Durkheim, Religion, and Buddhism
Author(s): Marco Orrù and Amy Wang
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 47-61
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Durkheim,Religion, and Buddhism*
MARCO ORRUt
AMY WANGt
Since its publicationin 1912, Durkheim'sElementaryForms has been scrutinizedin great detail,
but researchers have mostly neglected or accepted uncritically Durkheim's brief discussion of
Buddhismat the beginning of Book One. Such disregardis remarkablesince Durkheimreliedon his
interpretationof Buddhism to support two crucial claims in his definition of religious phenomena:
that gods or spirits are not essential to religion, for Buddhism has no meaningfulgods or spirits;
and that the sacred-profanedichotomy is characteristicof all religions, since it is found even in an
atheistic religionlike Buddhism.We examineDurkheim'sdiscussion to show that, despite qualifications and caveats, his claims regarding Buddhism are flawed on both counts. On the one hand, we
show that Buddhism admits the existence of supra-mundanebeings not as a secondary, but as a
primarycomponentof its religion;on the other hand, we demonstrate that the distinction between
sacred and profane is marginal to Buddhist thought.
INTRODUCTION
The study of religious phenomena was a lifelong, abiding interest of Durkheim's
sociology, from his 1887 review of Jean Marie Guyau's L'Irreligion de l'avenir, to his
1912 masterwork, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. The interest of other
social scientists in Durkheim'swritings on religion has equaled, and perhaps surpassed,
Durkheim'sown preoccupationwith the topic, from Gustave Belot's "LaReligioncomme
principe sociologique," published in 1900, to W. S. F. Pickering's definitive study,
Durkheim'sSociology of Religion, publishedin 1984. In his bibliography,"OnDurkheim
and Religion," Pickering (1975:313-21;1984:544-62)listed about 400 publicationswhich
had appeared on the topic prior to 1982.
Durkheim'smost articulatediscussionof religiousphenomenais foundin Elementary
Forms, and most studies of Durkheim's sociology of religion have centered on the ideas
he presented in that book, including his concept of the sacred and the sacred-profane
dichotomy, and his discussions of totemic beliefs and of rituals. (For an analysis of the
literature on these topics, see Pickering 1984:parts II-IV.) This article does not provide
an overall assessment of Durkheim's sociology of religion, nor does it deal with
Durkheim's Elementary Forms in its entirety. Instead, our specific concern is with
Durkheim's analysis of Buddhism in Elementary Forms and its relation to Durkheim's
general definition of religious phenomena in that same book.
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the meetings of the American Sociological Association,
Cincinnat4 Ohio, August 1991. The authors are grateful to the editor and the anonymous reviewers of this journal
for their helpful comments and suggestions.
tMarco Orru'is associate professor in the Department of Sociology, University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida
33620-8100. Amy Wang is a doctoral student in the Department of Sociology, University of Illinois, Chicago,
Ilinois 60680.
) Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1992, 31 (1): 47-61
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JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
Despite the detailed scrutiny of Elementary Forms, researchers have mostly
neglected Durkheim'sbrief discussion of Buddhism (in Book One, ChapterOne, Sections
2 and 3), or accepted it uncritically (e.g., Ling 1973:16-19).Such neglect is remarkable
since Durkheimrelied on his interpretation of Buddhism to support two crucial claims
in his definitionof religious phenomena:that gods or spirits are not essential to religion,
for early Buddhism had no meaningful gods or spirits; and that the sacred-profane
dichotomy is characteristicof all religions, since it is central even to an atheistic religion
like Buddhism. In this article we examine closely Durkheim's short discussion to show
that his claims regarding Buddhism are ambiguous, if not altogether misleading, on
both counts. On the one hand, we show that Buddhism clearly posits the existence of
supra-mundanebeings, not as an afterthought but as a central component of its belief
system; on the other hand, we demonstrate that the distinction between the sacred and
profane,althougharguable,is in no way a crucialcharacteristicof Buddhism.In a cursory
fashion, Melford E. Spiro (1966:91-96)has already raised similar objections regarding
Durkheim's theses on Buddhism. However, in this article we go beyond Spiro's
preliminaryformulation and provide a detailed analysis of Buddhist doctrines as they
developed historically, to show Durkheim's ambiguous understanding of key features
of Buddhism in particular and of the central characteristics of religious phenomena
in general.
Ourarticleproceedsin four steps. First, we present Durkheim'sdefinitionof religion
and its philosophical presuppositions, to evince some of the background factors which
led to Durkheim'sown definition of religion. Second, we counter Durkheim'sclaim that
Buddhism is atheistic at heart by showing that Buddhism posits the existence of suprahuman beings, and that such beings are essential to Buddhism as a religion. Third,we
show that the sacred-profanedichotomy is not a central characteristic of Buddhism;
rather, in Buddhism the dharma of both the physical and the transcendental worlds
is similarlycharacterizedby emptiness, the signless, and the wishless. Fourth, we assess
the implicationsof our findings for an improvedunderstandingof Buddhismin particular,
and for a better sociological characterizationof religious phenomenain general. On the
basis of the evidence found in Buddhism we conclude, in a preliminary fashion, that
the belief in supernaturalbeings is a better markerfor religious phenomenathan is the
concept of the sacred.
