On the youth’s basic education (for interfaith/religious dialogues)
Dante Luis P. Leoncini
Some among the youth portray an attitude of indifference and show no interest at all
regarding God, religion, and their stories. They are comfortable without obligation or
involvement with anything “religious.” In short, there are some among the youth possessing
an extremely passive behavior on matters about belief or faith; but, passionate with their
conviction. Few among them are different. They manifest profound knowledge regarding
their respective religious claims and inclinations; and, exhibit an aura of extreme certainty
and confidence when actively involved in debates or discourse regarding such matters. They
exhibit an extremely passionate behavior on matters doing with belief or faith. Many among
them, however, portray characteristics of the two previous types. They are “active” for they
get involved and participate in religious rituals every now and then. On the other hand, they
are passive for they show no interest in discussions on matters of belief. So, where do we
think we fit? Where do we want to fit ourselves in? Are these the only options we can choose
from? Most important, can these types interact in a healthy way, understand, and extend
sympathy by accommodating the beliefs or stands and stories of others without necessarily
changing theirs? Certainly, there are cases when that is possible; but, there are many more
when it is not. This paper presents an optimistic view—that healthy interaction, sympathy,
and understanding can be actualized among the youth belonging to different categories on
matters of belief. It advocates and reinforces an alternative education encouraging the
development of both intellectual and moral values.
The problem(s)
We are discouraged and reminded not to get involved in discussions about
religion or matters of belief to evade nasty arguments. We think otherwise. There are no
nasty arguments without dialogues but silence does not always solve problems. Interfaith
dialogues—whenever the occasion arises—must be welcomed and pursued to open new
avenues for learning, understanding, and practicing values worthwhile possessing.
Ideally, these dialogues do not exclude those who are not gifted with faith. But before
opening these avenues, some clarifications need to be verbalized.
Our unconventional way of thinking is coupled with assumptions: People
discouraging and reminding others not to get involved in matters of belief is symptomatic
of incapacity to practice impartiality, objectivity, and open-mindedness. Thus, this
incapacity is a clear indicator and reflection of the educational system’s shortcoming in
terms of producing students who are congenial, impartial, objective, open-minded,
sympathetic, and understanding.
The problem is the lack of an impartial, objective, and open-minded attitude. That
entails the tendency of attaching extreme confidence and certainty in beliefs or
inclinations. Though it is true that complete impartiality and rationality are both
impossible, it is possible for us to be as impartial and rational as much as we can if we are
made aware and given the proper foundations for doing so. Russell’s (Hare 2007)
insistence on the importance of reasons or evidences “does not lead Russell to presuppose
the existence of an infallible faculty of rationality. Complete rationality…is an
unattainable ideal; rationality is a matter of degree.” What follows are instances reflecting
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education’s shortcoming not only in the case of the youth but of adults too: Some, for
example, insist on pursuing arguments despite knowing they are wrong. Others tune out,
not to listen to or respect another’s opinion, but to figure a good counter argument to
discredit the “defender of a distasteful perspective. Both examples betray what Zachary
Seech (1993) calls the “win, don’t lose—whatever the cost attitude.” 1 As a result of this
attitude, speakers take a combative stance in conversation—that is, discourse dominated
by military metaphors.2
If the “conversants” are not aware of the appropriate ways of doing dialogue, then
they fail to make themselves examples of how it should be to get involved with an issue.
Moore and Parker (2002: 6) say, the term “issue” is used “to identify the focus of a
debate, discussion, or dispute. In the broadest sense, an issue is any matter of controversy
or uncertainty; it may be in dispute, in doubt, or simply ‘up for review.’” Issues are
different from topics of conversations. An issue can be identified through the word
“whether.”
Most of us are either unaware or forget the real purpose of getting into an
argument. An argument is “a piece of reasoning articulated in words or symbols” (Ceniza
1994:2). The purpose of an argument is to resolve an issue. In this sense it is a tool, along
with others, such as, observation and consultation with reliable sources (Moore and
Parker 2002: 10). Because it serves that purpose, one’s aim in getting into arguments is
not to make one appear better than others but to help and learn from each other.3
Arguments are commonly—as we know them (since other arguments can be symbolized
using statement forms)—made up of claims and claims consist of terms. A claim is “a
proposition or statement that is either true or false but we do not necessarily have to know
whether it is true or not Claims always have truth values—the truth value of a true claim
is true and that of a false one is false [Cf. Moore and Parker (2002: 3) and Ceniza (1994:
65)].
