AP US History Document Based Question
Between l800-l896, farmers and workers claimed that the government and the courts
overwhelmingly favored big business and the rich. To what extent were they correct in
their judgment of the situation?
Document A
“Facts and figures were heaped together and published to prove to President Grant that,
should gold rise in this country about harvest time, grain, the price of which, being fixed in
Liverpool, was independent of currency fluctuations, would be worth so much the more and would
at once be hurried abroad; but that to secure this blessing Government must not sell any gold. . . .
The President seems to have been persuaded that a rise in gold while the crops were moving
would advantage the country. At any rate, orders were given early in September to sell only gold
sufficient to buy bonds for the sinking fund. The conspirators redoubled their purchases. The
price of gold rose till, two days before Black Friday, it stood at 140 1/2. Grant had been duped
into doing the bidding of the conspirators. . . . At this time the ring was believed to hold in gold
and in contracts to deliver the same, over $100,000,000. . . . To prevent being mobbed the pair
encircled their opera house with armed toughs and fled thither. There was no civil process or
other molestation was likely to reach them. Presently certain of "the thieves' judges," as they were
called, came to their relief by issuing injunctions stopping all transactions connected with the
conspiracy which would have been disadvantageous for the conspirators.” E. Benjamin Andrews,
Black Friday, Pg.134.
Document B
“The railroads of the United States are creatures of State legislation. There has been no
governmental supervision of railway construction. New lines have everywhere been authorized
with the utmost freedom by the various States and Territories, and leases, purchases and
consolidations have been easily arranged in which State lines have been altogether disregarded.
The railroad system has been almost potent agency for the practical unification of our country by
quietly obliterating territorial divisions, while threading the land with a network of iron rails along
which interstate commerce moves without rest. . . . This universal reliance upon competition as
the safeguard of the public has had two noticeable results: first, it has tended to entrench railroad
managers in the belief that the public was protected sufficiently thereby, and that carriers by rail,
like carriers by sea, were entitled to fix rates at will, subject only to the control of competitive
conditions. . . . In the second place, in its practical working, competition bred discrimination. The
evils of unjust discrimination in railway methods cannot be too vividly portrayed. As time went on
they became more and more pronounced, until they were too great to be endured. Legislative
investigations were demanded. . . .” Interstate Commerce Act, April 5, 1887.
Document C
“The remedy proposed (to regulate railroad rates) was the forbidding of unjust
discrimination under pains and penalties. That was the essence of the Interstate Commerce law.
In other words, the result was prohibited while the cause was left in full operation. It was thought
that free and unrestricted competition must be maintained as an essential principle of the
American railway system.. . . . Of course discriminations in railway rates are necessary; for
example, the rate upon silk and upon sand should not be the same, and the question is often a
doubtful one whether a particular discrimination is or is not unjust. The determination of this
question, is the matter which has chiefly occupied the attention of the Commission since the
passage of the law. . . .” Senator Shelby M. Cullom of Illinois, 1887.
Document D
“. . . . So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be
deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its
purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by
the legislature, to override it. . . . The Constitution does not secure to anyone liberty to conduct his
business in such fashion as to inflict injury upon the public at large, or upon any substantial group
of the people. Price control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary,
discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence
an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty. . . . we find no basis in the
due process clause of the 14th Amendment for condemning, the provisions of the law here drawn
into question. . . .” Munn v. Illinois, 1877.
Document E
“ Among the causes of the [farmers] unrest were the declining prices of farm products, the
growing indebtedness of farmers to merchants and banks, the discriminatory freight rates
imposed on farmers by the railroads, and the acquisition by the railroads of public lands that
formerly had served pioneer farmers as a source of new farmland. The event that marked the
beginning of the Granger movement was the formation, in 1867, of the National Grange of the
Patrons of Husbandry. Although the Grange was a nonpolitical organization, its lodges, called
granges, became the centers of discussion among the traditionally individualistic farmers, and out
of these discussions arose an awareness of the need for concerted political action to solve
common problems. As a result, a number of political parties, bearing such names as Reform
party and Anti-Monopoly party, were organized in several states during the 1870s and 1880s.
These parties succeeded in electing several state officers and three U.S. senators, and in a
number of states, including Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and California, contributed to the
passage of laws regulating railroad rates and practices. Although most of these so-called Granger
laws were repealed or drastically modified within a few years, a number were upheld in the U.S.
Supreme Court, and they served as the basis for much later legislation in the field of railroad and
public utility regulation.” Microsoft (R) Encarta, 1996
Document F
“. . . . as to the controlling influence of the Constitution of the United States over this
legislation of the state of Illinois, raises the question which confers jurisdiction on this court.
