Economic and Social Review, Vol 10, No. 3, April, 1979, pp.
255-265.
The U n i o n i s t State and the Outdoor Relief
Riots of 1932
P A U L BEW
The Ulster Polytechnic
CHRISTOPHER N O R T O N *
Leeds University
Precis:
T h i s p a p e r breaks w i t h the m o n o l i t h i c c o n c e p t i o n o f the U n i o n i s t State in the inter-war p e r i o d .
I t argues t h a t the State apparatuses w e r e c h a r a c t e r i s e d b y a n intense p o p u l i s t / a n t i - p o p u l i s t d i v i s i o n . I t
takes a significant i n c i d e n t — the O u t d o o r R e l i e f riots — w h e n working-class u n i t y seemed to be
i m m i n e n t t o illustrate the o p e r a t i o n of this i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t . T h i s p e r m i t s some general c o m m e n t o n
the role of " o b j e c t i v e " e c o n o m i c c o n s t r a i n t s i n this e p o c h .
I
INTRODUCTION
he O u t d o o r Relief ( O D R ) workers' strike o f 1932 enjoys a unique status
_L i n the history o f Ireland since p a r t i t i o n . I t is the o n l y m o m e n t when the
elusive u n i t y o f Protestant and Catholic workers i n Belfast politics appeared t o
have actually come about. For many i t is a s y m b o l w h i c h keeps alive the hope
that class — rather than national or sectarian — loyalties may become again
the decisive force i n Irish politics. I n the t w e n t i e t h century such hopes have
centred o n the w o r k i n g class as the focus o f a new l o y a l t y ; i n the nineteenth
century i t was believed that the c o m m o n class interest o f the tenantry was
a p o t e n t i a l basis. See Paul Bew ( 1 9 7 9 ) , especially the conclusion.
The elementary details o f the O D R crisis are fairly well k n o w n . The
u n e m p l o y m e n t rate i n N o r t h e r n Ireland was 28 per cent i n 1932. Protestant
skilled engineering workers were grieviously affected as were Catholic
labourers. I n this situation, the Belfast Board o f Guardians refused assistance
t o m a n y o f the r a p i d l y increasing number o f applicants for niggardly
O u t d o o r Relief rates. I n fact, before becoming eligible for a small cash pay*We are i n d e b t e d to the P u b l i c R e c o r d O f f i c e o f N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d ( P R O N I ) a n d the trustees o f the
S p e n d e r papers for p e r m i s s i o n to quote papers i n their care.
ment u n e m p l o y e d men had t o do t w o and a half days' w o r k per week on
such O D R schemes as mending roads. By October 1932 large sections o f
b o t h Catholic and Protestant workers refused t o endure this situation. A
sudden u n i t y o f purpose developed; b y means o f mass demonstration, and
even r i o t , a d o u b l i n g o f the relief rate was w o n .
de Paor's (1970) comment conveys the originality o f the experience:
The Protestant u n e m p l o y e d o f the Shankill Road r i o t e d i n support o f
their Catholic fellows and yet again Belfast saw wrecking, b u r n i n g and
k i l l i n g ; t w o men died o f wounds. But it had not been a sectarian riot.
Farrell (1976) has c o n t r i b u t e d the one outstanding account o f the
development o f the strike f r o m the popular side. We do n o t propose t o
repeat this analysis here. There is o n l y one serious omission i n Farrell's
account and that is a discussion o f the Marxist propaganda o f the period.
This was t o be f o u n d i n the Irish Worker's Voice and the Daily Worker, and
b o t h journals presented the O D R crisis i n a very particular way. The O D R
conflict was apparently n o t just a part o f the economic class struggle, b u t an
integral part o f the resolution o f the national question. Communist writers
seem t o approve o f a revival o f the I R A i n Belfast; State repression o f the
strikers was regularly compared w i t h the Black and Tan activities and i t was
argued that i n simultaneously opening negotiations w i t h de Valera on the
annuities issue and assisting repression i n Belfast, the British Government was
embarking on a co-ordinated two-pronged assault on anti-imperialist forces
i n Ireland {Daily Worker, 28.9.1932, 7.9.1932 and 12.10.1932).
