having control over the decisions made in the
scheme. In the Mbare group, individuals expressed how in the previous year the NGO they were
working with approved Gungano Urban Fund as Z$1,000 yet without having consulted them in
terms of affordability. Gungano is a loan fund established in 1998 by the ZHPF. It consists of
savings by the urban poor, government and donor funds. Its main purpose is to provide loans for
the purchase of land and provision of infrastructure services and small to medium business loans
to the saving scheme members. In the year 1999 each member of the federation was contributing
Z$5 but due to inflation they it went up to almost Z$1,000 per month.
International exchange programs are the backbone of the operations of the urban poor
under the Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation. Members in the schemes have the chance to
go and learn how other communities are making it. In 1999 it cost Z$30 000 to build thirty-six
square meters with a bathroom, two small rooms and asbestos roof sheets. Monthly income for
21
Chimanya (2004)
12
the poor was about Z$1 500 per month. By the year 2004 costs had risen to Z$3 500 000 to build
two rooms. In 2004, the fifty-four schemes in Harare attracted almost 12 200 household savings
which had household savings of Z$322 652 for land for the period of 1999 to 2003. Z$8, 000,000
was required for purchase of stands and the deficit was Z$56 745 518 which came from Gungano
loan fund to pay the council. In the forthcoming paragraphs, we discuss the housing situation and
the rationale behind cooperative tenure arrangements in Harare’s shelter provision matrix.
Cooperative Organization of Land Tenure in Urban and Peri-urban Harare
The following paragraphs will highlight some case studies in the politics of public goods
provision by housing cooperatives in Harare (see Figure 2 for location of the cooperatives). In
the past decade or so, it is housing co-operatives that have contributed notably to alleviate
housing shortages in Zimbabwe. Harare City Council has more than 40 000 residents on its
housing waiting list though they could be more who have not registered with the local authority.
Housing cooperatives sell plots at intrinsic value. This has seen a ‘stands’ rush’ with numerous
people joining housing cooperatives (Share, 2012).
Figure 2: Map of Harare Highlighting Location of the Different Housing Cooperatives
In each case some brief history, nature of organizations, role of cooperatives vis-a-vis
other actors, are provides. As to be noted, there are various dimensions of variation across the
different housing coops discussed, including gender and organizational dynamics. The lowincome earners (the poor) constitute the key population of interest in these paragraphs. Women
13
are an often-disadvantaged group in conventional housing models. Nevertheless, the group has,
benefitted greatly through the cooperatives.
Delays in securing a stand have resulted in some losing faith and pulling out of the
register. The state, through local authorities has allocated undeveloped land to housing cooperatives. The co-operatives have, in turn been servicing the land (Share, 2012). Servicing of
the stands is a complex process that entails engineering designs, the roads, and sewer and water
reticulation systems. Little help has been received from local authorities in installing offsite and
onsite infrastructure. In this regard, co-operatives have, on their own, to put in place
infrastructure. This takes off those financial resources that could have been used for developing
the superstructures. In the City of Harare, it is noted how “…large open spaces where urban
farming used to thrive in Tafara, Mabvuku, Mufakose, Epworth and Hatcliffe, have been taken
up by housing cooperatives and informal sector businesses” (Matonho, 2012:4). Of course, this is
part of the urban footprint and ecological footprint debate (Shlomo et al, 2010) unraveling the
extent to which land availability is central to urban housing provision. Hence, urban land is a
highly contested factor in urban development and management (Chipungu, 2005; 2011).
In recent times, loans for housing in Harare, have been pegged housing in medium and
low-density between US$5 000 and US$90 000 a price range making it impossible for the
ordinary person to own a stand or a house. This private sector strategy is available only to the
wealthier class or formal sector employees. Since the majority of low-income earners cannot
afford this. The development justifies the rise of housing cooperatives as a self-help housing
strategy in the city. During the period between 1999 and 2008, housing cooperatives managed to
build 2,351 houses. More than 40 000 cooperative members were resident on more than 11,479
stands in Harare as at 2012. Consequently, many have turned to housing cooperatives, which
have sprouted throughout the country.
