1
LEADERSHIP AND INTEGRITY IN POLICING:
THE MARCH AWAY FROM MILITARISM
Presentation at the Third Police Leadership Conference
“Managing Change Through Principled Leadership”
April 10 – 12, 2002
Vancouver, BC, Canada
To be delivered by:
John Murray APM, BA, LLB, MBA, GCLP*
Chief Police Officer for the Australian Capital Territory
Australian Federal Police
*John Murray took up his present position on 11 September 2000. His former positions include, Assistant
Commissioner, South Australia Police; Associate Professor/Head of Australian Graduate School of Police
Management (Charles Sturt University), Developer with the Open University of Hong Kong and
Training/Education Advisor to the Hong Kong Police. He is currently Visiting Professor with the Charles
Sturt University, Sydney, New South Wales and adjunct Associate Professor with the University of South
Australia.
Sergeant Rachel Brown B.Comm, LLB (Hons) provided research assistance for issues in this paper
specifically related to the Australian Federal Police.
April, 2002
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LEADERSHIP AND INTEGRITY IN POLICING:
THE MARCH AWAY FROM MILITARISM
Introduction
For the regulation of organisational and individual integrity, policing has traditionally
relied on a militaristic philosophy with (what are perceived by some as) its inherent
qualities of rank based leadership, a rules-driven culture and a strict disciplinary code.
However, police leaders across the developed world have been forced to examine the
appropriateness and efficacy of this traditional model for at least two reasons. The first is
its inflexibility and consequent inability to meet the demands of efficiency and
effectiveness in an environment described as volatile as any competitive marketplace
(Densten: 1999, p 45). 1 The second is the experience of many police leaders that the
autocratic style of leadership and the strict enforcement of rules associated with the
traditional model is at odds with the expectations of a modern workforce, and moreover,
the strict disciplinary code is not conducive to developing the highest levels of integrity.
This paper concentrates on the second point and challenges the assumption still held by
some that the traditional military model is best placed to bring about and maintain
individual and organisational integrity. In doing so, the paper critiques the
characteristics of the traditional model of policing, concluding that in the current
environment, police leaders should be not only cautious of its effectiveness in promoting
and maintaining integrity but should also be alert to the possibility of it being counter-
3
productive. I also consider the effects of relying on the traditional policing model which
is essentially rules-driven, and find as Kelling, Wasserman and Williams did, that the “…
mechanisms that have seemed most certain to ensure control have created the illusion of
control, but often little more than that” (Kelling, Wasserman & Williams, 1988). I go on
to examine the effects of the transition from a rules-driven model to a values-driven
model of policing which I argue to be more conducive to developing and maintaining
individual and organisational integrity. In doing so I use the Australian Federal Police as
a case study.
Traditional Leadership and the Shaping of Police Behaviour
When the Peel model of policing was introduced in England then largely replicated in
many countries across the developed world, this new form of policing, despite its civilian
base, adopted a militaristic managerial philosophy and organisational design. This
should be no surprise as there were only two models from which to draw – the military
and the church (which was arguably militaristic as well). It is probably too strong to
suggest that some forces/services have not changed very much from this original model
but some, it could be argued, still bear striking similarities. Supporters of the traditional
model tend to make comments like “It is tried and tested and has stood the test of time,”
and “If it aint broke don’t fix it”. Conservative comments like this do not help much. If
a militaristic model were suited to a “civilian” force/service even in Peel’s time, its
relevance and suitability to modern policing cannot simply be assumed especially with
1
Governments in major industrialised countries since the mid eighties have required greater efficiencies
and administrative accountability in the public sector – this caused the introduction of new management
techniques which saw policing to varying degrees move towards corporate lines (Bryett, 1999).
4
regular findings of police corruption and bad practice (Fitzgerald, 1989; Mollen, 1994;
Wood a, 1997; Lawrence, 1999).
Indeed, Justice Wood in his 1998 Inquiry into the New South Wales Police found that
police corruption and bad practice have been shown to be cyclical. As he put it to a
Seminar on Police Corruption:
The process of scandal, inquiry and reform of Police Services with which we have
become familiar has tended to be a cyclical process, universally shared. The
inquiry or Royal Commission that follows such a scandal proves an occasion for a
valuable insight into the well being and efficacy of the Service, and most
particularly into its stance on corruption and its ability to deter and to respond to
the problem.
