How Are We Doing?
Group-Based Economic Assessments and African American Political Behavior
J. Matthew Wilson
Southern Methodist University
Abstract: Using data from the National Black Election Study, this paper tests the importance of
group-based economic evaluations in driving African American political behavior.1 Group-based
evaluations powerfully influence presidential approval and vote choice, even controlling for national
and personal evaluations and a conception of “linked fate.” More importantly, group-based
assessments are a significant and independent influence on turnout, the central variable in black
electoral politics. The results extend and reconsider the implications of linked fate as a motivator of
black political behavior and suggest that a revision of traditional notions of economic voting is in
order, at least for African Americans.
For some time, scholars and pundits alike have recognized the vital importance of economic
issues in determining the outcomes of American national elections (Kramer 1971; Tufte 1975; Hibbs,
Rivers, and Vasilatos 1982). “It’s the economy, stupid,” the Democratic mantra in 1992, could
reasonably be applied to most modern presidential contests. There is virtually universal agreement
that voters’ evaluations of an incumbent’s economic record weigh heavily in the electoral decision
calculus. On what basis, however, do voters arrive at these judgments? This question has been a
source of scholarly debate and refinement for over three decades.
The first comprehensive empirical model of economic voting, advanced by Kramer (1971),
implicitly assumed that voters reward or punish incumbents according to changes in their own
economic circumstances. This view, labeled the “pocketbook” hypothesis, was soon challenged by an
alternative view arguing that citizens tend to discount personal financial fortunes and look instead to
the economic well-being of the nation as a whole (the “sociotropic” hypothesis—see Kinder and
Kiewiet 1979, 1981). More recently, other scholars have moved away from a monolithic treatment of
the electorate, positing systematic variation in economic voting according to acceptance of American
core values (Feldman 1982), media consumption (Mutz 1992), and political sophistication (Gomez
and Wilson 2001, 2003, 2006), among other factors. Overall, the literature on economic voting seems
to have reached a broad consensus: sociotropic considerations are generally more powerful predictors
of candidate choice than pocketbook ones, but with some important and interesting heterogeneity
among voters.
This widely accepted understanding of economic voting, however, overlooks a third potential
source of economic evaluations: group-based heuristics. As originally set forth by a small group of
scholars in the 1980s (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Conover 1985, 1988; Kinder, Adams, and Gronke
1989), this view holds that individuals, in making economic judgments, look not primarily to their
own economic circumstances or to the economic health of the nation, but to the relative prosperity of
1
a relevant social group. Theoretically, this explanation would seem to make a great deal of sense. The
social group is a unit of reference large enough to iron out the idiosyncrasies of personal experience2,
but small enough to create a stronger identification and sense of commonality than the national whole
(Tajfel 1981; Turner 1987). Empirically, however, the evidence is mixed. While Conover (1985,
1988) finds that group-based evaluations exert a significant, independent effect on political attitudes,
Kinder, Adams, and Gronke (1989) find that group-based evaluations are only weakly and indirectly
related to vote choice.3 Thus, the exact nature of the relationship between group-based economic
evaluations and citizen political behavior remains unclear.
The idea of group-based economic heuristics has not, however, been developed fully in the
area for which it would seem most appropriate: African American politics. Both Conover and
Kinder, Adams, and Gronke examine social groups in general, without looking specifically at the black
community. Individuals are analyzed with respect to those groups with whom they profess
“closeness,” whether it be farmers, the middle class, students, the elderly, or any other social
grouping—thus, racial identity is only one of many types of group consciousness considered. There is
considerable reason, however, to argue that racial identity among African Americans is of a different
order of magnitude than other group loyalties, and ought to be treated separately. Black politics
scholars have long observed that racial solidarity dominates any other sub-group identifications,
including gender, religion, and class, for African Americans (Walton 1985; Henry 1990; Higginbotham
1992; Tate 1994). Dawson (1994) offers perhaps the clearest articulation of this view, advancing the
idea of “linked fate” as an explanation for black political behavior. According to Dawson, African
Americans are profoundly conscious that their own success is inextricably linked with the well-being
of the black community in its entirety. Moreover, because of historical experience, blacks are easily
able to separate the level of prosperity in “society as a whole” (i.e. white society) from economic
conditions among African Americans. According to social psychologists, this sense of group
2
connectedness, coupled with relative deprivation, forms an ideal foundation for the development of
group-based political heuristics (Gurin, Miller, and Gurin 1980; Tajfel 1981; Turner 1987; Sniderman,
Brody, and Tetlock 1991).
If Dawson’s argument is correct, there are many theoretical reasons to expect that groupbased economic evaluations significantly influence African American political attitudes and behavior.
Some of these can be framed in terms of Downs’ (1957) seminal account of information acquisition
and rational voting. To begin with, group-based economic evaluations entail little more information
cost than pocketbook evaluations. African Americans are likely to have extensive contacts with other
African Americans in neighborhood, church, workplace, and extended familial settings. Given this
level of interaction, one could make a reasonable group-based economic evaluation by considering the
circumstances of one’s daily associates, not much more difficult than simply considering one’s own
circumstances. As Mutz and Mondak (1997, p. 287) argue, “the procurement costs and
trustworthiness of group-level economic information are likely to be favorable.” Thus, for the
relatively unsophisticated voter willing to bear very little information cost, a group-based heuristic is
possible, as long as the individual identifies his or her own interest with that of the black community
as a whole. Since, according to Dawson, the recognition of linked fate is almost universal in the black
community, group-based economic heuristics are likely even for politically unsophisticated African
Americans.
