Ecological Modernization and Eco-Marxist Perspectives:
Globalization and Gold Mining Development in Turkey
Nahide Konak
Introduction
Within environmental sociology, one of the central debates is between an ecological
modernization perspective and an eco-Marxist perspective.1 Both theoretical perspectives have
dealt with the environmental implications of globalization. While Mol (2002) examined the
consequences of globalization for ecological modernization studies,2 eco-Marxist treadmill
theorists,3 maintain that there has been little systematic application of the treadmill logic to
analyses of globalization.4
Both perspectives offer persuasive and internally consistent arguments; however, the use of
more empirical cases is necessary to critically evaluate their claims and assumptions. In this regard,
cyanide-leach mining at the Ovacik mine in Turkey offers an excellent opportunity.
Many countries have adopted policies of economic liberalization since the 1980s in order to
attract foreign investment. Gill conceptualizes these policies as “disciplinary neoliberalism,” in which
a discourse of political economy endorses the power of capital through the extension and deepening
of market values and disciplines in social life.5 Of course, the global extension and deepening of
disciplinary neoliberalism does not take place automatically. Rather, disciplinary neoliberalism
involves political and legal reforms of constitutions, laws, property rights, and various institutional
arrangements by nation-states.6 For example, since 1985 more than 90 countries have adopted new
mining laws or revised existing legal codes in an effort to attract foreign investment in the mining
sector of their economies.7 Bridge examines how neoliberal policy reforms in the developing world
Frederick Buttel, “The Treadmill of Production: An Appreciation, Assessment and Agenda for Research,” Organization
& Environment, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2002, pp. 323-336; Kenneth A. Gould, David N. Pellow and Allan Schnaiberg,
“Interrogating the Treadmill of Production: Everything You Wanted to Know about the Treadmill but Were Afraid to
Ask,” Organization & Environment, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2004, pp. 296-313; Arthur P.J. Mol and Gert Spaargaren, “Ecological
Modernization Theory in Debate: A Review,” in Arthur P.J. Mol and David A. Sonnenfeld (eds.), Ecological Modernization
Around the World (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 17-49; David A. Sonnenfeld, “Contradictions in Ecological
Modernization: Pulp and Paper Manufacturing in Southeast Asia,” in Mol and Sonnenfeld ibid., pp. 235-256; Richard
York, “The Treadmill of (Diversifying) Production,” Organization & Environment, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2004, pp. 355-362;
Richard York and Rosa Eugene, “Key Challenges to Ecological Modernization Theory,” Organization & Environment, Vol.
16, No. 3, 2003, pp. 273-288.
2 Arthur P.J. Mol, “Ecological Modernization and the Global Economy,” Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2002,
pp. 92-115.
3 Treadmill theorists hold that that ecological problems emerge from a treadmill of production that was created in
response to the strong drive to expand production and markets. See Allan Schnaiberg, “Draft for the second edition of
the Handbook of Economic Sociology,” online at:
http://www.sociology.northwestern.edu/faculty/schnaiberg/documents/22.ECONOMYYENVIRONMENT.pdf.
4Allan Schnaiberg and Kenneth A. Gould, Environment and Society: The Enduring Conflict (West Caldwell, NJ: Blackburn
Press, 2000).
5 Stephen Gill, “Globalization, Market Civilization, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism,” Millennium, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1995, pp.
399-423.
6 Ibid.
7 J. Otto, “A National Mineral Policy as a Regulatory Tool,” Resources Policy, Vol. 23, No. 1/2, June 1997, pp. 1-8; A.
Warhurst, and Gavin Bridge, “Economic Liberalization, Innovation, and Technology Transfer: Opportunities for
1
1
have driven changes in the geography of primary sector (i.e., extractive) activities globally and
analyzes new data on direct investment in the international mining industry.8 The adoption of
neoliberal globalization policies in Turkey has increased gold mining there by international
companies since the 1980s. Cyanide-leach gold mining carries tremendous social and environmental
risks in the form of water, air, and land pollution, adverse human health impacts, depletion and
degradation of natural resources, and the loss of biodiversity, to name a few.9 According to the U.S.
EPA Toxics Release Inventory for 2001, the mining industry is the largest source of toxic releases in
the U.S.10 The toxic threat of an ecologically unsustainable development project triggered the
environmental conflict in Bergama during the 1990s and resulted in struggles by various civil society
groups in Turkey.
The main purpose of this article is to critically evaluate the claims and assumptions of
ecological modernization and eco-Marxist perspectives through analyzing the gold-mining
conflict in Turkey in the age of globalization. The ecological modernization theory is useful in
analyzing the institutionalization of environmental policies and regulations in Turkey in
relation to European Union (E.U.) integration. However, it falls short in terms of analyzing the
outcomes of the environmental policy conflict among the Turkish state, private companies,
and civil society. An eco-Marxist perspective is more useful in critically assessing specific
struggles, such as the environmental conflict in the Ovacik gold mine case.
Ecological Modernization versus Eco-Marxist Perspectives
“Ecological modernization” is a relatively new concept, developed in the early 1980s by
German sociologist, Joseph Huber.11 Ecological modernization theory aims to “analyze how
contemporary industrialized societies deal with environmental crises.”12 It focuses on (existing and
programmed) environmental reforms in social practices, institutional designs, and societal and policy
discourses to safeguard societies’ sustenance bases.13 It analyzes the environmental origins and
environmental consequences of social change. One of the core premises of ecological modernization
theory is that ecological interests and criteria are slowly but steadily catching up with economic
criteria in organizing and designing global production and consumption.
Cleaner Production in the Minerals Industry,” Natural Resources Forum, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1997, pp. 1-12; K.F. Naito, K.F.
Remy, and J. Williams, Review of Legal and Fiscal Frameworks for Exploration and Mining (London: Mining Journal Books,
2001.)
8 Gavin Bridge, “Mapping the Bonanza: Geographies of Mining Investment in an Era of Neoliberal Reform,” The
Professional Geographer, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2004, pp. 406-421.
9 Robert E. Moran, “De-coding Cyanide: An Assesment of Gaps in Cyanide Regulation at Mines,” A Submission to the
European Union and the United Nations Environmental Programme, sponsored by Hellenic Mining Watch, Ecotopia,
CEE Bankwatch, FOE Europe, FOE Hungary, FOE Czech Republic, Food First Information and Action Network
(FIAN), MineWatch U.K., and Mineral Policy Center, 2002, published online at:
http://www.earthworksaction.org/publications.cfm?pubID=79; Carlos D. Da Rosa, James S. Lyon, and Philip M.
Hocker, Golden Dreams, Poisoned Streams: How Reckless Mining Pollutes America’s Water, and How We Can Stop It (Washington:
Mineral Policy Center, 1997).
10 U.S. EPA, Toxic Release Inventory, 2001, published online at: http://www.epa.gov/tri/.
11 Gert Spaargaren and Arthur P.J. Mol, “Sociology, Environment and Modernity: Ecological Modernization as a Theory
of Social Change,” Society and Natural Resources,” Vol. 5, No. 4, 1992, pp. 323-344; Arthur P.J. Mol, The Refinement of
Production: Ecological Modernization Theory and the Chemical Industry (Utrecht: Jan van Arkel/International Books, 1995); M.A.
Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and Policy Process (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995).
12 Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000, op. cit., p. 5.
