AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY
Charles Town, West Virginia
REDEFINING HUMAN INTELLIGENCE FOR THE MODERN AGE
A study submitted in partial fulfillment of the
Requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
in
INTELLIGENCE STUDIES
by
Patrick John Sullivan
Department Approval Date:
April 30, 2012
The author hereby grants the American Public University System the right to display these
contents for educational purposes.
The author assumes total responsibility for meeting the requirements set by United States
Copyright Law for the inclusion of any materials that are not the author’s creation or in the
public domain
i
© Copyright 2012 by Patrick John Sullivan
All Rights Reserved
ii
DEDICATION/ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
To my wife, for permitting me to be MIA during this process, my mother for teaching me what I
know about writing, my father for his reassurance and knowledge base, all of my AMU
instructors for the lessons learned in two years of course work, and all the Coast Guard, DoD,
and Law Enforcement professionals who instilled a curiosity for the mystique of the HUMINT
trade and Dr. Hogan for giving me an excuse to study something I love.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
PAGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
1
II.
LITERATURE REVIEW
What Is HUMINT?
Capabilities
Limitations
Role of HUMINT
6
6
11
16
20
III.
METHODOLOGY
Data Collection Technique
Case Studies
Human Study
Limitations of Study
24
24
25
26
27
IV.
RESULTS
29
V.
DISCUSSION
Research Question
Definitions
Capabilities
Limitations
Future
Summary
32
32
32
33
37
38
39
REFERENCES
41
iv
I: Introduction
From the earliest days of the Republic, the United States has recognized the compelling
need to collect intelligence by clandestine means. For much of our history, this collection
could only be done by human agents. Recent technological developments have, of course,
vastly increased our ability to collect intelligence. The capacity of these technical systems
is awesome and our achievements are astonishing. However, these technical means can
never eliminate the need for human sources of information. Often, the more difficult the
target is, the greater is the need for human agents.
-John Deutch, Statement on the damage caused by Aldrich Ames
On the morning of February 18, 2001, Special Agent Robert Hanssen of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) drove slightly less than a mile from his suburban Washington DC
home to Foxstone Park. It was colder than normal for that time of the year, and it was likely that
very few people would be at the park to see, let alone suspect, Hanssen. Having studied Soviet
and Russian tradecraft, Hanssen probably conducted pre-operational surveillance of the
footbridge near Creek Crossing Road to ensure that no curious onlookers were meddling around.
Anxious to offload his bundle of classified information, Hanssen did not notice the teams of FBI
agents who were closely watching his activities. Relieved, Hanssen placed the package under
the bridge, known as dead-drop site “Ellis” to him, and walked away. Little did he know, he was
walking away from an espionage career which lasted over twenty years. Heavily armed FBI
agents knew Hanssen carried a gun in his official duties and relied on the element of surprise to
ensure that Hansen didn’t take his life or the life of an arresting agent. What ensued were weeks
of debriefings by Justice Department officials and members of the US Intelligence Community
(USIC) which, as a cornerstone of a plea deal to avoid a death sentence, resulted in damage
1
assessments that exist at the TOP SECRET/SCI, SECRET, and unclassified levels. 1 The
Hanssen case exploited an organizational naivety to the risk and potential damage of a human
agent-in-place – a vulnerability that Hanssen exploited on behalf of the Komitet
Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti or Committee for State Security (KGB), Glavnoye
Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye or Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces (GRU) and Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki or Russian Foreign Intelligence Service
(SVR). By the time he was arrested, Hanssen had compromised dozens of human assets,
including three of which were executed, numerous highly technical, highly classified Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), and Imagery
Intelligence (IMINT) programs and platforms, including Operation MONOPOLY, an FBI
project to tunnel under a new Soviet Embassy in Washington DC and obtain SIGINT and
MASINT.23 While the precise extent and nature of the information Hanssen compromised is
classified, the hundreds of millions (possibly billions) of dollars wasted, and years of time,
human resources, and technology cast irrelevant is a testament to the impact of a single wellplaced HUMINT source.
It goes without saying that Hanssen was not an isolated example of the history of
effective HUMINT. In 1753, Major George Washington of the Virginia Militia was dispatched
on behalf of the British Government to make observations on French fortifications, order of
1
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the FBI’s Performance in Deterring,
detecting, and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 2003).
2
David Wise, Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI's Robert Hanssen Betrayed America (New York: Random
House, 2002): 98-110.
3
U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, United States v. Robert Philip Hanssen, Affidavit in
Support of Criminal Complaint, Arrest Warrant and Search Warrants, Stefan A. Pluta (February 16, 2001).
2
battle, and troop strengths in the Ohio Territory. 4 In his day, though, there was no other choice;
there were no such thing as electronic signals, there were no signatures to measure, no cameras
which were practical for tactical employment, and no computers to hack. One variable that
George Washington accurately summarized remains constant, the need for intelligence and the
difficulty, no matter the means, of obtaining it: “There is nothing more necessary than good
intelligence to frustrate a designing enemy, and nothing requires greater pains to obtain.” 5 The
advent of Morse code and electric telegraphy, wireless telegraphy, the telephone, and the radio
changed the face of nineteenth century intelligence collection as intelligence professionals
changed their tactics and formalized the SIGINT discipline. As the industrial revolution
progressed and the twentieth century ushered in an era of rapid technologic development, other
intelligence disciplines such as MASINT and IMINT became valuable intelligence collection
tools. In World War I, services on both sides of the frontlines were using aerial surveillance
platforms to track troop movements and provide real-time intelligence on order of battle that
human sources couldn’t. Perhaps this was the pivot point that ushered in an apparent reduction
in the reliance on HUMINT sources. Indeed, when evaluating budgets, publicity, and
bureaucratic growth, the relationship between time and HUMINT appears to be an inverse
relationship. As the world entered the twenty-first century, the digitization and reliance on
information networks has apparently further reduced the need for human sources in lieu of cyber
warfare tools. The changes in technology may only be part of the reason why HUMINT has
declined in favor of other techniques amongst major intelligence services; the public perception
of HUMINT has been skewed by decades of secrecy and dramatization.
4
P.K. Rose, The Founding Fathers of American Intelligence (Center for the Study of Intelligence, US Central
Intelligence Agency, 2010), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/booksand-monographs/the-founding-fathers-of-american-intelligence/art-1.html#rft1 (accessed January 23, 2012).
5
Ibid.
3
In the United States, declassification guidelines on various intelligence topics underscore
the public perception issues surrounding the role of HUMINT. In the US, Title 32 of the
Codified Federal Regulations part 2001 outlines classification guidelines for all manner of
national security information. Non-HUMINT operations considered to pose serious or
exceptionally grave danger to national security are classified between ten and 25 years from the
derivative classification date; whereas, “If an original classification authority is classifying
information that should clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the identity of a
confidential human source or a human intelligence source, the duration shall be up to 75 years.” 6
This means that HUMINT operations won’t typically be published until two to three generations
after the fact. It is no wonder that 75 year old news is not reported as part of the flavor-of-theday news cycles. As a result, military leaders, policy makers, and young people considering the
intelligence profession are not regularly sensitized to HUMINT operations. In the absence of
factual accounts of HUMINT operations and impacts, the aforementioned demographics are
relegated to learning about HUMINT from publishers and Hollywood directors: “Real spies may
not capture the public’s attention, but fake ones often do; Americans are watching more spy
movies than ever before. And those portrayals are seeping into how the public views the secret
world of intelligence.” 7 Furthermore, when real HUMINT news stories are reported, they are
perceived with less importance than other news stories. A Pew Research Center analysis of the
news cycle from August 24-30, 2009 supports the notion that legitimate information about the
HUMINT discipline is not well-received by an ill-informed populace – only three percent of
respondents indicated that a just-released CIA report on interrogation methods and suspected
6
President, Proclamation, “Classified National Security Information,” Federal Register 75, no. 123 (June28, 2010):
37256.