Each revolution of the wheel, however has the potential to cause great harm to the
reputation of the Service, and to threaten destruction of the careers of able and
corrupt police alike, as well as to occasion great personal harm (Wood, 1999).
A prior Royal Commission in Queensland Australia in 1989 had already provided a
valuable insight on the need for improvement. Referring to it, Chan draws attention to
the Justice Fitzgerald’s findings that within the Queensland Police Force at the time there
was a culture of contempt for the criminal justice system; disdain for the law and
rejection of its application to police; disregard for the truth; abuse of authority; and an
unwritten police code which exaggerates the need for, and benefits from, mutual loyalty
and support (Fitzgerald, 1989 referred to in Chan, 1999). Chan also notes the similarity
of the findings of the Mollen Report in 1994 relating to the New York City Police and
that fact that the police culture brought about the demise of the principle of accountability
(Mollen, 1994 referred to in Chan, 1999).
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Clearly the challenge is to establish a model of policing which slows the turning of the
wheel referred to by Wood, or ideally, brings it to a standstill. Since these Inquiries,
many police forces/services, including the News South Wales Police and the Queensland
Police have certainly taken up the challenge. Many police forces/services, as Bayley
notes, “have adopted new managerial practices with a view to changing the internal
culture of organisations, increasing operational performance, efficiency and cooperation
[so that] in a relatively short period of time these managerialist techniques came to
dominate public and police administrations” (Bayley, 1994, pp. 124-40).
The disciplinary process used in the traditional policing, is in effect, based on the military
model culminating in a court martial. Some police forces/services still assume that a
militaristic regime with its reliance on strict rules together with a punitive disciplinary
process provides an ideal model for maintaining organisational and individual integrity.
Before examining this assumption, it is appropriate, therefore, to identify the
characteristics of the military model. Typically, a full militaristic model:
·
·
·
·
·
·
has authority linked to rank;
relies on one-way communication – from the top to the bottom;
requires unquestionable acceptance of directions from a superior rank;
involves no consultation in decision-making;
neither seeks nor encourages initiative; and
incorporates a discipline within a rule based system on the assumption that
the employees cannot be trusted and should be punished when they breach
the rules.
Even for the military, it is difficult to imagine a situation outside of actual warfare where
the stringent characteristics outlined above would be helpful or appropriate, and insofar
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as policing is concerned, I would be surprised if any police leader today operating in a
relatively peaceful country would adopt the full military model. However, it still forms
the foundation for many forces/services and has been maintained, but simply adapted, to
varying degrees according to preference of the police leader. Strong advocates for a
para-military model believe that the effectiveness of how the job is done is not just
related to this model but also dependent upon it. The assumption here, as it has been
explained to me, is that unless the police force/service in its overall managerial
philosophy uses this model with its integral components of command and control,2 there
will be a break down in discipline and a loss of control.
Consequently, for these forces/services the emphasis in recruitment, training,
development and succession planning, is to varying degrees, aligned to the militaristic
characteristics mentioned above. I find this astounding since it ignores a most obvious
fact that police officers at the “lowest” organisational rung of the organisational ladder
invariably enjoy a high level of autonomy, make decisions free from direction or advice
and rely on their individual judgment. In the para-military model, therefore, there is an
obvious disjunction between organisational philosophy and what is actually being
practiced on the job: in the para-military model police are trained to rely/depend on
directions given from a higher rank but spend most of their time free from direction and
rely/act on their own intellect and judgement. Much of police work at the operational
level calls for individual judgement, localised responses and discretionary decisions. Far
2
Heal outlines the “architecture” of command and control and though referring to law enforcement, draws
on a military definition from the USA Marine Corps Command and Control Master Plan: “ [a]… set of
associated command and control elements arranged in a command structure and communication network to
enable a commander to plan, direct, coordinate and control the operations of his forces” (Heal, 1999)
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from being rule-driven, policing is characterised by ‘situationally justified actions’
(Manning, 1977).
