STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE BRAZILIAN AGE
DISTRIBUTION: 1950-2050
Morvan de Mello Moreira1
To be presented at the XXIV General Population Conference
International Union for the Scientific Study of Population
Salvador, Bahia, Brazil, August 18-24, 2001
1
Director of the Department of Population Studies of the Joaquim Nabuco Foundation Institute of Social Research and Lecturer at the Federal University of Pernambuco. The author
thanks Jose Alberto Magno de Carvalho and Laura R. Wong for their reading and suggestions
and takes entire responsibility for the remaining deficiencies of the paper.
1
STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE BRAZILIAN AGE
DISTRIBUTION: 1950-2050
Morvan de Mello Moreira
INTRODUCTION
Brazil is experiencing a deep demographic change with significant
transformations in its age structure. The main determinant of these changes has been
fertility, whose decline is one of the more intense observed among the most populous
countries in the world in modern times. The Brazilian Total Fertility Rate dropped from
5.8 children per woman, in the mid-sixties (Carvalho, 1978) to 2.3 children per woman
during the second half of the 90’s (IBGE, 2001). It will probably reach the replacement
level at the beginning of the first decade of this century and would continue to decline at
moderate rates afterwards (IBGE, 1997).
The Brazilian population growth was about 3.0% per year before the onset of the
fertility decline, i.e., during the sixties. By the end of the 20th century, however –
during the period 1991/2000–, the population growth averaged as much as 1.6% per
year. Available projections agree with the persistence of decline in the population
growth rate in the short and long run; it would go from 1.0% per year, between 2000
and 2010, to 0.3% per year, between 2045 and 2050 (IBGE, 1997; United Nations,
2001).
As a result of these changes, it is estimated that, only between 1980 and 2000,
approximately, 35 million children had not been born in Brazil. Had the 1980’ fertility
rates remained constant, at least another 35 million would be born between 2000 and
2010. As for the elders, defined here as those aged 65 or more, around 3.7 million were
added to them during the period 1980 and 2000. Between 2000 and 2010, a time
interval corresponding to half of the previous period, the absolute number of new elder
should be almost the same figure, that is 3.3 million people, thus signalling the
acceleration of the changing process.
2
The paramount structural changes in the Brazilian age pattern is better seen by
considering its age composition over the 100-year interval between 1950 and 2050.
According to the United Nations (United Nations, 1998), the percentage of the elderly
population, initially below 3%, will reach 18% at the end of the period. The deep
reduction in the proportion of the youngsters, i.e., those aged 15 years or less will be of
equally great magnitude. It was 41.6% in 1950, 28.8% in 2000, and will represent only
19.9% in 2050. In the long run children and the aged will have approximately the same
weight in the total population. Consequently, Brazil will experience one of the most
intense processes of population ageing among the most populous countries in the world
during this period. Such considerable variations in a short time will have important
repercussions on the Brazilian society, the type of social development programs to be
implemented and the quality of life of the population. This ageing process occurs in a
society that despite its fast modernisation simultaneously shows one of the world's most
unequal income distributions, a significant number of people living below the poverty
line and experiencing very low economic growth rates and high unemployment rates
since the 80’s.
This paper outlines a general view of the Brazilian demographic ageing process
during the period between 1950-2050. It strengthens the evolution of this process and
the consequent changes in the generations’ interrelationships through the demographic
dependency ratios. Some of its most specific characteristics as feminisation of the
ageing process and the survivorship of the elder are also emphasised. The international
context is considered for better understanding of the process.2
CHANGES IN THE BRAZILIAN AGE STRUCTURE
The Brazilian population, that represents approximately one third of the LatinAmerican population, grew from 54 million to 170 million during 1950 and 2000, being
estimated that it will reach 244 million in 20503.
2
In order to facilitate comparisons, estimates published by the United Nations were used in this
paper: The World Population Prospects – The 1998 revision (United Nations, 1999) and World
Population Prospects – The 2000 Revision (2001); the latter available on line
(www.un.org/esa/population/wpp2000.htm). Unless otherwise expressed, all data are from the
medium variant of the mentioned reports.
