Social Cognition, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2006, pp. 453-468
HUSKINSON DIFFERENCES
INDIVIDUAL
AND HADDOCKIN ATTITUDE STRUCTURE
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDE
STRUCTURE AND THE ACCESSIBILITY OF
THE AFFECTIVE AND COGNITIVE
COMPONENTS OF ATTITUDE
Thomas L. H. Huskinson and Geoffrey Haddock
Cardiff University
Research has demonstrated that some individuals possess attitudes that are
highly consistent with both their feelings and beliefs, whereas other individuals possess attitudes that are less consistent with these sources of information (Haddock & Huskinson, 2004). The current research investigated
whether individuals with strongly versus weakly structured attitudes differ
in the accessibility of their affective and cognitive responses. In two experiments, participants provided timed affective and cognitive judgments toward different attitude objects. Overall, individuals with highly structured
attitudes provided faster affective and cognitive attitudinal responses. Affective responses were also made more quickly than cognitive responses.
Two additional experiments ruled out the possibility of a generalized response latency advantage for individuals with highly structured attitudes.
The results speak to the importance of considering individual differences
in how people organize their attitudes, as well as the distinction between
the affective and cognitive components of attitude.
The multicomponent model of attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993;
Zanna & Rempel, 1988) states that attitudes are overall evaluations of stimuli that are derived from the favorability of an individual’s affects, cognitions, and past behaviors. Affective
We thank Don Carlston, Greg Maio, and Russell Spears for their feedback on earlier
drafts of this article.
Address correspondence to Geoff Haddock, School of Psychology, P. O. Box 901, Cardiff
University, Cardiff CF10 3AT, UK; E–mail: HaddockGG@Cardiff.ac.uk
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information refers to feelings an individual associates with an attitude object. Cognitive information refers to beliefs or attributes
an individual associates with an attitude object. Behavioral information refers to past behaviors or behavioral intentions relevant
to an attitude object. The multicomponent model raises a variety
of interesting questions. For example, do people differ in the degree to which their attitudes are consistent with both their feelings
and beliefs? That is, do some people have attitudes that are highly
consistent with the favorability of both their affects and
cognitions, whereas other people have attitudes that are less consistent with these sources of information? If so, what are the consequences of such differences? Second, which of the attitudinal
components is more accessible? For example, are affective responses more accessible than cognitive responses? These questions motivated the present research, which investigated whether
generally having strongly versus weakly structured attitudes is
associated with differences in the accessibility of affective and
cognitive responses.
AFFECT, COGNITION, AND INDIVIDUAL ATTITUDES
Research suggests that the contribution of affect and cognition to
the prediction of individual attitudes depends upon the attitude
object in question.1 For instance, Abelson, Kinder, Peters, and
Fiske (1982) found affective information to be a better predictor of
attitudes toward politicians than cognitive information. Conversely, Eagly, Mladinic, and Otto (1994; Study 2) found cognitive
information to be more important than affect in predicting attitudes toward various social policy issues. Other studies have also
demonstrated that the unique contribution of affective and cognitive information varies across attitude objects (e.g., Breckler &
Wiggins, 1989; Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993). It appears then
1. In line with recent research (e.g., Chaiken, Pomerantz, & Giner-Sorolla, 1995;
Huskinson & Haddock, 2004; Verplanken, Hofstee, & Janssen, 1998) we shall be concentrating solely on the affective and cognitive components of attitude. For a discussion of the
role of behavioral information in predicting individual attitudes see Haddock, Zanna, and
Esses (1994).
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDE STRUCTURE
455
that objects differ in whether individuals’ attitudes toward them
are based primarily upon affect or cognition.
The accessibility of the affective and cognitive components of
attitude may also vary. Verplanken, Hofstee, and Janssen (1998;
Study 4) recorded the time it took participants to make affective
and cognitive judgments toward various countries. For each
country, participants were presented with a series of adjective
pairs on a computer screen, some of which were affective (e.g.,
unpleasant/pleasant), others of which were cognitive (e.g., modern/traditional). Participants indicated which of the two adjectives in each pair best described their feelings/thoughts toward
the object. Verplanken et al. (1998) found that affective judgments
were made more quickly than cognitive judgments.