13 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
2
Historically, the theory developed in three consecutive stages. The first stage, lasting until the
late 1980s, placed emphasis on technological innovations to bring about environmental reforms. In
the second stage, from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, focus shifted from a determinist technology
perspective to the synergy between the market and the state, and the role of human agency,
institutions, and culture in environmental reforms.14 In the third stage, from the mid-1990s to the
present, the theory has been applied to non-European nations, increasing its focus on changing
global dynamics.15
One of its leading theorists, Mol, states that “the ecological modernization theory focuses on
the growing independence, ‘emancipation,’ or empowerment of the ecological perspective or sphere
from the basic three analytical spheres or perspectives in modern society: political, economic, and
socio-ideological or societal.”16 Mol argues that in the economic domain, ecological rationality has
begun to challenge the dominant economic rationality.17 Proponents of this theory consider:
…capitalism neither as an essential precondition for, nor as the key obstruction to, stringent or radical
environmental reform. They rather focus on redirecting and transforming “free market capitalism” in
such a way that it less and less obstructs, and increasingly contributes to, the preservation of society’s
sustenance base in a fundamental/structural way.18
Ecological modernization proponents argue that modern economic institutions and mechanisms can be
reformed and transformed according to the criteria of ecological rationality. These transformations are
grouped in four clusters:

First, modern science and technology are not evaluated for their role in causing
environmental problems but instead are valued for their actual and potential role in curing
and preventing them.19 From this point of view, science and technology should not be
viewed as the problem but should be seen as a means to solve environmental problems.
Modern science and technology are seen as principle institutions in “ecologizing” the
economy.

Second, attention is paid to the “increasing importance of market dynamics and economic
agents … as carriers of ecological restructuring and reform.”20 Procedures, credit institutions,
insurance companies, the utility sector, and business associations are said to increasingly turn
into social carriers of ecological restructuring, innovation, and reform (along with state
agencies and new social movements).21

Third, political modernization is hypothesized to be taking place where the structure and the
function of the nation-state is changing from one that is exclusive, centralized, and
bureaucratic to one that is more decentralized, flexible, inclusive, and participatory.
Arthur P.J. Mol, Globalization and Environmental Reforms: The Ecological Modernization of the Global Economy (Cambridge,
MA and London: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 57-58.
15 Ibid., p. 58; Gert Spaargaren, Arthur P.J. Mol and Frederick H. Buttel, (eds.), Environment and Global
Modernity (Thousand Oaks, CA, London, and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), p. 5.
16 Mol, 1995, op. cit., p. 64; Mol, 2001 op. cit., p. 222; Mol, 2002, op. cit., p. 93.
17 Ibid., p. 94.
18 Mol and Spaargaren, 2000, op. cit., p. 23.
19 Mol, 2001, op. cit., p. 61.
20 Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000, op. cit., p. 6.
21 Mol, 2001, op. cit., p. 61.
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Supranational organizations such as the World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO),
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations have been increasingly
involving themselves in various forms of policy formations, which Mol and Sonnenfeld say
“undermines the nation-state’s traditional role in environmental reform.”22 Mol argues that
institutions such as the E.U. and NAFTA. “are probably of greater relevance for the future
taming of transnational capitalism.”23

Fourth, ecological modernization proponents maintain that global social movements have
been increasingly involved in public and private decision-making institutions (within the state
and the market) regarding environmental reforms, in contrast to having been limited to the
periphery or even being outside of such processes and institutions in the 1970s and 1980s.24
They see social movements playing a central role in the environmental transformation of
contemporary society in collaboration with government agencies and business firms.
Eco-Marxist Perspective
According to this perspective, the origin of environmental problems is located in the
political economy of advanced capitalist societies. Capitalist economies behave like a “treadmill of
production” that continuously creates ecological harm through a self-reinforcing mechanism of
increasing rates of production and consumption. The “treadmill of production” concept holds that
modern capitalism and the modern state display a fundamental logic of promoting economic growth
and private capital accumulation. The imperatives of a capitalist economic system (i.e. profit
maximization and competition) push human societies to increasingly extract resources (withdrawals)
and to deposit wastes and by-products (additions). State agencies and officials prefer economic
growth both to ensure tax revenues and enhance officials’ likelihood of re-election.25 Thus, the role
of the state in capitalist society is to facilitate the conditions for capital growth. The treadmill of
production is directly linked to the ecological crisis, since economic growth and accumulation
require natural resource extraction, which contributes to pollution. The key claim is that capitalintensive economic expansion is intrinsic to capitalist market societies because of the structure of the
economy and the role of the state. Furthermore, capital-intensive economic expansion has an
intrinsic tendency toward environmental degradation.
Eco-Marxists reject the notion that capitalism can somehow be reformed on ecological lines,
as ecological modernization suggests.26 Rather, they hold that the logic of capitalist production
inevitably results in environmental degradation, since production necessitates the appropriation of
nature. At the same time, the unchecked use of raw materials and resultant pollution can undermine
the biophysical basis of production itself as capitalism treats nature as a free good. This argument is
the “second contradiction of capitalism” thesis formulated by James O’Connor.27 “Capitalism [is] a
crisis-ridden system …that combine[s the] power of capitalist production relations and productive
Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000, op. cit., pp. 6-7; Mol, 2001, op. cit., p. 62.
Mol, 2002, op. cit., p. 99.
24 Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000, op. cit., p. 7; Mol, 2001, op. cit., p. 62; Mol, 2002, op. cit., pp. 106-109.
25 James O’Connor, Natural Causes: Essays in Ecological Marxism (New York and London: Guilford Press, 1998); Allan
Schnaiberg, The Environment: From Surplus to Scarcity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Allan Schnaiberg and
Ken Gould, Environment and Society: The Enduring Conflict (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994).
26 D. Goldblatt, Social Theory and Environment (Oxford: Polity Press, 1996); James O’Connor, “Is Sustainable Capitalism
Possible?” in Martin O’Connor (ed.), Is Capitalism Sustainable? (New York: Guilford, 1994).
27 O’Connor, 1998, op. cit.
22
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forces [which] self-destruct by impairing or destroying rather than reproducing their own
conditions.”28
Eco-Marxist theorists also doubt that technology and science will solve environmental
problems in the long run. O’Connor points out that the history of industrial capitalism shows that
“technologies have been chosen on the basis of their effects on costs and sales, not on the
environment.”29
Treadmill theorists30 have begun to reconsider the notion of a treadmill of production within
the context of globalization and the transition to post-Fordism. They assert that in the age of
globalization with its increase in the mobility of financial and industrial capital, a “transnational
treadmill” has emerged. They contend that “transnational treadmill market actors” predominate over
“national institutions of the nation-state, and its society.” They argue that neoliberal policies of
economic globalization have allowed not only the movement of capital and technology, but also the
transformation of social and environmental costs to non-Western societies.31 Eco-Marxist theorists
posit that globalization also reinforces national treadmills of production, and thus contributes to the
global ecological crisis.32
Ecological Modernization: The European Union, Turkey’s Candidacy, and Environmental
Policy
On August 9, 1949, Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe, which was the first
European intergovernmental organization. The Council of Europe has close to 200 European
treaties or conventions, including the European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture, and the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The Convention formed three institutions, all
of which have supranational powers that Turkey accepted. These are the European Commission of
Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe.33 Turkey ratified Article 25 of the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms and recognized the right of individual petition in 1987, which gives
individuals the right to petition the European Commission of Human Rights after domestic
resources are exhausted.34 There have been about 1,500 petitions from Turkey to the European
Commission of Human Rights, including one about the Ovacik gold mine case.35
Ibid., p. 165.
Ibid., p. 204.
30 A. Schnaiberg and K.A. Gould, 2000, op. cit.
31 Ibid.; O’Connor, 1998, op. cit.
32 Allan Schnaiberg, Adam Weinberg, and David Pellow, “The Treadmill of Production and the Environmental State,” in
Arthur P.J. Mol and Fredrick H. Buttel (eds.), The Environmental State Under Pressure (London/JAI: Elsevier, 2002);
O’Connor, 1998, op. cit.; Peter Dickens, “Beyond Sociology: Marxism and the Environment,” in M. Redclift and G.
Woodgate (eds.), The International Handbook of Environmental Sociology (Cheltenham/Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar,
1998), pp. 179-192; Ted Benton, Natural Relations (London: Verso, 1993).