For the more sophisticated black voter, who actually seeks political information beyond that
acquired incidentally, a group-oriented political calculus is also likely in the Downsian model. Downs
maintains that most voters seek to transfer information costs by turning to outside sources for
synthesis and interpretation of political and economic events. Downs identifies four main sources of
such information: the major media, interest groups, political parties, and the government. As the last
two are regarded by most voters (and particularly black voters) as biased and/or inaccessible, most
3
political information comes from either the major media or interest groups. Downs contends that
individuals seek out information sources that share their priorities and perspectives, so that
information costs can be reliably transferred. Group-oriented media outlets are especially likely to be
chosen in this regard. According to Walton (1985), the black press serves as a crucial information
source and filtration mechanism in the black community, casting national news stories in terms of
community interest.4 Likewise, the publications of organizations such as the NAACP, the SCLC, or
the Urban League will naturally tend to cast issues in terms of racial group interest. To the extent that
black voters seek political information from these sources, they will be encouraged to “think black” in
making political and economic evaluations. Thus, according to the Downsian model of information
acquisition, one would expect many black voters, both sophisticated and unsophisticated, to employ
group-based heuristics in making political choices.
Hypotheses
If black voters indeed employ group-based heuristics in evaluating a president’s economic
performance, this should be reflected in vote choice models. All else equal, voters who think that
economic conditions in the black community have improved should be significantly more likely to
support the incumbent than those who feel that conditions have worsened or remained the same.
This relationship should hold even after controlling for the voter’s evaluations of personal and
national economic circumstances. As a corollary, these evaluations should also significantly influence
a voter’s affect toward the incumbent presidential candidate, but not toward the challenger. In all
extant conceptions of the economics and voting model (Downs 1957; Kramer 1971; Fiorina 1981;
Kinder and Kiewiet 1981), voters evaluate the economic performance of the incumbent with respect
to some referent (be it themselves, their group, or the nation). Economics therefore influences
elections through its impact on evaluations of the current president; evaluations of the challenger,
4
about whom there is presumably little or no retrospective information, should remain constant,
regardless of a voter’s perception of current economic circumstances. Thus, one would expect black
voters who feel that economic conditions in the black community have improved to have higher
opinions of incumbents (e.g. Reagan in 1984, Bush in 1992, Clinton in 1996, Bush in 2004), while
their opinions of challengers (e.g. Mondale, Clinton, Dole, and Kerry) remain essentially unaffected.
In many respects, however, candidate affect and vote choice are not the central questions in
black electoral politics. One must remember that any increased likelihood of African Americans
voting Republican is strictly relative. As a general rule, blacks vote overwhelmingly for Democrats. A
Democratic presidential candidate has not in recent memory won less than 85% of the African
American vote. Black voter turnout, on the other hand, does fluctuate significantly from election to
election, and is often a critical element in the victory or defeat of Democratic candidates. The key
question on election day is generally not “For whom will blacks vote?” but “How many blacks will
vote?”. Thus, any analysis of African American political behavior that does not include turnout is
clearly incomplete.
Turnout is typically modeled, in empirical accounts, as a function of socio-demographic
variables (income, education, gender, etc.) and political interest or motivation (see, among many
others, Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Conway, 1991; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Few
scholars have devoted any attention to the impact of economic evaluations on political participation.
Yet it is quite plausible that the same forces that drive candidate affect and vote choice could
significantly influence turnout levels as well. For many people, particularly members of minority
populations, whether to vote, not for whom to vote, is the central political choice and vehicle for
expression of preferences. In this view, perception of declining economic well-being, either of the
family, the group, or the nation, could act as a galvanizing force, prompting anger and motivating an
individual to turn out to vote against the incumbent.
5
This pattern seems particularly likely with regard to group-based economic evaluations in the
African American community, given the overwhelming homogeneity of black partisan loyalties.
Uhlaner (1989) has outlined formally the potential power of group identity in spurring political
participation, particularly when group members share common political interests and allegiances.5
Moreover, Dawson (1994) and others have noted that the tendency of African American economic
fortunes to decline during Republican administrations is a source of significant anger in the black
community. This lends credence to the notion that blacks who perceive their community’s economic
fortunes to be waning would be galvanized to turn out in opposition to a Republican incumbent (e.g.
Reagan in 1984, Bush in 1992, or Bush in 2004). Blacks who felt that their community’s economic
conditions were improving, by contrast, would be more internally conflicted: their traditional
Democratic allegiances would be mitigated by their perceptions of current circumstances (i.e.
improvement for the group under a Republican president). These individuals, according to both
empirical and formal models, would be less likely to vote on election day, thus exercising what Tate
(1994) terms the option of “exit.” According to Tate, many black voters use the turnout decision as
the primary means for the expression of their political sentiments. If they dislike the Democratic
nominee, feel that Democrats have been ignoring the black community, and/or approve of certain
aspects of the Republican candidate’s platform or performance, they are still unlikely to actually vote
for the GOP—for most, this option is effectively foreclosed for both affective and policy-based
reasons. Instead, their response may well be to stay home on election day (something that Tate argues
many black voters did in 1988 because of displeasure with Michael Dukakis).6 On this point, Tate
(1994, pg. ix) tellingly quotes Voter Education Project Director Ed Brown: “The view is that blacks
have nowhere else to go, but blacks always have somewhere to go—they can go fishing.” Clearly, any
assessment of the relationship between economic assessments and African American political choice
must include an examination of turnout, but this element is almost entirely absent from extant work.