As of 2012, most local authority stands22 in Harare’s high-density areas “… cost an
average of US50 cents per square meter” (Share, 2012). The majority of the home seekers are
civil servants are civil servants earning US$300 a month hence do not qualify for mortgage
bonds. Mortgage loans at most financial lending institutions attract a 15 percent interest repaid
over 10 years. One such financial institution is the First Banking Corporation (FBC), which has
housing units in such places of Harare as Glaudina, Waterfalls, Helensvale and Philadelphia. A
good number of houses in these places require a deposit of US$17 000 and a US$900 monthly
payment for the agreed years. Failure to service the mortgage payments results in the “…bank
repossessing the house or stand. The stand or house would be resold for the bank to recoup its
money” (Share, 2012). The majority high and middle-income earners can afford houses and
residential stands through loans from banks and lending institutions at an arranged interest rate.
The agreed term can be up to 25 years. Zimbabwe, in recent times, has recorded expensive
mortgages.
The City of Harare has demanded that certain ‘urban standards’ be first achieved before it
can take responsibility of the peri-urban settlements. Indeed, under self-help provision, the
government can take a back seat in the construction of the houses but then comes in terms of
control and taxation as urban management strategies. At the same time, the rural local authorities
22
A stand is a lot or plot, usually created through layout planning and subdivision (or consolidation) of land. On this
lot, a housing structure is built. There are three basic types of stands in Zimbabwe – high-density stand (averaging
250 square meters), medium-density (averaging 450 square meters) and low-density stand (usually between 800 and
2000 square meters).
14
to which most of the peri-urban settlements belong lack in the capacity to meet those
requirements. There is a gap between the local administrative authorities themselves. Their
incorporation into urban Harare remains undone. At the backdrop of everything, there exists a
‘cold war’ between these local administrative authorities. Rural local authorities tend to rely on
land-based resources like control of farms (before the land reform) and mines. From these they
get substantial taxes. However, with urban expansion revenue is lost to the urban local
authorities. Urban expansion means that rural land is being ‘eaten up’. Sometimes this means
loss of revenue and other resources to the rural local authority. The ‘transfer’ is never that
smooth. Indeed, when two elephants fight, the grass suffers. Unfortunately, the bulk of the
‘grass’ lacks in the knowledge of the tools to asserting their existence. It is the weapon used by
politicians for political gain; they are a ‘political hot potato’ in their own right.
Issues in Cooperative Projects
There are a number of issues defining the housing cooperative projects in urban and periurban Harare (e.g. the role of women, the state, and external organizations. I provide an analysis
of the issues for reflection towards some systemic development. The role of women is shown in
many cooperatives especially the Joshua Nkomo Heights Housing Cooperative. This is a lowincome Kambuzuma Housing Cooperative23 allocated to stands to its members on a farm taken
over by war veterans after independence. The cooperative was named in honor of the late Vice
President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Comrade Joshua Nkomo. Its principal aim was to ensure
that as many women as possible would acquire housing (though it also had male members) given
the general exclusion of this group in most housing schemes in the past largely owing to
patriarchy and institutionalized discrimination against women. The cooperative adopted within
its structures transparency as a core value so that all stakeholders would appreciate its efforts to
justify the women cause. In 2003, Joshua Nkomo Heights had 2500 stands of varying sizes (of
between 300 square meters and 500 hundred square meters). Each member was entitled to pay a
monthly subscription of between Z$3500 (about US$17.60 then) and Z$5000 (about US$25
then) depending on the size of the stand allocated to him or her. Those members working within
the cooperative arranged to guarantee that the monthly subscription was paid at the end of each
month. Others paid by sweat equity, which involved using their labor in molding bricks for the
cooperative.
Mupondi (2003) has established that in the Joshua Nkomo Heights Housing Cooperative
both the men and women were involved in the brick making process, working on an average of
eight hours per day leaving them with no free time to do anything else let alone to get a little
extra earning to use for their upkeep. Because of this concerted effort in putting together
financial and labor, material resources were mobilized and core houses of two rooms per family
were built. Some ready houses were immediately availed to members on the queue. First
preference was given to those paid-up members, in terms of monthly subscriptions. Despite their
efforts to produce the required deposits and producing their identification particulars, most
women could not readily access the houses. Such a case reveals the politics of gender imbalance
in which men hijack some cooperatives. One female respondent in Mupondi’s study argued that,
“It is all because women lack in self-confidence and mutual respect. That is why, even when one
woman decides to contest for the seat of a councilor, most women would rather not support the
woman but men. It is our fault. We give men a lot of leadership chances” (Mupondi, 2003:46).
