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The new phase of globalization
and brain drain
Migration of educated and skilled Iranians
to the United States
Mohammad A. Chaichian
Department of International Studies, Psychology, Sociology and Social Work,
Mount Mercy University, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, USA
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to focus on “brain drain,” or emigration of educated and skilled
individuals to the USA from one Southwest Asian nation, Iran, which has experienced fundamental
social changes since the early 1970s. The author examines the profile of the educated Iranian emigrants
particularly in the last two decades, internal and external socio-economic and political forces and
processes that have facilitated emigration, and costs and benefits for both sending and receiving
countries.
Design/methodology/approach – Building on earlier world-system and dependency theories the
author traces the roots of center-periphery relations that have triggered emigration, and applies
David Harvey’s analysis of the new phase of globalization (post-Fordist flexible production) to
distinguish the emigration dynamics of Iran’s educated individuals during the 1950-1980 period from
those of the last three decades (since the 1979 Iranian revolution).
Findings – The findings indicate that while in the former period (1950-1980) educated Iranians
emigrated to further their education and sharpen their skills as sojourners, with the expectation that
they will return to Iran and serve their nation, emigrants in the latter period (1980-present) are guided
by a new culture of the post-Fordist globalization phase that thrives on the mobility of a highly skilled
and educated global labour force that can be promptly and efficiently utilized wherever there is a
demand. Similar to some other nationalities, the post-Fordist educated Iranian emigrants are no longer
constrained by the nationalist sentiments of the previous period. Rather, they have developed an
“internationalist national identity” that allows them to respond to the demands of a global market
while still maintaining their Iranian cultural identity.
Originality/value – This is an original research based on documentation and personal interviews of
a non-random sample of Iranian students at the University of Iowa.
Keywords Iran, United States of America, Immigrants, Globalization, Skilled workers, Social groups,
Brain drain, Iran (emigration), United States (immigration)
Paper type Case study
International Journal of Social
Economics
Vol. 39 No. 1/2, 2012
pp. 18-38
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0306-8293
DOI 10.1108/03068291211188857
Introduction
This paper’s focus is on emigration of the educated and skilled individuals to the USA
from one Southwest Asian nation, namely, Iran which has witnessed fundamental
social changes since the early 1970s. In the past two decades the educated and highly
skilled individuals have comprised a sizeable portion of international migration known
as “brain drain,” mostly from developing nations to developed countries. For instance,
An earlier draft of this article was presented at the conference on Trans-Atlantic Perspectives on
International Migration: Cross Border Impacts, Border Security, and Socio-political Responses,
March 4-5, 2010, University of Texas, San Antonio.
in 1990 a total of 12.9 million very well educated (i.e. those with “tertiary education”)
immigrated from Africa, Asia and the Pacific, North and South America to OECD
countries[1], of which 7.0 million went to the USA (Carrington and Detragiache, 1998).
In the same year, Iran had the highest rate of brain drain to the USA among Asian
countries whereby 14.7 percent of its labor force with a tertiary education immigrated
to the USA (Carrington and Detragiache, 1998).
A few years later, Iran’s student news agency (ISNA) reported that about 220,000
leading academics and industrialists had left Iran for Western countries in 2000; and
quoting the minister of science, research and technology at the time concluded that
“they are unlikely to return” (Payvand, 2001). But during his first term (2005-2009)
Iran’s President Ahmadinejad categorically denied the news about the country’s
critical level of brain drain, and declared that “we do not have any brain drain”. At
about the same time, in its 2009 Annual Report the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
reported that with the emigration of 180,000 educated and skilled individuals Iran has
the highest level of brain drain among 91 developing and developed nations, costing
the government an equivalent of $50 billion in foreign exchange currency. The IMF
report also indicated that more than 420,000 Iranians with higher education degrees
resided in the USA, of which 250,000 were physicians and engineers (Payvand, 2001).
Eventually, in the aftermath of the June 2009 presidential election fraud controversy,
the second-term president in 2010 explicitly admitted that the emigration of educated
elite has become one of the main social problems facing Iranian society – so much so
that the government had to establish a special committee to tackle the issue of brain
drain (Tale’ii, 2010). A new phenomenon that has compounded the problem for Iran is
the recent emigration of thousands of Iranians to European countries and the USA, or a
“new generation of exiled Iranians” who, in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential
election have been applying as refugees or asylum seekers (Deutsche, 2009). But what
makes Iran’s migration story unique, is that it has also hosted millions of refugees,
mostly from Afghanistan and Iraq. Based on one estimate, in 1990 Iran admitted about
2,300,000 Afghan and 800,000 Iraqi refugees (Hakimzadeh, Figure 1, p. 7); and in 2003
the United Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that by
granting asylum to 985,000 individuals Iran ranked second after Pakistan in hosting
refugees (IRNA, 2004)[2].
Theoretical context
In general, the term “brain drain” can be defined as “the permanent or long-term
international emigration of skilled people who have been the subject of considerable
educational investment by their own societies” (Wickramasekara, 2002, p. 3). Brain drain
is sometimes also called as “focused migration,” or promotion by certain developed
countries of emigration of highly educated individuals from developing nations (Murro,
2008, p. 158). Conventional theories of economic development and growth focus on
nation-states and consider education a major determinant of long-term growth in
developing countries, leading to the conclusion that migration of the educated citizens
will hamper their economic growth since they will inevitably be replaced by the less
educated, lower skilled individuals (Lucas, 1988; Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974; Piketty,
1997). International organizations such as the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and even the World Bank make a similar
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argument – that a “global knowledge divide” or emigration of the educated elite will
inevitably put a damper on developing nations’ economic growth (Rizvi, 2005,
pp. 175-6)[3]. However, others have set forth the argument that in developing countries
with a potential for growth and a heterogeneous labor force the emigration of educated
individuals will encourage others to seek higher levels of education (Mountford, 1997;
Docquier and Rapoport, 1997). For example, in their proposed economic model Beine et al.
(2001) postulate that in developing countries with a growing economy emigration of the
educated elite offers the possibility of a beneficial brain drain (BBD), as those left behind
will see the benefits of education and hence will be encouraged to further theirs. Another
economic model is presented by Collier et al. (2004) who, using data for 48 countries for
the 1970-1990 period conclude that brain drain or “human capital flight” is mainly a
“portfolio choice”, meaning an individual decision aimed at furthering one’s chances for
success regardless of a given country’s socio-economic and political environment or
placement in a global economy.