6
This study seeks to measure the impact of group-based economic assessments on African
American political behavior, in terms of candidate evaluation, vote choice, and, most importantly,
turnout. Building on Dawson’s (1994) work, I construct models of presidential candidate affect and
vote choice, testing the relative simultaneous effects of personal, group, and national economic
evaluations among African Americans. From there, I proceed to test the crucial and heretofore
unexamined participation hypothesis, modeling turnout as a function of demographic variables,
strength of political preferences, sense of linked fate, and the three different levels of economic
evaluation. Taken together, these various models should afford a comprehensive view of the impact
of economic evaluations on black political behavior and test the centrality of group-based economic
heuristics in African Americans’ electoral choices.
Data and Method
The analyses presented here are based on data from the 1984 National Black Election Study.7
The NBES is a nation-wide telephone survey of black households, done by random-digit dialing
weighted for the clustering of black populations, with an initial sample size of 1150.8 Use of this data
source brings with it both advantages and disadvantages. The most obvious drawback, of course, is
that the study is now over 20 years old.9 Ideally, one would want to test African American electoral
responses to group economic assessments under several incumbent presidents of both parties.
Indeed, there is good reason to suspect that the relationship between perceptions of group well-being
and voter turnout under a Democratic incumbent would be opposite to that hypothesized here, as
positive perceptions would then reinforce, rather than mitigate, existing partisan loyalties and thus
spur, rather than suppress, participation. Unfortunately, however, the replication of the NBES done
in 1996, which would have allowed a test of this proposition, inexplicably omitted the question on
perceptions of group economic well-being.10 Thus, the 1984 NBES is the only national study with a
7
large African American sample in which respondents are asked parallel questions about the economic
well-being of their household, their racial group, and their nation.11 While more recent data would
certainly be welcome, however, one should not overestimate the drawbacks of using the 1984 study.
Black partisan loyalty, relative economic position, and strong group identity have remained largely
unchanged over the last 25 years, suggesting the continued applicability of patterns found in the
Reagan re-election campaign.
The disadvantages of using the 1984 NBES are outweighed by several key advantages. Most
obviously, the study affords a much larger cross-sectional sample of African Americans than is
available in the National Election Study, General Social Survey, or other major national studies, which
typically have only 200-300 black respondents. Additionally, this study directly measures respondents’
assessments of the economic circumstances of their own family, the black community, and the nation
as a whole, the only available study to do so with comparable survey items. Finally, using this study
allows for direct comparisons with important previous work. Many of Dawson’s (1994) explorations
of group identity and African American politics draw on data from the 1984 National Black Election
Study, particularly his models of vote choice and presidential approval. Likewise, the Kinder, Adams,
and Gronke (1989) study that finds no direct effects of group-based economic evaluations is based on
NES data from the 1984 election, as are many of Conover’s (1988) analyses. Finally, Mutz and
Mondak’s (1997) general analysis of group-based economic judgments uses data from the 1984 South
Bend Study. Using the 1984 National Black Election Study as the basis for analysis here allows for
direct comparison with all of this previous work, without fear of confusion arising from differing
electoral contexts.
In this study, the impact of group-based economic heuristics is assessed across three different
dimensions of African American political attitudes and behavior: presidential candidate affect, vote
choice, and turnout. As mentioned previously, Dawson (1994) has explored the impact of African
8
American group interest on both vote choice and presidential approval, and has made major strides
toward delineating and quantifying the components of black political decision-making. The analyses
in this study, however, differ from Dawson’s in several important respects. Dawson’s vote choice
model is rather schematic, including only four key variables: national economic evaluations, group
economic evaluations, perception that Democrats work harder on black issues, and presidential
approval (a highly endogenous predictor).12 Both the candidate approval and vote choice models
presented here introduce several new elements into the equation.13 To begin with, they include
measures of changes in family economic circumstances, thus testing for the first time the effects of all
three levels of economic evaluation (personal, group, and national) simultaneously.14 Additionally, the
models include measures of respondents’ positions on issues of particular concern to the black
community (government economic aid to minorities, affirmative action, and racial integration), to
allow for the possibility that specific individual issues drive African American political preferences.
Finally, these models include a measure of “linked fate” (the respondent’s sense that his own wellbeing is bound up with that of other African Americans) as an explicit control, something missing
from Dawson’s models. Including the linked fate variable in the models allows one to adjudicate
between two different sorts of racial heuristics—one in which political choice is driven by a stable,
enduring level of attachment to the group regardless of economic circumstances, and another in
which political behavior is driven by actual assessments of the group’s economic fortunes under a
given incumbent. Thus, the candidate affect and vote choice models presented here should provide a
more comprehensive test of the group interest thesis by controlling for several additional alternative
hypotheses.
