II.#Methodologies#for#Constitutional#Arguments##
III.#Counter6Majoritarian#Difficulty#
IV.#Bank#Controversy##
a. McCulloch#v.#Maryland#
V.#Presidential#Power##
#
a.#Dellinger#
#
b.#Prize#Cases.##
#
c.#Ex.#Parte#Merryman##
VI.#Judicial#Power#
a. Ware#v.#Hylton##
b. Hylton#v.#U.S.##
c. Chisolm#v.#Georgia#
d. Stuarat#v.#Laird##
e. Marbury#v.#Madison##
f. Ex.#Parte#Milligan##
VII.#Natural#Rights##
a. Fletcher#v.#Peck#
b. Calder#v.#Bull#
VIII.##Commerce#Clause#Authority#
a. Gibbons#v.#Ogden#
b. Wilson#v.#Black6Bird#Creek#Marsh#co.##
c. U.S.#v.#DeWitt#
d. U.S.#v.#E.C.#Knight#(sugar#trust)#
e. Champion#v.#Ames#(lottery#cases)##
f. Hammer#v.#Dagenhart#(child#labor#laws)#
g. West#Coast#Hotel#v.#Parrish#(womens#labor)#not#ICC#
h. United#States#v.#Carolene#Products#(not#ICC)#
i. NLRB#v.#Jones#and#Laughlin#Steel#Corp##
j. United#States#v.#Darby#
k. Wickard#v.#Filburn##
l. Heart#of#Atlanta#Motel#v.#US#
m. Katzenbach#v.#McClung##
n. Daniel#v.#Paul#
o. Perez#v.#U.S.#
p. U.S.#V.#Lopez#
q. U.S.#v.#Morrison##
r. Raich#v.#Gonzalez.##
IX.#Economic#Rights#and#Substantive#Due#Process#Clause#
a. Hepburn#v.#Griswald#
b. Knox#v.#Lee#
c. Julliard#v.#Greenman##
d. Matter#of#Jacobs#
e. Munn#v.#Illinois#
f. Railroad#Commission#Cases#
g. Santa#Clara#County#v.#Southern#Pacific#Railroad#
h. Minnesota#Rate#Cases#
i. Lochner#v.#New#York#
j. Nebbia#v.#NY#
k. Home#building#and#Loan#v.#Blaisdell#(mortgage#moratorium)#
l. West#Coast#Hotel#v.#Parrish#
m. United#States#v.#Carolene#Products#
n. Williamson#v.#Lee#Optical#Co.##
X.#Taxing#and#Spending#Power##
#
a.#Bailey#v.#Drexel#Furniture#Co.##
b.#California#Railroad#Cases#
c.#U.S.#v.#Butler#
d.#Sonzinsky#v.#U.S.#
e.#Steward#Machine#Company#v.#Davis#
f.#Helvering#v.#Davis#
g.#South#Dakota#v.#Dole##
XI.#Minority#Rights#and#Constitution#(13th/14th)#
a. Dred#Scott#v.#Sandford#
b. Slaughterhouse#Cases#
c. Minor#v.#Happersett#
XII.#Equal#Protection#Clause#
a. Strauder#v.#West#Virginia##
b. Plessy#v.#Ferguson##
c. Sweatt#v.#Painter#
d. McLaurin#v.#Oklahoma#State#Regents#
e. Brown#v.#Board#of#Education##
f. Bolling#v.#Sharpe#
g. Regents#of#California#v.#Bakke##
h. Grutter#v.#Bollinger#
i. McLaughlin#v.#florida#
j. Loving#v.#Virgina#
XIII.#State#Sovereignty#as#a#Constraint#on#Congress#
a. U.S.#v.#California##
b. National#League#of#Cities#v.#Usery##
c. Garcia#v.#San#Antonio#Metropolitan#Transit#Authority##
d. Judge#Gregory#v.#Governor#Ashcroft##
e. New#York#v.#United#States.##
f. Hodel#v.#Virginia#
g. Printz#v.#United#States##
XIV.#Fundamental#Rights##
a. Palko#v.#Connecticut#
b. Adamson#v.#California##
c. Meyer#v.#Nebraska#
d. Pierce#v.#Society#of#Sisters#
e. Skinner#v.#Oklahoma#
f. Griswold#v.#Connecticut#
g. Eisenstadt#v.#Baird#
h. Carey#v.#Population#Services#International#
i. Roe#v.#Wade#
j. Webster#v.##
k. Planned#Parenthood#v.#Casey##
l. Michael#G.#v.#Gerald#D.##
m. Cruzan#v.#Director#Missouri#Dept.#of#Health##
n. Washington#v.#Glucksberg#
o. Bowers#v.#Hardwick#
p. Lawrence#v.#Texas#
q. Windsor#v.#U.S.##
r. D.C.#v.#Heller#and#National#Federation#of#Independent#Business#v.#Sebellius##
#
I.