33 Ayse Betul Celik, “Transnationalization of Human Rights Norms and Its Impact on Internally Displaced Kurds,”
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 25, 2005, p. 984.
34 Ibid., pp. 984-985.
35 E.U. Regular Report on Turkey 2004, published online at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/report
_2004/pdf/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf.
28
29
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For years, Turkey has sought membership in the E.U. On September 12, 1963, Turkey
signed an Association Agreement, the Ankara Treaty, with the European Community (E.C.) and
became an associate member. On April 14, 1987, Turkey applied for full membership to the E.C.36
Ten years later at the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, the European Council decided not to include
Turkey among the list of candidate countries nor start accession negotiations. In March 1998, the
Commission prepared a European Strategy for Turkey, and the Council adopted it in June 1998.
Turkey then approved the pre-accession criteria that the European Union had adopted at the
Copenhagen European Council of June 1993. Finally, the E.U. granted the desired candidacy status
to Turkey in Helsinki in December 1999. On November 8, 2000, the European Commission
approved an Accession Partnership Document for Turkey, which was adopted by the Council on
March 8, 2001. Turkey then adopted its National Program for the Adoption of the acquis (the body
of E.U. law and regulations) on March 19, 2001. In the Copenhagen summit of December 2002,
E.U. leaders agreed to review Turkey’s candidacy based on its ability to meet the political aspects of
the Copenhagen criteria. The E.U. has thus far denied Turkey entry, citing human rights violations
and the lack of “true” democracy.37 However, negotiations for membership began between the E.U.
and Turkey on October 2005, and they are expected to last for at least a decade.
Ecological modernization provides the framework within which the E.U. not only frames
and tackles its environmental problems but also marries economic growth to its environmental
protection policies.38 Ecological modernization requires the integration of environmental policy into
other areas of governmental action, such as economic activity, reform of the tax system along
ecological lines, taxing exploitation of environmental resources, and the development of clean
technology. The E.U. has been initiating these policy developments, and member and candidate
countries have been adopting them.39
As Roggeband and Verloo40 indicate, the structure of policy-making within the E.U. has
changed the nature of policy-making in Turkey. Thus, the E.U. set large portions of Turkey’s policy
agendas in several areas. For example, Turkey integrated environmental concerns into its
OECD, OECD and Environment (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1999).
E.U. Regular Report on Turkey, 1998, published online at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/report
_11_98/pdf/en/turkey_en.pdf;
op. cit., 1999, published online at: http://ec.europa.eu/ comm/enlargement/report 10_99/pdf/en/turkey _en.pdf;
op. cit., 2000, published online at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/pdf/en/tu_en.pdf;
op. cit., 2001, published online at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/report2001/tu_en.pdf;
op. cit., 2002, published online at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/report2002/tu_en.pdf;
op. cit., 2003, published online at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/rr_tk_final.pdf.
38 Susan Baker, “The European Union: Integration, Competitions, Growth and Sustainability,” in
W.M. Laerty and J. Meadowcroft (eds.), Implementing Sustainable Development: Strategies and
Initiative in High Consumption Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 303-421.
39 Andrew Jordan and Duncan Liefferink, Environmental Policy in Europe: The Europeanization of Environmental Policy in Europe
(London: Routledge, 2004); Christoph Knill, The Europeanization of National Administrations: Pattern of Institutional Change and
Persistence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ecotech, “Administrative Capacity for Implementation and
Enforcement of E.U. Environmental Policy in the 13 Candidate Countries,” Birmingham, U.K, 2001; Miranda Schreurs,
“Environmental Protection in an Expanding European Community: Lessons from Past Accessions,” Environmental
Politics, Vol. 13, No.1, 2004, pp. 27-51.
40 Conny Roggeband and Mieke Verloo, “Global Sisterhood and Political Change: The Unhappy ‘Marriage’ of Women’s
Movements and National States,” in Kees van Kersbergen, Robert H. Lieshout, and Grahame Lock (eds.), Extension and
Fragmentation: Internationalization, Political Change and the Transformation of the Nation State (Amsterdam: Amsterdam
University Press, 1999), pp. 177-194.
36
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development policy. The preface of the Turkish National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP),
prepared in 1995, states that:
In order to achieve the country’s environmental objectives, the NEAP (i) proposes a number of
actions for developing an effective environmental management system; (ii) emphasizes the need for
enhancing environmental information and awareness; (iii) includes a set of new investment proposals
on different thematic areas; (iv) builds the first steps to adopt E.U. environmental standards and
regulations at a feasible pace for integration with the E.U. in the long term. 41
The Turkish national environmental policy, which was articulated in the Seventh Five-Year
Development Plan (1996-2000), emphasized protection and improvement of the environment with
emphasis on pollution prevention rather than clean-up, the polluter pays principle, and ensuring that
environmental policies are in accordance with E.U. norms and international standards.42
Turkey’s desire to become a member of the E.U. has also played an important role in the
recent rapid development of environmental regulations and legislation within the country. Turkey
ratified various environmental conventions, treaties, agreements, declarations, and protocols, and to
some extent, modified its national environmental policies accordingly.43 By 1997, the country had
become party to 38 conventions, signed 29 declarations, and enacted 15 bilateral agreements on
environmental protection and management, which, according to the Constitution, have the “effect
of law.” Since then, Turkey has continued to work on making its environmental regulations
compatible with environmental regulations of the E.U.44 As laid out in the Copenhagen criteria,
candidate states need to meet accession criteria and adopt the bulk of E.U. legislation in the areas of
human rights, democratization, economic conditions, and environment through approximation,
transportation, and adoption of the acquis. “Under the Treaty, all the new members of the E.U. must
comply with the full … (body of European community law), including all environmental directives
and regulations.”45 According to the E.U. 2003 regular report on Turkey’s progress toward
accession, some of the preconditions for its full membership are that it strengthen its approach to
environmental issues, increase democratization, and improve its human rights record, with special
emphasis on making structural and legal adjustments in these areas.46 As a formal candidate for
membership in the E.U., Turkey’s environmental, human rights, and democratization records have
come under heavy scrutiny.
Certainly, passing environmental laws and adopting regulations compatible with E.U.
environmental regulations is only the first step. Implementing and enforcing them are also
DPT-NEAP, 1998, published online at: http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/cevre/eylempla/neap.html.
Seventh Five-Year Development Plan, Turkey (1996-2000), published online at: http:// ekutup.dpt.gov.tr
/plan/vii/ing.html.
43 R. Kele, R. and C. Hamamcı, Çevrebilim. (Ankara: Imge, 1993); OECD, 1999, op. cit.; Türk-AT Mevzuat Uyumu Sürekli
Özel Ihtisas Komisyonu, Çevre Alt Komisyonu Raporu (Ankara: DPT, 1997).
44 Rana Izci, “The Impact of the European Union on Environmental Policy,” in Fikret Adaman and Murat Arsel (eds.),
Environmentalism in Turkey: Between Democracy and Development (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 87-100; Profile, “Turkiye AB
Iliskileri Ortakliktan Tam Uyelige,” Ankara, EKO Avrupa Ekonomik Danisma Merkezi, 2001, p. 208; Ahmet Sandal,
“Avrupa Birligine Girme Surecinde Cevre Yonetimi Alaninda Gerceklestirilmesi Gereken Reformlar,” Ankara, Yerel
Yonetim ve Denetim Dergisi, Vol. 3, 2001, pp. 52-60; Nuran Talu, “Avrupa Birligi Cevre Politikasi ve Turkiye,” Ankara, Yeni
Turkiye Dergisi, Cevre Ozel Sayisi, 2000, p. 1071.
45 Regina S. Alexrod and Norman J. Vig, “The European Union as an Environmental Governance System,” in Norman
J. Vig and Ragina S. Axelrod (eds.), The Global Environment: Institutions, Law, and Policy (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press,
1999), pp. 72-97.