DURKHEIM'S DEFINITION OF RELIGION
As is typical in much of his sociological work, Durkheimbegins Elementary Forms
by addressing conceptual issues in the study of religions. Chapter One of Book One is
titled "Definition of Religious Phenomena and of Religion." There we find, italicized,
Durkheim's conceptualization of religion as follows:
A religionis a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things
set apart and forbidden- beliefs and practices whichunite into one single moralcommunitycalled
a Church,all those who adhere to them (Durkheim[1912] 1965:62).
For Durkheim, religion combines four elements: beliefs, practices, the sacred, and
a Church.Beliefs are sets of collective representations in a society; practices are rituals
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DURKHEIM AND BUDDHISM
49
enacted in a society to celebrate and reinforce beliefs; the sacred is the referent matter
of religious beliefs and practices; and the Churchis the organization which structures
religion socially. Of these four elements, the sacred is undoubtedly the most important
component in Durkheim's definition of religion. Pickering (1984:115)has said it best:
"For Durkheim, at the heart of every religion stands the sacred ... Durkheim gives
a priorplace to the sacred even over religion itself." The other three elements of religion
(beliefs, practices, and a Church)are functional to the sacred and depend on it for their
existence. Beliefs and rituals are religious insofar as they refer to the sacred, and the
churchprovides the organizationalframeworkfor celebratingidentifiably sacred beliefs
and rituals.
Scholars have often objected to Durkheim's definition of religion in Elementary
Forms, arguingthat it is not a scientificbut a metaphysicaldefinition;it is not a nominal,
but an essential definition (Pickering 1984:163-192).Instead of providing operational
markersfor empiricallyobservable religious phenomena,Durkheimincorporatedin his
definition of religion his own theory of religion: He included what he considered to be
an essential requirementof all religions (and thus what he thought constituted religion
itselfl, namely, the "sacred." Pickering has identified Durkheim's essentialist definition as resulting from several factors. For the purposeof our discussion here, two factors
are particularly significant:
First, during the period from approximately 1900 to 1906, the concept of the sacred rose to such
prominencein Durkheim'sthought [that]. . . There could thereforebe no alternative but to define
religion in terms of that concept.... [Second,] Durkheim openly denied that God or the gods
existed.... By contrast, as he was firmly convinced, the sacred had a reality which could not be
denied (Pickering 1984:187-188).
The concept of the sacred, we can argue, became central to Durkheim's definition
of religionbecause it provided him with a substantive criterionfor religious phenomena;
the inclusion of such a criterion allowed him to characterize the belief in supernatural
beings as non-essential to religious phenomena. The sacred easily replaced the supernatural. To be sure, Durkheim was not, and has not been, the only social scientist to
define religion in terms of the sacred (Marett 1914; Malinowski 1925; Radcliffe-Brown
1952;Eliade 1959);but just as numeroushave been those social scientists who did define
religion in terms of beliefs in superhuman beings (Spencer 1864; Tylor 1874; EvansPritchard 1956; Firth 1959).
Durkheim's problematic definition of religion was partly a result of the realist
philosophicalassumptions whichled him to treat sociologicalconcepts commedes choses
(as if they were things). On the one hand, he thought of social concepts and beliefs as
partaking of the same facticity which characterizes natural objects. To admit that all
religions display some form of belief in supernaturalbeings was, for Durkheim, equal
to admitting that supernatural beings have a factual existence. To include the belief
in gods as a criterion for identifying religious phenomena could be construed, from a
realist stance, as saying that gods do exist. On the other hand, Durkheim still thought
it necessary that religions everywhere should display some real and universal
characteristic, and he identified this universal characteristic with the sacred.
Durkheim'spreliminarydefinitionof religionin ElementaryForms was not a working
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JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
hypothesis or a tentative point of departure for empirical analysis. Rather, it was a
definitive statement about religion which was not open to later discussion or reelaboration (no new, revised definition is found at the end of Elementary Forms).
Durkheim'scharacterizationof religionwas not an operationalconstruct for the purpose
of setting out to study religious phenomena;rather, it was a theory which he sought
to support with relevant empirical evidence. For this reason, Book One, titled
"PreliminaryQuestions," turns to the discussion of Buddhism in orderto demonstrate
that the definition of religion Durkheim provides is a sound one.