In making these observations I am not ignoring the need for command and control when
the circumstances require it. Here I am merely referring to the disproportionate emphasis
that can be given to it. There is absolutely no doubt there are situations in police
operations where command and control is critical and that rank based authority is
required to give directions free from dissent, equivocation or debate. Accordingly, every
police force/service must have an organisational regime which recognises these
situations, and when required, moves into a command and control format. However, the
number of times a command and control is necessary is really quite small. That some
police services/forces in the context of this self-evident fact continue to place a
disproportionate emphasis on command and control in training, development and
management philosophy is, therefore, confusing. Acknowledging the place of command
and control Kelling, Wassserman and Williams at the same time draw attention to the
“strains” of relying on a command and control system:
… many aspects of police work are not compatible with classical command and
control organisations. First, patrol work is not amenable to attempts to simplify
or routinize it … Second, police officers, unlike assembly line workers or military
troops, do not work under the direct scrutiny of supervisors [and consequently,
and amongst other things, brings about] considerable role strain on officers who
are portrayed as professionals on one hand but treated as recalcitrant semi-skilled
workers on the other (Kelling, Wasserman & Williams, 1988).
This confusion is further evident in the language used in policing since a police
force/service with a managerial philosophy relying predominantly on command and
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control usually uses terms like “commanding” and “leading” interchangeably as if there
were no difference. A useful broad definition of a police leader is one who shapes and
shares a vision that provides direction, focus, meaning and inspiration to the works of
others (Conger, 1989; Handy, 1989; Kotter, 1988 referred to in Palmer, 1994), whereas a
commander uses absolute power and complete authority to direct the actions of others
(Robbin & Coulter, 1999). A further distinguishing characteristic described by Heal as
the litmus test for whether one has command and control is the ability to inflict
punishment (Heal, 1993).
Obviously in policing it is not a question of whether there should be leadership or
command - both are required and circumstances will determine when one should be used
in preference to the other. Both are necessary and it will be obvious which will be
appropriate according to the circumstances. Both concepts can be best explained,
therefore, in terms of being on a continuum. My concern, however, is the bias with
traditional policing to the command end of the continuum which gives rise to an
autocratic leadership style as being the norm rather than the exception.
I agree with Ayres’ concern about the traditional, para military structure since it:
“ensure[s] a surplus of followers – as well as a corresponding scarcity of leaders.
The paramilitary structure has the chief – the leader – at the top of the
organisational pyramid, leading directing down where all the followers eagerly
await to obey orders. This old model of leadership argues that someone has to be
in charge to make things happen, that followers are needed to do the work, and
that very few people are natural leaders (Ayres, 1994).
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Other assumptions can be made about the traditional para military model in policing.
First, in this traditional model, the commander is assumed to have the franchise on what
is the “right” decision/solution since the authority which he/she enjoys is absolute and
assumes no need to consult “subordinates.” No doubt there was a time when this was
applicable to the military, but today, even at the peak of battle there would be few
occasions when a military commander would not consult. And while this would
obviously be true for policing, some police forces/services are still dependent on
command and control as an overarching managerial philosophy, that is, to be used for all
occasions in the management of the force/service.
Second, in the traditional model, the “subordinates” are assumed to have nothing of value
to contribute. This approach stifles worthwhile (and sometimes critical) feedback from
the people who actually do the job. It certainly discourages initiative.
Third, the strict disciplinary code in the military model also assumes that members
through institutionalised discipline will tend to obey rules on the fear of sanction and
when rules are broken punishment will be corrective. For some time research has shown
the weakness in that assumption and that the mere existence of rules, no matter how strict
the sanction, will not guarantee their compliance. Cain (1973) examining a British
constabulary found police were preoccupied with “encounters” with both the public at
large and senior officers who might uncover them breaking laws and rules. As a group,
Cain found a conscious barrier against such intrusions, since the police saw law breaking
as being necessary to the rank-and-file definition of policing. How they were supposed
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to do the job and how they actually did it were at odds, or as Chatterton (1976)
discovered in his distinction, there was the “written law” and the “law in action”.
Holdaway (1979) found exactly the same in his work, where he wrote of “written policy”
and “policy in action” demonstrating how the lower ranks replaced the formal policy with
which they were supposed to work, with their own policy.
