Testing thresholds in the South China Sea
Recent events in the South China Sea have reignited debate among analysts and
commentators alike regarding the situation there. For the uninitiated, the debate
accommodates a dizzying array of inter-related issues ranging from international law, to
domestic political concerns, resource competition, territorial disputes, and military strategy.
The outcome of this eclectic mix of issues and viewpoints is there is a tendency for
complexity to stifle analytical clarity. This, in turn, leads to a tendency to be surprised,
particularly when events are moving quickly. In the South China Sea, surprises are
unwelcome. We don’t like surprises.
The recent events I am referring to are China’s land reclamation efforts, or the building of
artificial islands on top of what was shallow reef, that began in earnest in the latter part of
2014. In particular, construction efforts on Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef in the Spratly
Island chain have been the focus of attention. Satellite and aerial surveillance imagery have
so far identified the establishment of airstrips, porting facilities, accommodation, air traffic
control towers and ground-based radar on the new islands. David Shear, the assistant
defense secretary for Asian and Pacific security affairs, said the Pentagon estimates that
China will complete construction of an airfield on Fiery Cross Reef by 2017 or 2018.1
On 21 May this year, a new actor was introduced into the frame. An exclusive CNN report
from aboard a US P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft, conducting a routine flight
over the Spratly Islands, outside the 12 nautical mile zone of either of these reclaimed
1
Bill Gertz, “Chinese Military Using Jamming Against U.S. Drones,” Washington Free Beacon, accessed May 28,
2015, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinese-military-using-jamming-against-u-s-drones/.
features, 2 conveyed audio of the PLA Navy ordering the P-8 to remove itself from the area
no less than eight times. American pilots replied in each case that they were flying through
international airspace. The CNN reporter describes China’s building of military facilities,
barracks, and “early-warning radar” 3 on the islands. On 28 May, The Age reported “China
puts weapons on its new artificial islands”, 4 without providing further details. In a related
story, the Washington Free Beacon reported unconfirmed accounts of Chinese attempts to
jam US Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles conducting surveillance over the islands. 5 It
emerged on 28 May that two mobile artillery units had been detected on one of the
artificial islands about a month ago by US surveillance, which have since been either
removed or concealed. A US official reportedly advised the artillery guns posed no threat to
US Navy and Air Force, though they could potentially be used against nearby islands claimed
by Vietnam. “There is no military threat,” the official told The Wall Street Journal, who first
broke the story, “But it is about the symbolism.” 6
The CNN report and subsequent intensified media focus adds an unpredictable element to
the already tense situation. The exact military details of what China does, or does not, put
on these artificial islands is of acute significance for regional stability. In short, any mix of
capabilities that adds to the PLA’s ability to extend air defence 100’s of kilometres from its
shore is significant. A greater ability to contest or deny airspace out there is a direct
2
Agence France-Presse, “US Warns ‘Next Step’ Could Be to Test Beijing’s Territorial Claims in South China Sea,”
The Guardian, accessed May 28, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/22/us-warns-next-stepcould-be-to-test-beijings-territorial-claims-in-south-china-sea.
3
Jim Sciutto, “Exclusive: China Warns U.S. Spy Plane,” CNN, accessed May 28, 2015,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/20/politics/south-china-sea-navy-flight/index.html.
4
David Wroe and John Garnaut, “China Puts Weapons on Its New Artificial Islands,” The Age, May 28, 2015,
http://www.theage.com.au/national/china-puts-weapons-on-its-new-artificial-islands-20150527-ghaxa8.html.
5
Gertz, “Chinese Military Using Jamming Against U.S. Drones.”