Within the limited framework of this article we cannot address the complex
epistemology underlying Durkheim's work on religion in particular or his sociology in
general, nor do we claim that we can provide definitive empirical evidence to disprove
Durkheim's theory of religion. Such an endeavor would likely fail if it chose to ignore
Durkheim's underlying epistemology and sought to disprove his theory of the sacredprofane dichotomy simply on the basis of the empirical evidence marshalled by contemporary ethnographers. As MeAtrovichas argued in his reappraisal of Durkheim's
ElementaryForms, the critical approachadoptedby several scholars (Jones 1986;Lukes
1973; Pickering 1984) "entirely misses Durkheim's point: namely, that the conceptual
distinction between the sacred and profane is all around us at all times" (Mektrovic
1989:267).However, for the purpose of our limited discussion, the crucial fact remains
that Durkheim endeavored to demonstrate the validity of his definition of religion by
citing the empirical evidence found in Buddhism.
In Durkheim'sdefinition, empiricalgeneralizations regardingreligious phenomena
become the building blocks of his essentialist conceptualizationof religion. His assumption is that if a trait can be shown to characterize all observed religions, then we can
claim that it constitutes the essence of all religions.Conversely,Durkheimassumes that
if a trait cannot be observed in every religion, then it cannot be said to constitute a
valid characteristicof any religion.Durkheim'sdefinitionof religionbecomesproblematic
because the distinction between empirical generalizations and conceptual constructs
becomes very thin or disappears altogether; for Durkheim, empirical generalizations
regarding religious phenomena become the real essence of religion. However, more to
the point for our purpose, the empirical evidence on which Durkheim builds his essentialist definitionof religionis itself highly questionable.Durkheimrejectedsupernatural
beings as a feature of religious phenomena and instead proposed the sacred as central
to all religions,by referringto the evidence found in Buddhism. In the next two sections,
we analyze in detail the evidence regarding these two issues, and evaluate Durkheim's
claims concerning Buddhism.
THE SUPRA-HUMAN IN BUDDHISM
In Elementary Forms, the section on "Definition of Religious Phenomena and of
Religion"begins, in a typically Durkheimianfashion, with a methodical demonstration
of how the criteria used by other scholars to identify and define religious phenomena
are unsatisfactory. This is Durkheim's standard procedure of "argument by elimination" (Lukes1973:31-33).In the specificinstance of ElementaryForms, Durkheimshows
that not all religions concern themselves with the supernatural or with divinity;
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DURKHEIM AND BUDDHISM
51
accordingly, neither feature can be essential to religious phenomena. Criticizing the
emphasis on the supernaturalby scholars like Spencer and Muller,Durkheim (1965:43)
argues that the idea of mystery "has a place only in a very small number of advanced
religions. It is impossible to make it the characteristic mark of religious phenomena
without excluding from the definition the majority of the facts to be defined." Concurrently,he reproachesReville and Tylor for emphasizingthe belief in gods or spiritual
beings: "Religion is more than the idea of gods or spirits, and consequently cannot be
defined exclusively in relation to these latter" (50).
The specific evidence Durkheim marshals from Buddhism to demonstrate that it
is a religion without gods or spiritual beings is ambiguous from the onset. He cites
Burnouf(1844),Barth (1879),and Oldenberg(1881),to show that Buddhism is, at heart,
an atheistic religion. (For a more recent defense of this thesis, see von Glasenapp 1966.)
He begins his argument by stating: "In the first place, there are great religions from
which the idea of gods and spirits is absent, or at least, where it plays only a secondary
and minorrole. This is the case with Buddhism"(Durkheim1965:45).He carefullyadmits
that the evidence from Buddhism might not be univocal: To say that gods and spirits
play a secondary and minorrole in Buddhism is one thing; to claim that gods and spirits
are absent is quite another.Yet Durkheim'swhole argumentregardingBuddhismtreads
on equivocal evidence. For instance, he argues:
Instead of praying, in the ordinarysense of the term. .. he [the Buddhist] relies upon himself and
meditates. This is not saying "that he absolutely denies the existence of the beings called Indra,
Agni and Varuna;but 'he believes that he owes them nothing and that he has nothing to do with
them".... Then he is an atheist, in the sense that he does not concern himself with the question
whether gods exist or not (Durkheim1965:46;emphasis added).
Later he comments:
It is true that Buddha, at least in some divisions of the Buddhist Church,has sometimes been
considered as a sort of god ... [but] this divinization of Buddha, granting that the term is exact,
is peculiarto ... Northern Buddhism.... We may well ask if he [Buddha]has ever really divested
himself completelyof all humancharacter,and if we have a right to make him into a god completely;
in any case, it would have to be a god of a very particularcharacter.... Finally, whatever one may
think of the divinity of Buddha,it remains that this is a conceptionwhollyoutside the essential part
of Buddhism (46-47;emphasis added).
The evidence Durkheim presents regarding the atheistic qualities of Buddhism is
ambiguous, and to remedy such shortcomings he has to qualify his claims repeatedly;
thus, he strengthens his evidence from Buddhism by elaborating restrictive criteria on
prayer, atheism, divinity, and Buddhism itself. He resorts to narrow definitions of
divinity to downplay its role in Buddhism, or to dimiss it altogether. However, an
examinationof the availableevidenceconcerningthe role of divinity in Buddhismreveals
a different picture from the one Durkheim provided.