3
Table A1, in the Annex, shows the sex and age distribution of the Brazilian population for the
years 1950, 2000 and 2050
3
Figure 1
Brazil – Relative age and sex distribution (%) – 1950, 1970, 1990, 2000, 2025, 2050
Brasil - Distribuição Etária Relativa - 1950
Brasil - Distribuição Etária Relativa - 1970
90-95
85-90
85-90
80-85
80-85
75-80
75-80
70-75
70-75
65-70
65-70
60-65
60-65
55-60
55-60
Idades
95-100
90-95
Idades
95-100
50-55
45-50
50-55
45-50
40-45
40-45
35-40
35-40
30-35
30-35
25-30
25-30
20-25
20-25
15-20
15-20
10-15
10-15
05-10
05-10
00-05
00-05
9
7
5
3
1
1
3
5
7
9
9
7
5
3
1
Percentagem
Brasil - Distribuição Etária Relativa - 1990
90-95
90-95
85-90
85-90
80-85
80-85
75-80
75-80
70-75
70-75
65-70
65-70
60-65
60-65
55-60
55-60
Idades
95-100
Idades
3
5
3
5
3
5
7
9
Brasil - Distribuição Etária Relativa - 2000
95-100
50-55
45-50
50-55
45-50
40-45
40-45
35-40
35-40
30-35
30-35
25-30
25-30
20-25
20-25
15-20
15-20
10-15
10-15
05-10
05-10
00-05
00-05
9
7
5
3
1
1
3
5
7
9
9
7
5
3
Percentagem
1
1
7
9
Percentagem
Brasil - Distribuição Etária Relativa - 2025
Brasil - Distribuição Etária Relativa - 2050
95-100
95-100
90-95
90-95
85-90
85-90
80-85
80-85
75-80
75-80
70-75
70-75
65-70
65-70
60-65
60-65
55-60
55-60
50-55
Idades
Idades
1
Percentagem
45-50
50-55
45-50
40-45
40-45
35-40
35-40
30-35
30-35
25-30
25-30
20-25
20-25
15-20
15-20
10-15
10-15
05-10
05-10
00-05
00-05
9
7
5
3
1
1
3
Percentagem
5
7
9
9
7
5
3
1
1
7
9
Percentagem
Source: United Nations (1999)
4
In the five final decades of the 20th century the population aged less than 15
years grew from 22 to 50 millions and would remain around this figure with small
oscillations, up to 2050. The population above 65 years old on the other hand, increased
from 1.6 million in 1950, to 8.7 million in 2000, and, it will probably reach 42 million
in 2050. Thus, while it is expected the young population twofold, the elderly would
grow approximately 26 times in these 100 years.4 A synthesis of this change is shown in
Figure 1. The chronological sequence of the age and sex distribution is initiated having
a typical young format pyramid that remained virtually constant up to 1970, becoming
practically rectangular at the end of the period (2050). This series points out a process
toward a relatively quick new stabilisation when compared to the demographic
evolution had by currently developed countries.5
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate, in detail, the different variation by age, in absolute and
relative terms of the Brazilian population age structure. Figure 2 highlights the most
significant variation in volume during the first 25 years, when, as it was seen in the case
of the population pyramids, the variation in the structure was almost non-existent. The
young population contingent (less than 15) stabilises around 1985; inside this large age
group, the children up to 5 years old decline in absolute terms afterwards.
The maximum volume of youngsters, slightly above 51 million people,
corresponds to 1990; absolute figures decrease in 2000, tending to stabilise numerically
afterwards. Since the 60’s, when the levels of national fertility started to decline, the
absolute increment in the successive cohorts had been lesser each time until 1985. This
trend remained in the following decade, where the absolute variations – positive or
negative – are cyclical, tending to stagnate around a null asymptote value. The inertial
effect of this destabilisation, initiated with the fertility decrease around the 70’s, which
appeared in the 90’s in terms of the absolute number of births, will remain over the
future decades with the corresponding variations in the social and economic demand
that each age group generates. This aspect will be brought up again later.
4
Due to the inertial effect of the age structure and the relatively narrow interval of the
future fertility and mortality variations, we believe that the possibility of these forecasts to fail
shall be relatively small.
5
See as an evidence of this comment, the French evolution of the age structure for the
period 1775 to 1959 made by Pressat (1970).
5
Figure 2 – Brazil – Accumulated Population until Indicated Age – 1950-2050
Population (million)
200
100
0
1950
1970
1990
2010
2030
2050
Years
Total
Up to 80
Up to 70
Up to 15
Up to 10
Up to 5
Up to 60
Up to 50
Up to 40
Up to 30
Up to 20
Source: United Nations (1999)
Figure 3, with the proportional age distribution of the total population, shows the
transformation mentioned above. The curves that suggest a moving net, evidence,
proportionally, more accentuated changes among the young population (left side of the
Figure) after 1965 –beginning of the destabilisation– and until approximately 2005,
when it would tend swiftly toward an new quasi–stabable population.
6
Figure 3 - Brazil - Age Distribution of Total Population - 1950 -2050
18%
1950
1955
16%
1960
1965
1970
14%
1975
1980
12%
1985
1990
1995
10%
2000
2005
8%
2010
2015
6%
2020
2025
2030
4%
2035
2040
2%
2045
2050
0%
00-05
05-10
10-15
15-20
20-25
25-30
30-35
35-40
40-45
45-50
50-55
55-60
60-65
65-70
70-75
75-80
80-85
85-90
90-95 95-100 100 +
Source: United Nations (1999).
INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AGE GROUPS
Table 1 quantifies the transformations of the Brazilian age structure. It includes
measures of the age structure according to large age groups and the values of the mean
and median ages.
Before analysing the relationship between the large age groups, it is worth to
observe the variation in the average values of the age distribution, particularly the
median age. It eloquently shows the speed of change, since it duplicates over the period
of reference.
While at the beginning of the period, 50% of the population was less than 20
years old, in 2050, such proportion would correspond to those up to 38 years old. In the
Latin-American context, this increase would be smaller than the cases of Mexico,
Colombia and Cuba only; in any case, it would be larger than the foreseen for Latin
America, as a whole, and, even, for Asia.6
6
Cuba has a population dynamic very different from the rest of Latin America. Notice
that, already in 1950, the Cuban median age was above of the Latin–American average: 23.0
and 20.1 years respectively. For 2050, the corresponding values would be 43.1 and 37.5 (United
Nations, 1999). In the Asian context, however, Thailand and Republic of Korea stand out, with
an increase greater than 22 years in the median age during the period.