I t was claimed at the time that i n October 1932 there was a six-fold
increase i n Daily Worker sales i n Belfast. I n a sense this was deserved. The
paper's editorial coverage o f the plight o f the Belfast unemployed d i d n o t
begin and end — as w i t h the British Labourist j o u r n a l , the Daily Herald
(13.10.1932) — w i t h a condemnation o f proletarian violence and the pro­
d u c t i o n o f the usual bromides. There was substantial coverage long before
the open clashes. Y e t i t is possible t o wonder about the effects o f propaganda
w h i c h identified U n i o n i s t workers as t a k i n g part i n an anti-imperialist
struggle — w i t h o u t any attempt t o prove that there had been a shift o f
o p i n i o n o n the national question i n Protestant ranks. Also, the strident
denunciation o f reformist sections o f the Labour movement was counter­
productive. Certainly, the N o r t h e r n Ireland Government felt that one way o f
fending o f f British Government and trade u n i o n enquiries about the
behaviour o f the Ulster police was t o pass on the Daily Worker cuttings
depicting the anti-imperialist struggle i n Belfast, the exposure of sham
socialists, and so on ( P R O N I Cab. 7 B / 2 0 7 ) .
However, the full significance o f the strike can only be understood w i t h
reference t o the State and the political relationships w h i c h i t threatened.
Farrell's w o r k tends t o present a picture o f the U n i o n i s t leadership i n the
inter-war p e r i o d as an undifferentiated group o f sectarian bigots. ( I t should
be n o t e d i n passing that this was n o t quite the judgement o f certain nationalist
contemporaries.) I n fact, the recently opened State papers present a very
different picture.
However, these sources also p e r m i t an assessment o f some o f the themes
o f the critics o f the recent radical nationalist w o r k . I n particular, these
critics have defended the Unionist State b y stressing the role o f the
objective, financial constraints on its capacity for generous policy-making.
D u r i n g the O D R crisis, i t has been stressed b y Buckland ( 1 9 7 8 ) , "the
government o f N o r t h e r n Ireland's r o o m for manoeuvre i n the face o f acute
distress was severely l i m i t e d " . However, the study o f the broader context
o f decision-making — w h i c h is r i g h t l y demanded here — reveals very m u c h
more than the operation o f simple economic restraints.
1
2
I I T H E POPULIST/ANTI-POPULIST DIVISION
The events o f the 'thirties were t o show clearly the contradictions that
existed between the different elements o f the N o r t h e r n Ireland State
apparatus — i n particular, the conflict between its populist and anti-populist
elements. The populist p o s i t i o n o f Sir J . Craig, J . Andrews, and Sir R.
Dawson-Bates p r o m o t e d close relations w i t h the Protestant masses. I t was
based on the premiership and the Ministries o f Labour and H o m e Affairs
above all. The first p r i o r i t y o f the populists was the r e p r o d u c t i o n o f a
" g o o d " relationship between the Protestant masses and the Unionist
bourgeoisie t o the visible exclusion o f the Catholic p o p u l a t i o n , irrespective
o f any British Government p o l i c y that may have hindered or obstructed
this strategy. The anti-populist element, whose m a i n base was i n the M i n i s t r y
o f Finance and whose chief protagonists were H . Pollock, the Minister o f
Finance, and Sir W i l f r i d Spender, the permanent secretary t o the Minister o f
Finance and head o f the N o r t h e r n Ireland Civil Service, were resolved t o do
things "the British w a y " . This i m p l i e d opposition t o Orange t r i u m p h a l i s m ,
resistance t o sectarian criteria i n civil service appointments, and even dis3
1. See S P O ( D u b l i n C a s t l e ) S 4 7 4 3 for evidence o f some n a t i o n a l i s t c o m m e n t o n U n i o n i s t d i v i s i o n s ,
albeit o f a r a t h e r speculative n a t u r e . K e v i n O ' S h e i l ' s ( C o l l i n s ' s assistant L a w A d v i s e r ) notes o n Craig's
s p e e c h o f 1 0 . 1 1 . 1 9 2 2 are p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t e w o r t h y .
