THE PRIME MINISTER
INTRODUCTION
The prime minister is the head of the executive branch in the UK. The office dates back to
Walpole (1721-42), though Disraeli was the first occupant of the office to describe himself as
prime minister when signing the Treaty of Berlin (1878). The formal powers of the prime
minister are by convention exercised on behalf of the Queen. The prime minister appoints,
reshuffles and dismisses ministers, and appoints archbishops and bishops, senior judges and the
heads of public bodies. He chairs meetings of, and sets the agenda for the Cabinet (and for
Cabinet committees, whose membership and terms of reference he also determines). He requests
a dissolution of parliament by the Queen in preparation for a general election. He is head of the
civil service and of the armed forces, and also grants honours. His formal power rests on his
being the elected leader of the party with a majority of seats in the House of Commons. In
principle, he is ‘primus inter pares’ (first among equals); in practice the prime minister is chief
policy maker and the acknowledged spokesman for the government. Leadership of their party is
the means by which prime ministers exercise control over the House of Commons and is the basis
of their national leadership and high public profile.
THE POWER OF THE PM
Asquith declared that ‘the office of prime minister is what its holder chooses, and is able to
make of it’. His power is not confined to his formal duties, and varies with the incumbent of the
office and with circumstances. Over the last hundred years, a variety of such circumstances, such
as the challenges of wartime leadership, the opportunities for international diplomacy, and the
ability to address the nation directly via the media, have allowed for the greater exercise of
power. The factors influencing the power of any individual prime minister include support from
ministerial colleagues, opportunities to take successful initiatives (particularly in periods of
national crisis), the size of his party’s Commons majority, party unity over policy, the strength (or
weakness) of the Opposition, favourable media coverage and standing in opinion polls, the health
of the economy, and the ability to project a statesmanlike image. Prime ministers are often at their
strongest when offered an opportunity to provide leadership in wartime or periods of conflict
overseas – as was the case with Churchill (1940-45), Thatcher (in the Falklands in 1982) and
Blair (in the conflicts in Afghanistan (2002) and in Iraq (2003)). Successful prime ministers have
a clear perception of what they want to achieve, and exert their control over the political agenda,
at the same time knowing when and to whom to delegate, in the process creating a strong team or
else benefiting from creative tension. They have the ability to prioritise policy commitments, to
maintain the support of senior colleagues and their party, and to grasp opportunities on the
domestic and international stage. They often need determination to see through unpopular
policies, while exploiting any political tide (such as public opinion, the weakness of the
Opposition, the strength of the economy, or healthy standing in the polls) that is flowing in their
favour. And, perhaps above all, they need stamina and not a little luck.
GROWTH IN THE POWER OF THE PM
It is now seen as axiomatic that the power of the prime minister has increased over time, partly
reflecting the growth in the scope and complexity of government, and partly because of the
media’s preoccupation with personality and style over substance. It is often claimed that Cabinet
government has made way for prime ministerial government, and this is scarcely a recent
charge. After Macmillan’s dismissal of seven Cabinet ministers in 1962, Crossman (1963)
contended that ‘the post-war epoch has seen the final transformation of Cabinet government into
prime ministerial government’. The same theme was echoed by Mackintosh (1977), Benn (!985)
and Crick (2003). Hailsham (1976) argued that the UK was suffering from ‘elective dictatorship’,
an observation that pre-dated the premierships of both Thatcher and Blair! The ‘prime
ministerial’ government thesis focuses upon the range of patronage available to the prime
minister and his tendency to by-pass the Cabinet in making policy decisions - Mackintosh saw the
Cabinet as little more than a clearing house and a court of appeal. Other factors are his control
over the civil service, his dominance of the House of Commons, his high media profile, and his
ability to appear ‘above politics’ and to make direct, statesmanlike appeals to the electorate. The
thesis was revived during the Thatcher premiership, when the power of the office appeared to be
stretched to its limits. More recent commentators, focusing specifically upon the present prime
minister, have described Blair’s leadership style as ‘Napoleonic’ (Hennessey), ‘presidential’
(Foley) and even ‘monarchical’ (Cohen). They underline his control over the Cabinet Office and
creation of a prime minister’s department in all but name, as well as his primacy in foreign policy
and regular resort to the bully pulpit as a means of taking forward his own policy agenda. Yet
every strong prime minister since Gladstone was accused of being dictatorial, and even
presidential.