Roughly started in the late 1960s and early 1970s, brain drain is a fairly new
phenomenon that has evolved with the new phase of globalization. The main
characteristic of this new phase is its tendency to integrate nations and people across
political boundaries in order to facilitate free flow of goods and services, capital,
knowledge and skills, as well as people (Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 9-10). The earliest theoretical
analyses of this new phase of globalization included the neo-Marxist world-systems and
dependency theories formulated by Walllerstein (1974) and Frank (1980), respectively.
Rather than focusing on nation-states Wallerstein provided a “macro-level” model for a
capitalist world-system instead, whereby an international division of labor has led
to emergence of a hierarchy of various regions in the world, each with their specific
processes of production, consumption and labor conditions. In brief, he divided the
world into three categories of countries, namely, core (Western colonial powers and other
countries with advanced capitalist economies); periphery (former colonies or newly
independent nations that provide cheap labor and raw materials to the core countries
and are controlled by them); and semi-periphery (peripheral countries in transition with
a capacity for economic growth and development and technological advancement).
Frank on the other hand postulated that the world capitalist system is based on an
unequal socio-economic and political power relation between the rich, developed core
nations and the poor developing countries that perpetuates the latter nations’
“underdevelopment” on one hand and dependency in the former on the other. Some
scholars argue that both Frank and Wallerstein consider brain drain as the by-product of
a world capitalist economy that is geared for economic development in core countries at
the expense of the periphery:
It is argued that such a system encourages people in the periphery or semi-periphery who
possess high skills or education to emigrate to the core, further strengthening the core’s
position within the world-system. The world-system theory is thus used to show brain drain
to be a predictable structural consequence of world capitalism, resulting in the reproduction
of underdevelopment and global inequalities (Rizvi, 2005, p. 183).
But Rizvi is critical of the world-system and dependency theories’ approach to “brain
drain” and argues they both provide a “functional theory of capital accumulation” that
mechanically leads to emigration of the skilled individuals from periphery to the
core independent of their specific historical and social locations; subordinates
“cultural dynamics to economic generalization”; and fails to “come to terms with people’s
‘situatedness’ in the world” (Rizvi, 2005, p. 183).
A more accurate interpretation of the new phase of globalization is offered by Harvey
(1991) who calls the post-1970s period as the era of “post-Fordist flexible accumulation”
which is in sharp contrast with the pre-1970 “Fordist-Keynsian” phase of globalization.
Accordingly, the “Fordist-Keynsian” era was characterized by a rigid model of mass
production that relied on a vertical corporate structure – a spatial hierarchy of industrial
production that utilized former colonies and the newly independent countries
to produce consumption goods while technology, know-how, and production of the
more sophisticated capital goods remained in the center. This was a post-colonial
nation-building approach that sought to modernize former colonies and aid them in
economic development in order for them to become a more viable and compatible
partners in the global market, and to that end students from developing countries were
allowed to pursue their higher education in Western developed core countries (Peet and
Hartwick, 1999). But there was little brain drain during this phase, as students were
expected to “[. . .] return home and utilize their skills in nation-building projects” (Rizvi,
2005, p. 178). In contrast, Harvey (Rizvi, 2005, pp. 177-9) contends that the “post-Fordist
flexible accumulation” is a decentralized global production process that relies on
small-batch production, sub-contracting and outsourcing; as well as a two-tiered global
labor market of highly mobile unskilled and skilled, multi-tasking workers with
minimum or no bargaining power. This is closely linked to brain drain, as this new phase
of globalization thrives on the ability of highly skilled and educated immigrant
populations that could be moved around and utilized beyond national political
boundaries in order to meet the demands of a global capitalist economy. Available data
also tend to support a global shift in the extent of labor mobility during the second phase
of globalization. For instance, in 2000 the United Nations reported that one out of every
35 persons in the world, or 175 million, were international migrants, representing more
than a twofold increase since 1960 (United Nations, 2005, p. 379).
On the surface the emphasis on individual “portfolio choice” seems to be a
plausible argument regarding global labor mobility (Collier et al., 2004). But Harvey’s
analysis (1991) clearly indicates that individuals’ decisions to migrate are more
based on “rational” than “portfolio” choices, influenced by demands for migrant labor
during various phases of globalization and structural transformation of the world
capitalist economy. In addition, economic and cultural dependency relations between the
colonized and the colonizers strongly influence the social and cultural environment of the
former, which in turn affect individuals’ choices and the direction of migration. For
example, making the case for France’s former colonies Portes and Borocz (1989, p. 609) note
that “Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians [former French colonies] have immigrated to
France in large numbers while virtually ignoring the ‘comparative advantages’ of other
Western European countries”. Many factors, both internal and external, may trigger or
initiate population mobility beyond national boundaries. During the colonial era migration
patterns were mostly dictated by the colonial powers’ need to expand the colonies as well as
maintain social order in the center. Thus, except for the forced migration of the African
slave populations, up until the mid-twentieth century migration was mostly from central
countries to the colonies and not vice versa[4]. However, the post-Second World War
period’s anti-colonial movements and wars of independence in many colonies resulted
in a new form of social disintegration, as indigenous ruling elite and certain members
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of the intelligentsia and government bureaucracy who helped maintain dependency
relations with the colonizing “center” were perceived by the new revolutionary or
post-colonial regimes as accessories of colonial powers, and often were forced to
emigrate[5]. This first wave of migration from post-independence/post-revolution countries
in the periphery is often followed by consecutive waves, when the newly established
post-colonial governments are incapable of delivering what they promised or creating
enough jobs. Externally, colonial powers’ national and global interests are also often at
odds with the policies and ideological direction of post-revolution nations in the periphery,
leading the former to impose punitive economic and political restrictions on the latter and to
court and at times encourage the dissident population to leave. Classic examples related to
the US’ colonial interests are Cuba after 1959, Vietnam after 1975, and Iran after 1979
(Chaichian, 2008a, Epilogue). However, despite similarities in immigration patterns,
internal socio-economic, political, and cultural dynamics and incentives to emigrate are
unique to each nation. At this juncture it is important to recognize the fact that regardless of
individual decisions to emigrate or social conditions in the sending nations, the receiving
country always has the final say in the numbers, conditions and qualifications of those who
are admitted.
