TI: A critique of the urban transportation planning process: the performance of Portland's
2000 regional transportation plan
AU: Dueker,-Kenneth-J
SO: Transportation Quarterly v 56 no2 Spring 2002. p. 15-21
PY: 2002
ABSTRACT: The writer comments on the performance of the Portland, Oregon, Regional
Transportation Plan (RTP). The RTP for a forecast year of 2020 illustrates the tensions in the
urban transportation planning process between powerful decentralizing trends and the efforts to
reverse them. In Portland, this planning process is dominated by "new urbanist" stakeholders
who are intent on curbing urban sprawl by changing urban development patterns and
transportation behavior. However, they ignore the forecasts of transportation modeling. These
show that compact urban development land use, transportation policies, and investment do not
perform well.
TEXT: The urban transportation planning process is buffeted by one of the paradoxes of
American public opinion. The public decries urban sprawl, but craves the comfort and
convenience of the auto and larger homes and lots. Typically, planners and policy makers are
unwilling to confront the contradiction between what the public says and what it does. But "new
urbanists" are intent on changing preferences and behavior, and they have captured the urban
transportation planning process in places like Portland, OR. Portland's Year 2000 Regional
Transportation Plan (RTP) for a forecast year of 2020 illustrates the tension in the urban
transportation planning process of balancing accommodation of powerful decentralizing trends
and the advocacy of programs to reverse those trends.
David Hartgen, professor and coordinator of transportation studies at the University of North
Carolina at Charlotte, called for MPO-level (metropolitan planning organization) transportation
performance measures.(FN1)
Steve Heminger, executive director of the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, the MPO
for the nine -county San Francisco Bay Area, acknowledges criticism of MPOs in the areas of
ineffective leadership, poor information provided the public on long-range transportation plans,
and failure to set forth a regional vision.(FN2) Metro, the Metropolitan Transportation
Organization in Portland, OR, is considered by many an exception to these criticisms and
Portland is considered to be a well -performing area. However, as this article suggests, a more
powerful and visionary metropolitan planning organization may not be producing better plans.
Current trends in travel show a growth in personal transportation demand, continued dispersal of
population and economic activity, and growing congestion. However, there is reluctance to
accommodate this growth in personal auto travel and dispersal of activities, and many
stakeholders in the urban transportation planning process, particularly new urbanists, call for
plans and programs to arrest or even reverse these long-term and strong urban decentralization
trends. New urbanists are particularly strident in calling for reduced reliance on the auto and
increasing the use of alternative modes- -transit, ridesharing, walking, and cycling. New
urbanism has evolved by influencing two current and larger movements in urban planning,
sustainable planning, and smart growth, which increases the normative or doctrinaire character of
urban planning today.
Many of those who directly contribute to the travel and dispersal trends decry "urban sprawl,"
but insist that they do not have an adequate choice of alternative modes of travel and location
choices. They see a need to expand transit service to serve others and get them off the road, and
see their own schedules as too tight or complex to be serviced by transit. When offered closer in,
higher density housing options, most households opt for outlying locations where density and
costs are lower.
Meanwhile, others appear to be unconcerned about the cumulative effects of travel and
development trends. Implicitly, they trust that technology and markets will allow these trends to
continue with improved economic performance and quality of life. They perceive that most
aspects of urban life have improved and that they are better off. They are reluctant to give up the
freedom of the auto and low density living, and appear willing to travel "all over town" for a
broader selection of jobs, goods, services, education, and recreation opportunities. To the extent
they feel the effects of congestion and other urban ills, they, too, decry urban sprawl, but seek
avoidance by purchasing bigger and more comfortable vehicles, second homes, telecommuting,
or even moving farther out rather than changing their preferences for personal transportation and
low-density living.
Others adapt by relocating closer to workplaces or to more transit and pedestrian-friendly
locations. This growing, but still small group constitutes the market for transit oriented
developments (TODs) and infill housing projects. Yet it is this group that receives the most
attention by planners and the media, with efforts to grow this market and to regulate and restrict
the growth of the other markets. This group is doing more than lip service to combat urban
sprawl.
Many of the active "stakeholders" or decision makers in the urban transportation planning and
programming process embrace "new urbanism," with calls for land use and transportation
policies, regulations, and investments to promote compact urban development. The Metro 2040
Plan and the Coalition for Livable Futures are examples of processes and organizations
dominated by new urbanist stakeholders.
New urbanists support regulations to reduce conventional suburban scale development patterns,
and support subsidies for higher-density, transit oriented developments. The new urbanists
interpret "public involvement" in planning as a process of "educating" the public on the
wastefulness of driving alone, low-density developments, and an opportunity to extol the virtues
of compact development. This planning paradigm has strong political favor; supporters are active
while opponents are largely silent. Few want to speak in favor of low-density living, while
antisprawl rhetoric has more political appeal.
The profession of urban planning is split between adhering to its traditional rational planning
roots and advocating the more normative new urbanism concept. Interestingly, advocacy in
planning originated from a movement to better represent underrepresented minorities, while
advocacy today seems to represent a planning concept that some see as elitist.