Generally, we know how to reason out well and the conclusions we draw are
correct. There are moments, however, when we cannot be rational at all! One reason for
this is making up our minds prematurely—that is, committing ourselves emotionally to a
conclusion or prejudging another. Commonly, we talk about these as bias (or, “bias for”)
and prejudice (or, “prejudice against”), respectively. Biases are formed because of at least
three reasons: forming an opinion too soon; forming an opinion that is contradicted by
evidence; and, forming a well-reasoned opinion. The last reason shows that not all biases
are unreasonable or considered wrong.4 Prejudices, on the other hand, are formed as a
result of first impressions, premature judgments, and false suppositions. Both biases and
prejudices also lead one to being defensive. Seech (1993: 7) says, “When someone says
you have been defensive on an issue, we might think that you have been evasive and
unwilling to talk about the issue at length. However, this is not the only way to show
defensiveness. Actually, your frame of mind is a defensive one whenever you concentrate
more on defending one view than on openly evaluating a new view. You may, in fact,
appear to be quite on the offense, to the point of being offensive and overbearing.”
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The presence of biases and prejudices create “logical points of vulnerability.”
These are topics about which a person cannot be rational, cannot be objective, think
clearly, consider evidence impartially, and draw a sensible, justified conclusion. It is
worth reflecting and identifying one’s logical points of vulnerability so we will not
appear as “unjustifiably self-righteous” and “prevent [us] from managing to believe that
some nonsensical reasoning makes sense. Such arrogance and irrationality serve only to
put a person in a foolish position.”5 Given these examples and observations, how can we
make conditions better for interfaith dialogues and what can we do to make students
better conversants for the sake of all dialogues?
The solution
The solution is an education giving unquestioned importance to critical thinking
as a means to achieve the necessary attitudes and skills so that interfaith/religious
dialogues shall be perceived as a pleasant activity everyone can look forward to. This
entails a bold habit of continuously verbalizing to the youth (also, the youth formerly)
about details for achieving the ideals and appropriate manners for “dialoguing.” That
means, bringing these ideals and manners to their awareness or consciousness whenever
we observe that these are not so. Although this educational framework is itself an ideal,
there is no reason why it should not be conceived as a possibility that can be actualized
ultimately. As it is said, “Dreams come for free!”
The solution entails producing individuals of a certain type. Schools will have to
find means and ways to address their shortcoming based on the problems observed. The
goal of the educational system will have to be geared towards the development and
production of individuals who are well-versed with certain habits or skills of thought and
appropriate behavior. These students will serve as living examples to generations that are
to follow and their elders as well. What follows are some recommendations that can be
altered and refined as the development and production of these individuals proceed:
Schools can develop the habit in today’s youth to learn and practice these critical
thinking attitudes and skills so that congenial adults and pleasant relationships come easy
in the future. Starting early is of great help. As Protagoras, the great sophist, says:
“Teaching requires natural endowments and training; one should begin to learn when one
is young.”6 For example, we can show young children abstract paintings and irregularshaped objects that they can view from different angles and allow them to talk about and
appreciate their impressions for as long as they like. This exercise arouses their attention
and curiosity so they can be good listeners. This encourages them to ask questions or
enquire and speak their minds regarding the perceptions of others so they learn to make
distinctions. Also, this develops their imaginative and creative powers that come handy in
their adult life. This teaches them to be enterprising in searching for solutions and
develop their talent to imagine and picture the consequences of their courses of action
and decisions. Most importantly, while viewing these objects and paintings, they learn to
appreciate what others see that they do not. So they enjoy discussing each others’
viewpoints and learn that their way of seeing is only one way among others. As a result,
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they learn not to insist that what they see is the one correct way of seeing. Thus, they
learn early that their wishes and desires do not characterize what the world is.
As they mature, these lessons and exercises are intellectualized by giving them
further lessons and readings on critical thinking and a lot of examples. Let us teach them
about claims, issues, arguments, and rules of inference, among others. Let them listen to
speeches to identify flaws in argumentation and ask them to reconstruct better arguments
if it is possible and identify the fallacies committed. Let them watch television
advertisements to identify the fallacies and inconsistencies of the presentation like
women, for example, sporting nail polish and well-tailored signature two-piece swimsuits
in a pre-historic setting! Let us ask them what they will do instead if they were to do the
same.