CONSTRAINTS ON THE PM
The growth of patronage has certainly enhanced prime ministerial power. All prime ministers aim
to ensure that their Cabinets contain a good number of colleagues who share their political
ideology, though it is in their appointments to Cabinet committees, responsible for the lion’s
share of policy decisions, that their powers of patronage really come into play. This was
particularly evident with Thatcher, who also had frequent recourse to ad hoc committees and to
meetings with individual ministers as a basis for determining policy, an approach also favoured
by Blair, who is often seen as the authoritative spokesman for all aspects of government policy.
Nevertheless, the prime ministerial thesis can be over-stated, and it is important to distinguish
between an apparently presidential ‘style’ and political reality. Prime ministers do not have a free
hand, and ultimately need to carry their ministerial colleagues and backbenchers with them.
Heath was forced into a series of policy U-turns which undermined his authority, while Major
never really overcame the handicaps of inheriting a bitterly divided party with a small Commons
majority, the humiliating withdrawal from the ERM, and a barrage of press criticism of his
‘indecisive’ leadership. All prime ministers face constraints, and particularly when the political
tide finally turns against them, however impressive their earlier track record might have been.
The sheer volume of work means that no prime minister can be aware of and involved in
everything. Issues cannot be permanently kept off the agenda, while unexpected crises are
inevitable. The number of dissidents on the backbenches increases as more ministers are
dismissed and more ambitions are frustrated. And all prime ministers, however ostensibly strong,
run the risk of a leadership challenge.
Even over the course of a premiership, power is subject to considerable fluctuation. For much of
her time in office Thatcher faced a divided opposition, had the benefit of substantial North Sea oil
revenues, and was presented with several ‘dragons’ to slay, in the shape of General Galtieri,
Arthur Scargill and the leaders of the Soviet Union. She was in an ideological minority in her
own Cabinet between 1979 and 1983, and at the peak of her power between 1983 and 1987. Yet
she was ousted in 1990 as party divisions over Europe intensified and once she was perceived as
an electoral liability who had lost her touch after the introduction of the ill-fated community
charge. Blair enjoyed the benefit of huge Commons majorities, a united party and persistent leads
in the opinion polls, a weak and divided Opposition, favourable media treatment, foreign policy
success and a strong economic inheritance. Yet much the same had been true of Thatcher in 1987.
The parallel is, however, not exact – Blair’s strength and apparent ability to ‘walk on water’ has,
at least until recently, rested less on a dominant personality than on the dramatic growth in the
size and importance of the Cabinet Office and the accompanying centralisation of power.
TONY BLAIR
Tony Blair became prime minister following Labour’s landslide victory in the 1997 General
Election, and his huge Commons majority was barely dented with the party’s second victory in
2001. He came to office determined to make ‘New’ Labour ‘the natural party of government’ and
exercises greater control over the party’s policies than has any previous Labour leader. At the
same time the gradual shift towards the centralisation of governmental decision-making
machinery in 10 Downing Street has led many commentators to suggest that Blair is also the most
powerful prime minister in history. For several years, it appeared that he practically ‘walked on
water’, both in his party and in the country, though his second term has become increasingly
turbulent, with mounting criticism in parliament and a considerable loss of trust among voters.
Prime ministers, who have no departments of their own to run, are not short of sources of advice,
and the number of such sources has grown in recent years. The process pre-dates Blair’s
premiership. All prime ministers since Wilson have had ‘inner cabinets’ of senior ministers, or
even ‘kitchen cabinets’, where their most trusted colleagues and intimate advisers (such as
Campbell and Mandelson after 1997) meet on a regular basis, and are thus at the heart of the
prime minister’s policy-making exercise. The Policy Unit was originally set up in 1974, and was
expanded in size by Blair in 1997, with David Miliband as its head. It has become particularly
significant, being now located in the Cabinet Office and used as an instrument of prime
ministerial coordination and domination of policy. The Cabinet Office, first established by Lloyd
George, was the central coordinating body within the civil service, with the principal role of
facilitating the work of the Cabinet, though it is now a resource for the prime minister rather than
the Cabinet. The Cabinet Office and prime minister’s office have been closely integrated since
1998, effectively creating a coordinating ‘Policy and Government’ (or ‘joined-up government’)
office for the prime minister, under Jonathan Powell, Blair’s chief of staff. After the general
election of 2001 Blair merged the Policy Unit with his Private Office to create a new ‘Number
Ten Policy Directorate’, headed by the civil servant, Jeremy Heywood, who works alongside
Powell, and which consists of a number of sections. Alastair Campbell was moved from his role
as Blair’s official press spokesman to become Director of Communications in a new Strategy
Unit. He was replaced in 2004 by Blair’s former press chief, David Hill, who has not retained the
power of his predecessor to give orders to civil servants. Anji Hunter became head of the new
Government Relations Unit, designed to oversee relationships with ministers, with the devolved
assemblies and with the Labour party, and was replaced by Sally Morgan in 2003. Pat McFadden
was appointed to the new post of Director of Political Operations, while Geoff Mulgan, former
head of the Forward Strategy Unit, replaced Andrew Adonis as Director of Policy Operations.