The case of Iran
The 1979 Iranian Revolution that dismantled the ancien regime and established the
Islamic Republic led to a steady emigration of educated Iranians, with significant
numbers settling in Europe and the USA. There are several interpretations of the
internal and external factors that have influenced emigration of Iranians since the 1970s
(Bozorgmehr, n.d.; Chaichian, 2008a, Epilogue; Hakimzadeh, 2006; Torbat, 2002).
A reading of the census data indicates that during the 1960s, or almost two decades
before the 1979 revolution Iranian immigration to the US gained momentum. Many
immigrants came from affluent families who had economic means to send their children
abroad to study (Hakimzadeh, 2006), and the number of those who were admitted was
much lower than those in the following decade that preceded the 1979 revolution (10,291
and 46,152, respectively). Yet, most observers of Iranian immigration patterns consider
the 1971-1980 period as the decade that produced the “first wave of emigration”. Three
factors are identified as the main impetus for population mobility during this period.
First, in an attempt to consolidate his political power in 1975 the then Shah
(Mohammad Reza Pahlavi) dissolved all existing political parties and asked all Iranians
to join his newly established Iranian People’s Resurgence Party (Hezb-e-Rastakiz-e
Mellat-e Iran). Facing the expected resistance to this unilateral authoritarian decree he
also asked those who did not agree with his one-party political system to pack and leave
the country (Banuazizi, 1976, p. 476). Torbat (2002, p. 274) contends that “a number of
political activists and academics who could not tolerate the Shah’s repression gradually
started to leave the country”. In the meantime, affluent upper and middle-class families
continued to send their offspring abroad to pursue their higher education. According to
one study, during the 1977-1978 academic year alone there were about 100,000 Iranians
studying abroad, of whom 36,200 were enrolled in American institutions (Hakimzadeh,
2006, p. 2). But probably the third and the most significant factor for emigration during
this decade was the flight of the Shah’s supporters (royalists) and members of religious
minority groups particularly the Jews and the Baha’is. The former group comprised
mainly of the families closely associated with the monarch-government bureaucrats,
military personnel and the upper echelon of the business community who were tipped off
about the imminent collapse of the Shah’s regime and left the country “with significant
liquidated assets in hand” (Hakimzadeh, 2006).
After the 1979 revolution Iran experienced the highest level of emigration in its recent
history during the 1981-1990 period, generally identified by observers as the “second
wave of emigration”. While there was more than fourfold increase in the number of
immigrants during the 1970-1980 period compared to previous decade (10,291 and
46,152, respectively); the 1981-1990 period stands out with another fourfold increase in
the number of those who left Iran, with substantial numbers being individuals with
tertiary level of education and special skills[6]. The second wave included professionals,
academics, members of the left-wing parties and organizations, women escaping
religious and ideological restrictions and gender-based discrimination, and the draft-age
men trying to escape the military service and fighting during the eight-year war between
Iran and Iraq (1980-1988). In his analysis of the Iranian brain drain particularly to the
USA, Torbat (2002, pp. 275-6) attributes two actions by the Islamic government to the
surge in emigration during the 1980s. First, purging the skilled workers and experienced
professionals who were affiliated with the ancien regime in a systematic government
“cleansing campaign” ( paksazi ) and replacing them with government sympathizers and
supporters of the Islamist ideology. Second, launching the “Cultural Revolution”
(Enghelab-e Farhangi ) in 1980 that aimed to “de-Westernize” the institutions of higher
education and purge secular, pro-Western faculty opposing Islamization plans which
resulted in closing the universities for almost three years[7]. The decade also witnessed
the highest numbers of Iranian refugees seeking for asylum as a large-scale crackdown
and execution of political opponents that left no other choice for many than to flee the
country[8]. Although with less intensity, the US Government continued to admit
112,597 Iranian immigrants during the 1991-2000 period compared with 154,857 for
previous decade (Hakimzadeh, 2006). But compared to the 1980s and early 1990s the
number of Iranian refugees and asylum seekers has been on the rise since the mid-1990s
even though fewer Iranian immigrants have been admitted to the USA. The estimates by
the UNHCR indicate that in 2004 Iran ranked tenth among countries of origin for asylum
seekers across Europe; and by the end of 2005 “there were 111,684 refugees, asylum
seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPS) and other persons of concern from Iran
worldwide of which 20,541 were hosted by the United States” (Hakimzadeh, 2006)[9].
During the 2006-2008 period Iran ranked very high among various nationalities and
countries of origin (third in 2006 and 2007, and fourth in 2008) thus signaling possible
changes in social, economic, and political conditions within Iran[10]. In the aftermath of
controversial June 2009 presidential election there has been an increase in the number of
Iranians, mostly educated and skilled, who have left Iran and applied for asylum in
Western countries. For instance, between January and July 2009 Turkey processed
150 applications for asylum per month from Iran, with the numbers reaching an average
of 250 per month from August 2009 to March 2010. Asylum applications in Germany
also had an 80 percent increase (Mardomak, 2010a).
In her analysis of immigration cycles of Iranians to the US Hakimzadeh (2006) also
identifies a “third emigration wave”, roughly from the mid-1990s onwards that in
contrast to the previous two waves is much smaller in size. She also identifies two “very
distinct” populations during this last wave comprised of “highly skilled individuals”
leaving universities and research institutions, and the “working-class labor migrants
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and economic refugees” who sometimes have “lower education levels and less
transferable skills than previous emigrants”. My focus in this study is emigration of the
highly skilled Iranians during the third wave (mid-1990s to present) who contribute to
Iran’s brain drain. In the following pages I will examine several dimensions of brain
drain, namely, national and global reasons; extent and costs; and educational,
professional, and cultural profiles of Iranian immigrants in the USA.