2. See B u c k l a n d ' s n o t i c e o f F a r r e l l ' s w o r k i n History, V o l . 6 3 , 1 9 7 8 , p p . 1 5 9 - 1 6 1 . F o r an e x p a n s i o n
o f these themes see B u c k l a n d ( 1 9 7 9 ) .
3 . F o r m o r e detail see B e w , G i b b o n , a n d Patterson ( 1 9 7 9 ) , f o r t h c o m i n g , C h . 3 . T h i s w o r k is
discussed b y W h y t e ( 1 9 7 8 ) . T h e s e issues are r a t h e r s l u r r e d over i n O l i v e r ( 1 9 7 8 ) . See the n o t i c e b y
B e w i n the special s e c t i o n o n e c o n o m i c s a n d p u b l i c affairs i n Books Ireland, N o . 2 6 , S e p t . 1 9 7 8 .
approval o f pro-Protestant discrimination o f the matter o f Local Government
contracts. However, the strength o f the anti-populists w i t h i n the Government
was the lesser o f the t w o factions. For example, the actual real c o n t r o l o f
the M i n i s t r y o f Finance i n relation t o governmental apparatuses was con­
siderably less than that o f its British counterpart. I t frequently happened
that expenditure w h i c h was seen b y the M i n i s t r y o f Finance as " w a s t e f u l "
was seen b y Craig, i n a significant phrase, as a necessary " d i s t r i b u t i o n o f
bones" t o his supporters ( A r t h u r ( 1 9 7 7 ) , p . 104).
The object o f this paper is t o study the relationship between these t w o
factions during a period when i t was bedevilled b y a double p r o b l e m : intense
class conflict arising o u t o f mass u n e m p l o y m e n t locally and an unhelpfully
stringent British Treasury p o l i c y nationally.
I l l 1932: T H E B R E A K W I T H B R I T I S H E C O N O M I C P O L I C Y A N D T H E
I N T E N S I F I C A T I O N O F T H E C O N F L I C T B E T W E E N T H E POPULISTS
A N D ANTI-POPULISTS
I n the spring o f 1929 the populist M i n i s t r y o f Home Affairs had i n i t i a t e d
a public works scheme to supplement the existing O u t d o o r Relief machinery.
The background is fairly clear. While some o f the more fatuous members
of the Board o f Poor L a w Guardians spoke o f solving the u n e m p l o y m e n t
p r o b l e m b y sending men back t o the land (Belfast News Letter, 2.1.1929),
other more substantial members supported a " p u b l i c w o r k s " solution
(Belfast News Letter, 9.1.1929 and 15.2.1929).
They were anxious, i n effect, t o place the responsibility for the problem
w i t h the Government. There were good reasons w h y the populist section o f
the Government was prepared t o accept this burden. There was a consensus
amongst social workers, clergymen, and senior civil servants that the Belfast
relief rates were inadequate. However, the public works schemes were, at
first, o n a small scale and they were certainly n o t sufficient t o deflect
criticism o f the Guardians.
The doctrine o f "step b y step" was quite simply n o t h o l d i n g true.
Promises that the Protestant w o r k i n g class w o u l d be denied n o t h i n g enjoyed
b y their British counterparts were obviously false — the amount o f relief
given t o claimants i n N o r t h e r n Ireland was well below that received b y
u n e m p l o y e d workers in Britain, b o t h i n cash and i n wages. A man, wife and
one child that were " o u t o f b e n e f i t " received the following weekly rates i n
England and Scotland (Belfast News Letter, 5.10.1932):
Manchester
21s.
Bradford
26s.
Liverpool
23s.
Northampton
27s.
Glasgow
25s. 3 d .
4
4. See Craig's speech to the Ulster Unionist Labour Association (Belfast News Letter,
7.1.1929).