. . . . If the Illinois statute could be construed to apply exclusively to contracts for a carriage which
begins and ends within the State, disconnected from a continuous transportation through or into
other States, there does not seem to be any difficulty in holding it to be valid. . . . The supreme
court of Illinois does not place its judgment in the present case on the ground that the
transportation and the charge are exclusively state commerce, but, conceding that it may be a
case of commerce among the States, or interstate commerce, which only Congress would have
the right to regulate. . . . if it had attempted to do so, argues that this statute of Illinois belongs to
that class of commercial regulations which may be established by the laws of a State until
Congress shall have exercised its power on that subject. . . . We must therefore hold that it is not,
and never has been, the deliberate opinion of a majority of this court that a statute of a State
which attempts to regulate the fares and charges by railroad companies within its limits, for a
transportation which constitutes a part of commerce among the States, is a valid law. . . . [This]
shows the value of the constitutional provision which confides the power of regulating interstate
commerce to the Congress of the United States, whose enlarged view of the interests of all the
States, and of the railroads concerned, better fits it to establish just and equitable rules. . . . and
demands that it should be done by the Congress of the United States under the commerce clause
of the Constitution.” Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railroad Company v. Illinois, 1886.
Document G
“The Homestead Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1862, granted 160 acres (65 ha) of
public land in the West as a homestead to "any person who is the head of a family, or who has
arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and is a citizen of the United States, or who shall have
filed his declaration of intention to become such." The homesteader had only to pay a small filing
fee, live on the land for 5 years, and make certain improvements in order to receive clear title.
The passage of the Homestead Act was the culmination of years of controversy over the disposal
of public lands. From the 1830s on, groups called for free distribution of such lands. This became
a demand of the Free-Soil party, which saw such distribution as a means of stopping the spread
of slavery in the territories, and it was subsequently adopted by the Republican party in its 1860
platform. The Southern states had been the most vociferous opponents of the policy, and their
secession cleared the way for its adoption.
Although it remained in effect until repealed in 1977, the Homestead Act was not an
unqualified success. The better lands soon came under the control of the railroads and
speculators, forcing settlers to buy from them rather than accept the poorer government lands.
Even so, by 1900 about 600,000 farmers had received clear title under the act to lands covering
about 80 million acres (32 million ha).” Benjamin Hibbard, A History of the Public Land Policies
(1965).
Document H
“It cannot be denied that the power of the State to protect the lives, health, and property of
its citizens, and to preserve good order and the public morals, "the power to govern men and
things within the limits of its dominion," is a power originally and always belonging to the States,
not surrendered by them to the general government, nor directly restrained by the Constitution of
the United States, and essentially exclusive. The relief of the citizens of each State from the
burden of monopoly and the evils resulting from the restraint of trade among such citizens was
left with the States to deal with. . . . On the other hand, the power of Congress to regulate
commerce among the several States is also exclusive. . . . Commerce succeeds to manufacture,
and is not part of it. The power to regulate commerce is the power to prescribe the rule by which
commerce shall be governed, and is a power independent of the power to suppress monopoly.
But it may operate in repression of monopoly whenever it comes within the rules by which
commerce is governed or whenever the transaction is itself a monopoly of commerce . . . . The
regulation of commerce applies to the subjects of commerce, and not to matters of internal police.
Contracts to buy, sell, or exchange goods to be transported among the several States, the
transportation and its instrumentalities, and articles bought, sold or exchanged for the purposes of
such transit among the States, or put in the way of transit, may be regulated, but this is because
they form part of interstate trade or commerce. The fact that an article is manufactured for export
to another State does not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce, and the intent of the
manufacturer does not determine the time when the article or product passes from the control of
the State and belongs to commerce. . . .” U.S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 1895.
Document I
“Coxey's Army was a contingent of unemployed workers who marched on Washington,
D.C., in 1894. The group was organized by the reformer Jacob S. Coxey (1854-1951), hence its
nickname; its official name was the Commonweal of Christ. Its purpose was to protest the
unemployment that followed the Panic of 1893 and to lobby for laws creating legal currency to be
spent on road building and other public improvements. The army, about 100 strong, left
Massillon, Ohio, on Easter Sunday 1894. When it arrived in Washington on May 1, it had grown
to only 500 and was immediately broken up by the police. Coxey's Army was only one of several
protest "armies" of the era.” D. L. McMurry, Coxey's Army , 1929.
Document J
The bankers followed us out west; And in mortgages they did invest;
They looked ahead and shrewedly planned, And soon they’ll have our Kansas land.