It is not very difficult to identify what strategy the educational system must adopt
for the youth’s basic education given the problem and the solution suggested. Very
clearly, the strategy is the inclusion of critical thinking as a required course for all
students. Though it is true that training the youth to think critically is necessary for the
possibility of pleasant interfaith dialogues, it is not necessarily limited to that end alone.
The benefits of critical thinking extend from the level of individuals (i.e., congenial,
impartial, objective, sympathetic, understanding, and open-minded) to that of society
(i.e., peaceful co-existence, pleasant relationships, and a community in the true sense of
the word). Its benefits apply to instances when individuals spend their time reflecting on
their own to their respective relationships being cultivated and nurtured outside the home
and classroom.
On critical thinking
So what is critical thinking? Common phrases attached to critical thinking in
readings (e.g., Bertrand Russell, Moore and Parker, Zachary Seech, Peter Facione)—
either explicitly or implicitly—are “the ability to think for oneself” and “the ability to
listen well.” This ability compliments the former since listening well is one way for one
to be well-informed; and, thinking for oneself requires being well-informed. Another one
is “the ability to be reasonable.” This ability is coupled with familiar attitudes, such as,
that of being impartial, objective, open-minded, understanding, and sympathetic.
Strictly speaking, these abilities are not accurate definitions of critical thinking
but these sure give us an idea of what critical thinking is all about. In fact, if we were so
obsessed with categorizing then these abilities might as well be included under the
heading “On the critical thinker!” This is likewise true when we take a look at Bertrand
Russell’s7 view on “critical judgment.” Russell emphasizes the importance of judgment.
He proceeds to associate “critical judgment” with abilities of weighing evidences and
arguments, estimating truth, being critical about one’s attempt at criticism, and the
awareness that refutations are not final but means to further refinements. Russell does not
consider critical thinking as a negative enterprise but one that emphasizes on constructive
doubt. The criticism it aims at is not one that seeks to reject but one that considers
apparent knowledge based on its merits and retains whatever survives critical scrutiny.
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Russell emphasizes critical scrutiny as necessary to determine the degree of confidence
attached to beliefs or opinions. He points out that one of the most important—yet
neglected—features of education is learning how to reach true conclusions on the basis of
insufficient data.
Another view about critical thinking that reinforces Russell’s earlier view is a
relatively recent one from Moore and Parker (2002:4). This view is stated as:
Critical thinking is the careful, deliberate determination of whether we
should accept, reject, or suspend judgment about a claim—and of the
degree of confidence with which we accept or reject it. The ability to think
critically is vitally important; in fact, our lives depend on it. The way we
conduct our lives depends on what we believe to be true—on what claims
we accept. The more carefully we evaluate a claim and the more fully we
separate issues that are relevant to it from those that are not, the more
critical is our thinking…When we are confronted with a claim, usually we
already have a certain amount of information relevant to the topic, and we
can generally figure out where to find more if we need it. Having both the
desire and ability to bring such information to bear on our decisions is part
of the critical thinking process. Critical thinking involves a lot of skills,
including the abilities to listen and read carefully, to evaluate arguments,
to look for and find hidden assumptions, and to trace the consequences of
a claim. If you are beginning to sense that there is no simple way of
deciding when to accept a claim, you are on the right track. We could say,
of course, that we should accept a claim only when we have good reason
for doing so.
The importance of critical thinking and the critical thinker
What is true of the close relation between notions of critical thinking and the
critical thinker is likewise true in the case of critical thinking’s importance and the critical
thinker. Notions on the importance of critical thinking necessarily translate to notions
about the critical thinker or the youth hoped for the future. That means, whatever is said
about critical thinking’s importance applies to the critical thinker when restated. Thus,
combining these matters under one section serves our convenience.
Very few writers have noticed the impact and importance of Russell’s views8 on
critical thinking relating to certain issues. Hare (2007) informs us that Russell’s
humanistic conception of education is one that views the student as an independent
person whose development is threatened by indoctrination, concerned with protecting the
child’s freedom to exercise individual judgment on intellectual and moral questions, and
claims that schooling all too often encourages the herd mentality, with its fanaticism and
bigotry, failing to develop what Russell calls a “critical habit of mind.”9
Hare states good reasons why critical thinking is necessary today. These are: (1)
The threat of indoctrination; (2) The importance of individual judgment; and, (3) The
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prevalence of fanatical opinions. Given those, Russell’s views on critical thinking help
everyone understand why this thinking type is important for the youth’s education.