In terms of promoting and maintaining organisational and individual integrity, the
question must be asked of the traditional model, “Is it fully effective or even appropriate
for policing today?” Wood identified that “the core of many of the [corruption]
problems that have emerged [in New South Wales] lies in the traditional approach of the
Service to its staff [and a] limited authoritarian and conservative outlook [which] has
permeated the upper levels of the Service in the past” (Wood 1997b, pp. 207-8). As I
see it, some of the inherent weaknesses in the traditional disciplinary system of policing
include:
·
investigations are complex and inflexible - they fail to distinguish between
serious offences and minor disciplinary matters and pursue both with the
same rigour – this promotes anxiety and uncertainty and in some cases it
results in serious stress, especially since there are usually substantial
delays;
·
the adversarial nature of the process and its punitive consequences,
discourages openness and willingness to reform bad behaviour – instead
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since few complaints are admitted, it encourages denial and
untruthfulness;
·
the adversarial nature of the process also promotes negativity – those who
have been disciplined often complain of the disproportionate nature of the
process (a sledgehammer to crack a walnut) and regardless of the eventual
finding, often believe that the system ignores issues relevant to leniency or
excuse;
·
the results of the process tend to demonstrate a lack of attention towards
individual remedial action;
·
the process focuses on the individual in a specific incident/s and seldom
addresses the managerial or other issues of organisational responsibility;
·
the process tends to rely on complaints - the investigations are, therefore,
essentially retrospective; and
·
with rank-based autocratic leadership, accountability rests with the person
with the authority – to a large extent this takes away accountability rather
than ascribe it (as formal inquiries into policing regularly remind us) - the
individual is not encouraged to consider the values underpinning the
orders nor their merit or purpose.
Also noting shortcomings, Kelling, Wasserman and Williams called for improvement and
change in police accountability, observing that the centralized command and control
management structure of the police creates grave problems of accountability and
concluded that overcoming the negative aspects of police culture could be achieved in
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three ways, “leadership through values, accountability to the community and
administrative mechanisms of control (Kelling, Wasserman & Williams, 1988). This
supports the findings of formal inquiries into police behaviour which have found a link
between entrenched bad practices and lack of accountability and the need to consider
alternatives to the traditional policing process for discipline.
The Shift to Values Based Leadership and Integrity
It is not enough in modern policing for a leader to rely entirely or predominantly on rank
or position for authority, however the move from that style of leadership to leadership
through values requires a substantial shift. Leaders in a rule based organisation rely on
authority ascribed by rank which allows them to command behaviour and action.
Without this authority they can feel powerless and frustrated. By contrast, the principle
of leadership through values is not linked to authority based on rank but instead involves
the leader using persuasion and influence towards the establishment and promotion of the
organisations shared values which form the organisations culture and ultimately influence
the way the organisation operates and the employees behave (Alexander, 1987). There
is, therefore, a major distinction between the two leadership styles that call for quite
different expectations. Certainly with leadership through values there is a very high
emphasis on personal attributes. As Robbins and Coulter suggest, it is critical today for
all leaders to have “credibility” which is judged in terms of his or her honesty,
competence, and ability to inspire and “trust” which can be defined as the belief in the
integrity, character and ability of the leader (Robbins & Coulter, 1999, p 537). They go
on to point out that followers who trust a leader are willing to be vulnerable to the
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leader’s actions because they are confident that their rights and interests will not be
abused.
Leadership through values is by definition aligned with a democratic style of
management, as it tends to incorporate dimensions of consultation and trust whereas the
autocratic style/rank based-authority is clearly slanted more towards control mechanisms
and the need to monitor. The differences can be seen if their definitions are paralleled:
An autocratic style of leadership describes a
leader who typically tends to centralise authority,
dictate work methods, make unilateral decisions,
and limit subordinate participation.
A democratic style of leadership describes a
leader who tends to involve subordinates in decision
making, delegate authority, encourage participation
in deciding work methods, and use feedback as an
opportunity for coaching.
(Robbins S.P. & Coulter ,1999 p54)
The differenct assumptions that arise from the different styles of leadership can also be
seen to be some distance apart, as set out below:
Assumptions arising from an Autocratic Style of
Leadership
Assumptions arising from a Democratic Style of
Leadership
1.
Decision-making - The commander has
the “franchise” on the “right” decision
since members are not invited to contribute
to the decision-making.
1.
Decision-making - There are no single
answers to most problems, and debate and
consultation, especially with those who are
intimately affected by the decision, will
have a valuable contribution to that
decision.
2.
Expectations - Members will only do that
which they have been directed to do.
When the directions are clear members will
not have to break the rules.
2.
Expectations - Members will understand
the reasons behind the direction and will
have faith in its value. Consequently they
will be more committed to the results.
3.
Trust - Trust is related more to the system
of institutionalised discipline rather than
3.
Trust - Trust in the member is assumed
and since trust is a mutual phenomenon
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members would have had some respect for
the ultimate decision.
with the individual. Strictness in training
and development will ensure compliance.
