INTR13/71/72-310
R. James Ferguson © 2007
Lecture 11:
Scripts for Cooperation and Protest:
People Power, Low-Violence Strategies, and Cosmopolitan Governance
Topics: 1. People Power: Protest, Mass Demonstration, and Low-Violence Strategies
2. People Power: The End the Marcos Regime in the Philippines
3. People Power: The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia
4. Humanising Globalisation?
5. Constructive Democracy, Proactive Reform and Cosmopolitan
Governance
6. Bibliography, Resources, and Further Reading
1. People Power: Protest, Mass Demonstration, and Low-Violence Strategies
Today we will be looking at several strategies that have moderated the dominant
pattern of 'globalisation-from-above'. We have already seen how 'great' nations
such as France, India and China can resist and modify globalisation patterns to some
degree, while particular cultural and economic cultures also adapt the way globalising
forces work at the local level. Other avenues have begun to modify the emerging
global culture. First, during the 1980s and then again in the 21st century people
power, that is, the direct mass action of populations, have been able to change the
destiny of nations quite directly. We can see this by looking briefly at the Philippines
and former Czechoslovakia, while elsewhere people power has been mobilised to
press for change in countries as diverse as Poland, Mexico, Serbia, Indonesia and
Hong Kong. Through 2003-2007 such strategies have also come into play in
changing governments in Georgia, the Ukraine, and problematically in
Kyrgyzstan, but been difficult to sustain in the Ukraine (see Page 2005; Gedmin
2007), and via unsuccessfully mass protests in Uzbekistan.
Related strategies of cooperative social policy action and participatory action
research have also been used to mobilise local and international communities on
particular agenda, e.g. on the environment and poverty reduction (Ulrich 2002).
Second, there have recently been called for a modification of the international
capitalist system to make it more responsive to human rights and to local cultural
needs. This Soft Capitalism has emerged as an area of reform in business culture,
which seeks to humanise market reforms as well as draw in environmental concerns
but it remains to be seen how far this will flow into existing patterns of economic
globalisation (see Thrift 1998), i.e. whether it can provide the needed human face for
capitalism. Another emerging paradigm to humanise global flows is the notion of a
new cosmopolitan governance based on explicit awareness of the role international
civil society and transnational flows in shaping a more responsive and tolerant global
system. This approach has an emphasis on social relations, human capital and
constructive dialogue among different groups and institutions.
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Reform and change often tend to be viewed along the spectrum of evolutionary or
revolutionary change. Revolutionary change is often supported by those who argue
that an existing system cannot be reformed and needs to be totally swept away: in the
past, Communist and fascist parties alike often argued for this kind of change, as have
those who have argued for democratic revolutions against authoritarian governments.
The democratic revolutionaries in 18th century France and America found that real
reform could only be achieved by violent revolution, followed by wars in support of
these revolutionary changes. In the 19th century, on the other hand, evolutionary
change did support both democratic and socialist reforms in countries such as
Britain and Germany, and in the late 20th were the by-word of (Fabian) socialism,
social-democratic parties, and liberal democracies which tended to favour low-violent
reform of authoritarian or oligarchic political systems. In the 21st century the question
has begun to focus on reform at different levels: local, city-level, national,
regional, at the level of global institutions and the moderation of the negative
impact of globalisation processes.
Political change, however, can also be facilitated by non-violent or low-violence
popular mobilisation. Specific economic and international conditions can allow
sudden political change which is revolutionary in nature but rests not on violent
warfare nor a revolution, but on a civil society that manages to change political
systems with a relatively low degree of violence. Two classic and complete
examples of this process can be cited: the mass movement which forced the flight of
President Marcos from the Philippines, and the 'Velvet Revolution' which replaced
an authoritarian communist regime with a broadly-based, democratic system in
Czechoslovakia. Both happened very quickly: some months of political manoeuvring
and pressure resulted in a sharp period of public protest again Marcos in 1986. In
Czechoslovakia, partly inspired by reforms in the Soviet Union and Poland, students
and other reforming elements came together in a sudden outburst of demands in 1989,
virtually bringing the existing government to its knees in 1989 over little more than
ten days.
Both are clearly examples of people power, i.e. the mass activation of popular protest
and mass demonstration which expressed its will directly, with a wide range of
different organisations only partly involved in leading such protest. Yet as we shall
see, in both cases very conditions needed to be met before this expression of popular
opinion could lead to positive changes. In particular, the international and military
climate needed to be ripe for such mass opposition to be effective. Usually, the
legitimacy or unity of a governing regime has to be weakened before mass popular
action can easily displace an authoritarian government.
People power, in this sense, has been widely used as part of mixed strategy in a
number of other cases. A number of ideologically led revolutionary movements in the
19th century and anti-colonial revolts (the revolutions of 1848, the Paris Commune of
1871, the 1905 protest in Russia (see Ackerman & Duvall 2000), the 1917 revolution
in Russia, the generally mass supported revolutions, revolutionary wars or colonial
wars in Ireland, China, Vietnam, Indonesia) included elements of people power,
though often combined with military and political action of a committed
revolutionary leadership. Cases of people power in the late 20th century include the
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post-Communist reform movements in Poland (see Ackerman & Kruegler 1994,
pp283-316), from the late 1990s in the Baltic States where civilian-based defence
was used to help defend democratic but military weak states which had just
recently declared independence (Randle 1994, p63; Ackerman & Kreugler 1994,
pxxiii), Romania, where elements of the military soon joined mass popular
demonstrations and fought a short civil war against security forces, the anti-coup
movement in the Soviet Union in 1991, and in part the movements which helped
forced the resignation of President Suharto of Indonesia in 1998. Likewise, the
replacement of the Milosevic regime within Yugoslavia in 2000 was based on
elections backed up by an impressive display of mass mobilisation on the streets,
in part coordinated through trained student organisations. In the Georgia (2003-2004,
in part through seizure of the parliament) and in the Ukrainian 'orange revolution'
(via street protests and civil disobedience in rejecting a suspect poll outcome in 2004
elections) mass popular action was needed to ensure the transfer of power from
corrupt governments to more democratic governments under President Mikhail
Saakashvili and President Viktor Yushchenko (see Meyer 2005; Karatnycky 2005).
From 1996-2000 major street marches had protested electoral 'irregularities'
within former Yugoslavia, helping oust Milosevic form government (Courtesy OSCE Photo Archive)
People power, in the sense of mass agitation demanding positive change, therefore
remains a major component of modern political reality, and a major aspect of
international change. Furthermore, it is now not just directed at particular
governments, but more diffusely at international institutions, regimes, and more
vaguely at patterns of globalisation and neo-liberal reform. However, as well
shall, people power mechanisms cannot be directly ported across to mechanism of
reform for intergovernmental organisations or the structures of transnational capital.
Here, civil society and INGOs can try to make such Inter-governmental
organisations (IGOs) more accountable, but the anti-globalisation movement as a
whole contains very diverse elements that provide a strong critique but not clear
replacement agenda for the IMF, World bank, G8 or other groups.
The methods used by 'people power' only sometimes equate with the notion of
non-violence or civil disobedience. Systematic non-violent opposition to illegitimate
governments or unjust laws has been used and consciously developed by a number of
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thinkers. It was made famous by Mahatma Gandhi in his efforts to gain social and
political rights for Indians in South Africa, and then to resist British rule in India. It
was used by Martin Luther King Jr. and his followers over a total of some 15 years in
their efforts to secure civil liberties for Afro-Americans in the U.S. (Ackerman &
Duvall 2000, p3), and was used by more recent leaders such as Desmond Tutu in
efforts to secure reform in South Africa, and remains one of the main tools of
Buddhists supporting the Dalai Lama and seeking reform in Tibet, though some
groups have suggested that non-violent strategies will be insufficient to promote rela
change in Tibet. Thus, as the sixth round of informal talks between PRC and the Dalai
Lama's representatives failed to achieve real outcomes through mid-2007, there was a
sense that peaceful strategies are not always productive: For Tibet, there is a growing realisation that the process of informal talks with Beijing
seems to be going nowhere. It has been hopeful that the Middle-Way approach could
provide the basis for a prospective settlement of the Tibetan question. The approach
consists of a quid pro quo wherein Tibet would foreswear independence in return for a
high degree of autonomy. The expectation is that autonomy would allow it to
safeguard the Tibetan identity, culture and language as well as help it play an active
role in redefining the economic future of the region. Today, Tibet finds itself at a
crossroad, as the Middle-way approach has failed so far to yield any signs of a middle
ground. If anything, China has only hardened its position. This may lead to a
hardening of the Tibetan resistance movement. (Kurian 2007).
However, non-violent and low-violence strategies have been adopted by many
political reform groups as an effective tool which makes its point publicly, but doesn't
alienate wider public sympathies. Here, a mixture of passive resistance,
demonstrations, strikes, political and legal activity, and the creation of parallel
institutions, can all come together to have an effect on a stronger opposition. These
are all sanctions that hurt, weaken, or impose costs on, the opponent in political, social
or economic ways (Ackerman & Kreugler 1994, pp4-6). A wide range of tactics can
impose sanctions on a regime: In each of these conflicts, disruptive actions were used as sanctions, as aggressive
measures to constrain or punish opponents and to win concessions. Protests such as
petitions, parades, walkouts, and demonstrations were used to rouse public support
for movements. Forms of non-cooperation such as strikes, boycotts, resignations, and
civil disobedience helped subvert the operations of governments. And direct
intervention such as sit-ins, nonviolent sabotage, and blockades frustrated many
rulers' will to subjugate their peoples. (Ackerman & Duvall 2000, p2)
One of the key aims is usually to 'erode an opponent's source of tangible support'
(Ackerman & Kreugler 1994, p8). Thus, when 'the state had run out of ways to coerce
. . . compliance, it would have to come to terms' (Ackerman & Duval 2000, p1). In the
case of Gandhi's activities, non-violent approaches gained publicity: Even such a succinct exposition of Gandhi's career reveals the complex interaction in
the Indian independence struggle between radical civil resistance and conventional
politics. The mixed fortune of the campaigns also demonstrated the importance of the
broader context in which they were taking place, even when facing the same
opponent. In the campaign of 1920-2, and again in 1930-1, the difficulty for the British
authorities was that they could not act too violently or repressively against a nonviolent movement without alienating the moderate Indian politicians whose
cooperation they hoped to enlist, and without risking opposition at home and abroad.
