7AAN2035 Indian Philosophy II: The Heterodox
Schools
Syllabus – Academic year 2014/15
Basic information
Credits: 20 Module Tutor: Dr Will Rasmussen Office: PB/A702 Consultation time: TBA Semester: Second Lecture time and venue: TBA Module description (plus aims and objectives)
This module (along with 7AAN2034 Indian Philosophy: The Orthodox Schools) is intended for students who
wish to gain an introduction to Indian philosophy that looks carefully at the high standard of logic,
epistemology, metaphysics and linguistics that grounded the various philosophical systems. The schools
most fully examined are Buddhism, Jainism and Advaita Vedānta (strictly, an Orthodox school, but attacked
for heterodoxy). However, the positions and arguments of opposing schools, such as Sāṅkhya, Mīmāṃsā,
Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Carvāka (Materialists), are regularly adduced to enhance our study. The examination
of these schools makes use of translations of the key primary texts and focuses upon the vigorous debate
over conceptual analysis and argumentative strategies by which the schools presented their philosophical
positions, defended them against attacks by other schools, and mounted in turn their own attacks. Studying
Indian philosophy in this way demonstrates both the similarities and the philosophically important
differences in the way the main issues of philosophy have been addressed in India and in the West.
Assessment methods and deadlines
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Formative assessment: 1 x 2,000–3,000-­‐word essay, due on the last day of term Summative assessment: 1 x 4,000-­‐word essay. For the deadline see http://www.kcl.ac.uk/artshums/depts/philosophy/study/handbook/assessment/pgt/coursework/deadlin
es.aspx Outline of lecture topics (plus suggested readings)
For an excellent survey of Indian Philosophy prior to (and during) the course, see Hiriyanna, M. (2000)
Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass. The course book is Radhakrishnan, S. & Moore,
C. A. (eds.) (1989) A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Week One<DATE>: << Buddhism: Foundations and the Deconstruction of the Individual Self >> Suggested reading: •
Radhakrishnan, S. & Moore, C. A. (eds.) (1989) A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, Princeton,
Princeton University Press: 273-288 •
Rahula, W. (1997) What the Buddha Taught, Oxford, Oneworld •
Siderits, M. (2007) Buddhism as Philosophy, Burlington VT, Ashgate: 1-68 •
Warder, A. K. (1970) Indian Buddhism, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Week Two<DATE>: << Buddhism: Abhidharma and the Metaphysics of Empty Persons >> Suggested reading: •
Radhakrishnan, S. & Moore, C. A. (eds.) (1989) A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, Princeton,
Princeton University Press: 289-292 •
Siderits, M. (2007) Buddhism as Philosophy, Burlington VT, Ashgate: 69-137 Week Three <DATE>: << Buddhism: Yogācāra and the Non-existence of an External World >> Suggested reading: •
Viṃśatikā and Triṃśikā in Radhakrishnan, S. & Moore, C. A. (eds.) (1989) A Source Book in Indian
Philosophy, Princeton, Princeton University Press: 328-37 •
Siderits, M. (2007) Buddhism as Philosophy, Burlington VT, Ashgate: 138-79 Week Four<DATE>: << Buddhism: Madhyamaka and the Doctrine of Emptiness >> Suggested reading: •
Mahāyānaviṃśaka and Mūlamadhyamakakārikā in Radhakrishnan, S. & Moore, C. A. (eds.) (1989) A
Source Book in Indian Philosophy, Princeton, PUP: 338-45 •
Garfield, Jay at http://www.thezensite.com/ZenEssays/Nagarjuna/Dependent_Arising.htm •
Nāgārjuna (1971) ‘The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna (Vigraha-vyāvartanī)’, Bhattacharya, K.
