Legally Interned:
A Legal Perspective of the Internment of Japanese Americans during World War II
Patrick Granger
HIS 4936
Professor June Melby Benowitz
March 28, 2011

Granger 2
The impact of the laws and court cases regarding the unethical and unconstitutional internment of Japanese Americans during World War II was profound historically. It is important that these legal aspects of the internment of Japanese Americans are placed in proper historical context. This is true for the laws and events that happened before the internment, and since the internment.
After December 7, 1941, when the Japanese Navy launched a surprise air raid against the
United States' Naval fleet based in Pearl Harbor and Hitler's declaration of war on December 11, the United States was launched into World War II. Drastic actions were taken by President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to deal with the perceived threat of Japanese Americans sympathizing with the Empire of Japan. The actions would not distinguish between the Japanese immigrants, commonly referred to as "Issei", and their children ("Nisei"). Less common were third generation
Japanese Americans (“Sansei”). As a result, somewhere between 100,000 and 120,000 Japanese
Americans, 60 percent of whom were naturally born citizens of the United States, were sent to internment camps until the war ended. Not all Japanese Americans served the entire duration of their possible internment. Some entered the military, and others were deemed trustworthy and patriotic enough on an individual basis to be rewarded with their constitutionally granted freedoms.
Historical Context Leading up to the Pearl Harbor Attack
Discrimination against Japanese immigrants began long before the surprise attacks at
Pearl Harbor, or Japan's invasion of Manchuria. Case law, dating as far into the past as 1790 with the Naturalization Act, has been used as justification for the racist agenda of denying citizenship to those who are not Caucasian. The first large waves of Japanese immigrants to the United
States took place in the early 20th century. In California, and throughout the west coast, farming

Granger 3 was the primary occupation of many of these Japanese immigrants. Landholdings among the
Japanese immigrants skyrocketed from 61,858 acres in 1905 to 281,687 acres in 1913. However, only a small percentage of those acres were owned, the rest were leased or contracted.
1
The
Alien Land Law of 1913 and the more effective Alien Land Law of 1920 halted the substantial growth. M. Browning Carrott writes of the Land Laws, "California's Alien Land Law of 1913 was the first measure of depriving the Japanese of any substantial rights in America, and its passage testifies to the growing hostility toward the Japanese."
2
Both laws sought to prevent the Japanese from holding land by restricting the rights of those who were classified as aliens. However, the 1913 Alien Land Law had a tremendous loophole in that the first generation immigrants could lease land or legally transfer the property to their children, who were natural born citizens as were any other children born on American soil.
3
The 1920 Alien Land Law closed these loopholes, denying anyone without citizenship the right to lease land or be the legal guardian of a child with land.
4
These were just among the first anti-Japanese laws being passed on the west coast. The state of Washington would follow
California's footsteps and, in 1921, passed a similar law to California's 1920 Alien Land Law.
Furthermore, these laws were upheld by the United States Supreme Court in 1923 which ruled that the states had the power to prevent aliens from holding land.
5
The animosity toward the Japanese Americans would go beyond mere resentment regarding Japanese immigrants taking American jobs, and would reach a new level after the
Pearl Harbor attacks. The harsh realities of life prior to the internment of Japanese Americans
1
Yuji Ichioka, " Japanese Immigrant Response to the 1920 California Alien Land Law," Agricultural History
Society 58, no. 2 (1984): 158, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3742992 (Accessed March 27 2011).
2
M. Browning Carrott, "Prejudice Goes to Court: The Japanese & the Supreme Court in the 1920s," California
History 62, no. 2 (1983): 129-30, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25158153 (Accessed March 23, 2011).
3
Ibid.
4
Ichioka, 163.
5
Carrott, 132.

