2011 Private Equity
Buyer/Public Target
M&A Deal Study
Summer 2011
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public
Target M&A Deal Study
Summer 2011
Table of Contents
Page
KeyObservations
SurveyMethodology i
iii
Surveyed Transaction Terms
Deal Structure
1
One-StepMergervs.Two-StepTenderOffer/Back-EndMerger
1
Target Fiduciary Duty Issues 3
Go-ShopProvisions
3
ChangeinTargetBoardRecommendation
4
Deal Protections for Buyer
5
Matchand“LastLook”Rights 5
“ForcetheVote”Provision
7
Break-UpFeePayablebytheTarget 8
ExpenseReimbursementbytheTarget
9
Target’sObligationtoPayaTerminationFeeDuringa“Tail”Period 11
Deal Certainty Provisions for the Target
12
Target’sAbilitytoObtainSpecificPerformanceAgainsttheBuyer
12
ReverseTerminationFees
13
SelectBuyerClosingConditions
15
MarketingPeriods
16
18
Appendix A — Surveyed Transactions 19
Appendix B — Additional Charts and Graphs 20
Appendix C — Break-Up Fees and Reverse Termination Fees 21
Other Selected Deal Points
Appendices
KeyObservations
Weconductedoursurvey,inpart,toobserveanynotabletrendsorthemesbasedonour
reviewofthe25transactions.Pleasenote,however,thatinourexperience,particularly
intermsofdeal-makingpost-2008creditcrisis,thesedealsareoftensui generisdueto
anumberoffactors,includingthemarketability/prospectsofthetarget,theregulatory
profileofthetransaction,whethertheagreementistheproductofdedicatedone-on-one
negotiations,aformalauctionorsomewhereinbetween,thestateofcreditmarketsandthe
recenthistoricaltrackrecordofthebuyer.Accordingly,undueweightshouldnotbeplaced
onthisstudy—itisintendedtohelpidentify“marketpractice”forindividualdealtermsand
assistonnegotiations,butdoesnotpurporttoestablishwhatisappropriateforanygiven
transaction.
Ourkeyobservationsareasfollows:
•
As expected, we observed a “market practice” based on the treatment/inclusion of a
number of the key deal terms.Forexample:
o
Noneofthedealsincludedatraditional“forcethevote”provisionorprovided
thebuyerwithaclosingconditionregardingappraisalrights.
o
Noneofthedealsstructuredassingle-stepmergersprovidedthebuyerwitha
financingclosingcondition.
o
Approximately90%ofthedeals:
 Permittedthetargetboardtomakeachangeinrecommendationother
thanspecificallyinconnectionwithasuperiorproposal;
 Providedthebuyerwithmatchingrightsand“lastlook”matchingrights;
 Includeda“tailprovision”thatappliedintheeventthemerger
agreementwasterminatedundercertaincircumstances;and
 Had“marketingperiod”provisions.
o
80%ofthedealswerestructuredasone-stepmergers.
o
Approximately75%ofthedealsgavethetargetcompanyalimitedspecific
performancerightthatwasonlyavailableif(i)thebuyer’sclosingconditions
tothemergeragreementweresatisfiedand(ii)thebuyer’sdebtfinancingwas
available.
•
The size of the break-up fee payable by the target company (as a percentage of
target’s equity value) did not decrease significantly as the size of the deal tripled
or quadrupled. Wehadexpectedtofindthatasthesizeofthedealincreased,the
break-upfee(asapercentageofequityvalue)payablebythetargetcompanywould
decreasesignificantly.
•
The range of the reverse termination fee (“RTF”) payable by a buyer (as a percentage
of target’s equity value) varied dramatically. Wehadexpectedtofindatighterrange
intheRTFspayablebybuyers—insteadtherangevarieddramaticallyincertain
instances(e.g.,5.51%to38%intheeventofawillfulbreach(thehighestwastheGTCR/
ProtectionOnedeal)).
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | i
•
While “go-shop” provisions are not “market practice,” they are widely used and
not exceptions to the rule. Ofthe25deals,approximately50%includeda“go-shop”
provision.
•
While there have recently been innovations in deal terms in strategic acquisitions of
U.S. public companies, these innovations have not spread to transactions involving
private equity buyers. Ingeneral,thedealtermswereviewedwereeithercustomary
orvariationsofcustomaryprovisions.Otherthanthedual-trackone-stepmerger/
two-steptender/offerback-endmergerapproachusedin3GCapital/BurgerKing
andApax/Epicor(describedonpage1),wedidnotseeanytermsthat,inourview,
representedasignificantdeparturefrommarketpractice.Forexample,ahybridofthe
“go-shop”and”no-shop”provisionswasusedinafewrecenttransactionsinvolving
non-financialbuyers(e.g.,Nicor/AGLResourcesandAESCorp./DPLInc.),however,
suchaprovisionwasnotincludedinanyofthe25dealswereviewed.Similarly,afallawayprovisiontothe“lastlook”matchingright(discussedonpage5)wasincluded
inLeonardGreen&Partners/ProspectMedical,butnotinanyofthe25dealswe
reviewed,excludingtheamendedmergeragreementintheTPG/J.Crewtransaction
(whichisdisregardedforpurposesofoursurveybecauseofthepotentialimpactthe
relateddeallitigationmayhavehadononeormoredealterms).
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© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | ii
SurveyMethodology
Thisstudyanalyzesthetermsoffinancialbuyeracquisitionsofpubliccompanytargets.We
reviewedthe25cashmergeragreementsenteredintobetweenU.S.publiccompaniesand
financialbuyersforconsiderationofatleast$500millioninenterprisevalue1duringtheperiod
fromJan.1,2010toJune1,2011.Ourfindingsdescribedinthissurveyarenotintendedtobe
anexhaustivereviewofalltransactiontermsinthesurveyedtransactions;instead,wereport
onlyonthosemattersthatwefoundmostinteresting.
Ourobservationsarebasedonareviewofpubliclyavailableinformationforthesurveyed
transactions.ThesurveyedtransactionsaccountedforonlyaportionofM&Aactivityduring
thesurveyperiodandmaynotberepresentativeofthebroaderM&Amarket.