46 E.U. Regular Report on Turkey, 2003, op. cit.
41
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important. Yet, so far, the implementation of such environmental laws has been extremely
ineffective.47 The adoption of an economic development plan predicated upon cyanide-leach gold
mining and recent neoliberal policies are in reality contradictory to Turkey’s stated environmental
goals. The E.U. Regular Report on Turkey48 points out this contradiction:
Despite the adoption of a number of regulations on nature protection, legal harmonization remains
low. A framework law on nature protection and implementing legislation transposing the provisions
of the birds and habitats acquis needs to be adopted. Steps need to be taken to ensure implementation.
Legislative changes foreseen regarding Natural Heritage and a new Mining Law may seriously hamper
progress on nature protection.
According to the E.U., the problem lies in the Turkish state’s incomplete adoption of E.U.
standards of regulation and enforcement. But, in reality, as the eco-Marxist perspective argues, the
root causes of the problem lie in the contradiction between capitalist economic growth and
environmental protection, and the state’s primary role in producing conditions for capital
accumulation.49 Thus, the adoption of these E.U. environmental regulations by Turkey is merely
symbolic50 in the sense that they have had no real power to prevent the movement of
environmentally risky cyanide-leach gold mining to Turkey.
The ecological modernization contention that environmental problems can be, and indeed
have been, addressed through the structures and processes of modernity has been strongly criticized
by European scholars,51 who argue that the empirical basis of the modernization theory—that is, the
extent to which European states or industrial sectors have undergone ecological modernization—
remains open.52 In other words, they point out that ecological modernization theory is inconsistent
with the reality on the ground, since the ecological crisis continues to get worse, even in European
countries.
Neoliberal Economic Globalization and Gold Mining: Transfer of Toxic Technology to
Turkey
As with many developing countries, since the 1980s Turkey has adopted neoliberal exportoriented development policies in the hope of attracting economic development. Export-oriented
industrialization is defined as a type of “industrialization promoted by transnational firms and their
subsidiaries for the manufacture of consumer goods for export to markets primarily in the advanced
countries.”53 The worldwide promotion of export-oriented industrialization has resulted in
competition among countries to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Developing countries have
thus been encouraged with money and assistance from the IMF and World Bank with the aim of
subverting nationalist economic development models. Turkey’s adoption of neoliberal economic
Zulkuf Aydin, “The State, Civil Society, and Environmentalism,” in Fikret Adaman and Murat Arsel (eds.),
Environmentalism in Turkey: Between Democracy and Development, op. cit., p. 64.
48 E.U. Regular Report on Turkey, 2003 op. cit., p. 107.
49 O’Connor, 1998, op. cit.
50 Baker, 2007, op. cit.
51 I. Bluhdorn, Post-ecologist Politics: Social Theory and the Abdication of the Ecologist Paradigm (London: Routledge, 2000); N.
Luhmann, Ecological Communication (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
52 Baker, 2007, op. cit.
53 Berch Berberoglu, The Political Economy of Development: Development Theory and the Prospects For Change in the Third World
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 52.
47
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policies attracted the global mining industry54 at a time when disincentives in developed countries—
especially the U.S., Australia, and Canada—encouraged the mining sector to move into developing
countries. These disincentives included the rise of strong environmental movements against
environmental problems, the exhaustion of high tenor mining ore, a decrease in the price of metals
during the 1980s,55 and strengthening environmental policy (at least until 2001.)56 Mining companies
have moved to South America, Africa, and South and Central Asia.57 Roger Moody noted that stateowned mining assets “are being offered for sale under ‘free market’ privatization” and that “under
pressure from the IMF and the World Bank, more that 70 countries have changed their mining laws
to make them more attractive to foreign investment.”58
Before 1980, mining in Turkey was under the control of state institutions (namely, the
General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration, and Etibank), as articulated in article 168
of the 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. This article reads as follows:
Natural wealth and resources shall be placed under the control of, and put at the disposal of the state.
The right to explore and exploit resources belongs to the state. The state may delegate this right to
individuals or public corporations for specific periods. Of the natural wealth and resources, those to
be explored and exploited by the state in partnership with individuals or public corporations, and
those to be directly explored and exploited by individuals or public corporations shall be subject to
the explicit permission of the law.59
As an extension of liberalization policies, mining Law 3213 of 198560 granted numerous privileges to
domestic and foreign capital. Moreover, in 1994 mining was privatized by Article 3996. This meant
that with the transition to a “free-market” economy, the state can now grant mineral rights to
foreign companies with up to 100 percent foreign ownership as long as the foreign companies are
registered in accordance with the laws and regulations of Turkey. The changes in laws and
privatization policies began in the 1980s, and since then the foreign direct investment in mining—
especially gold mining—has increased. As a result, many multinational corporations, such as
Eurogold, Camino and Tuprag, have come to develop natural resources in Turkey.61 Multinational
corporations interested in searching for gold were given authorizations for 560 different sites in
Turkey.62 Currently, 88 foreign companies from various countries are registered for mining,63 nine
specifically for gold explorations.64
Tahir Ongor, “Globalization and Mining Laws,” presented at the Conference on Globalization and Mining Laws,
Istanbul Technical University, January 13, 2003.
55 M.R. Auty, “The Geopolitics of Mineral Resources,” Mining, Environment and Development Series No.1, UNCTAD,
published online at: http://www.natural resources.org/ minerals/ CD/ docs/unctad/auty. pdf; P. Crowson, “Mining
Industry Profitability?” Resource Policy, Vol. 27, 2001, pp. 133-142.
56 Al Gedicks, Resource Rebels: Native Challenges to Mining and Oil Corporations (Boston: South End Press, 2001); Ongor,
2003, op. cit.
57 Ongor, ibid.
58 Roger Moody, “Mining the World: the Global Reach of Rio Tinto Zinc,” The Ecologist, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1996, p. 46.
59 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, published online at: http:// www.byegm.gov.tr/ mevzuat/
anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm.
60 Published online at: http://www.wmcturk.org.tr/Mining%20in%Turkey_dosyalar/minerals.
61 Sefa Taskin, Siyanürcü Ahtapot (Istanbul: Sel Yayincilik, 1998).
62 Ibid., p. 11.
63 Ali Ihsan Arol, “Current Status of FDI and Environmental Issues in Turkey,” paper presented at the OECD Global
Forum on International Investment, Conference on Foreign Direct investment and the Environment: Lessons to be
Learned from the Mining Sector, Paris, February 7-8, 2002.
64 Ibid.
54
9
The Ovacik gold mine in Bergama, run by the Turkish subsidiary of Normandy Mining, Ltd.
of Australia, is the first gold mine in Turkey to use cyanide-leach technology in its production
process. The Eurogold/Normandy firm registered in 1989 for gold reserve prospecting. Following
the discovery of the Ovacik gold deposit, applications for an operating permit were registered with
the Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources,65 which granted the environmental permit in
1994. The construction of the process plant, tailings pond, and associated infrastructure was initiated
in 1996 and completed at the end of 1997.66 However, the mine was not fully commissioned until
June 2001, mainly due to grassroots environmental resistance. In June 2001, Turkish officials
granted a permit to the firm to begin “trial production,” and the mine has been operating since. The
Ovacik gold mine is located in a heavily populated area close to seventeen villages that includes
fertile soil and historical and cultural artifacts.
Role of Social Movements in Taming Global Capitalism and Protecting the Environment:
The Bergama Environmental Movement
Throughout the 1990s, as Eurogold/Normandy tried to obtain permits from the Turkish
government, a grassroots environmental effort to halt the Ovacik gold mine began in the seventeen
nearby villages, prompted by the former Bergama mayor, Sefa Taskin; the Bergama Environment,
Art and Cultural Society; and some Bergama political party leaders. Over time, many local, national,
and international civil society organizations also supported the grassroots effort, which developed
out of a collaboration composed of potentially affected villagers; local activists; former Bergama city
government officials (particularly left-oriented local party leaders); regional and national engineeringbased organizations, such as the Turkish Engineer and Architecture Occupational Organization
(TMMOB); environmental organizations; public health organizations; university professors; the
Izmir Bar Association; and environmental rights lawyers.