4.
.
Consultation - Members have little or
nothing to contribute.
4.
Consultation - Members are assumed to
have something worthwhile to contribute,
especially those who are directly affected
by the decision. They will know what
works but more importantly know what
doesn’t work (a critical factor in having
policies that are actually followed).
An autocratic/rank-based authority style of leadership is not likely to be sufficient to cope
with the police environment today. If police leaders are to influence the direction of their
own force/service and at the same time meet the demands of a dynamic environment a
leadership style which is biased towards command and control and autocracy is likely to
be an impediment. “Survival in [volatile] environments places constant pressure on
senior law enforcement officers to change and adapt in order to cope” (Densten,1999, p
45). In his examination of a sample of 480 senior police officers in Australia, Densten
compared the leadership behaviours of these officers with leadership norms established
by Bass and Avolio (1990) and their theory of transformational and transactional
leadership. Shortly described, Bass and Avolio, classify leadership behaviours that
emphasise telling or controlling as transactional leadership because rewards and
discipline are administered according to adherence or deviation from instructions.
Transformational leadership on the other hand alters the higher order needs of followers
by changing their attitudes, beliefs and values. As Densten notes, the type of leadership
behaviours are important in policing since senior police directly influence rank-and-file
officers and any process of change (Densten, 1999, p 46). Moreover, transformational
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leadership involves raising the consciousness of followers by appealing to higher ideals
and values, and moving the focus of followers away from their self-interests.
Densten found that from the sample of senior police officers there was a predominance of
management-by-exception over other leadership styles, that they were mainly passive and
focused on correcting deviations from the status quo, a finding Densen points out has
been made in other studies. This, he concludes, demonstrates a transactional style of
leadership and gives rise to certain shortcomings which limit leadership effectiveness.
An interesting point from Densten’s work is that despite the shortcomings of
transactional leadership in the law enforcement environment he examined, the findings
indicate relatively high levels of follower satisfaction with this leadership behaviour.
Consequently, he concluded there would be little incentive to encourage leaders to use
other leadership behaviours.
The link between autocratic leadership arising from a predominantly para-military model
of policing and the findings of transactional leadership behaviour in senior police is
interesting in terms of the implications for organisational and individual integrity. The
findings tend to suggest, in terms of leadership or managerial philosophy, police leaders
have not moved very much from the traditional model in policing which relies on
authority and a rules driven culture. The challenge to modern policing, it seems to me is
to provide a leadership and managerial system which recognises the value of a more
democratic style and at the same time provides a disciplinary process not built on blame
but on values the organisation seeks to promote. The Australian Federal Police over the
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last few years has attempted such a model. It has been in place long enough now for
some critical observations to be made.
Towards a Values Driven Model - The Australian Federal Police - A
Case Study
Throughout the last decade the Australian Federal Police’s (AFP) managerial structure
has evolved from an autocratic or para-military model to one with a democratic or
transformational basis. This change was initiated in 1994 as the result of an Executive
Team conference which set about defining the role of the AFP, its core business and how
it could best achieve the outcomes expected by Government and other key stakeholders
(Palmer, 2000, p1).
Identified essentially as a long-term goal outcome the Executive committed the AFP to a
journey towards “… the development of:
·
expert generalist officers who have the diversity of skills necessary to take
law enforcement into the 21st century;
·
a more prepared, capable and flexible workforce;
·
a values driven organisation which expects and celebrates integrity and
accountability, promotes and embraces personal opportunity, initiative and
development, and focuses on results;
·
mobility across the AFP and between law enforcement agencies to maximise
the opportunities to make the best possible use of people and generate
individual growth and satisfaction; and
17
·
a far higher use of joint agency, multi-jurisdictional and even international
target directed teams comprising the best possible mix of skills and resources
to deal with the particular problem (Palmer, 2000, pp1-2)”.
This shift in philosophy was to form the basis of the National Teams Model which would
enable the AFP to respond effectively to unpredictable domestic and international
environments.
The National Teams Model
In 1995 the National Teams Model (NTM) was introduced, resulting in a flattening of the
hierarchical structure of the AFP and allowing investigations to be conducted by
“flexible, empowered teams which assume all management responsibility for an
investigation” (NTM, 2000, p1). It was envisaged that the concept of empowerment
would extend to all levels of the organisation and in practical terms this would increase
the authority and decision making powers of members from the lowest levels up.