In related research, Giner–Sorolla (2001) explored the accessibility of affect– and cognition–based attitudes. In this research, attitude objects were selected on the basis of being affect– or
cognition–based. Giner–Sorolla (2001) found that affect–based attitudes were more accessible than cognition–based attitudes only
when attitudes were extreme. This finding diverges from that of
Verplanken et al. (1998). These conflicting results may be due to
the different judgments investigated in the studies: affective and
cognitive information per se in Verplanken et al.’s (1998) research, but affect– and cognition–based attitudes in
Giner–Sorolla’s (2001) research. While affective information may
be more accessible than cognitive information (as demonstrated
by Verplanken et al., 1998), attitudes may become detached from
the information upon which they were originally based (see
Zanna & Rempel, 1988), annulling any accessibility advantage of
affect–based attitudes.
Finally, other work has investigated the consistency among attitudes, affects, and cognitions about single objects. This research
suggests that attitudes lacking affective and cognitive consistency are weaker than attitudes with strong support. For instance,
Chaiken and Baldwin (1981) found that individuals with low
evaluative–cognitive (E–C) consistency (i.e., low consistency between the favorability of their measured attitude and beliefs)
were more susceptible to self–perception effects than individuals
with high E–C consistency. Chaiken, Pomerantz, and
Giner–Sorolla (1995) extended this research by considering both
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evaluative–affective (E–A) and evaluative–cognitive consistency.
Using the attitude object of capital punishment, these researchers
found that individuals high in both E–A and E–C consistency
(e.g., people with a positive attitude, feelings, and beliefs about
capital punishment) had more accessible and more stable attitudes than individuals low in both types of consistency (e.g., people with a positive attitude but neutral feelings and beliefs about
capital punishment). Interestingly, Chaiken et al. reported no differences in accessibility among individuals high in one type of
consistency but low in the other; the observed difference was restricted to less accessible attitudes among individuals low in both
E–A and E–C consistency.
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDE STRUCTURE
A small body of research has explored the possibility that structural differences in attitudes may also exist across individuals.
That is, people may vary in the extent to which they derive their
attitudes from affective and cognitive information. While a minority of people can be expected to rely more on either affective or
cognitive information, the synergistic relation between affect and
cognition (see Breckler, 1984; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) suggests
that most people are likely to rely upon both affect and cognition
to a relatively equal strong or equally weak degree. Some people
might generally possess attitudes that are highly consistent with
the favorability of both their feelings and beliefs, while other people might generally possess attitudes that are less consistent with
the favorability of their feelings and beliefs. It is these individuals
with strongly or weakly structured attitudes who are the focus of
the present article.
The existence of individual differences in attitude structure has
been demonstrated. Haddock and Huskinson (2004; see also
Huskinson & Haddock, 2004) asked participants to complete
measures of attitude, affect, and cognition for numerous attitude
objects. Using within–person correlations, they found that individuals differed considerably in evaluative–affective and
evaluative–cognitive consistency. Given the synergistic relation
between affect and cognition, they found that most respondents
(approximately 70%) possessed attitudes that were either equally
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDE STRUCTURE
457
high or equally low in both E–A and E–C consistency. Further,
such variability was associated with individual differences in the
Need to Evaluate (Jarvis & Petty, 1996), such that individuals low
in both evaluative–affective and evaluative–cognitive consistency were also low in the Need to Evaluate. Importantly, these
structural differences have been found to be consequential. In a
task where participants had to list affects and cognitions associated with the behavior of exercising, individuals high in both E–A
and E–C consistency clustered their responses by valence,
whereas individuals low in both E–A and E–C consistency did not
(Huskinson & Haddock, 2006; see Trafimow & Sheeran, 1998).
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
The present research investigated whether individuals possessing strongly versus weakly structured attitudes differ in the accessibility of their affective and cognitive responses. We focused
our research on individuals with strongly versus weakly structured attitudes because past research has demonstrated that these
individuals differ in the degree to which they respond to questions assessing attitude strength, whereas individuals with structural dissociations (i.e., high evaluative–affective
consistency/low evaluative–cognitive consistency, and vice
versa) do not (Huskinson & Haddock, 2006).