Friedhelm Korte, a leading geochemist at the Institute of Chemistry at the Technical
University of Munich, Germany who has conducted extensive research on the ecological and social
impacts of cyanide use in mining,67 is the scientific advisor for the grassroots struggle in Bergama.
Turkish geochemical, expert Ismail Duman, and many others have also worked to reveal the hidden
risks and uncertainties of the use of cyanide-leach technology in mining.68 Since the 1990s, a network
Taskin, 1998, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
E. Koksal, O. Ormanoglu and E.A. Devuyst, “Cyanide Destruction: Full-Scale at Ovacik Gold Mine,” The European
Journal of Mineral Processing and Environmental Protection, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2002, pp. 270-280.
67 Friedhelm Korte, “Global Inputs and Trends of Chemical Residues in the Biosphere,” in F. Coulston and W. Korte
(eds.), Environmental Quality and Safety, Global Aspects of Chemistry, Toxicology and Technology as Applied to the Environment
(Stuttgart: Georg Thieme Verlag, 1976), pp. 183-196; Friedhelm Korte and F. Coulston, “Some Consideration of the
Impact of Energy and Chemicals on the Environment,” Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology, Vol. 19, 1994, pp. 219-227;
Friedhelm Korte and F. Coulston, “From Single-Substance Evaluation to Ecological Process Concept: The Dilemma of
Processing Gold with Cyanide,” Ecotoxicology and Environmental Safety, Vol. 32, 1995, pp. 96-101; Friedhelm Korte and F.
Coulston, “Some Considerations on the Impact on Ecological Chemical Principles in Practice with Emphasis on Gold
Mining and Cyanide,” Ecotoxicology and Environmental Safety, Vol. 41, 1998, pp. 119-129; F. Korte, M. Spiteller, and F.
Coulston, “The Cyanide Leaching Gold Recovery Process Is a Nonsustainable Technology with Unacceptable Impacts
on Ecosystems and Humans: The Disaster in Romanian Ecotoxicology and Environmental Safety,” Environmental
Research Section B, Vol. 46, 2000, pp. 241-245.
68 Ismail Duman, Bergama ve Altin Madeni [Bergama and the Gold Mine] (Bergama: Bergama Belediyesi Kultur Yayinlari,
1998); Hayal Ozkilic, Bilim ve Utopya, Vol. 45, 1998, pp. 1-2.
65
66
10
of national and international independent scientists and experts has called for banning cyanideleaching technology in mining not only in the Ovacik gold mine but worldwide.69
The European Parliament, the Green Party in Germany, and the international human rights
organization Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN), which advocates for the right to
food, has called for urgent action to prevent the imminent destruction of the Edremit region, a
major agricultural region in Turkey, from gold mining.70 This collaboration has been supported by
international NGOs and advocacy networks working on cyanide and ecology, such as Greenpeace,
FIAN, the U.S. Mining Policy Center, Mine Watch in England, and the Mineral Policy Institute in
Australia.71
Strategies and Legal Actions by the Bergama Environmental Movement
In 1993, a report on the proposed cyanide-leaching gold mining projects in the Aegean
region was prepared and submitted to the European Parliament. As a result, the European
Parliament called upon the Turkish government to ban cyanide-leaching technology use in gold
mine production.72 On November 17, 1994, the European Parliament discussed these issues and
produced a report that argued that the potential damage from the project to underground water and
rivers would affect not only the surrounding local environment but also the Mediterranean Sea. The
nearby Greek Island of Lesvos (Midilli) was seen as particularly at risk. Because the potential damage
to the environment would not remain local but would expand its impact regionally, cyanide-leaching
technology use in the Ovacik gold mine in Bergama became a European issue.
In 1994, 652 citizens from local villages and the Bergama district petitioned against the
Turkish Ministry of Environment and the Eurogold company in the Izmir Administrative Court73 in
an attempt to halt the project. Initially, the Izmir Administrative Court ruled in favor of
Eurogold/Normandy. But activists and lawyers appealed, and on May 13, 1997, the Court of Appeal
decided that the gold mine had to shut down its operation due to the fact that it did not serve any
public interest.
In 1997 at the end of the three-year-long judicial process, the Higher Administrative Court in
Izmir, 6th Chamber, decided that Eurogold/Normandy must shut down the Ovacik mine because it
violated Turkish constitutional and environmental law. Specifically, the court held that the
ministerial act violated the principles stipulated in Constitutional Article 17, which says “everyone
has the right to life and the right to develop and protect his/her material and spiritual entity,” and
Article 56, which says “everyone has the right to live in a healthy, decent environment. It is the duty
of the state and citizens to improve the natural environment and to prevent environmental
Pergamon-Deklaration, “Scientific Aspects of Gold Extraction Using Cyanide,” Scientific Symposium, Technical
University of Istanbul, Faculty of Mining Sciences, Istanbul, June 26-27, 1997, published online at: http://kortegoldmining.infu.uni-dortmund.de/index2.html.
70 European Parliament 1994-1995, published online at: http://www.infu.uni-dortmund.de/kortegoldmining/Minutes.html.
71 Birol Ertan, “The Evaluation of the Verdict of the Court of Appeal: The Public Victory of Bergama and
Environmentalists,” Birikim, Vol. 113, 1998, pp. 84-88; Senih Ozay, Bergama ‘da Bir Yuittas Hareketi (Bergama: Bergama
Belediyesi Kultur Yayinlari, 1997); Taskin, 1998, op. cit.
72 European Parliament 1994-1995, op. cit.
73 Cetin Turan, Bergama ve Hukuk (Bergama: Belediyesi Kultur Yayinlari, 1998).
69
11
pollution.”74 Legal experts cited this as a precedent-setting case, since the court based its decision on
the right to live in a healthy environment. The decision also rejected the common corporate practice
of “cost-shifting”75 and was set to affect 560 other contracts in Turkey.76
The legal victory, however, proved short-lived. The Turkish government’s first response was
simply to not enforce the court’s decision. In response, some movement activists and lawyers
associated with the Izmir Bar Association took the case to an international organization, the
European Court of Human Rights.77 In 2003, it found the state of Turkey guilty for refusing to
implement national and local court decisions and obliged the Turkish government to pay 3,000
Euros to each of the plaintiffs.78
The fact that a transnational network that has developed strategies and taken actions at the
national and international levels emerged to halt the project seems to support the notion of
ecological modernization theory that social movements play a significant role in transforming a
society in the direction of ecological rationality. However, this social movement has had only a
limited impact on Turkish state behavior.
Role of Science and Technology in Environmental Protection
Amidst continuing demands to halt the project in 1997, company officials tried to find new
ways to break the resistance and convince government officials and local communities in Bergama
that the social and ecological risks of cyanide leaching in gold mining could be effectively minimized,
if not eliminated by adding a chemical detoxification system to the production process.
Eurogold/Normandy announced that the firm was going to add a chemical detoxification system
developed by the Canadian company, Inco Technical Services, Ltd. The INCO SO2/AIR method
was added for the decomposition of cyanide at the Ovacik mine in 1997.79
After installing this technology, the Ovacik gold mine was repackaged as a major green
economic development project—one with the most stringent environmental standards in the world.
Furthermore, the former director of the company, Jack Testard,80 claimed the mine was the first to
have such high international environmental standards and a such strong commitment to social
responsibility. He continues to argue that in the U.S., Canada, Europe, Australia, South Africa, New
Zealand, and many other “civilized” countries, more than 100 mines with this type of technology
have contributed significantly to the production of wealth81 and have proudly done so in an
Bergama’daki Siyanurlu Altin Olayina Iliskin Danistay Karari, (Bergama: Bergama Belediyesi Kultur Yayinlari, 1997).