Contemporary Song, 1890
Document K
The transcontinental railroad in North America became a reality on May 10, 1869, when the
tracks of the Union Pacific joined those of the Central Pacific at Promontory Point, Utah. The
event fulfilled dreams of spanning the continent that were spurred by settlement of the American
West and that dated back to at least 1845. Interest in a transcontinental railroad was heightened
by the acquisition of Oregon (1846) and California (1848) and the subsequent gold rush. In 1853,
Congress appropriated $150,000 to defray expenses of surveying feasible routes. . . . Congress
pushed through the Pacific Railroad Act (July 1, 1862), which authorized the Central Pacific to
build eastward from San Francisco and the Union Pacific to build westward from Omaha,
Nebraska. Each company was to receive 400 ft (122 m) of right-of-way through public (or 100
ft/31 m--through private) lands and 10 alternate square-mile sections of public land for each mile
of track laid. Loans of $16,000 to $48,000 per mile--depending on the grade of the terrain--were
also available as a first mortgage on the railroad. In 1864, Congress doubled the land grant and
made the financial subsidy a second lien on the property. It again amended the original legislation
in 1866 to allow the Central Pacific to advance eastward until it met the Union Pacific, thereby
turning the project into a construction race. A number of scandals accompanied the
transcontinental project. The most famous involved Credit Mobilier. . . . through which some of
the railroad's directors and various politicians pocketed enormous profits. Thomas Bailey, The
American Pageant.
Document L
The Pullman Strike (May-July 1894), a violent confrontation between railroad workers and
the Pullman Palace Car Company of Illinois, tied up rail traffic across the United States before it
was halted by federal injunction. In the wake of the Panic of 1893, the company cut wages but did
not lower rents or other charges to employees in the company town of Pullman, now part of
Chicago. When representatives of the American Railway Union protested (May 11), they were
fired. Eugene V. Debs, the head of the union, then called a boycott of all Pullman cars. On July 2,
Attorney General Richard Olney obtained a court injunction to halt the strike, and federal troops
arrived in Chicago on July 4. Rioting broke out and several strikers were killed, but by July 10 the
strike had been broken. Debs and other top union officials were jailed for disobeying the
injunction. The injunction became a major weapon that was used against labor unions. Almont
Lindsey Pullman Strike , 1942.
Document M
“This, then, is held to be the duty of the man of wealth: first, to set an example of modest,
unostentatious living, shunning display or extravagance; to provide moderately for the legitimate
wants of those dependent upon him; and after doing so to consider all surplus revenues which
come to him simply as trust funds, which he is called upon to administer, and strictly bound as a
matter of duty to administer in the manner which, in his judgment, is best calculated to produce
the most beneficial results for the community--the man of wealth thus becoming the mere agent
and trustee for his poorer brethren, bringing to their service his superior wisdom, experience, and
ability to administer, doing for them better than they would or could do for themselves. . . .”
Andrew Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth.
Document N
“By the 1880s and 1890s indebted Americans, especially farmers, were caught in a
deflationary pinch. A cry arose for inflating the currency by abandoning the single gold standard
and restoring the bimetallic gold-silver standard, dropped by Congress in 1873 ("the Crime of
'73"). The silverites specifically demanded the free and unlimited coinage of silver in the ratio of
sixteen ounces of silver to one ounce of gold.
"In the midst of plenty, we are in want," Harvey began. "Helpless children and the best
womanhood and manhood of America appeal to us for release from a bondage that is destructive
of life and liberty. All the nations of the Western Hemisphere turn to their great sister republic for
assistance in the emancipation of the people of at least one-half the world. . . . The moneylenders
in the United States, who own substantially all of our money, have a selfish interest in maintaining
the gold standard. They, too, will not yield. They believe that if the gold standard can survive for a
few years longer, the people will get used to it--get used to their poverty--and quietly submit.” W.
H. Harvey, Coin's Financial School (New York: American News Company 1894), pp. 130-133.
Document O
Fifty miles to water
A hundred miles to wood
To hell with this damned country
I’m going home for good
Contemporary Song, 1882
Document P
“The trusts argue that competition means war and is therefore destructive. The trust is
eminently docile and hence seeks to destroy competition in order that we may have peace. But
the peace which they give us is like that which exists after the leopard has devoured the kid. This
professed desire for peace is a false pretense. They dread the war of competition because the
people share in the spoils. When rid of that, they always turn their guns upon the masses and
depredate without limit or mercy. . . . The main weapons of the trust are threats, intimidation,
bribery, fraud, wreck, and pillage. Take one well-authenticated instance in the history of the Oat
Meal Trust as an example. In 1887 this trust decided that part of their mills should stand idle.
They were accordingly closed. This resulted in the discharge of a large number of laborers who
had to suffer in consequence. The mills which were continued in operation would produce seven
million barrels of meal during the year. Shortly after shutting down, the trust advanced the price of
meal one dollar per barrel, and the public was forced to stand the assessment. The mills were
more profitable when idle than when in operation. . . . The Sugar Trust has it within its power to
levy a tribute of $30,000,000 upon the people of the United States by simply advancing the price
of sugar one cent per pound for one year. If popular tumult breaks out and legislation in restraint
of these depredations is threatened, they can advance prices, extort campaign expenses and
corruption funds from the people, and force the disgruntled multitude to furnish the sinews of war
for their own destruction. They not only have the power to do these things, but it is their known
mode of warfare, and they actually practice it from year to year.” Thomas Bailey, The American
Pageant.
Document Q