7
Amy B. Zegart, “’Spytainment’: The Real Influence of Fake Spies,” International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence 23:4 (2010): 601-602.
4
detainee abuse at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility was the most closely followed story of
the week (the death of Senator Kennedy received over five times more attention).8 Because
HUMINT doesn’t get attention when it is reported in the news, the public perception draws
largely from fictional accounts of unrealistic HUMINT operations and operatives, and actual
HUMINT related information is so sensitive that people die before their appetite for non-fiction
tales can be satiated. All of this contributes to the status quo of a total misunderstanding of the
HUMINT discipline.
Those who work with HUMINT regularly can be generally grouped in to two categories:
those who, accepting the limitations of human source operations, understand and appreciate the
contribution of HUMINT to the common intelligence picture and those who see HUMINT as a
subjective and costly form of intelligence collection which diverts attention from other programs
and distracts decision makers with Bond-esque romance. Public misperceptions and opposing
opinions by those in the intelligence community suggest that few outside of the HUMINT
discipline have an understanding of the field and those who do have apparently failed to clearly
establish HUMINT as a cornerstone of the intelligence picture in the modern age. This paper
seeks to define HUMINT, discuss and highlight capabilities and limitations, and analyze its role
in modern intelligence. By objectively evaluating HUMINT as a whole, this paper aims to
enlighten the average citizen and intelligence professional outside of the HUMINT field.
Nothing in this study rises to the classified level, a fact which makes a study on the highly
sensitive nature of HUMINT difficult; luckily, the James Bonds and Jason Bournes of the world
have inspired significant scholarly and professional works used as a basis for an extensive review
of pertinent literature.
8
Pew Research Center, “Public Worried, Informed About H1N1” (September 3, 2009), under “Top News Stories,”
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1331/public-worry-swine-flu-confidence-in-government (accessed March 17, 2012).
5
II: Literature Review
Works on the subject of HUMINT appear to originate from all manner of authors, from
former HUMINT case officers, to those in academia, and some who present HUMINT in a
manner which furthers some political aim. The most difficult factor in conducting a review of
applicable literature is determining what is, in fact, applicable. As in HUMINT operations, the
establishing of bona fides is a point which, when present in HUMINT works, assists in
establishing credibility. Literature on HUMINT tends to fall in to one of several categories:
General explanations/defining HUMINT, capabilities of HUMINT, limitations of HUMINT, the
role of HUMINT in the intelligence picture, the future of HUMINT and special interest or
politically charged HUMINT related topics such as interrogation tactics or detainee treatment.
Consistent with this study’s aim to provide an accurate understanding of the role of HUMINT in
the modern age, literature will be presented which discusses current works’ takes on the
definition, capabilities, limitations, role, and outlook of HUMINT.
What is HUMINT?
When defining HUMINT through the lens of the USIC, one first must understand the
service and functional components of the USIC responsible for conducting HUMINT operations.
Of the 17 agencies that compose the USIC, ten participate in at least limited HUMINT missions:
CIA, DIA, US Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, FBI, and DEA. 9 The
Director of National Intelligence has delegated the regular administration of the HUMINT
9
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2-0: Joint Intelligence, 2007 (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office): III-4,5.
6
mission to the Director of CIA; however, the only definition of HUMINT found in official but
unclassified CIA publications is “Vital information from human sources acquired by Core
Collectors of the National Clandestine Service in response to national intelligence
requirements.” 10 That definition is of little applicability to the other nine agencies that practice
HUMINT. A better definition comes from the second most applicable actor in the HUMINT
field: the DoD. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 defines all military terms and describes HUMINT as
“A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human
sources.” 11 If JP1-02 left the definition as stated above, the ambiguity could be interpreted
differently by every service and could lead to inconsistencies within the USIC. Joint Publication
2-0 further defines HUMINT as being comprised of separate and distinct parts: Interrogation,
source operations, debriefing, and document exploitation. 12 While this breakdown may work for
the military services, agencies working overseas with non-citizens and domestic agencies,
especially police forces, cannot operate with the relative impunity of the military HUMINT
forces. A telling example of the uneasiness with the association of the word HUMINT comes
from the Coast Guard Intelligence Program:
Interagency partners frequently associate the term HUMINT with collecting foreign
intelligence, maintaining confidential sources, possessing specialized foreign intelligence
HUMINT training, employing particular tradecraft, and operating under different
authorities than the Coast Guard. Due to the Coast Guard’s law enforcement and
regulatory authorities, Coast Guard law enforcement intelligence element personnel use
the term LEIC rather than HUMINT when describing their collection activities. 13
The effect of specifying the missions of HUMINT in the definition is to alienate domestic Law
Enforcement and intelligence agencies such as the Coast Guard and contribute to the general
10
National Clandestine Service, “Human Intelligence,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/offices-ofcia/clandestine-service/intelligence.html (accessed March 17, 2012).
11
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Definition of Military and Associated Terms,
2010 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office): 156.
12
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2-0: Joint Intelligence, 2007 (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office): 2-4.
13
United States Coast Guard, Publication 2: Intelligence, 2010 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office): 6,7.
7
confusion of the term. Most literature that discusses in part or in whole the definition of
HUMINT makes one of three errors: Defining HUMINT as a factor of examples or capabilities,
over-specification as a cumulative of sub-disciplines, or incorporation of counterintelligence in
the definition.
Scholarly and academic works meant to familiarize unfamiliar individuals with the
sweeping spectrum of USIC functions and capabilities tend to define HUMINT by providing
either broad, unhelpful definitions or examples and capabilities of the discipline. In a required
reading for an introductory course of American Military University’s Intelligence Studies
programs, Jeffrey Richelson defines HUMINT by explaining typical HUMINT collectors, the
objectives of HUMINT collectors, the use of HUMINT in the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT), and the clandestine and overt components of HUMINT. 14 Explanations such as these
suffice as a primer of HUMINT in the USIC, but do not do the discipline justice because it
doesn’t leave the limits of HUMINT to the imagination of the reader; they provide limits as a
function of the examples used. Using stories of penetrations into hostile organizations or nations
such as the Taliban or the Chinese Government to define HUMINT is similar but slightly
different than the practice by some scholars and many official publications which outline
HUMINT as a sum of its parts.
One of the most highly publicized US HUMINT publications was developed in the
shadow of interrogation and alleged detainee abuse scandals at Abu Gharib and Guantanamo
Bay and its use was directed by President Obama via executive order on his first day in office. 15
Army Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3 replaced FM 34-52 and outlines the upper and lower limits of
14
Jeffrey Richelson, The US Intelligence Community (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008): 291-310.
Adam Lankford, “Assessing the Obama Standard for Interrogations: An
Analysis of Army Field Manual 2-22.3,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33 (2010): 20-35.