In addition to this important extension and development of the candidate choice analysis, this
study departs from previous work by examining the impact of group-based economic assessments on
African American political participation. Turnout is modeled here as a function of all the standard
9
demographic predictors, including gender, region, income, education, unemployment, and church
attendance. In addition, cognitive engagement with politics, a strong predictor of turnout, is captured
through strength of partisanship and strength of ideology. Finally, and most importantly, the model
includes all three levels of economic evaluations, to test the proposition that positive assessments of
group economic well-being depress African American turnout under a Republican incumbent.
Results
An examination of the relationship between economic evaluations and candidate choice
reveals a pattern very consistent with the hypotheses delineated above. Table 1 presents coefficients
and marginal effects (Δ) from a logit model of presidential vote.15 Not surprisingly, party
identification is the single largest influence on vote choice, with strongly Republican African
Americans 52 percentage points more likely to support Reagan than their (much more numerous)
strongly Democratic counterparts. None of the demographic items has any discernible effect.
Ideology seems essentially unrelated to presidential vote choice among African Americans, a result
consistent with Harris-Lacewell’s (2004) contention that “conservatism” has a very distinct meaning in
the black context. Likewise, specific preferences on racial issues have no discernible impact in the
model. Finally, the “linked fate” term is not significant, suggesting that a sense of racial solidarity in
and of itself is insufficient to motivate higher rates of support for the Democratic candidate.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
For purposes of this study, though, it is the economic evaluations that are of most theoretical
import. Here, the effects are substantial. As in many previous studies, personal economic evaluations
have no apparent impact on presidential vote choice. Assessments of the economic conditions of
10
blacks and of the nation as a whole, however, both exert a major influence on presidential preference.
The effect is largest for national evaluations; those who think the national economy has gotten “much
better” in the past year are about 24 percentage points more likely to support Reagan than those who
feel it has gotten “much worse.” The effect of racial group evaluations, while less dramatic, is still
appreciable. Those who feel that the economic circumstances of African Americans have improved
greatly in the past year are 12 percentage points more likely to support Reagan, all else equal, than
those at the opposite end of the spectrum. Clearly, both the sociotropic and group heuristic
hypotheses find considerable support in the data, while the pocketbook hypothesis seems to provide
little leverage in explaining African American presidential preference.
It is important, however, to put all analysis of African American presidential preference in
perspective. In the 1984 election (as indeed in most modern presidential contests), over ninety
percent of African Americans voted Democratic; as a result, any examination of black presidential
vote choice confronts a problem of limited variance. In practical terms, this means that even
relatively large increases in the likelihood of voting for Reagan still may leave an individual as a
probable Mondale supporter. To provide a concrete example, an otherwise “typical” African
American (i.e. sample mean values on all other variables) who thought that the economic
circumstances of both the nation and the black community had gotten much better in the past year
would still be slightly more likely to vote for Mondale than for Reagan. Because of the overwhelming
Democratic allegiance of the black community and the resultant low variability in presidential
preference, vote choice models generally can only provide limited insight into the dynamics of African
American public opinion. Supplementing the vote choice model with an analysis of candidate affect
(in which there is considerably more variance) provides a fuller picture.
An examination of the candidate affect models, presented in Table 2, reveals several
interesting results. Separate models are presented for feeling thermometer ratings of Reagan,
11
Mondale, and the difference between the two (Regan rating-Mondale rating). Consistent with the
standard retrospective account of economics and voting (Fiorina 1981), both group and national
economic evaluations exert a significant influence on attitudes toward the incumbent and on the
feeling thermometer differential. Put in concrete terms, an individual who thought that national
economic conditions had gotten much better would, on average, rank President Reagan about 24
points higher on a feeling thermometer than one who thought the national economy had gotten much
worse, a result duplicated in the difference model. A comparable difference in evaluations of black
economic conditions would produce a swing of about 7 points. These same variables have no
discernible impact on evaluations of Mondale, the challenger, a finding again consistent with
retrospective voting.16 Personal economic evaluations, by contrast, exhibit a strange pattern,
influencing to some degree assessments of both Reagan and Mondale. Clearly, this result suggests that
pocketbook considerations operate according to a somewhat different dynamic than sociotropic or
group-based heuristics.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Aside from the economic evaluations, the affect model for Reagan is essentially consistent
with the vote choice model. Personal unemployment experience is apparently inconsequential, as are
most of the demographic controls (with the exception of gender and church attendance—black
women seem to like Reagan even less than do black men, and more religious African Americans are
more favorably disposed toward the president). The only significant issue item is government
economic aid to African Americans, and even its effect is rather small. Not surprisingly, party
identification plays a strong role in shaping African American attitudes toward Reagan. Finally, a
12
sense of linked fate plays a small but significant role, as stronger attachments to the racial group are
associated with more negative assessments of the president.