Thus the campaigns, precisely because they were non-violent as well as radically
4
disruptive of the administration, exercised genuine pressure in the tough world of
realpolitik. (Randle 1994, p70)
Mahatma Gandhi first developed his ideas in South Africa, where as a young lawyer
he agitated for the rights of Indian residents in that country. Various variants of this
non-violent resistance were used on his return to India in 'the non-cooperation
campaign of 1920-2; the civil disobedience campaigns of 1930-1 (see Ackerman &
Kreugler 1994, pp157-212), and 1932-3; the campaign of individual civil
disobedience in 1940; and the Quit India campaign of 1942.' (Randle 1994, p63). Civil
disobedience continued in 1939, and by 1941, some 26,000 non-violent protesters
(satyagrahis) had been arrested by the British (Randle 1994, p69). Satyagraha is the
rough equivalent of ' peaceful non co-operation' but literally means "the struggle for
truth" (Shiva 1999). It was developed by Gandhi to operate at two levels. There were
those, firstly, who fully accepted the concept of non-violence (ahimsa) and therefore
should never resort to violence (Randle 1994, p72). Secondly, it forced imperial and
local authorities to use force to maintain enforcement of their laws and policies,
exposing them as using violence and further wielding an authority that had become
illegitimate. It must be stressed, of course, that Gandhian non-violence was one
among many tools used in the struggle for Indian independence.
Similar methods were also used by Germans when the Ruhr Valley was occupied by
the France and Belgium in 1923, with a wide campaign of passive resistance which
included strikes and non-cooperation (Ackerman & Kruegler 1994, pp99-156; Randle
1994, p53). It was also used by Norway and Denmark in resistance to the demands of
German occupation forces, and included an extensive programme to save Jews living
in Denmark, though it could not directly overthrow these forces (Ackerman &
Kruegler 1994, pp213-250; Randle 1994, p54; Sharp 2005 et al.). Mass popular
action, sometimes non-violent, or using low levels of violence, was also used in
overturning the Jean Claude Duvalier dictatorship in Haiti (early 1986), in resisting
repressive regimes in Chile (Drake 2000) and defending democracy in Thailand in
1992 (Miller 2005). In many cases, however, if low-violent strategies fail, they will be
followed by intensified forms of violence and protest. Likewise, a successful regime
change or defence at one stage does not necessarily lead to an entirely democratic or
stable state in following years, e.g. as has been in Thailand, the Philippines, the
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan (see further below).
International influence and international cooperation are often major components
of these programmes. Civil rights protests in the U.S. of the 1950s and 1960s were
already inspired by the example of Gandhi, which in turn inspired some of the
strategies used by the Dalai Lama in relation to Tibet (Randle 1994, p55; Tenzin
Gyatso 1990, p127). Otherwise, a large number of international campaigns on a wide
range of issues, e.g. nuclear weapons, environmental issues, social justice, debt relief,
reform in the G8, protests against the World Bank, the IMF, and the Summit of the
Americas have used campaigns of non-violent solidarity, though different groups
sometimes run different strategies at the same time. The World Peace Brigade, for
example, was set up in 1962 to protest the testing of nuclear weapons in Algeria and
related issues, while Peace Brigades International (PBI) became active in Central
America in the 1980s (Randle 1994, p56, p82, p85). The Freedom and Peace Group
which was set up in Poland in 1985 likewise had close links with the Western peace
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movements (Randle 1994, p62). Non-violent strategies were widely used in South
Africa between 1946 and 1992, though later a militant arm (Spear of the Nation) of
the ANC was formed in 1962, perhaps in part as a response to the Sharpeville
massacre of 69 unarmed protesters (a further 180 were injured) in 1960 (Randle 1994,
p74). Yet the sabotage and attacks on security forces by these and other military
groups was internationally less importance than the continued demonstrations, strikes,
boycotts and township insurrections, which prominent leaders such as Biko, Mandela,
Tutu and Boesak turned against the South African government. Low-violent
challenges were crucial in reform throughout East Europe through the late 1980s (e.g.
Poland and Czechoslovakia), was partially applied in Indonesia through 1997-1998 to
remove President Suharto (though street violence did escalate), in the removal of
Milosevic in Serbia through 2000, and in 2003-2005 reform in Georgia and Ukraine, a
and less successfully in Kyrgyzstan (for the strong dependency of Kyrgyzstan on the
international system, see Petric 2005).
However, in many cases such non-violent methods are not strictly peaceful. If the
protesting groups remain sufficiently in control to avoid all violence, they nonetheless
are often subject to the violent actions of police, security forces, the military, and
political thugs often used to suppress dissent. Furthermore, in some cases, particularly
in student protests, a certain degree of ritual violence may be entered into, ranging
from the destruction of property and the hazing of police, to all out pitched battles
with rocks and sticks, e.g. student activities in South Korea and Indonesia at times
have crossed over into more violent forms of confrontation, as have protests at G8
meetings over the last decade. The borderlines between non-violent protest and
moderately violent confrontation are in fact very hard to define, unless group or
ideologically driven discipline rigidly sets the limits of confrontation (see
Ackerman & Kreugler 1994, pp9-10).
In this session, we will be focusing on 'low violent' methods which mobilise mass
support, split government and military opposition or at least neutralise or
weaken the moral of ordinary troops (Ackerman & Kreugler 1994, p37), and
mobilise 'civil society' without the need to resort to a military revolution which
directly destroys government forces (see for example Moore 2001). These strategies
may also be more appropriate for reform of international institutions and for the
mobilisation of international civil society. These types of action can therefore be
viewed as 'low violence' examples of people power. Low-violence demonstrative
strategies are often particularly effective because they rob governments, authoritative
leaderships, the military or police of the moral right to retaliate with high levels of
force. Non-violent resistance can also be more effective in gaining wider public
sympathy as well as international support through global media coverage,
including independent and alternative media (see Stengrim 2005). Thus one of the
slogans of young Czech university students in 1989 had been 'We have no weapons . .
The world is watching' (Ackerman & Duvall 2000, p4). It can also sap the will of
military and police forces and divide leadership, who often begin to sympathise with
the popular cause, e.g. in the Philippines in 1986, in Moscow in 1991, in Iran during
1979 this was the case, as well as in Ukraine during 2004-2005 (see Kuzio 2006). At
times, mixtures of non-violent and low violent strategies can be used, though
usually these two aspects need to be sharply distinguished to avoid repressive reprisals
that seem justified and allows the rallying of internal regime support (Ackerman &
6
Duvall 2000, p7; Ackerman & Kreugler 1994, pp43-45). However, these activities are
strategically highly active, and are designed 'to fight' the authority of colonial or
repressive governments (Ackerman & Duvall 2000, p5).
We can summarise some of the main strategic implications of these trends:  Non-violent demonstration and resistance can be extremely effective not just
within democracies, but also against weakening authoritarian regimes and
colonising powers (see Albert 1985). Some philosophers, such as John
Rawls, have argued that civil disobedience can only be effective in basically
democratic states with a shared sense of justice (for a critique, see Murphy
1998). In international and transitional terms, this view will have to be
modified. As we shall see, strong 'nonviolent conflict maybe be shown to
precede, abet, and defend the democratizing process' and that such action is
the means 'by which civil society first asserts, and then defends itself from
counterattack' (Ackerman & Kreugler 1994, pxxiii).
 Limited successes are also possible against an overwhelmingly strong
military occupier, e.g. in Norway against the Germans during World War II,
even though an overthrow of the enemy may be impossible (Randle 1994,
p86). Likewise, Tibetan and other minority groups have been able to made
their views known internationally with protest actions that are of low violence,
though often clamped down ruthlessly by the PRC when viewed as forms of
'splitism' or revolt, but have not been able to change the dominance of China
over Tibet.
 Non-violent campaigns based on people power require the ability to organise
groups at the grass-roots level, even if no overarching organisation is
possible. Therefore grass-roots groups, religious organisations, human rights
groups, unions or political parties often can help provide such organisational
frameworks, even on an ad hoc basis. Loose cooperation among several
such groups and local leaders, rather than centralised leadership, is
often effective.
 International and local media coverage can be a crucial factor, sometimes
moderating how far military or coercive force can be applied. Likewise,
internet, email, phone and fax campaigns (changing messages, or via
networks) can be mounted to begin to mobilise international civil society
against oppressive regimes. These tools can also be used to impact on
mainstream politics and electoral campaigns overseas, and change
international perceptions of the costs of 'doing business' with such regimes
(see Foot & Schneider 2002).
 People power campaigns are often only effective 'when the time is right',
i.e. a large number of factors come together. Often they a preceded by a
long period of undermining the support base of the regime, e.g. this was
the case in the Philippines and Poland in the 1980s, and for the Ukraine from
2004-2005.
 Non-violent popular campaigns are also most effective when the military and
security forces have either declared their neutrality, as occurred at first in Iran
in 1978, have been split and divided, as in Philippines in 1986 and Moscow
1991, or when it has been demoralised, as seems to have been the case in
Czechoslovakia in 1989, or indeed, have joined the reformers, as occurred in
Romania during the overthrow of the totalitarian Ceausescu regime.
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 External groups such as trainers from the Otpor group who had helped
push out Milosevic from Serbia helped maintain a coherent and peaceful
organisation in the Ukrainian transition through 2004-2005 (Van Zon 2005,
p376). A similar group, Khmara, helped push forward the Georgian
transition, and were also influenced by the methods of the Serbian group
Otpor as well (Silitski 2005; Akerman & Duvall 2005).