15
8
HUMINT operations, the HUMINT process, and explains authorized Techniques, Tactics, and
Procedures (TTP) for HUMINT collectors. The manual defines HUMINT as
“The collection of information by a trained HUMINT collector […] from people and their
associated documents and media sources to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength,
dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities.” 16 Left alone, this definition stands
as one of the most comprehensive and flexible definitions of HUMINT which could be
interpreted by foreign HUMINT collecting agencies as well as domestic HUMINT or LEIC
collectors. Unfortunately, FM 2-22.3 goes on to break down HUMINT as the umbrella term for
the HUMINT disciplines of Military Source Operations (MSO), allied and host nation liaison,
elicitation from human sources, tactical and strategic debriefing, enemy prisoner of war and
detainee interrogation, and document exploitation (DOCEX). 17 Taking the Army’s definition of
HUMINT in whole is an example of defining a term as a sum of its parts, and, because of its
over-specification, it alienates domestic HUMINT agencies. A definition useful across
jurisdictional and mission lines is found by separating the Army definition and using only the
broad and flexible initial definition. A major strength of the FM2-22.3 is the manner in which
Counterintelligence activities are clearly and appropriately presented as distinct activities from
the broader term of HUMINT – this practice is in sharp contrast to the practice of other
HUMINT agencies and scholars that group the two together. This relationship is best shown in
figure one, HUMINT vs. CI Functions, found in FM2-22.3.
In Virginia Beach, Virginia, on an unassuming street, the US Navy and Marine Corps
teach the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) CI/HUMINT course. At this 15 week
course, young sailors and marines are taught how to become CI/HUMINT assets for the
16
Department of the Army, Field Manual 2-22.3: Human Intelligence Collector Operations (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 2006):1-4.
17
Ibid, 1-4,5
9
Department of the Navy. In contrast to the Army’s definition of HUMINT as entirely
independent of CI, Navy and Marine Corps doctrine groups CI and HUMINT collectors and
operations together. 18 By grouping HUMINT and CI together, the Navy and Marine Corps assert
that HUMINT and CI cannot be done independently and one constitutes the other. This is
simply not true. Counterintelligence operations may incorporate other types of intelligence
collection, such as Communications or Signals Intelligence (COMINT or SIGINT) and
conversely, HUMINT will often not pertain to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of a
foreign intelligence service.
18
Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Warfighting Manual 2-1: Intelligence Operations, 2003 (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office): 3-9.
10
Figure 1: HUMINT vs. CI Functions 19
An analysis of HUMINT definitions concludes that despite some deviations, the least
common denominator is similar to what is described by JP 1-02 – essentially, HUMINT is
simply information, collected against a requirement, that originates from human sources. What
most of these definitions omit is recognition of the training and qualifications necessary to be an
effective and ethical HUMINT collector. After defining HUMINT, an understanding of the
discipline’s capabilities is a critical factor in establishing its place among other assets in the
modern intelligence age.
Capabilities
In order to analyze the definitions of HUMINT, the USIC was filtered in order to reveal
the functional and service members that were subject matter experts; to evaluate the capabilities,
one quickly finds that the ends of the spectrum are often determined by other fields, especially
psychology and politics. This fact is underscored by numerous case studies and literature in
academia and government which tell of HUMINT successes or near-misses and reveal that the
targets and manner of exploitation are only limited by political restrictions, psychological pitfalls
or failures of established TTP. Unfortunately for academia, even cursory research into the
capabilities of HUMINT collection reveals that most agencies maintain HUMINT TTP and
discussions of capabilities at the SECRET level or higher. Despite this limiting factor, three
works provide a comprehensive and unclassified look at the methods used to conduct HUMINT
operations. Of these, Army FM 2-22.3 defines HUMINT, outlines strengths and weaknesses and
19
Department of the Army, Field Manual 2-22.3: Human Intelligence Collector Operations (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 2006): 1-6.
11
spells out HUMINT TTP used by Army personnel, while a work that can shed light on the
psychological component of HUMINT is Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors, and Preston’s
Introduction to Political Psychology.
Intelligence collection through the use of satellites, airborne, or offshore platforms does
not require the political discretion required of operating human assets in foreign or hostile
territories. Extensive training teaches HUMINT collectors to be capable of managing numerous
human sources while possibly gaining personal access to information, documents, or places
which may satisfy intelligence requirements. In order to target, recruit, and effectively obtain
information from a human source, one requires an understanding of political psychology.
Cottam et al define political psychology as “Explaining what people do, by adapting
psychological concepts, so that they are useful and relevant to politics, then applying them to the
analysis of a political problem or issue” which in turn allows those proficient in the field to
anticipate, understand, and influence political behavior. 20 Throughout the book, Cottam et al
seek to explain why people do what they do. This is an important lesson in HUMINT operations
because it is critical to understand the motivation of the human source that is providing
information. The book explains those motivations through the lens of national and international
leaders explaining how they process the world around them and why decisions are made
consistent with identities and perceptions. Applying those principles to non-leaders can serve to
explain who provides information to HUMINT collectors. For domestic intelligence collection,
human sources would likely demonstrate nationalistic tendencies, and the book dedicates a full
chapter to explaining nationalism and provides HUMINT collectors with a perspective that can
be used to understand these individuals: “First, nationalists tend to be more sensitive than nonnationalists to threats to the nation-state, and the image through which they view the threatener is
20
Martha L. Cottam et al, Introduction to Political Psychology (New York: Psychology Press, 2010): 5-7.
12
extreme.”21 Understanding the cognitive justification of nationalists to report information on
perceived deviants and inferior out-groups is critical for follow-on exploitation of the source and
influences determinations of credibility and reliability. When conducting foreign HUMINT, a
study of conflict and political dissidence is more appropriate, and reporting sources can be
explained by the concept of dissonance, a form of explaining why a person would provide
information contrary to the group: “Dissonance refers to an aversive state that results when our
behavior is inconsistent with our attitudes. Dissonance creates psychological tension, which
people feel motivated to avoid through selective attention to information. Once dissonance is
experienced, people are motivated to relieve it.”22 These psychological explanations are
important to HUMINT collectors as a basis of determining what kind of personality is most
sensitive to manipulation and what TTP should be employed for maximum extraction of
information. The types of TTP used by HUMINT collectors once a source of information has
been identified are best detailed in Army FM 2-22.3.
Partially as a result of the detainee scandals at Abu Gharib and Guantanamo Bay and
partially due to the US Governments transition to a time of transparency in government
operations, the US Army published FM 2-22.3 as an unclassified, publicly available guide to
Army HUMINT operations. The manual explains, in detail, the various allowed TTP to be used
when interacting with foreign non-combatants, enemy prisoners of war (EPW), and enemy
combatants. Because of the Posse Comitatus act, the Army is forbidden from conducting law
enforcement operations within the United States and as such, guidance does not exist in FM 222.3 regarding TTP to be used on American citizens. This shortcoming is overshadowed by the
depth and detail of the information contained in the manual. The Army divides HUMINT
21
22
Martha L. Cottam et al, Introduction to Political Psychology (New York: Psychology Press, 2010): 234.
Ibid, 41.
13
operations in to one of four categories: Human source contact operations, debriefing,
interrogation, or liaison. Human source operations are the types of information most commonly
associated with the term HUMINT and include one-time, continuous, and formal contacts. Of
the three, only formal contacts can be tasked, trained and paid informants to US forces. 23 In
order to obtain information from one-time and continuous contacts HUMINT personnel will
sensitize, but not outright task contacts to answer intelligence requirements and use “systematic
questioning, deception detection techniques, and crosschecking of information” in order to
determine the veracity of the source’s information. 24
Debriefing operations are defined by FM 2-22.3 as “The systematic questioning of
individuals not in the custody of the US, to procure information to answer collection tasks by
direct and indirect questioning techniques. The primary categories of sources for debriefings are
friendly forces and civilians including refugees, DPs, and local inhabitants.” 25 Unlike
interrogation, the exact techniques and protocol used in debriefing is classified at the
SECRET//NOFORN level; however debriefing operations are typically conducted as a result of
or as a component of regular Army operations such as patrols, forced entry operations, or
checkpoints.
