The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications
Author(s): Mark T. Gilderhus
Source: Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1, Presidential Doctrines (Mar., 2006), pp.
5-16
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ARTICLES
The
Monroe
Doctrine:
and
Meanings
Implications
MARK T. GILDERHUS
Texas Christian
University
since its articulation
in
presents a brief history of the Monroe Doctrine
as a statement
to European
in opposition
in the Americas,
intrusions
it
a
under President
Theodore
U.S.
intervention.
To
cultivate
Roosevelt
justification
for
American
trade and goodwill
the Great
and
the Second World
Depression
during
This
First
article
Franklin
administration
Roosevelt's
onset of the Cold War, perceived
in countries such as Guatemala,
in idealistic
couched
racy,
means
the various
rhetorical
Cold War
such
style
rhetoric
emphasizing
of the Monroe
what
they understood
as articulated
associated
many
of
or
humankind,
at
a
freedom,
democracy,
ennobling
purposes
connected
contained
beyond
what
Doctrine
also
Over
tions,
some
the
the
depending
instituted
years,
upon
of
threat
States
by
Monroe's
shifting
policies
of
take
as
regarded
a pattern
James
to
affirming
doctrine
and
pronouncements
to
by
and
strategic
took
preferences,
as
if other
bounds.
appropriate
defensive
values
economic
countermeasures
the
the
advance
served
a
cause
of
as
such
cover
less
for
and
interests
went
nations
The
Monroe
objectives.
on
various
but
meanings
nevertheless
and
implica
consistently
holds the Lyndon B. Johnson Chair in the department of history at Texas Christian
Mark T. Gilderhus
U.S.-Mexican
under Wilson
Relations
and Revolution:
include Diplomacy
versity. His publications
in the Western
Pan American
Visions: Woodrow
Wilson
1913-1921;
Carranza;
History
Hemisphere,
American
Relations
A Historiographical
and The Second Century: U.S.-Latin
Historians:
Introduction;
1889.
Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (March) 5
? 2006 Center for the Study of the Presidency
the
during
and high principle,
upholding
sometimes
defense
interests.
in 1823 established
of idealism
purported
language
the
economic
Congress
thereof,
portion
Such
and
similar
often
purpose
with
kind
United
with
later
in the language
substantial
peace.
strategic
the U.S.
before
years
couched
presidential
least
and
usually
as national
Doctrine
affirmations
Latin
imperatives
the Dominican
and Chile. Though
Republic,
typically
to solidarity
Pan-American
commitments
and democ
as a
Doctrine
served U.S. policy makers
consistently
Cuba,
and after. Typically
became
War,
Later with
the
of nonintervention.
led to a series of new interventions
the principle
accepted
international
versions
advancing
for
The Monroe
a
1823.
conceived
Uni
and
and
since
6
I PRESIDENTIALSTUDIESQUARTERLY /March 2006
as a
served
sphere.
to
order
the
but
dren
of
and
and
Latin
of
much
not
could
same.
function
Europeans,
open
varied
the
a
the
to ensure
access
to
time
to
from
them,
Underlying
as
viewed
Usually
to
according
Americans
keep
and
condescension.
direction,
out
implementation
remained
racist
of
to
concern,
Hemi
in the Western
purposes
wanted
special
objectives
a sense
discipline
makers,
policy
of
the means
sure,
these
of
and
goals
makers
Policy
in areas
be
projected
in need
U.S.
To
of U.S.
them.
stability
pursuit
constant
another
articulation
among
and
resources.
and
time,
out
stood
safeguard
markets
in the
mainstay
Three
prevailing
chil
unruly
among
assumption
without
paternalistic
oversight
supervision.
emerged in response to the exigencies of European politics
In efforts to put the world back together again, the
Wars.
The Monroe Doctrine
at the end of the Napoleonic
Great
that
Powers,
of the Treaty
to
with
Alliance
Prussians,
in 1815 formed
and
order,
peace,
the Austrians,
is,
of Paris
status
the
Three
quo.
turned
into
terms
the
an alignment
it
rehabilitated
under
British,
Alliance,
later,
years
of France, a newly
the admission
and
Russians,
the Quadruple
committed
the
Quintuple
under the restored
monarchy
Bourbon
kings.
For good reason in the aftermath
the
threat
in
1820,
ever
A
of
they
agreed
supported
caused
John
took
forces
the Ottoman
1821,
things.
down
action
armies
to
also might
harbor similar ambitions
Spanish
American
empire.
of
the United
As Clay
San Mart?n
very
have
too
attributed
but
For U.S.
nevertheless
das
preoccupied
Americans
Spanish
institutions
was
Civil
4,
stamped
dissension
1821,
pendence
tion,
of
and
he
he
well,
In
government."
upon
was
elaborated
their
prayers
infused
upon
be.
his
education,
into
his
has or shall be unfurled,
her
scant
But
she
all
levels
high
the Great
to reinstate
American
in
not
official
their
view,
"arbitrary
their
their
seminal
and Jos? de
perceptions
probably
to
enough
of
indigenous
enthusiasm.
reactions.
the
newly
not
to
power,
habits,
The
negotiation
of the Flori
standard
her [the United
abroad
in
search
"free
and
all
of
wishing
or
liberal
ecclesiastical,
their
In a proclamation
principles."
the
establish
upon
Latin
independent
military
and
the
employed
to the acquisition
ability
"Wherever
there will
the
Revolution.
. . .
and
of popular
leading
upon
thoughts.
goes
whether
Such
and
recognition
faith
also
actions
Such
leaders and ruin his diplomacy. While
Spanish
put
the
papers."
example
Spain
Premature
alienate
wher
in Italy.