To be sure, the ambiguity apparentin Durkheim'sdescriptionof Buddhism's beliefs
vis-a-vis divinity is not simply the product of his overzealous attempt to prove a point;
it is mostly due to the ambiguity created by a multiplicity of doctrines which accompanied the development of Buddhism starting with the life of Buddha (560-580 B.C.),
through the archaic period of Buddhism (the first 140 years after the Nirvana of the
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JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
Buddha),to the schism which saw the development of 18 orthodox schools (around140
B.E.): with the Sthaviras schools in Ceylon and Southeast Asia on one side, and the
Mahasinghikas in Northern India on the other side (for historical overviews, see Conze
1980 and Kitagawa and Cummings 1989). The orthodox schools together are known
as Theravada (or Hinayana) Buddhism; the other schools, which later spread to China,
Japan, and Korea, are collectively labeled Mahayana Buddhism.
A careful examination of Buddhist thought in these three phases reveals that some
idea of divinity and of supernatural beings is present throughout Buddhist thought,
although it is strongerin MahayanaBuddhismthan in archaicand scholastic Buddhism.
However, let us consider the available evidence.
Archaic Buddhism
In his Buddhist Thoughtin India, Conze(1967:56)has describedthe archaicBuddhist
thought as follows:
The progressive detachment from the world is accompaniedand facilitated by the constant application of the three marks[impermanent,ill, and not-selflto all worldlyevents, and it furtherpromotes
in its turn the five cardinal virtues [faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration,and wisdom].
Conze also argues: "Oncehe has achieved perfect indifferenceto all worldly things,
the Yogin can automatically make Nirvana into an object" (56). The Visuddhimagga
of Buddhaghosa (VM xxi 128) proclaims: "Now at last the supramundane Path will
arise!" (cited in Conze 1967:77).This reference to entering the supramundanePath is
crucial in its implications:
At this point the Buddhists [distinguish]between two qualitatively different kinds of persons, the
"holyperson"and the ordinarypeople.... Holy men and ordinarypeople occupy two distinct planes
of existence,the "worldly"and the "supramundane."
A person becomes"supramundane"
on "entering
the Path".... The "saint," as distinguished from worldly people, at the moment of entering the
first Path is said to "realize"Nirvana in the sense of "seeing" it (57; emphasis added).
Nirvana is reachedthrough the supramundanedoors to deliverance[emptiness, the
signless, and the wishless]: "They are quite near to the true reality of Nirvana, at its
very threshold" (69-70).Nirvana itself is Deathless, and the Buddha entered Nirvana
by conqueringDeath (Mara),"a deity, who tries to cause difficultiesto anyonewho wants
to transcend death, and who was defeated by the Buddha immediately before his
enlightenment" (72).
This evidence shows that concepts of divinity and transcendenceare clearly present
in early Buddhism.Concludinghis descriptionof archaicBuddhist thought, Conzeclaims
that "Nirvana is obviously transcendental" and can be reached only through the
supramundanedoors to deliverance(76).He quotes from the Suttanipata (1069):"Alone,
without support, 0 Shakyan, I am unable to cross the great flood. Tell me the objective
support, 0 All-seeing One, leaning on which I could cross that flood" (cited in Conze,
1967:77).
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DURKHEIM AND BUDDHISM
53
Scholastic Buddhism
The schism between the Mahasanghikas and the Sthaviras led to the development
of 18 schools of Buddhism. The Sthaviras (literally, the Elders) stood for tradition and
orthodoxy in Buddhism. The significant doctrinalpoint of the Sthaviras for our purpose
is the classification of those who have attained Nirvana; such a point is related, more
broadly, to Buddhism's envisioning of the Absolute. Conze (1967:159)has outlined the
issue: "The Absolute occurs in an impersonal form as the 'Unconditioned'or 'Nirvana,'
and in an apparently personal form as the 'Buddha' or 'Tathagata.' "
Attempts to characterizeNirvana are sporadicand equivocalin Sthaviras doctrines,
but these same doctrinesare detailedin their classificationof those who achieve Nirvana.
Scholastic Buddhism identifies three classes of increasinglyenlightenedindividuals:the
Arhat, the Pratyekabuddha, and the Buddha The Arhat, at the lowest level, is "one
who has eliminated all ill." At the next higher level is the Pratyekabuddha, of whom
Conze (1967:167) writes:
He is a Buddha for himself alone, who, unlike the Arhat, has ... won his enlightenmentby his own
effort without instruction from others, but who, unlike the Buddhas, does not proclaim the truth
to others.... The first two "adepts" represent the ideals of the individualists.
