Ladies, gentlemen, good afternoon, (CLICK 1)
I am Commodore Antonios Papaioannou, Greek
Navy, I was the first force commander of operation
Atalanta, actually from 13 DEC 09 – 6 APR 09 and I
am going to give you a briefing on the following
issues. (CLICK 2)
MISSION (CLICK 3)
EU NAVFOR is to protect WFP shipping, other
vulnerable shipping, deter and, subject to suitable
arrangements for prosecution being in place, arrest
pirates/ armed robbers in the AOO, for the duration
of one year, after the declaration of IOC.
In support of UNSCR 1814 -1816.
AREA OF OPERATION (CLICK 4)
Area of operation was huge, approximately 1,5 – 2
million square miles. Currently, after the expansion
from 600 to 700 miles off Somalia coast, including
Seychelles archipelago, the area of operation is
much larger.
INDICATIVE TF 465 UNITS (CLICK 5)
Indicative composition of EUNAVFOR during my
comand is shown on the projection. During my
command about 14 naval units from various
European Countries as well as a large number of
organic helos and 1 MPA, participated in the
operation. As from April, the member states were
encouraged to offer more assets, and so to this day,
10-13 ships are operating in Atalanta.
EU STAFF (CLICK 6)
Staff consisted of 14 personnel from various EU
countries. Initial proposed manning was 34 persons,
but I think that the above personnel, reinforced also
by the flagship’s crew, was adequate enough.
PROBLEMS WE FACED (CLICK 7)
As first Force Commander, I had to get familiarized
with the operational environment, modus operandi
of the pirates, cooperation with the other players in
the area, in other words, to set up the operation,
regurarly. The lack of EU oiler during the first 3
months of my command, forced my staff to deal on
a daily basis with this need, taking into account the
large distances from the ports. The lack of EU wide
area network between units, forced us to establish a
fexweb / chatroom so other players, Russians,
Chinese but also EU – OHQ, CTF151 etc
communicated with us. The need for more MPAs, is
obvious, taking into consideration, the huge AOO.
LESSONS LEARNED (CLICK 8)
- WFP (World Frod Programme) escort
- Organic helo – main deterent naval asset
- MSCH – HOA
- Group Transit
- Reassurance
- Cooperation between various forces in GOA
- Media
- High alert of merchant vessels transiting GOA
- Piracy tactics
- Threat identification
- Strenght and weaknesses of pirates
WFP (CLICK 9)
During my 4-months command term, more than 20
WFP ships were escorted, whereas to this day, 41
ships have been escorted by EUNAVFOR ships,
carrying totally 280.000 tons of food to Somali
people. Problems were raised, owing to the fact that
the merchant vessels chartered for this purpose,
were of small size, slow speed, unreliable time
schedule, resulting to significant delays, as well as,
waste of time.
HELO - MAIN AIR ASSET (CLICK 10)
Taking into account the large area of operation, as
well as, the estimated time the pirates take down /
highjack a merchant vessel (statistically 15 – 45
minutes), organic helos being in flight or in the
appropriate alert state on helicopter deck, are the
primary assets for quick reaction. My experience
shows that a piracy attack which takes place
roughly speaking within 20 NM from a helicopter it
is very likely to be prevented, provided that the right
position will be given from the merchant vessel
which is under attack (I will explain you later on
about this issue). Apart from the helo, as the main
preventive asset, use of maritime patrol aircraft,
give to the force commander the area picture,
concentration of fishing vessels among whose the
pirates can hide themselves, waiting for the vessel
victim, but also can provide us with loitering skiffs in
the area.
MSC – HOA (CLICK 11)
From the beginning of the operation a small
percentage of merchant vessels transiting GOA,
registered in this website, which was established
and monitored by EU-OHQ in London. For instance,
in JAN 09 700 users were registered, whereas in
SEPT 09, 5700 users were registered in this
website. This website helps EUNAVFOR ships to
monitor the most vulnerable ships, such as ships
sailing in slow speeds, low freeboard etc. and to
well organize group transits.