 More loosely coordinated people-power campaigns have been targeted
at regional and global institutions ranging from the APEC agenda, World
Bank and IMF policies (e.g. in Thailand, Washington D.C.), major protests
against the WTO through 1999-2003 (e.g. in Seattle 1999 and Cancun 2003),
and ongoing pressure on the accountability and policies of the G8 over several
years. However, diverse groups take part in this protests (unions,
environmentalists, pseudo-anarchists, NGO-groups) using different strategies
(dialogue, street protest, direct attacks on police and institutions, widespread
verses targeted property strategies). In such a setting, it may be very hard to
sustain a controlled low-violent strategy, and hard to control negative
global media images (see Solomon 2000). In part, reactions against
'globalisation-from-above' may not have yet generated a strong core of
cosmopolitan policies that provide a path for coherent strategies (see further
below). The long-term issue is whether such campaigns can make global
and IGO-based institutions more accountable and open, as well as
influencing their agenda and policies. In the case of reform of the WTO, we
can see of the mixed methods at Cancun in 2003, which put poverty 'on the
agenda', but did not lead to strong outcomes: In opening the WTO session Wednesday, amid protests that grew deadly,
Mexican President Vicente Fox pleaded with delegates to make poverty "the
enemy that must be conquered, We cannot continue closing our eyes while
millions of people remain poor."
Fox urged ministers from 146 member nations to dismantle global trading
rules that favor rich nations, remarks aimed at the United States and the
European Union, the Dallas Morning News said.
Thousands of angry Mexican farmers and foes of global trade marched noisily
through Cancun Wednesday and clashed with security forces blocking their
trek to the WTO meeting. (UPI 2003; see further below)
These trends suggest that we can effectively reconceptualise so-called passive
resistance (which is rarely passive) as strategic non-violent conflict (Ackerman &
Kreugler 1994, pxix, pp21-53), and more often as strategic, low-violent
confrontation, depending upon the circumstance. In particular, as the power of the
state is comparatively moderated by a large number of other international actors, a
large number of non-state actors wielding power in low violence contexts, with
many of these are 'well suited to waging nonviolent conflict' (Ackerman & Kreugler
1994, pxxi). To be highly effective, people power using non-violence usually needs
an effective even if dispersed (or in depth) leadership, an 'operational corps' who
will help organise and do the confrontational work required, and a broad
civilian population which is at least dissatisfied with the status quo (modified
from Ackerman & Kreugler 1994, p27). Such campaigns have been waged at the
local, national, regional and global level as strategies of overthrow, reform, or protest.
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2. People Power: The End the Marcos Regime in the Philippines
Two historical cases, e.g. the Philippines and former Czechoslovakia, can show
exactly how people power toppled apparently strong regimes and lead to longterm outcomes. It will be necessary to provide a brief outline of the condition of the
Philippines under former President Ferdinand Marcos. From 1946-1972 the
Philippines practised a form of Presidential democracy theoretically following the
U.S. model. During parts of this period, the Philippines were regarded as one of the
most advanced Asian states, with a growing economy, an educated population, and
command of the English language which gave it certain trade advantages. President
Marcos, having held two consecutive terms of office (elected in late 1965 and in
1969) and therefore not able constitutionally to hold a third, declared martial law
in 1972, thereby continuing his rule.
From 1972-1978 Marcos closed Congress and largely ruled through executive
orders, and when he did create an interim National Assembly in 1978, it had
almost no powers and was filled with his supporters (Casper 1995, p41). Martial law
was formally lifted in 1981 and a somewhat more powerful and more diverse National
Assembly was created in 1984. However, the President still had considerable
powers, including the right to appoint the prime minister, control of political
patronage through the New Society Movement, considerable influence in the military,
and dominance of economic patronage through control of most political offices (see
May & Nemenzo 1995). He also had virtually complete control of the judiciary and
Supreme Court, since the bureaucracy had to submit undated letters of resignation to
him, letting Marcos 'accept' the 'resignation' of an government official whenever he
wanted (Casper 1991, p48). These factors, combined with a tendency to discount the
Spanish legacy and to compare aspirations with U.S. standards, had led to a serious
undermining of faith in the political process, and to negative images of nationhood
(see Mulder 1996).
It is all the more surprising, then, that the Marcos government would begin to
encounter mainstream opposition from different elements in society. In the 1980s
resistance to the Marcos regime came from several sources, with some of these
factors leaving problems that flowed into later politics:  The opposition party LABAN, based around politicians in the Manila area
including Benigno Aquino.
 An opposition party called UNIDO, an umbrella organisation which split
from the New Society Movement.
 The Communist Party of the Philippines (officially banned) and its military
wing, the New People's Army, which was very active at that time (still in
existence through 2004-2007 and targeted among other groups by a strong
new anti-terrorism law through mid-2007 (Gonzales 2007).1
1
"Specifically, the law broadly defines a terrorist as anyone who commits an act punishable under
Philippine laws on piracy and mutiny in the high seas, rebellion or insurrection, coup d'etat, murder,
kidnapping, crimes involving destruction, arson, toxic substances and hazardous and nuclear waste,
hijacking, highway robbery and illegal possession and manufacture of firearms and explosives.
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 The Muslim secessionist movement, especially the Moro Nationalist
Liberation Front (MNLF) in Mindanao, based in part on reaction to the long
term policies of the government, but also on local poverty and the impact of
attempts at military repression of the movement (see Ringuet 2002). [From the
mid-1980s the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has been political
active, and from 1992 Abu Sayyaf has run a campaign of hostage taking and
terrorism against the government (Ringuet 2002), with both representing
continuing opposition to government policies through 2001-2007, with
another round of increased conflict with the government expected over Abu
Sayyaf killing of Philippines marines through July 2007, a factor which could
endanger 'fragile peace talks' with the MILF (Symons 2007).]
 Reform groups within the army, the most radical of which was Reform the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement (RAM), which was composed
mainly of young graduate officers who sought a return to a professional,
uncorrupted army. Indeed, under later governments the role of the army and
officers would need careful monitoring, with attempted coups or mutinies
in 2003 and 2006.
 Slowly, the Catholic Church in the Philippines came more and more to
oppose the Marcos regime, which it realised was oppressive, corrupt, and
immoral. Partly under the influence of the social justice concerns of the
Second Vatican Council, it slowly tiptoed towards a more political stance,
though the bishops were at first more conservative than many priests and
nuns (Casper 1995, p55, p59). The words of Pope John Paul II also helped
maintain the notion of non-violence, arguing that suffering can never be
solved 'through violence, power play or political systems' (in Casper 1995,
p74). However, by 1977, the Catholic Church of the Philippines began to
attack the 'martial law regime', and by 1979 Cardinal Sin suggested that
President Marcos should step down and call for fresh and fair elections
(Casper 1995, p62). The Catholic Church would in fact become relatively
progressive in the Philippines during the following decades down to 2004,
pushing for more accountable government an active social reform in relation
to poverty and education (see Linantud 2005).
These groups, gradually coming together to provide real opposition to the
government, provided the conditions which would lead to the erosion of support for
the Marcos government. In particular, the Marcos regime used several patterns to try
to legitimate itself: publicly, it held out the hope of socioeconomic reform and
improvement in living conditions and the spoke of the threat of insurgent revolution.
Less publicly, Marcos continued his patronage to certain elements of the ruling elite,
the rich, and segments of the older officers in the armed forces. In many cases, this
resulted in bias toward people from his own province, and from those he thought
would not to turn against him.
Popular resistance to the Marcos government can be seen in a number of trends
during the late 1970s and 1980s: -
All these acts are considered acts of terrorism if they sow "widespread and extraordinary fear
and panic" among the public "to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand". (Gonzales
2007)
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 In 1979 Cardinal Sin called for Marcos to step down, arguing that the
'continuation of martial law would further erode the social condition and
cause a revolution', a move supported by grass-roots religious organisations of
different denominations (Casper 1995, p76).
 In 1981 Marcos tried to use the papal visit to legitimate his rule, but the Pope
criticised the human rights abuses and authoritarian nature of the regime
(Casper 1995, p77), though not actually calling for political mobilisation.
 There was a partial boycott of the 1981 presidential elections, with only
50% voting (Casper 1995, p46).
 Throughout the 1980s the Catholic Church continued its creation of Basic
Christian Communities, (BCCs), a grassroots movement which tried to deal
with poverty and oppression by direct action at the local level and
organising self-help programmes (Casper 1995, pp24-27, pp77-78).
Through these and other social programmes, the Church began to create
parallel social programs which undermined reliance on state programmes and
political patronage (Casper 1995, p78).
 From the 1980s', demonstrations against Marcos began to occur even in
Makati, the financial district of Metro-Manila, since his policy of supporting
cronies excluded a large segment of the business community (Casper
1995, p50)
 On 21 August 1983, Senator Benigno Aquino, an opposition political
leader, was assassinated at Manila International Airport, while under
military escort and in full view of television cameras (Randle 1994, p88). These
created a storm of resentment and opposition, tarnished the army's
reputation, and moved the Church into a position of calling for the overthrow
of the Marcos regime.
However, one of the key elements in the overthrow of the Marcos was the divided
role of the military, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). If a united military
had stood united behind the Marcos regime, it would have been very difficult for
either political or people-power strategies to succeed. The Philippines' military, at first
aspiring to a purely profession role under the principle of civilian supremacy, moved
gradually to a wider social and government rule in support of the Marcos regime
(Casper 1995, p87). This lead not only to the taking up of administrative and
corporate posts by officers, but also to widespread corruption, cronyism, and
factionalism within the army itself, as officers lined up behind various sources of
promotion, wealth and patronage (Marcos, Ramos, Enrile, Ver etc.). However, this
politicisation of the army in the end meant that some groups in it came to see the
military as an arbiter of government, while others demanded reform back to a more
professional and proud army. The result was that the army itself was divided, and
could not be used as an effective tool of oppression to crush the 1986 popular
movements. We can outline some of these trends:  From the 1950s, in response to the Huk rebellion (a peasant revolution), and
the possibilities of Muslim and Communist insurgency, the army had moved
to a central role of internal security - at first this included socioeconomic
projects such as digging wells, rural health and education projects, improving
local farming etc. (Casper 1995, p90). In the long run this would involve them
in broader political and social issues.
11
 From 1965, Marcos began to use the armed forces in his broader economic
management strategies to sustain his economic programmes. He promoted
those officers that remained loyal, reduced the powers or retired those he felt
he could not trust.
 From 1972, Marcos began increasing military budgets from 13.4% in 1972
to 21.8% of the government budget in 1975 (in contrast, military budgets
through 2002-2004 were less than 1.5%, see Chipman 2004, p325), and
increased its size from 55,000 in 1972 to 250,000 by 1985 (Casper 1995, p93).