The Buddha's enlightenment, at the highest level, is vastly superiorto that of the
Arhats or of the Pratyekabuddhas. The Buddha surpasses individually experienced
enlightenment and is able to proclaimthe truth to the world. In the Sthaviras doctrines,
the Buddhais not simply one who has achievedenlightenment,but one who can proclaim
the truth. Conze has elaborated:
The Abhidharmadefines the differenceof the Buddhafromthe other two adepts.... As for epithets,
he is called "the Lord"(Bhagavan),the "Conquerorof Mara," the "King of Dharma."the "superman," the "Tathagata," the "victor unvanquished,"and so on (168-69).
The Buddha also has power over the cosmos and is its sovereign:
Possessing to a superior degree the miraculouspowers attributed to all saints, the Buddha can
at will create, transform and conserve external objects, shorten or extend his life-span, move
through solid bodies, travel rapidly for long distances through the air, reduce the size of material
bodies.... (170).
Thus, one can conclude that, "It is, of course, a fallacy to regard the Buddha as
a 'person' in the ordinary sense of the term.... Far more than a person he is (1) an
impersonal metaphysical principle, (2) a supernatural potency, and (3) a type" (171;
emphasis added).ScholasticBuddhism'stheoriesof supernaturalforcesand metaphysical
entities strengthens the earlier evidence from archaic Buddhism.
Mahayana Buddhism
If the Sthaviras schools were unclear about the ontology of the Absolute (the
Unconditioned),MahayanaBuddhism resolutely clarifiedthis central issue. (MaxWeber
[(1923) 1958:244-561detailed the sociological factors leading to the development of
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JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
Mahayana doctrines.) The Buddha, in Mahayana doctrines, is characterized as a
metaphysical principle, identified with the absolute Dharma: "The true Buddha is
transmundane ... the historical Buddha is a mere apparition of him" (Robinson and
Johnson 1982:65).The Mahayana broadenedthe access to enlightenment to include all
individuals, whereas the Sthaviras schools had a more selective interpretation of who
could achieve Buddhahood. Robinson and Johnson (1982:65-66)have argued:
The Mahayanainnovation was to proclaimthat the bodhisattva [future Buddha]course is open to
all, to lay out a path for aspiring bodhisattvas to follow, and to create a new pantheon and cult of
superhumanbodhisattvas and cosmic Buddhas who respond to the pleas of devotees.
There is no doubt that supernaturalbeings exist in Mahayana Buddhism and that
these beings are instrumental in the individual's path to Nirvana; cults of the great
bodhisattvas (like Maitreya, Manjusri, Avalotikesvara, and Mahasthamaprapta)
flourishedin MahayanaBuddhism. Robinson and Johnson have describedthe Maitreya
cult:
Maitreya, unlike the Buddhas before him, is alive so he can respond to the prayers of worshippers.
Being compassionate ... he willingly grants help; and being a high god in his present birth, he has
the power to do so. His cult thus offers its devotees the advantage of theism and Buddhism
combined (79-80).
Therecouldbe no strongerevidencethat supernaturalbeings do in fact exist in Mahayana
Buddhism, and that their help is actively sought by those who seek to achieve
enlightenment.
The evidence presented throughout this section has shown clearly that Mahayana
Buddhismqualifies as a theistic religion;it also shows that significant theistic elements
arepresent as well in archaicand in scholastic Buddhism.In archaicBuddhism,"a person
becomes supramundaneon enteringthe Path," and entering Nirvanarequirestranscending the god of death, Mara. In scholastic Buddhism, the Buddha is clearly described
as a supernaturalbeing and a supernaturalforce with supernaturalpowers;the Buddha
is also the only one who can proclaimthe truth of Buddhism to others. While one could
identify a variation in the centrality of beliefs in supra-humanbeings in the three phases
of Buddhism, it is nevertheless evident that the belief in supra-humanbeings is present
throughoutBuddhist religion.We will elaborateon the implicationsof this finding later,
but next we must turn our attention to another issue: whether the sacred-profane
dichotomy is a central feature of Buddhism.
SACRED AND PROFANE IN BUDDHISM
In Book One, Chapter One, Section Three of The Elementary Forms, Durkheim
(1965:52)provides a sweeping definition concerning religions:
All known religious beliefs, whether simple or complex, present one common characteristic:they
presuppose a classification of all the things, real and ideal, of which men think, into two classes or
opposed groups, generally designated by two distinct terms which are translated well enough by
the words profane and sacred. This division of the world into two domains, the one containing all
that is sacred, the other all that is profane, is the distinctive trait of religious thought.
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DURKHEIM AND BUDDHISM
55
He also clarifies that "by sacred things one must not understand simply those
personal beings which are called gods or spirits" (52), and in support of such clarification he resorts to the evidence obtained from Buddhism: "That is how Buddhism is a
religion: in default of gods, it admits the existence of sacred things, namely, the four
noble truths and the practices derived from them" (52).