7
Table 1 - Brazil – Total population and proportional distribution by large age groups,
Dependency Ratio and its components, and Mean and Median Age – 1950-2050
Total
Years Population
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
(1)
53.977
72.757
96.021
121.673
147.939
170.116
190.876
209.734
225.161
236.541
244.228
Relative age distribution
Dependency Ratios
(%)
(%)
(a)
00-14 15-64 65 + TDR
CDR(b) ADR(c)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(2)
(3)
41,6
55,5
3,0
80,3
74,9
5,4
43,3
53,5
3,3
87,1
80,9
6,1
42,4
54,0
3,7
85,3
78,5
6,8
38,1
57,8
4,2
73,1
65,9
7,2
34,8
60,9
4,3
64,1
57,0
7,1
28,8
66,0
5,1
51,4
43,7
7,8
25,3
68,4
6,3
46,2
37,0
9,2
23,3
68,2
8,5
46,7
34,2
12,5
21,5
66,6
11,8
50,0
32,3
17,7
20,6
65,0
14,5
53,9
31,7
22,2
20,1
62,6
17,3
59,6
32,0
27,6
Mean
Age
Median
Age
(8)
23,5
23,2
23,6
24,7
26,2
28,7
31,3
33,8
36,2
37,9
39,0
(9)
19,2
18,6
18,6
20,3
22,7
25,9
29,4
32,9
35,5
37,0
38,2
(a) TDR (Total Dependency Ratio) is the ratio of the population below 15 and above 65 to the population aged 1564.
(b) CDR (Child Dependence Ratio) is the ratio of the population below 15 to the population aged 15 to 64.
(c) ADR (Aged Dependence Ratio) is the ratio of the population above 65 the population aged 15 to 64.
Source: United Nations (1999)
As a first approach to changes in the intergenerational relationships it can be
seen that, due to ageing process, there are substantial modifications in the demographic
dependency ratio. Although it is a purely demographic measure, since it takes the age as
the only variable, in highly indicative of important intergenerational social and
economic relationships that will happen.
Both, the Child Dependency Ratio (CDR - ratio of population below 15 to
population 15 to 64) and Aged Dependency Ratio (ADR - ratio of population above 64
to population 15 to 64), although with different evolution, determine the declining trend
of the Total Dependency Ratio (TDR - ratio of population below 15 and population
above 64 to population 15 to 64) that was practically constant and at high levels (around
80-90%) up to 1970. It starts to decrease exclusively due to the proportionally higher
reduction of the youngsters (column 2). Thus the total-dependency ratio would reach its
minimum values during the period 2010 to 2020, due to fast reduction of the childdependency ratio (CDR - column 6). The aged-dependency ratio component (ADR column 4), that remains almost non-expressive until, say, 2010, will present significant
increases after 2020/30, due to the increase of the elders. The significant changes in the
path of the dependency ratios over the period 1950-2050 are plotted in Figure 4.
8
Figure 4 - Brazil – Total, Child and Aged Dependency Ratios - 1995-2050
100
90
80
RATIO 9%)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
Period
TDR
CDR
ADR
Source: Table 1.
Summarising, for a long while the dependency ratio should remain descending
below historical levels previous to the beginning of the age structure changes. In this
transition the child-dependency will decline quickly while the aged-dependency
increase – slowly at the beginning, and faster afterwards. This combination will
certainly bring about important implications for demand and allocation of public and
private resources among both youngsters and elders.
As to the youngsters, such drastic variation in the ratios, inclusive in absolute
number, has important repercussions in the investments needs. It certainly creates
favourable chances to the improvement of the educational and health level, for example,
that would guarantee, in the future, a better quality of life for the Brazilian population.
The period that will extend approximately until 2025 was characterised as a
“window of opportunity” by Carvalho and Wong (1995) or ‘demographic bonus’ related
to similar impressive structural changes in other underdeveloped settings. This
relatively optimistic approach rely in the assumption that it is a period where the
quantitative pressures imposed by the child-dependency attenuates, while quantitative
9
demands of the elder are not yet growing expressively7. Thus, a favourable conjuncture
draws round favouring both:
a) Expanding coverage and improve quality of socio-economic resources to
attend young population.
b) Time for rearrangements to adequately face the challenges imposed by the
foreseen growth of the elderly population.
BRAZILIAN
CONTEXT
AGING
POPULATION
IN
THE
INTERNATIONAL
Transformations mentioned in the previous lines show, above all, the ageing
process of the Brazilian population. This process is analysed with more detail next
considering its volume and intensity in the international context.
Intensity is measured comparing the Ageing Index8 since its evolution
throughout the time is directly related to the population ageing process. The Ageing
Index is easily understood and highly sensitive to the variations in the age distribution
caused by the fertility decline which is the case for Brazil.
Table 2 portrays the probable evolution of the aged population, its relative
weight and the Ageing Index in Brazil. It also includes world figures classified
according to the United Nations concept of more and less developed countries and some
selected regions9. The data points to the existence of distinct worlds when referring to
the aged population: one of them, compounded by the less developed countries (LDC),
in which the number of elders is large but has relatively small weight. The other formed
by the more developed countries, in which the absolute size of the elderly population is
7
This profile, demographically advantageous will be present in other the
underdeveloped countries experiencing similar demographic changes. This is the case of some
Latin American countries, such as Mexico and Colombia. It is also applied to Asian countries
like Indonesia, Republic of Korea and Thailand, among others.