The#Bank#Controversy#–#1st#major#constitutional#debate#
a. Madison’s#view#–#said#it#was#beyond#Congress’s#constitutionally#delegated#authority.##
i. Methods#of#Argument#
1. Drafters*Intent*–*I#was#at#the#drafting#of#the#Constitution#and#we#talked#about#it#and#
decided#not#to#include#charters#of#incorporation.#Charters#are#therefore#unconstitutional.#*
2. Plain*Text*–*Article#1,#§#8#does#not#list#this#as#a#power#held#by#Congress.*
a. Intratextualism*–*looks#at#other#enumerated#powers#within#this#article#and#
makes#analogies.#*
3. Structuralism*–*There#is#a#general#structure#of#government#with#three#branches#and#
there#are#finite#enumerated#powers#that#limit#the#government#power.##Only#three#clauses#
could#justify#Congress#establishing#the#bank:*
a. Power#to#lay#and#collect#taxes#–#the#bank#has#nothing#to#do#with#this#though.#*
b. Power#to#borrow#money#–#still#has#nothing#to#do#with#this.#*
c. Necessary#and#Proper#Clause#–#best#argument#but#this#is#ambiguous.#Strict#v.#
Narrow#reading#of#the#text#cannot#resolve#this.#An#overly#broad#reading#would#
give#congress#unlimited#power.#*
4. Ratifiers*Intent*–*this#bill#is#contrary#to#the#spirit#in#which#the#constitution#was#adopted.##*
ii. Madison’s#Rules#of#Interpretation:*
1. Don’t#interpret#in#a#way#that#is#contrary#to#the#structure#of#the#established#system*
2. If#meaning#is#clear,#stick#to#it.#*
3. If#meaning#is#unclear,#pick#the#meaning#that#has#the#better#outcome#(consequentialist)*
4. He#does#not#give#a#hierarchy#of#how#these#methods#should#be#applied.#*
b. Attorney#General’s#Opinion#(Edmund#Randolph)#–#This#is#a#power#grab#on#the#part#of#Congress.##
i. Some#proponents#wrongly#were#relying#on#the#preamble#because#this#was#just#a#declaration#of#
the#views#of#the#convention,#not#operative#law.#Consequentialist#–#a#similar#construction#on#
every#specified#federal#power#will#stretch#the#arms#of#congress#into#the#whole#circle#of#state#
legislation.##
c. Jefferson’s#Critique#of#the#Bank#(Secretary#of#State)#–#If#such#a#latitude#of#construction#be#allowed#in#
this#phrase#as#to#any#non6enumerated#power#it#will#go#to#every#one.##
d. Hamilton’s#Defense#–#the#objections#of#Jefferson#and#Randolph#are#founded#on#a#general#denial#of#
the#authority#of#US#to#erect#corporations#
i. ###Methods#of#Argument##
1. Structural#–#Sovereign#governments#should#have#all#powers#not#expressly#denied#them.#
The#power#to#charter#a#bank#was#not#expressly#denied#to#Congress.#Flexible#reading#of#the#
necessary#and#proper#clause#to#enact#statutes#that#further#the#ends#of#specifically#
enumerated#powers.##
2. Consequentialist#–#if#we#adopt#a#strict#necessity#test#then#congress#will#never#get#
anything#done#because#things#can#rarely#be#said#to#be#strict#necessities.#There#may#be#
several#ways#to#accomplish#a#goal,#with#none#of#them#being#strictly#necessary.##
3. CONTEXTUAL#–#if#the#necessary#and#proper#clause#was#meant#to#restrict#the#powers#of#
congress,#it#would#be#in#§#9,#not#in#§#8.##
4. Practical*Precedent#–#Congress#has#already#passed#laws#to#further#their#ends#through#
means#that#were#not#strictly#necessary.##
ii. Hamilton’s#Test#–#there#must#be#some#nexus#between#the#desired#ends#and#the#means#
necessary#to#accomplish#them.#Whether#the#means#employed,#or#in#this#instance#the#
corporation#erected,#have#a#natural#relation#to#any#of#the#acknowledged#objects#or#lawful#ends#
of#the#government.##
e. Judicial#Examination#of#Congress’#Authority#to#Create#the#Bank#
i. McCulloch(v.(Maryland((Marshall#writing#opinion)#–#uses#this#case#as#an#occasion#to#broadly#
