XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki 2006
Estonian Economy under the Soviet Rule: A Historiographic Overview
Martin Klesment
Estonian Interuniversity Population Research Centre
martin@ekdk.estnet.ee
Session 87
Draft – please do not cite.
Soviet economic history has been and will be a challenging issue for historians. For years
scholars have been puzzled with questions about economic growth under the Soviet rule.
Typical problem, if doing original research in this field, appears to be lack of reliable sources,
which also applies to Estonian case. If one considers previous accounts on this subject,
another drawback appears, namely ideological determination of authors. Due to the latter,
profoundly different approaches to economic history of Estonia under the Soviet rule exist,
which makes the use of these materials rather complicated. This paper aims to distinguish
between (ideologically) different types of writings on economic development and outline the
progress of their argumentation. It is quite clear that Soviet authors’ writings on Estonia
differ a lot from that written outside Soviet space and time.
In terms of research problems it would be too ambitious a task to cover all topics here.
There certainly are some issues that have received more attention, such as sovietisation in
1940-41, post-war collectivisation and industrial development, but also more general
problems of living standards and economic growth. This paper will summarise treatments of
Estonian economic history under the Soviet rule, divided into three sections. The first group
includes works by Soviet authors, the second section covers works by Estonians in exile, and
the third group incorporates recent studies carried out after the fall of the Soviet Union.
The history of Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR) begins with the establishment
of Bolshevik rule in June 1940, followed by the so-called first Soviet year, which lasted until
the German occupation in the fall of 1941. The Soviet rule, or occupation, was re-established
in the fall of 1944 and lasted until 1991. The periodisation of the latter era distinguishes lateStalinism (1945-1955), the period of territorial councils of national economy (1956-1965),
and recentralisation or stagnation period (since 1965). Because of unequal concentration of
significant events over time, the present text pays more attention to interpretations of the first
decades of the Soviet rule in Estonia.
Publications in ESSR
Although propaganda was almost always existent in ESSR’s historical writing, it was much
more intense during the first decades of the Soviet rule, taking forms of almost childish
exaggerations about marvels of Soviet economy. During the 1970s and 1980s propaganda
seems to be more concealed. Another feature of Soviet scholarship was that it rarely
corrected itself, which means that even rather illogical statements, made by communist
leadership with propaganda purposes, were later picked up by historians and repeated over
again. Political statements about current situation became historical facts later.
Transformation of Estonia to Soviet type of economic system during the first year has
mostly been described as a success by Soviet authors. In order to emphasise this change, the
previous period of independent republic was depicted as an anomaly in Estonian history. It
1
was usually stated that the period of independence discontinued the natural economic
relations between Estonia and Russia, which had evolved for centuries. 1 In this sense, the
events of 1940 were interpreted as a return to normality. It was common to interpret the
Baltic economies as an integral part of Russia, performing their functions that had developed
in relations with Russia. According to this rhetoric, the formation of independent republics
discontinued normal relations that had been the foundation of the Baltic countries’ economic
development for more than two centuries. 2
For the Soviet writing, it was important to show that changes such as land reform,
nationalisation of enterprises, price and wages reforms, which took place in the first year of
Soviet rule, were entirely positive developments. It was usually underscored that transition to
socialist system was the result of a local initiative that occurred in revolutionary manner,
being the result of workers’ hard situation in bourgeois Estonia. 3 Naturally, large part of this
kind of interpretation was taken from the political leaders of the time. For example, a
propagandistic statement made in the first year by political leaders was that during the first
months of the Soviet government real wages of workers increased more than a third.4 This
statement was repeated after the war as well. 5 Similar type of argument was circulated about
economic growth, stating that industrial production increased 60% during the first Soviet year
1940-1941.6 More recent authors claimed that it was only in the first quarter of 1941, when
Estonian industry produced 64.9% more compared to the first quarter of the previous year
(which was supposed to be sufficient speed to achieve the status of an industrial country in 45 years),7 but the provenance of the ‘historical fact’ seems to be the same. During the postwar years, transition to socialism and the reforms of the first year were described in even
more idealistic manner, in a style that could be termed ‘Stalinist’. 8 The statements were not
accompanied by explanations of how was industrial production measured or how did other
conditions change, which leaves the grounds of such a dramatic growth unclear.
Soviet Estonian authors have later pointed out that Estonia, taking the course to
socialism, was able to use the experiences and help of other Soviet republics. As a result of
quick transformation, benefits such as free medical care and lowered housing rental fees
improved population’s well-being. 9 Another issue, constantly repeated by Soviet authors, was
the increase of wages in the fall of 1940. Even in the 1980s, it was argued that workers’
wages experienced 30-40 per cent rise in 1940, accompanied by equalisation of male and
female workers’ wages.10 Eduard Brandt devoted a chapter to praise the support coming from
other Soviet republics to building of socialism in Estonia.11 Unfortunately, facts about
practical experiences of socialism building coming from older Soviet republics are not easy
to find and the latest research speaks against this argument. Also, often-repeated statement
1
E. Brandt. Sotsialismi ülesehitamise mõningaid iseärasusi Nõukogude Eestis. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus,
1955, pp. 3–4.
2
A. Ansberg, V. Tarmisto. Eesti NSV: majandus ja kultuur. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1960, p. 23.
3
See V. Krinal, O. Karma, H. Ligi, F. Sauks. Eesti NSV majandusajalugu. Tallinn: Valgus, 1979, p. 166.
4
O. Sepre. „Kergetööstus enne ja nüüd“ in: A. Vaarandi (ed.). Eesti minevikus ja nüüd. Tallinn: Poliitiline
Kirjandus, 1941, lk. 44.
5
See for example, J. Vares, „Mida tõi nõukogude võim Eesti rahvale“ in: Viis aastat Nõukogude Eestit 1940–
1945. Tallinn: Poliitiline Kirjandus, 1945, lk. 58–59; O. Sepre, „Eesti NSV 1944./45. aasta rahvamajanduslikud
saavutused“ in: Viis aastat Nõukogude Eestit 1940–1945. Tallinn: Poliitiline Kirjandus, 1945, lk. 114–115.
6
A. Veimer. Eesti NSV majandusprobleeme. Tallinn: Poliitiline Kirjandus, 1945, p. 73.
7
V. Krinal, O. Karma, H. Ligi, F. Sauks. Eesti NSV majandusajalugu. Tallinn: Valgus, 1979, p. 171.
8
See, for example, E. Brandt. Sotsialismi ülesehitamise mõningaid iseärasusi Nõukogude Eestis. Tallinn: Eesti
Riiklik Kirjastus, 1955, pp. 3–4.
9
R. Juursoo, R. Pullat. A Brief History of the Estonian Working Class. Tallinn: Perioodika, 1981, pp. 81–85.
10
See J. Kahk, K. Siilivask. Eesti NSV ajalugu. Tallinn: Perioodika, 1984, p. 107.
11
See E. Brandt. “Vennasrahvaste abi Eesti töötajaile sotsialismi ülesehitamisel” in: Materjale Baltimaade
rahvamajanduse ajaloost. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1956, pp. 27–39.
2
about wage increase was not correctly explained in the context of increasing prices.
It was, nevertheless, clear that economic life changed dramatically during the first year
and some later publications implied that changes were not always well designed. Vilmar
Ruus described how in August 1940 Estonian economy was run by eight peoples'
commissariats (other name for ministry), including 22 departments and dozens of subdepartments,12 thus referring to vastly increasing bureaucracy. As shown below, dramatic
bureaucratisation in economic management was later mentioned by foreign Estonians as an
extremely inefficient feature of sovietisation.