Europeans
possibly
institutions
governed
realpolitik
Treaty with
Adams.
Secretary
states might
U.S.
indicated
they
in contrast,
leaders,
the
to wonder
emulate
our
revolutionary
to
The
leaders such as Sim?n Bol?var
copied
our
importance
of the 1819 Transcontinental
American
of
to
attempts
principles,
sentiments
much
circumstances,
conscious
our
"adopted
and
language
as
in 1818, Latin American
observed
and
revolts
inspired a great deal of interest among
such as Congressman
Henry Clay of
States.
them
regarded
Kentucky,
of
in Greece.
in the New World,
wars for independence
Indeed, many,
The Latin American
a rebellion
state,
of Troppau
whenever
a series
in Spain.
uprising
of
the Congress
activities
suppressed
out
snuff
secretary
Powers
citizens
an
against
the U.S.
Adams,
Consequently
leaders feared
European
at
insurrectionist
Austrian
in efforts
Turks
Quincy
of the French upheaval,
most
to put
in
after,
French
later
than
forcibly
Soon
necessary.
year
more
revolution
freedom
institutions.
on
and
July
inde
States] heart, her benedic
of monsters
to
destroy."
/ THE MONROE
Gilderhus
In the spring of 1823,
commercial
possibilities
diplomatic
and
cultivate
new
the
later
and expulsion
America.
Spanish
to the
recognition
and Mexico
bia,
the defeat
in
President
governments
others.
of Spanish
Monroe
and trade. He worried
armies opened
up new
extended
Colom
Peru,
Argentina,
U.S.
instructed
meanwhile,
Adams,
I 7
consequently
with
beginning
DOCTRINE
to
diplomats
about British
goodwill
especially
rivalry. British policy,
at the same time, entered a period of flux. Following
the Congress
of Vienna,
Lord
had
in
the foreign secretary,
believed
the alliance
Castlereagh,
system
maintaining
for
responsible
the
against
implications
reversed
Canning
successor,
Austrian
the
risk
of
the
of
reacted
Canning,
in other
countries,
a long struggle
had waged
possibility
out
Britain
Great
George
intervened
troops
of Wellington
than
took
course,
The
superiority
Canning's
decision.
command
of
of Great
British
Britain's
transactions
commercial
a
remove
and
continental
and
alliance,
against
entanglements,
a
pursued
of
policy
naval
America.
Spanish
facilitated
also
capabilities
on such advantages
The
by taking
minister
foreign
connive with King Ferdinand VII in efforts to restore
Such an outcome would nullify British commercial
source
lucrative
potentially
the
discussed
and
to capitalize
with
in a conversation
Subsequently
minister,
economic
leaders intended
that his former allies might
authority in the Americas.
ambitions
U.S.
the Duke
his
contrast,
and
isolation."
"splendid
Spanish
French
Rather
domination.
Napoleonic
worried
when
in Spain, where
especially
In
Napoleon.
defeating
in August
ramifications
of
of
trade.
and Richard
1823, Canning
the French
in
involvement
Spain.
the
Rush,
When
Rush
expressed his view that fundamental British interests required that Great Britain oppose
French intervention or seizure of territory in the New World, Canning
inquired whether
a
in
the United States might
with
Great
Britain
unified
declaration
of
join
policy. Further,
as a sign of good faith, he suggested a pledge of self-denial
in which
the British and
Americans
When
Rush
discussions.
Thomas
to
nothing
ally. He
fear
proposed
made
no
the
from
early
self-denying
sense.
words,
rest
clause;
an
He
as
Meanwhile,
French diplomats
intervention
of
the intentions
distrusted
the
against
advice
preferred
"a cockboat
Canning
signed
of
the proposal
forwarded
Seeking
intention
any
in
a
him,
lost interest
America.
promise
of
a British
for
themselves.
he set off a flurry of high-level
contacted
former
presidents
favored acting in tandem with the
as an ally, the United
States had
contrast,
as commercial
statement
independent
the wake
in
Adams,
estate
Monroe
Britain
Great
of the British
the Polignac
in Spanish
1823,
both of whom
Europe.
for
real
seeking
toWashington,
in October
Jefferson and James Madison,
that with
arguing essentially
British,
in his
renounce
would
preferred
to
competitors.
against
annexing
unilater
He
of
disliked
or Cuba
Texas
instead
of policy
act
appearing,
man-of-war."1
in a joint declaration. On October 9, British and
in which France made a pledge
Memorandum
Nevertheless,
rumors
of
a French
fleet
poised
and Kenneth
G. Paterson,
1. All the foregoing
appear in Thomas
J.
J. Garry Clifford,
quotations
to 1920,
American Foreign Relations: A History
101-03.
5th ed. (Boston: Houghton
2000),
Mifflin,
Hagan,
see Dexter
Perkins's
For more details on the European
and the framing of the Monroe
Doctrine,
background
rev. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown,
the role
classic work, A History
1963), chaps. 1, 2. On
of theMonroe Doctrine,
see Lars Schoultz,
Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America
of racist assumptions,
MA: Harvard
1998).
Press,
University
(Cambridge,
I PRESIDENTIALSTUDIESQUARTERLY /March 2006
8
and ready to move
a
Clay,
the New World
against
of Latin
champion
self-appointed
tered on the interest of Tsar Alexander
a
into
America,
I in extending
States and put
in the United
raised anxiety
A
panic.
Russian
cen
concern
related
from
southward
territory
Alaska.