AsummaryofthesurveyedtransactionsisattachedasAppendixA.
1
Theequityvaluesofthe25transactionsrangedfrom$331millionto$3.8billion(calculatedbasedonoutstanding
stock, excluding options, warrants and other securities convertible into or exercisable for common stock).
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | iii
DealStructure
Wereviewedthe25transactionstodeterminewhethertheywerestructuredasone-step
statutorymergersortwo-steptenderoffer/back-endmergers.
1. One-Step Merger vs. Two-Step Tender Offer/Back-End Merger
Ofthe25transactions:
•
20ofthe25transactions(80%)wereone-stepmergers;theremaining5transactions
(20%)weretwo-steptenderoffer/back-endmergers.
•
2ofthe5two-steptenderoffer/back-endmergers(8%overall)—3GCapital/Burger
KingandApax/Epicor—employedadual-trackstructureofpursuingamergerand
tenderofferatthesametime,sothatwhichevermethodresultedinfasterapprovalof
thetransactioncouldbeusedtocompletethetransaction.Inboth3GCapital/Burger
KingandApax/Epicor,thetenderofferwasusedtocompletethetransaction.
o
•
Adual-trackstructurerequiresboththebuyertolaunchatenderoffer
promptlyaftersigningandthetargettofileapreliminaryproxystatement
promptlyaftersigning(whilethetenderofferispending),and,totheextent
thetargetstockholdermeetingisnecessaryforthebuyertoconsummate
aback-endmerger,forthetargettoholditsstockholdermeetingtoobtain
stockholderapproval.Thedual-trackstructureisusefulwherethetargetdoes
nothaveenoughauthorizedbutunissuedshares(plussharesheldintreasury)
tograntthebuyeratop-upoptionsufficienttoobtainthesharesrequiredfor
ashortformmergerbasedon50.01%ofthetargetstockholderstenderinginto
theoffer.
Theother3two-stepmergeragreementsonlyrequiredthetargettofileaproxy
statementandholdameetingtoobtainstockholderapprovalifrequiredbylaw,i.e.,if
thetenderoffer,togetherwiththeexerciseofthetop-upoption,wasnotsufficientto
obtainthe90%requiredtocompleteashortformmerger.
Ingeneral,thebenefitofatenderofferistheability—indealsinvolvingnoregulatoryissues—to
closeinaslittleas1to2monthsascomparedtoatraditionalone-stepmerger,whichusually
takes2to3monthstoclose.2Historically,privateequitybuyershavebeenreluctanttouse
thetwo-stepstructurebecauseof,amongotherthings,themarginruleslimitingborrowing
to50%ofthevalueofthecollateralpledgedtosecuretheloanmadeitdifficulttoobtain
acquisitionfinancingtofundthetenderoffer.Severaldevelopmentshavemadetenderoffers
moreattractive:
2
o
In2006,theSECclarifiedthatthe“allholders/bestpricerule”doesnot
applytoemploymentcompensation,severanceorotheremployeebenefit
arrangementsthatmeetcertaincriteria,whichprovidedcomforttoprivate
equitybuyersconcernedaboutthetreatmentoftargetmanagementpostclosingarrangements.
o
Theuseofthetop-upoption,whichallowsthebuyertoensurethatitwill
reachtheownershipthresholdneededtocompleteashortformmerger,allows
privateequitybuyerstostructurefinancinginawaythatnavigatesthemargin
rules.
Timing assumes the SEC staff does not issue any comments.
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 1
o
RecentDelawaredecisions3haveprovidedguidanceonproperlystructuringa
top-upoptiontowithstandstockholderlitigation.
o
Tenderoffersalsoofferanadvantageindealingwithstockholderoppositionto
atransaction.
Whiledelayofastockholdermeetingtosolicitadditionalvotesinthefaceofoppositionis
possible,itismorevulnerableto courtchallenge.Incontrast,atenderoffercaneasilybe
extendedrepeatedlyuntiltheminimumtenderofferconditionissatisfied.
Goingforward,wewouldexpecttoseeprivateequitybuyersusethetwo-stepstructuremore—
atleastintransactionsthatdonotinvolvesignificantregulatoryorantitrustissues—totake
advantageofthetenderoffer’stimingbenefit.
3
See Joanne Olson v. ev3, Inc.,C.A.No.5583(Del.Ch.Feb.21,2011)andIn re Cogent, Inc. Shareholder Litigation,
Cons. C.A. No. 5780 (Del. Ch. Oct. 5, 2010).
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© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 2
TargetFiduciaryDutyIssues
Wereviewedthe25transactionsforcertainprovisionsrelatedtothetargetboard’ssatisfaction
ofitsfiduciaryduties.
2.Go-Shop Provisions
Wereviewedthe25transactionstodeterminewhichofthemincludeda“go-shop”provision
(i.e.,aprovisionthatgrantsthetargettheaffirmativeright—duringaspecifiedperiodoftime—
tosolicitalternateacquisitionproposals).Asnotedinthefollowingchart:
•
14ofthe25transactions(56%)had“go-shop”provisions.
•
The“go-shop”periodsrangedfrom21to54days(median:40days;mean37.6days).4
•
Ofthe14transactionswith“go-shop”provisions,7ofthemhadlanguagethatpermitted
thetargetboardtocontinuenegotiationswithan“excludedparty”(generallydefined
asanypartythatmadeawrittenacquisitionproposal duringthego-shopperiod)
withouttheneedforthetargetboardtodeterminewhethertheexcludedparty’soffer
constituted,orwasreasonablylikelytoconstitute,asuperiorproposal.
o
Ofthese7transactions,2limitedtheperiodduringwhichnegotiationswith
excludedpartiesarepermittedto15daysafterthe“no-shop”startdate,1
transactionlimitedtheperiodto20daysafterthe“no-shop”startdate,and4
transactionshadnosuchrestrictions.
Recently,ahandfuloftransactionsinvolvingstrategicbuyersandpubliccompanytargetshave
includedahybrid“go-shop/no-shop”provisionthatdoesnotprovidethetargetwitha“goshop”rightbutspecifiesthatalowerterminationfeeappliesintheeventthetargetacceptsa
superiorproposalduringalimitedperiodoftimeaftertheexecutionofthemergeragreement.