Thought the cooperative began with women, at the end of the cooperative project at least in
23
Mupondi (2003)
15
terms of stands’ allocations, of the 190 members, only 50 women benefited. Most women in the
cooperative ‘retreated behind their husbands’ fearing that whatever the case might be men would
eventually take over the project that began primarily as a women project. Male corruption was
becoming viral and this saw the selection of a committee composed of both males and females
representatives to create a code of conduct. Nevertheless, the women formed a club to help boost
their income to pay monthly subscriptions. Among the club activities were fundraisings and
sponsored walks.
In the case of Perseverance Housing Scheme in Kambuzuma that began in 1994 the role
of women was also indicated. By 2007, Perseverance Housing Scheme had 16 dedicated and
motivated members24. These worked effortlessly in order to service their land and build houses
for their membership. At the time of Mguni’s study in 2007, some of the members had left the
country due to instability in the Zimbabwean economy. This development greatly impeded the
promising progress of the cooperative in terms of building. Mguni (2007) established that 69%
of the females involved in the Perseverance Cooperative were educated, a development which
enabled them to share the financial burden with their partners, of buying building materials and
paying those building the houses for them. Perseverance Housing Scheme worked with Housing
People of Zimbabwe and the results were great. In addition, the small numbers in members
contributed to the success of this scheme. The loan that the Perseverance Housing Scheme got
from CABS boosted the production of houses. The major lesson we can draw from this is that
with ‘aid’ cooperatives can do much better. In addition, a smaller cooperative (in this case
Perseverance with just 16 members with working spouses), could manage better results that big
and crowded cooperatives, most with predominantly male-employed members. Overall, better a
small manageable group than a large and unmanageable cooperative.
Space for Accepting (or Disowning) Facilitator Support
Sometimes housing cooperatives have demonstrated that they can organize and operate
smoothly to a limited extent. As such, they would require external support including access to
building loans. However, as demonstrated in Tashinga Housing Cooperative case to be presented
here, the denial of external support has been a major cost to the project, which could have been
finished a very long time ago. Tashinga Housing Cooperative is a community-based cooperative
in Dzivarasekwa that was formed in 198825. Domestic workers who were employed in
Malbereign low-density suburb formed the cooperative. As of 2008, it had sum 224 members of
which 162 (72%) were women. A study by Chirisa and Munzwa in 2008 revealed how, (at the
time of that study), most of the members were involved in informal activities (selling fruits,
vegetables and clothes). They cited the reason for doing this as the derisory wages they said were
receiving from their employers. The founder of the cooperative is Ms Eneasia Kuchidzemhandu
and has remained the chairperson of the cooperative to date (25 years in office). The
management committee of the committee (at the time of the 2008 study) comprised only three
women out of the nine that as elected representatives. According to the chairperson, the
cooperative initiative emerged due to the need by members to own houses. As of 1988, the
chairperson’s salary was only Z$300 per month and could not take her anywhere near acquiring
a house. in this situation, she decided to join up with a similar cohort of people needing houses.
Forming a cooperative would help them pool resources together. The cooperative was formed. It
made an agreement among its members to have a ceiling on the number of people who could
24
25
Mguni (2007)
Chirisa and Munzwa (2008)
16
become members. This helped a great deal in the management of the cooperative as well as the
processes of building houses and allocating the core houses finished. Members legible as cooperators had to be residents from Malbereign and homeless. The joining fee was Z$2 and the
monthly subscription was Z$125 payable by all members. Tashinga acquired land at a cost of
Z$1 720 000 on which 224 stands of 300 square meters each were allocated to each member.
This amount was raised entirely from the cooperative’s savings26. The cooperative is guided by a
set of byelaws. These include regular attendance by members to general meetings that are held at
the beginning of every month. Those who fail to attend must pay fines. Forfeiture of
membership arises on members missing three consecutive meetings without cause.
Tashinga Housing Cooperative appointed Housing People of Zimbabwe as its project
manager. Owing to this deal, it made significant strides in the acquisition and developing its
land. HPZ signed the service agreement because the cooperative, through its management
committee was empowered to do so. . Further, HPZ assisted in getting engineers to produce the
engineering drawings and bills of quantity for the major services needed (including sewerage and
water sanitation, roads and storm drains). The level of organization was high at every stage of
payment made to the contractor. Tashinga Housing Cooperative managed to pay for the
construction of the sewer, road reticulation and storm water drain projects from the savings it
made within a six-year period. HPZ drew the cooperative plans for a fee. In 1995, the total costs
payable by the cooperative including sewer installation costs, at the obtaining rate of inflation of
30%, totaled Z$34 840. The total amount of the project was going to total Z$46 0003 200, with
funds availed in the first year (Munzwa 1999). An application made to CABS for a loan, was
successful through the help of HPZ. Upon receiving the offer letter, the cooperative decided to
retreat and go the savings route. By 1997, Tashinga Housing Cooperative had built 35 core
houses at the cost of Z$3,000,000. The finished houses were let to the members at a cost of
Z$340 per month per unit. By the end of 1997 the cooperative was collecting Z$57,820 per
month from monthly contributions of Z$205 per member per month plus Z$340 per month per
unit from the 35 core houses.