24
National and global reasons for Iran’s brain drain
According to one estimate approximately 800,000 individuals join the labor force in Iran
each year, of which about 300,000 are university graduates. However, only 25 percent of
the college educated individuals are able to find jobs (Iran Daily, 2005b). With
unemployment rate of about 20 percent the Iranian Government has had a hard time in
creating jobs for an increasing army of the unemployed, particularly the young and
educated. It is a well-worn and oft-repeated fact-based cliché that many university
teachers and students in Iran have to “moonlight as cab drivers to make ends meet”
(Dehghanpisheh, 2004). The government’s control of almost four-fifth of Iran’s economy,
economic mismanagement, and corruption at all levels of the bureaucracy further
hampers the private sector’s ability to expand and create jobs and hence encourages
capital flight (Thomas, 2006, p. 1). Yet, despite the apparent damage to Iran’s economy
the government does not prevent the out-migration of people for at least three reasons.
First, Iran’s economy cannot provide adequate jobs for the country’s educated and
skilled workforce; and creating good paying jobs for the educated and skilled Iranians is a
costly undertaking that may be well beyond the government’s means. Based on one
estimate, in 2005 it would have cost the government around $18,000 in order to create one
new job for skilled workers – certainly not an economically feasible option (Iran Daily,
2005a). An example of post-revolution Iran’s dilemma in training an educated labor force,
was the government’s decision to open up teacher training and technical colleges and
semi-private universities known as “Free University” (daneshgah-e azad ) in all provinces.
With less rigorous application procedures and no entrance exams these colleges and
universities were easier to get in and reportedly provided lower standard educational
curricula. Related to the Free University’s medical school graduates in particular, one
observer and practitioner called the plan “a grave mistake” that eventually “contributed to
an oversupply of physicians in the country – a situation worse than not having enough
doctors” (Saidi, 2006, p. 433). It is not a secret that many graduates of its medical schools
cannot secure a job in their profession unless they are willing to serve in outlying
“deprived” regions (manategh-e mahroom), further leading to their desire to leave. Saidi
also observes that a major part of the physician brain drain pool after the 1979 revolution
comprised of those “who have had part or all of their education and training in Western
countries”, and once back home faced a culture shock and perceived themselves as
“academic elites” who deserved a much better treatment than others. Often frustrated
with their country’s inability to accommodate their needs and their own inability to adjust,
this latter group returned “right back where they came from” (Saidi, 2006, p. 434). The
flight of Iranian physicians has continued to the present time, with most coming to the US
to continue their studies, work or both[11]. In his assessment of the share of a global
physician brain drain for several advanced industrialized nations Mullan (2005, p. 1812)
puts the number of Iranian International Medical Graduates (IMGs) in the US at 4,002,
or 0.5 percent of its total physician labor force[12].
Second, adding insult to injury, many of the young educated Iranians have
been exposed to the outside culture, mostly Western, either via the internet and satellite
television or by traveling abroad; and have grown impatient with the government’s
restrictions on social interactions and democratic processes such as the freedom of the
press and individual expression (Dehghanpisheh, 2004). On the other hand, keeping
several hundred thousand unemployed and discontented young educated Iranians
would be a recipe for political and social crisis and as one observer notes, in the absence of
social and economic opportunities “these highly educated citizens could well contribute
to an effective civil opposition” (Dehghanpisheh, 2004). The best example in this case is
the composition of the so-called Green Movement supporters in Iran that emerged in the
aftermath of the June 2009 controversial presidential election who accused the Iranian
Government of rigging the election results that led to the defeat of their candidates
(Moussavi and Karroubi) and effectively sealed the second-term presidency for the
incumbent President (Ahmadinejad). In his analysis of the clashes between protesters
and the government and the latter’s “bloody” repression tactics Athanasiadis (2009)
concludes that “a galaxy of disparate and overlapping causes and social groups –
human rights advocates, discontented clerics, women’s groups, students, and
unemployed workers” made up the Green Movement’s base; with student groups and
committees at major universities comprising the movement’s core organizational body.
Iranian students’ presence in Iranian political scene predates the revolution. But
with their increasing disillusion about the Islamic government’s objectives, direction,
and repressive strategies to govern their participation in Iran’s democratic movement
in the past two decades has intensified, the latest being the Iranian Government’s
violent confrontation with student protests in December 2009[13]. The level and
intensity of students’ dissatisfaction with and opposition to the government’s handling
issues of both academic and social concern has reached an alarming level; and a
government official recently acknowledged that based on existing data in the 2009
presidential election 70 percent of students voted against Ahmadinejad’ re-election
(Rooz Online, 2009). According to a United Nations report since the controversial June
2009 presidential election and ensuing street violence more than 4,200 Iranians have
applied for refugee status worldwide, with students comprising a sizeable portion of
this refugee population. For instance, Hamid Dabashi, an Iranian American professor
at Columbia University is quoted as saying that the level of inquiry by students in Iran
who have contacted him and wanted to come to the USA in 2009 was “more than
20 times the rate of previous years,” and that it was “mind-boggling how many
extremely accomplished young people were trying to come abroad” (Stecklow and
Fassihi, 2009)[14].
Third, an often overlooked and unacknowledged factor that eventually leads to brain
drain is Iran’s rigorous university entrance exams known as “concours”[15] that secure
high school graduates a seat at national state-sponsored universities. But since the
available seats are limited this means that on average only 10-12 percent of applicants
can gain entry, leaving the rest behind who then join others who failed previous years’
entry exams[16]. Thus, if they can afford, many students who fail the concours opt
for leaving Iran to pursue their education mostly in Europe, the USA, Canada,
and increasingly in the past decade Australia. Even those who are admitted
to the universities often become frustrated with Islamization of higher education
institutions in terms of the curricula and social environment, inadequate faculty
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and staff, lack of institutional support for research, and repression of students’ freedom
of expression and exchange of ideas in academia. Restrictive government policies have
also put Iranian academics in a bind, as the intellectual environment of Iranian
universities has increasingly succumbed to the ongoing political crises and the
government’s religious ideological control. In his brief analysis of the causes of Iran’s
brain drain Kamyab (2007) provides a succinct account of this problem:
Scholars and scientists feel excluded from decision making their expertise qualifies them
for and believe their work is unappreciated. An Education Ministry official states that a
large number of university scholars who go abroad on sabbaticals contact their home
institutions requesting unpaid leave: a tacit way of acknowledging they intend to stay
abroad. Officials attribute this to lack of resources, including insufficient research facilities
and laboratories, a lack of new books and access to education websites as well as low salaries.
The extent and costs of Iran’s brain drain
One of the most common critiques of the brain drain process in both scholarly works and
popular discussions, is its negative and often disastrous outcomes for the sending country
while the host nation rips all the benefits not only in terms of utilizing the skills and
educational talents, but also the costs involved in educating each student on both sides[17].