Wehaveyettoseesuchaprovisioninpubliccompanytransactionsinvolvingprivateequity
buyers,butthereisnoreasonwhyitcouldnotbeused.
Length of Go-Shop Periods
Length of Go-Shop Period in Days
60
50
40
Mean = 37.6 days
30
20
10
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Forpurposesofcomputingtherange,medianandmean,weomittedtheextensionofthego-shopperiodfrom53to
85 days in the amended J. Crew/TPG merger agreement.
4
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© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 3
3. Change in Target Board Recommendation
Asexpected,allofthetransactionswesurveyedpermittedthetarget’sboardofdirectorsto
changeitsrecommendation(“CIR”)toitsstockholderstoapprovethemergerundercertain
circumstancesinordertosatisfyfiduciarydutyrequirements.5However,buyerscontinuetobe
abletolimitthescopeofthatrightinvariousways.Asnotedinthefollowingchart:
•
In3ofthe25transactions(12%),thetargetboardwaspermittedtomakeaCIRonlyin
connectionwithasuperiorproposal.
•
Theremaining22transactions(88%)permittedthetargetboardtomakeaCIRother
thanspecificallyinconnectionwithasuperiorproposal.Ofthese22transactions:
o
12transactions(48%overall)permittedthetargetboardtomakeaCIRbased
ontheBoard’sdeterminationthatitsfiduciarydutiesrequiredaCIR—without
specificlanguageintheagreementastotheunderlyingreasonsforsuchCIR.
o
10transactions(40%overall)hadmorerestrictivelanguage—permittingthe
targetboardtomakeaCIRonlyinconnectionwithan“interveningevent”
(generallydefinedasaneventorcircumstancethatthetargetboardbecomes
awareofaftersigningthemergeragreementthatresultsinthetargetboard
determiningthatitsfailuretomakeaCIRwouldbeinconsistentwithits
fiduciaryduties)butnotgenerallytosatisfyitsfiduciaryduties.
Change in Recommendation (CIR) Triggers
CIR Permitted Absent
a Superior Proposal
88%
CIR Only in
Connection
With a
Superior
Proposal
Intervening Event
Required: 40% Overall
12%
General Fiduciary
Out: 48% Overall
OursurveyresultswereconsistentwithrecentviewsofDelawarelegalexpertsthatafiduciary
outforgeneralpurposesoraninterveningeventisnecessary.
5
Wealsoreviewedthe25transactionstoanalyzethevariousformulationsofthestandardthatapplieswhen
determining when a target board is permitted to make a CIR:
•
13ofthe25transactions(52%)used“wouldbeinconsistentwith”or“wouldlikelybeinconsistentwith”its
fiduciaryduties.
•
5ofthe25transactions(20%)used“wouldbereasonablylikelytobeinconsistentwith”itsfiduciaryduties.
•
4ofthe25transactions(16%)used“couldbeinconsistentwith”itsfiduciaryduties.
•
3ofthe25transactions(12%)used“wouldbereasonablylikelytoviolate”itsfiduciaryduties.
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 4
DealProtectionsforBuyer
Wereviewedthe25transactionsforprovisionsdesignedtoprotectthebuyer’sdealagainst
toppingbidsandtargetstockholderopposition.
4. Match & “Last Look” Match Rights
Wereviewedthe25transactionstodeterminewhetherthebuyerhadinitial“matching”and
“lastlook”matchingrightsunderthemergeragreement.Initialmatchingrightsprovidethe
buyerwithanopportunitytonegotiatewiththetargetboardduringaspecificperiodoftime
afterreceiptofnoticefromthetargetboardofanintendedCIRandproposemodifiedterms
thataresufficientlyimprovedsoastoprecludethetargetfromeffectingaCIR.“Lastlook”
matchingrightsprovidethebuyerwithafurtherrighttonegotiateintheeventthattheother
bidderrevisesitsproposedterms.
•
Allofthetransactionshadinitialmatchingrightsandalmostall(24of25;96%)had
“lastlook”matchingrights.
•
Asnotedinthefollowingcharts:
o
Therangeofinitialmatchingrightswas3to7days(mean:4.4days;median
4days);and
o
Therangeof“lastlook”matchingrightswas1to5.6days(mean:3.1days;
median4days).
WenotethatinIn re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. Shareholder Litigation,C.A.No.6164(Del.
Ch.May20,2011),ViceChancellorParsonsoftheDelawareChanceryCourtdeterminedthat
eachofthedealprotectionprovisionsagreedtobythetarget,whichincluded,amongother
protections,athree-day“matchingright”provision,were “standard,”whetherconsidered
aloneorasagroup.6
Wealsoreviewedthe24transactionswithinitialmatchingand“lastlook”matchingrightsto
comparethedurationsfortheinitialmatchingand“lastlook”matchingrights.Asnotedin
ChartB-1inAppendixB:
•
In9ofthe24transactions(38%),thedurationswereidentical.
•
In4ofthe24transactions(17%),thedurationforthe“lastlook”matchingrightwas
approximately50%oftheinitialmatchingrightduration.
ApartofthesettlementoftheshareholderslitigationovertheJ.Crew/TPGmerger,TPG
agreedtoaneliminationofitsmatchingrightsintheeventacompetingbidderoutbidTPGby
$2.00pershareormore(a4.5%premiumtotheTPGprice).Wealsonotethatinatleastone
recenttransactionnotincludedinourstudy(LeonardGreen&Partners/ProspectMedical),
thebuyer’scontractualmatchingrightswereeliminatedifacompetingbidderoutbidthe
buyer’spricebymorethan10%.
Theotherdealprotectionprovisionsincludeda“no-shop”clauseandabreak-upfeeofapproximately3.4%ofthe
equity value.