(tr.), Journal of Indian Philosophy 1: 217-261. See vv. 5-6 & 30-46. Also at
http://www.springerlink.com/content/b0jl4u2767u407q2/ •
Siderits, M. (2007) Buddhism as Philosophy, Burlington VT, Ashgate: 180-207 Week Five<DATE>: << Buddhism: Buddhist Logic and the School of Dignāga >> Suggested reading: •
Siderits, M. (1982) ‘More Things in Heaven and Earth', Journal of Indian Philosophy 10: 187-208 •
Siderits, M. (2007) Buddhism as Philosophy, Burlington VT, Ashgate: 208-230 •
Stcherbatsky, F. T. (1962) Buddhist Logic, New York, Dover: 59-78 & 457-477. And at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/44173254/Stcherbatsky-Th-Buddhist-Logic-Vol-1 Outline of lecture topics (plus suggested readings) – continued if necessary
Week Six<DATE>: << Jainism. The Theory of Non-one-sided-ness and the Doctrine of Standpoints >> Suggested reading: •
Matilal, B. K. (1981) The Central Philosophy of Jainism (Anekānta-vāda), Ahmedabad, L. D. Institute
of Indology: 1-46. Find at http://www.scribd.com/doc/78637945/Central-Philosophy-of-Jainism-BimalKrishna-Matilal •
Padmarajiah, Y. J. (1963) Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge, Bombay, Jain Sahitya Vikas
Mandal: see especially chapters 5 &10. Available at:
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=pWjFsW_uIPAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Padmarajiah&hl=en&sa=X
&ei=3W86T9z9K4mh8gPrsqH3Cg&ved=0CDkQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Padmarajiah&f=false •
Syādvādamañjarī & Sanmatitarka in Radhakrishnan, S. & Moore, C. A. (eds.) (1989) A Source Book
in Indian Philosophy, Princeton, PUP: 262-263 & 269-271 Week Seven<DATE>: << Jainism. The Doctrine of Conditional Affirmation >> Suggested reading: •
Matilal, B. K. (1981) The Central Philosophy of Jainism (Anekānta-vāda), Ahmedabad, L. D. Institute
of Indology: 47-61. Find at http://www.scribd.com/doc/78637945/Central-Philosophy-of-Jainism-BimalKrishna-Matilal •
Matilal, B. K. (1998) The Character of Logic in India, Albany, SUNY: ch. 6 •
Syādvādamañjarī in Radhakrishnan, S. & Moore, C. A. (eds.) (1989) A Source Book in Indian
Philosophy, Princeton, Princeton University Press: 260-268 Week Eight<DATE>: << Advaita Vedānta. The Doctrine of Superimposition and the Logic of Nescience >>
Suggested reading: •
Kaṭha Upaniṣad in Radhakrishnan, S. & Moore, C. A. (eds.) (1989) A Source Book in Indian
Philosophy, Princeton, Princeton University Press: 42-50 •
Vedāntasūtra I.i.1-iv.23 in Radhakrishnan, S. & Moore, C. A. (eds.) (1989) A Source Book in Indian
Philosophy, Princeton, Princeton University Press: 509-521 Week Nine<DATE>: << Advaita Vedānta. The Metaphysics of Non-duality and the Valid Means of Knowledge >>
Suggested reading: •
Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad in Radhakrishnan, S. & Moore, C. A. (eds.) (1989) A Source Book in Indian
Philosophy, Princeton, Princeton University Press: 77-89 •
Vedāntasūtra II.i.5-ii.32 in Radhakrishnan, S. & Moore, C. A. (eds.) (1989) A Source Book in Indian
Philosophy, Princeton, Princeton University Press: 521-535 •
Satchidanandendra Sarasvati (1989) The Method of the Vedānta: a Critical Account of the Advaita
Tradition, Alston, A. J. (tr.), London, Kegan Paul: 1-8 Week Ten <DATE>: << Advaita Vedānta. Sublation (bādha) and the Epistemology of Liberation >>
Suggested reading: •
Kena Upaniṣad in Radhakrishnan, S. & Moore, C. A. (eds.) (1989) A Source Book in Indian
Philosophy, Princeton, Princeton University Press: 41-42 •
Vedāntasūtra II.iii.16-IV.iv.22 in Radhakrishnan, S. & Moore, C. A. (eds.) (1989) A Source Book in
Indian Philosophy, Princeton, Princeton University Press: 535-543 •
Devaraja, N. K. (1962) An Introduction to Śaṅkara's Theory of Knowledge, Delhi, Motilal
Banarsidass: 113-201 Suggested essay questions
This course is designed to encourage you to pursue what really interests you in the light of your study of
primary sources in Indian philosophy, and to think for yourself. So try to focus upon the primary texts and
commentaries, and exhibit your own critical assessment of the issue, stimulated by your wider reading of
secondary sources. Also, feel free to augment your examination of the topic by drawing upon any relevant
Western philosophy that you have studied.
Here are some suggestions, but the instructor welcomes you to meet or email him to discuss your own choice
of title and essay structure.
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A critical assessment of Buddhist arguments for their doctrine of no-self.
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Is the Buddhist no-self doctrine compatible with the soteriological project of liberation (nirvāṇa)?
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Can Buddhism even have a coherent moral theory, given that it denies the existence of selves as
moral agents?
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Does Abhidharma Buddhism succeed in refuting the conventional ontology of wholes, substances,
universals, change etc.?
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Does Yogācāra Buddhism succeed in proving there is no external world?
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What do Nāgārjuna’s arguments for his doctrine of emptiness prove, if anything?
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Is Dignāga’s theory of exclusion (apoha) a correct account of the semantic power of language?
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Can Jainism refute the charge that its doctrine of non-one-sided-ness (anekānta) is self-contradictory
and/or inconclusive?
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Assess Advaita Vedānta’s use of the principle of sublation to prove that only the Self exists.
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Does Advaita Vedānta succeed in providing a satisfactory error theory explaining why is it not
commonly known that ‘All is Brahman’?
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Are Advaita Vedānta’s doctrines of the existence of God and of the possibility of individuals
achieving liberation compatible with its absolute monism?
Suggested additional readings