Granger 4 may be seen through the eyes of Denver Post Journalist and former Nisei internee, Bill
Hosokawa, who granted author Mark Junge an extensive interview in 1991.
In the interview Hosokawa described first hearing of the attacks on Pearl Harbor. He recalled knowing about how Germans were treated in the World War I era and about the rampant racism on the west coast at the time. He realized that it would only get worse as the hysteria spread.
6
Hosokawa also remembered the dangers of not having full citizenship because the FBI was looking for anyone who was "potentially dangerous."
7
Executive Order 9066 and Internment
On February 19, 1942 Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066. The decision was not an easy one. Many factors had to be considered and Roosevelt leaned heavily on his advisors. However, his advisors produced conflicting information. Prior to the bombing of
Pearl Harbor, the FBI released a report claiming that the vast majority of Japanese Americans remaining out west were loyal and not a threat. Essentially, Director J. Edgar Hoover thought that he had already neutralized the threat by going after high risk targets on an individual basis.
This recommendation came in stark contrast to the military’s advice that Japanese Americans were disloyal and not to be trusted.
8
Greg Robinson said of the report produced by the office of General John DeWitt: In his
"'Final recommendation' in support of his request for relocation of Japanese Americans, [DeWitt] asserted that they were members of an 'evil race' regardless of their citizenship."
9
This kind of advisement may have been able to push President Roosevelt who, according to Robinson, during
6
Bill Hosokawa, "Heart Mountain: One Man's Struggle Inside a Japanese Internment Camp," Interview with Mark
Junge, Lakewood Colorado, October 22, 1991. 4. http://www.archive.org/details/billHosokawaOneMansStruggleInsideHeartMountainAJapaneseInternment_619
7
Ibid, 5-6.
8
Greg Robinson, By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans . (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2001), 62.
9
Ibid, 85.

Granger 5 the prewar years, “consistently regarded Japanese Americans as adjuncts of Japan and therefore potential enemies despite their American birth and decades-long residence in the United
States.” 10
This is evidenced by the President’s ordering the FBI as well, as Curtis B. Munson and his group of independent investigators, to analyze the sympathies and intentions of Japanese
Americans. The results of these investigations consistently reveal very high rates of loyalty to
America. This is especially true of the Nisei, and it even holds true in Hawaii, where there is a slightly higher incidence of loyalty to Japan.
11
The issue of loyalty and allegiance to America becomes a large issue later on when considering United States Supreme Court rulings.
The executive order itself, does not actually mention the words Japan or Japanese, but rather gives nearly unlimited power for the military to do what it will in an area of military importance. The key excerpt in the executive order explains the military’s discretion regarding who may stay and who must leave a military zone: “Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion.” 12
The military zone included most of California, Oregon and Washington. As a result, the military was able to forcibly evacuate the majority of Japanese Americans from their homes because most of them lived along the Pacific coast.
The United States produced well known newsreels on the topic of the internment of
Japanese Americans. These films are useful resources for putting the Internment into historical perspective, especially if it is possible to contrast among newsreel films. They do not merely
10
Ibid, 71.
11
Ibid, 76.
12
Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas,” Executive Order 9066
(February 9, 1942).

Granger 6 indicate what happened, but because they were crafted carefully as propaganda films, they may also indicate the cultural conventions, standards, ethics, etc.
"Japanese Relocation," produced by the Office of War Information in 1943, and narrated by Milton Eisenhower, paints a rosy picture of the relocation. A small selection of musical pieces plays in the background, behind the narration. Most of this music is fairly upbeat in accordance to what is being shown visually, and what the narrator tells us. In the newsreel, Eisenhower stated, "the Japanese, themselves, cheerfully handled the enormous paperwork involved in the migration...the evacuees cooperated wholeheartedly."
13
When Eisenhower said they cheerfully handled the paperwork, the camera showed a line of Japanese Americans, none of whom had a smile on their faces. The newsreel also acknowledged, but glossed over, the financial losses inflicted upon the internees by selling their homes and businesses for significantly less than they were worth. However, the ending line in the newsreel reveals much about how Japanese
Americans were perceived: "We hope, most earnestly, that our example will influence the Axis
Powers in their treatment of Americans who fall into their hands."
14
This could be innocent enough and mean Americans who were living abroad before America's direct involvement in
World War II, and are being held captive. However, it still creates an "us" and a "they" with
Japanese Americans being one of "them."
Immediately after announcement of the internment of all west-coast Japanese Americans, and even before they were forced to leave their homes and businesses, some citizens were willing to speak out about the injustice. Lawrence E. Davies wrote an article for the New York
Times denouncing the imminent internment. He spends much of the article correcting popular
13
"Eisenhower, Milton, narrator, "Japanese Relocation." (United States Office of War Information, 1943), 9 min.,
28sec.; From the Prelinger Archives, MPEG2, MPEG4, OOG, RealMedia, http://www.archive.org/details/Japanese1943 (Accessed March 27, 2011).
14
Ibid.