In effect, the military became one of the main tools enforcing Presidential
decrees and orders. It also began 'running companies, being regional
development officers, and conducting civil engineering and medical programs
at the local level' (Casper 1995, p95).
 In the 1980s the Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement
(RAM) became active in making demands for professionalism and fairness
within the armed forces, but soon moved to a political agenda which opposed
Marcos in 1986, and even considered a military junta as an option in running
the country.
In the snap February 1986 elections, Marcos was sure that he would win through
forced mobilisation of his supporters, as well as a wide range of coercion, bribery,
vote-buying, miscounts, and intimidation (Paulson 2005). His declaration that he had
won the election with 54% of the vote, however, was not accepted by the opposition,
due to violence during the election an detected cases of falsification of returns
(Paulson 2005), and resulted in mass popular protest. Combined with opposition
from he Church and segments in the military, he fled to Honolulu, (taking up to $10
billion with him). The specific factors which lead to his downfall included:
 The United States began to be critical of his activities, and sent an
observers delegation from Congress (Casper 1995, p109), thereby encouraging
high level Western media coverage, putting these events onto the world stage
and making electoral corruption harder to sustain (for a controversial view of
U.S. involvement, see Davis 1987). Criticism of later electoral corruption by
international observers as undermining though not destroying Filipino
democracy has continued down to 2007 (see Linantud 2004; see further
below).
 The retired military officers came out in outrage at the assassination of
Benigno Aquino, arguing that the regime, not the military itself was at fault
(Casper 1995, p110).
 Marcos himself was in ill-health, and clearly had not solved the major social
and economic problems of the country. The Reform the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Movement (RAM) came out with a clear statement that it would
not support a successor government of Marcos' choice, i.e. Imelda Marcos
and Fabian Ver (Casper 1995, p113).
 Opposition parties LABAN (People Power) and the United Nationalist
Democratic Organisation (UNIDO) ran on one ticket, backing moderate
reformers Corizon Aquino and Salvador Laurel.
 The Church, though not saying who people should vote for, ran a major
series of meetings and discussions in churches which made it clear that
people should turn out to vote and back the more moral party, i.e. Aquino.
This counterbalanced Marcos' control of the mass media (Casper 1995, p120).
12
 Marcos' election manipulation was restrained by a large volunteer watchdog
group, the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), which
had strong Church, business, and international support in double-checking
vote counts and keeping an eye on intimidation at voting booths (Casper
1995, p116). Nuns and priests in full habit were used to stand around
'intimidating the intimidators'. Such groups made it known that 3.5-5 million
voters were effectively barred from voting, and that 91-200 died during
election violence (Casper 1995, pp116-117; for comparative figures of relative
violence with up 1,000 dying in Filipino elections, see Linantud 2004). During
this period some Christian groups were also provided with seminars on
active non-violence, in accordance with concepts derived from the Social
Gospel and Liberation Theology (Delotavo 2006).
The result was not what Marcos expected. President Reagan and most international
media at last agreed that the elections had not been fair, with the U.S. sending a
special envoy to try to negotiate between Marcos and Aquino. At this stage, Corazon
Aquino moved to a 'people power strategy' to reverse this falsified electoral
outcome (Paulson 2005; Casper 1995, pp117-136):  One million people attended a People's Victory Rally to denounce the
election results and to claim Aquino as the real winner.
 Aquino called for a one-day general strike, and national boycott of
businesses owned by Marcos and his 'cronies' until Marcos stepped down.
 Priests and nuns had earlier on held prayer and protest rallies against
electoral fraud.
 Bishops supported the call for civil disobedience, and declared the Marcos
regime illegitimate. Cardinal Sin, speaking on the Church radio, Radio
Veritas, called for people power. When this station was closed, pirate radio
stations using smaller transmitters were used.
 When Fidel Ramos (then Vice Chief of Staff) and section of the military
split from Marcos, the Church radio called for mass people power to
support these military groups from attack by Marcos' loyalist forces. In
particular, rebel soldiers at Camp Aguinaldo were protected by a 'human
barricade' of over 800,000 people. The press of people made loyalist officers
reluctant to shoot into the crowd, thereby disabling the tanks, mortars and
helicopters which had been brought in to deal with the 'rebel' soldiers. Some
officers, furthermore, got their orders 'mixed up' and somehow took their
heavy equipment off to the wrong base, perhaps not by accident (Casper
1995, p135. For later confrontations at Camp Crame, see Smith 1986; Paulson
2005). Shortly after, Marine forces under Colonel Braulio Balbas also refused
to attack reformist soldiers or civilians, while by late February 90% of the
armed forces had 'defected' from supporting Marcos (Paulson 2005).
In effect, people power in the Philippines meant the link of several areas of
popular activity. This included activity through several political parties, the creation
of a number of opposition leaders to gather support (Corazon Aquino, Ramos),
activism within the Church, critical activism within the army (especially the young
officer ranks), the use of alternative media including pirate radio stations, and the
willingness of millions of people to move onto the streets to directly demand change
and support political reform.
13
Of course, the following Aquino government, begun with such high expectations,
did not live up to hopes for deep and genuine reform. Sluggishness land reform,
problems in economic development, and in lags in reform in the army soon
destabilised her authority, with the government also having to repress repeated
attempted military coupes in mid and late 1986 and 1987, and again in 2003 and
2006 (Casper 1995, p140-144). However, from this time, including the stronger
leadership of former President Fidel Ramos (President from 1992), no Philippine
government could ignore 'people power' - mass protests on several occasion
reminded these leaders of the real need to address human needs.
After this time, people power came into play on several occasions as a corrective
to governments or limitations in government policies:  In late 1997, mass marches in Manila of up to 500,000 people dissuaded
Preisent Ramos from trying to change the constitution to allow himself another
term as the country's leader (Tiglao 1997). In many ways, the continued
survival of the democratic Philippines is directly linked to direct people
power as well as an intact electoral system.
 Displays of popular protest were also seen in the 1999-2001 period in
removal of the corrupt government President Joseph Estrada, once again
based on legal proceedings, mass protests, opposition from the Catholic Church
and most Protestant Churches (including the Catholic Bishops Conference and
the National Council of Churches), and withdrawal of military support for the
government, leading to the Presidency of Gloria Arroyo (Delotavo 2006;
Newsweek 2001). Sometimes called People Power II, "participants believed
that Philippine President Joseph Estrada was guilty of the charges filed against
him, the judicial and political systems were no longer effective, and active
nonviolence could make Estrada step down from office. Civil society groups
utilized mass media and information technology to network, mobilize, and
conscientize the public-at-large. During People Power II, Filipino street
protesters employed active nonviolent tactics such as communicating with a
wider audience, representing their group, acting symbolically, pressuring the
opponent, dramatizing and singing, sponsoring public assemblies, and
withdrawing support from the politically powerful." (Macapagal & NarioGalace 2003)
 From 2001, mass meetings have urged President Gloria Arroyo to address the
continuing problem of poverty within the country (Brown 2001).
Problems of ongoing relative poverty, lack of land reform, the action of insurgent
(MILF) and terrorist (Abu Sayyaf) groups, and the nexus with the 'war on
terror' have been ongoing problems for the Philippines government through
2001-2007. Likewise, events in late July 2003 and again in 2006 indicated that the
role of the military in relation to politics had yet to be stabilised, with revolts
either aimed at overthrowing or embarrassing the Arroyo government. (SMH 2003a;
SMH 2003b). Thus, through 2006, it was argued that: At the same time, elements of the military, which had still not fully overcome the longterm effects of its thoroughgoing politicisation under Marcos, became restive. In late
14
February, Arroyo declared a state of emergency after Chief of Staff General Generoso
Senga announced that an elite unit’s commander had planned to join anti-government
protests and had asked military leaders to withdraw support from the administration,
as they had done in 1986 and 2001 when Marcos and Estrada, respectively, were
ousted. Despite this move to counter the coup attempt (the 12th since 1986),
disaffected military splinter groups pose a continuing threat to political stability.
Though the state of emergency, which allowed for arrest without warrant and
dispersal of demonstrations, lasted for only a week, critics voiced fear that it might be
a prelude to martial law. In late May, military intelligence officers arrested five Estrada
supporters, who were charged with rebellion for their alleged involvement in a plot to
assassinate members of Arroyo’s cabinet. The situation remains unstable. (Strategic
Comments 2006)
Philippines Timeline 2003-2007 (after BBC 2005a; 2006a; 2007a)
2003 July - Army mutiny in Manila; some 300 soldiers seize a shopping centre but surrender
peacefully following negotiations. President Arroyo declares a state of rebellion.
2004 February - Peace talks between government and communist rebel New People's Army
start in Norway, but are called off by the rebels in August.
2004 June - With counting completed, Gloria Arroyo wins May's presidential elections.
2004 July - Philippines withdraws its peacekeeping troops from Iraq, bowing to the demands
of the kidnappers of a Filipino lorry driver. The driver is subsequently freed.
2004 November-December - Hundreds of people are killed in floods and mudslides as
powerful storms and a typhoon hit the country.
2005 January - Heavy fighting between government troops and MILF rebels breaks the July
2003 ceasefire.
2005 April - Breakthrough on contentious issue of ancestral land achieved at peace talks in
Malaysia between government and MILF rebels.
2005 June - Influential Cardinal Jaime Sin, who led two peaceful revolts, dies aged 76.
2005 July-September - President Arroyo is pressured to resign over allegations of vote-rigging.
In September she survives an opposition attempt to impeach her.
2005 November-December - Scores are killed during clashes between troops and Muslim Abu
Sayyaf rebels on the southern island of Jolo.
2006 February - President Arroyo declares a week-long state of emergency after the army says
it has foiled a planned coup.
2006 June - The death penalty is abolished. It was scrapped in 1987 but had been reintroduced.
2006 August - President Arroyo survives an attempt to impeach her over allegations of
2007 February - Government report accuses military figures of being behind the killings of
hundreds of mainly left-wing activists since 2001.
2007 April - The military says it is stepping up its offensive against the Islamic militant group,
Abu Sayyaf, after the group beheaded seven Christian hostages on the southern island of Jolo.
2007 May - Parliamentary and local elections. More than 120 die in violence in three months
of campaigning.