Russell, in fact, insinuates that critical thinking is close to what we know of as virtue—
literally, “excellence.”
Russell conceives critical thinking as a virtue encompassing both intellectual and
moral aspects. More important—for our purpose—is his view that this virtue (critical
thinking) can be taught. Russell speaks of virtue in terms of education’s purpose—that is,
to prepare the youth to form reasonable judgments on controversial issues they are likely
to consider in the future. In other words, the educational system should have foresight or
be able “to see what is not yet” for the sake of improving the state of affairs of a world
characterized by diversity. Hare (2007) explains:
Russell’s conception of critical thinking involves reference to a wide range
of skills, dispositions and attitudes which together characterize a virtue
which has both intellectual and moral aspects, and which serves to prevent
the emergence of numerous vices, including dogmatism and prejudice.
Believing that one central purpose of education is to prepare students to be
able to form “a reasonable judgment on controversial questions in regard
to which they are likely to have to act.” Russell maintains that in addition
to having “access to impartial supplies of knowledge,” education needs to
offer “training in judicial habits of thought.” Beyond access to such
knowledge, students need to develop certain skills if the knowledge
acquired is not to produce individuals who passively accept the teacher’s
wisdom or the creed which is dominant in their own society. Sometimes,
Russell simply uses the notion of intelligence, by contrast with
information alone, to indicate the whole set of critical abilities he has in
mind.
In “Critical Thinking: What it is and why it counts” Peter Facione (1998)
mentions six of these mental skills he calls the “core critical thinking skills.” These are:
analysis, interpretation, evaluation, inference, explanation, and self-regulation. In the case
of Russell, Hare (2007) states what critical skills include or refer to: “Such critical skills,
grounded in knowledge, include the ability to form an opinion for oneself,10 the ability to
find an impartial solution,11 and the ability to identify and question assumptions.12 The
development of these abilities or skills calls for one’s disposition, meaning, these skills
need to be practiced. Practicing these result to their conversion into actual behavior. This
is no different from the point that Moore and Parker make. They (2002: 1-2) say:
One of the advantages of living in a free society is the opportunity to think
for oneself. But having the opportunity to do is one thing, and having the
ability to do is quite another. Thinking—especially clear, reasoned
thinking—is not easy work, and it doesn’t always come naturally…[By
constantly trying to think critically we] develop some of the skills required
to form intelligent opinions, make good decisions, and determine the best
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courses of action—as well as recognize when someone else’s reasoning is
faulty or manipulative.
Russell foresees the point that clear reasoned thinking is not easy and does not come
naturally, so he includes education in the picture as the means of instruction that aids in
the formation of these skills that will eventually become mental habits. The mental habits
Russell (Hare 2007) mentions are stated in the following manner:
The mere possession of critical skills is insufficient to make one a critical
thinker. Russell calls attention to various dispositions which mean that the
relevant skills are actually exercised. Typically, he uses the notion of habit
(sometimes the notion of practice) to suggest the translation of skills into
actual behavior. Russell describes education as the formation, by means of
instruction, of certain mental habits [and a certain outlook on life and the
world]. He mentions in particular the habit of impartial inquiry, which is
necessary if one-sided opinions are not to be taken at face value, and if
people are to arrive at conclusions which do not depend solely on the time
and place of their education; the habit of weighing evidence, coupled with
the practice of not giving full assent to propositions which there is no
reason to believe true; the habit of attempting to see things truly, which
contrasts with the practice of merely collecting whatever reinforces
existing prejudice; and the habit of living from one’s own centre which
Russell describes as a kind of self-direction, a certain independence in the
will. Such habits, of course, have to be exercised intelligently. Russell
recognizes clearly, indeed it is a large part of the problem which critical
thinking must address, that one becomes a victim of habit if the habitual
beliefs of one’s own age constitute a prison of prejudice. Hence the need
for a critical habit of mind.
Russell’s view complements another one from Protagoras that states, “skill [is]
nothing without practice, and practice nothing without skill.” 13Mental habits are
developed by consistently exercising the corresponding skills. It is actually difficult to
make distinctions between mental and intellectual habits if we were to depend on the way
they are called. If we, however, examine the concepts attached to them, respectively, we
notice that mental habits are close to the notions of abilities and skills. The difference
between habits and abilities or skills is the fact that one’s capability or talent for doing
precedes the ease of doing consistently. The habit of impartial inquiry, for example, is
preceded by the ability or skill to make an impartial inquiry.