The term interrogation stirs strong emotions in the United States and brings to mind
practices such as water-boarding and maltreatment. In reality, interrogation is defined by two
standards; one, for use in military operations and against an EPW or enemy combatant is “The
systematic process of using approved interrogation approaches to question a captured or detained
person to obtain reliable information to satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with
23
Department of the Army, Field Manual 2-22.3: Human Intelligence Collector Operations (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 2006):5-2 - 5-7.
24
Ibid, 5-3.
25
Ibid, 5-7.
14
applicable law and policy.” 26 When interrogation is used against US persons, or persons
detained by US law enforcement personnel suspected of breaking US law, it is defined as
“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 27 Aside from the source of
information the primary difference in tactics is the objective – for military interrogations, the
purpose is to fulfill an intelligence requirement, for law enforcement, it is to solve a crime. In
both cases, physical abuse of the subject is strictly prohibited by the Geneva Accords and the US
Constitution. As opposed to physical coercion, interrogators rely on psychological techniques to
answer questions to sensitive requirements. The Army provides 18 approaches, or techniques, to
conduct interrogations and span from less complicated forms such as direct questioning to more
complicated types such as Rapid Fire. 28 One fallacy of the Army manual is the assertion that
these interrogation approaches must be done within the controlled environment of the
interrogator’s choosing. The lack of discussion of conducting such approaches in less or
uncontrolled environments leaves questions for those who look for alternative applications to the
approaches defined in FM 2-22.3. A component of interrogation, debriefing, and contact
operations is the TTP associated with asking questions.
One of the most elusive objectives of a HUMINT collector and one of the strongest
arguments for the HUMINT discipline is the ability to determine what information is credible.
Army FM 2-22.3 addresses the issue of determining credibility and truth by detailing various
questioning techniques used by military and law enforcement agencies and taught by civilian
interrogation and interview courses such as the one run by the Reid Institute. Interviewers and
26
Department of the Army, Field Manual 2-22.3: Human Intelligence Collector Operations (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 2006): 5-13.
27
Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
28
Department of the Army, Field Manual 2-22.3: Human Intelligence Collector Operations (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 2006):8-1 - 8-16
15
interrogators will use any combination of initial/topical, follow-up, nonpertinent, repeat, control,
or prepared questions in the conduct of a typical questioning session. 29 Using these specific
forms of questions, interviewers can pair verbal responses with non-verbal and para-linguistic
cues to determine the truthfulness of the subject’s answers. These questioning techniques are
extracted from a chapter that goes on to discuss the equally pertinent practices of identifying
deceptive behavior and the practice of elicitation – techniques which are used by military and
law enforcement questioners. In all, FM2-22.3 is one of the most comprehensive and recent
sources of HUMINT TTP and though mission-focused for the Army, could serve as a guide to
other HUMINT collectors for HUMINT collection operations. The extensive capabilities of
exploiting human weaknesses and manipulating situations for a collector’s gain can only be fully
understood when considered against the limitations of the discipline.
Limitations
As the capabilities of human source operations are linked closely to psychological
fundamentals, so too are the limitations. When one human obtains information from another
human, many factors are taken in to account in order to determine the value of the reporting
source. The psychological principle of perception affects the manner in which a human source
understands and processes first hand information, and the reason the source of information is
providing the information can be one of many factors used to determine the reliability and
credibility of the source. Indeed, determining source credibility and reliability is one of the three
most limiting factors of HUMINT operations; the other being obtaining sources with sufficient
29
Department of the Army, Field Manual 2-22.3: Human Intelligence Collector Operations (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 2006): 9-2.
16
placement and access to provide information fulfilling intelligence requirements and the time and
resource requirements needed to target, recruit, and operate human sources.
Nearly all psychology texts include some discussion on the definition, role, and impact of
perception on human cognition. If HUMINT in its most pure form is simply information
obtained from a human source, and human sources are influenced by the perception of the
source’s surroundings, it follows that HUMINT in its most pure form is influenced by the
perception of source’s surroundings. Perception is defined most simply as “The study of how the
mind interprets information provided by the senses.” 30 Whether a HUMINT collector is
obtaining information from another human source or collects it themselves, accurate intelligence
dissemination relies on an ability to accurately perceive one’s surroundings. Four factors
relating to perception can influence a human source’s ability to understand their surroundings:
primacy effect, recency effect, halo effect, and projection bias. Primacy effect is the
scientifically backed concept of first impressions that restricts a person’s ability to look beyond
the first even in a sequence as a basis for their overall interpretation of a situation. Recency
effect is just the opposite, by focusing on the last events in a sequence, the earlier events are
overlooked. The halo effect is “a perceptual error whereby our general impression of a person
[or situation], usually based on one prominent characteristic, colors the perception of other
characteristics.” 31 Finally projection bias, studied extensively by intelligence analysts, is the
concept of applying one’s own norms, beliefs, and behaviors to another. Taking these perceptual
shortcomings in to account, it is easier to understand some HUMINT failures of the past,
including that of the legendary “Curveball,” a source used extensively to prove the existence of
the Iraqi WMD program prior to the US invasion in 2003, where HUMINT collectors failed to
30
31
Ian Stuart-Hamilton, Key Ideas in Psychology (Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1999): 175.
Steven McShane and Mary Ann Von Glinow, Organizational Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008): 82-83
17
recognize that the source’s information was probably more of a result of the primacy and halo
effects than an accurate depiction of the status quo. 32 The misstep also suggests that US
intelligence personnel mis-judged the credibility of the source leads.
Educing Information is a compilation of articles written on the practice of HUMINT for
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and focuses on interrogation and the extraction
of information from human sources. In it, experts in the field of intelligence, psychology, and
political science make a case for a change in at least one paradigm of HUMINT collection. One
article in particular underscores the difficulty of determining the veracity of sources: “Methods
of detecting when an individual is attempting to deceive a listener constitute a primary basis for
assessing the potential utility and validity of information obtained from human sources.” 33
Without an accurate assessment of credibility, human source information may be discounted or,
in the case of some sources used by Secretary of State Powell during his speech on Iraqi WMD
before the United Nations, may be overstated or exaggerated. Hazlett agrees with other military
training and interrogation expert’s findings that deception is most likely to manifest itself in the
form of nonverbal cues, verbal cues, and paralinguistics. Hazlett found that “most nonverbal
cues to deception do not appear to be useful,” “results of studies on verbal behavioral cues
appear rather positive,” and “most paralinguistic cues do not appear to be effective.” 34 Hazlett
goes on to explain how his research design struggled to quantify the results of a human study and
determined that further research design was necessary to make a convincing argument for or
against the three factors of identifying deceptive behavior. What is absent from Hazlett’s
research is the concept of baselining. During the course of an interview or interrogation, military
32
Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010): 140.
Gary Hazlett, “Research on Detection of Deception What We Know vs. What We Think We Know,” in Educing
Information, ed. Intelligence Science Board (Washington DC: National Defense Intelligence College Press, 2006):
46.
34
Ibid, 48-49.