I n some o f these cities an additional allowance was made for the payment
of rent. For Belfast, i n comparison, the n o r m a l O u t d o o r Relief grant for a
man, wife and one child was 12s. I f w o r k were available o n the relief
schemes, the head o f the family w o u l d be given a day and a half's w o r k i n
the week and he w o u l d be paid i n cash; i f no w o r k were available, the whole
grant w o u l d be paid i n k i n d , even though the man was still expected t o pay
rent i n cash. The O u t d o o r Relief workers' leaders ^demanded that all relief
works should be done under trade u n i o n conditions and that they should be
remunerated at trade u n i o n rates. They also demanded an increase o f relief
t o the f o l l o w i n g weekly rates (Belfast News Letter, 4.10.1932):
man
wife
each child
15s. 3 d .
8s.
2s.
Signs o f dissatisfaction also came f r o m the bastion o f loyalist w o r k i n g
class support, the U n i t e d Unionist Labour Association, w h o , on the eve o f
one O D R crisis, passed the f o l l o w i n g resolution (Belfast News
Letter,
3.10.1932):
While we appreciate the d i f f i c u l t position i n w h i c h the Guardians are
placed o w i n g t o the present regrettable and widespread distress, we feel
i t absolutely necessary that the amount given i n the f o r m o f o u t d o o r
relief should be considerably increased.
This was significant indeed. Craig insisted t h a t the Ulster U n i o n i s t Labour
Association was the most i m p o r t a n t b o d y i n Ulster, more i m p o r t a n t even
than the Orange Order.
The i r o n y o f this situation requires some stress. Belfast relief levels were
very m u c h lower than the British average because Belfast rates were lower.
I n general, the populist axis were the m i l i t a n t champions o f the ratepayer.
This was a most significant part o f Unionism's appeal t o the middle strata i n
this period and the Craig/Bates group passionately resisted British Treasury
pressure — usually supported b y the N o r t h e r n Irish M i n i s t r y o f Finance —
that N o r t h e r n Ireland rates should come more i n t o line w i t h the B r i t i s h . A t
the same time the populists had been vigorous champions o f the rights t o
British welfare levels o f the loyalist w o r k i n g man. I t was apparently
necessary for the populists to drop one or the other favoured group. I n fact,
although intervening marginally against the Guardians and their views, they
5
6
5.
C r a i g to S i r J o s e p h D a v i d s o n , the O r a n g e L o d g e G r a n d Master, 1 2 . 1 . 1 9 3 3 , P R O N I C a b . 8 P F / 2 2 .
6. P R O ( L o n d o n ) T 1 6 0 * 2 6 9 / l 1 1 9 9 9 , N . I . S o c i a l S e r v i c e s ; G . C . U p c o t t ' s m e m o r a n d u m o f
3 . 8 . 1 9 2 5 ; a n d the Financial
Diaries
p a s s i m . See also L a w r e n c e ( 1 9 6 5 ) a n d B o g d a n o r ( 1 9 7 9 ) for
important background information.
d i d neither, b u t solved the p r o b l e m another w a y . Sir W i l f r i d Spender,
arguably the most m i l i t a n t anti-populist, at first enjoyed the discomfiture
o f p o p u l i s m . N o t n o r m a l l y a champion o f the unemployed, he felt free t o
p o i n t o u t their claims and the failure o f the Guardians. He cannot, however,
have relished the eventual populist solution t o the crisis.
I V T H E E X P A N S I O N O F T H E R E L I E F SCHEMES
There was an additional i r o n y , however. T o meet the u n e m p l o y m e n t
p r o b l e m o f 1929 the Unionists h a d already sanctioned a few public w o r k
schemes. However, as the situation deteriorated i n 1932 — 70,000 were o u t
o f w o r k i n A p r i l a n d 76,000 b y August ( P R O N I Cab. 4 / 3 0 3 / 1 7 , 22.6.1922)
— and as ministers desperately considered the setting up o f soup kitchens,
the British Treasury suddenly intervened i n such a way as t o aggravate the
problem.