6
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 5
ht
30
50
25
40
20
% of Deals
% of Deals
Length of Match & “Last Look” Match Rights
30
20
15
10
10
5
0
0
4
3
5
6
7
Calendar Days of Match Right
0
1
Calendar Days
30
25
% of Deals
20
15
10
5
0
7
0
1
2
3
4
5
Calendar Days of “Last Look” Match Right
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 6
5. “Force the Vote” Provision
Noneofthe25transactionswereviewedincludedatraditionalunqualified“forcethevote”
(“FTV”)provision(i.e.,aclausethatrequiresthetargetboardtosubmittheproposed
transactiontoavoteoftargetstockholders,evenifthetarget’sboardhasmadeaCIRpriorto
terminationoftheagreement).Thisisapro-buyerprovisionbecauseitcandiscourageother
biddersfrommakingatoppingbidgiventhatthetargetcannotterminatetheagreementto
acceptfinalbids.Byrequiringastockholdervote,anFTVprovisionnecessitatesthedrawnoutprocessoffilingtheproxystatementandsecuringapplicableconsentsandregulatory
approvalsbeforethetargetcanenteratransactionwithanotherbidder.
Notethat11ofthe25transactions(44%)containedalimitedFTVprovisionthatrequiresthe
targettoholdthestockholdervoteonthetransactiondespiteaCIRunlesstheagreement
isterminated.AlimitedFTVprovisionofferslittleprotectionwhenthetargetisterminating
theagreementtoenterintoanagreementforasuperiorproposal,butmayoffersome
protectioninthecontextofaCIRforaninterveningeventthatdoesnototherwisegiveriseto
aterminationright.
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 7
6. Break-Up Fee Payable by the Target
Wereviewedthe25transactionstocalculatethesizeofthetarget’s“break-upfee”(asa
percentageofequityvalue)intheeventthetargetchosetoterminatethemergeragreement
toacceptasuperiorproposal.Asnotedinthefollowingchart:
•
Therangeofbreak-upfees(asapercentageofequityvalue)was0.72%to4.99%
(mean:3.15%;median:3.12%).
Break-Up Fees
6%
% Equity Values
5%
4%
Mean = 3.15%
3%
2%
1%
0%
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Aswithotherdealprotectiondevices,Delawarecourtshavenotprovidedanybright-line
rulesregardingwhenabreak-upfeewillbedeemedunreasonableinamount.Nevertheless,
practitionerscantakecomfortthatfeesintherangeof2.0%to4.0%ofequityvalueare
generallypermissible.
Delawarejurisprudence,mostrecentlyintheIn re Cogent Inc. Shareholder Litigation,suggests
thatequityvaluemaybetheappropriatemetricforcalculatingabreak-upfeewhereatarget
hasminimaldebt.Conversely,wherethebuyerisassumingasignificantamountofatarget’s
debt,enterprisevaluemaybetheappropriatemetric.
Givenawiderangeoffeesanddealsize,wegroupedthe25transactionsbydealsizeand
notedtherangeofbreak-upfees(asapercentageofdealsize7).Somewhatsurprisingly,we
observedthattheaveragesizeofthebreak-upfeeasapercentageofequityvaluedidnot
decreaseappreciablyasthedealsizeincreased:
Deal Size
(Equity Value)
Range
Mean
Median
Upto$1Billion
(13of25Transactions)
2.02%to4.99%
3.40%
3.30%
$1Billionto$3Billion
(7of25Transactions)
0.72%to4.11%
2.68%
2.79%
$3Billionto$4Billion
(5of25Transactions)
2.82%to3.70%
3.19%
3.14%
All break-up fees were structured so as to be paid net of any reimbursements for expenses.
7
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
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7. Expense Reimbursement by the Target
Wereviewedthe25transactionstodeterminewhichofthemrequiredthetargettoreimburse
thebuyerfortransactionexpensesandthesizeofandtriggersforsuchreimbursement
obligation.
•
17ofthe25transactions(68%)imposedanexpensereimbursementobligationon
thetarget.8Asnotedinthefollowingchart,thetriggersforthisobligationwere
terminationoftheagreementdueto:
o
Target’sshareholdersrejectingtheproposedmerger:17ofthe17transactions
(100%),ofwhich:
 14(82%ofthissubset)didnotrequiretheexistenceofacompeting
acquisitionproposalpriortotermination(i.e.,a“nakedno-vote”).
 2(12%ofthissubset)requiredthatthetargetboardhadmadeaCIR
priortotermination.9
 1(6%ofthissubset)requiredthatanalternativeacquisitionproposal
hadbeenmadeandnotbeenwithdrawnpriortotermination.
o
Target’smaterialbreachofrepresentationsorcovenants:10ofthe17
transactions(59%).
o
Target’sentryintoanalternativeacquisitionproposal:5ofthe17transactions
(29%).
o
Changeoftargetboard’srecommendation:5ofthe17transactions(29%).
o
Materialadverseeffectontarget:1ofthe17transactions(6%).
o
Failureofthepartiestoconsummatetheclosingbytheoutsidedate:1ofthe17
transactions(6%).
Inaddition,theTPG/J.Crewmergeragreementwasamendedtoprovideexpensereimbursementifathird-party
biddermadeasuperiorproposalandwassubsequentlyoutbid.
9
Twotransactions(CPIandinVentiv)allowforexpensereimbursementwherethereisa“nakedno-vote”butonlyin
thesituationwherethetargetboardhaschangeditsrecommendation.Bothtransactionsalsoprovidedforpayment
of a termination fee if the board had changed its recommendation.
8
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Target Expense Obligation Triggers
% of Transactions
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Vote Down
by Target
Stockholders
Target Breach
of Reps or
Covenants
Entry Into
Alternative
Acquisition
Agreement
Change of
Recommendation
by the
Target Board
Material
Adverse Effect
on Target
Failure to
Consummate the
Transaction by
Outside Date
•
Allexpensereimbursementprovisionswerecapped.Asapercentageofequityvalue,
capsrangedfrom0.18%to1.25%(median:0.69%;mean:0.72%).SeeChartB-2in
AppendixB.
•
Groupingthe17transactionsbydealsize,theexpensereimbursementobligationsasa
percentageofdealsizewereasfollows:
Deal Size
(Equity Value)
Range
Mean
Median
Upto$1Billion
(11of17Transactions)
0.31%to1.25%
0.78%
0.77%
$1Billionto$3Billion
(4of17Transactions)
0.18%to1.20%
0.55%
0.42%
$3Billionto$4Billion
(2of17Transactions)
0.39%to0.45%
0.42%
0.42%
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 10
8. Target’s Obligation to Pay a Termination Fee During a “Tail” Period
Wereviewedthe25transactionstodeterminewhetherthetargetwasobligatedafterthe
terminationofthemergeragreementtopayaterminationfeeifitsubsequentlyenteredinto
adefinitiveagreementorconsummatedanalternativeacquisitionproposal(a“tailprovision”).