33
18
technical manuals and training documents teach that subjects must be determined to have a
baseline of typically truthful behavior. Hazlett does not suggest that interviews or interrogations
in his human study began with the questioner asking questions that the subject had no reason to
lie about and calibrate the subject’s behavior. Establishing a baseline can also be accomplished
by becoming more familiar with continuous or formal contacts; however, screening a pool of
informants for the one with placement, access, and helpful motives is another limitation to
conducting successful HUMINT operations.
Screening techniques and source profiling are important for HUMINT practitioners in
order to focus limited time and resources on the proper source and ensure that the most credible
and pertinent information is being obtained. Determining the credibility of a contact is closely
tied to psychology, and an understanding of why sources report information is as important for
determining the proper interrogation approach as it is a basis for information credibility. An
article written by CWO3 Gregory Garcia explains that source profiling and screening is
important because of the large number of available human sources in a particular area of
operations and the very limited supply of trained and certified HUMINT personnel. Garcia
proposes a five step process: Identify potential sources and develop categories; develop source
indicators for each source group; select primary and alternate approach techniques; develop
approach indicators; and orchestrate approach strategies. 35 The basis of the process which results
in better HUMINT is the identification and analysis of potential sources. Garcia does not delve
into the fine details of how such profiling should be done, other than to reiterate doctrine from
FM2-22.3 that suggests exploiting non-confrontational, non-combative sources as a first option.
Despite the lack of detail, Garcia concludes that Collectors’ abilities to understand the sources,
their behaviors, attitudes, and the environment will determine the effectiveness of their collection
35
Gregory Garcia, “Tactical Source Profiling and Indicator Analysis,” Military Intelligence (March, 2003): 37-41.
19
operations. Source profiling is one method that supports tactical mission planning and the
successful implementation of HUMINT and CI methodologies.” 36 Despite what existing
literature presents as limitations of HUMINT, the discipline remains well-poised to play a critical
role in answering intelligence requirements as a stand-alone operation or in support of other
intelligence collection disciplines.
Role of HUMINT
An exhaustive search of a comprehensive work that analyzed the role of HUMINT and its
interdependency on the other major intelligence collection disciplines did not yield any tangible
results. An alternative found during research was analysis of the other intelligence disciplines
using a comprehensive introductory-style book, and evaluating a possible unstated HUMINT
connection. Jeffrey Richelson’s The US Intelligence Community was assigned reading for
American Military University’s INTL501: Introduction to Intelligence, and provides an ideal
balance between presenting a broad range of topics and offering enough detail and examples in
to each topic to provide background information and an understanding of the roles of the
intelligence disciplines in the broader context of the USIC. This review will specifically focus
on the role of HUMINT as a stand-alone function, and its role in Signals Intelligence (SIGINT),
Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) and Open
Source Intelligence (OSINT).
Stand-alone HUMINT operations are what most HUMINT articles, case studies, and
technical manuals mean when they talk about HUMINT. On its own, HUMINT can be
invaluable for any intelligence enterprise. As a cornerstone of the oldest intelligence discipline,
36
Gregory Garcia, “Tactical Source Profiling and Indicator Analysis,” Military Intelligence (March, 2003): 41.
20
human agents are invaluable because of their knowledge of a broad range of intelligence
requirements, an ability to interact with others, and a target limit bound only by a collection
manager’s imagination. An extensive HUMINT operation was undertaken to locate and capture
Saddam Hussein in the second Gulf War. Because Saddam relied on a low-technology and tightknit network to keep him hidden, there were few emissions to point to a location, no imagery that
would have found the spider hole he was hiding in, and MASINT or OSINT that had any real
applicability. Integrated teams of Central Intelligence Agency agents and military Special
Forces operatives joined together and conducted numerous interviews and interrogations of
known associates of the fallen-from-glory leader which lead one step closer to the objective. 37
The intelligence that finally led to finding Hussein came from the interrogation of an identified
sympathizer immediately prior to the raid on the Tikrit farmhouse where Hussein was ultimately
found.38 The intelligence operation to find Hussein is a prime example of a HUMINT-centric
operation, but other intelligence operations, such as SIGINT can be impacted by HUMINT.
The intercept and exploitation of electronic signals is the most literal definition of
SIGINT. Richelson describes SIGINT as an accumulation of SIGINT operations throughout
history and brief dialogues on its potential usage. Of particular interest to HUMINT collectors is
the idea that land lines or signals sent over a physical transmission medium can generally only be
intercepted and exploited if a device is placed on or in close proximity to the transmission line. 39
Obtaining the information that a physical line exists, the location of the line, and the types of
information transmitted over the line are all questions HUMINT collectors could answer as a
cornerstone to the SIGINT operation. It is worth noting that HUMINT is also important for
37
Yochi Dreazen et al, “Holed Up: U.S. Troops Capture Saddam Hussein; Dramatic Seizure Changes Reality From
Baghdad To the White House; Intelligence Effort Pays Off,” Wall Street Journal, December 15, 2003.
38
Ibid.
39
Jeffrey Richelson, The US Intelligence Community (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008): 212.
21
counter-SIGINT operations – a vastly expensive lesson learned by the US after FBI Special
Agent Hanssen’s betrayal, whereby “In one case, he compromised an entire technical program of
enormous value, expense and importance to the United States Government. In several other
cases, he compromised the United States Intelligence Community's specific communications
intelligence capabilities.” 40
Like all of the intelligence disciplines, IMINT is self-described as the capturing of
imagery from targets of intelligence value. In the first half of the twentieth century, this was
only possible through the modification or dual-outfitting of military warplanes with photographic
equipment. During the space age and arms race in the second half of the century, IMINT
platforms evolved to a heavy reliance on spacecraft capable of high-resolution close-up images
or broad, coarsely detailed images for targeting. In one example of the use of IMINT, Richelson
describes the detection of a secret Russian facility: “US imagery satellites monitored Russian
construction of a huge underground military complex inside Yamanatau Mountain in the Ural
mountains as well as a second underground facility at the same location.” 41 Once the work was
done however, how would overhead imagery platforms ascertain the contents or function of the
facility? To answer that question, intelligence planners would have to rely on HUMINT. While
an application of HUMINT to IMINT operations is not a stretch of the imagination, MASINT
and OSINT collection reduce the incorporation of HUMINT by their nature.
Measurement and Signature Intelligence is described by Richelson simply as any
“Remote technical collection other than SIGINT and traditional imagery intelligence.” 42 There
is no typical target of MASINT; Richelson lists dozens of potential uses of MASINT ranging
40
U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, United States v. Robert Philip Hanssen, Affidavit in
Support of Criminal Complaint, Arrest Warrant and Search Warrants, Stefan A. Pluta (February 16, 2001).
41
Jeffrey Richelson, The US Intelligence Community (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008): 183.
42
Ibid, 245.
22
from detections of nuclear detonation to identifying strategic bombers based on electro-optical
emissions, radar information, and acoustics. 43 Of particular interest is one of Richelson’s
conclusions, that only a small amount of MASINT is useful because of the difficulty of
positively matching the information with an emitter. Though Richelson stops short of suggesting
HUMINT or other inter-disciplinary correlation, if an unknown platform could be positively
identified by a human source (such as an air traffic controller or flight crew), MASINT
signatures could be verified. Finally, OSINT has gained traction as a low-risk, low-cost method
of obtaining economic, military, and political information on an adversary. While most OSINT
is collected from publically available publications and internet sources, Richelson hints at a
HUMINT component: “A significant portion of the intelligence gathered by the CIA and other
intelligence organizations is acquired by means of electronic surveillance and emplaced sensors
[…] and it requires trained personnel to install the surveillance devices.” It is very likely that the
person trained to install such a device is a HUMINT formal source or HUMINT operative.