We must emphasize here, that it is not our aim to prove the absence of a concept
of the sacred in Buddhism. Supernatural beings in Buddhism are clearly sacred in
religious practice, as they are enshrined and worshippedby the believers. Phenomenologically speaking, the sacred is found in all societies and religions, and its identification cannot be settled through doctrinal religious disputes (for a phenomenological
appreciationof the sacred and profane,see Eliade 1959).Ouraim in this articleis instead
to show that while Durkheim claimed that supernatural beings are marginal to
Buddhism, and the sacred-profanedichotomy is central to it, we wish to demonstrate
the opposite thesis: that supernatural beings are central, and the sacred-profane
dichotomy is marginal, to Buddhism as a religion.
We saw in the previous section that Durkheim's evidence for claiming that spirits
and supra-mundanebeings are not central to Buddhism was most ambiguous. We now
wish to show that the sacred-profanedichotomy Durkheim claims to be central to all
religions is in fact at least marginal, if not altogether rejected or denied, in Buddhism.
Before presenting our evidence, however, let us consider Durkheim's only example
regarding the sacred in Buddhism: "the four noble truths and the practices derived
from them."
The Four Noble Truths
The early scripturesof Buddhismshow that Buddhaproclaimedthe fournobletruths
in his sermon at Benares, where "the enlightened Lord" addressed the five monks. The
four noble truths concern pain, the cause of pain, the cessation of pain, and the way
that leads to the cessation of pain (Burtt 1982:30). Describing his path to enlightenment, Buddha stated:
As long as in these four noble truths my knowledge and insight with the three sections and twelve
divisions was not well purified,even so long, monks, in the world with its gods, Mara,Brahma, its
being with ascetics, brahmins,gods, and men, I had not attained the highest complete enlightenment (cited in Burtt 1982:31).
In his sermon,Buddha announcedthat the highest completeenlightenment(Nirvana)
cannot be achieved unless one has a "well purified" insight into, and knowledge of the
four noble truths. The Buddha himself is able to proclaimthe four noble truths because
he has achieved enlightenment, and he is now the Lord (Bhagavan). It appears, then,
that what gives the four noble truths a central position in Buddhism is that, having
attained complete enlightenment, the Buddha can proclaim these truths as noble. For
those who have not achieved Nirvana, these four truths are incomprehensible:They are
philosophical statements about suffering in this world, and how to eliminate such
suffering, but they cannot be fully understood unless enlightenment is achieved. What
does it matter to proclaim that "existence is unhappiness" unless one has obtained
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JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
Nirvana's purified knowledge?
The four noble truths of Buddhism are not sacred in themselves; rather, they derive
their significance from the fact that the Buddha, having achieved enlightenment and
having become the Lord, proclaims them as such. Thus, at the center of Buddhism we
find not the four noble truths, but the enlightenment of the Buddha. Conze (1967:30)
has explicitly argued such a point: "Buddhism bases itself first of all on the revelation
of the Truth by an omniscient being, known as 'the Buddha.' " This shows that
supramundanebeings (and most importantly the Buddha) are central to Buddhism as
a religion, directly underminingDurkheim's (1965:45)claim that "all that is essential
to Buddhism is found in the four propositions which the faithful call the four noble
truths." We admit, to be sure, that the four noble truths display some degree of
sacredness (one could argue that the transition from the first truth to the second, third,
and fourth represents the shift from most profane to most sacred). However, the fact
remains that whatever sacredness these four noble truths display is not an intrinsic
quality of the truths themselves, but a quality the Buddha has given them.
The Conditioned and the Unconditioned
The four noble truths are not a fitting example of the centrality of the sacred in
Buddhism, but are there any other elements in Buddhism which would fit Durkheim's
sacred-profanedichotomy? His central notion is that all religions divide the world into
two distinct domains:the sacredand the profane.Stanner(1967:217-240)sought to refute
Durkheim's dichotomy based on its logical inconsistencies and on contrary evidence
found in aboriginal religions. He argued "not only that 'the profane' is the weaker of
the two categories, but that the dichotomy itself is unusable except at the cost of undue
interference with the facts of observation" (229). Here we will limit our observations
to the evidence about the sacred and the profane found in Buddhism.
Durkheim did not provide any illustration of the sacred-profanedichotomy in
Buddhism, but if anything comes close, it is Buddhism's treatment of the Conditioned
(Pratitya-samutpadaor Samsara) and the Unconditioned (Nirvana),the two opposite
realms of the physical world (past, present, and future) and of the transcendental world
(enlightenment).This is an importantissue in Buddhism, as well as in other majorworld
religions,since it displays the tension between the profane"this-worldly"and the sacred
"other-worldly," which is at the root of much religious thought (Weber [1922]
1978:518-634).Buddhism partakes of this tension (Lopez 1988).