7
I n the a u t u m n o f 1932, the British Government ruled o u t public works
as a m e t h o d o f p r o m o t i n g economic recovery. This was l i n k e d t o a general
determination t o avoid budget deficits and m a i n t a i n confidence (Howson
( 1 9 7 5 ) , p p . 92-93). Spender and Pollock wished t o f o l l o w the British
Treasury's line o n relief w o r k schemes; however, Craig, Andrews and
Dawson-Bates were n o t so enthusiastic. W i t h rapidly increasing unemploy­
ment there h a d been an alarming g r o w t h i n the number o f applicants f o r
relief i n a very few months. The figures available t o the cabinet i n J u l y are
w o r t h c i t i n g ( P R O N I Cab. 4 / 3 0 4 / 2 1 , Cabinet M e m o r a n d u m o n Distress,
8.7.1932):
Date
4 A p r i l , 1931
3 October, 1931
26 M a r c h , 1932
18 M a r c h , 1932
Cases
415
614
1,242
1,985
Persons
1,816
2,888
5,744
9,144
Cost
£384
£494
£958
£1,131
Wages Paid
£206
£253
£272
£415
Total (per week)
£590
£747
£1,230
£1,546
Again this was n o t the t o t a l picture o f those i n distress as the "means test"
had disallowed many from receiving relief benefits. The Labour Party ( N I ) ,
i n their A n n u a l Report o f 1 9 3 0 / 3 1 , h a d stated that over 500 applicants for
relief were being t u r n e d d o w n every week b y the Court o f Referees
(Harbison ( 1 9 6 6 ) ) . The number o f those employed o n relief w o r k schemes
was around 2,000. T o accept British p o l i c y i n the strict way demanded b y
the anti-populists involved unacceptable political risks. Dawson-Bates voiced
these fears i n J u l y o f 1932 ( P R O N I Cab. 4 / 3 0 4 / 2 1 , 8.7.1932),
7.
PRONI
C a b . 4 / 3 0 4 / 2 6 , Distress
in Northern
Bates, Minister o f H o m e Affairs, 3 1 . 8 . 1 9 3 2 .
Ireland,
memorandum
submitted
by R . Dawson-
. . . all m y i n f o r m a t i o n shows that unless adequate measures are taken
i n good time and on some settled p l a n , there is grave danger t h a t the
peace o f the Province w i l l be endangered . . . the o n l y alternative t o
relief measures is t o keep order b y force, and for this purpose, i n the
face o f widespread discontent, the existing force is n o t adequate.
He concluded,
I t w i l l be necessary t o have relief w o r k s o n a large scale i n the c o m i n g
m o n t h s , and i t w i l l be necessary for the Government t o assist b y way
o f grants.
However, even t h o u g h the British had n o t abandoned all public w o r k s ,
Spender insisted that Ulster p o l i c y represented a deviation. He t o l d Bates i n
November ( P R O N I D 7 1 5 , Sir W i l f r i d Spender's Financial Diaries, 28.11.1932),
I p o i n t e d o u t t o h i m that our government still seemed t o be going on
w i t h U n e m p l o y m e n t Relief Schemes, and that I t h o u g h t that this
departure from the British p o l i c y w o u l d get us i n serious t r o u b l e .
A t this time the Government's involvement i n relief works had t w o forms:
(a)
the grants made b y the M i n i s t r y o f L a b o u r towards approved schemes
for the relief o f u n e m p l o y m e n t , and
(b)
grants made b y the M i n i s t r y towards the distress schemes i n i t i a t e d b y
the Board o f Guardians i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the C o r p o r a t i o n .