In close
gress
to a
States
free
and
not
to
the Old World
the
as
as
considered
endorsed
Europeans
"dangerous
three essential
by
any
by
the Con
the United
continents,
European
the
by
are
and maintain,
assumed
colonization
future
to
message
first committed
"the American
that
have
they
to
subjects
The
points.
affirming
which
condition
Monroe's
recommendation,
of noncolonization
independent
second
Adams'
2 set forth
policy
be
with
conformance
on December
henceforth
The
powers."
a policy of "hands off" while arguing that the monarchical
system of
that
America"
that
and
of
"is essentially different from
"any attempt" by
to
"extend
to
our
their
peace
to any
system
and
safety"
of
portion
as
and
this
would
hemisphere"
"an
of
evidence
appear
disposition
unfriendly
toward the United
States." The third recalled Washington's
farewell address by embrac
a
"In
the wars of the European
from
affairs:
of
abstention
European political
ing policy
in matters
powers
to
relating
we
themselves
never
have
taken
nor
part,
it comport
does
our policy to do so." A related policy of "no transfer" already had taken shape in
In his
1823 when Adams warned Spain against selling Cuba to Great Britain.
April
with
words,
pable
U.S.
all
For
the most
leaders,
Latin
while
American
leaders,
from
its bosom."
scant
expressed
an
States
arrogant
sent
the
the United
States
under
standing
to defend
Mexico,
Monroe
international
its own basic
Following
most
the
Cuba,
during
and
Latin
con
to enforce
power
in
the
for
quest
to government
Memorandum
French.
Tsar
international
advantage
of it when
and
at
Americans
first
the United
States rejected
the Monroe
for upholding
Central
a unilateral
Doctrine,
law,
committed
statement
presidential
the United
States
to do
very
without
little,
except
interests.3
the initial
Americans
of
A
Doctrine.
of Austria
alliance. Ironically, the responsibility
the result of a common concern with
upon the Royal British Navy,
for maintaining
and free trade. As historian John J.
markets
open
the
observes,
Johnson
an
Polignac
constraining
expressed high
their offers of military
devolved
the Monroe
worthy
gained
levels of interest but then lost much
Doctrine
in
Metternich
gesture
had
of
copies
in
role
by
guided
expectation
lacked the naval and military
that Monroe
Canning
inca
which
Union,
an
Such
and
Spain,
American
interest
von
Klemens
it as
the United
with
connection
the North
off
Minister
Britain's
showing
unnatural
towards
century.2
Europeans
worrying
trade,
her
nineteenth
disdained
In their view,
contrast,
gravitate
cast
Foreign
I of Russia
tempt.
In
the
part,
as
only
cannot
through
such
Alexander
it.
of nature
law
policy
few
can
own
its
from
disjoined
self-support,
same
the
once
"Cuba,
of
stir, the Monroe
the
remainder
America,
of
Latin
Doctrine
the
America
receded
nineteenth
passed
into the background
century.
out
of vogue
Indeed,
as a
except
for
for
compelling
2. Perkins, Monroe Doctrine,
ed., The Evolution of Our Latin-American
chap. 2; James W Gantenbein,
(New York: Columbia
Press,
1950), 323-26.
Policy: A Documentary
History
University
A Hemisphere Apart: The Foundations
3. John J. Johnson,
of United States Policy Toward Latin America
(Baltimore:
Press,
1990), 80-81.
Johns Hopkins
University
Gilderhus / THE MONROE DOCTRINE
interest.
sented
neither
cultivated
nor
dangers
economic
regarded
connections
colossus.
Driven
by
convictions
following
Mexico's
national
route
to Asia,
U.S.
Destiny,"
in 1848,
and
America
Central
and
territory
northern
aroused
new
northern
of
ideologi
in
south
among
search
to
the
half of
absorbed
interest
states
in
of Guadalupe
States
merchants
in adding
succeeded
group
the Treaty
and
the
resulted
expansion
of
also
of
power
the United
nations
the British,
a constellation
territorial
pre
those
Instead,
growing
a consequence
As
countries
especially
and
ambition,
continent.
new
States.
the
against
with Mexico
Cuba
neither
United
American
the Europeans,
commercial
American
seeking
but
the
counterweights
"Manifest
the War
territory.
owners
slave
for
ties with
hunger,
as
the North
Hidalgo
ern
land
known
of
conquest
as
South
remote,
culturally
opportunities
and political
such
cal
and
distant
Geographically
( 9
a
of
shorter
the Union.
Early in his presidency, James Knox Polk briefly resurrected the Monroe Doctrine
and invoked it in 1845 as a warning against British and French meddling
in Texas and
California,
regions
earmarked
already
for
into
incorporation
the United
States.
Similarly,
at the end of the Civil War, Secretary of State William
Henry Seward warned the French
to cease and desist in their intervention
in Mexico
but without
explicitly mentioning
the Monroe Doctrine. When
the French later withdrew
their forces, they left the hapless
to meet
Maximilian
Emperor
other
in
instances
ditions
against
U.S.
of urbanization,
States more
the United
and
powers
the
for
them
in attendance
to
creation
of
of
tions
of
the
"new
of
Blaine,
America
in
States
United
union.
concrete
diplomacy"
clearing
house
later
accomplishment,
with
its
emphasis
to
to accept
as
Blaine's
agenda
on
commerce
promote
proposals
the
and
and
DC.
trade
distrust
but acquiesced
Pan-American
suggested
and
during
invitations
peace
uninterested
part
ambitious
known
appeared
Pan-Americanism,
inWashington,
whether
efforts
the most
For
thrust
of Pan-Americanism,
advocate
considered
consequences
the great European
on
Conference
a
by
diplomacy"
change
emphasis
a staunch
they resisted Blaine's most
a commercial
a dearth
spite
the
"new
of
resulted
measure
the
among
indication
American
expe
redressing
century
small
instability,
ensuing
a new
of
form
G.