Proponents of new urbanism include elected public officials, professional planners, and a
growing number of citizen activists. This coalition is becoming active in reshaping the urban
transportation planning process and redirecting transportation improvement plans away from a
"balance" that has emphasized highways to accommodate the growing number of auto users.
New urbanism planners are calling for a rebalancing of transportation investments to discourage
single occupant auto use and encourage alternative modes. They contend a continued reliance on
autos and the urban sprawl it engenders is not sustainable.
THE PORTLAND, OR CASE
In the Portland, OR, region new urbanist stakeholders control the urban transportation planning
process. In Portland, the popularity of compact urban development stems from the Oregon land
use planning system of urban growth boundaries and protection of resource lands. Portland's
"love affair" with light rail transit has resulted in transit -supportive planning processes and an
emphasis on transit-oriented development. This has been fueled by the Oregon Transportation
Planning Rule, which calls for a reduction in vehicle miles of travel (VMT) by discouraging the
use of single occupant vehicles and encouraging alternative modes. Advocacy of light rail in
Portland preceded the new urbanism movement, but it was quickly embraced in the form of
transit oriented developments "to make rail work." However, the real estate market has been less
enthusiastic about TODs and heavy public subsidies have been required to achieve these types of
development.
The new urbanist dominated urban transportation planning process has two impacts. First, the
public involvement process is tilted to stakeholders who are intent on curbing urban sprawl by
changing urban development patterns and transportation behavior. Second, the forecasts of the
transportation modeling show that the compact urban development land use and transportation
policies and investments do not perform well, but these forecast results are largely ignored. The
travel demand models used in urban transportation planning show that transit ridership will not
increase enough to diminish congestion or to justify the transit investments.
The year 2020 forecast of performance measures in Portland's 2000 RTP is sobering. Even with
generous assumptions about land use density and parking prices, and a 50% increase in transit
hours of service, only an increase from 3.5% to 5.1% is forecast for transit mode share in the
financially constrained scenario. On the other hand, in spite of relaxed level of service standards
for measuring traffic congestion and generous assumptions regarding ride sharing, congestion in
the peak period is expected to grow from 198 miles to 684 miles, a 245% increase. If the
ambitious assumptions regarding transit ridership are not met, an even higher level of congestion
than is forecast will occur.
The financially constrained scenario in the Year 2000 RTP identifies $1.94 billion for transit
capital, yielding an increase from 4,400 to 6,400 average weekday transit revenue hours, an
increase of 45%. The plan identifies $1.26 billion for highway capacity expansion, from 3,805 to
4,140 lane miles, an 8.8% increase.(FN3) This corresponds to a projected 50% increase in
average weekday auto trips, from 4.27 million per day to 6.39 million. The average weekday
vehicle miles of travel is estimated to grow by nearly 50%, from 16.11 million to 24.04 million.
Vehicle miles of travel per capita is estimated to grow by 2.28%. But the transit investment will
only reduce the proportion of single occupant vehicle trips from 61.48% to 60.74%, a less than
one percentage point reduction.
The financially constrained scenario of the 2000 RTP calls for a transit capital cost investment of
$1.18 per 2020 forecast transit trip and a highway capital cost investment of $0.05 per 2020
forecast auto trip. This imbalance or under-investment in highway capacity is expected to result
in a 560% increase in congested hours in the PM peak period, from 7,764 to 51,494 hours, or
from 6.5% of the miles in the highway network to 21.6%.
The Atlanta Regional Commission conducted a Peer City Survey of growth indicators of 20-year
forecasts. The peer city average transit share increase was 0.68% per year. Portland was the
highest at 3.58% increase in transit ridership per year. No other city comes close to forecasting a
100% increase in 20 years. Most forecast a loss and two forecast an increase of 25 to 35%. They
also compared VMT growth and speeds in the peak hour. In both cases Portland was well below
average. Portland tends to be more optimistic about increasing transit ridership and curbing the
auto than other metropolitan planning organizations. The peer comparison suggests the Portland
RTP estimates to be wishfully optimistic or unrealistic.
The poorly performing forecasts that are contained in the year 2000 RTP do not seem to have
any impact on the transportation investment plan. Consequently, I contend the 2000 RTP is not
internally consistent, nor achievable. The plan is unsustainable in that the land use and mode
choice assumptions result in congestion levels that people will not tolerate. Also, there is
insufficient evidence that the assumed housing and job densities associated with compact
development will occur, especially at the forecasted levels of congestion. Similarly, transit
ridership outcomes are inconsistent with what people would expect for the amount of transit
investment called for in the plan. These outcomes strongly suggest that land use will not occur as
assumed and there is no land use feedback loop in the land use-transportation modeling system
to correct for this. If land does not develop at the assumed densities transit ridership will not be
as high as expected, which may lead to even higher levels of congestion. The expected and
unexpected congestion will likely lead to a more dispersed land use pattern, which will increase
the difficulty in achieving the transit ridership targets, and make the large transit investment even
more uneconomic.