15
In general, in spite of ongoing scandals (e.g. claims of electoral abuses by Arroyo in
2004 elections), democracy has survived in the Philippines, in spite of real tensions
through 2003-2007, and severe political violence during parliamentary and local
elections in May 2007 (see Timeline above). Thus, through 2002-2007 controversy
continued over the constitution and political processes under President Arroyo: Arroyo, who in 2002 stated her aim to create a ‘strong republic’, characterised by
effective political institutions and bureaucracy, efficient tax-collection and sustained
economic growth, promised to be a dynamic and effective president, but controversy
has increasingly detracted from her ability to implement reforms. Between 2001 and
2004, she faced repeated attempts by Estrada’s supporters to depose her. After the
2004 elections, she faced opposition from supporters of her vanquished election
opponent, Fernando Po, Jr, who claimed that she had rigged votes. In July 2005,
Arroyo survived an attempt to impeach her for electoral corruption, but street rallies
calling for her removal continued. By early 2006, there was growing support in
congress for a new impeachment bill. Meanwhile, controversy mounted over the
Arroyo administration’s attempts to amend the constitution, including a shift from a
US-style presidential system to parliamentary government. Congressional opponents
claim that it would help Arroyo maintain her hold on power by dissolving congress,
creating an unelected parliament and extending the terms of public officials. (Strategic
Comments 2006)
However, the use of people power does not always sit easily with electoral democracy,
and people power strategies can be misused as a party-political tool: In conclusion, the 2004 polls demonstrated that safer elections have moved the
country, however slightly, in the direction of liberal democracy. In other areas, the
growth of democracy has outpaced that of constitutional liberalism, an imbalance that
has created illiberal democracy. The country has little choice but to accept elections,
since public opinion has rejected authoritarian and military government, communist
revolution, and theocracy. . . .
The barriers to constitutional liberalism, on the other hand, have been more
fundamental than those to democracy. Even if election violence continues to fall,
government inefficiency, corruption, and fraud would still present serious challenges.
The true dilemma, however, is that the growth of democracy has necessarily impeded
certain parts of liberalism: public faith and religious organizations are simultaneously
building blocks of democracy and the rule of law, but barriers to a fully secular polity
and society. This might arguably satisfy the immediate needs of the Philippines, but
does not augur well for Western liberalism as a comprehensive national project.
Finally, People Power is at once a blend of partisan rivalry, democratic idealism, and
religious nationalism that symbolizes the replacement of illiberal autocracy with illiberal
democracy. In 2004 People Power did not materialize because elites and residents of
Manila decided it was not necessary. But since 1986 it has become a legitimate
antidote to perceived abuses of state power. The goals are democratic, but the
methods are illiberal. If leaders have lost the right to govern, they should be removed
through elections. If People Power continues to become a partisan device rather than
an extraordinary response to an unusual situation, it will become increasingly arbitrary
itself. (Linantud 2004)
3. People Power: The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia
The former united state of Czechoslovakia (from 1992 separated into the Czech and
Slovak Republics) provides us with two major test cases of civilian resistance and
16
popular protest. One failed initially, though managed to provide strong resistance for
some months to Soviet interests in 1968, but the second succeeded in sweeping away
the communism regime in Czechoslovakia in ten days of sudden and surprising action
in November 1989, thus called the 'Velvet Revolution'. We will focus on events in
1989, but a brief mention of the 1968 Soviet invasion will help set the stage and allow
us to draw some comparisons.
Czechoslovakia has a fascinating and in some ways tragic history. In the 1930s, it was
one of the most economically advanced and robust of East European states, but
suffered from its location in the very heart of Europe, subject to pressures from the
West and East. Carved up as part of the appeasement to Hitler's demands,
Czechoslovakia fell under the domination of Soviet influences in the post-World War
II period. But Czechoslovakia had always viewed itself as having a more independent,
middle-road role than most Warsaw Pact countries. This can be seen in 1968 when
Alexander Dubcek embarked on a path of moderate reform within the Communist
system, reducing censorship and allowing greater levels of trade with Western Europe
and Germany. He aimed to create 'socialism with a human face' (Randle 1994, p94).
When the hardliners were unable to reign in these reforms, massive Soviet and
Warsaw Pact forces (400,000 troops) rolled into Prague on 20 August 1968, the
famous 'Prague Spring'. This was one of the first examples of massive civil resistance
to Soviet control, with earlier efforts in Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956 having
been fiercely suppressed by Soviet tanks. The popular basis of the 1968 uprising
needs to be emphasised: Czechoslovakia in 1968 represents the most dramatic instance in recent history of
popular non-violent resistance against foreign invasion and in support of a
government that had earned the support of the population through its programme
reforms. For seven days Czechs and Slovaks came out into the streets in their tens of
thousands to confront the tanks and their crews and give the lie to the Soviet
propaganda that Czechoslovakia was in the throes of counter-revolution. It was a
display of unity rare in the history of any country, and particularly impressive in the
case of a state where there were historic tensions and divisions between Czechs and
Slovaks. Soviet plans to install a client government which would retrospectively
legitimise the invasion were, in the short term, frustrated. (Randle 1994, p93).
Students and ordinary citizens stood in the path of tanks, while young people who
knew Russian argued with confused Russian soldiers (Randle 1994, p95). Slogans on
walls, leaflets turned out from numerous small printing presses, the parading of the
Czechoslovak flag and pins, improvised memorials where ever someone had been
killed, altered streets signs (most of which now were labelled Dubcek Street) were all
used to confuse and deflate the invading forces, while maintaining national
resistance (Randle 1994, p96).
In the end, combined Soviet military and political pressure wore down this
opposition. The resultant victory of Soviet policies can been summarised: In Czechoslovakia itself, thousands of people poured out onto the streets to confront
the oncoming tanks, and they maintained a remarkable civil resistance to the
occupiers until Dubcek and other leaders had been released and reinstalled in office.
However, the Czechoslovak leadership had been pressurised in Moscow into making
concessions, including the re-introduction of censorship, and this enabled the Soviet
17
leaders to apply 'salami tactics' over the following months to secure their removal and
institute a wholesale purge of the Party. (Randle 1994, 57).
Later on, the role, name, and image of Alexander Dubcek would largely be suppressed
from the public discourse and educational system of Czechoslovakia. One third of the
entire communist party in the country would be purged. Yet in 1989, Dubcek would
once again speak before massed protesting crowds, to whom he was not so much a
leader but a symbol of past humiliation and the need for a reborn national
struggle.
Several background factors prepared the ground for the 'velvet revolution' in
November 1989, so-called because it went so smoothly. These background factors
included:  People who witnessed the events of 1968 never forgot it, even though this
was a taboo topic. This legacy from the past was never healed within the
communist system of Czechoslovakia. In effect, neither hearts nor minds had
been won in the decades following 1968.
 The Charter 77 group was formed by leading writers and intellectuals to
criticise the regime, particularly on human rights and intellectual issues. At its
heart was Vaclav Havel, a playwright by profession, philosopher by
inclination, and a future political leader (see Stokes 1993, p149; Havel 1991).
The government tried to suppress this group 'with harassment, house arrest,
preventative detainment, forced exile' (Stokes 1993, p150) which if anything
increased the political will of the group and their hidden popularity. The group
focused on indirect, non-violent opposition and non-cooperation with
the regime.
 The Churches did not play as large a part in supporting change in Poland.
Among Slovaks 70% baptised their children, among Czechs only 30%.
Nonetheless, among the Slovaks the Catholic Church in particular had a
role in organising resistance, especially under the revived papacy of John
Paul II (Stokes 1993, p152). Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek tried to invite the
Pope to a mass rally in 1985 at Velehrad - the authorities refused permission
and the Pope could not come. But 100,000 Czechoslovaks attended this
celebration of Saint Methodius anyway. Six hundred thousand people also
signed a 31 point petition in 1987, demanding freedom of religion (Stokes
1993, p152). This religious influence, however, was less than in Poland.
 In the USSR Gorbachev had opened up a period of openness and
political reform. He also made it clear that Soviet tanks were unlikely to
intervene in Eastern Europe. When Gorbachev visited Prague, he was
welcomed with joyous shouts of 'Gorby, Gorby', as in East Germany. In fact
reform was now sweeping through all of Eastern Europe and shaping a new
international context (see Batt 1994 & Szajowski 1991 for an overview). The
Czechoslovak government claimed it was interested in perestroika, but in reality
changed nothing (Stokes 1993, p149), with the state keeping complete control
of all media and maintaining their watchdogs in all organisations.
 The success of Solidarity in Poland, which had survived martial law and
brought the government there to the negotiation table and forced them to
partially free elections, was gradually becoming known in all parts of Eastern
Europe, indicating that reform was possible.
18
 The government in 1988, especially Prague party boss Mirosav Stepan, tried to
use a mixed carrot and stick approach, allowing some freedom, but at other
times crushing opposition and refusing any dialogue - the government as a
result looked as much incompetent as strong (Stoke 1993, p153).
 Vaclav Havel was arrested and imprisoned in January 1989, while on the 15
January a series of protests started, with police charging and battling crowds
of between 500 and 5,000 through mid January 1989.
 In mid-June 1989, Vaclav Havel and other writers released a document called
for 'freedom of assembly, a free media, and open discussion' - within two
months 22,000 people had signed it (Stokes 1993, p155), turning an
intellectual movement into a mass movement.
Mass popular action galvanised people in Prague and other cities in November
1989. Key trends include:  There was a brutal suppression of a peaceful student protest of some
30,000, demanding reform, by security forces on 17 November 1989. A
number of students were beaten, and it was rumoured that some students had
died (Stokes 1993, pp155-156). Activists and ordinary people who saw the
forceful suppression were deeply shocked, and in spite of media silence, word
began to spread through Prague.
 The students formally placed a petition before the union of Theatrical
Workers, with the result that the Union went on strike and began talking
about these and other issues. Theatre was extremely popular in
Czechoslovakia and people turned to up to find shows cancelled, or audiences
found themselves addressed by the actors on political issues (see further
Glenn 1999; Ackerman & Duvall 2000). This spread the word rapidly that the
time might be ripe for action.