GROUP TRANSITS (CLICK 12)
Group transits were organized primarily for 10 and
12 kts and during my command up to a group of 14
ships. Here, I would like to say that escorting a
large number of ships is not a simple action.
Actually, the warship should patrol in high speed,
around the ships, trying to be always visible from
potential pirate skiffs, in particular, during daytime.
The formation should be a close formation (2 – 3
lines) and not necessarily a simple line in which you
put at risk the last ones. During my command, there
was an incident during which the pirates attacked to
the last one of a group which was escorted by a non
– EU warship, not because the pirates ignored the
warship’s presence, but simply, because the
warship wasn’t clearly visible (CLICK 13).
Nowadays, there is a coordination between
EUNAVFOR and CMF (in Bahrain), establishing
patrol boxes along the corridor, through which the
merchant vessels are transiting.
REASSURANCE (CLICK 14)
Apart from the meetings at sea with other
commanders, in the context of reassurance I visited
some merchant vessels. Among them was the
Turkish vessel Karagol, which was captured and
remained under pirate’s control for almost 2
months. These visits provided us with a large
number of information, regarding the daily life of the
captured crew, of the pirates, as well as the modus
operandi of the pirates during the ship’s capture.
COOPERATION WITH OTHER PLAYERS
(CLICK 15)
A productive cooperation between EUNAVFOR
ships and other naval groups or individual warships
in the area, brings good results. Here, we have to
take into account that the mission all of them, is not
the same one. Some of them are organizing and
escort only group transits, some others are doing
group transits of specific nationalities, some of them
are not doing group transits but they only patrol in
the area. EUNAVFOR ships executed both group
transits and patrolling without any discrimination
against or for. Regarding the individual groups:
a. Chinese warships execute escort of Chinese
interest’s ships, following a route 2 NM north of
recommended corridor.
b. Russian warships execute patrolling and escort
c. Japanese warships, follow the group transits
which are organized by EUNAVFOR
d. Indian warships, escort only Indian interest’s
ships.
MEDIA (VIDEO) (CLICK 16)
There was a long discussion in the beginning of the
operation. Finally, taking into consideration the 900
articles within 42 days in terms of operation
Atalanta, plus, the large number of journalists
onboard the flagship during the media day but also
the embarkation of large number of journalists
onboard the ships on national basis, I think that a
great job has been done on that issue, but there is
still room for more visibility.
HIGH ALERT OF MERCHANT VESSELS
TRANSITING GOA (CLICK 17)
Merchant vessels, transiting GOA, in particular
during daytime, should remain vigilant. They should
transit high risk areas, as these areas are defined in
MSC/HOA website during nightime, and in case of
an emergency, they should give a precise position
of the attack, as well as, they should take (CLICK
18) the appropriate self – measures, such as turn
on the waves, highest speed, maneuvering,
(CLICK 19) and waiting for assistance. Panic
causes dozens of false alarms to the warships
resulting to the waste of time and assets. A typical
example is the following. (CLICK 20)
This Greek merchant vessel transmitting a distress
signal through channel 16, gave a wrong position.
There was not early detection of the pirates skiff,
due to lack of the appropriate vigilance.
You can see the result, pirate skiff with two pirates
alongside (CLICK 21). Despite the fact that an EU
– helo was in flight less than 20 NM (that means 10
minutes flight), initially it was directed to the wrong
position, and then, it was re – directed to the right
position, spending 19 minutes in flight. The final
result is shown on the projection (5 of them already
onboard).
PIRACY TACTICS (CLICK 22)
Pirates operate using small skiffs with powerful
engines. The modus operandi of the pirates is not
always the same. In some attacks they use two
skiffs from both sides, in other attacks they use 1
skiff with 5 – 7 on board, in other cases, their skiffs
are launched from the so – called mother ships and
this is a fact which explains their activity hundred of
miles off Somalia coast. It is possible to identify the
factors that make a ship more vulnerable: low
freeboard, low speed, low crew members and lack
of adequate watch – keeping. Usually they target
ships with low sides but we have confiscated also
ladders having 11 meters length. They paint the
sides of their skiffs white/blue, in order to make their
visual detection difficult, sailing on the waves. They
hide themselves, so you can see a skiff with two
persons on board, but when you stop them, you find
7 – 9 hidden. To me, having the experience of this
command and having seen them many times after
an interception and arrest, they are young,
desperate people, 16 – 25 years old, not well
trained, (CLICK 23) many of their confiscated
weapons were rusty and inoperative, and for sure,
they don’t attack in the vicinity of a warship or
helicopter.