8
The Aging Index is the ratio of the population over 65 years old to the population
below 15 years old.
9
According to The 1996 General Assembly of the United Nations the categories include
the following countries/regions:
More developed: Northern America, Japan, Europe and Australia–New Zealand.
Less developed: Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia (excluding Japan) and
Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia. Notice that this category excludes least developed
countries (38 in Africa, 9 in Asia, 1 in Latin America and 5 in Oceania).
10
small but their relative participation in the total of the population is high. In the LDC,
the elders were approximately 250 million in 2000 but they corresponded to only 5.1%
of the total population. In the more developed countries, this contingent reached 170
million representing, however, 14.4% of the total population. While, in 1950, the aged
population of the LDC was practically equal to the more developed (60.6 and 64.2
million, respectively), in 2050 it would be almost four times larger in the LDC (1.2
billion against 300 million).
Table 2 – Brazil and Selected Regions – Population above 65 years old, Percent of
Elderly and Ageing Index - 1950-2050
Brazil and Selected Regions
1950
1975
2000
2025
2050
Population above 65 years old (in thousands)
Brazil
1.604
4.247
8.709
Less developed countries(*)
66.644
118.027
248.221
More developed countries (*)
64.202
116.029
171.069
Latin America and Caribbean
6.178
14.061
28.080
South–eastern Asia
6.735
10.691
24.371
Western Europe
14.373
23.513
29.151
Percent of elderly in the total population
Brazil
3.0
3.9
5.1
Less developed countries(*)
3,9
3,9
5,1
More developed countries (*)
7,9
10,7
14,4
Latin America and Caribbean
3,7
4,4
5,4
South-eastern Asia
3,7
3,3
4,7
Western Europe
10,2
13,9
15,9
Ageing Index (per cent)
Brazil
7,2
9,7
18,1
Less developed countries(*)
10,3
9,4
15,7
More developed countries (*)
28,9
44,2
79,1
Latin America and Caribbean
9,2
10,6
17,2
South–eastern Asia
9,4
7,7
15,0
Western Europe
43,8
61,0
93,5
21.919
42.243
561.749 1.163.054
253.912
299.249
67.472
135.666
58.100
131192
41.749
46.918
10.1
8,5
20,9
9,7
8,5
22,7
17.8
15,0
25,9
16,8
16,7
27,5
46,8
34,1
133,1
41,1
37,0
152,3
92,9
73,9
169,3
83,7
85,2
185,8
(*) See previous footnote
Source: United Nations (1999)
It should be notice, in addition, the speedy ageing process of those regions that
had initiated recently the demographic transition, which is the case for Latin America
and the South–eastern Asia. Taking 1950 as ground for comparison, these regions
would present a faster ageing process since its aged population may be 20-fold over this
100-year time interval. The Ageing Index, that in 1950 presented values below 10 (i.e.,
one elder for every 10 youngsters) for both regions, would be nearly 10-fold in 2050
when it will be more than 80 elders per 100 youngsters.
11
Despite this huge ageing process, however, the large difference regarded Europe
would remain; in Western Europe, for instance, youngsters and elders almost equal
(Ageing Index = 93,5) already at the beginning of the 21st century; the ancients,
however, would be significantly more than the youngsters afterwards.
In sum, the ageing process between 1950 and 2050 measured trough the variation of the
Ageing Index would be faster in the LDC than in the more developed countries: it
would increase 617% and 486%, respectively.10
Regarding Brazil and compared to Latin America and Caribbean, Table 2 shows
important findings between 2000 and 2050:
a) The country will present similar proportional growth in the size of the
elderly population (around 385%);
b) notwithstanding, a larger relative increase in the proportion of the elderly
related to the corresponding total population (249% against 211%, for Latin
America) and,
c) an even bigger relative increase in the Ageing Index (313% against 286% for
Latin America).
This apparent contradiction on similar proportional growth in the size of the
elderly population and a bigger relative increase in the Ageing Index is due to an inertial
effect. In fact, that the absolute number of the elders in 2050 will be less affected by the
time of the onset and speed of fertility decline in the Region and in Brazil than the other
two measures. The data points to a faster ageing process in the Brazilian population than
in the Region, as a whole.
Additionally, by accepting the United Nations’ projections, Ageing Index in
Brazil (93) would still be much lower than in Western Europe (186) and in South–
eastern Asia (115) in 2050. As a matter of fact it is impressive the ageing process to be
experienced by the latter between 2025 and 2050, when its Ageing Index would change
from 37 to 85 elders per 100 youngsters.
Finally, according to the United Nations projections’ (United Nations, 1999), the
Brazilian ageing process, measured by the evolution of the Ageing Index would be
among the most intense seen in the period 1950-2050. These data characterise Brazil
among the 35 more populous countries in the world with the 4th most intense ageing
10
Notice that the developed countries had certainly initiated this process prior to 1950;
furthermore, for this date its Ageing Index was almost three times higher than the corresponding
to the LCD.
12
process, following the Republic of Korea, Thailand and Japan. In this one hundred-year
period the Brazilian Ageing Index would be 12-fold, while the corresponding to
Republic of Korea would be 21-fold, 19-fold in Thailand, and around 16-fold in Japan.
(See Table A2).