Innearlyallofthetransactionswereviewed,thetailprovisionsrequiredathirdpartytohave
publiclymadeanalternativeacquisitionproposalthatwasnottimelywithdrawnpriortothe
dateofterminationofthemergeragreement.
•
24ofthe25(96%)hadatailprovision.Ofthese24transactions:
o
20transactions(83%ofthissubset)hada12-monthtailperiod;3transactions
(13%ofthissubset)hada9-monthtailperiod;and1transaction(4%ofthis
subset)hadan18-monthtailperiod.
o
23transactions(96%ofthissubset)requiredthatanalternativeacquisition
proposalhasbeenmadeandnotwithdrawnpriortotheterminationofthe
agreement.Ofthe23transactions:
 17transactions(71%ofthissubset)requiredthesubsequent
consummationofanalternativeacquisitionproposal(eitherduringor
afterthetailperiod)totriggerthetailprovision.
 6transactions(29%ofthissubset)requiredeithertheentryintoorthe
consummationofanalternativeacquisitionproposaltotriggerthetail
provision.
o
23transactions(96%ofthissubset)areformulatedsuchthattheproposalthat
triggerstheterminationdoesnothavetobethesameproposalthattriggers
thetailprovision.
o
1transaction(4%ofthissubset)isformulatedsuchthattheproposalthat
triggerstheterminationmustbethesameproposalthattriggersthetail
provision.
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 11
DealCertaintyProvisionsfortheTarget
Wereviewedthe25transactionsforcertainprovisionsaffectingcertaintyofclosingthe
transaction.
9. Target’s Ability to Obtain Specific Performance Against the Buyer
Wereviewedthe25transactionstodeterminewhetherthetargethad(i)aspecific
performancerighttoforcethebuyertoconsummatetheclosingsubjectonlytothe
satisfactionofbuyer’sclosingconditions(a“fullspecificperformanceright”),(ii)alimited
specificperformancerightthatalsorequiredthebuyer’sdebtfinancingtobeavailable(a
“limitedspecificperformanceright”)or(iii)nospecificperformancerighttoforcethebuyer
toclose(i.e.,thetarget’sonlyremedywastoterminatetheagreementandreceivewhatever
fees/damagesareprovidedintheagreement).Asnotedinthefollowingchart:
•
2ofthe25transactions(8%)grantedthetargetafullspecificperformanceright.
•
19ofthe25transactions(76%)grantedthetargetalimitedspecificperformanceright.
•
4ofthe25transactions(16%)didnotprovidethetargetwithaspecificperformance
right,butinsteadprovidedthetargetwiththerighttoterminatethemerger
agreementandreceiveareverseterminationfeefromthebuyer.Withrespecttosuch
4transactions:
o
1transaction(25%ofthissubset)hadasingle-tierreverseterminationfee
provisionthatwastriggereduponafinancingfailure;and
o
3transactions(75%ofthissubset)hadatwo-tierreverseterminationfeewith
thelowertierfeeapplicableintheeventofafinancingfailure,andthehigher
tierfeeapplicableintheeventofwillfulbreachbythebuyer.
Target Specific Performance Rights
Full Specific
Performance Right
No Specific
Performance Right
8%
16%
76%
Limited Specific
Performance Right
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 12
10. Reverse Termination Fees
Wereviewedthe25transactionstoanalyzethestructure(single-tiervs.two-tier)andsize
ofthereverseterminationfees(“RTFs”)(expressedaspercentageoftargetequityvalue)
requiredtobepaidbythebuyerinconnectionwiththeterminationofthemergeragreement.
Asnotedinthefollowingchart:
•
AllofthetransactionshadRTFs.
•
16ofthe25transactions(64%)hadsingle-tierRTFs.
•
8ofthe25transactions(32%)hadtwo-tierRTFswithtriggeringeventsforthehigher
feetierdueto:
•
o
Buyer’swillfulbreach—5ofthe8transactions(63%ofthesubset;20%
overall).10
o
Buyer’sfailuretoconsummatethetransactionafterobtainingdebtfinancing—
3ofthe8transactions(38%ofthesubset;12%overall).
1ofthe25transactions(4%)(MadisonDearborn/BWAY)hadatwo-tierRTFwitha
highertiergeneralreverseterminationfeeandalowertiertriggeredbythetarget’s
failuretomaintainaspecifiedratioofdebttoEBIDTAatclosing.
Reverse Termination Fees
36%
Two-Tiered Fees
Higher Fee for No Equity
Financing: 12% Overall
Single-Tiered
Fees
64%
Lower Fee for
Target’s Failure
to Meet Financing
Metric: 4% Overall
Higher Fee for Willful
Breach: 20% Overall
Wenotethat3ofthese5transactionsdefined“willfulbreach.”1ofthese3deals(Veritas/CPI)definedthetermso
as to require an act “knowingly undertaken … with the intent of causing a breach of [the agreement].” The other 2
deals(Cerberus/DynCorpandGTCR/ProtectionOne)definedthetermdifferently—soastorequireanacttaken
withactualknowledgethattheactwouldcauseabreachofthemergeragreementbutwithoutanyrequirement
thattheacthavebeentakenwiththeintenttocauseabreach.Theformulationusedinthelatter2dealsisgenerally
consistentwithDelawareChanceryCourtViceChancellorLamb’sdefinitionofa“knowingandintentionalbreach”
inHexion Specialty Chemicals v. Huntsman Corp.,C.A.No.3841(Del.Ch.Sept.29,2008),whereheheldthata
“knowingandintentional”breachmeans“thetakingofadeliberateact,whichactconstitutesinandofitselfa
breachofthemergeragreement,evenifbreachingwasnottheconsciousobjectoftheact.”Wenotethatthe
“knowingandintentional”formulationinHexionandinthelatter2deals(Cerberus/DynCorpandGTCR/Protection
One)istarget-friendlyinthatitavoidsanyneedtoestablishthatabuyeractedwiththeintentofbreachingthe
mergeragreement,whichmaybeverydifficulttoprove.