Iran’s educational system is predominantly government sponsored and supported by
extensive subsidies and therefore it is difficult to accurately calculate the per capita cost of
education at different levels; and except for for-profit private schools that are tuition-driven
all state-sponsored K-12 schools in Iran are tuition free. Since in both Iran and the USA the
K-12 education is heavily subsidized, a strong case can be made for the dollar amount saved
by admitting foreign born immigrants with post-secondary education and degrees, in this
case from Iran. For instance, in state-run universities students who pass the nation-wide
“concours” not only pay no tuition; their room and board is also free of charge[18]. In
contrast, based on one estimate the average “transcript cost”, or the tuition for a student at
undergraduate level in the University of Florida system for 2006-2007 academic year was
$33,672 (Johnson, cf. Lederman, 2009)[19]. Since there are no available data for Iranian-born
population with tertiary education in the USA in 2006, we cannot use the above estimate
and calculate the savings for the USA in 2006-2007 by having these educated Iranians
admitted to American universities. But the census data indicate that in 1997 there were
165,000 Iranian born individuals 25 years or older with tertiary education in the USA
(Torbat, 2002, p. 281, Table 2). If we adjust the estimated cost of four-year higher education
($33,672) for inflation in reverse, back in 1997 each Iranian-born immigrant with tertiary
education would have cost the USA $28,072[20]. Thus, the total cost for training 165,000
Iranian-born college graduates in 1997 would have been more than $4.6 billion,
a considerable savings for the USA and a huge loss for Iran[21]. Iranian-born immigrants
with post-graduate degrees provide even more savings for the American society, and the
case can be made for Iran-educated Iranian-American physicians: Iran’s state-run medical
schools provide free education for those who pass the national “concours”; while the cost of
medical school at the University of Florida system for the 2005-2006 academic year was a
whopping $259,781 (Lederman, 2009).
Educational, professional and cultural profiles of Iranians in the USA
A dominant theme both in scholarly works and in newspaper articles and blogs about
Iran’s brain drain particularly those who have come to the USA, is their high levels
of education. For example, in 1998 immigrants of Iranian ancestry in the USA only
trailed Egyptians as having the highest levels of education (Table I). In addition, persons
of Iranian ancestry far surpass the overall US population in terms of their educational
achievements. As is demonstrated in Table II, data for 2000 and 2007 indicate that
Iranian immigrants with a bachelor’s or higher degrees who have been admitted to the
USA are maintaining a constant 33 percent gap with the rest of population. To be sure,
this is not the case of a nation with people of superior intelligence and learning abilities.
Rather, similar to some other Asian nations the secret lies in Iran’s educational system
particularly at the high school level which “places a premium on science and exposes
students to subjects Americans don’t encounter until college”. This tradition is extended
to undergraduate programs whereby students learn subjects that are normally taught at
the graduate level in American universities (Molavi, 2008).
Similar to some other developing nations, this rather-exceptional level of skills and
education among Iranian immigrants is an indication of Iran’s approach to educational
programs and appreciation of scientific research and development. For example, a recent
report by the research firm Science-Metrix that examines the extent of growth in
scientific and technological research in the past two decades has concluded that while
the aggregate scientific output in the fields of inorganic and nuclear chemistry, nuclear
and particle physics, and nuclear technology has increased by 34 percent at the world
level, that of Iran has increased by 84 percent with Iran and Turkey “leading the pack”
among all countries in the Middle East (Archambaud, 2010, p. 5). Another report by the
University of Hong Kong compares growth and/or decline of biomedical research for
various countries, indicating remarkable advancement by Iranian researchers in this
area that has improved the country’s global ranking from 51 in 2000 to 26 in 2009.
Certainly, Iran’s scientific achievements in the past three decades cannot be discounted,
Ancestry
Bachelor’s degree or higher
Graduate degree or higher
Egyptian
Iranian
Nigerian
Russian
Turkish
60.4
56.2
52.9
49.0
40.9
25.6
26.0
26.3
24.3
22.1
Bachelor’s degree or higher
Graduate degree or higher
27
Table I.
Top five ancestry groups
with highest levels of
education in the USA,
1998 (percent)
Source: US Census Bureau (1990a)
Educational attainment
(highest level)
Migration of
Iranians to the
United States
1990
2000
2007
Iranian ancestry Iranian ancestry US total Iranian ancestry US total
56.2
26.0
57.2
27.5
24.4
8.9
60.1
29.0
27.5
10.1
Source: 1990 data: US Census Bureau (1990b); 2000 data: US Census Bureau, 2000 Summary File 4,
cf. Mostashari and Khodamhosseini (2004); 2007 data: US Census Bureau, 2007 American Community
Survey 1-year Estimates
Table II.
Highest educational
attainment levels for
persons of Iranian
ancestry in the USA,
1990-2007 (percent)
IJSE
39,1/2
28
as they with no doubt have multiplier effects within the Iranian scientific and academic
community (Figure 1)[22].
The expected outcome of Iranian immigrants’ high level of educational achievement
in the USA has been their strong and prominent presence in both the academia and
corporations. For example, The Iranian Studies Group (ISG) at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology compiled a list of 50 Iranians in senior leadership positions in
Fortune 500 companies and other corporations with $200 million or more in assets and
value. The names include General Electric, AT&T, IBM, Verizon, Intel, Cisco, Motorola,
Oracle, Nortel Networks, Lucent Technologies, and eBay. In 2004 the Fortune magazine
also ranked Pierre Omidyar, E-Bay’s Iranian American founder and chairman as the
“second richest American entrepreneur under age 40” (McIntosh, 2004). Iranian
Americans also have a strong presence in management and professional-level
occupations (Table III).
Iranian-Americans’ presence in the American academic circles is also significant.
Using census data for 1997 Torbat (2002, p. 285) estimates that there were close to
4,000 Iranian professors who taught and conducted research in American colleges and
universities. Later, in 2004 the ISG reported that more than 500 Iranian American
professors were teaching and conducting research at “top-ranked” universities. The long
list included MIT, Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Carnegie Mellon, the University
Ranking based on number of articles
Figure 1.