The German occupation in Estonia, following the withdrawal of the Soviets in the fall
of 1941, has been much less treated by Soviet Estonian authors. As a rule, the German
occupation was treated as a deliberate destruction of the achievements of the first Soviet year.
A quite monumental volume on the German occupation begins with a statement about
Estonian people having fought German invaders over 700 years since 13th century. 13 The total
sum of damages caused by German occupation to Soviet Estonia was declared to be 16.1
billion roubles in 1941 prices. This number was included in publications probably without
any critical consideration.14 Later it was stated that Estonia was the most damaged Soviet
republic, if losses were calculated per capita.15 Another claim of Soviet authors was that the
German occupation government cancelled the Soviet land reform and nationalisations, which
meant returning the land to kulaks.16 In short, the German occupation was presented as
something completely different from the first Soviet year, something that reversed the
previous success and was impedance to rapid advancement of socialist economy in Estonia.
Thus, a comfortable explanation to anything that failed during the first Soviet year.
Publications of the immediate post-war years were highly ideological, mostly used as
carriers of propaganda. It seems that during the first decade after the war, historians and
researchers of economy dealt primarily with explaining decisions made by government and
justifying these decisions. It served propaganda aims, because several issues (collectivisation
through deportations, declared industrial growth but no goods to buy) probably raised
questions among local population. As a result works were published explaining that transition
from capitalism to socialism in Estonia occurred in circumstances which determined, for
example, preferred development of oil-shale industry, collectivisation, etc. The nature of
economic history research of these years has been outlined in a compilation composed of
presentations at a conference in Tallinn in 1955. The issues addressed were, for example,
support from friendly Soviet republics to Estonia during sovietisation, the importance of oilshale industry, collectivisation of agriculture in Estonia, agricultural situation in Estonia
before sovietisation.17
Agriculture was rather a problematic issue. The five-year plan prescribed that pre-war
production level was to be exceeded in many agricultural fields already by 1947,18 an aim
which later turned out to be unattainable. In a similar vein, Endel Vint, whose research had
specialised on grain production, wrote in 1948 that grain production was supposed to exceed
the pre-war level in 1950 (an assertion which was, of course, in accordance with the official
12
V. Ruus. Sotsialistlikud ümberkorraldused Eestis 1940–1941. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1980, pp. 37–38.
H. Kruus. „Eesti rahva võitlusest saksa okupantidega minevikus“ in: M. Laosson, E. Päll, J. Saat (ed.-s).
Saksa fašistlik okupatsioon Eestis aastail 1941–1944. Tallinn, Poliitiline Kirjandus, 1947, p. 11.
14
See A. Jõeäär, „Kui suurt kahju tegid Saksa okupandid Eesti rahvamajandusele.“ in: M. Laosson, E. Päll, J.
Saat (ed.-s). Saksa fašistlik okupatsioon Eestis aastail 1941–1944. Tallinn, Poliitiline Kirjandus, 1947, pp. 182,
189.
15
V. Krinal, O. Karma, H. Ligi, F. Sauks. Eesti NSV majandusajalugu, p. 180.
16
R. Juursoo, R. Pullat. A Brief History of the Estonian Working Class. Tallinn: Perioodika, 1981, pp. 92–94.
17
See Materjale Baltimaade rahvamajanduse ajaloost. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1956.
18
See A. Veimer. Uuest stalinlikust rahvamajanduse taastamise ja arendamise viie aasta plaanist. Tallinn:
Poliitiline Kirjandus, 1946, pp. 29–31.
3
13
five-year plan).19 Later, Vint corrected his optimistic statements, showing that in the 1940s
and even in the 1950s grain production per hectare yielded much lower results than was
necessary to reach the 1939 level. 20 Such corrections were rare. For obvious reasons, Soviet
writing was not interested in publishing actual yields per hectare or real production.
Ideological dictate required authors to deal with success of collectivisation. If one is looking
for spectacular examples of Stalinist style of writing, it is worth considering Eduard Brandt's
publications of the time. Brandt stated that collectivisation in Estonia was carried out with
ultimate success, collective farms achieved better results already in the first years and poor
peasants moved massively towards establishing collective farms. 21 Brandt, without any
ground, claimed that overall grain production in 1950 was higher than that of 1940.22 (Later,
even Soviet Estonian statistical yearbooks’ figures showed it considerably lower).
In a similar vein, N. Buzulukov, analysing collectivisation in Estonia, argued that
collectivisation was initiated by peasant farmers, who were convinced that small farms could
not achieve increasing work productivity. 23 Such works may have left an impression that it
really was peasantry who initiated collectivisation. Some more light on the issue was shed in
a book by V. Matin and M. Bronštein, which mentioned that “intensification of agricultural
co-operation” was decided at the plenary session of Estonian Communist Party Central
Committee in April 1947. Since collective farm was considered the highest form of
agricultural co-operation, it referred to collectivisation. This so-called intensification targeted
mostly kulaks, bringing about higher taxes, compulsory deliveries, and other repressive
measures.24 The deportation of kulaks, which coincided with the collectivisation campaign,
was not concealed in Soviet literature, but quite clearly expressed in some publications as a
necessary part of collectivisation.25
Several academic dissertations were dedicated to collectivisation, including those by
Evald Laasi and Ants Ruusmann. Laasi in his works pointed out some interesting facts. He
argued that in the post-war years Estonian open agricultural fields received much less
fertilisers compared to 1939. It was only in 1947 when fields began to be more fertilised.26
This seemingly insignificant fact was one of the grounding arguments of Laasi's paper (which
remained unpublished though) that questioned the reliability of Soviet post-war agricultural
statistics. Official agricultural statistics claimed that the overall production of grain as well as
yield per hectare in 1947 surpassed the average level of pre-war years. Laasi challenged this
claim, arguing that besides actually receiving lesser amount of fertilisers, other possibly
favourable conditions (such as climate or new agricultural techniques) were not present
either. Increase of production, according to Laasi's argument, was due to the technique of
how grain production was measured (in fact, estimated). Laasi presented examples of how
officials at different levels deliberately increased the production estimates. This resulted in
approximately 30% inflated production figures. 27
19
E. Vint. Teravilja tootmine Eesti NSV-s. Tartu: Teaduslik Kirjandus, 1948. pp. 20–22. .
E. Vint. Intensiivse põllumajanduse majanduslik efektiivsus Eesti NSV-s. Tallinn: Valgus, 1971. p. 168.
21
E. Brandt, Sotsialismi ülesehitamise mõningaid iseärasusi Nõukogude Eestis. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus,
1955, p. 51.
22
Ibid., p. 60.
23
N. Buzulukov, „Eesti NSV talundite majanduse analüüs alates Nõukogude maareformist (1944.–1947. a.)
kuni massilise kollektiviseerimiseni (1949. a.)“ in: J. Vaabel, J. Nuut, O. Sepre ja H. Lumet (ed.-s). Nõukogude
teaduse arengust Eesti NSV-s 1940–1950. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1950. pp. 189–190.
24
V. Matin ja M. Bronštein. Eesti NSV põllumajanduse kollektiviseerimine ning selle sotsiaalsed ja
majanduslikud tulemused. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1959. pp. 65–66, 71–75.
25
R. Murel. Eesti NSV põllumajanduse kollektiviseerimine. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1950, p. 17.
26
E. Laasi. Eestimaa Kommunistlik Partei ellu viimas V. I. Lenini kooperatsiooniplaani 1944–1950. Tallinn:
Eesti Raamat, 1980. pp. 29–30.