As noted earlier, Chaiken et al. (1995) found that low
evaluative–affective and evaluative–cognitive consistency were
associated with less accessible attitudes toward a single object.
Congruent with Chaiken et al.’s (1995) findings, we reasoned that
individuals whose attitudes are high in both E–A and E–C consistency (individuals we refer to as Dual–Consistents [DCs]) would
provide faster affective and cognitive judgments than those individuals whose attitudes are low in both E–A and E–C consistency
(individuals we refer to as Dual–Inconsistents [DIs]). Additional
rationale for this notion comes from Fazio (1995), who argued that
an attitude is accessible to the extent that the information upon
which it is based is perceived as diagnostic by the individual.
Diagnosticity comes about through individuals learning to trust
some classes of information as more indicative of their attitudes
than other classes of information. In the present context,
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dual–consistents may perceive their affects and cognitions as
more diagnostic of their attitudes, which should elicit faster (i.e.,
more accessible) affective and cognitive responses.
To address this issue, individuals with highly or weakly structured attitudes were presented with items on a computer screen
corresponding to affective (e.g., unpleasant/pleasant) and cognitive (e.g., modern/traditional) dimensions. The task of participants was to indicate which of the two words from each pair best
described their thoughts/feelings toward the object in question.
On the basis of previous findings (e.g., Chaiken et al., 1995;
Verplanken et al., 1998), we hypothesized: (1) that individuals
with highly structured attitudes would respond faster than individuals with weakly structured attitudes, and (2) that affective
judgments would be made faster than cognitive judgments.
These predictions were tested in two separate experiments using
different attitude objects and different affective and cognitive
adjective pairs.
EXPERIMENTS 1A AND 1B
OVERVIEW AND DETERMINATION OF ATTITUDE
STRUCTURE CLASSIFICATION
Data were collected in three different waves of participants over
three different academic years. At the beginning of the academic
year, participants in each wave took part in a study in which they
completed semantic differential measures of attitude, affect, and
cognition (see Crites, Fabrigar, & Petty, 1994) toward diverse attitude objects (e.g., abortion, Germans, spiders). Their responses
were then used to compute within–person correlations for each
participant. A measure of evaluative–affective consistency was
computed by correlating a participant’s attitude and affect responses across all attitude objects, and a measure of
evaluative–cognitive consistency was computed by correlating
their attitude and cognition responses across all attitude objects.
As these indices are derived from multiple attitude objects for
each individual, they represent the extent to which an individual
generally maintains attitudes consistent with affective and cognitive information. An individual was categorized as having highly
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDE STRUCTURE
459
structured attitudes if both his or her E–A and E–C correlations fell
above the medians, whereas an individual was categorized as
having weakly structured attitudes if both his or her E–A and E–C
correlations fell below the medians.2
Approximately four months after completing this initial assessment, a random selection of individuals with highly or weakly
structured attitudes returned to the lab for two different accessibility studies. Experiment 1A used a procedure that was conceptually identical to research by Verplanken et al. (1998; Study 4).
Participants evaluated a number of countries on a series of affective and cognitive dimensions. Their task was to indicate which
word from the pair best represented their impression of each
country. In Experiment 1B, participants evaluated a different set
of attitude objects using a different set of affective and cognitive
dimensions. In both experiments, participants’ responses were
timed to provide affective and cognitive component accessibility
data for each participant.
METHOD
Participants. Ninety–three participants, (ten male, 81 female,
two did not provide this information; mean age = 19 years) who,
on the basis of their attitude structure classification, fit the criteria
for a dual–consistent or dual–inconsistent, participated in return
for course credit.
Design. Each study used a mixed–model design. The between–person variables were attitude structure classification
(dual–consistent vs. dual–inconsistent) and data wave session
(wave 1–3). The within–person independent variables were attitude component item type (affective vs. cognitive) and attitude
object (ten countries in Experiment 1A; four different objects in
Experiment 1B; see below for individual items).