The Mondale model explains less variance than the Reagan model, and produces some
coefficients not easily accounted for theoretically. The significant predictive variables for affect
toward Mondale among African Americans are pocketbook economic evaluations, party
identification, region, linked fate, church attendance, education, and income (marginally). Party
identification works as expected, with black Republicans rating Mondale substantially lower than black
Democrats. The other variables, however, are less straightforward. As discussed above, retrospective
economic evaluations should theoretically have no impact on one’s assessment of a presidential
challenger; nevertheless, in this case, individuals whose family economic circumstances have improved
tend to rate Mondale somewhat lower than those whose economic fortunes have declined. In
addition, black southerners tend to rate Mondale higher than blacks in the North, despite his
Minnesota origins. Church-going blacks rate Mondale more highly than others, just as they do
President Reagan. Finally, wealthy African Americans are a little more favorably disposed toward
Mondale than poorer ones, while more educated blacks and those with stronger senses of linked fate
view him less warmly (perhaps due to their more nuanced and qualified embrace of the Democratic
Party and its candidates). All in all, the results for Mondale are somewhat curious, suggesting that
affect models (particularly ones based largely on retrospective evaluations) are more useful for
incumbents than for challengers.
Results of the feeling thermometer differential model largely mirror those reported for the two
candidates individually. Women, southerners, and wealthier African Americans tend to have larger
relative preferences for Mondale, while Republican identification, as well as positive assessments on
all three economic measures, are associated with smaller Mondale advantages.
13
As I have already noted, however, vote choice and candidate affect are not really the most
salient questions in African American political behavior. The more important issue in most electoral
contexts is turnout, as the number of blacks voting can often swing outcomes either way (witness the
difference between the 1998 and 2002 midterm elections). Thus, an effect of economic evaluations
on turnout is in many respects more significant electorally than an effect on vote choice. In this
regard, the results of the logit model of turnout, presented in Table 3, are quite instructive.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
As expected, all of the well-documented motivators of political participation (strong
partisanship and ideology, high income, high levels of education) emerge as significant in the model.
Likewise, church attendance is an important predictor of political participation, a result consistent
with previous work suggesting the politicized dimension of much black religious experience (CalhounBrown 1996; Harris 1999; Harris-Lacewell 2007). As in the vote choice model, the linked fate term is
not significant, suggesting once again that the behavioral manifestations of group solidarity are
mediated, rather than direct. The interesting and striking difference from the candidate preference
models, however, comes in the area of economic evaluations. When it comes to turnout, national
economic evaluations have no apparent effect. With group-based evaluations (and pocketbook
assessments as well), however, the pattern is quite different. Those individuals who feel that the
economic circumstances of black Americans have improved in the past year are substantially less likely
to vote than those who feel that economic conditions in the black community have deteriorated. In
concrete terms, those who say that black economic conditions have gotten “much worse” are 10%
more likely to vote than those who say things have gotten “much better.”17 Shifts of that magnitude
in black political participation levels are clearly consequential for partisan politics in America, as they
14
could change the outcome in scores of key electoral contests (the 2000 presidential race being the
most notable example). It significant as well that group-based evaluations are the only form of
economic assessments to affect both vote choice and turnout. Clearly, these results suggest that group
heuristics drive political behavior among African Americans in a broad-based way that pocketbook
and sociotropic concerns simply do not.
Discussion
From the results of this study, it is clear that group-based economic heuristics are important
determinants of political attitudes among African Americans. Racial economic evaluations are
significant predictors of vote choice and candidate affect, even after controlling for personal and
national assessments and a host of other variables. This finding amplifies and extends Dawson’s
“linked fate” thesis, suggesting that previous studies discounting the impact of group-based
assessments (e.g. Kinder, Adams, and Gronke 1989) are not applicable in the African American
context. Among blacks, group economic well being does matter politically, exerting an influence that is
both substantial and direct.
In addition, this study demonstrates that the analysis of economics and voting can be
profitably expanded to the previously ignored domain of voter turnout. If black Americans feel that
they, as a group, are suffering economically, they can be galvanized to higher levels of participation.
Conversely, those who believe that conditions are improving for African Americans, particularly
under a Republican president, may feel cross-pressured, torn between this observation and their
traditional partisan loyalties. The resulting ambivalence, according to Downs (1957) and myriad
others, is the classical psychological condition for non-participation. Moreover, this is an effect not
found with regard to either personal or national economic conditions. Because of this impact on
participation, group-based heuristics may in fact be the most electorally salient type of economic
15
evaluations among African Americans. This potential for economically driven group mobilization
carries the linked fate thesis a step further, suggesting one potential vehicle for increased black
political participation and empowerment.
In light of the findings presented here, many issues arise for future research. What exactly is
the relationship between personal, group, and national economic assessments among African
Americans? Would the patterns differ across varying electoral contexts (gubernatorial, congressional,
etc.)? If the incumbent president were a Democrat rather than a Republican, how would that alter the
relationship between group-based economic assessments and turnout? At present, available data
allow only speculative answers to these questions. What we can say with certainty, however, based on
the analysis presented here, is that a simple pocketbook/sociotropic dichotomy is insufficient for
explaining political behavior among African Americans, and that economic heuristics have can
significant impacts in areas (e.g. turnout) previously ignored by most scholars. These findings should
provide significant guidance for future research into African American political behavior and the
economic dimensions of group identity more generally.
16
TABLE 1
Logit Model of Presidential Vote Choice

Variable
Coefficient (S.E.)