27
E. Laasi. „Mõnedest korrigeerimist vajavatest arvudest“, an unpublished paper in the series of Eesti NSV TA
Toimetised. Ühiskonnateadused, 1971, No. 2, pp. 157, 159, 164.
4
20
Later on, descriptions of post-war agricultural success tended to be more modest. An
interested reader was able to grasp that it was the Soviet regime that created the need for
collectivisation (first cutting down the size of private farms, thus bringing about their
weakness, as a result of which they had to be unified into collective farms).28 It was admitted
that first collective farms were rather weak, both in terms of economy and organisation.29
Production figures became more realistic. Collectivisation in Estonia and respective reforms
in other socialist countries found some comparative treatment.30 Despite these moderate
corrections, Soviet authors believed that collectivisation was the right way, proved by relative
economic success of collective farms in the 1960s.31
Regardless the fact that agricultural production figures became more realistic in
statistical compilations, say in the 1970s, contradictory arguments remained. For instance,
Edgar Tõnurist argued that Estonian agriculture had reached the pre-war level by the end of
the first post-war five-year plan, i.e. in 1950. In 1953, according to him, agricultural gross
production exceeded the pre-war level by 4 per cent.32 Some other contributions on this issue,
however, implied that the pre-war level was not reached before the 1960s,33 and this
argument could be well supported by official statistical figures. 34
A few authors to write on post-war Estonian economy were former economists of the
Republic of Estonia. For example, Arkadi Rannes had published extensively during the
republic. In his post-war works Rannes described the first five-year plan in Estonia as an
enormous success. As usual, Soviet period was contrasted with bourgeois economy. The
latter was described as wasteful, whereas Soviet years were expected to boost industrial
production to unprecedented levels. 35 Unfortunately, his treatments retained the character of
propaganda even in the coming decades, leaving less space for analysis. 36 Regarding the
research on industrial development, it was typical that Soviet authors focused on the field that
was currently the central point of government policy. During the first post-war decade the
focus was mainly on energy and chemical industry, which were supposed to be the
foundation of further industrialisation. 37 Also, machine-building industry was regarded as one
of the main pillars of ESSR’s economy, claimed to have suffered a lot during the time of
bourgeois republic. Yet, it was typical to the Soviet writing that interests of research
transformed according to changes in official economic policy. Therefore, if in the mid-1950s
one regarded machine building and metal working industry as of primary importance, he
began to acclaim the importance of electro-technical and radio equipment industry during the
period of Council of National Economy. 38
In general, historical writing viewed the post-war decade as a period of massive
economic growth. Economic performance was usually expressed in terms of overall growth.
For example, it was insisted that industrial production increased 17 times between 1940 and
28
See Krinal, Karma et. al. Eesti NSV majandusajalugu, pp. 181, 183.
Ibid., pp. 188, 198.
30
J. Kahk. „Mõningaid põllumajanduses sotsialistlike tootmissuhete võidulepääsemise võrdleva analüüsi
küsimusi“ in: J. Kahk, E. Laasi, A. Ruusmann. Eesti talurahvas teel sotsialismile. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1965,
pp. 7–57.
31
E. Tõnurist. Eesti NSV põllumajanduse sotsialistlik rekonstrueerimine. Tallinn: Valgus, 1967, p. 22.
32
E. Tõnurist. Eesti NSV põllumajanduse industrialiseerimine. Tallinn: Valgus, 1974, pp. 10–11.
33
See E. Vint. Intensiivse põllumajanduse majanduslik efektiivsus Eesti NSV-s. Tallinn: Valgus, 1971, lk. 168;
Krinal, Karma et. al. Eesti NSV majandusajalugu, pp. 188, 198.
34
See, for example, figures of grain production, cattle size, dairy production, etc. in Eesti NSV rahvamajandus
1972. aastal. Statistiline aastaraamat. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1974.
35
A. Rannes. Tööstusökonoomika probleeme Nõukogude Eestis. Tartu: Teaduslik Kirjandus, 1948. P. 100.
36
See, for example, A. Rannes. Industry in Soviet Estonia. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1966.
37
See, for example, E. Kull. Eesti NSV tööstuse ja transpordi edusammud. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus,
1955, p. 6.
38
See E. Kull. Masinaehitus Eesti NSV-s. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1960, pp. 84–85.
5
29
1965.39 Another author argued that in 1959 Estonian industry produced 10.3 times more than
it had done in 1940.40 The credibility of such indexes is, of course, questionable and hardly
verifiable.
It can be noticed that during the Khrushchev era, a slight revision of earlier standpoints
took place, which was also accompanied by a relative reduction of unreasonable propaganda.
The immediate post-war years were not so much glorified any more, which was a natural
result of de-stalinisation campaign. Instead, the administrative reforms carried out by
Khruschcev administration (establishment of councils of national economy) were praised. As
a rule, commentators provided reasons for abandonment of earlier development strategies and
adoption of new policies. Veimer stated that the new territorial management, the result of
administrative reforms, allowed enhanced planning and exploitation of productive
capacities. 41 The earlier period was now described as having too widely disintegrated
management of industry, whereas the years of the Council of National Economy were
supposed to concentrate and specialise industrial production.42 In order to contrast with the
previous era, the industrial growth in the second half of the 1950s was considered to be
mainly the result of administrative reforms.43
Agricultural development during the period of the Council of National Economy
received mostly positive treatment. The effects of reforms (liquidation of machine-tractor
stations, transition to money wages in collective farms) were expressed in growing yields per
hectare and increase of livestock.44 Edgar Tõnurist spoke of 2.2–2.4 times increase in
production of collective farms between 1958 and 1967.45 What was usually not mentioned
was very low productivity of collective farms up to mid-1950s, which set the comparison
level rather low. Probably due to relative success in industry and agriculture, some authors
reflected later that Estonia was experiencing the stage of developed socialism already in the
second half of the 1950s. As positive aspects of socialism, they pointed out quick
urbanisation, electrification of agriculture, and increasing number of industrial workers. The
latter had the side effect of increasing immigration of workers from other Soviet republics,
but it was assured that mixture of different nations was a characteristic of socialism. 46
Attempts were made to demonstrate ESSR’s economic performance in comparative
context, because nothing could exemplify the success of socialist system better than
improvement over market economies. Henrik Allik concluded in 1957, using family budget
data, that the average income of industrial workers was 57 percent higher in 1955 than it had
been in 1938.47 Later, Valter Klauson developed this approach further and argued that in
1966 the real income of worker’s family in ESSR was 2.5 times higher than that of a
bourgeois Estonian family in 1938.48 Klauson also compared Soviet Estonian and Finland’s
wages and consumption expenditure, concluding that in 1966 in Estonia workers’ real wages
were 34 per cent higher than in Finland. ESSR’s development would have seemed even more
39
H. Linnuse. Suurte saavutuste aastad. Tallinn: ENSV Rahvamajanduse Nõukogu Tehnilise Informatsiooni
Keskbüroo, 1965, p. 6.
40
R. Renter. Nõukogude Eesti tööstus tootmistehnilise progressi teel. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1961, pp.
5–6.
41
A. Veimer. Eesti NSV sotsialistlik industrialiseerimine. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1958, p. 111.
42
R. Renter. Eesti NSV rasketööstus ja selle arenemisperspektiivid. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1964, pp. 30–32.
43
R. Renter. Nõukogude Eesti tööstus tootmistehnilise progressi teel. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1961, pp.
5–6.