Materials and Procedure. Participants took part individually. The
experimenter indicated that the session would involve a series of
2. Across the three waves, approximately 70% of respondents in the initial assessment
met our classification for having strongly or weakly structures attitudes (approximately
35% in each category). The remaining participants possessed attitudes that were predominantly consistent with either their feelings or beliefs.
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short experiments. Participants were then seated at a computer
with instructions on the monitor. The instructions were also read
aloud to them by the experimenter. In Experiment 1A, the instructions explained that they would be asked to make a series of decisions about different countries. They were told that for each
country, a series of bipolar adjectives would be presented consecutively on the screen. They were instructed that for each adjective
pair, they needed to indicate which of the items best represented
their impression of the country (this was done by pressing one of
two buttons on the keyboard). They were instructed to respond as
quickly and accurately as possible. Finally, they were instructed
that the first country presented was a practice trial.
There were ten different countries used in Experiment 1A (excluding the practice trial): France, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. The affective
bipolar adjectives used in conjunction with these stimuli were:
aggressive/peaceful, beautiful/ugly, gloomy/cheerful, enjoyable/unenjoyable, exciting/dull, nervous/calm, romantic/not
romantic, and unfriendly/friendly. The cognitive bipolar adjectives used in conjunction with these stimuli were: dry/wet,
full/empty, flat/hilly, large/small, modern/traditional,
north/south, sparsely populated/densely populated, and
woody/bare (see Verplanken et al., 1998). 3
After a filler task, participants completed Experiment 1B.
There were four attitude objects used in this study: blood donation, capital punishment, the British Monarchy, and Tony Blair.
The affective bipolar adjectives used in conjunction with these
stimuli were: acceptance/disgusted, angry/relaxed, excited/bored, joy/sorrow, happy/annoyed, love/hateful, sadness/delighted, and tense/calm. The cognitive bipolar
adjectives used in conjunction with these stimuli were: foolish/wise, harmful/beneficial, imperfect/perfect, safe/unsafe,
useful/useless, valuable/worthless, and wholesome/unhealthy (see Crites et al., 1994).
3. In both studies, the order of attitude object presentation was randomized for each participant, as was the order of affective and cognitive bipolar adjectives for each attitude object.
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDE STRUCTURE
461
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In both experiments, responses to items were log–transformed,
and separate affect and cognition scores were computed for each
participant by computing the mean latency across the relevant
items. Responses less than 300 ms or greater than 3,000 ms, which
accounted for 6.8% of the data in Experiment 1A and 5.2% of the
data in Experiment 1B, were removed.
In Experiment 1A, the results of the analysis revealed two relevant significant effects. First, individuals with highly structured
attitudes (M = 1,257 ms) made faster responses than individuals
with weakly structured attitudes (M = 1,315 ms; see Figure 1), F(1,
85) = 3.05, p = .08. Second, affective responses (M = 1,191 ms) were
made faster than cognitive responses (M = 1,388 ms), F(1, 85) =
157.84, p < .001.4
The results of Experiment 1B revealed a similar pattern. First,
individuals with highly structured attitudes (M = 1,167 ms) made
faster responses than individuals with weakly structured attitudes (M = 1,285 ms; see Figure 2), F(1, 81) = 3.99, p < .05. Second,
affective responses (M = 1210 ms) were made faster than cognitive responses (M = 1,248 ms), F(1, 81) = 2.74, p = .10.5
Given the consistent findings across the experiments, we conducted a meta–analysis to determine the studies’ combined effects. Using a combined probability framework (see Rosenthal,
1991), this analysis revealed two significant effects. First, individuals with strongly structured attitudes provided faster judgments than individuals with weakly structured attitudes (p =
4. Three other, less theoretically relevant effects also emerged. There was a main effect
of data wave [F(2, 85) = 2.99, p = .05], suggesting that the waves differed in overall accessibility. There was also a main effect of country [F(9, 77) = 5.64, p 001], suggesting that accessibility differed across countries. Finally, there was an interaction between country and
component [F(9, 77) = 9.90, p .001], suggesting that the difference between reaction times
for affect and cognition differed across countries.