10
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 13
WithrespecttothesizeoftheRTFs:
•
Fortransactionswithsingle-tierRTFs—therangewas5.28%to9.43%oftargetequity
value(mean:6.74%;median6.36%).
•
Fortransactionswithtwo-tierRTFs:
o
Therangeforthefirsttierwas2.23%to15.16%ofequityvalue(mean:5.73%;
median3.23%).
o
Therangeforthehighertierwas4.46%to37.89%(mean:12.40%;median
7.27%).Withrespecttotheseparatetriggereventsforthehigher-tierRTF,the
rangeswereasfollows:
 Intheeventofwillfulbreach—5.51%to37.89%(mean:17.83%;median
8.30%)
 Intheeventoffinancingfailure—4.46%to7.27%(mean:5.44%;median
4.58%)
o
Asdiscussedabove,intheMadisonDearborn/BWAYtransactionthelower-tier
RTF,whichappliedintheeventthebuyerterminatedduetotarget’sfailureto
maintainaspecifiedratioofdebttoEBIDTAatclosing,was1.12%whereasthe
higher-tiergeneralRTFwas6.15%.
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 14
11. Select Buyer Closing Conditions
Wereviewedthe25transactionstoseewhether,withrespecttothebuyer’sclosing
conditions,theyincluded(i)astand-alonenomaterialadverseeffect(“MAE”)closing
condition(ascomparedtojustrelyingonthenoMAErepresentationandtherelatedaccuracy
ofrepresentationsclosingcondition(whichmaybelessbuyer-friendlybecauseittakes
intoaccountdisclosuresmadeagainstthenoMAErepresentationinthetarget’sdisclosure
schedules)),(ii)afinancingclosingconditionand/or(iii)afinancialmetricclosingcondition.
Asnotedinthefollowingchart:
•
17ofthe25transactions(68%)includedastand-alonenoMAEclosingcondition.
o
Ofthose17transactions,15ofthem(88%ofthissubset)providedcomfortasto
theabsenceofanMAEsincetheapplicablesigningdate;theremaining2(12%
ofthissubset)providedcomfortastotheabsenceofaMAEsincethetarget’s
mostrecentauditdate.
•
3ofthe25transactions(12%)includedafinancingcondition;eachofthe3
transactionswasstructuredasatwo-steptenderoffer/back-endmerger.
•
2ofthe25transactions(8%)includedaclosingconditionrequiringthetargettohave
aspecificratioofconsolidateddebttoEBITDA.
•
Noneofthe25transactionsincludedaclosingcondition regardingtheexerciseof
appraisalrightsbythetarget’sstockholders.
“No MAE” Closing Conditions
Included a Stand-Alone
“No MAE” Condition
68%
Did Not Include
a Stand-Alone
“No MAE”
Condition
32%
“Since Most
Recent Audit Date”
Formulation: 12%
“Since Signing Date”
Formulation: 88%
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 15
12. Marketing Periods
Wereviewedthe25transactionstodeterminewhichofthemhada“marketingperiod”
provision(i.e.,aprovisionnecessitatedbyprovisionsinthebuyer’sdebtcommitmentpapers
thatprovidesthatthebuyerisnotrequiredtoconsummatetheclosingunlessithasreceived
certainspecifiedfinancialinformationconcerningthetargetandaspecifiedtimeperiodhas
expiredsincethereceiptofsuchinformation).Asnotedinthefollowingchart:
•
22ofthe25transactions(88%)hadmarketingperiodprovisions.
•
Ofthe22transactions,17ofthem(77%)hadamarketingperiodofapproximatelyone
month.
•
Theaveragelengthofamarketingperiodwas30calendardays,withamedianof28
days.11
Marketing Periods
70%
60%
% of Transactions
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
0-20
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61+
Length of Marketing Period in Calendar Days
Wherethemarketingperiodwasexpressedinbusinessdays,weconvertedtheperiodtocalendardaysfor
comparison purposes. See Chart B-3 in Appendix B for more information.
11
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 16
Becausethesizeofthetransactioncanimpactthetypeofdebtfinancinginvolved(e.g.,larger
transactionsoftenincludeahigh-yielddebttranchethatcanrequiremoretimetocomplete),
wecomparedthemarketingperiodprovisionsinthe22transactionsbasedonthedealsize:
Deal Size
(Equity Value)
Average Length
Median Length
Upto$1Billion
(10of22Transactions)
33.6CalendarDays
29.5CalendarDays
$1Billionto$3Billion
(7of22Transactions)
26.1CalendarDays
28CalendarDays
$3Billionto$4Billion
(5of22Transactions)
27.6CalendarDays
28CalendarDays
Contrarytoexpectations,theaveragelengthofthemarketingperiodwasshorterforlarger
transactions.
Wealsoreviewedthe22transactionstodeterminewhenthemarketingperiodcouldbegin:
•
•
21ofthe22transactions(95%ofthissubset)conditionedthebeginningofthe
marketingperiodonthebuyer’sreceiptoffinancialinformationpursuanttothe
target’scooperationwiththefinancingcovenant.
o
12ofthe21transactions(57%ofthissubset)conditionedthebeginningofthe
marketingperiodonthesatisfactionofclosingconditions(otherthanthose
conditionsthatbytheirnaturecanonlybesatisfiedatclosing).12
o
5ofthe21transactions(24%ofthissubset)providedthatthemarketingperiod
couldbeginnoearlierthanthemailingoftheproxy.
o
2ofthe21transactions(10%ofthissubset)providedthatthemarketingperiod
couldbeginasearlyassigning.
o
2ofthe21transactions(10%ofthissubset)werestructuredastwo-steptender
offerswherethemarketingperiodbeganonadatecertainbutwassubjectto
thesatisfactionoftheofferconditions.
1ofthe22transactions(5%ofthissubset)conditionedthebeginningofthemarketing
periodonreceiptoftargetstockholderapproval.
Oneofthetransactionsincludedinthissubsetalsoprovidedthatthemarketingperiodcouldnotbeginuntilthe
endofthego-shopperiod.