The house construction stage was not going to be as smooth as the other stages as the
savings had run out. The survey by Chirisa and Munzwa in 2008 further revealed that 180 0f the
224 houses have been constructed, albeit, at different stages - 30%of the houses were complete,
20% had 4-6 rooms completed, 30% of the completed houses had been taken over by members
who built through loans or savings from children helping parents as they were now employed.
Title deeds could only be given to owners after all the houses were completed. The study
revealed that 5% of the original members pulled out. The majority of the finished houses
belonged to the late comers who had taken over from the members who had withdrawn. Some
old members complained that these new members did not have the interests of the cooperative at
heart. This case shows the shortchanging that resulted by the management of the cooperatives
refusing assistance by ‘external organizations’ albeit to the detriment of the development strides.
In addition, the internal dynamics of the cooperative indicates the politics and strife that exist
where members are new and ‘stigmatized’ as out of touch with the allegiance to the cooperative
philosophy.
The Role of the State
Whether or not housing cooperative projects have received sufficient state support for
their operationalization is a major issue. Most have ridden of the inefficiencies and failures in the
26
Munzwa (1999)
17
state to boost their existence and prowess. Cooperatives of Sally Mugabe Heights have
capitalized on this largely as illustrated in the following few paragraphs.
Sally Mugabe Heights is located near Borrowdale, a leafy suburb of Harare. It is
however, under the jurisdiction of Goromonzi Rural District Council. The project has five
different housing schemes. In particular, Sally Mugabe cooperative has 2059 stands27.
Seventeen point seven percent (17.7%) of the people in the schemes are from communal areas,
and the rest from Harare. The layout plan for the area was achieved through government
assistance. A subscription fee of US$500 per annum has been payable to the Ministry of Local
Governance and Urban Development for a period of over ten years. In 2012, a study by
Chamadenga revealed that only 12.7% of the residents claimed title to their land while the rest
purported title after full payment. Sally Mugabe Heights being under Goromonzi Rural District
Council has experienced an on-going debate among its beneficiaries who have been divided to
remain under Goromonzi Rural District Council or be part of Harare. The settlement is a mosaic
revealing both rural and urban standards. For example, there are lacks in basic urban services
such as electricity and reticulated water. There is one primary school, no secondary school and
no clinics. Some 12m wide roads have been constructed in keeping with the Model Building
Byelaws of 1977. However, some houses are connected to ZESA illegally. Residents have been
mobilizing funds so that they can install concrete electricity pylons. Due to the frequent absence
of electricity in surrounding areas, they have constructed traditional housing structures (thatched
huts) in which to do the cooking. The case of Sally Mugabe Heights resembles schemes typical
peri-urban housing cooperatives around Harare like Harare South, Hatcliffe, Caledonia and
Whitecliffe. In these cooperatives, semi-rural housing conditions prevail. Infrastructure like
roads and piped water remain little developed. The rural and urban local authorities having a tugof-war over the settlements normally fight to the detriment of the settlers in these settlements. for
the rural local authorities, the reason for tightly holding to these emerging settlements is to gain
ground rents that tend to assume urban one hence are much bigger than the usual rural ones. At
the same time, the urban local authorities (in this case, Harare) find it costly to absorb
undeveloped sites readily into their jurisdictions. This has tended to fuel a number of challenges
among the three actors (peri-urban settlers), rural local authorities and urban local authorities
involved. Generally, there is a ‘crisis of expectations’ among the three stakeholders. In most
cases, peri-urban squalor has resulted consequently.
The case of Current Housing Consortium in Harare is another case where cooperatives
have tried to ride on state initiatives to their advantage. Harare City Council wanted to test the
idea of educating and providing technical support to intended beneficiaries of the housing
schemes28. It let members in different cooperatives work together and a pilot project in Budiriro
called Current Housing Consortium (CHC). This is a group of housing cooperatives, registered
by the Ministry of Youth Gender and Employment Creation. The consortium has 656 members.