5. Variation in degrees of freedom from Experiment 1A reflects differences in patterns of
missing data. Similar to Experiment 1A, the same three less theoretically relevant effects
also emerged. There was a marginal main effect of data wave [F (2, 81) = 2.41, p = .10], suggesting that the waves differed in overall accessibility. There was also a main effect of object [F (3, 79) = 9.67, p 001], suggesting that accessibility differed across objects. Finally,
there was a marginally significant interaction between object and component [F (3, 79) =
2.42, p = .07], suggesting that the difference between reaction times for affect and cognition
differed across objects.
Mean Response Time (ms)
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1400
1300
Affect Words
Cognition Words
1200
1100
Dual-Consistents Dual-Inconsistents
FIGURE 1. Experiment 1A: Response latencies as a function of individual differences
and attitude component.
.009). Second, affective judgments were made faster than cognitive judgments (p = .005).
These results provide support for the contention that the accessibility of affective and cognitive judgments differs across individuals, depending on the consistency among their attitudes,
feelings, and beliefs. Individuals who generally maintained attitudes highly consistent with both their affects and cognitions provided faster affective and cognitive judgments than individuals
whose attitudes were less consistent with their feelings and beliefs. These results also revealed an accessibility advantage for
affective information, replicating previous research.
While Experiments 1A and 1B provided convergent evidence,
one could argue that individuals with highly structured attitudes
might be faster in all types of judgments, including judgments not
relevant to attitudes. Rather than arguing for a general response latency advantage for dual–consistents, we would like to suggest
that their advantage is limited to attitude–based judgments. If individuals with highly structured attitudes are faster to respond to affective and cognitive attitudinal items because they view these
items as diagnostic of their attitudes, there is no reason to expect
speed differences for non-evaluative judgments. We therefore conducted two additional studies that tested whether individuals with
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDE STRUCTURE
463
Mean Response Time (ms)
1300
1250
Affect Words
Cognition Words
1200
1150
1100
Dual-Consistents
Dual-Inconsistents
FIGURE 2. Experiment 1B: Response latencies as a function of individual differences and attitude component.
highly or weakly structured attitudes differed in how quickly they
responded to non-evaluative judgments. If the response latency
difference between dual–consistents and dual–inconsistents is limited to attitudinally relevant judgments, these studies should
reveal no latency differences between the groups.
EXPERIMENTS 2A AND 2B
METHOD
Participants. Participants were 38 individuals (four males, 34 females; mean age = 19.0 years) who, on the basis of their attitude
structure classification study, fit the criteria for being a dual–consistent or dual–inconsistent.6
Procedure. In Experiment 2A, participants completed a lexical
decision task. They were seated at a computer and instructed that
a series of letter strings would appear in the center of the screen.
They were instructed to judge whether the letter string was a
word or non–word, and to press a key indicating their response.
6. In all of the research reported in this article, the predominance of female participants is
a reflection of the undergraduate psychology population from which we sampled.
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They were told to complete this task as quickly and accurately as
possible. There were 12 words (e.g., print) and 12 non–words
(e.g., prult).
After a filler task, participants completed Experiment 2B. In this
task, they responded to a series of general knowledge questions
(e.g., “What is the capital of Canada?”; “Which band had a hit
with ‘Jumping Jack Flash?’ ”). For each question, they were given
two alternatives; their task was to press the key corresponding to
the correct answer as quickly as possible.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As in the other experiments, responses were log–transformed. In
each experiment, responses across items (e.g., speed of responses
to proper words in Experiment 2A; speed of responses to knowledge questions in Experiment 2B) were combined to form single
latency scores for each individual for each task.
Separate ANOVAs were performed on responses to the lexical
decision and general knowledge tasks. In both experiments, there
was no difference in response times between individuals with
highly versus weakly structured attitudes, both Fs < 1. Furthermore, there were no differences between groups in the number of
correct responses on the general knowledge task, F(1, 32) = 1.12,
ns.7
Taken together, the results of Experiments 2A and 2B demonstrated that individuals with highly versus weakly structured
attitudes did not differ in the speed with which they made
non–evaluative judgments. These results support the contention that the component accessibility advantage shown in Experiments 1A and 1B was not attributable to a general speed
advantage. Rather, they are consistent with the proposal that response latency differences are limited to attitude–based judgments.