Graph 5 – Brazil and Selected Countries – Variation of the Ageing Index – 1950-2050
Index: (1950 = 100)
2200
1950=100
1650
1100
550
0
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
Anos
R. of Korea
Japan
Brazil
Spain
United States
Republic
of Congo
Source: Table A2.
Figure 5 displays the evolution between 1950 and 2050 of the Ageing Index
corresponding to Brazil. It also includes the Republic of Korea, Japan, Spain, United
States and the Democratic Republic of Congo (first and last countries corresponding to
the most intense and slowest ageing processes among the 35 most populous countries in
2000, as shown in Table A2 in Annex).
The intense ageing process of the Brazilian population contrasts with the one
observed among the countries with already old age structure and where the transition to
low fertility levels started well before and took a longer time interval. Consequently, in
these countries the institutional adjustments and the social and economic
transformations needed to assist an aged population also had a longer time interval.
13
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BRAZILIAN AGING PROCESS
Evidence of the relatively fast ageing process that the country might experience
has been given already; this item analyses some more specific characteristics as the sex
differential and, briefly the age groups inside the elder population.11
Feminisation
Ageing happens differently by being man or woman. Although the sex ratio (SR)
at birth favours men, females have lower mortality levels by age vis–a–vis the males;
thus there are more women than men from, say, age 20 onwards. Usually lower sex
ratios are located at older ages, where the cumulative effect of higher male mortality is
more intense. Because of the probable mortality trends, an increasing feminisation in the
Brazilian ageing process is expected. In fact, it is presumed that, at least in the long run,
improvements in the Brazilian life expectancy will happen keeping constant the current
and significant mortality differentials by sex.
Data referring to Brazil (Table 3) show the probable evolution of the sex
differences among the elders, over the period 1950-2050. The already higher proportion
of elderly women existing in 1950 (almost 25% more women than men) should increase
substantially (there would be 40% more women than men would by 2050). This would
result in an increment of their participation in the elderly population of 55,5%, in 1950,
to 58,4%, in 2050, thus extending the distance between sexes of the Ageing Index.
Additionally, two aspects must be considered when dealing with the
feminisation in the expected ageing process. In the first place, this sub–population
would probably have more improvements in their mortality levels, above the projected
ones, perhaps, that will enlarge sex differentials. Thus, certainly the data above are not
completely disclosing the degree of feminisation that the Brazilian aged population
might reach.
11
It would have been important to characterize this process considering ethnic
characteristics, but the census data concerning this variable are unusable due to obvious errors.
Data deficiency is evidenced, for example, in the sex ratio over 100 in ages above 30 for the
black/brown population. Inconsistency is evidenced, also, in the increase of the size of brown
cohorts as we go further on time. (A clear example of this, is the brown population of age 1014, in the 1960 census, whose volume was of 1.343 thousand children; in 1980, being at the age
30-34, the cohort size was 1.355 thousand. Finally, in 1990, when they would be at the ages 4044, the volume extended to 1.485 thousand). For “migration” movements between the diverse
ethnic groups, see Wood et al. (2000).
14
Table 3 – Brazil – Elderly Population, Sex Ratio, Proportion of Total Population and
Ageing Index by Sex – 1950-2050
Elderly Population (in Sex
Proportion of Total
Ageing Index
Ratio
Years
thousand)
Population (%)
(per cent)
(%)
Men
Women
Men
Women
Men
Women
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
715
1.068
1.614
2.378
2.886
3.790
5.094
7.509
11.105
14.131
17.560
891
1.315
1.918
2.677
3.505
4.919
6.893
10.345
15.476
20.052
24.683
80,2
81,2
84,2
88,7
82,5
77,0
73,9
72,7
71,8
70,4
71,2
2,7
2,9
3,4
3,9
3,9
4,5
5,4
7,3
10,1
12,3
14,8
3,3
3,6
4,0
4,4
4,7
5,7
7,1
9,7
13,4
16,5
19,7
6,3
6,7
7,9
10,2
11,1
15,2
20,7
30,1
44,8
56,8
70,1
8,0
8,4
9,5
11,6
13,8
20,4
29,0
43,1
65,1
84,2
103,0
Source: United Nations (1999).
In the second place, it must be emphasised, however, that the striking unbalance
between elderly men and women is not a Brazilian particularity. Indeed, the sex ratios
shown in Table 4 indicate that Brazil is currently close to the Latin American average
despite the fact that –always according to the United Nations' projections– it is among
the lower ratios of the world12. Notice that among the more developed countries, after
reaching a minimum sex ratio in the 70s (62,9, in 1975), they will probably have a
persistent, yet slow return to higher sex ratio (74.1 in 2050).13
Table 4 - Brazil and Selected Regions - Elderly Sex Ratio - 1950-2050.
Brazil and Selected Regions
1950
1975
2000
2025
2050
Brazil
Less developed countries(*)
More developed countries (*)
Latin America and Caribbean
South-eastern Asia
Western Europe
71.1
82,7
74,1
76,2
79,8
76,6
80.3
80,3
71,0
84,7
83,7
74,6
86.9
84,9
62,9
85,4
82,2
62,3
77.0
84,1
65,4
78,4
78,9
64,9
72.1
83,4
72,4
75,7
78,4
75,6
Source: United Nations (1999).
12
This is due, to a large extent, to the significant differences by sex peculiar to the
Brazilian mortality, which, in addition, is expected to remain. Sex difference in the Brazilian life
expectancy oscillates between 7,5–7,8 years favoring women for the beginning of the 21st
century (Pronex/Cedeplar, 1999; CELADE, 2001).