It considered housing cooperatives that had sound management of funds from both work and
community based housing cooperatives. These had members with varied experience; some
members were already involved in housing development. These include Tamuka Housing
Cooperative that developed houses in Crowbrough by 2010 and Vimbainashe that developing
houses in Warren Park since 2003. The memorandum of understanding states that the
dissolution of CHC is subject to the housing cooperatives constructing housing units for all their
27
28
Chamadenga (2012)
Paradza (2010)
18
members hence the handover of ownership to individual members. Of work-based cooperatives,
60% of are male; women strongly represent in the community-based cooperatives. All 22
members of the CHC management committee are male. A chairperson and a treasurer represent
each cooperative. The management committee is has only been involved in site servicing and not
day-to-day operations of the consortium. CHC has managed to provide water and sewer systems
up to Harare City standards. Road construction and security installation were at an advanced
stage in 2012. Getting to this stage had taken 5 years. The major weakness of CHC has been the
imposition of development by the leadership without consulting cooperative members. The 2008
hyperinflation eroded all the savings CHC had had. New members joined replacing those that
could no longer afford to build their houses. CHC members began to pay their monthly
subscriptions in United States dollars in 2010. This enabled them to pay their contractors on time
and to purchase their raw materials from South Africa of which CHC was in now in charge of the
construction. Members with construction skills have been used as a cost cutting measure. CHC
has been maintaining the water system as HCC was already collecting rates every month.
Electricity poles are in place, what is left are connecting cables to the main electricity line. Wellleveled roads with no potholes have been constructed, though they are not paved. Due to defaults
in paying of monthly subscriptions by community-based, cooperative members of CHC are
failing to complete their projects in time, which was a source conflict in CHC. Different factors
explain how these different cooperatives have different success rates in terms of access to
housing (Table 2). Such factors point to the weaknesses in the capacity of the state to deliver
houses to its citizens.
Table 2: Summary of the Main Dimensions of Variation Highlighted
Cooperative(s)
Factors
for
survival
(political expediency)
Location
Joshua Nkomo
Heights
Housing
Cooperative
There has been naming of
the cooperative after the late
Vice President of the
Republic of Zimbabwe,
Comrade Joshua Nkomo.
Urban
Perseverance
Housing
Cooperative
This took a loan from a
building
society
and
managed to build so much it
so little time.
Urban
Tashinga
Housing
Cooperative
The cooperative was started
by domestic workers. They
refused a loan. Up to now
they are at different levels
of construction. The early
years were remarkably
successful
Naming of the cooperative
after the late wife of
President Robert Mugabe,
Now urban
but began
as
periurban
Sally Mugabe
Heights
Cooperatives
Typically
peri-urban
19
Internal
Dynamics
defining uniqueness of
the cooperative
The initial thrust was
women
empowerment.
Over the years, men have
taken the lead. Both men
and women involved in
resource pooling
The majority of the female
spouses, being educated
and employed assisted their
husbands both in decisionmaking
and
material
support.
There has been no change
in
the
leadership
specifically
the
chairperson. This may have
impeded the acceptance of
new ideas.
Services and infrastructure
remain lacking though the
members of the cooperative
Remarks
The women factor in
housing cooperative
while
an
empowerment
requirement remains
little defined. The
results have not
been as expected.
With aid, the lowincome
came
achieve great at an
accelerated rate.
Leadership can stifle
or enhance progress
of
cooperatives.
Innovation cannot
be
replaced
by
charisma.
Cooperators strive
to be as ‘politically
correct’ as possible
Sally, is a motif to achieve
acceptability
would love to be part of the
big city, Harare.
but in so doing they
fail to address the
services
and
infrastructure
requisites
that
constitute
progressive housing
developments
Discussion and Conclusion
Shelter is a fundamental human need that is essential for survival and a sense of
belonging. The issue of slums is one that is on many national agendas.