7. Much to our surprise (and disappointment), approximately 35% of our participants
responded that Montréal is the capital of Canada and that The Who had a hit with “Jumping Jack Flash.”
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDE STRUCTURE
465
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across two experiments (1A and 1B), individuals whose attitudes
were highly consistent with both their feelings and beliefs provided faster affective and cognitive attitudinal judgments compared to individuals whose attitudes were less affect– and
cognition–consistent. Two additional experiments (2A and 2B)
ruled out a general response latency advantage for individuals
with highly structured attitudes. The attitude component accessibility advantage is compelling when one considers the temporal
separation (approximately four months) between the session in
which the attitude structure classification was derived and the
session in which the accessibility data were gathered. The use of
such a temporal lag offers impressive testimony regarding the
stability of the obtained effects.
These results have a number of important implications regarding the role of individual differences in attitude structure. For instance, they are instructive when considered in light of past
research on attitude accessibility and attitude structure. Chaiken
et al. (1995) reported that attitudes toward capital punishment
were more accessible when they had evaluatively consistent support from feelings and beliefs, concluding that attitudes are
strong to the extent that they are high in evaluative–affective and
evaluative–cognitive consistency. The present research extrapolated this finding to the individual level, as well as to the component level, suggesting that individuals with highly structured
attitudes, given the evaluatively consistent support for their attitudes from both their affects and cognitions, possess a general
latency advantage for affective and cognitive responses.
The current findings are also consistent with Fazio (1995), who
argued that an attitude will be accessible to the extent that the information upon which it is based is perceived as diagnostic by the
individual. Although no direct measure of diagnosticity was included in the present research, the mechanism is consistent with
the present results. To the extent that both their feelings and beliefs are highly consistent with their attitudes, individuals with
highly structured attitudes may hold their affects and cognitions
with greater confidence, resulting in their affects and cognitions
being more accessible.
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One interesting line of inquiry arising from the present research
concerns upon what exactly individuals low in both
evaluative–affective and evaluative–cognitive consistency base
their attitudes. One possibility is that the behavioral component
might be a particularly important antecedent for these individuals. In line with this notion, at the level of a single attitude object,
Chaiken and Baldwin (1981) demonstrated that individuals low
in E–C consistency were particularly susceptible to self–perception effects. Future research might investigate whether individuals
low in both E–A and E–C consistency are most inclined to show
evidence of self–perception.
A second goal of the research was to contribute to the literature
regarding the accessibility of affective and cognitive information.
Verplanken et al. (1998) demonstrated that affective information
was more accessible than cognitive information. In the present research, two separate studies, using different types of attitude objects and affective–cognitive dimensions, provided support for
differences in accessibility for affective and cognitive information. These findings are relevant to discussions regarding the relative accessibility of affect and cognition. It has been argued that
affect can be elicited in the absence of prior cognitive processes,
and should be considered as more primary than cognition (e.g.,
Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Zajonc, 1980; cf. Lazarus, 1984). The present results are consistent with such theorizing—affective judgments were made faster than cognitive judgments toward a range
of attitude objects—although other explanations could also possibly account for such a finding. Perhaps the general need to ascertain the truth or falsity of cognitive as opposed to affective
judgments contributes to the accessibility advantage of affective
information. It is instructive in this regard to note that Experiment
1A, which employed cognitive items of a more factual nature, obtained more of an affect accessibility advantage than Experiment
1B, which employed cognitive items that were more evaluative in
nature. A further possibility, raised by Verplanken et al. (1998), is
that affective judgments may be less complex in nature than cognitive information. Whereas affective judgments can simply refer
to a general feeling state toward an object, cognitive judgments
may involve the deliberation of a variety of contingencies and
factors to arrive at a judgment. Understanding the mechanism(s)
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDE STRUCTURE
467
behind this affect accessibility advantage is an issue that is worthy
of additional research.
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