Granger 7 falsehoods about Japanese Americans. He cites surprisingly accurate statistics, such as the fact that as many as 60,000 Japanese Americans who are naturally born citizens will soon be moving against their will or best interest. Using sarcasm, and putting certain phrases in quotes, Davies undermines the position that the Japanese Americans are “potentially dangerous” or that the western coast of the United States is a “combat zone.” In a very poignant line, he states that the people who are currently persecuting the Japanese Americans are those who, “’before Pearl
Harbor’ would have denounced as violation of civil liberates any treatment for Japanese
Americans which was not considered proper treatment for other citizens.” 15
Davies does appear to be a bit ignorant of the discrimination that the Japanese Americans endured. However, he does make a valid point about the panic of post-Pearl Harbor Americans who turned their fears into prejudice against a group of Americans because they looked like the attackers. Possibly of greater importance is the progressive and foresighted nature of this article. Apologists of internment may state that it was a different time, that hindsight is perfect, or that from the perspective of the people at the time, it may have truly seemed like a military necessity. Davies’ article disproves the belief that the heinousness of the internment was impossible to see or that the people at the time would not care for the rights of someone in another social group.
"A Challenge to Democracy" was a film produced a year later, in 1944, by the War
Relocation Authority. The mood of this film is much more somber. There is no music in the background, and the Japanese Americans shown in the video clips are not all happy about their new, temporary homes. In stark contrast to "Japanese Relocation", "A Challenge to Democracy" will assert, "Relocation centers are not normal, and probably never can be...Americanism, taught
15
Lawrence Davies, "Japanese Moving Day Looms," New York Times , 1 March 1942, E8.

Granger 8 in schools and churches and on the playgrounds, loses much of its meaning in the confines of a relocation center."
16
One particular section of the film is particularly telling:
The War Relocation Authority has been more concerned with permanent relocation.
Getting the evacuees out of the backwaters out of the backwaters of the relocation centers, and into the mainstream of American life. So their labor can help to win the war.
So the cost of the taxpayer may be reduced. So there can be no question of the constitutionality of any part of the action taken by the government to meet the danger of war. So that no law abiding American need to fear for his own freedom.
17
As this section indicates, by 1944 the War Relocation Authority was fully aware of the unethical nature and possibly the unconstitutionality of holding people indefinitely, without a trial or any evidence of wrongdoing, even in the context of war. Another interesting note is that by saying that it is necessary to reintegrate the Japanese Americans for the purpose of winning the war, the film seems to acknowledge the error of internment; not from a legal or ethical standpoint, but from a practical one. While the film is explicitly different in many key ways, it maintains the same unapologetic support of the military necessity of the internment.
Furthermore, the War Relocation Authority seems to be in self-denial with regard to what they were doing, with statements like, "They are not under suspicion. They are not prisoners. They are not Internees. They are merely dislocated people. The unwounded casualties of war."
18
Bill Hosokawa also gave a high quality, descriptive account of having to follow the law by reporting for assignment at an internment camp. Hosokawa provided a personal example of his family losing a significant amount of money by having to sell his large furniture for pennies on the dollar. According to Hosokawa, a used furniture dealer would drive down the streets of a predominantly Japanese American street and say, “Hey you Japs! You’re gonna get kicked outa
16
A Challenge to Democracy" (United States War Relocation Authority, 1944), 18 min., 3 sec.; From the Prelinger
Archives, AVI, MPEG2, MPEG4, OOG, RealMedia, http://www.archive.org/details/Challeng1944 (Accessed
March 27, 2011).
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.