Latin
a customs
and
ful of such initiatives,
the
the
James
from
with
cooperate
arbitration
through
one
sent
of
purpose
in no
and
the
In
Qu?retaro.
French
objections.4
Driven
policy.
of uncertainty
World,
in
of State
the
into the imperial struggle
the New
presidency
Secretary
by
delegates
to
and
in the late nineteenth
industrialization,
emphatically
In
no
at
squad
Spanish
for
raised
relations
approach
firing
the
Domingo
officials
in 1889 at the first International
specifically
Summoned
the
Santo
at a time
and
Japanese.
Harrison's
Benjamin
reactive
immigration,
when
century,
and
foreign
resources
and
for markets
a Mexican
before
government
less
aggressive,
fate
Mexico,
shift in U.S.
A paradigm
in a more
his
nineteenth
Argentina,
grievances,
legitimate
quest
the mid
the main
in
In
Union.
direc
peace.3
Monroe Doctrine,
chaps. 3,4.
in my book, The Second Century:
of this essay also appear
in the remainder
of the themes
5. Most
see it for elabora
DE: Scholarly
American Relations Since 1889
U.S.-Latin
Resources,
2000);
(Wilmington,
see Walter
the "new diplomacy,"
tion and clarification.
On
LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation
of
American Expansion,
1860-1898
LaFeber, The American
Press,
1963); Walter
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
vol. 2, in The Cambridge History
(New York:
Search for Opportunity,
1865-1913,
of American Foreign Relations
to the New,
2d
L. Beisner,
From the Old Diplomacy
1865-1900,
Press,
1993); Robert
University
Cambridge
IL: Harlan Davidson,
ed. (Arlington
1986).
Heights,
4. Perkins,
10
I PRESIDENTIALSTUDIESQUARTERLY /March 2006
Another
tion
the Monroe
of
secretary
Monroe
under
Doctrine,
cally
sovereign
fines
its
this
in
the British
Olney's
quently
to
managed
a demand
case,
in his
position
annual
a
extract
the U.S.
assertively,
the influence of more
marked
of William
presidency
arbitration
to
message
The
the
the
is practi
it con
to which
subjects
of
dispute.
Expressing
agreed
in the
intervention
and expansive
This
came
decision
to
attitudes
the
in
conflict
on policy
three
nearly
on
arbitrate
Spanish-Cuban
after
subse
and
by them for more
territory occupied
nationalistic
McKinley.
in December
Congress
British
exclude
would
understanding
than fifty years.6
more
the
upon
to
States
the United
"today
law
for
compromise.
that the proceedings
Even
is
Olney,
corollary
a response for five months
and then simply denied the
in response took up the issue by sup
Doctrine.
Cleveland
withheld
of the Monroe
applicability
porting
this
that
its fiat
and
continent,
interposition,"
disdain,
terms
Richard
his
proclaimed
defini
Britain
Great
with
and Venezuela,
Cleveland,
in unsubtle
declaring
on
a controversy
of
Guiana
British
Grover
President
course
in the
1895,
between
boundary
state
of
In
Doctrine.
a disputed
over
shift took shape in a revived and more militant
sign of paradigm
1898
the
during
of attempt
years
ing to find peaceful means for restoring order and stability to an island wracked by civil
war. Though not explicitly
's request for a war
linked to the Monroe Doctrine, McKinley
aimed at goals consistent with
declaration
the
it, specifically
expulsion of the Spanish
from
presence
special
consequences,
long-term
overthrow
also
initiated
of
and
of peace,
the
a
of
establishment
whose
Nevertheless,
protectorates.
oscillated
In
sevelt
preferred
Americans
the
between
emphasis
the
on
on
the
twentieth
favorite
U.S.
techniques,
Hemisphere
and
international
debts,
11.
for
then
1904,
intervention.
taking
in which
off
corrective
case
he
States,
attributes.
to the United
U.S.
became
Latin
the point
America
differently,
again.
President
to
arrange
very
toward
back
to
right
the United
an
As
corollary
for warding
responsibility
the
This
interest
of
policy
and
TR's
author
States
those
or to make
in December
and
protec
Cuban
Republic?also
U.S.
century,
coercion
of
places
Dominican
and cajolery,
Congress
for
Second Century,
other
model,
and
terms,
against
violations
to nonintervention
to
and
in
resulted
of coercion
rationale
the Western
6. Gilderhus,
the
message
his
affirmed
reneged
of
intervention
assumptions
in
rest
displays
annual
presented
uncompromisingly
vention
Haiti,
Nicaragua,
For
Cuba
the Cuban
following
States?Panama,
an
in
actions
subsequent
a U.S.
independence.
not
but
Europeans
in
colonies
into
its
United
and
sovereignty
the
the
upon
outcome
The
without
of Cuba
Under
sig
and
Philippines
Guam.
empire
transformation
bestowed
against
an
of
Amendment.
of Cuban
Cuba
and
Rico,
introduced
the
of
acquisition
Puerto
construction
Platt
the matter,
in defense
safeguard
the
subsequent
so-called
in
choice
militarily
might
in Cuba,
in
the
by
the
by
scant
with
among
resulting
the
them,
sovereignty
marked
as authorized
intervene
from
Spanish
a process
Caribbean,
torate
ment
restoration
States.