13
The low values of the SR among the aged in the more developed countries, more
specifically those located in Western Europe, are explained, in part, by the world wars.
15
Ageing among the elderly
The effect of the fertility decline, combined with survivorship improvements
among the elders tend to benefit the eldest population, that, on turn, are responsible for
higher growth rates of the elderly population together. Thus growth among the “old–
old” i.e., above the age 80, at least during a certain period, will have the highest growth
rate. Being female survivorship much higher than male at these extreme ages of life, the
feminisation of the “old–old” is, to a large extent, due to the survivorship of the eldest
age groups. Table 5 presents the elders above the ages of 65, 70 and 80, the respective
relative participation and growth rates for the period 2000-2050.
Between 2000 and 2050 the size of the elderly population would be 5-fold, and
the older the age group, the greater the increase rate would be. The volume of people
aged 70 or more would be nearly 7-fold; yet, this increment should be less than among
the “old–old’ that would be nearly 8 times and would extend its participation to more
than 20% of the aged population.
Finally, the high growth rates, above of 4,0% for the periods after 2020 in the
ages above 70, will be product of the combined effect of the high fertility of the past and
the improvements in the mortality levels that is expected for these ages.
Table 5 – Brazil – Elderly Population by Age Groups – 2000-2050 (in thousand)
a) Age groups (cumulated)
65 or more
70 or more
80 or more
Years
Proportion
Proportion
Proportion
Total
Total
Total
(%)
(%)
(%)
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
Interval
2000/10
2010/20
2020/30
2030/40
2040/50
8.709
11.987
17.854
26.581
34.183
42.243
100,0
100,0
100,0
100,0
100,0
100,0
5.371
7.507
10.798
16.664
23.081
28.916
61,7
62,6
60,5
62,7
67,5
68,5
b) Average Annual Growth Rate (%)
65 and above
70 and above
3,19
3,98
3,98
2,52
2,12
3,35
3,64
4,34
3,26
2,25
1.219
1.865
2.763
4.179
6.606
9.263
14,0
15,6
15,5
15,7
19,3
21,9
80 and above
4,25
3,93
4,14
4,58
3,38
Source: United Nations (1999)
16
THE SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF THE AGED IN BRAZIL
One of the first assemble evidences about the social-demographic situation of
the elders in Brazil was elaborated by the Seade Foundation (1990) that centred its
investigations on the São Paulo State elderly population. Several researches have been
released since then and those presented at National Meetings of the Brazilian
Association of Population Studies (ABEP) are of particular importance14. Camarano
(1999) organised the most recent publication focusing the elder at national level tracing
a general view of recent social conditions of the aged, based on secondary data and field
research.
A review of the elder life conditions allow us to infer that, generally speaking,
the elders have better life conditions than the rest of the population. They have higher
income (either wages, pensions, saving returns, etc); higher proportions own the houses
they live in and contribute significantly to the family budget. The latter applies
particularly to elder man and to his work income, i. e. salaries (Conceição, 1998;
Wajnmam et alii, 1999). In economic crisis and huge unemployment context, the
financial contribution of the elder to the family support is fundamental. Furthermore,
there are evidences of expressive increase in income level of the elder during recent
periods, to which much would have contributed the welfare state. Expressive increments
would have occurred between women, mainly due to the extension of the welfare state
coverage in rural areas. It was also the women who experienced major improvements in
the literate and enrolment ratios.
Continuation of the elder as important contributor to family support, in the
future, is questioned, when the current difficulties for generating and cumulating wealth
among young adults are considered. (Camarano et alii, 1999; Camarano, El Ghaouri,
1999). It is known that those difficult are caused by conjunctural and structural reasons,
among them, the high unemployment rates, the growth of the ‘non–formal’ work market
that prevails in the Brazilian economy and the global process of destroying unskilled
jobs, very often suitable for the younger labour force.
The importance of the governmental transfers to the elderly population via
welfare state is the decisive element for maintaining a reasonable standard of living at
the final stage of life. Turra (2000) shows that through welfare state, an enormous part
of public resources is transferred to the population; i. e., payments made to pensioners
14
See especially the available survey in Moreira (1997)
17
and retired, in one way or another, are passed through to children and relatives of
different ages. Altogether, certainly, the most benefited are the aged, that compare to the
younger population, receive higher volumes of governmental transfers.
In the public sphere, the rural Welfare State constitutes a significant element of
social protection to the aged; it contributes to expand their family income, which, as a
rule, are generally very low. Rural welfare state has also represented an important
channel social integration for women. A household survey carried out in the two most
populous regions of Brazil (Northeast and Southeast), found that more than 60% of the
retired and pensioners were women (Delgado and Cardoso Jr, 1999). Although this can
be reflect of the sex composition of the elderly, where, as has seen, the women
predominate, it is worth no note that in the rural area, 87% of the total income of
women over 60 years old come from welfare state. As for men, this percentage is of
55%15. Other data also show that the welfare state constitutes an important source in
small cities and villages where the welfare benefits constitute a significant fraction of
the monetary resources that circulate there.