The new urbanist change agents call for redressing past imbalances by increasing investments in
alternative modes and reducing highway investment. But if consumers choose not to live, work,
and shop at the assumed locations and at the assumed densities, the result may be more auto
travel and more sprawl than would occur in the absence of such strong planning assumptions.
The urban transportation planning process in Portland is deficient in not adjusting the land use
forecasts to reflect higher than assumed levels of congestion and lower than assumed levels of
transit ridership.
Metro is developing a land use model, called MetroScope, which will provide the land use
feedback loop in the urban transportation planning process in Portland. However, problems can
be anticipated in its application. Land use modeling generally, and MetroScope in particular, is
in an R&D stage and reliable and defensible results are problematic at this time. This will lead to
disputes in interpreting model results. Some will see support for the concerns raised in this
article, while other will dismiss the results as an extrapolation of past trends that need changing.
Metro commissioned a study to examine why development in urban centers was occurring at
lower than anticipated densities and to identify policy directions that would be effective in
increasing development densities. The analysis concludes that the desired 2040 levels of density
are not being achieved in the centers--the principal reason being that zoning in centers is
generally ahead of the market. But instead of revisiting assumption and targets, new regulations
and incentives are proposed.
To the extent the change-agent stakeholders acknowledge the poor performance, they consider it
as evidence that even stronger regulations and policies are needed. Instead it should be a signal
to revisit the assumptions, investments, and policies upon which the plan is based.
The urban transportation planning process in Portland is in trouble. Transit and density targets
are too high to be achieved. New urbanist change agents are ignoring evidence contained in the
2000 RTP, which indicates the plans and policies for which they advocate are not performing.
They seem unwilling to consider plans that are more accommodating to travel preferences of the
majority of urban area residents. The urban transportation planing process in Portland has been
subordinated to the achievement of state-mandated and regional governmental supported land
use goals. This has resulted in a transportation plan that is target driven and not very realistic or
achievable.
IMPLICATIONS
The stakeholders in the urban transportation planning process should not treat the auto and lowdensity development as enemies. Urban planning ought to establish land use policies and make
transportation investments that reflect the positive aspects of personal transportation that people
value highly, while at the same time "taming" the negative impacts of auto mobility.
Autobashing and sprawl busting rhetoric need to be scaled down, as density and transit are not
likely to be accepted at levels that would be necessary to reverse a significant amount of auto
use. Many urban planners have a faith in new urbanism that is blind to what reasonable forecasts
tell them. Their exuberance is politically popular, but the accountability of their profession is at
stake. This bubble will burst and the politics of new urbanism will be challenged when
congestion grows to gridlock. This is near in Portland, which was promised that investments in
rail transit would obviate the need for investing in highways. This is proving to be untrue.
Urban transportation planners are caught between what people say and what people do. In
Portland, planners are directed by new urbanism politics to develop plans that are not internally
consistent or sustainable. Densities that would be needed to drive down auto use and increase the
use of transit are far beyond what would be socially and economically acceptable.
New urbanism-based planning in Portland, and elsewhere will likely lead to backlashes, such as
central city neighborhood and suburban jurisdiction opposition to upzoning proposals, the flight
of families seeking the space they need and can afford, and ballot initiatives to finance and build
roads. An urban transportation planning process that is predicated on reducing personal
transportation and increasing densities faster than market acceptance invites opposition. Yet the
opposition to date has been mild, as the inertia of current trends masks the impacts of visionary
plans. And the assumptions upon which such plans are based take time to show their
deficiencies.
Added material
Kenneth J. Dueker is professor of urban studies and planning, and director of the Transportation
Studies Center at Portland State University. He directed the Center for Urban Studies at Portland
State from 1979 to 1998. His transportation research interests include transportation and land use
interactions, travel and parking behavior, and Geographic Information Systems- -Transportation.
He is an Emeritus Member of the Spatial Data and Information Science Committee of the
Transportation Research Board. Additionally, Dueker was awarded the Horwood Service Award
by the Urban and Regional Information Systems Association, and the Millar Award by Portland
State University for his long-term research record.
FOOTNOTES
1. "MPO Performance: Why, How, When? A Scene from the Rear-View Mirror." Ideas in
Motion, Transportation Quarterly 51(4), (1997): 26-29.
2. "Growing Pain for Metropolitan Planning. "Ideas in Motion, Transportation Quarterly 55(3),
(2001): 7-9.
3. A more recent tabulation of RTP financially constrained system identifies the modal share of
committed and planned transportation funds for roads, 33% (road modernization, 25%; freeways,
8%), and transit, 56% (transit LRT, 42%; bus transit, 14%). The 1992-2003 actual allocations
were roads, 60% (road modernization, 13%; freeways, 47%) and transit, 17%. Source:
Attachment 5, 2002 MTIP Update, JPACT, Metro, July 31, 2001.
Portland has and proposes to increase heavy investment in transit capital. The Metropolitan
Transportation Improvement Program (MTIP) process in Portland has diminished the importance
of cost -benefit efficiency criteria in project selection and places an increasing weight on projects
that are supportive of the 2040 Plan, a plan with strong normative growth containment and
densification policies. The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is
reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is
prohibited. UD: 20020614 AN: 200211911700