relationship binding Cuba
In this war, the fighting
lasted only three months but nevertheless
the
ities,
the
region,
to the United
nificant
the
the Caribbean
Theodore
expression
the Monroe
threats
action
prescribed
Roo
of
inter
of European
Latin
whenever
the
his
Doctrine
use
of
pre
I 11
Gilderhus / THE MONROE DOCTRINE
ventative
have
intervention. While
his
country
original meaning.
wrongdoing"
out
rying
meant
an
of
that
or
"sooner
assumptions
ramifications,
an
such
view,
either/or
"chronic
and
society"
the
Hemisphere
the
of
obligation
Roosevelt
later
car
explained
to the powers
of Europe"
ourselves."7
toward
policy
the
whether
of a difference.
debate
Mexico
policy
over the meaning
a distinction
presumes
or
strategic
primarily
coun
the Caribbean
among historians
served
formulation
and
economic
without
much
TR
and his successors, William
Howard Taft and Woodrow
Obviously
intended to safeguard both sets of interests by keeping out the Europeans and
Wilson,
to markets
claim
laying
Doctrine
ated through U.S.
As
experts.
in practice
and
effect
a
of
Taft
"dollar
commerce.
and
often
had
In
By
the Monroe
implication,
called
diplomacy"
administration
such methods
reasoned,
America.
sword.
two-edged
on
emphasis
in Latin
banks and for skilled
order,
peace,
aging
the
the
Taft,
resources
and
had
always
Under
have
would
contrast
with
customs
of
by
encour
by
seldom
they
result
negoti
houses
notably
expectations,
the
loans
copious
effects,
good
consequences,
counterproductive
for
of Caribbean
worked
med
political
by U.S. officials.
the Monroe Doctrine became more
and racial condescension
dling
Under Wilson,
Hiram
Bingham
of Yale
Professor
as
hallowed
creed
Bingham
advised
Western
"an
shibboleth"
a multilateral
definition
would
approach
of his
premises
Wilson
in ways
inMexico
that
force,
by
New
Columbus,
he also used
On
I9I6.
with
in this
acts
and
the
seizing
Mexico,
in 1916.
in pursuit
methods
each
his
occasion,
actions
1914
to disorder,
in Haiti
elicited
confused
In
and
then
Villa
the
for
to
response
by
violence
and
the
Villa's
and
instability,
resistance
the
ordering
alleged
in 1915 and in the Dominican
violent
goal.
cooperative
mil
twice employed
following
an
contra
and
of
appeals
the president
of Francisco
In response
interventionist
with
of the
Such
trouble.
implementation
Americans.
in
to
the
of
pretensions.
all the nations
response
because
in 1910,
of Veracruz
city
in
achieved
Latin
angered
unilateralist
to which
intervention
unilateral
of
puzzled
never
Wilson
policies,
into Chihuahua
tive Expedition
preferences,
but
the onset of revolution
following
first
action
its
of
because
according
collective
take
Wilson's
combined
endeavors
itary
with
conformed
explicitly an issue in 1913 when
an article describing
the
published
University
obsolete
Hemisphere
dictory
war
order
keep
U.S.
undergirded
especially
In my
interests.
in
must
As
"to say 'Hands off
the 1920s and inspired an ongoing
tries until
U.S.
we
later
assume
power."
police
a decision
must
the
Doctrine
words,
civilized
of
In the Western
cases"
flagrant
international
of State Elihu Root,
Such
and
exercise
"the
to Secretary
in
in his
ties
invert
the Monroe
when,
"the
nation."
civilized
act would
intrusions,
in
he would
Doctrine,
an
such
intervention
breakdowns
reluctantly,
of the Monroe
though
on European
for U.S.
"some
by
"however
States,
even
right,
caused
"impotence"
intercession
compelled
United
a sanction
became
or
things
a prohibition
Initially
to TR
according
the authority
invoking
set
in and
step
nearly
Puni
raid on
threats,
Republic
produced
Mexico.
7. Ibid.,
issue.
chap.
1, quotes,
29- Serge Ricard
examines
the Roosevelt
Corollary
in detail
in an article
a
12
I PRESIDENTIALSTUDIESQUARTERLY /March 2006
in the
forms of international
cooperation
M.
Colonel
Edward
his
and
confidant
friend
House,
Hemisphere.
Encouraged by
for a
late in 1914 the negotiation
of a Pan-American
treaty providing
proposed
Wilson
Western
Wilson
additionally
collective
regional
a multilateral
for new
system
featuring
security
of
definition
ians responded
called
the Monroe
icans
Doctrine.
Although
everywhere.
Subsequently
Doctrine
and the loss of trust inWilson
Venustiano
and
altogether
issues
These
idency.
demanded
as many
Carranza,
own
his
announced
American
markets
tution
of
property
of
various
the
a
of
of
free
the
collective
the
of give
commitment
down
cerebral
while,
implement
to defeat
thrombosis.
the victory
their
victorious
These
the
developed
various
asserted
collective
and
security,
his most
Point,
1918.
cherished,
also
appealed
faced a political
the
notably
what
view,
And
forces?
in
difficult
fight on two
French,
and
British,
the
emerged,
what
while
sovereignty?
of
Treaty
Could
the
treaty.
the League
Doctrine?
Could
Hemisphere?
his
to make
unwillingness
all contributed
Wilson
the Monroe
about
the Western
convincingly,
about
questions
of U.S.
conceptions
respond
Senate
raised
They
in the fall of 1919
the
Allies,
In his
take.
intervention
to
in
autocracy,
in
role
he
security and the League, represented the best that he
then had to deal with Republican
opponents who had
of military
in outside
illness
influential
goals.
and
Fourteenth
and
subvert
incapacity
sions, and his
in
Senate
security
result
Wilson's
went
and
purposes
the
over
a process
U.S.