Ranking by number of
biomedical articles for
selected countries,
2000 and 2009
US
China
United Kingdom
Japan
Germany
Italy
France
Canada
Spain
Australia
The Netherlands
South korea
India
Brazil
Turkey
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Belgium
Israel
Denmark
Poland
Greece
Finland
Australia
Iran
Norway
portugal
Hong kong
Mexico
Ireland
Singapore
Newzealand
Czech Republic
Argentina
South Africa
Hungary
Thailand
Russia
Egypt
Slovakia
Tunisia
Chile
Pakistan
Malaysia
Serbia
Croatia
Saudi Arabia
Nigeria
Slovenia
1
1
2
3
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
40
20
9
3
2
4
4
5
6
7
8
6
5
7
8
10
11
14
15
20
24
12
13
26
18
16
21
17
27
22
23
51
25
37
28
30
35
36
29
33
31
32
34
38
39
42
39
56
43
52
48
44
40
0
Ranking in 2009
Source: Clinical Trial Magnifier (2009), Vol. 2 No. 12, p. 72
20
Ranking in 2000
41
40
49
58
of California system (Berkeley, UCLA, etc.), Stanford, the University of
Southern California, Georgia Tech, University of Wisconsin, University of Michigan,
University of Illinois, University of Maryland, California Institute of Technology,
Boston University, and George Washington University (McIntosh, 2004).
The leading Iranian-American organizations and several web sites run by Iranian
expatriates often boast of star qualities and conspicuous presence of highly educated
Iranian-Americans in the business, academic and scientific circles. Sometimes the
media and freelance Iranian journalists also tell tales of “head hunting” or “snatching”
of Iranian students or graduates from top Iranian universities by the alleged agents of
top-ranking universities or corporations in the USA or Europe. Initially, head hunting
emerged in the late 1960s in response to a global demand for the most talented and
educated individuals who can manage knowledge-intensive industries. With their
clients being organizations and not job candidates, headhunters by definition are
“third-party agents” in the corporate business circles “who are paid a fee by employers
for finding job candidates for them” (Finlay and Coverdill, 2002, p. 2). Related to Iran, in
his account of the dynamics of brain drain Molavi (2008) provides the following
anecdotal example:
Migration of
Iranians to the
United States
29
Never far behind, Western tech companies have also started snatching them [educated
Iranians] up. Silicon Valley companies from Google to Yahoo now employ hundreds of
Iranian grads, as do research institutes throughout the West. Olympiad winners are
especially attractive; according to the Iranian press, up to 90 percent of them now leave the
country for graduate school or work abroad.
Supporting above claims, in 2009 a weekly magazine of Iran’s Agency for Management
and Planning (Sazeman-e modiriyat va BarnameRizi-e Iran) reported that out of
125 Iranian students that had participated in international Olympiads 90 students were
studying in American universities (Tale’ii, 2010). But not all educated Iranians are
recruited by head hunters. The case of emigration of faculty and graduates of
one prestigious university in Iran to the USA, Canada and Australia, namely, the
Sharif University of Science and Technology (SUST) in Tehran is a good example. In
my personal interviews with several graduate students from Sharif University who
are in PhD or post-doctoral engineering programs at the University of Iowa, they
also considered the “head hunting” practices more as a myth rather than a reality.
Furthermore, they indicated that almost all graduates from Iran’s elite universities
directly contact faculty in American universities with whom they share similar research
interests; adding that getting admitted in American universities is an arduous task
requiring hard work and high quality research, often with little or no encouragement and
incentive offered by the host country[23]. Funded by the Iranian Government as a public
university, SUST is considered as one of the top three institutions of higher education
Occupation type
Management, professional and related occupations
Sales and office occupations
Service occupations
1990a
2000b
41.9
35.0
9.3
51.8
27.5
9.0
Source: aUS Census Bureau (1990a, b), Foreign Born Population (Torbat, 2002, p. 282); bUS Census
Bureau, 2000 (Hakimzadeh and Dixon, 2006)
Table III.
Major occupational
characteristics of Iranians
in the USA, 1990 and
2000 (percent)
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39,1/2
30
in Iran[24]. Known for its world-class programs in the fields of science and engineering,
SUST graduates are being sought after and recruited by top-ranking universities
particularly in the USA. In a report titled The Star Students of the Islamic Republic
Molavi (2008) traces SUST’s track record to few years back:
In 2003, administrators at Stanford University’s Electrical Engineering Department were
startled when a group of foreign students aced the notoriously difficult PhD entrance exam,
getting some of the highest scores ever. That the wiz kids weren’t American wasn’t odd;
students from Asia and elsewhere excel in US programs. The surprising thing, say Stanford
administrators, is that the majority came from one country and one school: Sharif University
of Science and Technology in Iran.
Although in 2010 SUST was ranked 549 in the world among top 600 universities, its
admirers often boast of the statement made by Bruce Wooley, the former Chair of
Electrical Engineering Department at Stanford University who once announced that
“without a doubt the finest university in the world preparing undergraduate electrical
engineers is Sharif University of Technology in Tehran” (Molavi, 2008)[25]. Students
from SUST and other top universities in Iran have also gained a reputation as being
“superstars” in International Olympiads, often “taking home trophies in physics,
mathematics, chemistry and robotics” (Molavi, 2008).
Emergence of “diasporic nationalism”
A distinct characteristic of the post-Fordist immigrant population is its peculiar form of
nationalism and attachment to the source country’s culture and identity, clearly setting
them apart from pre-1970 period immigrants. More clearly, the post-Fordist phase of
global economy’s need for a highly mobile skilled labor force transcends extreme
nationalistic sentiments that prescribe unconditional allegiance to the source country on
one hand; and the conventional assimilationist theories that assume and predict
immigrants’ mechanical acceptance and adoption of host society’s cultural values and
consequent detachment from their home country’s cultural traditions on the other (Park
and Burgess, 1921; Gordon, 1964). Instead, immigrants have substituted a new and more
flexible form of international cultural identity while navigating the host society’s new
cultural environment for a more rigid political-ideological identity that is based on
recognition of clear center-periphery divide. Accordingly, Iranian immigrants in the US
and elsewhere have become part of this global diaspora who collectively share certain
cultural values and ideals[26]. This is supported by two recent opinion polls of
Iranian-Americans in 2008 and 2009, whereby more than half of respondents indicated
that their ethnic heritage is a very important factor in defining their identity in the USA.