 On 19 November 1989, Civic Forum, led by Vaclav Havel, was formed. It
consisted of a number of groups, including Public Action Against
Violence, Charter 77, and a revisionist Communist group, Obroda
(Rebirth) and other opposition groups (Stokes 1993, p156). Havel declared
anyone anywhere who wished reform a valid leader of Civic Forum. It was
thus an open, decentralised network of groups with many leaders, large
numbers of activists, and a wider, sympathetic public, thus fitting into
some of the main requirements for successful low-violent reform movements
(see above).
 Masses of students, workers, and ordinary citizens began appearing on the
streets of major cities. They joined in massive street parades in Prague, but
allowed themselves to be turned back by police barricades. They espoused
non-violence, and sang the Czech national anthem.
 Young students talked to the security forces, offering them flowers and
making peace gestures. Many of the security forces were ashamed of their
earlier punishment of the students, and were visibly shaken. This eroded the
will of the security forces.
 On 20 November 250,000-300,000 people gathered in Wenceslas Square,
listening to speeches by a large number of reformist leaders, including
Dubcek, and Vaclav Havel. This was followed by a mass meeting of 750,000
at a larger venue on the next day. When a Prague party boss, Stepan, tried to
address these crowds, he was whistled down with chanted statements of 'We
19
are not children' (Stokes 1993, p157). These crowds, however, remained in
very good control, and engaged in a strange dialogue with the large number
of speakers who came to see them. Humour was also used to attack the
Communist party leadership. This was a key turning point which the
government could not reverse.
 On November 27 there was a two hour general strike (during lunch time).
The majority of workers joined this strike.
In the end, Party Secretary Milos Jakes (himself one of the anti-Dubcek
conspirators) and the entire politburo were forced to resign, even though the
communist party for a short time tried to recreate another government with only
cosmetic changes. After the resignation from government of the Communist Part, on 1
January 1990, Vaclav Havel was appointed President by the national assembly, and
thereafter re-appointed by free elections. From this time on, Czechoslovakia moved
towards a democratic and capitalist system, though some economic and social
pressures would soon be felt by the new government (for these challenges, see Ulc
1992; McCarthy 1993). Although the nation soon divided into separate Czech and
Slovak states, this was done through democratic procedures and with a minimum level
of violence, thus sometimes being called the Velvet Divorce (see Buyukakinc 2002).
People power, with its limited objectives of overthrowing the communist regime,
had succeeded. Since this time, the Czech Republic, and somewhat more slowly, the
Slovak Republic, have tracked a path towards greater stability and functioning
democracies that have entered the European Union (2004). Though challenges remain,
e.g. the treatment of Roma minorities and the role of organised crime, both states have
made a successful exit from authoritarian patterns of government, largely based
on a mass mobilisation and people power (Glenn 1999).
4. Humanising Globalisation?
We have seen the way that globalisation has spread commodities, ideas, and forms of
institutional structure around the globe. At the same time, this has propagated the idea
of the market and capitalism as the dominant form of economic organisation, i.e.
a form of neo-liberalism based on market economies. This penetration has also
meant that in many cases think-tanks, academics, intellectual elites and universities
(epistemic communities) too, have begun to operate much like private commercial
operations, trying to link their activities into a free, international market of ideas and
money (for some of these issues see Fuller 2005; Saul 1997). In general terms,
capitalism, powerful states, and epistemic networks have been drivers of neoliberalism and 'globalisation-from-above' as a key shaper of world affairs. At the
same time, these groups have not been totally indifferent to demands of poorer
countries, international civil society, labour, feminist and environmental movements
and advocacy groups for greater reform and accountability in international and
transnational organisations. Has this process created a more humane and
responsible global system over the last two decades? Are there mechanisms that might
make these power cores more accountable and lead to effective reform?
Transnational corporations and media companies, especially as they have begun to
move into the service, entertainment, and information sectors of the global
20
economy, have begun to create their own research centres, publish journals, and
organise information sources (see Thrift 1998, pp25-26). Business and commercial
groups are deeply involved in formulating the structure of the international economy,
the way trade and finance is regulated, and in generating the intellectual norms of key
organisations such as the WTO, G8, IMF, World Bank and the OECD, the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (for one critical view see
Ramonet 1997). As such, they have created a 'critical' mass of information and
ideas that have become the dominant world-view. German author Günter Grass had
a critical view of this approach, arguing that it has created a new ideological dogma: What is peddled today as neo-liberalism is a return to the methods of the Manchester
liberalism of the nineteenth century. In the seventies, in most of Europe, there was a
relatively successful effort to civilize capitalism. If you believe in the principle that both
socialism and capitalism are the charmingly spoiled children of the Enlightenment,
then you also have to admit that they have had a certain way of keeping each other in
check. Even capitalism has been subject to certain responsibilities. In Germany, we
call this the social economy of the market, and there was a general consensus, which
included the conservative party, that the conditions of the Weimar Republic should
never be reproduced. This consensus broke down in the early eighties. Since the
Communist hierarchies fell apart, capitalism has come to believe that it can do
anything, that it has escaped all control. Its polar opposite has defaulted. The rare
remaining responsible capitalists who call for prudence do so because they realize
that they have lost their sense of direction, that the neoliberal system is now repeating
the errors of Communism by creating its own dogma, its own certificate of infallibility.
(Grass & Bourdieu 2000)
Nigel Thrift has suggested that we can now see the emergence of a new, more
educated and sophisticated form of economic activity which he calls 'soft
capitalism' (Thrift 1998). One of the key aspects of this thinking is that rather than
relying on a perfect knowledge base or systematic methodology (the so-called 'Joshua
discourse', as might be found from religious, philosophical or pure, foundational
science), it often relies on an evolving, messy but practical 'knowledge by doing'
(Thrift 1998, pp31-32; see for example Zucker & Darby 2003). On this basis, it has
tapped into the idea of more diverse concept of rationality, with rationality: * 'embodied, relying on our bodily natures;
* going to engage the emotions, since feeling is conceptualized and conceptualization
always involves feeling;
* based on a notion of meaning as concerning symbols which are constitutive of the
world and not just mirrors of it. These "symbols" are, in fact, imaginative processes
which rely on our capacity to produce images, to store knowledge of particular levels
of complexity, and to communicate . . .
* reliant on categories that are not independent of the world but are defined by
upgraded processes (like metaphor, metonymy and mental imaging), which means
that there can be no objectively correct description of reality (this does not, of course,
mean that there is no objective world, only that we have no privileged access to it from
some external viewpoint).' (Thrift 1998, p32)
In this creative Genesis discourse 'knowledge has become an archipelago of islands of
epistemic stability in a sea of disorder, fluctuations, noise, randomness and chaos'
(Thrift 1998, p32). Businesses must adapt to a messy, ever-changing and dynamic
environment. The 'expanding institutional world of business knowledge' must also
therefore move beyond mere information gathering to the actual production of
knowledge, management of knowledge, and distribution of knowledge to a wide range
21
of diverse audiences (Thrift 1998, p42). This trend can be seen already not just in
companies like IBM and Microsoft, but also in management consultancies (such as
Arthur Andersen), and in major information, publishing and entertainment companies.
On this basis, a new managerialism, often operating in transnational businesses or as
advisers to government and IGOs, use several tools on an everyday basis including: * An 'emphasis on competitive advantage, in a business world that is
increasingly constituted by information that is incurred by knowledge' (Thrift
1998, p54).
* a managerial effort to harness existing knowledge and generate new
'organizational knowledge'
* rather than create an overall strategic plan, the aim is to create an evolutionary
and learning strategy that is highly adaptive to 21st century change.
* on this basis the manager or administrator becomes a kind of 'cultural
diplomat', concerned with reiterating the aims and values of the
organisation, and deepening communication flows both within the
institutional and with its key global linkages, creating an extended relational
architecture (Thrift 1998, pp54-56). This diplomacy is then projected into its PR,
media profile, advertising and public perceptions, as well as taking on board
environmental or humanitarian concerns that might create future risks for
companies, shareholders or stakeholders..
In such a system, knowledge and its products become the key competitive
components globally. The cultural circuit of human and soft capital manages the key
phases of production of both knowledge (Thrift 1998, p58) and the regulation of
markets and international norms.
This new 'soft capitalism' has the advantage of being more intelligent, more open to
some audiences, and relies on the production of services and information (or
value-added products) rather than the crude exploitation of natural resources or the
creation of monopolies or oligopolies. However, it has several downsides. First, it
poses as a new ideology without real credentials to being a systematic discipline of
body of knowledge: it is eclectic and opportunistic rather than morally or
intellectually committed. Second, it tends to empower existing elites, and can result
in the exploitation or 'down-sizing' of traditional segments of the work force (Thrift
1998, pp60-61). As such, it may open up and maintain division across the globe
between poor and displaced groups, and those at the core aligned with the production
of wealth and knowledge, in effect strengthening the relative dominance of
Transnational Capitalist Classes, or TCCs (Van Apeldoorn 2000; Robinson 1999).
Third, it has its destructive side, often clearing away less efficient structures,
institutions, nations, ideologies and cultures on the basis of relatively narrow criteria
of profit, self-interest, and conformity to a certain model of modern life. As noted by
Thorstein Veblen, the 'tides of capitalism . . . require periodically a ritual of
purposeful destruction, clearing away debris and excess from the system.' This process
'is inescapably barbaric . . . since it always imposes the loss and suffering first and
most severely on the least among us' (in Greider 2000). In such a system, it is hard
to generate real trust, which had been viewed as a key component of modern liberal
states and their capitalist societies (Thrift 1998, p61; Fukuyama 1995), as distinct
from a artificial set of narrow relationships among 'skill-gurus'. Likewise,
22
intellectuals, critics and protesting groups tend to be swept up as simply another
source of public information and entertainment, or as mere adjuncts to wider
governmental, corporate and institutional agenda (see Saul 1997). Furthermore, as we
have seen (see lectures 6 & 7), the generation of balanced and sustainable
economic and environmental governance at the global level is highly
problematic. It remains to be seen, then, whether the new rhetoric of 'soft capitalism'
will generate a truly humanitarian and inclusive economic system.