Mental habits are not the same as intellectual habits but are related. Intellectual
habits suggest flexibility and truthfulness. Intellectual habits are closer to our concept of
attitude or character. It takes character or willingness, for example, to be ready to act or
react in a particular way; and, acting or reacting presupposes the awareness that the habits
in question are appropriate coupled with a commitment to their realization. Russell (Hare
2007) says:
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Because they are not simply automatic responses in which one has been
drilled, such intellectual habits in effect reflect a person’s willingness,
what Russell typically calls one’s readiness, to act and respond in various
ways. His examples include: a readiness to admit new evidence against
previous beliefs, which involves an open-minded acceptance (avoiding
credulity) of whatever a critical examination has revealed; a readiness to
discard hypotheses which have proved inadequate, where the test is
whether or not one is prepared in fact to abandon beliefs which once
seemed promising; and a readiness to adapt oneself to the facts of the
world, which Russell distinguishes from merely going along with
whatever happens to be in the ascendant, which might be evil. To be ready
to act, or react, in these ways suggests both an awareness that the habits in
question are appropriate and a principled commitment to their exercise.
They have in common the virtue Russell called truthfulness, which entails
the wish to find out, and trying to be right in matters of belief.
What about “critical attitudes,” what are they? The problem we encounter is different
authors have their own way of expressing their thoughts. What is important is we
remember that whatever category all these habits and attitudes belong to, all these will
ultimately refer to the characteristics and qualities that make one a critical thinker! Peter
Facione14 (1998) enumerates seven of what he considers and calls “critical attitudes.”
These are: being inquisitive, systematic, analytical, open-minded, judicious, truthseeking, and confident in reasoning. Critical attitude, for Russell on the other hand, refers
to the outlook of a critical person. The critical attitude, for Russell, implies realizations
that a critical thinker has come to terms with. Attitude, as the terms suggests, is reflected
in a person’s behavior. He includes among the attitudes he mentions an outlook that is
midway between skepticism and dogmatism. He calls that “critical undogmatic
receptiveness.” Hare (2007) says,
In Russell’s conception, beyond the skills and dispositions outlined above,
a certain set of attitudes characterizes the outlook of a critical person. By
the critical attitude, Russell means a temper of mind central to which is a
certain stance with respect to knowledge and opinion which involves: a
realization of human fallibility, a sense of the uncertainty of many things
commonly regarded as indubitable, bringing with it humility; an openminded outlook with respect to our beliefs, an “inward readiness” to give
weight to the other side, where every question is regarded as open and
where it is recognized that what passes for knowledge is sure to require
correction; a refusal to think that our own desires and wishes provide a
key to understanding the world, recognizing that what we should like has
no bearing whatever on what is; being tentative, without warranted by the
evidence. Russell defends an outlook midway between complete
skepticism and complete dogmatism in which one has a strong desire to
know combined with great caution in believing that one knows. Hence his
notion of critical undogmatic receptiveness which rejects certainty (the
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demand for which Russell calls an intellectual vice and ensures that openmindedness does not become mindless.
Hare adds too that the critical outlook, for Russell, reflects an epistemological and ethical
perspective which emphasizes: how beliefs are held (i.e. not dogmatically); the
doubtfulness of all beliefs; the belief that knowledge is difficult but not impossible;
freedom of opinion; truthfulness; and tolerance.
Conclusion
The critical thinker is, therefore, the product of the educational system that we
envision. Aside from everything written and said, the critical thinker is one who has one’s
own mind and is reasonable. S/he is not easily swayed by the opinions and persuasions of
others but very well understands, sympathizes if necessary, what others exactly want to
say. S/he is ready to welcome and respects the views of others even if these do not
conform one’s own. A good example is the case of the mother who cannot or refuses to
accept that her child committed a crime. The critical thinker, in this case, needs to be
considerate and sympathetic to the mother and understands why she holds such a view
without necessarily agreeing with her. This is close to Russell’s concept of “hypothetical
sympathy” or the capability of “knowing” or “feeling” how it is to think the way “the
other” does. This is close to our concept of empathy.