For the former, as far as road w o r k was concerned, the grants from the
Government h a d , for the last t w o years, been funded b y the Road F u n d ;
for the latter, i t was financed b y up t o 50 per cent f r o m the Road F u n d , the
balance being made up b y the C o r p o r a t i o n and the Guardians. Pollock was
well aware that heavy b o r r o w i n g f r o m the Road F u n d t o m a i n t a i n the relief
schemes was endangering his attempts t o balance his Budget w h i c h he
managed t o do b y reducing expenditure and often raiding the Road F u n d
( P R O N I Cab. 4 / 3 0 4 / 2 1 , 8.7.1932). Pollock approached Craig t o w a r n h i m
o f the danger o f over-expenditure o n relief w o r k schemes; the incident was
recorded b y Spender i n his diary ( P R O N I D 7 1 5 , Financial Diaries, second
week i n October 1 9 3 2 ) :
. . . M r Pollock addressed a letter t o the PM dated the 3 October dealing
w i t h this subject (relief schemes). The Prime Minister saw M r Pollock
and gave h i m very full assurances that no burden w o u l d be placed on
the Budget i n regard t o relief schemes w i t h o u t his full knowledge.
Despite his reassurance t o Pollock, Craig had revealed his true position
when speaking at a meeting o f the Duncairn-Clifton Unionist Association i n
late September. He t o l d his audience t h a t (Belfast News Letter, 1.10.1932)
the Government was prepared t o give liberal grants i n aid o f relief
schemes, n o matter what the cost.
Pollock was soon t o discover this fact when he learnt that the M i n i s t r y o f
Home Affairs had promised large grants t o Local A u t h o r i t i e s i n order t o
continue relief schemes, the grants being funded b y the Road F u n d . When
Pollock enquired f r o m the M i n i s t r y o f Home Affairs as t o the extent o f its
c o m m i t m e n t s , he was shown that heavy liabilities had been incurred on the
Road F u n d i n respect o f relief schemes and that a sum o f £200,000 had
already been sanctioned. Spender w r o t e o f this incident ( P R O N I D 7 1 5 ,
Financial Diaries, 28.11.1932),
The true facts have n o w come t o light, namely that the Minister o f
Home Affairs has, i n that capacity, approved o f very heavy grants being
made t o local authorities f r o m the Road F u n d w h i c h is under his
c o n t r o l , and that having authorised such contributions from the
Government, he n o w says they have t o be met from the Exchequer
although the Ministery o f Finance has never been consulted o n the
matter. In other words, the method of handling this matter has resulted
in the Minister giving authority for very heavy expenditure from the
Exchequer without bringing the matter to the notice of the Minister of
Finance. I cannot imagine any other country where such a state of
affairs could be possible, (emphasis added)
Craig, Andrews and Dawson-Bates, drawing o n what they felt t o be the
m o o d o f the Protestant masses at the time and what they felt t o be the
proper lesson o f the riots i n October, pressed on w i t h expenditure on relief
w o r k schemes, irrespective o f the British Government and their o w n M i n i s t r y
o f Finance. Craig was t o answer his anti-populist critics at the beginning o f
1934 (Financial Diaries, 9.1.1934):
The agitation had got so serious that he believed that they might have
f o u n d themselves confronted w i t h w i l f u l damage w h i c h w o u l d be out
o f all p r o p o r t i o n t o the £300,000 paid away on Relief Schemes.
V CONCLUSION
The argument presented here has been based on the existence o f a division
w i t h i n the Unionist State between populist and anti-populist sections.
Despite the n o t o r i o u s l y labile nature o f the term " p o p u l i s t " , we have
maintained the usage o f " p o p u l i s t " and " a n t i - p o p u l i s t " t o indicate a gamut o f
practices rather wider t h a n c o u l d be denoted b y reference t o "sectarian"
and " l i b e r a l " groupings. (There w o u l d also be the danger then o f presenting
the anti-populists anachronistically as an inter-war version o f O'Neillism.)
The populist political practice was one o f paternalistic concession towards
the Protestant w o r k i n g class embodied i n a practical and vulgar interventionism — at a time when i t was unfashionable i n Britain — combined w i t h a
deliberately hard line towards Catholics. The anti-populist practice was
established b y the strictest adherence t o the Treasury o r t h o d o x y o f the
period and a softer face towards Catholics.