43
Richelson, The US Intelligence Community (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008): 246.
23
III: Methodology
Data Collection Technique
This research study sought to use a mixed method approach including qualitative analysis
of scholarly or academic works, case studies, government publications, military doctrine, and
non-fiction works and quantitative analysis of the ability to recognize truthful or deceptive
behavior demonstrated by subjects of Coast Guard Law Enforcement Intelligence Collection,
consistent with the author’s professional duties. Creswell’s technique of Sequential Exploratory
Design was used to collect qualitative data from the aforementioned existing works and analysis
was done in order to determine what tools, techniques, and procedures would be most likely to
result in an ability to increase the accuracy of determinations of credibility of human derived
intelligence.44 In total, over 70 articles, books, military manuals, white papers, government
publications and case studies were reviewed. As a result of this qualitative research, works were
determined to address one of the following categories that correspond to the more broad research
question of determining the role of HUMINT in the modern age: Definitions, TTP, capabilities
and/or limitations, legal and cultural hot-button issues, the role of HUMINT related to other
intelligence collection disciplines, and analysis of historical HUMINT operations. Analysis of
works regarding TTP and capabilities was used during quantitative data collection from
American military, cleared defense contractor, and foreign maritime personnel. An initial
sample size of ten human sources was used to determine the feasibility of such a study, resulting
in the subsequent abandoning of the mixed method approach as a result of a lack of control of the
44
John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches (Los Angeles:
Sage Publications, 2009): 203-209.
24
study environment, study results from existing works, and an inability to correlate assessments of
behavior with the truthfulness of the subject. While the quantitative portion of the study would
have served to support or challenge the qualitative analysis, it was determined that it was not
absolutely necessary in order to answer the research question as the results would only have
addressed the capabilities and limitations factor and observations of human sources.
Observations of interviewees will be presented; however, they will be applied through the lens of
the author’s role as the interviewer, an approach Creswell describes as “Participant as observer
[with the] observation role secondary to the participant role.” 45 A qualitative approach is
appropriate for this type of research study which seeks to understand and analyze the nature of
HUMINT collection practices and policy. The results of this study capitalize on analysis of
existing works in order to explain to the reader the role of HUMINT in the context of the USIC
and offer recommendations as to how HUMINT may be better utilized in the future.
Case Studies
Consistent with Creswell’s guidance on conducting qualitative research, a variety of
methods were evaluated and weighed against the existing pool of research, resulting in the
decision to use the case study approach. The case study technique was determined to be the most
applicable because the objective of defining HUMINT’s role was quickly determined to require
an in depth exploration of “[…] A program, even, activity, process, or one or more
individuals.” 46 Historical case studies on HUMINT failures of the United States such as the
failures resulting in poor intelligence for the Bay of Pigs invasion and pre-war intelligence of
45
John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches (Los Angeles:
Sage Publications, 2009): 179.
46
Ibid, 13.
25
Iraq’s WMD program were analyzed against HUMINT successes of other nations, such as the
success of the Soviet Union to operate Robert Hanssen over a span of two decades. This study
did not focus on the legal ramifications of conducting HUMINT operations, except for a review
of the Miranda v. State of Arizona case which continues to serve as the primary legal basis for
conducting criminal interrogations and obtaining HUMINT from individuals suspected of a
crime. In lieu of legal cases to study, a more holistic approach was used to study the cases made
by individuals whose contributions to the field of HUMINT constituted the research base for this
study. Historical case studies, while enlightening, focused more on a historical perspective and
the causes and effects of poor intelligence on the situation of interest. Analysis of these specific
cases did not provide any appreciable information not gleaned through research and analysis of
non-specific assessments of HUMINT-related topics.
Human Study
As mentioned earlier, a feasibility study was conducted in order to determine the
potential of conducting a human study to determine the success and failure rates of individual
HUMINT TTP. Two existing works specifically addressed such a study, and both suggested that
a large and diverse sample size with a well-developed research design was unsuccessful in
developing useful information for furthering the qualitatively obtained research. John Reid, a
renowned expert on the conduct of criminal interviews and interrogations points out that when
subjects are instructed to lie on purpose, their behavior is not representative of those who lie
without premeditation. 47 A study by psychologist Gary Hazlett expounds on such a challenge
47
Fred Inbau et al, Essentials Of The Reid Technique: Criminal Interrogation And Confessions (Sudbury, MA:
Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2005): 78-80.
26
and concludes that no pertinent study of identifying deceptive behavior has done so with the
proper research framework and did not suggest any comprehensive solution for conducting an
unbiased and successful human study. 48 Specifically, Hazlett explained that many studies used
college students as the sole sample group (inadvertently sampling from a pool of the generally
more intelligent) and that sample sizes were too small to verify the effectiveness of more than a
few specific TTP (sample sizes were cited as averaging 40 or less per study). 49 The feasibility
study was completed in the role of “participant as observer” as defined by Creswell and sampled
two trained HUMINT collectors, two non-HUMINT military personnel, two foreign nationals,
two cleared defense contractors, and two civilians. All interviews were done consistent with the
author’s official duties, and no additional level of scrutiny was required in order to obtain
information pertinent to this study.
Limitations to the Study
Nearly immediately it became obvious that considerable amounts of information
regarding HUMINT exists at classified or controlled unclassified levels. Numerous examples of
this limiting factor were found throughout the research process; one of the first of which was an
attempt (and failure) to find details on what the CIA considers to be the role of HUMINT within
the parameters of this study – an especially disappointing failure because the CIA is the primary
USIC agency for conducting HUMINT operations. Professionally obtained training material and
lessons were also off limits for this study because of the Coast Guard’s handling of their
48
Gary Hazlett, “Research on Detection of Deception What We Know vs. What We Think We Know,” in Educing
Information, ed. Intelligence Science Board (Washington DC: National Defense Intelligence College Press, 2006):
49-54.
49
Ibid, 51.
27
Intelligence Program at the UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) level. The
discussion of HUMINT at the purely unclassified level also prevented access to military
HUMINT instructors and officers, who did not feel comfortable filtering their knowledge for an
unclassified forum. Finally, the time frame and proposed scope of the study were limiting
factors which were compromised in order to gather and analyze useful information. Though
over 70 works were analyzed in the course of the study, seemingly hundreds of others were
ignored because of time constraints. In contrast to the time constraints, the proposed scope of
this study was determined to be too focused on TTP, and acknowledging the classified nature of
many TTP documents, was broadened to provide a more holistic understanding of the factors
that shape the use and role of HUMINT in modern intelligence enterprises. Despite the
limitations, this study succeeded in applying a wide variety of source material to a broad research
question, and focused material in on factors determined to be a basis for an understanding of
HUMINT.
28
IV: Results
As mentioned, during the course of this study, over 70 works were reviewed in order to
answer the research question. The case study research method narrowed the broad research
question into the categories of definition, capabilities, limitations, and role of HUMINT. These
categories were subsequently used to guide the review of literature and structure the existing
expertise on the topic of HUMINT in to usable material for this study. A significant amount of
academic works and media reports were found during the course of research that addressed the
legal and moral concerns of certain HUMINT collection techniques – particularly interrogation
or torture techniques. While acknowledging their influence on the political support of HUMINT,
works addressing legal and social concerns were found to be highly time-applicable, that is, hotbutton issues at one time were generally mitigated by modifications in official US Government
policy. What follows are answers to the research questions and perspectives from a wide range
of experts in their fields.