44
See, for example, A. Karu. Põllumajanduse tootlike jõudude kasv viisaastakul. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1968,
pp. 4–5.
45
E. Tõnurist. Eesti NSV põllumajanduse sotsialistlik rekonstrueerimine. Tallinn: Valgus, 1967, pp. 80–81.
46
Juursoo, Pullat. A Brief History of the Estonian, pp. 102, 104, 107.
47
H. Allik. Võrdlusi tööstustöölise elatustasemest Eestis. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1957, p. 40.
48
V. Klauson. Rahva hüvanguks. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1967, pp. 31–34.
6
dramatic, if one considered that Finnish standard of living had exceeded Estonian one in
1940.49 Other comparisons were made on the basis of per capita production of some products.
For example, it was stated that in terms of consumption of meat, eggs, butter and milk per
person, ESSR exceeded the level of Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and United
Kingdom in 1961.50
When the era of the Council of National Economy was brought to an end, interpretation
of economic development and policy changed as well. Authors, who previously had
applauded to territorial administrative system and councils of national economy, revised their
statements. The new argument was that specialisation of industry and industrial co-operation
were more important than territorial management and, therefore, returning to old industrial
branch management system was justified. Focus on specialisation and co-operation resulted
also in intensifying research on economic relationships with other Soviet republics, because
more profound specialisation required more frequent contacts with suppliers and consumers.
Veimer admitted in 1967 that the system of councils of national economy had become a
hindrance to specialisation and co-operation.51 Specialisation of industry was supposed to
happen in parallel with concentration of industry, whereas concentration was considered an
objective principle of socialist economic system that secured increasing productivity of
work.52
Recurring reforms and policy changes required relevant explanation in literature. At
some points, economic policy changes were explained as logical reactions to quick
industrialisation. Regarding the metal and machine-building industry, typical plot of
development was as follows. It was stated that during the first post-war decade machinebuilding industrial branch served mostly for establishing general productive capacities. Next,
during the Council of National Economy, concentration and specialisation of industry was
started, together with the development of less raw material intensive electro-technical
industry. In 1965, the third stage of ESSR’s metal and machine-building industry began,
namely intensification of production processes.53 Of course, these turns were presented as
results of natural development, not as something coming from political changes.
The decades of 1970s and 1980s revealed gradually more criticism towards the
economic management and administrative system. Kalev Kukk, focusing on Estonian
exports, admitted that exports had begun to decline in 1971, mostly due to diminishing meat
and dairy products exports. Overall exports declined, although more industrial products were
sent to other Union republics. The author concluded that one reason for declining exports was
lower quality of products. This was particularly relevant to industrial goods, as those were
very much quality dependent. Decreasing product quality was, on the other hand, problem of
the entire Soviet Union. 54 In another publication Kukk analysed problems of exporting
machine-building industry’s production. Most of the exports went to socialist states abroad.
He stated again that exports had fallen due to decreasing quality of products. Factories were
not interested in competing quality-wise. 55 Both publications were available only for
restricted use. A brochure of this type was also issued by Uno Sepp, who stated that
49
Ibid., p. 57–58.
V. Kaufmann. Eesti NSV majanduse arengu jooni. Tallinn: ENSV Ühing Teadus, 1964, pp. 20–21.
51
A. Veimer. Eesti NSV tööstuse arenemine seitseaastakul. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1967, p. 12.
52
A. Veimer. Tööstuse spetsialiseerimise ja koopereerimise probleemidest Eesti NSV-s üheksandal viisaastakul.
Abiks lektorile. Tallinn: Ühing „Teadus“, 1971, pp. 3–4.
53
K. Eigi. „Masina- ja metallitööstus“ in: Eesti NSV tööstus kümnendal viisaastakul. Compiled by O. Lugus.
Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1978, pp. 45–49.
54
K. Kukk. Eesti NSV toodangu eksport (mõningaid kvalitatiivseid momente). Tallinn: Eesti Teadus- ja
Tehnikainformatsiooni ning Majandusuuringute Instituut, 1984, pp. 6–17.
55
K. Kukk. Ekspordiprobleeme Eesti NSV masina- ja metallitööstuses. Tallinn: Eesti Teadus- ja
Tehnikainformatsiooni ning Majandusuuringute Instituut, 1985, pp. 3–5, 10–13.
7
50
intensification of production had relatively insignificant effect on Soviet Estonian industry
and that industrial development during 1970-1985 was primarily extensive. As a result,
efficiency of industrial production decreased in 1980-85.56
So-called popular science writings on economy were quite common throughout the
Soviet period. Yet, because of contradictory statements and apparent propaganda aims, it is
difficult to take them seriously. For instance, while some publications boasted about one of
the highest level of food production per capita, 57 others introduced the forthcoming five-yearplan’s targets of securing food supplies to population.58 Unfortunately, large part of “serious
research” suffered from similar problems.
Contribution from Exile
Quite different from the above-discussed treatment of history and contemporary development
in ESSR was that of foreign Estonians. Those who fled to abroad had good knowledge of
previous developments in the country to contrast with later events. In the post-war years,
authors in exile were restricted to limited sources such as newspapers, official statistical
compilations, but also spoken word of people emigrating from ESSR.59 Unlike Soviet
authors, foreign Estonians regarded the years of the Republic of Estonia as economically
successful. 60 Generally, the authors agreed that economic conditions deteriorated
considerably with the beginning of Soviet rule. A general historical treatment, issued in 1946,
spoke about declining living standard after the transition to rouble.61
Sovietisation of agriculture during the first Soviet year was regarded as having almost
catastrophic consequences. One of the experts of Estonian agriculture, Joosep Nõu, stated
that the problem regarding agricultural production was mainly expressed in lowering yields
per hectare. Reasons behind the decline were obvious. Soviet land reform liquidated larger
and more profitable (30 hectares and up) farmer households. Private farms were pressed with
taxes in kind and farmers became uninterested in higher yields. 62 Arthur Ekbaum even
referred to modern slavery. As a proof of agricultural decline, he mentioned multiple increase
in slaughtering of cattle in the winter of 1940-41. Cattle numbers had decreased to 400
thousand by spring of 1941, which was 1/6th lower than before.63 Endel Kareda provided
more detailed information on sovietisation of agriculture. As a result of land reform,
56
U. Sepp. Majanduslik kasv Eesti NSV tööstuses. Tallinn: Eesti Teadus- ja Tehnikainformatsiooni ning
Majandusuuringute Instituut, 1987, p. 22.
57
According to Ansberg and Tarmisto, Estonian meat and milk production per capita was one of the highest,
compared to Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands. See A. Ansberg, V. Tarmisto. Eesti NSV:
majandus ja kultuur. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1960, pp. 82–83. See also V. Kaufmann. Eesti NSV
majanduse arengu jooni. Tallinn: ENSV Ühing Teadus, 1964, pp. 20–21.
58
V. Kirspuu. Rahva hüvangu nimel. Arve ja fakte. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1981, p. 3.
59
For instance, A. Kaelas, estimating the population size and ethnic composition of mid-1950s Estonia, relied
on people who had recently emigrated from Estonia (in 1955–56, they estimated population of Estonia to be 850
thousand Estonians, 300 thousand Russian civilians, and 100 thousand Soviet military personnel). He also used
Soviet Estonian radio broadcast as a source. See A. Kaelas. Das Sowjetisch besetzte Estland. Stockholm: Eesti
Rahvusfond, 1958, S. 19, et passim.