8
T o stress the relationship between the populist sections o f the Unionist
State and the Protestant masses is n o t , o f course, to i m p l y the t o t a l plasticity
of the masses i n the hands o f their o m n i p o t e n t leadership. As Probert
(1978) r i g h t l y insists i n this c o n t e x t ,
. . . the failure o f these economic struggles t o make any real impact on
the divisive ideologies o f the Belfast w o r k i n g class was also caused b y
the decisive intervention o f Orangeism as a relatively antonomous
force.
B u t i t is t o say the U n i o n i s t State was n o t neutral w i t h respect t o the repro­
d u c t i o n o f sectarian divisions w i t h i n Ireland.
I t should be noted that this division w i t h i n the State is l i n k e d t o the
division w i t h i n the proletariat. The populist grouping's role during the O D R
crisis makes sense only i n the c o n t e x t o f an assumption that the maintenance
o f hegemony over the Protestant masses was the p r i m a r y objective o f
p o l i t i c a l strategy. I n pursuit o f this end, this group were prepared t o take
the p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous step o f f l o u t i n g a p o w e r f u l adversary, the British
Treasury.
But the State considered as a t o t a l i t y was n o t i n a position t o allow an
u n c o n t r o l l e d p o p u l i s m . T o do so m i g h t have p r o v o k e d British intervention.
This was the stance o f the anti-populist group. I t permits us t o answer the
question w h i c h has plagued all students o f Belfast riots o f the 1930s. Why
d i d the non-sectarian proletarian riots o f 1932 give way t o the sectarian riots
of 1935?
9
We have already rejected the view o f the Unionist w o r k i n g class as the
8.
F o r the m o s t r e c e n t d i s c u s s i o n , see E . L a c l a u ( 1 9 7 7 ) , p p . 1 4 3 - 1 9 8 .
9. Farrell's ( 1 9 7 6 ) a n s w e r is discussed i n B e w ( 1 9 7 7 ) ; this p a p e r also discusses the role of the B r i t i s h
State w h i c h is o m i t t e d h e r e .
" p l i a n t " dupes o f the leadership. B u t , apart from the general conception o f
the Protestant w o r k i n g class ideology that this implies, we believe that our
analysis provides a different solution t o this question. For just as the connec­
t i o n between populism w i t h i n the U n i o n i s t State and the Loyalist masses is
an objective relationship o f great p o l i t i c a l importance, so also is the relation­
ship between the anti-populist elements and the loyalist masses. This is the
clue t o the understanding o f the 12 J u l y , 1935 riots.
The anti-populists pursued a strategy o f support for British Treasury
initiatives — for example, the raising o f the rates as was eventually achieved
i n 1934. They also opposed anti-Catholic discrimination i n the sphere o f
jobs and contracts. V e r y often they were unsuccessful i n this respect b u t
they d i d , at least, save the regime from dangerous excesses.
However i m p o r t a n t these activities have been t o the survival o f the State,
they d i d help t o create feelings o f disillusionment among Unionist supporters
b o t h i n the middle and w o r k i n g classes. There was, i n the 1932-35 p e r i o d ,
an increasing strain o f Loyalist o p i n i o n — the founding o f the extremist
Ulster Protestant League is o n l y one s y m p t o m — t o the effect that the
Unionist leadership was n o w " o u t o f t o u c h " w i t h its supporters. A l l this
helped t o generate the frustrations w h i c h expressed themselves i n the crisis
o f 1935. This crisis cannot be reduced simply to the inter-communal
violence o f J u l y itself. I t is n o t t o o m u c h to insist that the summer of 1935
marked one o f the most significant disruptions i n relationships between
U n i o n i s m and its mass support since p a r t i t i o n . I t involved a serious attempt
t o establish a "new U n i o n i s t p a r t y " w h i c h marked the temporary c o m i n g
together o f frustrated middle- and working-class layers. I t involved a
campaign t o purge Catholics from the police, oppose anti-populist economic
policies and so o n . The O u t d o o r Relief crisis had, thanks t o its mode o f
resolution, n o t altered the expectations the Protestant masses had o f " t h e i r "
State.
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