12
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 17
OtherSelectedDealPoints
13. Additional Points of Interest
Inconnectionwithourreview,weidentifiedthefollowingadditionalpointsofinterest:
•
24ofthe25transactions(96%)required“reasonablebestefforts,”while1ofthe25
transactions(4%)required“commerciallyreasonableefforts.”
•
9ofthe25transactions(36%)alsocontaineda“hellorhighwater”provision
obligatingthebuyertotakeanyactionsnecessarytoobtainantitrustapproval.In
general,suchaprovisionrequiresabuyertodivestassetsofthetargetand/orofthe
buyeranditsaffiliatestosatisfyantitrustconcerns.
•
Theaverage“look-back”periodfortarget’srepresentationsandwarrantieswas
approximately21.5months.Themedianwas24monthspriortothebeginningofthe
target’smostrecentfiscalyear.Therangewas1to3years.
•
19ofthe25transactions(76%)hada“noundisclosedliability”representationlimited
toGAAPliabilities(i.e.,liabilitiesthatmeettheFAS5standardasperGAAP,which
wouldnotincludeallcontingentliabilities).
•
20ofthe25transactions(80%)qualifiedthetarget’srepresentationsbydisclosurein
theexhibitstothetarget’sSECfilings.
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 18
AppendixA–SurveyedTransactions
Target
Sponsor
Date
Enterprise
Value
Equity Value
RCN Corporation
ABRYPartnersVI,L.P.
March5,2010
$1.2Billion
$561Million
infoGROUP, Inc.
CCMPCapitalAdvisors,LLC
March8,2010
$635Million
$463Million
BWAY Holding Company
MadisonDearbornPartners,LLC
March28,2010
$915Million
$447Million
DynCorp International Inc.
CerberusSeriesFourHoldings,LLC
April11,2010
$1.5Billion
$1.0Billion
CKE Restaurants, Inc.
ApolloManagementVII,L.P.
April18,2010
$1.0Billion
$694Million
Protection One, Inc.
GTCRFundIX/A,L.P.
April26,2010
$828Million
$396Million
Interactive Data Corporation
SilverLakePartnersIII,L.P.,Warburg
PincusPrivateEquityX,L.P.and
WarburgPincusXPartners,L.P.
May3,2010
$3.4Billion
$3.2Billion
inVentiv Health, Inc.
ThomasH.LeeEquityFundVI,L.P.
May6,2010
$1.1Billion
$911Million
SonicWALL, Inc.
ThomaBravoFundIX,L.P.and
OntarioTeachers’PensionPlan
Board
June2,2010
$717Million
$637Million
NBTY, Inc.
CarlylePartnersV,L.P.
July15,2010
$3.8Billion
$3.5Billion
Burger King Holdings, Inc.
3GSpecialSituationsFundIIL.P.
Sept.2,2010
$4.0Billion
$3.3Billion
Internet Brands, Inc.
Hellman&FriedmanCapital
PartnersVI,L.P.
Sept.17,2010
$640Million
$625Million
The Gymboree Corporation
BainCapitalFundX,L.P.
Oct.11,2010
$1.8Billion
$1.8Billion
American Commercial Lines
Inc.
PlatinumEquityCapitalPartnersII,
L.P.
Oct.18,2010
$777Million
$436Million
CommScope, Inc.
CarlylePartnersV,L.P.
Oct.26,2010
$3.9Billion
$3.1Billion
Syniverse Holdings, Inc.
CarlylePartnersV,L.P.
Oct.28,2010
$2.6Billion
$2.2Billion
J. Crew Group, Inc.
TPGPartnersVI,L.P.,GreenEquity
InvestorsV,L.P.andGreenEquity
InvestorsSideV,L.P.
Nov.23,2010
$3.0Billion
$2.8Billion
CPI International, Inc.
TheVeritasCapitalFundIV,L.P.
Nov.24,2010
$525Million
$331Million
Del Monte Foods Company
KKR2006FundL.P.,VestarCapital
PartnersV,L.P.,CenterviewCapital,
L.P.andCenterviewEmployees,L.P.
Nov.24,2010
$5.3Billion
$3.8Billion
Jo-Ann Stores, Inc.
GreenEquityInvestorsV,L.P.and
GreenEquityInvestorsSideV,L.P.
Dec.23,2010
$1.6Billion
$1.6Billion
Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc.
MidOceanPartnersIII,L.P.,
MidOceanPartnersIII-A,L.P.,and
MidOceanPartnersIII-D,L.P.
Jan.30,2011
$650Million
$649Million
Emergency Medical Services
Corporation
Clayton,Dubilier&RiceFundVIII,
L.P.
Feb.13,2011
$3.2Billion
$2.8Billion
SRA International, Inc.
ProvidenceEquityPartnersVI,LP
andProvidenceEquityPartnersVIA,LP
March31,2011
$1.88Billion
$1.82Billion
Epicor Software Corporation
ApaxUSVII,L.P.,ApaxEurope
VII-A,L.P.,ApaxEuropeVII-B,L.P.
andApaxEuropeVII-1,L.P.
April4,2011
$976Million
$802Million
CKx, Inc.
ApolloGlobalManagement
May10,2011
$560Million
$509Million
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 19
Appendix B – Additional Charts and Graphs
Chart B-1 | Duration of Match and “Last Look” Right
8
Match
7
“Last Look”
Calendar Days
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
N
RC
AY
up
Gro
info
BW
rp
E
nCo
Dy
CK
ne
t. O
tec
Pro
all
ata
iv
ent
icW
inV
Son
r. D
Inte
TY
NB
ger
Bur
.
e
pe
Lin
nds
ore
rse
Sco
m.
ive
mb
mm
. Co
Gy
Syn
Co
Am
g
Kin
rew
Bra
Int.