The welfare state benefit and its importance for the family income constitute a
central element so that, in the Northeast, the direct intergenerational transfers of income
go from the aged to their children. This diverges from results from São Paulo, where the
stream has the expected opposite direction, as Saad (1999) demonstrates. The author
shows that, in the Northeast, the co-residence between generations are much more due
to the adult children's needs than of the aged parents' (Saad, 1996). Ferreira (2001) draw
similar conclusions related to the peripheral areas of the Metropolitan City of Belo
Horizonte.
In the same sense and based on secondary data, Camarano et alii (1999) find
expressive proportions of young adults and children sharing the household headed by an
elder. At the aggregate level, Turra (2000) points out that, the intergenerational stream
flows from the older to the younger in Brazil, opposing Caldwell's (1976) suggestion.
He builds up further elements for explaining the persistence of the fertility decline in
Brazil by showing that bringing up children is expensive for parents, in net terms.
Camarano (1999) also affirms, based on the studies congregated in her publication, that
in Brazilian families, the intergenerational transfers have bi-directional flows,
particularly due to the economic crises that have affected more the young population.
15
Informe da Previdência Social (Informs of the Social Welfare)- 2001.v. 3, p. 4.
18
Barros et alii (1999) find that the percentage of poor people tends to be less
among the elder than among the rest of the population, which, to a large extent, is
explained by their earnings from the welfare state and their higher capability of saving.
The authors also find that the average income of the elder is above the per capita income
of most of the households, particularly among the poor ones. Thus, besides the fact that
the elder do not represents an increase in the economic dependency ratio, they
contribute to mitigate poverty among the non-aged.
Facing the fast Brazilian ageing process, two important questions come out: will
it be possible to continue with this relatively positive diagnoses for the elder that,
furthermore, transfers wealth to the younger generations? Will the Welfare state have –
with such an important social role– conditions to continue to do so in the long run?
CONCLUSIONS
The fast and intense fertility decline in Brazil does not have equivalent to any
historic experiences in the developed countries. In conjunction with the equally fast
reduction in the country's population growth rates, it is experiencing a deep age pattern
transformation in a short period of time. While showing one of the fastest demographic
ageing processes among the most populous countries in the world, Brazil is facing a
great challenge that goes beyond demographic matters. The key issue is how to bring
together economic development and reduction of both the abyssal social differences and
high levels of poverty that stigmatise the country, preserving, at least, the current life
conditions. During the period of time, when the decrease of the young population is not
yet compensated by increases in the elderly population, Brazil experiments a
demographic bonus, represented by a declining total dependency ratio, that will be
further extended without, however, reaching previous historical levels. In this change,
the dependency eminently young at the beginning will inexorable age, changing the
nature of the social demands by pressuring health system and, particularly, welfare
state.
Public policies' efforts in order to equate the Brazilian demographic transition
and the needs that this peculiar population growth originate are still at the incipient
phase; there is no evidence, however, that the elders are currently in worse life
conditions than the remaining social groups. On the contrary, the governmental transfers
19
are favourable to them and the rural welfare state, for example, constitutes a clear
example. Furthermore, there are evidences that the intergenerational income streams
still occur from the elder to the younger and that, among the poor, the situation of the
elders is rather favourable related the rest of the population. Given the fast ageing
process, however, Brazilian society has many challenges to confront in order to
guarantee quality of life for the elder. When formulating social security policies special
attention must be given, for instance, to the gender issue, since women are on average,
in disadvantage vis–a–vis men. Although they are responsible for most of the non-paid
household/family work, women have, in general, lower participation rates in the formal
job market, are usually found among the lower income stratum and very often do not
have social security.
Finally, although the combination of demographic bonus and the appropriate
welfare state and social support policy would much contribute to guarantee adequate
quality of life to the elder, there are other important issues to consider:
-
the increasing number of elderly population, in both relative and absolute
terms;
-
the lack of resources and permanent competitive social demands, typical
of an underdeveloped society;
-
the evidence that expressive segments inside the elderly population are
above the average standard of living.
These aspects bring about the importance of accurately identify inside the
elderly population the less privileged groups, and consequently the most
vulnerable. They should constitute the public policies' preferential target face to
the chronic scarce resources and imminent increase of ageing.
20
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22
Annex
Table A1: Brazil – Population by Age and Sex - 1950, 2000 e 2050
Age
1950
2000
2050
Group Total Men Women Total
Men Women Total
Men Women
Total 53.975 26.776 27.199 170.115 84.003 86.112 244.230 118.653 125.577
00-05 8.984 4.533 4.451 15.994 8.142 7.852
16.374 8.373 8.001
05-10
7.013 3.523 3.490 16.123 8.196 7.927
16.330 8.346 7.984
10-15
6.436 3.230 3.206 16.960 8.614 8.346
16.282 8.314 7.968
15-20
5.405 2.711 2.694 17.389 8.812 8.577
16.169 8.247 7.922
20-25
5.016 2.515 2.501 16.525 8.263 8.262
16.011 8.148 7.863
25-30
4.127 2.068 2.059 14.601 7.232 7.369
15.912 8.071 7.841
30-35
3.445 1.718 1.727 13.650 6.736 6.914
15.887 8.024 7.863
35-40
3.071 1.525 1.546 13.039 6.400 6.639
15.854 7.961 7.893
40-45
2.592 1.277 1.315 10.977 5.349 5.628
15.543 7.748 7.795
45-50
2.082 1.010 1.072
9.103 4.404 4.699
15.050 7.437 7.613
50-55
1.816
856
960
7.121 3.412 3.709
14.452 7.058 7.394
55-60
1.362
633
729
5.399 2.551 2.848
14.079 6.765 7.314
60-65
1.022
461
561
4.526 2.098 2.428
14.042 6.599 7.443
65-70
723
330
393
3.338 1.511 1.827
13.327 6.070 7.257
70-75
463
206
257
2.570 1.130 1.440
11.335 4.884 6.451
75-80
267
116
151
1.582
670
912
8.318 3.340 4.978
80-85
153
63
90
790
320
470
5.341 1.987 3.354
85-90
326
124
202
2.832
951
1.881
90-95
88
31
57
916
277
639
95-100
14
4
10
163
47
116
100 +
1
1
11
4
7
Source: United Nations (1999)
23
Table A2 – More Populous Countries in 2000 – Ageing Index - 1950-2050
Countries
Spain*
Italy*
Japan *
Germany *
Ukraine
Russian F.