Constant
-6.92 (1.50) ***
-----
Gender (Female)
Region (South)
Income
Education
Unemployed
Church Attendance
-0.39 (0.46)
0.25 (0.48)
-0.02 (0.08)
-0.09 (0.17)
-0.03 (0.79)
-0.02 (0.16)
-------------------------
Party ID (Republican)
Ideology (Conservative)
0.77 (0.14) ***
0.10 (0.09)
0.52
-----
Issue: Govt. Aid to Blacks
Issue: Affirmative Action
Issue: Racial Integration
0.21 (0.24)
0.04 (0.24)
-0.27 (0.21)
-------------
Linked Fate
-0.23 (0.19)
-----
Personal Economic Eval.
Group Economic Eval.
National Economic Eval.
0.11 (0.25)
0.69 (0.26) ***
1.06 (0.18) ***
----0.12
0.24
Log Likelihood = -76.85
Wald2 = 75.18 (15) ***
% Predicted Correctly = 93.5
N = 430
*** p < .01, one-tailed test
** p < .05, one-tailed test
* p < .10, one-tailed test
17
TABLE 2
OLS Models of Presidential Candidate Affect
Variable
Reagan

Mondale

Difference

-48.29 (7.56) ***
-----
Constant
19.25 (5.49) ***
-----
68.40 (4.81) ***
-----
Gender (Female)
Region (South)
Income
Education
Unemployed
Church Attendance
-6.14 (2.12) ***
0.57 (1.98)
-0.17 (0.33)
-0.62 (0.76)
-1.13 (3.19)
1.29 (0.77) **
-6.13
----------------5.10
0.08 (1.88)
4.88 (1.75) ***
0.51 (0.31) *
-1.07 (0.71) *
0.25 (2.76)
1.89 (0.74) ***
----4.82
5.20
-5.37
----7.67
-6.55 (2.74) ***
-4.43 (2.60) **
-0.70 (0.46) *
0.25 (1.06)
-1.64 (3.99)
-0.62 (1.06)
-6.44
-4.51
-7.01
-------------
Party ID (Republican)
Ideology (Conservative)
3.32 (0.86) ***
0.63 (0.48) *
19.86
3.64
-4.59 (0.75) ***
0.19 (0.43)
-27.48
-----
8.12 (1.19) ***
0.43 (0.64)
48.58
-----
Issue: Govt. Aid to Blacks
Issue: Affirmative Action
Issue: Racial Integration
-1.39 (1.04) *
-1.02 (0.97)
0.09 (0.89)
-4.10
---------
0.39 (0.94)
-0.65 (0.86)
0.81 (0.84)
-------------
-1.54 (1.33)
-0.26 (1.30)
-0.73 (1.21)
-------------
Linked Fate
-1.69 (0.95) **
-5.17
-1.79 (0.82) **
-5.37
-0.10 (1.24)
-----
Personal Economic Eval.
Group Economic Eval.
National Economic Eval.
1.55 (0.90) **
1.81 (1.05) **
6.09 (0.94) ***
6.15
7.26
24.39
-2.44 (0.89) ***
-0.02 (0.97)
-0.19 (0.78)
-9.82
---------
4.17 (1.27) ***
1.58 (1.24) *
6.17 (1.20) ***
16.65
6.34
24.91
R2 = 0.22
F (15) = 11.33 ***
N = 568
*** p < .01, one-tailed test
R2 = 0.15
F (15) = 6.15 ***
N = 570
** p < .05, one-tailed test
18
R2 = 0.26
F (15) = 11.12 ***
N = 566
* p < .10, one-tailed test
TABLE 3
Logit Model of Voter Turnout

Variable
Coefficient (S.E.)
Constant
-0.91 (0.66) *
-----
Gender (Female)
Region (South)
Income
Education
Unemployed
Church Attendance
0.04 (0.25)
-0.11 (0.23)
0.09 (0.05) **
0.28 (0.10) ***
-0.08 (0.33)
0.21 (0.10) **
--------0.12
0.19
----0.12
Strength of Partisanship
Strength of Ideology
0.54 (0.12) ***
0.20 (0.11) **
0.27
0.09
Issue: Govt. Aid to Blacks
Issue: Affirmative Action
Issue: Racial Integration
-0.10 (0.12)
0.08 (0.11)
0.06 (0.11)
-------------
Linked Fate
0.09 (0.10)
-----
Personal Economic Eval.
Group Economic Eval.
National Economic Eval.
-0.22 (0.11) **
-0.18 (0.10) **
-0.05 (0.10)
-0.11
-0.10
-----
Log Likelihood = -246.71
Wald2 = 61.37 (15) ***
% Predicted Correctly = 82.4
N = 573
*** p < .01, one-tailed test
** p < .05, one-tailed test
* p < .10, one-tailed test
19
Appendix:
Wording and Coding of All Variables
Presidential Vote Choice (VAR 2068): Now about the election for President—did you vote for a
candidate for President? [IF YES] Who did you vote for?
Mondale = 0; Reagan = 1
Reagan Affect (VAR 1053): Now let’s talk about your feelings toward some of our political leaders
and other people who are in the news these days. I’ll read the name of a person and I’ll ask you to
rate that person on a thermometer that runs from 0 degrees to 100 degrees…Our first person is
Ronald Reagan. How would you rate him using this thermometer?