Specifically, the NTM was designed to:
· “facilitate the efficient, effective, cohesive and flexible use of resources;
· build an empowered workforce which would be multi-skilled, adaptable,
competent and widely accepted as ethical and professional;
· enable the AFP and its people to adapt quickly and effectively to emerging
or sudden changes in priorities or circumstances;
· ensure method, reliability and consistency in the acquisition of skills and
experience by people, in order to develop optimally the individual and the
organisation;
· establish best practice nationally for the operations of teams; and
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· eliminate the possibility of systemic corruption” (NTM, 2000, p1).
In practical terms, the NTM had the effect of changing the position titles of all sworn
members in national operations (below the level of Deputy Commissioner) to “Federal
Agent”. This brought about national consistency so that personnel could move between
areas and organisational entities and adapt readily and confidently. The elimination of
ranks, particularly from middle to senior management, also allowed the AFP to refocus
on roles. During investigations members would thereafter be described by their role, such
as Team Member, Team Leader or Coordinator (NTM 2000:2). Members are now
selected for their role depending on their skills, knowledge and capabilities, with a view
to ensuring each role “fall[s] to the person with the most appropriate skills” (Penrose,
1998, p23). Once an investigation is complete, members are allocated to another team.
In community policing, the NTM resulted in the elimination of a number of ranks in the
vertical structure of the organisation. The three remaining levels are Constable, Sergeant
and Superintendent, before the executive levels. It has also increased the decision-making
capabilities of officers at all levels.
The NTM has had a flow-on effect throughout the organisation and is evident in the
training of new recruits. Many activities are designed to encourage team building and
develop cohesive team dynamics, which are essential in the AFP working environment.
Further, the assessment of new recruits is based on a “competent / not yet competent”
rating scale which avoids excessive competition. This rating scale is in contrast to many
schools and universities where students are graded against one another, which can lead to
19
a reluctance in students to help others for fear of jeopardising their own position. The
NTM avoids such fostering of competitiveness which can be individualistic and detract
from the building of proficient team skills.
Another aspect of the NTM is the recruiting of diverse and multi-skilled staff. The AFP
employs new members with a variety of backgrounds, ages and previous careers enabling
the workplace to “reflect the diversity of the citizens [it] serve[s]” (Harvey, 1996, 14).
Benefits of the National Teams Model
The NTM benefits the unique nature of the AFP’s role in a number of ways, as it:
· improves communication between levels by eliminating ranks which, as described
by Reiter, “does not automatically eliminate bureaucracy [but] … often
increases communication by eliminating unnecessary filters of information
often found in the middle levels of the organisational pyramid” (Reiter, 1999,
pg8);
·
increases the discretion of its employees, allowing for faster decision making
and action;
· improves employer / employee relations through increased trust as
“…
employees who are trusted, allowed to make their own choices, and take
responsibility for their actions will remain committed to their work and feel
that they play an important part in their organisation” (Reiter, 1999, pg7);
·
increases employees’ skill-base and adaptability;
·
increases the accountability of empowered employees by removing
responsibility from middle management and placing it with the individual;
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· allows for greater flexibility in the workplace, in so far as an empowered
organisation may revert to command and control in extreme circumstances,
“but a paramilitary or bureaucratic organisation experiences great difficulty
switching to an empowered approach when circumstances dictate” (Reiter,
1999, pg8); and
·
acknowledges and draws on the previous experience and background of
members, allowing members to use their initiative rather than only following
instructions.
Disciplinary Process
As a values driven organisation the AFP strives to develop and maintain the highest
levels of professional standards. New members of the AFP receive training about the core
values of the organisation, namely integrity, commitment, excellence, accountability,
fairness and trust, and are expected to uphold them. For a sworn member, adoption of
these principles and a commitment to them is formally acknowledged at the attestation
ceremony. The Professional Standards Team and Internal Investigations work closely
with operational areas and management to focus on these values and the performance of
individuals, teams and business areas.
The Commissioner’s Orders set out the level of professional standards that is expected of
all employees. Failure to comply with these standards will result in disciplinary
procedures addressing general performance issues, complaints received from the public
concerning an AFP member, and allegations made by an AFP member about another
member. Complaint handling is conducted in accordance with the provisions of the
21
Commissioner’s Orders, the Complaints (AFP) Act 1981 and the Australian Federal
Police Discipline Regulations. The AFP strives for reasonableness, accountability and
transparency throughout the complaint handling process which may include addressing
issues from shortcomings in the workplace to assessing employee suitability.