The majority of diasporic Iranian-Americans are also concerned about Iran’s social and
political environment indicated by their support of human rights and democracy
(Table IV)[27]. In his assessment of assimilationist theories and their relevance to the
new phase of globalization Rizvi (2005, p. 184) provides an interesting insight:
The popular idea of brain drain appears to link, in an essentialist way, each person’s identity
to one and only one nation, to which individuals are expected to display loyalty. Whether this
idea is sustainable in an era of globalization is highly questionable, as it is the notion that it is
only possible to make a contribution to the development of a nation by being located within
its physical boundaries. This is a fundamentally misguided way of looking at transnational
mobility in the global era.
As an indication of this new trend, Iranian-Americans in the last decade have formed
several organizations that are mostly supported by educated and professional middleand upper-class Iranians and are geared toward promotion of Iranian culture and
national and ethnic pride, and pursuing economic and political interests. The latest of
such effort was a campaign launched by the Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian
Americans (PAAIA) aimed at mobilizing Iranian-Americans to participate in the 2010
census. In an interview the organization’s director considered the campaign “as much a
matter of pride as it is an effort to gain information about the Iranian-American
community”. She further stated that:
Migration of
Iranians to the
United States
31
[. . .] even Iranian Americans who grew up in the United States will go to the trouble of filling
in “Iranian” instead of simply checking the “White box” including the second generation
Iranians – the majority of whom have been born and raised in the United States
(America.gov., 2010).
Thus, unlike other protected ethnic groups that often use their “minority” status as a
protective shield against the majority groups’ discriminatory practices, Iranians do not
consider themselves a “minority” yet insist on preservation and promotion of their
“Iranianness” as part of their diasporic identity. Mostofi’s (2003, pp. 688-9) observation
of Iranian-Americans in southern California provides a good example:
Iranianness, as a diasporic creation, has not maintained nationalistic characteristics in the
sense that it does not correlate with the contemporary nationalism expressed in Iran. In
diaspora, the flag, national anthem, and political consciousness are all drastically different
than those in Iran. Iranian immigrants have not only become US citizens, but they are also
outside the realms of Iranian nation-state authority. Thus, Iranianness can be understood as a
collective identity that is devoid of a physical location (like a nation) but that incorporates the
memories of a homeland along with its geography and history, as well as the process of
immigration and experiences in a new country.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have examined the issue of brain drain as it pertains to Iranian
immigrants in the last three decades, a period which David Harvey (1991) has identified
as the “post-Fordist flexible accumulation” phase of globalization. I have tried to
document the complexity of center-periphery relations which direct and often dictate the
parameters for a global brain drain. There is no question that socio-economic
and political conditions in the sending country play a significant role in the emigration
Issue
2008
Response level (%)
2009
Importance of their ethnic
Very important (56)
heritage in defining their identity
Level at which they follow news Very closely (41)
from Iran
The most important issue related 1. Promotion of human rights
to US-Iran relations
and democracy in Iran (70)
Very important (55)
Very closely (50)
1. Promotion of human rights
and democracy in Iran (72)
Source: Table constructed based on information in Zogby International (2008, pp. 13-22, 2009,
pp. 17-20)
Table IV.
Attachment of Iranian
Americans to their home
country, 2009
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39,1/2
32
of educated and skilled individuals. But it would be a simplistic and ahistorical analysis
if we assume that decisions by both individuals and government/institutional agents in
the sending country are made independent of global forces, as the latter often put
limitations on and dictate the course and direction of migration in the periphery. For
example, during the colonial era migration patterns were mostly dictated by colonial
powers’ need to expand the colonies as well as maintain social order in the center. Thus,
except for forced migration of the African slave populations migration was mostly from
center countries to the colonies and not vice versa[28]. The post-Second World War
period’s anti-colonial movements and wars of independence in many colonies resulted in
a new form of social disintegration and population mobility, as the indigenous ruling
elite and certain members of the intelligentsia and government bureaucracies that
helped to maintain dependency relations with the center (dependent elite) were forced to
immigrate to the center. Since the newly established governments were usually
incapable of delivering what they initially promised, this first wave of emigration from
post-independence/post-revolution countries in the periphery has often been followed by
consecutive waves. Externally, colonial powers’ national and global interests are
often at odds with the policies and ideological direction of post-revolution nations in the
periphery, which leads the former to impose punitive economic and political restrictions
on the latter and to court and at times encourage the dissident populations to leave. Some
classic examples related to the American colonial interests are Cuba after 1959, Vietnam
after 1975, and Iran after 1979 (Chaichian, 2008a, Epilogue). Needless to say, despite
similarities in migration patterns, internal socio-economic, political, and cultural
dynamics and incentives to emigrate are unique to each nation.
Arguably Iran is no longer located in the periphery, and in the last two decades it has
been able to elevate her status and join the countries in the semi-periphery[29]. This is
signified by Iran’s level of advancement in scientific research and development,
industrial design and production, as well as relative ability and autonomy to navigate in
a complex web of international political and economic relations. This means that as a
country in transition Iran should be less susceptible to domineering colonial and
imperial core-periphery relations. However, the USA and other European nations have
used direct and indirect political pressures such as severing diplomatic ties with Iran,
providing financial and ideological support for anti-regime opposition groups to
expedite regime change, and the threat of military strikes and/or outright plans to invade
and occupy the country in order to bring the non-complying Iranian regime
to submission. It is within the above-described context that Iran’s consecutive “waves”
of emigration should also be examined. Related to brain drain, on the surface it appears
that internal factors in Iran have been the main variables that have encouraged
emigration of the educated elite. But the preceding analysis suggests that they often
operate under the influence of global economic, political and ideological pressures. It is
also important to recognize the fact that receiving nations always have the final say in
the numbers, conditions, and qualifications of those who are admitted regardless of
individual decisions to emigrate and or social conditions in the sending countries.
Notes
1. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
2. The top five countries in granting asylum in 2003 were Pakistan (1.1 million); Iran (985,000);
Germany (960,000); Tanzania (650,000); and the USA (452,000).
3. This argument is very similar to the developmentalist ideology of the Fordist-Keynsian
period, which on the surface sympathizes with the nations in the periphery, but does not
acknowledge the new reality of the post-1970s new phase of globalization as formulated by
David Harvey.