0 (coolest) to 100 (warmest)
Mondale Affect (VAR 1054): [Follows same introduction as Reagan measure]. What about Walter
Mondale? How would you rate him using this thermometer?
0 (coolest) to 100 (warmest)
Voter Turnout (VAR 2067): In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people
were not able to vote because they weren’t registered, they were sick, or they just didn’t have time.
How about you—did you vote in the elections this November? [IF YES] Now about the election
for President—did you vote for a candidate for President?
Did not cast presidential ballot =0; Cast presidential ballot = 1
Gender (VAR 1231): [Observed and recorded by interviewer].
Region (VAR 0004): [Recorded prior to interview. Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas
classified as Southern states (1). All other states coded 0.]
Income (VAR 1195): We would like to know the general range of your family income, that is the
total income of all members of your family living with you, for 1983 before taxes. This figure
should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income. [Branching
response categories combined into single scale].
1 = Under $10,000; 2 = Between $10,000 and $20,000; 3 = Between $20,000 and $30,000;
4 = Between $30,000 and $40,000; 5 = Over $40,000
Education (VAR 1135): What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have completed?
Did you get a high school diploma or pass a high school equivalency test? Do you have a college
degree?
0 = 8th grade or less; 1 = some high school; 2 = high school graduate; 3 = some college;
4 = college graduate or beyond
Unemployed (VAR 1138): Are you working now, or are you unemployed, retired, a housewife, a
student, or what?
1 = “unemployed” or “temporarily laid off”; 0 = all other valid responses
20
Church Attendance (VAR 1181): Would you say you go to church or place of worship every week,
almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never?
0 = never; 1= a few times a year; 2 = once or twice a month; 3 = almost every week;
4 = every week
Party Identification (VAR 1050): Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, and independent, or what? [IF REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT]
Would you call yourself a strong Republican/Democrat or a not very strong Republican/Democrat?
[IF INDEPENDENT] Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the
Democratic Party?
0 = strong Democrat; 1 = weak Democrat; 2 = independent Democrat; 3 = independent;
4 = independent Republican; 5 = weak Republican; 6 = strong Republican
Ideology (VAR 2103): In general, when it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as a
liberal, a conservative, a moderate, or what? [IF LIBERAL OR CONSERVATIVE] Do you think
of yourself as a strong liberal/conservative or a not very strong liberal/conservative? [IF
MODERATE] Do you think of yourself as more like a liberal or more like a conservative?
0 = strong liberal; 1 = not very strong liberal; 2= slightly liberal; 3 = moderate;
4 = slightly conservative; 5 = not very strong conservative; 6 = strong conservative
Government Aid to Blacks (VAR 2127): For each of the following statements, please tell me if
you strongly agree with that statement, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly
disagree…The government should not make any special effort to help blacks and other minorities
because they should help themselves.
0 = strongly agree; 1 = somewhat agree; 2 = somewhat disagree; 3 = strongly disagree
Affirmative Action (VAR 2123): [Follows same introduction as aid to blacks measure]. Because of
past discrimination, minorities should be given special consideration when decisions are made about
hiring applicants for jobs.
0 = strongly disagree; 1 = somewhat disagree; 2 = somewhat agree; 3 = strongly agree
Racial Integration (VAR 2122): [Follows same introduction as aid to blacks measure]. The racial
integration of schools is so important that it justifies bussing children to schools outside of their
neighborhoods.
0 = strongly disagree; 1 = somewhat disagree; 2 = somewhat agree; 3 = strongly agree
Linked Fate (VAR 1106): Do you think what happens generally to black people in this country will
have something to do with what happens in your life? [IF YES] Will it affect you a lot, some, or
not very much?
0 = none; 1 = not very much; 2 = some; 3 = a lot
Personal Economic Evaluation (VAR 1012): We are interested in how people are getting along
financially these days. Would you say that you (and your family living with you) are better off or
worse off financially than you were a year ago? [IF BETTER OR WORSE] Is that much
better/worse off or somewhat better/worse off?
0 = much worse off; 1 = somewhat worse off; 2 = the same; 3 = somewhat better off;
4 = much better off
21
Group Economic Evaluation (VAR 1019): Would you say that over the past year the economic
position of blacks has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse? [IF BETTER OR
WORSE] Is that much better/worse or somewhat better/worse?
0 = much worse; 1 = somewhat worse; 2 = about the same; 3 = somewhat better;
4 = much better
National Economic Evaluation (VAR 1066): Now let’s talk about the country as a whole. Would
you say that over the past year the nation’s economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or
gotten worse? [IF BETTER OR WORSE] Is that much better/worse or somewhat better/worse?
0 = much worse; 1 = somewhat worse; 2 = about the same; 3 = somewhat better;
4 = much better
22
Notes
1
The analyses presented here are based on data archived by the Interuniversity Consortium for
Political and Social Research (ICPSR Study Number 9954). The original collector of the data,
ICPSR, and the relevant funding agency bear no responsibility for uses of this collection or for
interpretations or inferences based upon such uses. All estimations reported here were produced
using STATA SE, version 9.0. Full replication information is available from the author.