Joan Martinez-Alier, The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological Conflicts and Valuation (Northampton: Edward
Elgar Publishing, 2002), p. 73.
76 Akif M. Oznal, “National Dimension of Cyanide-Leach Gold Mine and Bergama Struggle,” Mimarlar Odasi Bulten, Vol.
2, 1997, pp. 1-5.
77 Arif Ali Cangi, “Bergama, Siyanur, Altin, Mahkeme Kararlari, Hukuksal Surec,” published online at:
http://www.geocities.com/siyanurlealtin/yazi/2002/surec.html.
78 “Chamber Judgment in the Case of Taskin and Others v. Turkey,” published online at:
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2004/Nov/ChamberjudgmentTaskin&OthersvTurkey101104.htm.
79 Duman, 1998, op. cit., p. 42; Sukriye Hicdonmez, “Why Are We Against Cyanide-leach Gold Production in Bergama?”
Bilim ve Utopia, Vol. 34, No. 22-26, 1997, p. 23.
80 Bergama Kuzey Ege Gazetesi (Bergama North Aegean Newspaper), Vol. 6, 1996, p. 1.
81 Ibid.
74
75
12
environmentally consciousness way.”82 Former Australian Environment Minister, Ros Kelly, who
was a member of Normandy Mining’s international board, argued that there can be no serious
objections to the Ovacik mine on environmental grounds, because its environmental mitigation
operations are “way in excess of any mine in Australia.” She added that in contrast to Normandy’s
Australian operations, which might not have detoxification plants or double-lined tailings dams, the
Ovacik mine in Bergama has a “policy of exceeding normal standards.”83
Eurogold/Normandy officials continue to insist that detoxification technology will render
the cyanide solution harmless. Company representatives also erroneously claimed that the U.S.based Sierra Club has stopped protesting against cyanide heap leaching. It also has been reported
that Eurogold/Normandy spent about US $100,000 a year on a public relations campaign to
convince the public that the Ovacik gold mine is “bringing life not death” to the area.84
Meanwhile, in the face of the court’s ruling to shut down the mine, the Turkish government
began searching for ways to allow gold mining to continue. The following quote by Imren Aykut,
the former Minister of Environment, best represents the official government line:
[T]he State does not poison its own people. If cyanide is detrimental, why do other countries use it?
Cyanide-leaching methods have been used safely [around the world]. 85
The Vice Undersecretary for Prime Ministry, Fusun Karaoglu, argued that the resistance to the
Ovacik gold mine has blocked foreign direct investment into Turkey, costing the country important
revenue.86 91 The former Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, claimed that the Court of Appeal’s
decision citing defense of the right to life damaged Turkey’s reputation as an attractive venue for
investment in the eyes of foreign corporations.87
The Turkish government also announced that it found the court decision ambiguous, and in
August 1999 the Turkish Prime Ministry requested that the Scientific and Technical Research
Council of Turkey (TUBITAK), the country’s preeminent scientific research organization, assess
whether or not Eurogold/Normandy had made enough improvements in the mine to operate
without harming the environment. During this time, the media reported that Australian government
officials, including the Prime Minister, the Minister of Natural Resources and Energy, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Environment lobbied strongly on behalf of
Eurogold/Normandy. They requested that Turkish officials do whatever necessary to allow the
Ovacik gold mine to continue operating in Bergama.88 The activists are convinced that this lobbying
played an important role in the Turkish Prime Ministry’s request for TUBITAK’s assessment.
Laurie Udesky, “Turkish Villagers Fight a Multinational That’s Come to Mine Gold in Their Town,” Turkish Daily
News, February 17, 1997.
83 Bob Burton, “Normandy’s Turkish Mine Stumped by Court Ruling,” Mining Monitor, Vol. 2/3, 1997, pp. 1-3.
84 Ibid.
85 Bergama Kuzey Ege Gazetesi (Bergama North Aegean Newspaper), Vol. 159, 1997, p. 1.
86 Bergama Kuzey Ege Gazetesi (Bergama North Aegean Newspaper), Vol. 387-388, 2001, p. 1.
82
Rojda Ildan, “Siyanure Bakan Destegi,” Evrensel Newspaper, November 26, 2001, published online at:
http://www.evrensel.net/arsiv.php.
88 Ibid.
87
13
TUBITAK’s report assessing the risks and possible impact associated with cyanide-leach
mining in the Ovacik gold mine came out in 1999 and argued that it would be impossible to mine
gold without cyanide. Instead the report claimed that the main focus should be on the question of
whether or not the environmental impact and risks of cyanide use met acceptable standards.89
Furthermore, the report claimed that cyanide use in gold mining in developed countries such as
Canada and the U.S. does not pose significant environmental risks.90 But these claims contradict
findings by the Mineral Policy Center in the U.S. that cyanide-leach gold mining is responsible for
serious environmental degradation and public health problems.91 The TUBITAK report claimed that
the addition of the detoxification system at Ovacik could minimize the risks to underground water if
the tailings pond cracked in the future. It also claimed that human health and environmental risks
were within acceptable limits92 and that the tailings pond was constructed according to sufficiently
high standards (which also exceeded Canadian standards).
Hayri Ogut, Eurogold’s public relations manager, insists that a detoxification process renders
the cyanide solution harmless. “There will not be any other poisonous substances in the water,” he
insists. Echoing the claims of numerous polluters before him, he says: “You can even drink it.”93
That assertion alarms Glenn C. Miller, Professor of Environmental and Resource Sciences at the
University of Nevada, Reno:
If a person from the mining industry suggests that the water is drinkable after the INCO process, ask
him if he would drink it or if he would allow his children to drink it. The waste water is still highly
contaminated and requires careful management and regulation over the long term. 94
Korte had previously analyzed this detoxification system in 1995-1996 and concluded that
the toxins released after detoxification exceed the levels in the standard proposed by the World
Health Organization.95 Furthermore, measurements show that this detoxification technology is not
capable of purifying cyanide compounds and heavy metals in tailings pond waste. Toxic waste
combined with various heavy metals and cyanide compounds will stay in the open tailings pond
waste and remain an ecological and social threat. In addition, other chemicals are utilized during the
detoxification process. Korte and others point out that because the nature and characteristics of
chemical reactions are complicated, the end product is difficult to predict. “The INCO-process does
not detoxify heavy metals,” Korte has written. “In addition, it brings into the atmosphere sulfur
oxides and nitrogen compounds.”96 Some other scientists contend that while detoxification may
improve the situation over a gold mining operation without any environmental control technology,
specific risk-benefit evaluations are not yet available, thus it is not possible to accurately measure the
improvement they provide.97 Geochemist Moran evaluates this detoxification as follows:
This process is often used to treat ores containing iron sulfides, or where iron
TUBITAK, Eurogold Ovacik Gold Mine Commission Assessment Report, 1999, p. 6.
Ibid., p. 7.
91 C.D. Da Rosa, J.S. Lyon, and P.M. Hocker, 1997, op. cit.
92 TUBITAK, op. cit., p. 8.
93 Udesky, 1997, op. cit.
94 Ibid.
95 Yeni Asir, “Hukuk Savasiyla Birlikte Avrupa’dan Buyuk Destek,” December 6, 1996.
96 Korte, 1995, op. cit., T.M.M.O.B., Chemistry Engineering Institution, Aegean Region Special Ihtisas Commission Assessment Report,
1997.