There is no common definition used to define HUMINT. Extensive research of each
USIC agency that conducts HUMINT in one form or another failed to yield one definition;
further, many agencies were not found to have a definition of HUMINT readily apparent. The
greatest difference in definitions appeared to be between agencies that conducted domestic and
foreign intelligence operations. Foreign operating intelligence agencies placed more emphasis
on tightly defining HUMINT as an accumulation of specific TTP and emphasized source
operations. Domestic agencies such as the FBI and Coast Guard tended to shy away from such a
reliance on the use of the term source and generally avoided mentioning clandestine or covert
29
collection means. This difference is thought to be attributed to the legal operating parameters of
domestic Law Enforcement Intelligence Elements.
The capabilities of HUMINT are defined more by an agency’s authority to conduct
operations and established TTP than by any other factor. This finding was supported by the
difference between guidance such as FM2-22.3 and Coast Guard Publication 2. The Army Field
Manual clearly defines the authority to collect HUMINT operations and details of the various
Army HUMINT TTP leave little to the imagination. Assuming that HUMINT officers are trained
properly and are familiar with Army regulations such as FM2-22.3, the Army appears to be very
capable of conducting effective HUMINT operations. In contrast, the Coast Guard unclassified
document mentions HUMINT only in enough detail to assert that Coast Guard Law Enforcement
Intelligence personnel do not conduct source operations and that LEIC activities should not be
considered HUMINT. Even controlled unclassified documentation providing more detailed
guidance on the Coast Guard Intelligence program does not detail TTP like the Army, rendering
agencies hesitant to conduct true HUMINT collection activities like the Coast Guard largely
incapable of successful operations.
Research of specific measures used by professional criminal interrogators and
psychologists was analyzed and applied to determine the feasibility of a human study. The
human study described in the Methodology section earlier encountered problems consistent with
the challenges described by two existing works and resulted in the conclusion that no particular
indicator of deception can be relied upon to determine the credibility of a particular source’s
information. Instead of relying on blanket claims of which verbal, non-verbal, and paralinguistic
cues indicate deception, the baseline technique of determining what behavior was typical of
subject while answering non-pertinent and non-threatening questions was determined to be the
30
most accurate standard of truthfulness. The most significant finding of the feasibility study was
that in the course of any human study of deceptive behavior, a subject must not be instructed to
intentionally lie. In lieu of these instructions, a determination of what is true and what is not is
based entirely on the observations of the interviewer and the subject’s willingness to be honest
about their claims. These conclusions shaped the study’s finding that if deceptive behavior is so
difficult to objectively identify, more reliance must be place on understanding all factors that
shape HUMINT, not just the ability to apply TTP. Beyond discussions of TTP, a vast majority
of authors of HUMINT literature were determined to be supportive of the discipline, and as
expected, suggested that the capabilities of HUMINT are largely tempered only by resource
availability, political support, and the imagination of collection managers.
As evidenced by the review of literature, no substantive literature appeared to focus and
explain the role of HUMINT with respect to other disciplines. Literature linking HUINT to other
intelligence collection operations likely exists at the classified level and may support the notional
concepts of inter-operability discussed in the following sections.
31
V: Discussion
Research Questions
The broad research question for this study asked what the role and outlook of HUMINT
was as part of a modern intelligence enterprise. Extensive research and professional experience
suggests that the answer to the broad question is reflected by determining and addressing factors
that have appeared to limit its usage in the last several decades: agreeing on a definition,
understanding and managing the expectations of capabilities, respecting and accepting
limitations, addressing the legal and moral concerns of the general populace and policymakers,
and appropriating resources and an organization for future HUMINT operations. Understanding
all of these factors provides a truly holistic view of HUMINT and puts its usefulness in
perspective.
Definitions
Research of numerous government publications and military manuals draws attention to
the most fundamental problem of understanding HUMINT – there is no single or agreed-upon
definition of the term. If the general public or policymakers are to understand HUMINT
operations and policy, they must first understand what HUMINT is, and what it is not. Some
consider CI and HUMINT to be inseparable and some services, such as the Marine Corps and
Navy have the two organizationally joined, but the union of the two disciplines, while convenient
for consolidating basic indoctrination to the fundamentals of HUMINT, does an injustice to both.
The Army did justice to their HUMINT program in FM2-22.3 when the clearly delineated the
32
difference between CI and HUMINT. After the field of CI is removed from the equation, a
common definition must be established. A balance needs to be struck between the overly broad
definitions like the one provided by the CIA and very detailed definitions such as the one in
FM2-22.3. A fitting and agreeable definition should be modeled after definitions of other
disciplines; SIGINT is defined by Richelson simply as the collection or interception and
subsequent processing of electronically emitted signals.50 Likewise, HUMINT should be an
agreed-upon term used by all members of the USIC and should be considered to be the
collection, processing, and exploitation of information originating from or collected by human
contact to fulfill an intelligence requirement. Of particular note, this definition does not mention
sources, CI, interrogation, or specific components of HUMINT such as interrogation, debriefing,
elicitation, or liaison. A sufficiently broad definition permits a wide range of use by USIC
components with the flexibility to define TTP as applicable to the agency’s or organization’s
mission and resources.
Capabilities
One of the most fundamental bureaucratic lessons that can be learned is that of properly
managing expectations. If the general public and policymakers expect James Bond or Jason
Bourne to jump out of a spy plane over Beijing, parachute on to the military headquarters
building, and infiltrate it to obtain classified material that magically answers a broad range of
requirements, HUMINT as a program will fail to meet expectations and will suffer.
Understanding the capabilities of HUMINT is a problem that leaders have struggled with for
centuries. The fields of psychology and sociology lend credence to the use of HUMINT to
50
Jeffrey Richelson, The US Intelligence Community (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008): 31.
33
successfully manipulate people in to providing information they may not have without mental
coercion. When seeking to understand the capabilities of a HUMINT officer to extract
information from an individual, it is important to consider whether that person is providing
information voluntarily or involuntarily. Nearly all studies and works pertaining to the TTP of
collecting HUMINT agree that cooperative sources are preferred to uncooperative ones because
of the significant difference in the time and resources needed to obtain useful information.
Obtaining HUMINT from cooperative sources in the counterinsurgency or domestic law
enforcement environment can have the effect of improving the relationship between the
intelligence collecting agency and the populace and may result in useful information. In addition
to cooperative civilians, trained HUMINT collectors can also be used to debrief friendly forces.
Friendly force debriefing can be as effective for FBI agents after a SWAT raid as for soldiers
patrolling the streets of Kabul. In both cases, and all range of possibilities in between, friendly
forces may be unaware of the importance of information they perceived in the course of their
normal duties. By using TTP similar to what the Army considers SECRET//NOFORN,
HUMINT collectors are capable of using special questioning techniques in a non-confrontational
and non-threatening manner to extract important details. Obtaining information from
cooperative civilians or friendly forces comprises one half of the capabilities of HUMINT, with
the other being the use of uncooperative or unwitting neutral contacts to obtain information not
obtainable by other intelligence disciplines.
The capabilities of using cooperative contacts provides a relatively easy and resourceconscious approach to obtaining human derived intelligence; however, it is the sometimes costly
and resource-demanding practice of getting information from uncooperative sources that can
provide ground-breaking or tactically critical intelligence. The most used tool against
34
uncooperative sources is the interrogation. For the purposes of this discussion, the least common
denominator of the US legal and DoD definitions will be used: the use of an interrogation
approach to obtain incriminating information from a person whose freedom has been curtailed.