We do not seek here to dismiss sacred-profanedistinctions altogether, but rather
to make a more specific point: namely, that a close scrutiny of the Conditionedand the
Unconditionedin Buddhismshows that they do not partakeof the sacred-profaneduality
which Durkheim considered central to religious phenomena. Let us be clear that
Durkheimhimself did not discuss the Conditionedand Unconditionedin Buddhism;we
have chosen these as the best examples, if any, of a possible sacred-profanedichotomy
in Buddhism.
Durkheimwrites inElementary Forms that "the sacredand the profanehave always
and everywherebeen conceivedby the humanmind as two distinct classes, as two worlds
between which there is nothing in common" (Durkheim1965:54;emphasis added).Yet
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DURKHEIM AND BUDDHISM
57
Buddhism's Conditioned and Unconditioned are two classes of dharmas, that is, two
classes of "truly existing objects," and they share a number of similarities.
In Buddhism, Conditioned and Unconditioned dharmas are both characterized as
Emptiness, the Signless, and the Wishless. Conze (1967:60-70)has described how these
three concepts apply to each of the two classes of dharmas:
In one sense 'emptiness' designates deprivation, in another fulfillment.... Objects ... have no
relevanceto anything that is worth knowing or doing [they are signiess].... The yogin ... forsakes
the 'sign,' . .. and aspires in resolute faith towards that which is without a 'sign.'. . . The Wishless
[is]... without predilectionor desires for the objects of perception.... Nirvanais an object of craving
only in so far as one forms a mistaken idea of it.
In Buddhist religion, since its inception, the Conditioned and the Unconditioned
appear to have significant commonalities which prevent us from considering them as
a mutually exclusive dichotomy in the sense Durkheim envisioned. With the development of Mahayana Buddhism, the blurring of the two realms becomes even greater.
Conze(1967:160)has commentedthat the Mahayanadevelopedthe method of "proclaiming the truth by boldly self-contradictorypronouncements."The relationship between
the Conditionedand the Unconditionedwas one such topic of contradictoryarguments:
The most startling innovation of the Mahayanais ... the identification of the Unconditionedwith
the conditioned.... The Mahayanapoints out that once someone has given up everything for the
Absolute,he simply is the Absolute,and nothingin him is any longerdifferentfromit.... The identity
of the contemplatorwith the Absolute seems to have a value of a self-evidentimmediatefact of experience (Conze 1967:227-28).
Thus, in Mahayana Buddhism, the conditioned individual becomes unconditioned;
as one achieves enlightenment, one is the Absolute. Yet the identity of Conditionedand
Unconditioned is also proclaimed at the level of non-individual entities. Both the
Conditionedand the Unconditionedare dharmas.The Mahayanaclaimthat if all dharmas
are non-different, they are by that very fact all the same (Conze 1967:228; Robinson
1978:184-90).They argue: "Nothing in Samsara is different from Nirvana; nothing in
Nirvana is different from Samsara. The limit of Nirvana is the limit of Samsara; there
is not even the subtlest something separating the two" (Madhyamakakarika25, 19-29;
cited in Conze 1967:228).
The Absolute in this system is defined as ... the supremelyreal Element, Dharma-elementor the
Buddha-element.This pure and eternal factor is the basis of the entire world of appearance,and in
the absence of any limitations it is the omnipresentgerm of Buddhahoodwhich indwells all beings
(Conze 1967:229).
In the Mahayana doctrine of sameness (or "suchness"), the Conditioned and the
Unconditioned thoroughly merge and become indistinguishable. They are central to
Buddhist doctrine, but they most clearly do not meet Durkheim's requirement of a
sacred and profane dichotomy which he considered to be the universal characteristic
of all religions.
Thus far, we have shown that Durkheim's arguments regarding Buddhism were
defective on two counts: He argued ambiguously that Buddhism does not really admit
of suprahuman beings or spirits, and he claimed inaccurately to have identified and
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JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
characterized the sacred in Buddhism. What are the implications of our findings for
characterizing Buddhism in particular and religious phenomena in general? We turn
next to these questions.
LESSONS FROM BUDDHISM
In his definition of religious phenomena and in his presentation of supporting
evidence from Buddhism, Durkheimused two strategies: He opted for a narrow definition of the super-humanwhich allowedhim to show Buddhismto be essentially atheistic,
and he chose a broad characterization of the sacred which, in Buddhism, could be
identified with the four noble truths. On the one hand, Durkheimarguedthat only those
beings which directly intervene in human affairs and are actively instrumental in
achieving salvation meet his definition of what gods are. This is the thrust of his argument, since he claims that the gods Indra, Agni, and Varunado exist, but the Buddhist
"believes that he owes them nothing and that he has nothing to do with them.... Then
[the Buddhist] is an atheist" (Durkheim1965:46).On the other hand, Durkheimposited
the sacred as anything a collectivity deems sacred, regardless of its pertinence to
transcendental matters. He claims that "a rock, a tree, a spring, a pebble, a piece of
wood, a house, in a word, anything can be sacred" (52), thus constructing the sacred
as an undeterminedcategory whose only criterion is its opposition to the profane. Yet
the profaneis, in Durkheim'stheory, a residualcategory for what is not sacred (Stanner
1967:230). Given the shortcomings of Durkheim's two-pronged approach, we must
conclude that it simply does not do justice to Buddhism as a religion, or to most
sociologically observed religious phenomena.