97 R. Moran, 2002, op. cit.
89
90
14
cyanide complexes are present in the effluents in significant concentrations. It involves the
addition of SO2, air, and a copper catalyst to breakdown cyanide. While this process does
greatly reduce free cyanide concentrations, it results in the formation of several other
byproducts that may be toxic to aquatic organisms, such as: cyanate, thiocyanate, sulfate,
ammonia, nitrate, some free cyanide, and elevated copper concentrations. Such treated
effluents may also contain elevated concentrations of other metals. The INCO process also
results in the formation of large volumes of calcium sulfate-rich sludges, which increase the
process and disposal costs (Yarar, 1999). Most Canadian gold sites that use the INCO
process are able to generate effluents that meet the discharge standards. However, many of
these effluents are still toxic to organisms in bioassay tests… Thus, these complex solutions
produce toxicity effects we don’t understand, probably as a result of synergistic effects, or
they contain toxic constituents that are not being detected or regulated.98
In conclusion, in contrast to Eurogold/Normandy’s claims, the independent scientific
community maintains that water with solid waste, heavy metals, and cyanide breakdown compounds
such as free cyanides and cyanates will remain in the tailings pond and pose ongoing environmental
and social risks, and the ultimate behavior of these compounds is unknown due to a lack of
scientific study and understanding. Thus, the debate over the Ovacik mine seriously challenges one
of the propositions of ecological modernization theory, namely, that science and technology play the
most significant role in environmental protection. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that as
long as scientific uncertainty exists, science and technology perpetuate environmental deterioration.
Disciplinary Neoliberalism, Constitutionalization, the Turkish State, and the Bergama
Environmental Movement
In 2001, the Turkish Council of Ministry allowed gold mine production and risked violating
the 1997 Court of Appeals decision by permitting Eurogold/Normandy to begin its one-year trial
production. In Turkey, Prime Ministry circulars cannot officially overrule Court of Appeals
decisions. Yet that is precisely what occurred. An analysis of why that happened is in order.
Gill’s concept of new constitutionalism offers an explanation. New constitutionalism is
defined as the political-juridical complement to the disciplinary neoliberal process of accumulation.
According to Gill, the fundamental purpose of new constitutionalism is to prevent future governments
from counteracting commitments to a disciplinary neoliberal pattern of accumulation. Gill says:
Worldwide, new constitutions were being enacted and old constitutions were being
amended. Often, under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World
Bank and other agencies of capitalist world economy, new institutional arrangements were
being devised in ways similar to the European architecture of economic governance—to
separate politics from economics. What was occurring was the gradual institutionalization of
a framework of constitutional constraints theoretically designed to maximize the efficiency
of a now potentially global capitalism. In other words, what was being constructed in a range
of contexts—national, regional, and international (e.g., through the IMF, the World Bank,
and the World Trade Organization (WTO))—was a de facto constitution for global
capitalism.99
Robert Moran, “More Cyanide Uncertainties Lessons From the Baia Mare, Romania, Spill—Water Quality and
Politics,” Mineral Policy Center, 2001, published online at: http://www.miningwatch.ca/ updir/mcu_final.pdf.
99 Stephen Gill, “Constitutionalizing Inequality and the Class of Globalizations,” International Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2,
2002, p. 49.
98
15
As the eco-Marxist perspective argues, the Turkish state has supported economic growth to
fuel its need for tax revenue. “The current financial crisis [in 2001] in Turkey has worked in
Eurogold/Normandy’s favor, as calls have been made for the country to fully exploit its gold
reserves—estimated at around 6,500 tons—to help pay for the large domestic debt.”100 Melda
Keskin, Greenpeace Mediterranean co-coordinator, states that:
We’ve seen in Turkey many instances where a local court—or even a national one—makes a
good decision, but then this is simply ignored by the state. Either they continue to operate
installations that have been ordered closed, or private companies operating under their
protection continue to work.101
Turkey’s acceptance of international arbitration law between foreign firms and the Turkish
state in this case reflects how new constitutionalism works. The main goal of the adoption of
international arbitration law is to send a clear message to the foreign investors that they are
guaranteed a proper investment environment in Turkey. Turkey is one of the leading countries that
has been willing to adopt the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in order to attract more
foreign investment to generate revenue for external debt payment. By playing a central role in MAI
negotiations, Turkey announced that it was ready, though with some reservations, to adopt the
MAI.102
The MAI is the creation of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). If adopted by various countries, it would have the authority of an international treaty and
thus take precedence over the domestic laws of countries that sign it. Basically, it is the continuation
of international commercial arbitration, which has become harmonized through international
conventions and regulations as a widely accepted method for settling international commercial
disputes.103
MAI negotiations in 1995 were intended to provide a multilateral framework for
international investment with the liberalization of investment regimes, the protection of investment,
and effective settlement procedures. If adopted, the MAI would have allowed foreign investors to
sue national and local governments, seek compensation from the state for an investor’s loss of
income and reputation, and challenge state legislation.104 It is similar to NAFTA, yet the MAI has
not yet been allowed to come into effect due to strong opposition from different groups. All over
the world, trade unions, NGOs, and environmental groups have been opposing the MAI in favor of
stronger labor rights and consumer and environmental standards.
In mid-1999, Turkish governmental bodies and business sectors began arguing the necessity
of including key MAI principles into national legislation to further liberalize, deregulate, and
restructure the economy in order to attract more direct foreign investment.105 That year Turkey
Jon Gorvett, “Turkish Court Bans Cyanide Gold Process Near Ancient Town,” Environment News Service, 2001, p. 1,
published online at: http://www.warprofiteers.com/article.php?id=193.
101 Ibid., p. 2.
102 Hazine Mustesarligi, The Turkish Ministry of Treasury Report, Ankara, Turkey, 1998.
103 Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, “Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs: Constructing International Justice from the
Competition for Transnational Business Disputes,” Law and Society Review, Vol. 29, No.1, 1995, pp. 27-64; D.E. Wagoner,
“Arbitration: Preparing for the 21st Century—The Mandate for Harmonization of International Arbitration
Procedures,” Arbitration: The Journal of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrator, Vol. 65, No. 1, 1999, pp. 17-23.
104 O. Hoedeman, “MAIgalomania: The New Corporate Agenda,” The Ecologist, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1998, pp. 154-161.
105 Cumhuriyet, 5/28/99, 6/2/99, 7/7/99; Hurriyet, 6/7/99; Milliyet, 6/4/99.
100
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unilaterally adopted some of the MAI principles, with the Turkish parliament passing three
constitutional amendments. With the amendment to Article 125, Turkey accepted national and
international arbitration for settling disputes between foreign investors and the Turkish government.
An amendment to Article 47 eliminated all legislative obstacles for privatizing public assets and
services. An amendment to Article 155 limited the scope of the domestic administrative law in favor
of the private law (arbitration law), bypassing the sanction of the Council of State regarding these
concessions. In 2001, the Turkish parliament passed the International Arbitration Law, which
remains in effect today. The IMF played an important role in transforming Turkey’s laws, by
basically bribing the Turkish government to adopt the international arbitration law: In exchange for
substituting international arbitration for the sovereignty of Turkish courts, the IMF gave Turkey an
additional credit loan.106
According to Turkish Constitution Article 90 “international agreements duly put into effect carry the
force of law. No appeal to the Constitutional Court can be made with regard to these agreements, on
the grounds that they are unconstitutional.” The constitutional status of international agreements
leads us to suggest that Turkey has already adopted arbitration for settling investment disputes since
when the Washington Convention … was duly put into effect in 1988 … The corollary of the
approval of the Convention is that Turkey recognizes the jurisdiction of the International Center for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), established by the Convention, to settle any legal dispute
arising directly out of an investment, between a contracting state and a national of another contracting
state.107
The written statement by the Under-Secretariat of the Prime Ministry instructed six
ministries to make the necessary changes to allow Eurogold/Normandy to resume its operation. The
justification was as follows: Eurogold’s investment is a foreign investment, which is subject to
international arbitration.108 The Turkish daily newspaper, Milliyet, also reported that
Eurogold/Normandy would file a compensation claim for US $300 million if it were forced to forgo
its gold mine operation.109
Thus, the adoption of international arbitration law on investment usurped the right of
individuals and groups to make use of national judicial systems and judicial remedies. Litigation is
one of the most common tools that environmental and community movements all over the world
use for redress of their complaints.110 Lawsuits seek compensation for actual environmental damage
and detrimental effects on human health.