60
Arnold Purre noted that some 1939 per capita production figures of Estonia were a lot higher than in the
Soviet Union. See A. Purre. Eesti saatuseaastad 1945–1960. III. Ed.-s R. Maasing, H. Kauri, A. Purre, E. Ernits
et. al. Stockholm: Kirjastus EMP, 1965, p. 107.
61
M. Ojamaa, A. Varmas, T. Varmas. Eesti ajalugu. Stockholm: Eesti Raamat, 1946, p. 402.
62
J. Nõu. „Hoop Eesti põllumajandusele“ in: Eesti riik ja rahvas teises maailmasõjas, III. Stockholm: Kirjastus
EMP, 1956, pp. 94–95.
63
A. Ekbaum. Destruction of Independent Farming in East Europe. Stockholm: Estonian Information Centre,
1949, pp. 29, 55.
8
cultivated acreage in 1941 was 2.77 million hectares as opposed to 3.18 million hectares in
1939. The average size of farm households decreased from 22.7 hectares to 16.7.64 In
addition to lowering production capacities, farmers were forced to sell products to the state at
fixed prices that were lower than actual production cost. As a result of this and increasing
prices of agricultural machinery, purchasing power of agricultural population decreased by
45% already by end of 1940.65 Another issue, accompanying land reform, was a
differentiated taxation of private farmers. This and cultivation of collective farming (in the
form of machine-tractor stations) hit agriculture hard, states Elmar Järvesoo.66 The fact that
agricultural producers had to sell their products below production cost was also emphasised
by William Tomingas.67
Although the first drawbacks were most visible in agricultural field, other aspects of
economic life were claimed to suffer as well. Nationalisation of industrial and banking sector
brought ca 1000 enterprises from private hands to the state sector. Management of state
enterprises was not carried out in the interest local people. Kareda was convinced that large
part of industrial production was exported to other Soviet republics without equivalent
returns.68 Nationalisation of enterprises was chaotic. Former owners were usually pushed out,
but sometimes re-appointed as managers, because new commissars were unable to run
enterprises due to lack of relevant knowledge. 69 Harald Nurk, providing an overview of the
first year, stated that Estonian industry, being linked to the Soviet Union, experienced a
transition to low-quality mass-production. Political decisions put main emphasis on oil-shale
industry, machine-building and construction material industry. Opening of new production
units and boost of production was carried out mainly in the interests of the Union market.
Industrial investments program mostly ignored local needs. 70 Nurk sums up that the overall
effect of the first Soviet year to Estonian economy was destructive: number of managers and
entrepreneurs were deported or murdered, people’s savings were wiped out, vast amount of
goods were exported to the Union without getting anything comparable in return.71
The transition of the first Soviet year has provoked many questions about the impact on
living standard. Concerning the wage increases in the fall of 1940, hailed by the Soviets,
observers in exile generally did not deny them. Nevertheless, it was usually pointed out that
Soviet authors showed only one side of the coin, because wage increases were always
accompanied by escalating commodity prices. Tomingas agrees that in August 1940 money
wages were raised by 20 per cent, but he adds that prices were lifted up by 50 per cent
immediately after that. In September 1940, money wages grew 40 per cent, but immediately
commodity prices were doubled.72 In terms of people’s living standard, an extra negative
effect was brought by currency reform in November-December 1940. Toivo Raun estimated
that the exchange rate, prescribed to convert kroons to roubles, devalued the kroon
approximately 8 times, which even more decreased the purchasing power of population.
64
E. Kareda. Technique of Economic Sovietisation. A Baltic Experience. London: Boreas Publishing, 1947, pp.
42–43.
65
Ibid., p. 52–53.
66
E. Järvesoo. „Progress despite Collectivization: Agriculture in Estonia“ in: Problems of Mininations. Baltic
Perspective. Ed.-s A. Ziedonis, R. Taagepera and M. Valgemäe. San Jose: California State University, 1973, p.
138.
67
W. Tomingas. The Soviet Colonization of Estonia. Toronto: Kultuur, 1973, p. 240.
68
Estonia. The Forgotten Nation. Compiled by E. Kareda. Toronto: Estonian Central Council in Canada, 1961,
pp. 19–20.
69
Kareda. Technique of Economic Sovietisation. A Baltic Experience. London: Boreas Publishing, 1947, pp.
62-64.
70
H. Nurk. “Eesti majandus punasel aastal” in: Eesti riik ja rahvas teises maailmasõjas, III. Stockholm:
Kirjastus EMP, 1956, pp. 116-119.
71
Ibid., p. 127.
72
Tomingas. The Soviet Colonization of Estonia. Toronto: Kultuur, 1973, p. 236.
9
Additionally, all savings accounts exceeding 1000 roubles were confiscated in January
1941.73
Kaelas has pointed out that during the late 1930s, the purchasing power of Estonian
worker was approximately 7-10 times higher than that of a worker in the Soviet Union. Thus,
in 1940 the standard of living of Estonian worker had to be gradually reduced to the level of
Soviet worker. However, until the outbreak of war, Estonian worker’s living standard
remained higher than that of Soviet worker.74 Social conditions deteriorated, new work
legislation prohibited exchange of workplace without permission, etc.75
The German occupation, as it was represented by foreign Estonians, did not differ much
from the first Soviet year. Kareda argues that the Germans were not eager to change the
structure of economy created by the Bolsheviks. The claim, that no substantial changes
occurred during the German occupation, was illustrated by a fact that at the end of the
occupation only 12 per cent of the land, confiscated by the Bolsheviks, was returned to
previous owners.76 Harald Nurk states that although the Soviet land reform was cancelled,
confiscated farms were not returned to farmers. Enterprises, nationalised by the Bolsheviks,
were taken over, not returned to private owners. Nurk’s verdict was that the administration of
economy under the German occupation turned out to be extremely inefficient and
bureaucratic.77 At the same time, the Germans’ demands, especially to Estonian agriculture,
were rather high. Demand for grain was higher than agricultural producers had been able to
market during the normal years. 78 Though the Germans to some degree modified the social
and work legislation of the Bolsheviks, it did not bring much relief. 79 Probably most Estonian
authors in exile considered both occupations equally devastating.
The immediate post-war years not only re-established the situation of the first Soviet
year, but implemented the Soviet system further. A brochure issued in Stockholm summed up
the situation as follows: “The free and flourishing Republic of Estonia, one of Europe’s
happiest small countries, is subjugated and enslaved by totalitarian terror, the remarkable
progress it made during its independence reduced to nought and its bright hopes for the future
dashed to the ground.”80 Authors in exile observed the situation as closely as possible, mostly
relying on ESSR’s newspapers, publications, and first-hand experience of refugees.
Agricultural situation emerged as one of the most sensitive issues, because
collectivisation was to change the life in the countryside profoundly. Unlike the Soviet
authors, Estonians in exile considered collectivisation to be violent and economically
destructive. It was observed that during the first post-war years, the Soviet rulers denied plans
of collectivisation until it was officially declared by communist leaders in 1948. 81 Before
that, the pre-war compulsory deliveries and taxation system were put into effect again.82 Land
holdings of persons, suspected in co-operation with the Germans, were dramatically
decreased. Together with land-redistribution, socialist farming was introduced in the form of
73
T. U. Raun. Estonia and the Estonians. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2001, pp. 151–153.
A. Kaelas. The Worker in the Soviet Paradise. London: Boreas Publishing Co., 1947, pp. 23-24.
75
See A. Kaelas. „Vabast töölisest riigi orjaks“ in: Eesti riik ja rahvas teises maailmasõjas, III. Stockholm:
Kirjastus EMP, 1956, p. 77.