We can see some of these issues coming to the forefront in recent G8 meetings,
where the leading industrialised nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, initially meeting from 1975) have
both accommodated and resisted demands from protests groups. Even as the G8 has
taken into its agenda the issue of poverty and development over the last three years, it
has been criticised for not doing enough and for a degree of conditionality in its
future aid. Although not as strict as World Bank programs, the G8 states that
'developing countries must "tackle corruption, boost private sector development, and
attract investment" and remove "impediments to private investment both domestic and
foreign."' (BBC 2005c)
Thus, although the promised 2005 package of $50 billion (raised to $60 billion in
2006) in aid might save up to 10 million Africans, this has been still been criticised as
too little too late, and having a limited environmental agenda (BBC 2005b). Stated
outcomes of the 2005 G8 meeting included:  Mr Blair said trade discussions in Hong Kong later this year should yield an end date






to agricultural subsidies.
$3bn agreed for Palestinian Authority for investment in infrastructure.
Nigeria's President Olusegun Obasanjo described the deal as a "success".
G8 commits to training 20,000 peacekeepers for Africa.
African leaders to commit to democracy and good governance as part of the deal.
Debts of the 18 poorest countries to be forgiven.
Universal access to anti-HIV drugs in Africa by 2010. (BBC 2005b)
However, as we have seen, in real terms much G8 aid has been directed towards
Nigeria and Iraq, with less attention given to least developed nations such as
Malawi. Furthermore, major domestic needs in areas such as energy access and
agricultural protection have undermined some genuine efforts at reform: Western trade and agricultural policies have been identified as a hindrance to
economic growth and development in Africa. The European Union's Agricultural policy
means that more funds are spent on cows born and bred in Europe than on what half
of the population of Africa have to live on at present. Similarly the US continues to
wave its farm subsidies on products such as cotton as a trophy to keep its cotton
farmers happy.
These two policies in particular symbolize the level of inequity that Africa is currently
facing in its struggle to overcome poverty. . . .
At last year's Summit, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, had pushed hard for
Africa to receive prominence and this resulted in the Gleneagles Africa Action Plan.
Blair's sincerity about working towards progress in Africa is not in doubt. And he did
not merely use his position as the host to highlight the plight of the beleaguered
23
continent but has consistently demonstrated a genuine interest to work towards
assisting Africa climb out of poverty. Two years ago he initiated the Commission for
Africa to "define the challenges facing Africa, and to provide clear recommendations
on the changes that are needed to reduce poverty". (Agunbiade 2006)
Thus, through 2007, African leaders such as Nigerian President Umaru Yar'Adua
continued to urge G8 leaders to fulfil their 2005-2006 pledges, including their
promise of comprise support again HIV/AIDS. Analysis of trend through early 2007
suggests that "global AIDS treatment efforts will fall far short of the G8 goal to reach
five million Africans and provide global universal access to AIDS drugs in the next
few years unless the pace of treatment scale up accelerates and the effort expands to
address key barriers" according to the "International Treatment Preparedness Coalition
(ITPC) a group of more than 1,000 treatment activists from over 125 countries" (PR
Newswire 2007; see full reports at http://www.aidstreatmentaccess.org/). Thus, on this
basis, the leadership credentials of he G8 remain uncertain, especially when they
fail to include growing economies such as India and China, and when they remain
unable to curtail tensions among key members such as the U.S. and Russia
through 2007, and have not generated a truly comprehensive plan of action in relation
to poverty, aids, have made limited strides towards new greenhouse gas emissions and
political instability in parts of Africa over the last two years (see Reuters 2007;
Penttila 2003). If we look at this process, it seems that violent protest has had much
less impact than organised low-violence protest that has gained media attention that
aided the efforts of individual leaders (Blair on African poverty, France's effort to
engage major developing countries, Germany's effort to push for targets for
emissions). However, adaptation of neo-liberal and global institutions may be
political accommodation rather than deep reform, suggesting that IGO's with low
institutionalisation and limited formalism may function very differently from national
governments in responding to civil campaigns. This
5. Constructive Democracy, Proactive Reform and Cosmopolitan Governance
Put another way, passive resistance, people power, and strategic non-violent conflict
are now 'a regular part of our national and international life and should be explored
and understood' (Ackerman & Kreugler 1994, pxix). One of the key aspects is the way
that informal and formal networks are used to keep an awareness of political
alternatives, in spite of the dominance of official channels by a party, regime, or
government. Likewise, activity groups are now often set up to highlight the activities
of corporations, or to demand greater responsiveness to consumer or citizen demands,
often using the new connectivity of the global information networks. International
Non-Government Organisations (INGOs) are thus part of a much wider
phenomenon of transnational civil society that can be mobilised via media and
communication technologies to enter into international campaigns on a wide range of
issues. At the very least, they can try to make IGOs and national governments more
responsive and accountable, even if they cannot shape the main agenda driven 'fromabove' by governments and transnational business interests. It this possible to speak of
'globalisation-from-below' as well as 'globalisation-from-above' as a factor in
global politics (see Brecher et al. 2000; Falk 1999; Herod et al. 1998).
24
From the 1990s onwards access to technology provides one of these key elements,
but all parties including repressive governments have access to these technologies: Since organized social conflict requires communication, improved access to cheap,
efficient, and discreet communications should make strategic nonviolent conflict both
easier to perform and more relevant. Indeed, new technologies from personal
computing to fax machines, beepers, and cellular phones have already created a
whole new range of opportunities for practitioners of nonviolent struggle. Despite
impressive examples of strategists exploiting these new opportunities, we must note
that technological advances confer no permanent advantage on those who are
democratic and nonviolent. The same tools can be used for domination and
repression. (Ackerman & Kreugler 1994, pxxiii)
In reality, a wide range of forms of connectivity, solidarity and creative social
organisation are more important, especially when used in conjunction with new
media. In Russia, East Europe and China, forbidden publications and information was
regularly passed along through clandestine personal networks, sometimes using
computers, tape recorders and photocopiers to reproduce several copies through each
generation of duplication. In Prague in 1989, video copies showing the real oppression
meted out to students were duplicated and passed out from hand-to-hand, directly
sensitising thousands to the real situation. In China during 1989, many of the families
and friends of the students involved in the protests in Beijing and Shanghai knew the
reality of what had happened, in the long run undermining official accounts of the
small 'counter revolution'. Likewise, access to faxes, phones, and Internet connections
can immediately disseminate information about causes and make them international
programs. The politics of even closed regimes such as those of Burma and the former
Yugoslavia have to contend with critics who can now readily set up homepages and
report on abuses of these governments on a regular basis. Thus, even in PRC, Cuba,
and Iran it has been difficult to fully close off access to international radio broadcasts,
top satellite television, and to international Internet sites, even when local hosts are
held liable for content displayed. In the long-run it is mobilisation of 'people power'
and transnational civil society is a likely strategy for reform in authoritarian
governments (see Schock 1999 for some of these issues). Protest groups against
globalisation regularly use Internet services and amateur video recordings to create
alternative media services, e.g. over protests in relation to WTO, the World Economic
Forum and G8 meetings.2
Images carried around the world, either through embassies or international NGOs
can also be effective, as can banners written in English for an international audiences
on CNN or the BBC. However, in the end, another issue is crucial. Although people
power can partly break out via mass resentment and frustration, some level of
strategic planning or at least shared political vision is required before such mass
action can be transformed into political revolution and social mobilisation. In the end,
the dreams of people who hope for a better future have to be mobilised into some sort
of comprehensive agenda which consciously shows the short-comings of existing
conditions and at least offers the possibility of improvement. It was precisely these
factors which had a strong influence in many countries around the world, and in
particular in the Philippines, the former Czechoslovakia, the Ukraine and George.
2
See for example the alternative news provided in The Independent Media Center, at
http://www.indymedia.org/.
25
Likewise, elements of people power were mobilised in the Philippines, in reform in
Cambodia, and in setting the conditions for an independent state in East Timor, and in
these cases included a 'history of systemic violence, loosening up of the authoritarian
regime, violence toward the prodemocracy activists, spiritual orientations of social
commitments, networking-mobilizing skills used to confront an authoritarian state,
building a social infrastructure to produce massive force, and conscientizing for active
nonviolence' (Montiel 2006).
In democracies as well, it seems that the general public can be a driving force for
real change (Cleveland 1992), an issue which leaders ignore at their peril. In this
context, we can still see why ideas, values, political leadership, culture, artistic
products and even 'the truth' remain central components of international
change. However, no set formula of 'people power' is sure to win in a given conflict.
Furthermore, a phase of people power does not necessarily lead to stable democracies,
an issue confronting Kyrgyzstan, and in part Venezuela and Haiti. Rather, as in all
conflicts, clear planning and flexible response to the wider setting are required to
maximise the attainment of strategic goals.
Likewise, there is a need for the wide range of agenda and goals of different
international groups to begin to converge on some better future in which there is a mix
of practical outcomes and accountability that goes beyond national politics. One
emerging area has been the slow evolution of cosmopolitics, cosmopolitanism and
theories of cosmopolitan governance, all directed towards a more humanistic and
responsive global system that recognises both human rights and global diversity
(Cartier 1999; Cheah & Robbins 1998). Cosmopolitanism is a thread of thought that
goes back to the Hellenistic Age and the Stoic philosophers who argued that humans
were citizens of the universe (cosmos) as much as they were citizens of an individual
city or state. In the 21st century this has been taken up as the idea of all humans as
citizens of a global community which in turn has some responsibilities towards
this wider notion of global community. It can be both a new model for democracy
in a globalising world, and a source of universal human values based on dialogue
and tolerance across different classes and social groups (Cartier 1999; Held 1999).
Viewed as 'a set of international societal processes and values, cosmopolitanism is a
humanist counterpart to globalization; and if the cosmopolitan has a geography,
world cities are its primary nodes' (Cartier 1999; see Lecture 10). In this sense,
informal multiculturalism has been a reality of world cities for millennia (Athens,
Alexandria, Rome, Malacca, Calcutta, Hong Kong, Shanghai, San Francisco), and
transnational groups and cultural fusions are now strong element of all world,
maritime and trading cities (Cartier 1999). Indeed, entire regions can be viewed as
oriented outwards by trade and migration flows into wider transnational human
and cultural spaces, e.g. Southeast China as oriented out via the South China Sea
onto global networks (viewed as positive access to 'blue ocean culture', but also as a
possible security threat by the PRC). California has also been viewed as juncture of
diverse cultures and new ideas opening onto the Pacific, leading towards what
Thompson typifies as a 'cultural-ecology' of the 'Pacific Aerospace' in which the
interrelationships between nature, religion and society can begin to be consciously
understood and move away from the old political ideologies which only served to
divide the world and serve as tools of conflict (Thompson 1989, pp30-33).