Granger 9 here tomorrow. I’ll give you ten bucks for that refrigerator. I’ll give you fifteen bucks for that piano. I’ll give you two dollars and fifty cents for that washing machine.” 19
Hosokawa may not have been able to recall the exact figures, and it is possible that he may have been exaggerating the financial figures; however this kind of story about a personal liquidation sale is not unheard of among those being interned.
Hosokawa described life at the internment camp: "Well being in prison isn’t much fun, whatever way you look at it. What you could do was limited, within barbed wire."
20
He described some of the classes offered within the camp, but Japanese is not one of them as the focus was on Americanizing the internees. Overall the life, as he saw it was quite boring.
Hosokawa also points out some of the absurdity of the entire concept of internment in terms of chronology. The greatest point of the evacuation of Japanese American civilians from the west coast was to secure major military and industrial installations from sabotage, using military necessity as an excuse. However, by May of 1942, the battle of Midway turned the tide in favor of the United States, and only at this time did the internment camps begin populating their crude barracks.
21
According to Hosokawa, there have been no trials against a Japanese
American for espionage against America for the Japanese Empire.
Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and the United States Supreme Court
There were many cases taken on by the United States Supreme Court that had a landmark impact on the World War II era, and continue to have an impact as major discussing points today. In some way or another, each of these cases defended internment, or curfews that were targeted toward Japanese American civilians.
19
Hosokawa, 21.
20
Ibid, 26.
21
Ibid, 9.

Granger 10
Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi was a university student who violated a curfew and was arrested. His appeal eventually came before the Supreme Court. In Hirabayashi v. United States ,
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and, in doing so, legally validated curfews.
22
The companion case, Yasui v. United States , was decided on the same day. The Supreme Court upheld Yasui's conviction upon the authority of the Hirabayashi ruling.
23
One of the concurring opinions, that of Justice Douglas, states, "After the disastrous bombing of Pearl Harbor, the military had a grave problem on its hands. The threat of Japanese invasion of the west coast was not fanciful, but real. The presence of many thousands of aliens and citizens of Japanese ancestry in or near to the key points along that coastline aroused special concern in those charged with the defense of the country."
24
It appears as if the emotional shock of the bombing of Pearl Harbor is creating, even in a Supreme Court Justices mind, an illogical and racist state of mind. The mental and emotional connection between the Japanese and
American citizens of Japanese ancestry is so strong that even a brilliant legal mind cannot break from it. This is may be taken as an indicator of how much of the rest of the country felt at the time.
Fred Korematsu was arrested for failing to report for internment. Korematsu v. United
States was decided in 1944, and like Hirabayashi , the court upheld the conviction and legally validated the military's interment program. This was the most controversial of the rulings on the subject of internment, and it was the most divided among the justices as a 6-3 split.
25
Justice Murphy's dissenting opinion of the majority is scathing. "This exclusion of 'all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien,' from the Pacific Coast area on a plea of
22
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)
23
Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943)
24
Ibid.
25
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)

Granger 11 military necessity in the absence of martial law ought not to be approved. Such exclusion goes over 'the very brink of constitutional power,' and falls into the ugly abyss of racism."
26
Justice
Murphy may be interpreted as reserved with this statement. Historians and legal scholars today, removed from the chaos of the period, may argue that the Korematsu decision went beyond the brink of constitutional power.
Ex Party Endo was a landmark Supreme Court case, which was decided unanimously at the same time as Korematsu v United States . It played a significant part in the internment of
Japanese Americans by ruling that the government cannot legally detain a citizen that it deems is loyal. However, the ruling does state that it will not challenge the institution of internment, rather it merely makes an exception for individuals to be decided on a case by case basis: "For we conclude that, whatever power the War Relocation Authority may have to detain other classes of citizens, it has no authority to subject citizens who are concededly loyal to its leave procedure."
27
The justification for this case should have prevented the 60 to 70 thousand naturally born
American citizens of Japanese descent.
There are many prior decisions which may be used to legally justify these landmark decisions regarding Japanese American internment. One of the most relevant cases for deciding
Korematsu or Ex Parte Endo dates back to 1866 in Ex Parte Milligan . Ex Parte Milligan ruled that the privilege of habeas corpus may be temporarily suspended if necessary. The writ itself is not suspended, just the person's ability to invoke it. While this may seem like a precedent that can lead to limitless power for those in control, the ruling does include specify that it only applies in certain circumstances. Paragraph 12 states, "A citizen not connected with the military service and a resident in a State where the courts are open and in the proper exercise of their
26
Ibid.
27
Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944)