Consti
of Nations.
League
for collective
treaty
and
self-determination,
The
an
play
militarism,
his
of
issues.
providing
could have hoped to gain. He
compel
colonialism,
trade,
to
he
the
U.S.
succeeded.
the Mexican
1917 and later sent an army to France
in April
determination
of his peace plan, Wilson
through
access to Euro
27 for expropriating
private
In 1938, President L?zaro C?rdenas took
to win
had
for
opportunities
part
of
provisions
from
in Article
the adoption
Versailles
over
the most
for
radical
them
of
support
diplomatic
new
of
of his pres
some
though
concerned
seeking
First,
Would
the
of war
statement
territorial
creation
Japanese,
a
them
various
even
I denied Latin Americans
initiatives
resist
his
them,
the world
as
Points
While
taken
Another
U.S.
to
Doctrine
for the remainder
to obtain
need
in defense
industry.
among
among
addressed
Brazil
renounced
of Mexico,
Carranza
concerns,
the
possible.
response,
a declaration
rid
To
making.
fronts.
In
petroleum
reasons,
Fourteen
the
as
in attempts
obtained
principles,
for
centered
countries
less well
Wilson
the
on
the authorization
1917, especially
resources.
and nationalizing
mineral
possession
peace
American
the effects ofWorld War
loans.
and
fared
for
One
trade when
efforts
Latin
transcended
attention.
Latin
expanding
pean
and
among Latin Amer
the president
of Mexican
the inviolability
sovereignty.
war
and making peace preoccupied Wilson
Waging
still
and
of disputes
the Argentines
particularly because of the
expressed misgivings,
such a treaty require
Peru.
with
Would
dispute
as
a
in
died
1916
consequence of the Persh
treaty
The proposed
into Mexico
Expedition
the Monroe
arbitration
compulsory
the Chileans
positively,
territorial
for an ongoing
implications
outside intervention?
ing Punitive
the
conces
to another
failure. The
treaty
from
consequences
of
languished
the
a
As a result, he left office in early 1921 with a broken heart. Mean
in the presidential
election of 1920 meant
that Republicans
could
own
vision
of world
order.
In Latin
America,
they
initiated
a
line
of
Gilderhus / THE MONROE DOCTRINE
policy
resulting
Neighbor
came
innovations
threat following
European
that
believed
interventionist
State J. Reuben
Clark wrote
as a rationale
for
the
hemispheric
various
reasons,
defeat
inWorld
had
relations,
the
Good
the
absence
of
exercise
an
of
I. Republican
Consequently,
in 1928
in which
by
he disavowed
and
to
According
arousing
of
Undersecretary
power
police
Doctrine.
this
a
leaders also
consequences
counterproductive
international
the Monroe
them,
among
War
nationalism.
American
amemorandum
from
States under
United
Latin
of
intervention
for
practices
forms
of
about
the German
anti-American
right
of
conception
policy.8
Such
lary
a new
in
eventually
| 13
TR's
corol
disconnected
the
interpretation,
the
the right of intervention
in defense of
U.S. citizens and property but not in conjunction with the hallowed creed.
This understanding
played a vital role in shaping the Good Neighbor
policy
the essential parts of which conformed with Pan
under President Franklin Roosevelt,
American
affairs
to
The
assumptions.
of nonintervention,
ple
the
of
effects
ures
for
the Great
II
of
in
started
the United
FDR
trade
gave
the
up
right
States
Another
to
the
of
the
attack
gained
once
policy
security,
on
meas
such
Pearl
the
through
War
World
in
resulting
and then to mobilize
the fighting
the
in efforts
self-proclaimed
opportunities
part
after
conflict
intervention,
princi
domestic
to combat
attempt
overseas,
of hemispheric
questions
the region against
entered
markets
of
the
in the
cooperation
an
In part
new
finding
to
States
intervene
American
commerce.
by
agreements.
prominence
to
right
for Latin
called
expand
gave
the United
the
has
in return for new commercial
first to insulate
attempts
when
nation
at home
In effect,
reciprocal
Europe
and
Depression
by his cousin Theodore,
negotiation
no
Another
security,
a trade-off.
entailed
committed
feature
that
reason.
any
maintain
peace,
central
affirming
of another
uphold
law retained
international
support
Harbor.
tactics implied a multilateral
of the
changes in diplomatic
understanding
came
Doctrine
and the payoff
when
administration,
by leaders in the Roosevelt
Such
Monroe
all
but
declared
later.
access.
Mexico
two
Latin
war
on
Roosevelt
He
sent
American
less
ground
with
opment
offers
and
air
and
sweet
of military
aid
the
American
in actual
interest
of shrewd diplomacy,
either
pressure,
Latin
regarded
took
nations
Under
them.
forces,
exceptions,
of
vitally
to
Italy
in
the
Axis
Chile,
and
important
Nevertheless,
and
the
the administration
loans
the
and
participation.
military
respectively,
promises
with
Argentina
as
resources
talk, and bribery,
and
relations
broke
postwar
era
around
wanted
easy
Brazil
Philippines.
obtained
or
powers
came
By
and
means
its purposes
to promote
devel
modernization.9
Pan American Visions: Woodrow Wilson
in the Western Hemisphere,
8. Mark T. Gilderhus,
1913-1921
Second Century, chaps.
of Arizona
1, 2; Gantenbein,
Evolution,
(Tucson: University
Press,
1986); Gilderhus,
the Monroe Doctrine,
and
Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean: The Panama Canal,
401. Richard H. Collin,
100-07,
for example,
Louisiana
State University
the Latin American Context
Press,
1990),
xiii-xiv,
(Baton Rouge:
to
accounts which misrepresent
aim. According
TR's
neo-Marxist
disdain
for predebt-minded,
expresses
than in "the exclusion
in "the subjugation
of Latin America"
the president
Collin,
always took less interest
definition
On the proposed multilateral
the Germans,
from the Western
of Europe,"
Hemisphere.
especially
see Thomas
"Hiram Bingham
L. Karnes,
and His Obsolete
of the Monroe
Doctrine,
Shibboieth,"
Diplomatic
History
versity
3 (Winter
1979):
39-57.