76
Kareda. Technique of Economic Sovietisation, pp. 111–114.
77
H. Nurk. „Eesti majandus saksa okuptsiooni ajal“ in: Eesti riik ja rahvas teises maailmasõjas, VIII.
Stockholm: Kirjastus EMP, 1959, pp. 72-75.
78
Ibid., pp. 83-84.
79
See A. Kaelas. „Sotsiaalpoliitikast saksa okupatsiooni ajal“ in: Eesti riik ja rahvas teises maailmasõjas, VIII.
Stockholm: Kirjastus EMP, 1959, pp. 127–136.
80
Estonia. Basic Facts on Geography, History, Economy. Compiled by E. Kareda, E. Blumfeld, A. Rei, Ed.
Poom. Stockholm: Estonian Information Centre, 1948, p. 16.
81
A. Purre. Soviet Farming Failure Hits Estonia. Stockholm: Estonian Information Centre, 1964, p. 8.
82
See A. Ekbaum. Destruction of Independent Farming in East Europe, p. 34.
10
74
sovkhozes and machine-tractor stations. First kolkhozes were established in the fall of 1947.83
Foreign authors generally agreed that the actual reason behind farmers joining into collective
farms was not the enthusiasm of farmers, but fear of being marked as kulak and deported.
Taagepera’s research convinced that massive establishment of collective farms began in
1949, right after the wave of deportation. He pointed out that before the deportation,
approximately 40 farmer households joined collective farms every day. After the deportation
in March 1949, thousands of households joined in every day. 84 Soviet authorities’ official
statement that collective farms were organised because of their higher productivity was
proved false by E. Poom’s study, which compared the productivity of Estonian and Soviet
agriculture in the interwar period. Poom concludes that productivity of Estonian farms was
superior to that of Soviet collective farms. Thus, demonstrating that Soviet authorities’
justification for liquidation of independent farms in Estonia, referring to higher productivity
of collective farms, was totally ungrounded. 85
Soviet authors spoke about rapid industrial growth during the immediate post-war
years. Estonians in exile did not deny that certain development took place in the industrial
sector, but had doubts about its success in terms of scale and quality. Industrial growth
figures could have been the result of vast investment into shale oil industry, as Raun
suggested.86 Others questioned the ability of Soviet economic system to ensure quick growth,
for instance, pointing out that an oil-shale worker of ESSR produced less in 1950 than had
produced an Estonian worker in 1939.87 A. Kaelas was quite aware of the bureaucratic nature
of the Soviet management system as well as of very moderate improvement in some
industrial branches, e.g. food and light industry. Heavy industry was characterised by him as
Moscow’s colonial industry, which produced mostly in the interests of central
administration.88 Industrial capacities had been employed mostly for the benefit of Soviet
Russia. Industrial products as well as foodstuffs were exported to Russia, even though there
was a shortage of those products in Estonia.89
In general, foreign Estonians were not convinced by Soviet publications boasting about
increasing living standards. It was evident that although rationing of food was ended in 1947,
food shortages persisted. The purchasing power of population was undermined by the
currency reform of 1947, which wiped out the savings. As an unfavourable result of forced
industrialisation, over 180 thousand immigrants were relocated to Estonia from other parts of
the Union. 90 Kaelas argued that the average income of worker in 1941 had been 307 roubles
before taxes, which according to the real exchange rate was twice as low as worker’s income
before occupation (30.7 kroons against 79.6 kroons). During the first post-war years, the ratio
between wages and prices remained the same as it had been during the first Soviet year.
However, food become rationed, black market flourished, and due to high prices workers
could hardly afford anything. 91
The reforms of the mid-1950s, carried out by Khrushchev administration, were
regarded by foreign Estonians as a reaction to lacking economic performance. A. Purre
83
R. Misiunas, R. Taagepera. Balti riigid: sõlteaastad 1940–1990. Tallinn: Koolibri, 1997, pp. 96–99.
R. Taagepera, „Soviet Collectivization of Estonian Agriculture: The Deportation Phase.“ – Soviet Studies,
vol. XXXII, no. 3, July 1980, p. 387.
85
E. Poom. The Productivity of Collective and Private Enterprise in Agriculture. A Comparative Study of
Soviet and Estonian Achievements. Societas Litterarum Estonica in Svecia. Stockholm, 1949, pp. 255–273.
86
Raun. Estonia and the Estonians, p. 176.
87
Misiunas, Taagepera. Balti riigid: sõlteaastad, lk. 109–110.
88
A. Kaelas. Okupeeritud Eesti. Stockholm: Eesti Rahvusfond, 1956, pp. 44–51.
89
The Colonial policy of the Soviet Union in occupied Estonia. Compiled by A. Kaelas. Stockholm: Estonian
National Council, 1956, p. 4.
90
Misiunas, Taagepera. Balti riigid: sõlteaastad, pp. 107–110.
91
Kaelas. The Worker in the Soviet Paradise, pp. 25, 31–32.
11
84
pointed out that Khrushchev had admitted problems with meeting the needs for food.92
Agriculture had experienced constant decline, expressed in decreasing acreage of cultivated
land, number of livestock and production figures. The downfall of agriculture was
acknowledged by everyone fleeing from Estonia and the fact itself was apparent if ESSR’s
literature was critically observed. On the other hand, authors in exile admitted that, compared
to the Stalinist period, certain improvement took place. Purre mentioned that the
reorganisation of collective farms in 1955 and liquidation of machine-tractor stations in 1958
resulted in increasing agricultural production.93 Raun points out major reforms in agriculture
(money wages for collective farm workers since 1958 and liquidation of MTS-s). Yet, he
acknowledges that since the mid-1960s, growth of agricultural production was relatively low.
It was known that by mid-1970s shortages of food had become common. 94 As of industrial
growth, it was acknowledged that gross production of industry exceeded the pre-war level in
the 1960s. Yet, growth figures provided by Soviet publications were not taken at face value,
but rather considered as objects of statistical manipulation.95
It was clear that social conditions did not improve immediately. Living standards in
collective farms were very different, depending on whether the farm was organised as a
model or it was lagging behind. Shortage of goods persisted. Even as late as 1957 free market
prices were considerably higher than official prices. Kaelas calculated that workers’ and
officials’ purchasing power was much lower in 1955 than it had been in 1939. Since goods
were not available for official prices, workers had to buy from black market, which further
undermined their situation.96
The period of re-centralisation since the mid-1960s, later known also as an era of
stagnation, somehow caused more relaxed treatment from the part of authors in exile. Estonia
was, despite of being occupied, regarded as experiencing certain positive developments. The
situation appeared particularly optimistic in comparison with other Soviet republics,
especially in the field of agriculture. Of course, authors in exile lacked reliable information,
but it would be too naïve to assume that they looked at Soviet statistics and economic data
without critical evaluation.
Official Soviet statistics claimed that in 1968 overall industrial output exceeded the
1940 level more than 20 times. E. Järvesoo believed that behind such an enormous growth
was a statistical trick which set the 1940 level very low, and suggested that the actual growth
had been 8-10 times.97 Growth should have had its effect on living standards. Allik’s and
Klauson’s calculations, which compared ESSR’s standard of living with Finland and
bourgeois Estonia, seemed not to convince Järvesoo.98
Increasing agricultural productivity in Estonia required explanation other than that
provided by Soviet authors. Järvesoo admitted that Estonian collective farms had achieved
relative success, which assured better results than in other Soviet republics. He argued that
this was the result of several factors, one of which was less harmful effect of collectivisation
in the Baltic States, because it was implemented later. Also, due to later collectivisation,
transition to money wages in collective farms occurred much sooner, thus farmers’ conditions
started to improve sooner. Moreover, agricultural education and knowledge of the republican
period had survived to some extent. Järvesoo also believed that newer advanced and
92
A. Purre. Soviet Farming Failure Hits Estonia. Stockholm: Estonian Information Centre, 1964, pp. 14–15.
Ibid., 16–18.