Granger 12 jurisdiction cannot, even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, be tried, convicted, or sentenced otherwise than by the ordinary courts of law."
28
Thus, the privilege to invoke the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended for a citizen when the civilian courts are still functioning.
The United States Supreme Court covered their bases with the Korematsu decision by including Ex Parte Endo.
Citizens cannot be detained beyond the point that they are deemed loyal; however, there was no limit with the regard to the amount of time the government could take to rule upon one's loyalty. There were, in fact, more than 60,000 Japanese Americans who were naturally born citizens, and who were living in one of several states where the courts were functioning. Given those facts, the internment of the majority of Japanese Americans could be interpreted to be unconstitutional by the strict interpretation of Ex Parte Milligan .
For any critics of this viewpoint, who believe that modern historians and legal scholars are using hindsight to take a position of moral superiority, there were prominent examples of legal scholars at the time speaking out. Among the strongest of these critics was Eugene V.
Rostow, who was a professor, and later, the dean of Yale Law School. He claimed, in a scathing review of the Supreme Court's decision in Korematsu , "All in all, the internment of the West
Coast Japanese is the worst blow our liberties have sustained in many years."
29
Rostow then claimed that the Supreme Court had an obligation to properly investigate the charges of military necessity, but failed to so, and thus they trampled the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the
Constitution. Rostow also stated, "We believe that the German people bear a common political responsibility for outrages secretly committed by the Gestapo and the SS. What are we to think
28
Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)
29
Eugene V. Rostow, "The Japanese American Cases--A Disaster," The Yale Law Journal 54, no. 3 (1945): 490, www.jstor.org/stable/792783 (Accessed March 25, 2011).

Granger 13 of our own part in a program which violates every democratic social value, yet has been approved by the Congress, the President and the Supreme Court?"
30
The ideas introduced in Rostow's article are very significant, not only because of what he claimed, but when these claims were published. The article was released in June of 1945, while the internment camps were still open, and while the war in the Pacific theatre had yet to be concluded. In addition, the war in Europe had just ended and the Allies had only recently discovered the extent of the German crimes against humanity. It was at this time that Rostow chose to compare the United States' policy of Japanese internment with the concentration camps of Europe. Within the context of the article, it is clear that he was not directly comparing the severity of the events; rather he was challenging the American concept of freedom and its selfimage. In this way his challenge to the Supreme Court was very similar to the challenge of hypocrisy voiced by civil rights activists toward the American government which has not ended slavery.
Comparisons and Contrasts with German and Italian Americans
Americans of Japanese ancestry were not the only ones interned during the chaos of
World War II. History professor Stephen C. Fox, in an attempt to broaden awareness of the issue of internment during World War II stated, "There have been two widely accepted assumptions about internment of 'enemy aliens' in the United States during World War II: first, that it was only the Japanese who were considered for internment, and second, that racism explains the first.
But truth does not suffer assumptions gladly."
31
According to Fox, roughly 10,000 German
Americans and Italian Americans were removed from the "military zone" along the west coast in
30
Ibid, 533.
31
Stephen C. Fox, "General John DeWitt and the proposed internment of German and Italian Aliens during World
War II," Pacific Historical Review 57, no. 4 (1988): 407, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3640375 (Accessed March 3
2011).