We observe, however, that the “the ability to make distinctions” is never
mentioned as an important characteristic of a critical thinker. Making distinctions is one
important feature necessary for identifying and figuring out differences. Identifying and
figuring out differences, such as, appropriate from inappropriate, dangerous from safe,
fallacious from flawless, etc., complement the capability of being reasonable. This ability
or skill to make distinctions helps one determine the realm of discourse that one is
involved in. Is it in the realm of facts (or that of the “I know”); matters of fact a.k.a.
opinions and judgments (or that of the “I think”); or matters of pure opinion a.k.a. beliefs
(or that of the “I believe”)? It is interesting to note that without this ability to make
distinctions, one will not be able to determine the particular realm of the discourse that
one is involved in. If we speak of facts, then those are verifiable. If we speak of matters
of fact, then these can be contentious but there are standards and tools to settle those. This
is the realm of issues. If we speak of matters of pure opinion, then we are in the realm of
belief and we are telling stories that have to be taken with a few grains of salt.
Related to what we just pointed out are some proclamations made 2,500 years ago
or so. Heraclitus says, “The things I rate highly are those which are accessible to sight,
hearing, apprehension.”15 He also exhibits the optimism we hold when he says,
“Everyone has the potential for self-knowledge and sound thinking.”16 Empedocles, on
the other hand, says, “a judicious use of the senses combined with a proper use of
intelligence can teach one the truth about the world.”17 Lastly, critical thinkers make their
mission contagious so that others may learn about open-mindedness. They do this by
making themselves examples of people who are open-minded, they use language fairly—
language without emotional charge, they do not take arguments in a personal way.18
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So, is it not possible at all to appreciate each other’s stories without getting
belligerent if these stories do not fit well with each other? The youth—the critical
thinkers—of tomorrow all say: “Yes, that is possible.” Yes, we can do that!
END NOTES:
1
From the Preface of Zachary Seech, Open minds and everyday reasoning (California: Wadsworth, 1993)
p. vii. “Certainly you know what it’s like to argue for a view long past the point where you know you’re
wrong. You must also know what it’s like to tune out while someone is talking, as you grope for a counter
argument that will devastate this defender of a distasteful perspective. These things happen when we
become more interested in winning an argument than in learning something from the other person.”
2
Seech (1993: 4) says, “Winning and losing, victory and defeat, are concepts that we use in reference to
personal quests for achievement, in sports, and in military operations. The military metaphors are the ones
that dominate the way we talk about dispute on hot issues. We hear talk of attacking another’s position,
with the hope that the other person will have to retreat from that position…We even hear people say they
need to combat a certain dangerous view. People say they are going to aim at the view that an opponent has
presented…
3
See Moore and Parker, Critical thinking (Philippines: McGraw-Hill, 2002) p. 2. They state:
It is important at the outset that thinking critically is not about attacking people. [We are]
expected to critique others’ ideas and they will be asked to critique [ours]. Doing this, however,
doesn’t mean putting people down. Every single one of us makes mistakes, and it can be quite
useful to have others help us see them. We appreciate it when someone points out that we have a
low tire or we aren’t gripping the golf club properly. Likewise, we can appreciate it if someone
points out that our position, theory, or idea is incomplete or unclear, insufficiently supported, or
in some other way unconvincing. And when we’re on the other side, we can help others see the
holes in their arguments. We don’t do our friends a favor by pretending their ideas are wise or
profound when they are actually half-baked. So critical thinking is more about helping others
than attacking them, and to the extent we are able to think critically about our own ideas, it is
about helping ourselves. Our goal, remember, is knowledge and understanding, not ‘winning’ or
‘coming out on top’.
4
Seech (1993: 5-7).
5
This long passage is written taken from Seech (1993: 2-3).
Generally speaking, we are quite good at our task. We are good thinkers and the conclusions we
draw are correct…At times, however, we don’t reason as well as we should. This is often
because we’ve already made up our minds. When we start with an emotional commitment to one
conclusion, or a prejudice against another conclusion, the chances are good that we will have a
hard time being reasonably objective and thinking clearly.
[There] are topics about which [a] person, we say, just cannot be rational… This person has
great difficulty in being objective on these topics. He or she finds it difficult…to consider the
evidence impartially and draw a sensible, justified conclusion. These topics are the points of
logical vulnerability for that person. Points of logical vulnerability vary from one person to
another. …A psychological commitment to a certain belief or against another [one] keeps the
person from weighing fairly the evidence for each side of the question…
What are your points of logical vulnerability: It is worthwhile to reflect in order to identify them.
