TEEHANKEE CENTER FOR THE RULE OF LAW
Pillar 1: Rule of Law and Good Governance
Pillar Research Work
RECENT JURISPRUDENTIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS ON
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY
Sabio v. Gordon 1
Although there is no provision in the "Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In
other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislation body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true –
recourse must be had to others who possess it."2
The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of the
government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority
and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis3
One important limitation on the Congress' power of inquiry is that "the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected." This is just another way of saying that the power of inquiry
must be "subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on government action." As held
in Barenblatt v. United States, "the Congress, in common with all the other branches of the Government,
must exercise its powers subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,
more particularly in the context of this case, the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights."4
Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine Branch) v. Senate Committee on Bank, Financial Institutions and
Currencies5
[T]he mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body
should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely
easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or
an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of
legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an
administrative investigation. 6
[I]t is axiomatic that the power of legislative investigation includes the power to compel the attendance of
witnesses. Corollary to the power to compel the attendance of witnesses is the power to ensure that said
witnesses would be available to testify in the legislative investigation. In the case at bench, considering
that most of the officers of SCB-Philippines are not Filipino nationals who may easily evade the
compulsive character of respondent’s summons by leaving the country, it was reasonable for the
respondent to request the assistance of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation to prevent said
1.
2.
3.
4
5.
6.
Sabio v. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704 (2006).
Id.
Id. citing Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete, 155 SCRA 421
(1987).
Id.
Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine Branch) v. Senate Committee on Bank, Financial Institutions and
Currencies, 541 SCRA 456 (2007).
Id. at 471.
TEEHANKEE CENTER FOR THE RULE OF LAW
Pillar 1: Rule of Law and Good Governance
Pillar Research Work
witnesses from evading the inquiry and defeating its purpose. In any event, no HDO was issued by a
court. The BID instead included them only in the Watch List, which had the effect of merely delaying
petitioners’ intended travel abroad for five (5) days, provided no HDO is issued against them. 7
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations 8
Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves
the President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view
that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even
her confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve
some vague legislative need. Regardless of who is in office, this Court can easily foresee unwanted
consequences of subjecting a Chief Executive to unrestricted congressional inquiries done with increased
frequency and great publicity. No Executive can effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face
of intense and unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the President’s decision-making process,
which inevitably would involve her conversations with a member of her Cabinet. 9
Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety,
National Defense, and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and
Electoral Reform10
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without
duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Section 21,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives,
or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."11
Dela Paz v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 12
Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: “Each House shall determine the rules of
its proceedings.” This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority
to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the
exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process. 13
[Dela Paz vs. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 579 SCRA 521(2009)]
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Id. at 474-75.
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, 564 SCRA 152 (2008).
Id. at 206.
Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National
Defense, and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reform 575
SCRA 170 (2008).
Id. at 190.
Dela Paz vs. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 579 SCRA 521(2009).
Id. at 525.
TEEHANKEE CENTER FOR THE RULE OF LAW
Pillar 1: Rule of Law and Good Governance
Pillar Research Work
The Philippine Senate has decided that the legislative inquiry will be jointly conducted by the respondent
Committee and the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue
Ribbon Committee). Pursuant to paragraph 36, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules, the Blue Ribbon
Committee may conduct investigations on all matters relating to malfeasance, misfeasance and
nonfeasance in office by officers and employees of the government, its branches, agencies, subdivisions
and instrumentalities, and on any matter of public interest on its own initiative or brought to its attention
by any of its members. It is, thus, beyond cavil that the Blue Ribbon Committee can investigate Gen. Dela
Paz, a retired PNP general and member of the official PNP delegation to the INTERPOL Conference in
Russia, who had with him millions which may have been sourced from public funds. 14
14.
Id. at 528.
TEEHANKEE CENTER FOR THE RULE OF LAW
Pillar 1: Rule of Law and Good Governance
Pillar Research Work
RELATED ARTICLES
***
Legal and political rights of Binay to snub Senate investigation 15
Romulo Makalintal
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Congress (Senate and House of Representatives) cannot
subpoena or compel the President to appear before it to answer an investigation conducted by any of its
committees. If Congress cannot subpoena the President then the same should be applied to Vice
President Jejomar Binay considering that the Office of the Vice President is regarded as a component of
the Executive Department of the government. Hence, Binay could not be forced by the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee to appear before it in connection with its inquiry on the alleged overpricing of Makati
City Hall II.
Binay has the option not to attend the hearing since only an “invitation” and not a subpoena was sent to
him to appear in the investigation. The pendency of a plunder case against him before the Ombudsman
which involves the same transaction further justifies his non-appearance in the Senate.
Also, any congressional investigation must strictly comply with the constitutional requirement that it is in
“aid of legislation.” If the inquiry is merely “in the guise of as aid in legislation”[1] then any subpoena by
such committee could be refused, as enunciated by then Constitutional Comission delegate later Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., in the 1986 ConCom deliberations.
Binay knows that it will be a political suicide to attend such investigation since it is now turning out to be
a political show rather than an inquiry in aid of legislation. His detractors who are conducting the
investigation had already said that there is “direct testimony” pointing to his alleged guilt – a prejudgment
that practically denies him a fair and impartial hearing in the Senate.
But legally speaking, the testimonies of these witnesses could only be treated as “evidence” afte r giving
Binay his lawful right to cross-examine the witnesses in a court of law which he could not do in the
Senate as the same is not allowed in a congressional inquiry. His lawyer cannot even say a word before
the committee but could only advise him in whispers. Thus, the testimonies of the said witnesses in the
Senate will remain as mere allegations and not evidence, until and unless they have been subjected to a
rigid cross examination which is the only means of testing their credibility and biases.*
15.
Romulo Makalintal, Legal and political rights of Binay to snub Senate investigation, M ANILA TIMES , Sept. 20,
2014, available at http://www.manilatimes.net/legal-political-rightsof-binay-snub-senate-investigation/128160/
(last accessed Nov. 16, 2014).