Although the
cooperative system can be depoliticized as housing provision is largely a social and technical
rather than political issue, now in Zimbabwe, it is difficult to do so. ZANU PF, which has been a
ruling party for a span of more than two and half decades, is trying to reset itself to its original
status by getting back the urban votes. Organizing people into housing cooperatives or
welcoming those cooperatives already formed and ‘providing them with land’ seems the only
option to achieve this latent goal. Politicians and political parties are rational entities, which will
ever seek to get or keep control of what brings power to them. In urban Zimbabwe, cooperatives
organization and land offers are the hook that ZANU PF is maximizing. Moreover, in this article,
I have explained the issue of patriarchy in housing cooperatives. The question becomes: How
can patriarchy be overcome in cooperatives? The answer is simple if one is to infer with other
sectors like higher education in the country. Affirmative action and strong advocacy campaigns
for the accommodation of women in the housing sector can be instrumental to manage or reduce
patriarchy. Through strong advocacy, over time, certain cultural bonds become loosed. With
increasing globalization, hence cultural mixes, coupled with favorable laws, it is becoming
increasingly difficult to maintain patriarchy as an invincible system. Like slavery and slave trade,
the notion is losing its grip. As campaigns and exposure continue, definitely, this will crumble
and housing cooperatives will shape in a positive direction. In the article, I also raised the issue
of how informal or tribal land tenure systems were rejected in favor of colonial ones. The major
reason for this was that the colonial system never sought to allow a syncretism in its dealings
with what it termed the natives. Largely it sought to simply set British standards in total. When it
saw it could not be able to achieve this, it went for a separatist ideology in which Africans were
to be confined to certain places where communal tenure systems were the dominant one while
the white enjoyed privatized systems. Overall and over the years, the formalization of informal
land tenure systems has not been attempted. The major reason has been the unwillingness by the
state to sanction something what it does not accept as the standard. Informal systems of
operations have continued to receive strong resentment from the state from the colonial days to
date (Tibaijuka 2005).
Housing schemes in Zimbabwe have led to the low-income urban groups becoming more
self-empowered by means of raising their own funds to build their houses They have not only
become a reservoir of hope but have allowed for a narrowing of the wide gulf between the rich
and the poor by having land that they can their own. Women have taken the leading role in
coming up with strategies of survival, contradictory to the very “foundation” upon which society
has built its values. The women of Sally Mugabe Heights are a classic example of how women
combated the issue of male corruption and cultural conflict, which have been dominant in many
cooperatives. The low-income are currently the largest producers of shelter and builders of cities
20
in the world. Seabrook (2007) Squatter camps increased exponentially since after independence.
Operation Murambatsvina did not make the situation any better, as there were more homeless
people in Zimbabwe than there had ever been since. Housing cooperatives came as a remedy to
eradicate this new evil that saw the poor being affected. Learning to walk on the path of selfreliance became a common feature and the backbone upon which most cooperatives were built
upon. The provision of public services in housing cooperatives such as sewerage, water services
and garbage collection are a major concern to many of the beneficiaries of the cooperatives and
this is because funds usually run out before they get to the stage of installing these. Residents
often resort to illegal connections or self-provisioning. These are the residents’ option to defend
the right to stay where they are. Land tenure is one of the complex issues in cooperatives. Land
tenure suggests a settled way of life and creates a sense of belonging. Uncertainty of the right to
ownership of land is because city councils refuse to give housing cooperatives land until they are
done building, which in some cases has become a motivator to development. This is because
though renting is a major form of housing, it is highly exploitative with conditions being below
the required standards. Housing cooperatives have therefore marked the dawning of a new era in
the lives of the urban poor in the twenty first century. Cooperatives in urban and peri-urban
Zimbabwe have faced serious politicization. As already highlighted, the government has sought,
among other things, to enhance housing cooperatives. For instance, The Daily News of 29
November 2012, through its reporter, Kachembere (2012:1) observes how the government,
through a revised national housing policy was seeking, among other things “… to promote
housing cooperatives, improve networking and stakeholder co-ordination and as well as create a
database in the housing delivery program”. This follows years of economic doldrums and
dysfunctionality in many state institutions. Political parties, especially ZANU PF have pushed
the cooperative agenda immensely. Seeing this gap, communities have coaxed the party to act in
their plea for land to build by suggesting that they will vote it to power. During run-up to
elections, the state always embrace cooperatives/informal settlements, but then reject them in
others instances especially if the votes turn out to be out favor with the party, especially ZANU
PF. this variation in state responses puts both the voters and the state in limbo. They always find
they are in need of each other albeit informally and in cheating of each other. This is really
interesting in terms of the central state, local government and cooperative roles at various points
in the housing process. For example in the period running up to the July 31, 2013 Harmonized
Elections, ZANU PF organized urban residents around cooperatives, a development which is
credited to its ability to secure urban seats after more than a decade of failure to do so hence
losing to its rival, the MDC. Urban land for housing is clearly a ‘political good’ even for ‘votebuying’. In the main, cooperatives have learnt the secret of working closely with the seating
ward councilor and mayor of the city. This is significant in land acquisition and housing
development; this collaboration seems to have largely contributed to this cooperative’s success.
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