The Head of the Home Civil Service, Andrew Turnbull, appointed in 2002, is Cabinet Secretary
in the strengthened Cabinet Office, with a ‘reform and delivery team’ of permanent secretaries
under his leadership, and a brief requiring civil servants to focus upon administration, while
government ministers specialise in policy-making. Permanent secretaries no longer simply have
the role of securing agreement between government departments on the prime minister's behalf;
they are now intimately involved in policy innovation and in actively promoting crossdepartmental policies. They were informed by Turnbull that they would be ‘held to account’ for
delivering the government’s agenda, thus cementing the links between Cabinet Office and
Downing Street officials. A formidable number of ‘units’ under this umbrella have been created,
including those for Performance and Innovation, Social Exclusion and Delivery; the PIU was renamed the Strategy Unit in 2001. These units deal with issues that cut across departmental
boundaries, and are staffed by civil servants, though members of the Policy Unit are very closely
involved in the various projects. The Delivery Unit, which supports the prime minister on public
services delivery, was relocated from the Cabinet Office to the Treasury in 2003. The effect of
these developments is to provide for ‘spatial’ leadership, giving Blair access to his own, separate
source of authority and policy-making power, and in the process further reducing the influence of
the civil service in providing advice, and of the Cabinet in decision making. In September 2003
Alan Milburn, one of Blair’s closest allies, was brought back into the Cabinet as minister without
portfolio, and with specific responsibility for spearheading Labour’s 2005 General Election
campaign, another example of what Hennessey has described as Blair’s highly personalised style
of ‘command and control’. The result is that all significant iniatives must be cleared with Blair’s
office before they are announced, a process that has become increasingly set in stone during the
second term. In November 2004, there were leaked details of a memo, sent by Alan Milburn and
his deputy, Ruth Kelly, to ministers and copied to senior figures, including Turnbull and Powell.
It confirms the existence of what is effectively a prime minister’s department, based around the
existing policy directorate and strategy unit. It sets out the division of responsibilities for
domestic policy areas, and requires ministers to send copies to Milburn and Kelly (promoted to
the Cabinet in December 2004) of all submissions and memos to the prime minister. They will
then identify ‘priorities’ for Blair, with a view to enabling him to optimise the use of his time.
The effect of these arrangements is to provide Blair with a ‘gatekeeper’ in the run-up to the
General Election, as well as to limit Gordon Brown’s input into the campaign.
The Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (2002), revealed that the number of
special policy advisers had risen from 32 under Major to 81 in 2002, with no fewer than 26
reporting directly to Blair. Since then their number has grown less quickly. They provide direct
and often highly specialist advice to the prime minister and to government ministers beyond that
available through the traditional route of the civil service, while not being required to observe the
latter code’s principles of impartiality and objectivity. This enables Blair to challenge any
departmental policy, and therefore to assume the lead in policy formulation and debate. Greater
control has also emerged in the appointment of individuals with a specific brief, and reporting
directly to Blair, such as Lord Birt, former BBC Director-General, appointed in 2002 to lead a
review of the railways. Thatcher had made use of independent think tanks, particularly the Centre
for Policy Studies, while Blair has done likewise, attaching particular weight to the
recommendations of the Institute for Public Policy Research. By 2003, as many as 238 of these
task forces and advisory groups had been set up.
IS BLAIR REALLY A PRESIDENT?