9- Fredrick B. Pike, FDR's Good Neighbor Policy, Sixty Years of Generally
an exceptionally
able analysis; Gilderhus,
of Texas Press,
1995) presents
Gentle Chaos (Austin:
Second Century, chap.
Uni
3.
14
I PRESIDENTIALSTUDIESQUARTERLY /March 2006
concerns shifted to peace making
the fighting drew to a close, U.S. diplomatic
of global and regional organization. After Roosevelt's death in April 1945,
As
and questions
his
successor,
Nations,
failures
S Truman,
Harry
viewed
by
resulted
the
of
intercourse.
the
creation
to
chance
the
of
United
the
for
compensate
the leaders also proposed the creation of
Hemisphere,
This
the traditions associated with the Monroe Doctrine.
in
Pact
the
Rio
Pan-American
a
As
in
the
on
based
political
Charter
OAS
as the
conceived
commercial
and
solidarity
the
embraced
also
secu
collective
(OAS) in 1948, an entity
to promote
feature,
alliance
military
States
Union
central
a
1947,
of American
rity, and the Organization
successor
to
as a second
Democrats
other
to defend
system
endeavor
a commitment
retained
and
In the Western
of 1919.
a regional
him
of
principle
nonintervention.
1945, the exigencies
leaders perceived
regional
of the Cold War
After
U.S.
Hemisphere
issues
became
ization
of U.S.
have
depend
the presidency
During
of
ciple
of
power
D.
War
upon
the
Plan.
threats.
within
the
and modern
the
obtained
Europe
Latin
benefits
in contrast,
America,
would
former
a
example,
Jacobo Arbenz
In
Company.
the era of the Good Neighbor
Eisenhower,
came
took
into
of
Guzman
reformers
and
under
Colonel
Carlos
Castillo
radicals
era
had
administration
Eisenhower
Armas.
prin
the properties
and confiscated
the
response,
the
in a new
resulting
priority,
coalition
with
conflict
had taken over and in 1954 clandestinely
that Communists
Consequently,
consequences
of development
of Western
imperatives
the
view,
for
Fruit
United
anti-Communists
by
Ike's
under President
the U.S.-owned
charged
Cold
when
In
Soviet
aid.
of Dwight
In Guatemala,
intervention.
sion
end
nonintervention.
assumed
of
to an
came
formally
trade,
not
countries
the Marshall
of
back
for purposes
loans
The
terms
turn
depending
of U.S.
influenced U.S. policy when
prism and saw the Western
profoundly
a Cold War
to
in which
unimportant
casualty.
the
on
arena
promise
early
under
largess
to
The
an
became
an
or
important
context.
War
Cold
as
primarily
issues through
an inva
sponsored
congruen;
Supposedly
the requirements
of the Monroe Doctrine
but clearly not with the OAS Charter,
means
this intervention by indirect
into exile and inadvertently
drove Arbenz Guzman
set off a civil war lasting for four decades and causing the deaths of over 100,000
with
Guatemalans.10
The
the Monroe
creed by name,
biggest Cold War
the
triumph
a devotee
of
had
erate
no
crisis since the Chinese
of Cuban
the
Communist
his
to
of John F. Kennedy
faced the boldest challenge
ever. Though Kennedy
the hallowed
seldom specifically mentioned
he took strong measures
in defense of it and became embroiled
in the
administration
incoming
Doctrine
country
revolutionaries
Cuban
nineteenth-century
ties
from
but
what
intervention
under
favored
he
saw
an
as
Fidel
set
and
patriot
anti-American
foreign
in Korea
Castro
in 1950. Early
events
the
nationalist
course
domination.
of
His
Jos?
action
in 1959,
in motion.
Castro,
Mart?,
initially
in efforts
execution
of
to
lib
political
10. Gaddis
and Wang,
1945-1993
Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine,
(New York: Hill
of "the [George F.} Kennan
in
takes on special importance
1994), chaps.
1-4; Smith's discussion
Corollary"
connection
with
the Guatemalan
reasoned
that U.S. policy makers
had no choice
caper in 1954. Kennan
to work with
to keep communism
if they wished
at bay. Gilderhus,
dictators
Second
except
right-wing
Century, chap. 4.
Gilderhus / THE MONROE DOCTRINE
his
enemies,
to
natives
Devised
the Central
Intelligence
Agency
clandestine
to
Alliance
for
would
plan
he
over,
invade
the
developed
and
a
he
popular
At
term,
Cubans
When
uprising.
the
sponsored
modernization.
about
second
anti-Castro
1,500
trigger
First,
strategy.
democracy
of
against
for bringing
in Eisenhower's
army
alter
administration
a plan emerged
and
radical
spreading
Eisenhower
late
an
island
a dual
to promote
Progress
on
relied
operation
in
interest
the
from 1954,
according
Kennedy
his
turned
model
by
took
and
property,
America
on the Guatemalan
proposed
who
in Latin
places
him. Drawing
his downfall.
this
of private
expropriation
other
I 15
creation
Latin
last,
an
of
Ameri
cans would
to them during World War II. Second, he
get some of the funds promised
to
to
eliminate Castro. Neither
go ahead with the CIA plan
part worked. Driven
agreed
the
false
and
alliance
foundered
when policy
assumptions
by
misleading
expectations,
makers
the impossibility
discovered
traditional
the
elites,
ruling
very
of promoting
people
invasion at the Bay of Pigs on April
when
Castro's
and
them,
the U.S.
the
missiles
ballistic
range
U-2
Various
sessions.