94
Raun. Estonia and the Estonians, pp. 198–203.
95
A. Purre. Eesti saatuseaastad 1945–1960. III k. Toim. R. Maasing, H. Kauri, A. Purre, Erich Ernits jt.
Stockholm: Kirjastus EMP, 1965, pp. 108–110.
96
A. Kaelas. Das Sowjetisch besetzte Estland. Stockholm: Eesti Rahvusfond, 1958, S. 97, 101–102.
97
E. Järvesoo. Die Wirtschaft Estlands und deren strukturelle Veränderungen. Sonderdruck aus Acta Baltica.
Institutum Balticum, 1970.
98
Ibid., S. 29–30, 35.
12
93
experimental technologies were applied in the Baltic States.99 As a result, he later declared
that while the mid-1950s were the lowest point of ESSR’s agriculture, noteworthy
development took place in the 1960s, which was based on chemical fertilizers, money wages
in collective farms, and improving living standards in the countryside. Somehow, Järvesoo’s
optimism about agriculture was also transferred to industrial realm, as he held that „[a]
considerable part of light-industrial output is of high quality and attractive design; Estonian
products are in strong demand all over the Soviet Union and are even marketed abroad.“100
One noteworthy aspect of ESSR’s agriculture was that private farming was maintained
at relatively large scale. Järvesoo argued that although private enterprise was discouraged, the
Soviet regime tolerated and even approved private production in agriculture for obvious
reasons. For example, in 1960 private sector in Estonia provided 28 per cent of overall
agricultural production. In the 1960s, the share of private farming decreased, but even in the
first half of the 1970s approximately 20 per cent of agricultural production still came form
private hands. The importance of private farming in Estonia was much higher than in the rest
of the Union. Also, efficiency and yields were higher in private sector.101 Thus, although the
ideological grounds of communists suggested liquidation of private enterprise, private
sector’s contribution to gross production justified its maintenance.
Overall, it seems that gradually more diversity appeared in foreign authors’ texts since
the 1970s. Some Estonians in exile expressed unprecedented optimism. Andres Küng stated
that Estonian economic development in the 1960s, measured by income per capita, had been
higher than in some Nordic countries. Moreover, in his view, the Baltic States had become an
industrial region using modern high-end technology. This was thanks to some local
communist leaders, who altered Moscow’s economic policy in favourable directions. It seems
that Küng was quite impressed by the results of economic reforms carried out in the mid1960s.102 Taagepera, speaking of soviet republics, pointed out certain aspects of autonomy
that allowed limited trade relationships, for example with Finland and Hungary. 103 On the
other hand, Agu Kriisa’s publication of 1984 continued the criticism of earlier decades,
arguing that living standards in the Soviet Estonia remained low. His calculations
demonstrated that purchasing power of ESSR’s worker in the 1980s was lower than that of
Estonian worker in 1939.104 Eduard Poom made calculations about Estonian national income
in 1974. Poom’s article points out that Estonian population was able to use only small part of
national income produced in Estonia, whereas larger part was channelled out of the country
by central administration.105
Recent Research
Research on ESSR’s economic history, carried out within the last fifteen years, should be
99
E. Järvesoo. „Progress despite Collectivization: Agriculture in Estonia“ in: Problems of Mininations. Baltic
Perspective. Ed.-s A. Ziedonis, R. Taagepera, M. Valgemäe. San Jose: California State University, 1973, p. 147.
100
E. Järvesoo, „The Postwar Economic Transformation“ in: A Case Study of a Soviet Republic. The Estonian
SSR. Ed.-s T. Parming and E. Järvesoo. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978, pp. 144–155.
101
E. Järvesoo. Private Enterprise in Soviet Estonian Agriculture. Baltic Scientific Conference. Stockholm,
1973, pp. 1–22.
102
A. Küng. Saatusi ja saavutusi. Baltikum tänapäeval. Lund: Eesti Kirjanike Kooperatiiv, 1973, pp. 74–77.
103
R. Taagepera, „Dissimilarities between the Northwestern Soviet Republics“ in: Problems of Mininations.
Baltic Perspective. Ed.-s A. Ziedonis, R. Taagepera, M. Valgemäe. San Jose: California State University, 1973,
pp. 78–79.
104
A. Kriisa. Okupeeritud Eesti – nii nagu ta on. Stockholm: Eesti Vabadusliit, 1984, lk. 53–54.
105
E. Poom. “Nationaleinkommen und Besteuerung in Sowjet-Estland” in: Eesti Teadusliku Seltsi Rootsis
aastaraamat – Annales Societatis Litterarum Estonicae in Sveca VIII 1977–1979. Stockholm, 1980, pp. 97–98.
13
qualitatively much different from the relevant Soviet scholarship (which was ideologically
influenced) and studies written in exile (which could not use archival sources). It is expected
the current research to take advantage of absence of those boundaries and fill the gaps. Many
of recently issued publications tend to expose damages caused by the Soviet regime.
Damages are either evaluated in terms of specific losses (e.g. unequal trade) or in comparison
with market economies and interwar republic. General consensus is that regarding the level of
Estonian economic development until 1940, Soviet reconstruction of economy was clearly
harmful. Questions have been posed whether forced industrialisation actually had
modernising effect at all.
The first Soviet year has been recently studied by Maie Pihlamägi, who concludes that
in all major sectors of economy – agriculture, industry, banking and finance – the
implementation of socialist command economy was carried out in 1940/41 and economic
independence lost completely. Unfortunately, her account remains rather descriptive, mostly
pointing out legislative actions of Soviet authorities and leaving less room for analysis.
Although she argues that economic planning was implemented in agriculture and industry in
1941, it remains unclear to what degree it was actually functioning.106
Olaf Mertelsmann sees the transition to socialist economic system during the first
Soviet year as carried out in an improvised manner. He suggests that no exact instructions or
help from Moscow were given regarding the reconstruction of economic system and that
mostly bourgeois Estonian experts were used to introduce changes.107 Speaking of trade
relations with the Soviet Union, Mertelsmann refers to price differences of import and export
goods in favour of the Soviet Union,108 which supports the argument of many authors about
unequal economic relations. As of developments in the countryside, Mertelsmann supports
the argument that due to price system, farmers were treated unfavourably, which led to
decreasing production. Land reform did not improve production, but rather hindered.109
Another important issue Mertelsmann addresses is industrial growth during the first
year, repeatedly declared by Soviet authorities and researchers. He suggests that during the
first quarter of 1941 industrial production actually decreased compared to previous period,
due to lowering work discipline, chaotic management, and insufficient investment.110 These
statements provide quite solid support to foreign Estonian arguments about declining
standard of living, work conditions, and general economic situation during the first Soviet
year.
Probably all recent authors agree that destruction of economic life during the first
Soviet year and German occupation was immense. Eve Tomson’s textbook provides some
figures about economic decline during the Soviet and German occupation, but lacks source
references. 111 A volume edited by Juhan Kahk in 1991 estimated the damages caused by war
and occupations.112 An update to this volume appeared in 2005, including a chapter by K.