Domestic and foreign HUMINT agencies alike are capable of using TTP like the Army’s 18
interrogation approaches in order to mentally coerce a subject to provide information they would
not normally. Whether tactical interrogations of recently captured combatants taking advantage
of the shock of capture or long-term strategic interrogations of detainees at facilities such as
Guantanamo Bay, information obtained from interrogations can often be actionable and valuable.
Practically speaking, a timely interrogation of a kidnapper could lead to a discovery of a victim
and a well-done interrogation in Afghanistan could lead to the location and nature of an enemy
IED. The capability of HUMINT collectors to perform interrogations of uncooperative and
unwitting sources contributes to the overall value of HUMINT, but HUMINT does not always
have to be as the foundation of an operation in order to be useful. The third capability of
HUMINT is the inter-operability with other intelligence disciplines to provide a better common
intelligence picture.
In a discussion of IMINT, Richelson unintentionally highlights the third capability of
HUMINT: to collect information not obtainable from other means. Citing over two dozen
examples of IMINT targets over the past two decades, Richelson points out the ability of IMINT
to discover new facilities, detect activity and movement, and an ability to provide limited
Indicator and Warning (I&W) intelligence, but does not discuss a manner in which resulting
follow-on requirements are answered. Once a secret mountain facility is constructed, there is no
IMINT that will determine the nature and impact of the activities taking place inside. If land
lines are used, SIGINT may be equally incapable of providing the answer to the intelligence gap,
35
and because the facility is built in to a mountain, MASINT may not necessarily have any
information to process. Intelligence challenges such as this are sure to increase in the future, as
sophisticated adversaries learn from compromises of the past and take added precautions to
thwart remote intelligence collection platforms of another nation – a notion supported by existing
HUMINT literature. 51 The same challenges exist for the exact opposite type of enemy; the
Global War on Terrorism and Operation Iraqi Freedom underscored the threat of a non-technical
enemy that relies on human networks to build support among the populace and plan and execute
attacks. It is against the unconventional and guerilla type forces confronted in counterinsurgency
operations that HUMINT is particularly effective. Domestically, unsophisticated criminal
enterprises, rooted in family ties, may not be detectable by technological collection platforms
such as UAVs or wiretaps. Criminal operations such as moon shining or meth labs may be
disguised to avoid non-intrusive imagery collection and may not have a need to communicate
their illicit activity via technically interceptable means such as cell phones or radios. Like
collecting information on an insurgency, HUMINT will continue to be unrivaled in its sole
ability to collect information on less-sophisticated but equally harmful illegal criminal
enterprises. The capabilities of HUMINT are bound only by the imagination of the intelligence
collections manager; however, the prospect of high quality and large quantity HUMINT is
tempered by the inherent limitations of working with humans and a lack of political capital.
51
Robert Steele, Human Intelligence: All Humans, All Minds, All the Time (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
Army War College, 2010), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=991 (accessed
March 12, 2012): 42-43.
36
Limitations
Expert analysis in existing literature on HUMINT and psychology underscore the
challenge of obtaining credible information from reliable sources. Psychology texts explain
numerous principles and theories that are central to intelligence collection from another human.
One of the most important psychological concerns for HUMINT collectors and analysts is
understanding the bias of the reporting source. If a HUMINT agent is reporting information they
obtained first hand, they will likely be biased to believe that the information they collected was
more useful and more credible than it may actually be. Understanding the bias of human
contacts is even more important; the ideological basis and personal motivation of a contact can
significantly influence a determination of credibility. The best way to determine credibility and
reliability is to maximize, to the greatest extent possible, the creation and maintenance of
continuous contacts. In absence of continuous contacts, HUMINT collectors expose one of the
greatest limits of the discipline: determining credibility. Inaccurate HUMINT has plagued the
USIC for decades and has contributed to prolific controversy (namely following the Bay of Pigs
and after the invasion of Iraq in 2003) regarding the use of HUMINT as single-source reporting.
Submitting one-time contacts to a polygraph is obviously unrealistic, so in order to improve
assessments of credibility, HUMINT collectors must be trained to understand more than the TTP
taught by technical manuals. Certified HUMINT collectors must be taught psychology and
become sensitive to the impact of perception, bias, and memory on reported information. Two
other limits for HUMINT programs are a lack of resources and political support, and are
inherently linked. After reading accounts of HUMINT collectors in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is
clear that the number of human contacts greatly exceeds the number that is capable of being
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handled by trained and certified HUMINT collectors. Military services and domestic law
enforcement agencies must provide at least rudimentary training on tactical questioning and
basic fundamentals of deception identification in order to increase the quantity of information
available to intelligence analysts and case agents. Without political support, the money and
resources necessary to provide that training will not exist, so it is equally important for HUMINT
agencies to aggressively educate policymakers and the general public about the realities of
HUMINT operations and ensure that information used by decision-makers is as accurate as
possible.
Future
Unconventional wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and technically savvy adversaries create an
ideal future for the value of HUMINT in stand-alone and support operations. Throughout the
winter and spring of 2012, the United States and key allied nations have taken a hard-line stance
against Iranian development of nuclear weapons. In the past, the stuxnet computer virus was
introduced to a uranium enrichment facility suspected of producing weapons-grade nuclear
material. As Iran continues to isolate and hide its uranium enrichment and research and design
facilities underground, American surveillance capabilities will continue to be reduced. While
MASINT may play a role in detecting the presence of certain materials or weapons, only a
human agent or source will be able to provide information from inside the facility in order for
policymakers to make informed decisions and weigh military against diplomatic options. The
Iranian example illustrates the use of HUMINT as a result of a paranoid and aware adversary;
however, insurgents and terrorist organizations will continue their reliance on human networks to
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share information and resources necessary to harm friendly forces. In the GWOT and in similar
conflicts in the future, HUMINT will play a critical role in obtaining information from an
unsophisticated enemy. Domestically, law enforcement agencies face more legal and social
challenges when new technologies or tools are used to collect information on the general
populace. Using infrared imaging equipment, UAVs, or sensitive listening equipment to
determine what takes place inside a particular house may be seen by many to be unconstitutional
or unethical, but talking to a neighbor about their perspective would be seen as relatively
acceptable. Human Intelligence collection, regardless of whether described by a definition
similar to the one proposed by this study, will continue to find use in stand-alone domestic and
foreign operations and will enhance and compliment the capabilities of other intelligence
disciplines.
Summary
The case of Robert Hanssen is a perfect example of the potential of HUMINT operations.
Hanssen obtained information on US assets, case files, plans, dossiers, and technical capabilities
that the Soviets may never have known existed. It was through the manipulation of Hanssen
(and the treachery of Hanssen himself) that the Soviets were able to verify the bona fides of
Aldrich Ames, execute at least three penetrations of the Soviet government, and alter military
and intelligence plans to be more immune to American surveillance. No spy satellite, antenna, or
newspaper could have provided the caliber or range of information that Hanssen did. Human
intelligence collection has been taking place for centuries, and has provided decision advantage
to political and military leaders that have shaped history. The practice of obtaining HUMINT is
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not antiquated, it is not passé, it will never be replaced by technology, and conversation should
continue in social and political circles regarding the use and role of HUMINT to ensure it
continues to meet the changing needs of a modern society.
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