THREAT IDENTIFICATION (CLICK 24)
a. Emerge from a port known to be used by
pirates
b. Loiter near sea-lanes for no apparent reason
c. Trail a potential victim vessel by matching
course and speed
d. A small boat with two or more speedboats
embarked or accompanying
e. Visible weapons
f. Blue/white painted skiff
g. Improper or deceptive navigational lighting
h. A fishing vessel with no fishing gear visible or
with rusty fishing gear on board
i. An
unusual
amount
of
electronic
communication on a vessel that does not
appear to be in good repair (CLICK 25). Here
you
can
see
pirate’s
routes
found
in
confiscated GPS devices.
j. Matching the description of a known pirate
vessel, or a stolen vessel which may be used
as a ‘mother ship’
k. Vessel refuses (or declines) to identify itself
upon inquiry
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF
PIRATES (CLICK 26)
STRENGTHS
a. ability to remain covert;
b. use of surprise;
c. ability to select a vulnerable target of their
choice; and
d. ability to select their most advantageous time
and place of engagement
WEAKNESSES
a. need for safe, reliable land bases;
b. limited tactical capability at sea;
c. sensor capability limits situational awareness;
d. endurance is limited;
e. easily diverted by active resistance;
f. conflict among factions within an operational
group involved in piracy.
ROE VIDEO (CLICK 27)
The rules of engagement that i was authorized to
use, were robust and adequate to do my job. A
number of Roe’s up to use of warning shots, were
given to the commanding offices discretion. The use
of disabling fire or non disabling fire and use of
minimum deadly force were retained by myself as
force commander. Here, I would like to say that
using warning shots sometimes for a long time (up
to 1 hour) we managed to stop them, keeping a de
– escalated situation, instead of using a disabling or
non – disabling fire which could have caused some
fatalities, firing from a helo (there was a recent
incident with a non – EU helo). Needless to say that
my intention was to use deadly minimum force, in
case a boarding was in progress and a helo or
warship was in presence, at the scene of action.
OPERATION ATALANTA ACHIEVEMENTS
(CLICK 28)
- The priority mission of EUNAVFOR, WFP
escort, resulted to escort more than 280.000
tons of food to Somali people. There is a need
for improvement of the quality, size and speed of
WFP chartered ships. Some progress has
already been achieved.
- We fulfilled the requirement to contribute to the
protection of all vulnerable shipping, but also, we
afforded dedicated protection (under the request
of UN), to AMISOM shipments to Mogadishu.
- 50% of the arrested pirates executed by
EUNAVFOR ships. The handover to Kenya
followed the signing of the EU – Kenya
agreement for the prosecution of the pirates.
Due to this agreement EUNAVFOR is now
viewed as one of the most effective Military
Force conducting counter piracy.
- The simplification of transit routes in GOA, and
the creation of internationally recognized transit
corridor as of 1 FEB 2009 was an OHQ initiative,
shortening the transit time in GOA high risk are,
as well as, moving the pirates away from Yemen
territorial waters (after an unsuccessful attack),
in which territorial waters, there was no
authorization for EUNAVFOR ships to enter in.
- Group transits have been designed by OHQ to
permit limitation of the risk to shipping. As a
result, the ratio of successful high jacks to
attacks has shifted from 1 in 3 (2008) to 1 in 8.
- The development of MSC (HOA), in the OHQ, is
an innovation, representing a real paradigm shift
in the conduct of maritime security. Integration of
Merchant Navy Liaison officers, with the OHQ
staff, creation of a widely recognized and
popular web – based interface with Maritime
action, promotion of best management practice,
guidance and registration.
Here, I conclude my presentation, and I am ready to
take questions you may have.