The description of Blair as a ‘president’ has been a constant refrain over the course of his
second term, and particularly after he opened the way for White House-style television briefings
in September 2003. Temperamentally, Blair is certainly more of a president than a prime
minister, as he has an obvious disdain for the House of Commons (voting in fewer than 5% of
divisions), a marked preference for the world stage and for the dramatic focus on the ‘big’
domestic issues. He specialises in ‘spatial leadership’, while the pronounced stress on the
presentation of policy has underlined his role as spokesman for both the government and the
nation. He has reorganised, expanded and centralised the core executive (chief of staff, policy
directorate, strategy unit, directors of communications, government relations and political
operations) to create a prime minister’s office in all but name, though of course on nothing like
the same scale as the American EXOP. At the same time, advocates of the ‘presidential’ thesis
may be guilty of confusing substance and style. There is nothing new about prime ministerial
reliance upon core insiders and political advisers, nor attempts to exercise a measure of control
over the media, while the process of centralising government and downgrading the influence of
Cabinet and civil servants did not begin with Blair. He has certainly accelerated these earlier
developments, and is particularly prone to the ‘presidential’ charge whenever he raises his profile
at international meetings, or has chosen to stake his reputation on direct appeals to the public over
the head of parliament, and even his own Cabinet. All modern prime ministers have relished any
very public exercise in international diplomacy, such as meetings of the European Council and
G8 summits. Blair has made regular overseas trips, such as those to India and Pakistan in 2002, to
Russia in 2003 and to several nations in the Middle East in 2004, though the ‘globetrotting’ has
frequently led to criticism that he is neglecting more urgent domestic problems. Blair has always
denied this charge; indeed he has been able to ride roughshod over some of Labour’s manifesto
pledges in pursuit of his ‘modernising’ agenda. This agenda is very unpopular in some quarters of
his party, and since 2001 this is reflected in the size and frequency of backbench rebellions.
BLAIR AND IRAQ
It is, however, Blair’s unshakeable alliance with President Bush over Iraq that has created a long
succession of difficulties. In 2002 Blair had quickly emerged as the (self-styled) leader of the
anti-terrorist coalition, adding weight to the accusation that he increasingly saw himself as
presidential. In 2003 he risked his political future in siding with Bush against most other EU
leaders in sanctioning military action against the regime in Iraq, despite the failure to secure a
second UN resolution. The decision to go to war cost Blair his Foreign Secretary, and, given the
scale of backbench rebellion, was made possible only through the support of the Conservative
Opposition. In April 2003, Blair admitted that he would have resigned had the vote gone against
him. Since the end of the war, his apocalyptic conviction has, if anything, increased in intensity,
despite the repeated failure to find weapons of mass destruction, the continuing violence in Iraq,
the video tapes of British hostages being beheaded, the widespread hatred in Britain of George
Bush, and the considerable fall in retrospective support for the war. Before the Second Reading
vote on top-up tuition fees and the publication of the Hutton Report in January 2004, newspapers
had referred to Blair as ‘on the edge of an abyss’, and there was mounting speculation that his
days as prime minister might be numbered. Blair survived the Commons vote by the narrowest of
margins while, to quote Campbell, his erstwhile Director of Communications, his exoneration by
Hutton a few days later ‘removed the stain on the integrity of the prime minister and the
government’. Yet the outcome might easily have been very different. The report effectively
highlighed the dangers of adopting a presidential approach. It revealed that, in the run up to the
publication of the allegedly ‘sexed up’ dossier, Foreign Office and MOD officials had been
largely ignored, with Blair conferring with senior advisers in a series of ‘running meetings’ to
plan the government’s response to the Kelly and Gilligan allegations. There was also little
opportunity to debate the dossier in Cabinet; it was eventually ‘nodded through’, as was the
invasion of Iraq itself. The subsequent Butler Report revealed that intelligence chiefs had taken
raw information directly to the prime minister without prior and proper checking and scrutiny.
Blair later expressed regret for intelligence failures, though made no apology for the weapons of
mass destruction claim that had been advanced as justification for war against Iraq. The public’s
trust in the prime minister had already fallen before Hutton and Butler reported, and the findings
in these reports have not served to reverse the trend. Yet Blair has an almost Panglossian ability
to make the best of any situation, however unpromising. He is proving to be a remarkably
resilient prime minister, despite his unpopularity, widespread criticism, loss of trust and growing
doubts about his health. In some ways his political ascendancy is undiminished – Cabinet
colleagues have devised an increasingly Blairite agenda for the expected third term, a term that
the prime minister states he will serve in full.