Poland
Korea
U Kingdom *
France *
Canada*
China
Thailand
United States*
Myanmar
Turkey
Mexico
Argentina
Vietnam
Brazil
Indonesia
Colombia
Iran
India
Algeria
Egypt
Philippines
Bangladesh
Pakistan
Kenya
South Africa
Nigeria
U.R. Tanzania
D.R. Congo
Ethiopia
1950 1960 1970 1980
26,9 29,9 35,0 40,2
31,4 37,6 44,3 59,0
13,9 19,0 29,4 38,4
41,9 54,1 59,0 84,4
27,9 29,3 36,6 55,8
21,4 21,0 28,9 47,2
17,8 17,2 30,6 41,7
7,3
7,9
7,8 11,2
48,0 50,2 53,3 72,1
50,1 44,1 51,8 62,7
25,9 22,4 26,0 41,4
13,4 12,4 10,8 13,4
7,1
6,1
6,5
8,8
30,6 29,8 34,7 49,7
8,6
8,3
9,0 10,1
8,6
8,6 10,7 12,0
10,6 10,2
9,2
8,4
13,8 18,0 23,7 26,6
11,4 10,9
9,8 11,3
7,2
7,6
8,7 10,9
10,1
8,3
7,2
8,2
7,4
6,7
7,4
9,3
13,7
9,3
7,5
7,4
8,6
8,6
9,0 10,5
10,9
8,8
8,6
8,4
7,5
7,7 10,4 10,1
8,2
6,8
5,9
6,7
9,6
9,1
7,7
7,5
14,1
9,5
6,8
6,5
9,9
9,0
8,2
6,7
9,3
9,4
9,3
8,5
5,2
5,6
5,5
5,7
4,8
5,0
5,1
4,9
8,7
6,6
6,3
6,1
6,8
5,7
5,6
6,6
Ageing Index
1990 2000 2010
71,3 117,0 138,5
96,6 127,5 162,2
65,1 115,2 145,5
93,0 105,5 149,5
56,6 79,6 106,3
43,7 68,9 82,2
40,0 61,8 76,9
19,4 31,3 46,9
82,1 85,2 102,3
69,1 85,2 95,3
54,1 67,4 86,3
20,1 27,6 39,8
13,6 23,1 34,5
56,5 58,3 69,1
11,4 17,3 22,4
12,2 20,6 25,6
10,3 14,2 20,8
29,2 35,0 39,6
12,4 16,0 20,1
12,4 17,7 24,8
10,8 15,4 22,3
11,9 14,4 19,0
7,8 12,1 16,8
11,9 14,9 20,7
8,5 10,3 12,0
9,6 11,6 15,3
8,6
9,9 13,5
7,1
9,1 12,1
6,8
7,6
9,4
6,1
6,9
6,7
8,8 10,2 11,6
6,1
7,1
8,2
5,4
5,7
6,1
6,1
5,8
6,1
6,5
6,2
6,1
2020
174,3
208,1
187,8
165,8
117,3
98,0
103,5
69,1
119,5
116,6
108,6
60,2
51,0
90,5
30,5
36,7
32,1
49,5
25,5
36,5
30,3
29,6
21,3
30,4
20,2
25,4
22,9
19,1
14,0
8,5
15,1
9,1
6,8
6,6
6,6
2030
239,0
250,5
202,9
194,1
150,2
136,1
135,5
108,4
138,3
136,7
133,2
90,4
81,6
115,7
50,4
53,8
49,3
60,4
43,8
54,8
44,7
46,4
34,6
43,4
34,0
37,5
35,7
29,2
24,6
14,3
20,8
12,5
9,4
8,3
8,4
2040
293,1
288,1
216,3
218,5
168,3
146,4
143,1
139,9
156,0
152,7
142,0
130,2
116,5
124,9
75,6
74,2
74,2
71,8
68,3
70,2
65,3
64,9
54,6
60,3
49,2
51,0
49,4
43,3
36,5
23,3
28,0
20,7
16,5
12,9
12,8
2050
311,4
290,8
229,6
212,1
195,9
174,5
167,6
154,3
154,1
152,6
140,0
138,5
137,4
127,1
96,9
96,7
96,6
90,4
88,0
86,2
83,0
80,2
80,2
77,3
72,1
71,8
70,7
69,0
49,3
43,2
40,2
31,8
26,8
21,7
21,2
Source: United Nations, 1999
* Richer developed countries
24