Migration of
Iranians to the
United States
4. Colonization of North American territories is a prime example, whereby even up until the
end of Second World War the majority of immigrants originated from European countries.
5. This group is commonly known as the “comprador bourgeoisie”.
6. See data by the US Department of Homeland Security in Hakimzadeh (2006).
7. This ideological tendency has resurfaced several times since the cultural revolution years;
the latest being the statement made by the current Science and Technology Minister,
Kamran Daneshjou, that “the country’s universities have no need for ‘secular’ professors,
and educators who do not subscribe to the Islamic worldview have no place in Iran’s
universities” (Radio Zamaneh, 2010).
8. For related data see Iranian Refugees’ Alliance Inc. (2008).
9. As Martin and Hoefer (2009, p. 3) report, this is in spite of the fact that in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001 fewer refugees have been admitted to the USA “due partly to changes in
security procedures and admission requirements”.
10. For an interesting account of the Iranian refugee situation in 2009 in the aftermath of
controversial presidential election and violent street protests and confrontations see
Stecklow and Fassihi (2009).
11. One of Iran’s prestigious medical schools prior to revolution was Shiraz University in the
southern city of Shiraz that was modeled after American schools where all instruction was in
English. Although aimed at educating Iranian doctors to serve in Iran (a post-colonial
strategy by the USA to help Iran’s development during the “Fordist-Keynsian” period), the
plan backfired and according to Ronaghy et al. (1972), Joorabchi, 1973) “fully one-half the
student body graduating from Pahlavi University in the years 1961 and 1962 eventually
emigrated to the United States”. By 1970 more than 1,000 Iranian physicians, mostly with a
specialty were practicing in the USA alone. At the same time, of a total of 7,800 practicing
physicians in Iran only 2,087 had a specialty (Joorabchi, 1973, p. 44).
12. Mullan’s data do not include any Iranian IMGs for the other three countries, an indication of
their low/insignificant numbers.
13. For a brief chronology of earlier student opposition movements, see Mahdi (1999) and Torbat
(2002, p. 287-8).
14. Although anecdotal, my own observation in a recent trip to Iran supports Dabashi’s
statement: “In December 2009 I was invited to give a talk to a group of students at Tehran
University and asked for a show of hands about their interest to study abroad, particularly in
the United States – the response was almost unanimously affirmative!”.
15. Adopted from the French word “concours” that means “examination”.
16. On this issue, also see Torbat (2002, pp. 286-9).
17. Examples of a more rigorous, scholarly works are Carrington and Detragiache (1999),
Murru (2008), Rizvi (2005), Torbat (2002), and Wickramasekara (2002). A plethora of
bloggers and journalists have also tackled the brain drain topic – here are some examples:
Esfandiari (2004), Javedanfar (2008), Kamyab (2007), Parker (2004), Rafsanjani (2007), and
Stecklow and Fassihi (2009).
18. In some state-run universities students are issued highly subsidized low-cost food tokens for
daily meals, but that is the extent of their cost for higher education.
33
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39,1/2
19. According to Lederman (2009) to calculate transcript costs “the total number of credit hours
students take are multiplied by the cost per credit hour, and then divided by the number of
degrees awarded”.
20. I adjusted the 2006 figure for a 2 percent inflation rate per year in reverse, arriving at the
calculated cost of $28,072 for 1997.
34
21. In 2004 the Iranian Government estimated that brain drain’s annual cost for the Iranian
economy was about $38 billion (Iran Daily, 2005b).
22. However, the findings by Science-Metrix group are disputed inside Iran. For instance,
Mohammad Yalpani, a Chemistry Professor at Sharif University is quoted as questioning the
ethical violation of publishing scientific papers and their quality, as “some articles are
published multiple times under different titles, and none of the published articles have any
industrial applications either in Iran or abroad” (Mardomak, 2010b).
23. I conducted personal interviews at the University of Iowa campus in Iowa City, Iowa
(February 20, 2010), and students wished to remain anonymous. This was a small
“snowball” sample and hence should not be considered as representative of all SUST
graduates in the USA. Of the 18 Iranian students enrolled at the University of Iowa at the
time of my interview seven were Sharif University graduates (six male and one female), all in
their mid-to-late 20s.
24. The other two are the University of Tehran and the Isfahan University of Technology.
25. For a ranking of top universities in the world in 2010-2011 visit the QS World University
Rankings: www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings
26. Safran (1999, p. 365) defines “diaspora” as expatriate minority communities who: (1) have
been dispersed from a specific original “center” to two or more “peripheral”, or foreign,
regions; (2) they retain a memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland-its physical
location, history, and achievements; (3) they believe that they are not – and perhaps cannot
be fully accepted by their host country and therefore feel partly alienated and insulated from
it; (4) they regard their ancestral home as their true, ideal home and as the place to which
they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return – when conditions are
appropriate; (5) they believe that they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance
or restoration of their original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; and (6) they
continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and
their ethno-communal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence
of such a relationship.
27. This study however does not distinguish between Iran born immigrants and those who have
been born in the USA.
28. Colonization of North American territories is a prime example, whereby even up until after
Second World War the majority of immigrants originated from European countries.
29. I have earlier defined the core-periphery concepts in the theoretical section.
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About the author
Mohammad A. Chaichian is Professor and Coordinator of Sociology and International Studies
programs at Mount Mercy University. He is the recipient of the Feld Chair Award for Excellence
in Teaching and Community Service (2008-2010). He has published numerous articles on
contemporary Iran, immigration issues, race relations, and urban political economy; and has
authored two books, White Racism on the Western Urban Frontier: Dynamics of Race and Class
in Dubuque, Iowa (2006, Africa World Press); and Town and Country in the Middle East: Iran and
Egypt in the Transition to Globalization (2008, Lexington Books). Currently, he is working on his
third book Empire and the Wall that focuses on the significance of building walls to either avert
racial-ethnic or gender-based conflicts, or subjugate and control the colonized populations during
various historical phases of globalization. He has also conducted workshops and given talks
about racial segregation in South Carolina and Iowa, as well as racial-ethnic conflicts in the
Middle East particularly related to the Palestinian-Israeli relations. Mohammad A. Chaichian can
be contacted at: mchaich@mtmercy.edu
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