2
Lane (1962), Feldman (1982), and Gomez and Wilson (2001; 2006) all note the tendency of many
voters, particularly less sophisticated ones, to discount the political relevance of economic events in
their own lives, ascribing them to a wide variety of highly localized causes.
3
It should be noted that Kinder, Adams, and Gronke test the group hypothesis in an electoral
context, while Conover tests it using survey data from an off year.
4
Walton’s observation is perhaps even truer today, when black newspapers and radio stations have
been supplemented by black television as a source of African American news and views. It should
be noted, however, that some have criticized the various black media for their relative paucity of
explicitly political content.
5
Uhlaner’s account, however, focuses heavily on elite-driven mobilization.
6
An analysis of turnout data reveals that levels of African American participation do fluctuate
appreciably over time, often not in tandem with patterns of white voter turnout. In presidential
elections since 1980, the gap between white and black turnout rates has been as large as ten
percentage points (in 1980 and 1992) and as small as two percentage points (in 2000) and, as Tate
suggests, was larger in 1988 than in 1984 (Stanley and Niemi 2005). This study, by exploring the
relationship between economic assessments and political participation, seeks to shed light on the
micro-foundations of these fluctuations.
7
Models using variables from the post-election wave of the study (like reported turnout and vote
choice), however, will have smaller case counts. Of the 1150 initial respondents, only 872 were reinterviewed after the election and, of these, only 608 reported having turned out and voted for a
major-party presidential candidate.
8
The survey includes respondents from 31 states, with the largest clusters in Illinois, Texas, New
York, North Carolina, Michigan, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina. For a full description of
the method and scope of the 1984 National Black Election Study, see Tate et al. (1988).
9
The National Black Election Study also contained a follow-up 1988 wave with a smaller (and
significantly biased—see Tate 1994) sample. I do not present analyses of these data because of the
later study’s serious shortcomings, as identified by Tate, and because the absence of an incumbent
on the 1988 presidential ballot mitigates the effects of economic voting generally (see Gomez and
Wilson 2001). Another potential problem with both waves of the NBES, pointed out by Davis
(1997a, 1997b), is the variability on some items produced by race-of-interviewer effects. While this
is a concern in any study of African Americans employing both black and white interviewers, it is
23
mitigated in this instance by two factors. First, there is no reason to suspect that race of interviewer
varied systematically with any of the key concepts of interest in this study; thus, any effects should
be essentially randomly distributed and cancel out. More importantly, I avoid in my analyses the
items on which Davis found race-of-interviewer effects to be most pronounced: evaluations of Jesse
Jackson and professions of group political efficacy.
10
Both the 1996 NBES and the 1993 National Black Politics Study ask respondents how blacks are
faring economically relative to whites, but this question is not a suitable proxy for the retrospective
group economic assessments item employed here. To begin with, it does not ask for a comparison
to some fixed point in the past in the way that the personal and national economic assessments do,
making it less suitable as a predictor of support for an incumbent president. During the 1990s, for
example, many African Americans might have praised Bill Clinton for narrowing the racial
socioeconomic gap, while still responding (correctly) that blacks were not doing as well economically
as whites. Moreover, analysis of the 1984 NBES data, which include both the retrospective groupbased economic assessment measure that I use here and the comparison to whites, shows that the
correlation between the two is only .37. This suggests that the two, while clearly related, are hardly
interchangeable.
11
There is considerable variation on all three of these assessments, though the distributions are
somewhat different. When asked about their own personal economic circumstances, 12% of NBES
respondents say they have gotten “much worse,” 23% say “somewhat worse,” 20% report no
change, 33% say things are “somewhat better,” and 12% say “much better.” In assessing the
economic conditions of African Americans generally, 18% say things are “much worse,” 19% say
“somewhat worse,” 35% perceive no change, 22% think things are “somewhat better,” and 6%
think “much better.” Respondents are most negative about the national economy, with 29%
believing it has gotten “much worse,” 21% believing it is “somewhat worse,” 31% perceiving no
change, 15% thinking things have gotten “somewhat better,” and only 4% believing things are
“much better.”
12
Dawson’s vote choice model also includes demographic controls for partisanship, education, and
age. The models that I present here supplement these with measures of gender, region, income,
employment status, and church attendance.
13
Exact wordings and codings of all variables in the models can be found in the appendix.
14
According to both Kinder, Adams, and Gronke (1989) and Mutz and Mondak (1997), voters are
able to distinguish fairly well between these three related but distinct economic domains. This
finding is supported in the present study, where pair-wise correlations between evaluations of the
three domains are all fairly modest (.27 for personal and national; .31 for personal and group; .28 for
group and national).
15
The Δ column reflects the change in probability of voting for Reagan produced by shifting the
variable in question from its minimum to its maximum while holding all other variables constant at
their means. These figures are presented only where coefficients attain statistical significance. All
marginal effects are calculated using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).
24
16
Along these same lines, the Reagan model has a substantially higher r2 than the Mondale model
(.22 vs. .15), again demonstrating that economic evaluations are much better predictors of support
for incumbents than for challengers.
17
Even these effects may be somewhat attenuated due to over-reporting of turnout in the sample.
The 11% figure is based on turnout rising from 75% to 85%, clearly above the realistic range. In an
area closer to 50%, one might expect a greater absolute increase, as there is more “room for
improvement.”
25
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