I
CP
J. C
e
n
An
ont
lM
De
Jo-
id
-Pa
Pre
SC
EM
A
SR
or
x
CK
Epic
Chart B-2 | Parent Expense Caps
1.40%
% of Equity Value
1.20%
1.00%
0.80%
Mean = 0.72%
0.60%
0.40%
0.20%
0.00%
N
RC
up
Gro
info
AY
BW
rp
E
nCo
Dy
CK
iv
ent
inV
w
g
e
ds
all
Kin
ore J. Cre
ran
mb
ger
tB
Gy
Ne
Bur
I
CP
icW
Son
e
ont
lM
De
l
n
An
ega
Joid L
-Pa
Pre
or
Epic
x
CK
Chart B-3 | Length of Marketing Period
Length in Calendar Days
70
60
50
40
Mean = 30 Calendar Days
30
20
10
0
N
RC
up
Gro
info
AY
BW
rp
nCo
Dy
E
CK
ata
r. D
Inte
iv
ent
inV
all
icW
Son
TY
NB
ger
Bur
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
.
e
e
rse
rew
. Lin
ore
cop
ive
J. C
mb
mm mmS
Syn
Co
o
.
C
Am
g
Kin
Gy
I
CP
e
ont
lM
De
n
An
Jo-
id
-Pa
Pre
SC
EM
A
SR
or
Epic
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 20
AppendixC–Break-UpFeesandReverseTermination
Fees(RTF)13
$10.0
$17.5
$15.8
$5.0
$12.5
$30.0
Break-Up Fee as
% of Equity Value
1.78%
3.12%
3.42%
1.12%
2.79%
2.99%
CKE
$15.5
2.23%
Protection One
$8.0
2.02%
$120.0
$27.5
$25.0
$53.6
$98.2
$50.0
$95.0
$23.0
$30.0
$50.0
$12.0
$14.0
$43.3
$103.9
$60.0
3.70%
3.02%
3.93%
1.54%
2.82%
1.51%
2.87%
3.68%
1.68%
2.79%
2.75%
3.21%
1.42%
3.40%
2.76%
$20.0
$13.0
$15.0
$60.0
$120.0
$20.0
$44.9
$21.5
$116.5
$28.2
$47.0
$15.0
$40.0
$20.0
0.72%
3.92%
4.53%
1.57%
3.14%
1.25%
2.80%
3.31%
4.11%
1.55%
2.58%
1.87%
4.99%
3.93%
Deal
RCN
infoGROUP
BWAY
DynCorp
Interactive Data
inVentiv
SonicWall
NBTY
Burger King
Net Brands
Gymboree
ACL
CommScope
Syniverse
J. Crew
CPI
Del Monte
Jo-Ann
Pre-Paid Legal
EMS
SRA
Epicor
CKx
Break-Up Fee
$30.0
RTF as % of
Equity Value
5.34%
$25.4
$5.0
$27.5
$100.0
$300.0
$15.5
$30.9
$60.0
$150.0
$225.0
$55.0
$60.0
$214.2
5.47%
1.12%
6.15%
9.98%
29.94%
2.23%
4.46%
15.16%
37.89%
6.93%
6.04%
9.43%
6.14%
$175.0
5.28%
$38.0
$50.0
$130.0
$16.0
$20.0
$233.8
6.08%
2.79%
7.27%
3.67%
4.58%
7.66%
$60.0
$120.0
$200.0
$22.5
$27.5
$249.0
2.76%
5.51%
7.19%
6.79%
8.30%
6.52%
$90.0
5.60%
$50.0
$203.9
$112.9
7.70%
7.19%
6.20%
$20.0
$60.0
$40.0
2.49%
7.48%
7.85%
RTF
Alldollaramountsinmillions.Fortwo-tieredfees,thefirstnumberisthelowertierandnumberbelowisthehigher
tier.
13
2011 Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Study | Summer
© 2011 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. All rights reserved. | 21
SchulteRoth&ZabelM&AGroup
SchulteRoth&Zabel’sM&AGrouprepresentsprivateinvestmentfunds,portfolio
companiesandpublicly-tradedcompaniesinpublicandprivateM&Atransactions,
includingleveragedbuyouts,“goingprivate”transactions,tenderoffersandproxy
contests,cross-bordertransactionsandleveragedrecapitalizations.
Thefirmwasrankedbymergermarketamongthetop20legaladviserstoU.S.
buyoutsbyvolumein2010andforthefirsthalfof2011andwasalsorecognizedfor
havingworkedononeof The Deal’sPrivateEquityDealsoftheYearin2010.SRZ
representedthebuyerinoneof Investment Dealers’ Digest’s2010DealsoftheYear
andactedascompanycounselto Marine Money’s2010DealoftheYear.
Foundedin1969,SchulteRoth&Zabelisamultidisciplinaryfirmwithofficesin
NewYork,Washington,D.C.,andLondon.Thefirmiswidelyregardedasoneofthe
premierlegaladviserstoprivateinvestmentfunds.
Acknowledgements
AteamofSchulteRoth&Zabellawyerscontributedtothiseffort.Theprincipal
authorswerepartnersJohnM.PollackandDavidE.Rosewater,specialcounsels
ChristopherS.HarrisonandNeilC.RifkindandassociatesSeanP.D.Berry,C.Walker
Brierre,AudraM.Dowless,EthanP.LutskeandKristenP.Poole.Invaluableassistance
wasprovidedbysummerassociateArianaZikopoulos.
John M. Pollack
+1212.756.2372
john.pollack@srz.com
David E. Rosewater
+1212.756.2208
david.rosewater@srz.com
M&A Group Partners
Stuart D. Freedman
+1212.756.2407
stuart.freedman@srz.com
Michael R. Littenberg
+1212.756.2524
michael.littenberg@srz.com
David E. Rosewater
+1212.756.2208
david.rosewater@srz.com
Robert Goldstein
+1212.756.2519
robert.goldstein@srz.com
Robert B. Loper
+1212.756.2138
robert.loper@srz.com
Paul N. Roth
+1212.756.2450
paul.roth@srz.com
Peter J. Halasz
+1212.756.2238
peter.halasz@srz.com
John M. Pollack
+1212.756.2372
john.pollack@srz.com
Marc Weingarten
+1212.756.2280
marc.weingarten@srz.com
Eleazer Klein
+1212.756.2376
eleazer.klein@srz.com
Richard A. Presutti
+1212.756.2063
richard.presutti@srz.com
André Weiss +1212.756.2431
andre.weiss@srz.com
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Illustration © 2011 Adam Niklewicz