6
Julian E. Barnes and Gordon Lubold, “U.S. Surveillance on Island in South China Sea Reveals Chinese Arms,”
Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2015, sec. World, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-surveillance-on-island-revealschinese-arms-1432864632?tesla=y.
challenge to US and Japanese aerial anti-submarine warfare capabilities; a key plank in US
regional strategy. Anything below this threshold, however, needs to be viewed in a more
localised context. Whatever understanding exists about these details between Beijing, the
PLA, Washington, and the US Navy is probably quite delicate. The speculation has already
sparked a war of words across the Pacific.7 US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter said later
“There should be no mistake: the United States will fly, sail and operate wherever
international law allows, as we do all around the world.” 8 He also called for “an immediate
and lasting halt” on all land reclamation activities, including those by the other claimants in
the region. Zhu Haiquan, a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in the US said “China’s
determination to safeguard its own sovereignty and territorial integrity is rock-hard and
unquestionable. The activities that China carries out are well within the scope of its
sovereignty and are beyond reproach,” and that the US should “stop irresponsible and
provocative words and deeds, and make no attempts to play up the tension in the region.” 9
The incident with the P-8 is nothing new, there have been a number of related incidents
involving US military aircraft and surface vessels and their Chinese counterparts over the
last seven years. What is new is the Pentagon’s decision to allow a CNN news crew on board
a P-8. And, of course, the scale and speed of these reclamation activities is worrying. There
is no shortage of speculation on when and how China will add military components to these
facilities, and what the Pentagon’s next move should be. For example, Rick Fischer, a China
military affairs analyst quoted in the Washington Free Beacon, says “it is likely that by this
7
Sui-Lee Wee and David Brunnstrom, “China Says U.S. South China Sea Actions ‘Irresponsible, Dangerous’,”
Yahoo News, accessed May 28, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/china-says-u-actions-south-china-seairresponsible-073527475.html.
8
Gordon Lubold, “U.S. Rebukes China Over Maritime Dispute,” Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2015, sec. World,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-rebukes-china-over-maritime-dispute1432766786?cb=logged0.8567222158890218.
9
Ibid.
fall (US), the People’s Liberation Army will be able to start placing weapons on these
islands—radar plus anti-air and anti-ship missiles first, then PLA Navy J-11B air superiority
fighters.” 10 Pentagon spokesman Colonel Steven Warren told reporters they are weighing up
sending warships and surveillance aircraft within 12 nautical miles of the artificial islands to
test Beijing’s claims as the “next step”.11
There is a good amount of contact and personal interaction that exists between Beijing and
Washington and their respective militaries. From an observers viewpoint, the expectation is
that some level of communication exists surrounding the pivotal issue of the militarisation
of these new islands. And that it exists independent of the speculation, both informed and
uninformed, that surrounds it. There is an expectation that this communication is robust,
and not likely to collapse into a series of exchanges that occur via military signals across the
Pacific, rather than between officials employed to talk when things get tense. On this, a
statement from State Department spokesman John Kirby has assured that Secretary of State
John Kerry had given a clear warning to China, and to other claimants regarding
militarisation.12 Indeed, evidence of greater stability exists. In May 2015, the Wall Street
Journal reported that commander-in-chief of the PLAN Admiral Wu Shengli told the US
Navy’s Admiral Jonathan Greenert that the new facilities “will not threaten freedom of
navigation and overflight,” and that they could be used for combined humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief operations.13 China has accused the US of being “selectively
10
Gertz, “Chinese Military Using Jamming Against U.S. Drones.”
France-Presse, “US Warns ‘Next Step’ Could Be to Test Beijing’s Territorial Claims in South China Sea.”
12
Barnes and Lubold, “U.S. Surveillance on Island in South China Sea Reveals Chinese Arms.”
13
Ankit Panda, “US Won’t Buy China’s Pitch on South China Sea Land Reclamation,” The Diplomat, accessed
May 6, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/us-wont-buy-chinas-pitch-on-south-china-sea-landreclamation/?utm_content=buffer65848&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=
buffer.
11
mute” about the reclamation activities of other states.14 Vietnam, for example, has armed
its claims with various weapons for some time. As Su Xiaohui has suggested, China “will not
give up the rights to make preparations for unexpected situations.” 15 We will have to wait
and see if the robustness of this communication is sufficient to weather the media storm.
The often quoted fears of miscalculation and misunderstanding in regional flashpoints are
about exactly this sort of thing. One suspects we won’t have too wait long.
14
Barnes and Lubold, “U.S. Surveillance on Island in South China Sea Reveals Chinese Arms.”
Su Xiaohui, “South China Sea Issue Tests China-US Relations,” China US Focus, May 26, 2015,
http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/south-china-sea-issue-tests-china-us-relations/.
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