26
Cosmopolitanism also addresses the idea of the moral and legal equality of all
humans, an idea that is seen to transcend national interest: Cosmopolitanism has become an increasingly important perspective in normative
political and international relations theory. Most simply, cosmopolitanism can be
described as the view that all human beings have equal moral standing within a single
world community. More specifically, we can distinguish two strands of
cosmopolitanism: moral cosmopolitanism and legal cosmopolitanism. Moral
cosmopolitanism holds that all persons stand in certain moral relations with one
another by virtue of the fact that they are all members of a universal community. All
persons possess equal moral worth deserving of our respect, and certain obligations
of justice with regard to other persons place constraints on our conduct. Legal
cosmopolitanism contends that a global political order ought to be constructed,
grounded on the equal legal rights and duties of all individuals. The emphasis here is
on creating or transforming institutional schemes so as to provide concrete procedural
and organizational mechanisms dedicated to securing and protecting the human
rights of all persons. Despite the basic distinction drawn here, moral and legal
cosmopolitanism share a commitment to at least three fundamental tenets: (1)
individualism, in that individual human beings are the ultimate units of concern; (2)
universality, in that all human beings possess equal moral status; and (3) generality, in
that persons are subjects of concern for everyone, that is, human status has global
scope. Consequently, moral and legal cosmopolitanism are compatible and may be
combined in mutually complementary fashion so as to give weight to the ideal of
'world citizenship'. (Hayden 2004)
To work effectively, however, cosmopolitanism will need to evolve mechanisms
that allow for diversity but also channel shared action and active dialogue on key
issues. In post-modern and post-national democracy, this is a crucial and shared
challenge, relying on transnational connections, communications, and the ability to
work across different layers in the global system (see Stengrin 2005). In this model of
complex world governance with different groups sharing responsibility for
overlapping tasks, several conceptual tools might be useful, including:  reflexive homogeneity, 'whereby members of a political community are bound by
a collective identity that allows them to recognize each other as autonomous
actors, to display a concern not only for their private interests but for the public
good as well, and to invest trust in the mutual benevolence of all those bound
together by a context of interdependent political action' (Schmalz-Bruns 2001,
p560, following Claus Offe and Michael Zürn). This is a recognition of
interdependence in the global system and area of relative autonomy, e.g. in
religious and social spheres.
 adequate representation, 'characterized positively by the inclusion of all those
affected and negatively by constraints on control and access to relevant
information' (Schmalz-Bruns 2001, p560). This goes beyond the notion of
traditional stakeholders towards actual dialogue with key groups affected as the
basis of long-term outcomes.
 dispersal of authority, thereby aiding pluralism and approximating 'democratic
accountability', where 'non-government organizations, social movements, cities and
micro-regions, and electronic technologies form the infrastructure of a globalized
civil society' (Schmalz-Bruns 2001, p561). This process has already begun in the
27
areas of environmental diplomacy, and is now a reality in terms of public
consultation and engagement in many democracies.
 emphasis on deliberative democracy, whereby communication, openness,
access to decision-making, public debate, and rationally supported
decisions occur across the spectrum of national, non-government and
transnational actors (Schmalz-Bruns 2001, p562). This follows bodies of thought
developed by Kant, John Dewey and Jürgen Habermas, using ideas of relative
autonomy and subsidiarity to arrive at collective problem solving (SchmalzBruns 2001, p560-566). The decade-long paths of climate negotiations and the
campaign against anti-personnel landmines indicates that such strategies can be
partially effective at the global level, but only with enormous effort and with a
gradualist approach during early stages.
 reflexive cooperation, whereby there is 'a premium on the design of deliberative
institutions and arenas that focus on the fairness and justice of cooperative
relations themselves. In such institutions, people are able to make judgements
about and influence the terms of their ongoing cooperation.' (Schmalz-Bruns 2001,
p566). This requires the spread of information across transnational networks as
well as up and down traditional political hierarchies.
 Transnational Governance itself needs more actors and support than can be
provided by national governments and international governmental
organisations. 'Governance' is a "term for describing decision making processes
that are less formal than a government. Although no international government
exists in a world of notionally sovereign nation states, global governance does exist
in indirect forms, and these processes have grown deeper in recent decades,
though now partly undermined by new security and energy access imperatives.
One of the key challenges of governance is siting authoritative decisions at the
proper level to coincide with the scope of the problem being addressed. The
proper level in economic or environmental terms might not match the
governmental units available for making and implementing decisions" (Charnovitz
2003). In itself, this functional gap invites greater participation from INGOs
and transnational civil society in the 21st century, but also requires that such
groups be accountable and representative of specific interests that are
localised as well as internationalised. We can see this in the stabilising role
provided by diverse humanitarian and aid agencies in the post-crisis periods
in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Afghanistan.
 In the current period of apparent religious conflict, knowledge of other becomes
crucial, not optional. During lectures made to the UN during 2006, it was noted
by major scholars that identity remains a core elements of current global problems:
Cosmopolitanism is especially useful today, Mr. Appiah noted, because it is
essentially contrary to the idea of tyranny and cultural conversion--goals inherent on
both sides of what many call today's "clash of civilizations". A cosmopolitan world is
one based on an underlying humility and on the fallibility of human knowledge. In
believing that all people have many things to learn, the door to true tolerance is swung
open. "Cosmopolitans think that there are many values worth living by and that you
cannot live by all of them", he writes in his book. "So we hope and expect that different
people and different societies will embody different values."
28
Mr. Appiah also pointed out that "globalization has made these ancient ideas
relevant". Cosmopolitanism requires both knowledge of other peoples and the power
to affect and be affected by them. People are likely already cosmopolitan in many
ways--the roots of music and art, for example, reach deep into international soil,
connecting such diverse places as West Africa and the American South, London and
Bangladesh, he said. Moreover, global media and powerful international systems have
made direct international relationships a sudden reality. Our choices as a human race
must reflect the heavy responsibility of this shift.
. . . The bottom line of intercultural dialogue, Mr. Appiah said, is a cosmopolitan
concern for one's fellow man. "At the heart of modern cosmopolitanism is a respect
for diversity of cultures, not because cultures matter themselves but because people
matter, and culture matters to people." (Gorelick 2006)
The key point here is that democracy is more than a system of government or
representation: it is based on modes of social life, patterns of communication,
and public debate, and identity, a crucial period in the current period where
religion and culture have emerged as major global forces (see Gorelick 2006;
Greene 2003). There is no guarantee, however, that a transnational and cosmopolitan
pattern of democracy will be developed in the near future. People-power can be
effective in national crises and on particular international and global issues, but
has not emerged as a coherent central actor alongside IGOs, INGOs, World Cities
and transnational corporations in the evolving global 'system'. Whether a stronger
cosmopolitan consensus can be reached to reform the emerging global system
remains to be seen.
6. Bibliography, Resources, and Further Reading
Resources
The Nation, an independent and critical journal with a large archive of thought-provoking
material
(also
to
be
read
critically),
will
be
found
at
http://www.thenation.com:80/index.shtml
The United States Institute of Peace, its journal Peace Watch, its Virtual Diplomacy project, and
its Peaceworks Reports can be accessed on the Internet at
http://www.usip.org/pubs.html and related pages.
The Institute for War and Peace Reporting provided useful reports, mainly covering Eastern
Europe,
the
Balkans
and
Central
Asia
at:
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?home_index.html
One World Net has a wide range of short articles on areas of global foreign policy,
located at http://www.oneworld.net/ Their articles can be viewed by country or
theme.
For a very different view of world affairs, see The Independent Media Center, at
http://www.indymedia.org/
Further Reading
29
ACKERMANN, Peter & DUVALL, Jack "People Power Primed: Civilian Resistance
and Democratisation", Harvard International Review, 27 no. 2, Summer 2005, pp4247 [Access via Infotrac Database]
BRECHER, Jeremy et al. Globalization from Below: The Power of Solidarity, Cambridge,
South End Press, 2000
CHARNOVITZ, Steve "The Emergence of Democratic Participation in Global
Governance", Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 10 no. 1, Winter 2003, pp4578 [Access via Infotrac Database]
GORELICK, Melissa "The Idea of Global Citizenship: Scholars Debate Notions of
Identity and Tolerance at Secretary General's Lecture", UN Chroncile, 43 no. 2,
July-August 2006, pp51-53 [Access via Infotrac Database]
HEROD, Andrew et al. (ed.) An Unruly World?: Globalization, Governance and Geography,
London, Routledge, 1998
KARATNYCKY, Adrian "Ukraine's Orange Revolution", Foreign Affairs, 84 no. 2,
March-April 2005 [Access via Infotrac Database]
KUZIO, Taras "The Orange Revoltion at the Crossroads", Demokratizatsiya, 14 no. 4,
Fall 2006, pp477-492 [Access via Infotrac Database]
LINANTUD, John L. "The 2004 Philippine elections: political change in an illiberal
democracy", Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27 no. 1, April 2005, pp80-101 [Access
via Infotrac Database]
MONTIEL, Cristina Jaymel "Political Psychology of Nonviolent Democratic
Transitions in Southeast Asia", Journal of Social Issues, 62 no. 1, pp173-190 [Access
via Ebsco Database]
SCHOCK, Kurt "People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement
Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma", Social Problems, 46
no. 3, August 1999 [Access via Infotrac Database]
STENGRIM, Laura "Negotiating Postmodern Democracy, Political Activism, and
Knowledge Production: Indymedia's Grassroots and e-Savvy Answer to Media
Oligopoly", Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies, 2 no. 4, December 2005,
pp281-304 [Access via Ebsco Database]
ULRICH, Clare "People Power Effects Change", Human Ecology, 30 no. 4, December
2002, pp7-12 [Access via Infotrac Database]
Bibliography
ACKERMAN, Peter & DUVALL, Jack A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict,
N.Y., Palgrave 2000
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via Infotrac Database]
ACKERMAN, Peter & KRUEGLER, Christopher Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of
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30
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