Kukk on economic losses. Kukk, similarly to many foreign Estonians, regards Soviet
Estonian economic system as a colonial economy. Colonialism was expressed in extensive
use of local natural resources in favour of all-union industrial branches and destruction of
nation-centred economic structure. Exports of natural resources to the Soviet Union were
106
M. Pihlamägi. “Esimene nõukogude aasta Eesti majanduses: 1940–1941” – Acta Historica Tallinnensia, No
9, 2005, pp. 187–208.
107
O. Mertelsmann. Der stalinistische Umbau in Estland. Von der Markt- zur Kommandowirtshcaft. Hamburg:
Verlag Dr. Kova , 2006. S. 32–35.
108
Ibid., S. 42–43.
109
Ibid., S. 58–64.
110
Ibid., S. 68–71.
111
E. Tomson. Eesti majandusajalugu 20. sajandil. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 1999, p. 79.
112
World War II and Soviet Occupation in Estonia: A Damages Report. Ed. J. Kahk. Tallinn: Perioodika, 1991.
14
from the beginning unfavourable to Estonia.113 Primary target of industrial investment during
the first post-war decade, oil shale industry and gas production, was working mostly with the
purpose of providing Leningrad with heating. 114
A treatment of the Baltic countries’ economic history by Juhan Kahk and Enn Tarvel
offers a long-term overview of economic development, but remains very short on the first
Soviet year. Concerning the post-war period, they point out industrialisation and
collectivisation as major issues of economic policy. The authors maintain that the peasantry’s
resistance to collectivisation was broken with deportation,115 as was stated by foreign
Estonian’s earlier research. The issue of kulaks and their liquidation has been recently studied
by Anu-Mai Kõll, whose research on one of the counties demonstrates that it was also
taxation that made the situation of some kulaks unbearable, often resulting in loss of entire
household.116 The latter disapproves the arguments of some Soviet authors about kulak taxes
not being very high. 117
Kahk and Tarvel point out that one of the aims of Soviet authorities was to use
industrialisation as an opportunity to settle immigrants from other Soviet republics to the
Baltic republics. Investments were made mostly in favour of industries producing for the
union market.118 Regarding the industrial development, Mertelsmann has questioned, whether
Stalinist type of industrialisation actually occurred in post-war Estonia, and found that
considerable advancement did not happen in Estonia. He argues that industrial output of 1955
was under the pre-war level. Growth figures were high due to the fact that implementation of
fixed prices in 1940 set the calculation base 4.8 times lower. (At this point he also suggests
an alternative reason for the low index base. While some authors in exile believed it was the
result of taking into account only half of 1940, Mertelsmann suggests that index was based on
the entire year, but official kroon-rouble exchange rate and fixed prices artificially set it low.)
Thus, while there was no considerable improvement of industrial production, the entire
campaign was more of a reconstruction than industrialisation.119 This, however, does not hold
him back of speaking about forced industrialisation,120 which implies to a question of
terminology. Mertelsmann has summarised Estonian economic degradation during the
Stalinist period by pointing out how different were Estonian Republic and the Soviet Union
at the end of the 1930s: Estonian real income was approximately three times higher than in
the Soviet Union, the average life-span was 58 years against the Soviet Union’s 41 years, etc.
In general, his research supports Misiunas’ and Taagepera’s argument that in the mid-1950s
living standard was considerably lower than it had been in independent Estonia. 121
The agricultural improvement of the 1960s was counted by Kahk and Tarvel mainly as
a result of using artificial fertilisers. They speak of concentration and intensification of
agriculture, which besides temporary boost of production had some negative effects, such as
decreasing arable area. Consequently, agricultural growth did not prove sustainable and the
113
K. Kukk. „Majanduskahjud“ in: Valge raamat. Eesti rahva kaotustest okupatsioonide läbi. Tallinn: Eesti
Entsüklopeediakirjastus, 2005, pp. 127–128.
114
Ibid., p. 132.
115
J. Kahk, E. Tarvel. An Economic History of the Baltic Countries. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell
International, 1997, pp. 120–123.
116
A.-M. Kõll. “Tender Wolves. Identification and Persecution of Kulaks in Viljandimaa 1940–1949” in: O.
Mertelsmann (ed.). The Sovietization of the Baltic States, 1940–1956. Tartu: Kleio, 2003, pp. 127–149.
117
See E. Laasi, „Esimene sõjajärgne aasta Võrumaa külas“ in: J. Kahk, E. Laasi, A. Ruusmann. Eesti
talurahvas teel sotsialismile. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1965. Pp. 214–215.
118
Kahk, Tarvel, pp. 123–124.
119
O. Mertelsmann. “Was there a Stalinist Industrialization in the Baltic Republics? Estonia – an Example” in:
O. Mertelsmann (ed.). The Sovietization of the Baltic States, 1940–1956. Tartu: Kleio, 2003, pp. 151–169.
120
O. Mertelsmann. “Vom Hitler-Stalin-Pakt bis zu Stalins Tod. Estland 1939–1953” in: O. Mertelsmann
(compiler). Vom Hitler-Stalin-Pakt bis zu Stalins Tod, Hamburg: Bibliotheca Baltica, 2005, S. 41.
121
Ibid., S. 31–44.
15
last years of Soviet rule witnessed constant decline of agriculture. 122 Relating to industrial
development, Kahk and Tarvel refer to ‘forced over-industrialisation’ that had unfavourable
consequences. Not only was industry built up in a way that made it dependent on other
regions of the Soviet Union, but also its scale posed a threat to local environment. In terms of
economic rationale, extensive growth of the 1960-70s could work only for a limited period of
time.123 The latter was observed already by Soviet researchers, as noted above.
A comparative study on Estonian and Finnish economic development, published a
couple of years after Estonia re-gained independence, offered new perspectives to assess
recent past. For instance, it was indicated that although Estonian post-war industrial
development had been faster than that of Finland, the standard of living remained much lower
than Finland’s.124 (The differences in living standard were expressed by purchasing power of
wages, which rendered to be more or less equal at the 1938 level, but largely in favor of
Finland in 1988.125) The authors believed that the roots of over-industrialisation were in the
late 1950s, an era when industrialisation was at its peak, but which was also the period of
relatively high degree of freedom (Council of National Economy). 126
In terms of estimating losses by taking into account wasted economic potential (‘what
would have Estonian economic development been if it had continued as a market economy’),
the Estonian-Finnish comparison can be considered thought provoking. As suggested recently
by K. Kukk, Estonia would have had 4-5 times higher GDP in 2003, had it developed in
conditions similar to Finland.127
Conclusions
As demonstrated above, diametrically different interpretations of ESSR’s economic
development can be found. Although a few exceptions appeared, Soviet interpretation and
observations made abroad tended to contradict. Recent studies, which in terms of objectivity
and source usage should be superior to previous works, in general seem to support foreign
Estonians’ arguments. The fact that recent research is usually less emotional about the issue
and more calculating on the gain-loss basis should only foster the reliability of its findings.
However, considerable gaps in historical treatment of ESSR’s economic development remain,
as long as more detailed estimates of living standard and economic growth have not been
established.
122
Kahk, Tarvel, pp. 126-128.
Ibid., pp. 129-130.
124
O. Lugus, P. Vartia (ed.-s). Estonia and Finland. A Retrospective Socioeconomic Comparison. Helsinki:
Taloustieto Co., 1993, pp. 107-109.
125
Ibid., p. 328.
126
Ibid., p. 71.
127
Kukk. “Majanduskahjud,” p. 150.
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123