1962,
of
promise
of
blockade,
an
latter
nuclear
grew
beach,
even
worse.
failure
some
killed
he hastily
under
warheads
of
consideration,
the
including
from
invasion
As
Cuba.
of Cuba
a
And
blackmail.
so
by
medium
in
the
and
air
of
possibility
Kennedy
that
demanded
For thirteen days in the middle of October
insisted, the
finally emerged. As Kennedy
also
secret
such
it when
targets
on diplomacy.
"quarantine,"
Khrushchev
and
remained
provision
a
called
with
against
to
response
gambit from photos taken by a
his top advisors into emergency
summoned
euphemistically
In
and got
armed
forces
military
learned of Khrushchev's
came
withdraw
against
this
albeit
the
the Soviet Union
nuclear
carrying
withdraw
would
then
from
send
the troops and missiles.
until a solution
the tension mounted
Soviets
on
attackers
the U.S.-backed
in a spectacular
to defeat
the
through
working
In addition,
an invasion, but in the end, the group decided
a naval
Khrushchev
ance
to
agreed
capable
alternatives
strikes or perhaps
authorized
it.
down
situation
asked for help
Kennedy
over Cuba,
spy plane high
the
the
view,
premier,
and
States. When
United
of
point
Khrushchev,
to
opposed
17, 1961 went
overwhelmed
to kill him, Castro
CIA plots
change while
rest.
the
captured
From
Nikita
forces
superior
most
agree
so
the
required,
to
that
Americans
would
out
of Turkey,
missiles
could
Kennedy
each
means,
their
take
could
side
claim
avoid
a
the
appear
victory
while
of the Monroe Doctrine,
such as Samuel Flagg
its basic goals. Champions
accomplishing
at
a
the
denounced
Yale
of
Bemis,
University,
emphatically
history
diplomatic
professor
on
outcome
sphere,
but
that
grounds
nevertheless
x
Cuba
still
Kennedy
a Soviet
remained
could
express
in the Western
protectorate
satisfaction
that
he
had
avoided
Hemi
a nuclear
war.1
During
America
served
the
years
remaining
interests
and
of
purposes
the
Cold
implicitly
War,
other
U.S.
with
associated
interventions
the Monroe
in Latin
Doctrine,
for catastrophe because they failed to bring in
potential
the Soviet Union. President Lyndon B. Johnson premised his invasion of the Dominican
in 1965 on the need to prevent "another Cuba." In 1973, President Richard
Republic
but none of them had as much
11. Smith,
Last Years,
chap.
5; Gilderhus,
Second Century,
chap.
5.
I PRESIDENTIALSTUDIESQUARTERLY /March 2006
16
M. Nixon
succeeded
Salvador Allende's
action,
in bringing
about the overthrow of President
by indirect means
leaders to take
socialist regime in Chile while encouraging military
the dominoes
venting
the
Nicaragua
government
Sandinista
with
operation
invoked explicitly
Though
the aims and purposes associated with
in defense
purpose
Monroe
of
whether
of
liberty,
States.
the United
and
wisely
As
the
and
democracy,
the Monroe
always,
during
in
insurgency
and Moscow.
American
of
way,
and
idealism
the
Doctrine
serve
could
high
of
invocation
it provided policy makers with
underlying
they defined as the strategic and economic
for acting
pre
headed by Daniel Ortega,
in expressions
shrouded
Typically
and the assumptions
on behalf of what
Doctrine
tification
ests
measures.
interventionist
for
right-wing
Havana
from
and
Ronald Reagan
and
during the Cold War, the Monroe Doctrine
it provided both a justification and an explana
seldom
tion
a
government
backing
interests
corporate
President
sustained
and
supported
a Communist
U.S.
safeguarding
in the Andes. Under
the reformist/radical
against
it as
depicting
of
purpose
from falling
U.S.
the
1980s,
the
for
presumably
the
a jus
inter
purposes,
multiple
or not.
effectively
creed could not survive the end of the Cold War. As Gaddis
Alas, the hallowed
Smith has shown in his thoughtfully
insightful book, The Last Days of theMonroe Doc
the collapse of the Soviet Union
removed all sense of external threat
trine, 1945-1993,
to
the Western
mitment.
U.S.
ricated
policy
also
often
Monroe
The
policy.
as
the
coercion
between
revealed
regarded
of
a
sense
as
of
inferiors
radicals and nationalists
a review
and
and
ignorance
on
racial
and
historically
what
also
for
reveals
the
and
have looked upon
so many
that
wonder
the United
enemy.
12. Smith,
Last Years,
chaps.
6-10;
Gilderhus,
Second Century,
chap.
6.
practical
things
defined
oscillations
nonintervention.
toward
condescension
No
leaders
U.S.
reflected
all
for
many
Latin
Latin
com
the
retaining
and
purpose
its history
intervention
built-in
grounds.
of
and
States
cooperation
a useful
served
consistently
the United
rationale
principal
served
longer
Nevertheless,
Doctrine
Monroe
self-interest
the
denied
no
Doctrine
to exist.12
ceased
purposes
and
Hemisphere
The
about
or
fab
in U.S.
They
Americans,
American
States as their natural