Arguing against Durkheim's criterionregarding superhumanbeings in Buddhism,
Spiro (1966:92) has contended:
With respect to supermundanegoals, the Buddhais certainly a superhumanbeing. Unlike ordinary
humans,he himself acquiredthe powerto attain Enlightenmentand hence Buddhahood.Moreover,
he showed others the means for its attainment. Without his teachings, natural man could not,
unassisted, have discovered the way to Enlightenment and to final release.
Plainly, Buddha is central to Buddhism as an observed religious phenomenon;neither
the four noble truths, nor the Dharma, nor the Samgha, nor the Unconditioned would
have any meaning without the Buddha. We believe the evidence we provided from
Buddhism warrants such a claim.
Spiro (1966:95)has also criticized Durkheim for his unwarrantedconclusion "that
religionuniquely refers to the 'sacred'while secularconcerns are necessarily 'profane.'"
Instead, Spiro has claimed that "religious and secular beliefs alike may have reference
either to sacred or to profane phenomena"(96).As an example, civic values we consider
sacred like liberty, or patriotism, or the pursuit of happiness are not commonly
understood to be attributes of a religion (but see Bellah 1970; Bellah and Hammond
1980);their endorsementor acceptancedoes not rest on a belief in transcendentalspirits.
Conversely,any kind of everyday profane activity (singing, bathing, eating) can assume
a religious character if it relates to beliefs in transcendental powers. Again, Buddhism
provides exemplary evidence in this respect. The four noble truths of Buddhism, taken
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DURKHEIM AND BUDDHISM
59
by themselves, have no sacred quality. Stoic philosphersin classical Greece and ancient
Rome, for instance, claimed as much as the four noble truths claim concerningsuffering
in this world and how to become indifferent to it (Polhlenzet al. 1987; Capes 1909), but
we do not commonly consider stoicism's pronouncements to be religious truths. The
differencebetween Buddhismand stoicism, then, is that the formerrests on the teachings
of the Buddha, the Lord, and it is geared toward achieving transcendental Enlightenment; stoicism, instead, proposes itself as a philosophy of life in this world, without
any reference to supernatural beings.
We have shown throughout this article that Durkheimwas exceedingly ambiguous
in describingthe corebeliefs of Buddhismconcerningthe existence of suprahumanbeings
and concerning the sacred and profane, and their relationship. To conclude, we want
to explore the broaderconsequences of Durkheim's misreadings and propose ways to
overcomethem. Religiousphenomena,as observedempiricallyin social groups, postulate
the belief in supra-mundanebeings as their distinguishing characteristic. Eliminating
this requirement, as Durkheim did in his Elementary Forms, makes religion and
philosophy, and even science and technology, essentially undistinguishable social
phenomena. Strong collective sentiments can accompany Darwin's theory of evolution
as much as they can accompany Buddhism's Eightfold Path to Enlightenment. The
singing of a national anthem can elicit the same strong collective emotions as does the
singing of religious hymns. The religious characterof a phenomenon,however,is clearly
located not in the sacredness of the phenomenonitself (as Durkheimclaimed)but rather
in the phenomenon's relation to the suprahuman and the transcendental.
Rejecting Durkheim's definition of religion, Spiro (1966:96)has provided his own
working definition of religion as "an institution consisting of culturally patterned interaction with culturallypostulated superhumanbeings." We also subscribeto such a definition. All social institutions, of course, are characterized by culturally patterned interaction (Berger and Luckmann 1966), but the distinguishing element of religion as an
institution is its collective belief in transcendental spirits (Goody 1961; Horton 1960).
Spiro (1966:98)has concludedthat "viewed systematically, religioncan be differentiated
from other culturally constituted institutions by virtue only of its reference to
superhuman beings."
It is outside the scope of this article to engage in an extensive demonstration of
how Spiro's definition of religion does better justice than Durkheim's definition to
religious phenomena;it is also outside its scope to discuss the desirability of identifying some modern ideologies as "varities of civil religion" (Bellah and Hammond 1980).
All we claim to have shown here is that Durkheim's analysis of Buddhism is seriously
defective. The evidence we found in Buddhism greatly underminesDurkheim's broader
definition of religion but it does not, by itself, provide final proof that such a definition
is wrong.Moreextensive, cross-culturalresearchon religiousphenomenawouldbe needed
to make such a conclusive claim. However, we hope our analysis of Buddhism has
achieved broadersignificance by raising serious questions about past characterizations
of religion and by providing some preliminaryhypotheses toward a better social scientific definition of religious phenomena.
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JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
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