construe#Congress’#powers#and#narrowly#limit#the#authority#of#state#government#to#impede#the#
federal#government.##
ii. Methods#of#argument:#
1. Practical*Precedent#–#congress#has#already#established#the#bank#and#then#made#another#
one.##
2. Structuralist#–#marshall#refutes#he#structural#compact#federalism#argument.#States#are#
subordinate#to#the#federal#government.#The#people#are#sovereign,#not#the#states.##
a. This#scares#states#because#this#ruling#means#that#federal#law#will#always#trump#
state#law#under#the#supremacy#clause.##
3. Consequentialist*–#takes#on#Hamilton’s#view.#If#the#nexus#is#not#present,#the#court#can#
strike#down#the#legislation.##
4. Drafter’s*Intent#–#if#the#drafters#wanted#to#restrict#the#power#of#congress#they#would#
have#made#this#clear#in#the#text#and#consequent#debates#and#federalist#papers.##
5. Textualism#–#why#would#we#need#§9#if#congress#only#had#those#powers#explicitly#lead#
out#in#§8.#
iii. Takeaways#–#adopts#a#flexible#perspective#on#the#scope#of#federal#legislative#power,#rejecting#
strict#necessity,#while#still#requiring#the#statute#be#in#furtherance#of#an#enumerated#power.#He#
asserts#for#the#judiciary#the#power#to#pass#ultimate#judgment#on#whether#a#statute#is#a#genuine#
effort#to#act#in#furtherance#of#an#enumerated#power#or#if#it#instead#is#a#pretextual#attempt#to#
achieve#some#other#purpose.##
f. Demise#of#the#Bank#
i. Andrew#Jackson#veto#Message#–#each#branch#of#the#national#government#can#engage#in#some#
measure#of#independent#constitutional#interpretation#(strong#view#of#separation#of#powers)#
1. Practical*Precedent#–#this#argument#cuts#both#ways,#and#it#actually#points#more#against#
the#bank.#Practical#precedent#is#a#dangerous#source#of#authority.#Argued#for#a#narrower#
approach#to#practical#precedent,#in#terms#of#consistency#required.##
2. Structuralist6#(1)#the#legislature#has#the#power#to#determine#whether#a#particular#
measure#is#necessary#and#proper,#and#from#that#decision#there#is#no#appeal#to#the#court.#
(2)#congress#has#the#power#to#regulate#the#currency,#and#this#power#should#not#be#
transferred#to#a#corporation.#(3)#This#act#takes#away#from#the#states#the#power#to#tax#
business#that#goes#on#in#their#states.#(4)#it#is#possible#to#create#a#national#bank#that#doe#
not#infringe#on#states’#rights#or#the#delegated#powers#of#the#government,#but#this#bill#does#
not#do#it.##
3. Consequentialist#–#rich#and#powerful#people#could#take#over#the#government.##
4. Judicial*Precedent#–#this#does#not#over#turn#McCulloch#because#this#particular#bill#is#
different#from#the#statute#chartering#the#bank.##
#
II.
Presidential#Power##
a. The#Veto#Power##
i. Evolution#of#the#Veto#Power:#at#first#it#was#to#be#used#only#when#the#President#objected#to#a#bill#
as#unconstitutional.#Today,#vetoes#are#used#for#all#kinds#of#reasons,#but#constitutional#
arguments#are#rarely#advanced#in#veto#messages#anymore.#
ii. #Presidential#Authority#to#Decline#to#Execute#Unconstitutional#Statutes#(November#2,#1994),#
Walter(Dellinger.#There#are#circumstances#in#which#the#president#may#appropriately#decline#to#
enforce#a#statute#that#he#views#as#unconstitutional.#He#argues#from#both#judicial#and#practical#
precedent#perspectives.#The#principle#does#not#offer#guidance#for#specific#situations.#Dellinger#
proposes:#
1. The#president#is#required#to#act#within#the#terms#of#the#Constitution.#
2. When#bills#are#under#consideration#by#congress,#the#executive#branch#should#promptly#