Granger 14
December of 1941 alone. Other restrictions were also placed on any resident who held the title
“enemy alien.”
Fox concluded that there were four reasons why the German and Italian Americans did not suffer nearly as much as the Japanese Americans during World War II. The first reason dealt with the American collective memory of German American persecution during World War I, and the unlikelihood of any "fifth column" activities. The second reason dealt with the degree of assimilation among German and Italian Americans in comparison with the Japanese Americans by the outbreak of World War II. Fox explains the third reason: "The German and Italian aliens were flesh and blood symbols of American values." He justified this claim by citing American fears that someone like baseball star, Joe DiMaggio, or former presidential candidate, Wendell
Willkie, could be interned if a blanket policy was implemented. The fourth primary reason stated by Fox that was the sheer number of German and Italian Americans and their descendants would make an internment like the one implemented for Japanese Americans nearly impossible.
32
Each of these arguments may have some merit as they reflected the train of thought of some people in 1942. However, though they may reflect the popular opinion of the time, that does not make the arguments sound from a legal or logical standpoint. Fox asserted that,
"Economics, politics, and morale were the primary determinants of U.S. internment policy during World War II, with race as a secondary, but nonetheless reinforcing, factor."
33
A similar argument can be made for the beliefs of white slaveholders in antebellum America. Their economic, political, and moral systems revolved around, and were dependent on a racist institution. If slavery was simply about economics or politics, then the slaves could come from anywhere, or have any color skin. Fox's second reason is especially unconvincing because citing
32
Ibid, 435-7.
33
Ibid, 438.

Granger 15 the greater assimilation of Germans and Italians into American society is ignoring the fact that
Americans on the western coast passed a wave of legislation that would prevent naturalization or land ownership. The first generation of immigrants, still a large proportion of the Japanese
American population, was not allowed to assimilate for racist reasons.
Fox was correct with regard to the fact that there were simply too many first or second generation German and Italian Americans to place them all in internment camps. There were as many as 8,000,000 people residing in the United States who were either born in Germany or had one or both of their parents born in Germany.
34
The sheer number of them, and the fact that they were Caucasian like a "normal" or "average" American would have also helped them appear to assimilate more efficiently. Japanese Americans, like any with Asian ancestry, would have a more difficult time blending in with the crowd.
Military Service and Draft Resisters
The United States draft during World War II did not discriminate based upon race. Many of the Japanese Americans were drafted into the armed services, despite the fact that they and their families were interned. It should be known that a great deal of Japanese Americans were
Nisei who were called to fight during World War II. More than 22,500 Japanese Americans served in World War II, roughly 18,000 of whom were segregated and served in the 100th
Battalion or the 442nd Regimental Combat Team.
35
An abnormally high percentage of these
Nisei served with great distinction. By the time the 100th Battalion had merged into the 442nd, the unit had participated in seven major campaigns and had been awarded seven Presidential
Distinguished Unit Citations.
36
It is the most decorated unit of its size and length of service in
34
Personal Justice Denied , (Washington: Civil Liberties Public Education Fund, 1997).
35
Robert Asahina, Just Americans: How Japanese Americans Won the War at Home and Abroad, (New York:
Gotham books, 2006), 6.
36
Ibid, 5.

Granger 16
American military history.
37
In the year 2000, President Bill Clinton upgraded 22 medals to
Congressional Medals of Honor, and 20 of these went to Japanese Americans.
38
One of those who received the Medal of Honor was current President pro tempore of the United States Senate,
Daniel Inouye who wrote:
In this climate of hate, many felt the necessity of stepping forward to volunteer for service in the military to prove their loyalty to the United States. These men for the most part carried out their military obligations with much courage and valor. However in this climate of hate, I believe that it took as much courage and valor and patriotism to stand up to our government and say "you are wrong." I am glad that there were some who had the courage to express some of the feelings that we who volunteered harbored deep in our souls.
39
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill law professor, Eric Muller, explored several such cases that dealt with the draft resisters. Among them were the resisters of Heart Mountain internment camp in Wyoming and Tule Lake internment camp in northern California. Most of the draft resisters did not fare well in federal court, but there was one sympathetic judge, Louis
E. Goodman, willing to give the Tule Lake resisters a fair trial. Muller claims that their resolve against joining the military was based on "a simple moral question: if we are loyal enough to serve in the military, what are we doing behind barbed wire?"
40
In the Heart Mountain group, there were 63 internees who refused the draft and were arrested. The Heart Mountain group was unfortunately assigned to a noted racist judge, T. Blake Kennedy. Judge Kennedy eventually classified the Heart Mountain resisters, all of whom were American Citizens as Nisei, as 4-C
"Enemy Aliens" due to their defense that the United States Government was against them.
41
37
Ibid, 259-60
38
Ibid, 7.
39
Daniel Inouye, forward to Free to Die for Their Country: The Story of Japanese American Draft Resisters in
World War II written by Eric L. Muller, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
40
Eric L. Muller, Free to Die for Their Country: The Story of Japanese American Draft Resisters in World War II,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 4-5.
41
Ibid, 111-12.