The constitutional amendments and new legislation regarding the international arbitration
law in Turkey abolished the right to administrative judicial review of environmentally unfriendly
investment by the Turkish state. Under this condition, if arbitration is approved for a possible
dispute, environmentally concerned citizens can no longer bring a case to administrative courts or
Cumhuriyet, 2/6/99.
Aykut Coban, “International Arbitration, Sovereignty and Environmental Protection: The Turkish Case,” in Frank
Biermann, Rainer Brohm and Klaus Dingwerth (eds.), Proceedings of the 2001 Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of
Global Environmental Change, Global Environmental Change and the Nation State (Potsdam: Potsdam Institute for Climate
Impact Research, 2002), p. 218.
108 Cumhuriyet, 6/23/00.
109 Milliyet, 1/6/01.
110 Al Gedicks, “International Native Resistance to the New Resource Wars,” in B.R. Taylor (ed.), Ecological Resistance
Movements: The Global Emergence of Radical and Popular Environmentalism (New York: State University of New York Press,
1995), pp. 89-108; I. Kaboglu, Çevre Hakkı ( Ankara: Imge, 1996); N. Turgut, Çevre Hukuku (Ankara: Sava Yayınları,
1998), pp. 291-299.
106
107
17
the Council of State, which has made landmark decisions devoted to environmental protection, such
as the Aliaga decision111 and the Bergama case. All laws—and environmental laws in particular—as
well as the Turkish constitution, which guarantees the right to life and right to live in a healthy
environment for every citizen, have been reduced to a “non-tariff barrier to trade” or an “illegal
trade barrier.”112
Bergama activists and lawyers argue that this is a violation of not only the right to recourse
through judicial review, but also of Article 10 of the Turkish constitution, which reads: “all are equal
before the law…No privilege shall be granted to any individual, family, group or class.” Izmir Bar
Association’s Ahmet Okyay argues that “the Prime Ministry’s actions do not suit a state of law.
Furthermore, a court verdict cannot be ignored with the excuses of having to comply with the
international arbitration law and having to attract foreign investment.”113 The quotation below best
summarizes the situation:
Reeling from an economic crisis, Turkey has embraced the IMF-WTO recipes of
privatization, deregulation, and unconditional surrender to foreign investors. The Turkish
Parliament has been frantically passing legislation to remove obstacles before foreign
companies and render the country’s environmental and agricultural laws ineffective. The
peasants of Bergama led by Oktay Konyar have been in the front of the resistance to this
frenzied neoliberalism in Turkey.114
Conclusion
The case study of the cyanide-leach Ovacik gold mine in Turkey challenges the
assumptions of the ecological modernization perspective; the eco-Marxist perspective offers a
more satisfactory analysis. By concentrating on the interactions among the state, market, and
civil society, this case study offers three main challenges to the ecological modernization
perspective. They are the following:
First, contrary to what ecological modernization suggests, there is no compelling evidence
that the environment has been emancipated from economic factors in decision-making criteria. In
Turkey since the 1980s, economic policies in general and mining policies in particular, have been
gradually restructured according to neoliberal economic globalization. Furthermore, the Turkish
nation-state has restructured its institutions, reformed its policies, accepted some free trade
agreements, and amended its constitution to facilitate the expansion of the global capitalist market.
At the same time, in line with the ecological modernization perspective, the Turkish nation-state has
revised its environmental policy according to E.U. environmental policy standards and signed
numerous international environmental agreements. However, as Wapner points out, compliance to
these environmental policy standards is poor, with the Turkish government violating the orders of
its own courts since 1997.115 The outcome of the Ovacik gold mine conflict shows that
environmental regulations have had almost no impact on Turkish state behavior. This challenges
one of the core premises of the ecological modernization perspective: that E.U.-based
K. Anadol, Termik Santrallere Hayır (Ankara: Verso Yayıncılık, 1991).
Kenny Bruno and Joshua Karliner, EARTHSUMMIT.BIZ: The Corporate Takeover of Sustainable Development (Oakland:
Food First, 2002), p. 9.
113 “Ovacik Gold Mine Continues to Spark Reaction,” Turkish Daily News, June 23, 2000.
114 Ustun Reinhard, “Life Against Gold,” Canadian Dimension, Vol. 35, 2002, pp. 17-20.
115 P. Wapner, “The State and Environmental Challenges: A Critical Exploration of Alternatives to the State System,”
Environmental Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1995, p. 48.
111
112
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environmental regulations would help tame global capitalism and ensure environmental protection.
On the contrary, as the eco-Marxist perspective suggests, the adoption of neoliberal economic
growth policies to attract direct foreign investment resulted in the transfer of ecologically risky
cyanide-leach technology to Turkey. There is no compelling evidence that economic development
and environmental protection are compatible in this case; as the eco-Marxist perspective proposes,
economic growth and capital accumulation have superseded environmental protection.
Second, the story of the Ovacik gold mine struggle demonstrates that the Turkish state
ignored the demands of civil society. The ultimate goal of the Bergama environmental movement is
to convince the mining industry and the Turkish state to halt cyanide-leach technology in mining.116
Neither the industry nor the Turkish state has considered halting it. Contrary to the hypothesis of
ecological modernization theory, rather than strengthening the voices of civil society, the synergy
between the market and the state suppressed them. Market criteria dominated the agenda even in the
face of strong grassroots organization, local and national court rulings, and E.U. demands for
ecological protection.
Third, instead of banning cyanide-leach technology, the Turkish state allowed it to continue
with the addition of new detoxification technology. However, many independent scientists maintain
that advanced pollution control technology such as the detoxification system used in the project
does not reduce environmental and health risks as long as cyanide is used in the mining process.117
This challenges one of the core hypotheses of ecological modernization theory: that the design,
performance, and evaluation of processes of production are based on ecological criteria as well as
economic criteria. Eco-Marxist analysis argues that they are predominantly based on economic not
ecological criteria.
The ecological modernization perspective posits that economy and environment can be
reconciled under a global capitalist system with reforms brought by civil society and the state. The
story of the Bergama environmental conflict belies this claim. The ecological modernization
perspective proposes that economic growth is not the problem, but the solution to environmental
problems. The Ovacik gold mine case demonstrates the opposite: neoliberal economic growth
policies to attract foreign direct investment resulted in the transfer of ecologically risky technology—
cyanide-leach technology—to Turkey. The goal of the Bergama environmental movement remains
to convince the mining industry and the Turkish state to ban cyanide-leach technology in mining
altogether. But neither the industry nor the Turkish state has considered a ban, which supports the
eco-Marxist claim that there is an inherent conflict between economic growth and environmental
protection.
The ecological modernization perspective assumes that supra-national institutions such as
the E.U. and the WTO would play an important role in taming global capitalism and solving
environmental problems. This case study demonstrates that instead of taming it, the policies and
practices of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO are designed to expand global capitalism. Some
critiques argue that even actors who are widely perceived as adopting a proactive stance toward
sustainable development, such as the E.U., have prioritized the economic and commercial
116
117
S. Taskin, 1998, op. cit., p. 11.
R. Moran, 2001, op. cit.
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dimensions of sustainability at the expense of ecological and social ones.118 So, if Turkey eventually
becomes a member of the E.U., it is debatable whether or not its environment will improve.
Finally, this case study illustrates that local examples of environmental consciousness and
strong environmental movements can be overwhelmed by national interests in economic growth
and capital accumulation As the global ecological crisis worsens, global civil society needs to
understand clearly the mechanics involved in corporate globalization’s usurpation of citizens’ rights,
resources, health, and environment and come up with more effective ways to resist. Eco-Marxism
can offer a way forward.
118
Susan Baker, Sustainable Development (London: Routledge, 2006); Baker, 2007, op. cit.
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