The AFP approaches disciplinary matters on the basis of managerial and administrative
discretion rather than relying on adversarial and punitive processes. The principle behind
this approach is an emphasis on embracing and practicing the principles of a learning
organisation with a view to developing a culture that accepts and learns from honest
mistakes at the individual and organisational levels.
Most minor complaints are dealt with by mediation or conciliation in the workplace with
the assistance of Supervisors / Team Leaders. When a complaint is received employees
are asked to examine their own behaviour and actions and to provide feedback to
supervisors and complainants. This promotes accountability for those involved in the
conciliation process, which is regarded as a highly successful method of resolving issues
quickly and to the satisfaction of complainants.
On the other hand, serious performance issues (such as corruption or serious professional
misconduct) are not tolerated and are thoroughly investigated. These investigations are
subject to external review by the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Office to ensure matters
have been addressed in a fair and appropriate manner (“PRS: Structure & Reference
Material”, 2000, pp 1-3).
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The organisation has an increasingly proactive approach as it educates the workforce to
develop an understanding and accept ownership of professional standards issues. This
movement away from a militaristic or autocratic disciplinary process to one with an
accepting and learning basis has led to a change in mindset of the organisation. Members
are more willing to report corrupt or inappropriate behaviour by other members without
fear of retribution. They are also comfortable taking complaint details from members of
the public and forwarding those through the appropriate channels. The change in rank
structure in the organisation has had the effect of making middle to senior management
more approachable and this has removed the previously perceived barriers between the
lower ranks and management and increased the confidence of members.
Conclusion
In my former position as an academic with the Australian Graduate School of Police
Management, Charles Sturt University, I found that police students in their
essays/assignments made frequent references to the complex environment in which
modern police operate and the constant need for change. Good students went on to
identify what they saw as the impediments to change and were often critical of the
conservative nature of policing and the general tendency to maintain the status quo. This
paper draws on this observation and highlights the danger of clinging to long-standing
practices without challenging the assumption of their appropriateness or effectiveness.
Insofar as integrity in policing is concerned, formal inquiries over the years have noted
the recurring instances of institutional corruption and bad practice and have highlighted
the need to challenge the assumptions of traditional police accountability.
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I specifically take issue with the assumption that a force/service which relies mainly on a
command and control philosophy will provide the best model for organisational and
individual integrity. This rules-driven management style with its traditional punitive
disciplinary system, as Kelling, Wasserman and Williams point out, has created an
illusion of control, but often little more than that. The traditional model assumes that the
commander will always have the right solution/s; that subordinates have little to
contribute; and the severity of sanctions will deter breaches of the rules. There are a
series of factors which will render this reasoning as invalid: investigations of breaches of
the rules are slow, cumbersome, inflexible and are focused on the individual to the
exclusion of the broader organisational needs. Moreover, punishment rather than cure is
the prevailing philosophy which brings about anxiety, apprehension disincentive and
discourages truthfulness.
With many police forces/services today there is a distinct move to a values-driven model
of policing where leaders use persuasion and influence towards the establishment and
promotion of the organisation’s shared values which form the organisation’s culture and
ultimately influence the way the organisation operates and the employees behave. Rather
than relying purely on punishment for disciplinary purposes, this model sets the standards
then through its encouragement of good behaviour seeks to remedy or cure breaches for
both the organisational and individual good.
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In what most of us regard as a volatile environment, there is unlikely to be a ‘survival’ of
a model which is inflexible and purely rules-driven. At the same time, police leaders
should be alert to the fact that while some forces/services are committed to a valuesdriven model, research such as Densten’s shows a reluctance for police managers to
move away from the traditional rules-driven model.
I am not suggesting that the Australian Federal Police has the best model for maintaining
organisational and individual integrity. However, reference to the principles in this case
study invite police leaders to consider a model that separates serious from minor breaches
of conduct and seeks to remedy rather than punish bad behaviour. There is something
distinctly healthy about an organisation which places its primary focus on good
performance. It seems to me that the big challenge to police leaders is to become “… as
adept at identifying good practice and rewarding officers for carrying it out as they are at
creating disciplinary rules and punishing officers for breaking the rules (Dixon, 1999).
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