An awareness of your points of logical vulnerability can prevent you from becoming
unjustifiably self-righteous and can further prevent you from managing to believe that some
quite nonsensical reasoning makes sense. Such arrogance and irrationality serve only to put a
person in a foolish position.
Often, when you desperately want a particular belief to be true, then almost any reasoning
offered in support of that conclusion looks like good reasoning, and when you desperately want
a particular belief to be false, then the reasoning that appears perfect for your neighbor may
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seem obviously inadequate for you. Ironically, the very same kind of reasoning may appear good
to you in one context and bad in another. If you are aware of your points of logical vulnerability,
you will be more likely to notice when you are inclined to shortchange yourself logically.
6
Robin Waterfield, The first philosophers (The Presocratics and the sophists) (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), p. 219.
7
Cf. William Hare’s “Bertrand Russell on Critical Thinking” in
http://www.criticalthinking.org/articles/bertrand-russell.cfm. Hare (2007) states:
There are numerous insights in Russell’s account which should have a familiar ring to those
acquainted with the recent critical thinking literature. First, Russell’s language, especially his
emphasis on judgment, suggests the point that critical skills cannot be reduced to a mere formula
to be routinely applied. Critical judgment means that one has to weigh evidence and arguments,
approximate truth must be estimated, with the result that skill demands wisdom. Second, critical
thinking requires being critical about our own attempts at criticism. Russell observes, for
example, that refutations are rarely final; they are usually a prelude to further refinements. He
also notes, anticipating a recent objection that critical thinking texts restrict criticism to
“approved” topics, that punishment awaits those who wander into unconventional fields of
criticism. For Russell, critical thinking must include critical reflection on what passes for critical
thinking. Third, critical thinking is not essentially a negative enterprise, witness Russell’s
emphasis on constructive doubt, and his warning against practices which lead to children
becoming destructively critical. Russell maintains that the kind of criticism aimed at is not that
which seeks to reject, but that which considers apparent knowledge on its merits, retaining
whatever survives critical scrutiny.
There is pervasive emphasis in Russell’s writings…on the reasons and evidence which support
or undermine a particular belief. Critical scrutiny of these is needed to determine the degree of
confidence we should place in our beliefs. He emphasizes the need to teach the skill of
marshalling evidence if a critical habit of mind is to be fostered, and suggests that one of the
most important, yet neglected, aspects of education is learning how to reach true conclusions on
insufficient data. This emphasis on reasons, however, does not lead Russell to presuppose the
existence of an infallible faculty of rationality. Complete rationality, he observes, is an
unattainable ideal; rationality is a matter of degree.
8
This is one important reason why Hare’s (2007) work on Russell is worth sharing for this paper’s purpose.
He says:
The ideal of critical thinking is a central one in Russell’s philosophy, though this is not
yet generally recognized. Russell’s name seldom appears in the immense literature on
critical thinking which has emerged in philosophy of education over the past twenty
years. Few commentators have noticed the importance of Russell’s work in connection
with any theory of education which includes a critical component.
9
Hare cites Chander, Woodhouse, and Stander as examples of the few who recognize Russell’s
contributions to a philosophy of education that includes critical thinking as an important component.
10
Hare (2007) says, this “involves…being able to recognize what is intended to mislead, being capable of
listening to eloquence without being carried away, and becoming adept at asking and determining if there is
any reason to think that our beliefs are true.”
11
Hare (2007) says, this “involves learning to recognize and control our own biases, coming to view our
own beliefs with the same detachment with which we view the beliefs of others, judging issues on their
merits, trying to ascertain the relevant facts, and the power of weighing arguments.”
12
Hare (2007) says, this “involves learning not to be credulous, applying what Russell calls constructive
doubt in order to test unexamined beliefs, and resisting the notion that some authority, a great philosopher
perhaps, has captured the whole truth.”
13
Robin Waterfield, The first philosophers (The Presocratics and the sophists) (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), p. 219
14
Peter A. Facione, “Critical Thinking: What it is and Why it Counts” (online article, 1998 update)
15
Robin Waterfield, The first philosophers (The Presocratics and the sophists) (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), p. 40.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid., p.134.
110
18
Seech (1993: 12-20).
111