Granger 17
Judge Goodman dismissed the charges against the Tule Lake internees with a very creative ruling. He stated that, because the internees were already being deprived of their freedom, there was no difference in the consequence received between a guilty plea and a plea of not guilty. Because there is no difference between the defendants' possible pleas, they are being deprived of their due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
42
However, as much as Judge Goodwin was willing to bend the rules for justice, he would not go so far as to rule on the legality of the internment camps as a whole.
43
Lasting Effects and Lessons of Internment
In the years following World War II, and up to recent decades, many court cases and legislative bills have been proposed regarding Japanese American Internment. Some of these laws and cases deal with the reparations for the interned Japanese Americans. Others regard rights or personal vindication.
In 1948, Congress passed the Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act in acknowledgement of the lost wealth of those who had been shipped to internment camps. Many of the internees were forced to sell everything they owned and could not carry with them to the camps. What's worse is that they were often given only two weeks to sell everything. Many of the former Japanese American internees were counting on assistance in recovering their lost wealth. Ultimately, however, the bill fell woefully shy of the total claim amount: "Twenty-six thousand, five hundred sixty-eight claims totaling $148 million were filed under the Act; the total amount distributed by the government was $37 million."
44
The Civil Liberty Act of 1988 was a much more appropriate measure taken by Congress, albeit 40 years too late. The Act was signed into law by then President Ronald Reagan, despite
42
Ibid, 145-46.
43
Ibid, 143.
44
Personal Justice Denied , 118.

Granger 18 his initial objection to it.
45
The act begins, “The Congress recognizes that, as described in the
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, a grave injustice was done to both citizens and permanent residents of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and internment of civilians during World War II."
46
The language in this act is much stronger than that in many other legislative or judicial documents concerning internment. The Issei are not referred to as "aliens" or "enemy-aliens," instead they are permanent residents. Furthermore, the entire act of internment is now referred to as a "grave injustice," which illustrates a clear change in thought over the years. Unfortunately, however many of the original internees were no longer alive to see their reparations. Among the internees that were still alive in the early 1990s, $1.65 billion dollars were distributed
47
In order to clear their names, many Japanese Americans who were put on trial for one reason or another, filed a writ of coram nobis. A writ of coram nobis is used to reopen one's case after the case has been decided upon. Among those who filed the writ was Fred Korematsu in
1983. It was decided upon that the conviction was based on a faulty and partially omitted report.
A lower California court cleared Korematsu of all charges. Gordon Hirabayashi and Minoru
Yasui followed Korematsu's example and filed their own writs of coram nobis.
48
Much interest in the internment of Japanese Americans has been sparked over the last few years. The usual topics for discussion with regard to the modern War on Terrorism will often mirror those typically associated with the Internment of Japanese Americans. The Patriot Act, with its suspension of the writ of habeas corpus may, and ought to remind most people of the
45
Timothy P. Maga, "Ronald Reagan and Redress for Japanese-American Internment, 1983-88," Presidential
Studies Quarterly 28, no. 3 (1998): 615, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27551904 (Accessed March 21, 2011).
46
House, Civil Liberty Act of 1988 , 100th Cong., H.R. 442.
47
Roger Daniels, Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II , (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004).
48
Philip Tajitsu Nash, "Moving For Redress," in The Mass Internment of Japanese Americans and the Quest for
Legal Redress , ed., Charles McClain, 181, (New York: Garland, 1994).

Granger 19
Executive Orders of World War II, such as 9066, that expanded executive and military power to the point of suspending the writ of habeas corpus. Racial profiling of Arab Americans, with all of the prejudices and poor assumptions that they are all loyal to one another ought to make one recall the treatment of Japanese Americans. Guantanamo Bay may easily be defined as an internment camp.
Bill Hosokawa ended his interview by answering the question of whether he thinks that the whole episode of Japanese American Internment could be repeated. He answered in the affirmative, citing the example of overhearing some kids talk about assaulting an "A-rab" after the Iranian hostage crisis. He states, "There are voices of reason but there are just enough wildeyed super-super patriots so that this sort of thing could happen again. And it’s happening in various places today."
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His answer to the same question today, in a post 9/11 world would likely be an even more emphatic "yes."
Conclusion
The Internment of Japanese Americans was clearly based in racism. This racism affected government officials at all levels and in all branches of the United States' government. After the
Pearl Harbor attacks, many Americans were unable or unwilling to distinguish between a soldier fighting for the Empire of Japan and an American citizen of Japanese ancestry. That in turn led this country to take away the constitutionally granted rights of well over 60,000 innocent citizens. Many of these citizens were even willing to enter the military, despite the fact that their parents were in internment camps. Others fought for their rights, and essentially fought for the constitutional ideals of this country. They fought a legal battle to ensure that their, and everyone else’s, right are protected. Sadly, most of them lost in the short term.
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Hosokawa, 47.

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I would hope that this country would take history’s lesson to heart and never again try to suspend a basic right like due process, simply out of fear or ignorance. I find it troubling to see books like In Defense of Internment on the bestseller bookcases. I can only take comfort in the knowledge that it was likely produced because shock literature sells and few people will believe the information that may be found in that kind of book.
Despite the time honored presence of the writ of habeas corpus and the emphasis of due process in several Amendments of the United States Constitution, it happened anyway. The Fifth
Amendment guarantees, "...nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
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One of the great dramatic and intellectual draws of this event in history is the knowledge that such events can take place, and anyone can be persecutes. By the admission of the government, there was never any evidence that Japanese Americans were guilty of treason or espionage. Many Americans were not willing to grant Japanese Americans the same benefit of the doubt that they were willing to grant the German or Italian Americans in the same situation.
This is possibly due to the shock of Pearl Harbor, or the deep rooted racism that clearly preceded
World War II.
One of the primary reasons to have a system of laws is to attempt to insure that the chief governing bodies do not go too far in their actions. Former Chief Justice, Earl Warren, was quoted as saying, “[M]ilitary judgments sometimes breed action that, in more stable times, would be regarded as abhorrent."
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However, I share Bill Hosokawa's cynical position that the culture that sparks these kinds of events is not going anywhere soon. It is a culture that spreads its ethnocentric prejudice, and immature thought process from one generation to another, with some help from biological impulses. Because we humans are social beings, we will constantly look to
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U.S. Constitution, amend. 5.
51
Geoffrey R. Stone, "Civil Liberties v. National Security in the Law's Open Areas," Boston University Law Review
86, December (2006): 1323, Lexus Nexus Academic.

Granger 21 be in a group, which generally means there are people outside of the group. If enough of us become aware of this, perhaps we will be able to lessen its devastating effect. For our society, which is based on laws, a clear understanding of the events and legal implications of what happened with regard to the Japanese internment may help us grow as a society.

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Davies, Lawrence. "Japanese Moving Day Looms." New York Times , 1 March 1942, E8.
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Interview with Mark Junge. October 22, 1991. Lakewood Colorado. 1-49. http://www.archive.org/details/billHosokawaOneMansStruggleInsideHeartMountainAJap aneseInternment_619
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New York: Gotham Books, 2006.

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