con
Center for
International
Conflict Resolution
“A Return to El Dorado”
The opportunities and risks presented
by foreign investment in Colombian gold mining
November 2012
Columbia University, New York, USA
Julien Barbey, Aly Jiwani, Delaney Simon,
Pushkar Sharma & Victoria Webster
School of International
and Public Affairs,
Columbia University
© Center for International Conflict Resolution
Columbia University- School of International and Public Affairs
420 W. 118th Street, 13th Floor
New York, NY 10027
Co-Authors: Julien Barbey, Aly Jiwani, Delaney Simon, Pushkar Sharma, and Victoria Webster
For inquiries, please contact authors by writing to PushkarMSharma@gmail.com
1
Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................... 4
The Government of Colombia is urged to: ............................................................................................... 5
Policymakers and legislators are urged to reform the Mining Code in the following ways: . 6
The Colombian Government is urged to fulfill its international obligations and to: ............... 6
Multinational gold mining corporations are urged to: ....................................................................... 6
UNDP at the national level is urged to: ..................................................................................................... 6
The UNDP at the departmental level is urged to: .................................................................................. 6
INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................................... 7
Background ......................................................................................................................................................... 7
Today..................................................................................................................................................................... 8
Methodology .................................................................................................................................................... 10
GOVERNMENT POLICY ....................................................................................................................... 12
Overlaps and Disagreements..................................................................................................................... 13
Monitoring........................................................................................................................................................ 14
Large-Scale Mining Versus Small-Scale Mining................................................................................... 17
Centralization of Mining Policy................................................................................................................. 18
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION POLICIES .............................................................................. 22
Ways MNCs Minimize Conflict ................................................................................................................... 22
Ways MNCs Exacerbate Conflict................................................................................................................ 24
SOCIAL IMPACT .................................................................................................................................... 26
Nariño and Antioquia ................................................................................................................................... 27
Agriculture and Multinational Mining ................................................................................................... 28
Small-Scale Mining and Multinational Mining..................................................................................... 29
Afro-Colombian and Indigenous Communities ................................................................................... 32
RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................................... 33
Recommendations to Policy Makers Drafting the Mining Code.................................................... 33
Recommendations to the Government of Colombia ......................................................................... 34
Recommendations for the Government of Colombia to Meet International Standards ...... 35
Recommendations to MNCs........................................................................................................................ 37
Recommendations to UNDP ....................................................................................................................... 38
Recommendations for Future Research ................................................................................................ 39
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 41
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...................................................................................................................... 42
APPENDIX A: CASE STUDIES ............................................................................................................ 43
Arboleda ............................................................................................................................................................ 43
Los Andes Sotomayor ................................................................................................................................... 45
La Llanada ........................................................................................................................................................ 46
Samaniego ........................................................................................................................................................ 47
Caramanta ........................................................................................................................................................ 48
Anorí ................................................................................................................................................................... 50
San Roque ......................................................................................................................................................... 52
Segovia ............................................................................................................................................................... 53
APPENDIX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND MEETINGS ............................................................... 56
2
APPENDIX C: THE MINING CODE OF 2001 AND THE CONCESSION PROCESS .................. 59
APPENDIX D: MINING CODE REFORM AND GRIEVANCES ...................................................... 61
APPENDIX E: INTERNATIONAL LAW............................................................................................. 63
APPENDIX F: MINING VALUE CHAIN BY TYPE OF MINER ...................................................... 67
REFERENCES.......................................................................................................................................... 69
3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Global demand for gold has reached historic levels. As a result, the
value of Colombia’s gold deposits has sky-rocketed, leading to a modern
‘gold rush’ that harks back to centuries past when Spanish explorers came
to Colombia in search of the mythical land of El Dorado. Today, over two
hundred foreign companies have received more than 1,600 concessions to
enter the country to explore for gold. President Santos has championed this
initiative and declared mining one of Colombia’s five ‘locomotives’ of
development.1 While this new gold rush has the potential to stimulate
economic development, it also has the potential to exacerbate Colombia’s
long-standing internal armed conflict.
Five researchers from Columbia University’s Center for International Conflict Resolution
(CICR) investigated how multinational corporations’ (MNCs) investment in gold mining has
affected the Colombian conflict. The researchers conducted a study in June and July of 2012
with crucial guidance and logistical support provided by the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) in Colombia. Research was qualitative in nature and based on over one
hundred interviews with a variety of actors including local level community leaders, government
officials (at the national, regional, and local levels), MNCs, Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs), and international organizations. The research focused on eight sites in two
departments: Nariño and Antioquia. These regions were selected for two reasons: firstly, they
represent two of the six implementing UNDP’s Reconciliation and Development Program
(REDES); and, secondly, foreign gold mining companies have significantly increased their
presence in these departments in the last ten years. Research sites were selected to paint a
comprehensive picture of the socioeconomic, political, and environmental impacts of gold
mining.2
The MNCs examined consisted of two large and two small enterprises active in Nariño
and Antioquia. AngloGold Ashanti is the largest gold mining MNC in Colombia by area of titles
owned. Gran Colombia Gold Corporation owns the only active gold exploitation site that the
study covered. Solvista Gold and Minatura are junior companies that expect to sell their titles
after the exploration phase is completed.
As a result of this research, the paper analyzes the impact of MNC gold mining on peace
and conflict in the departments of Nariño and Antioquia. Section 1 of the paper provides an
overview of the Colombian conflict and the historical and contemporary significance of gold in
the country. Section 2 discusses the ways in which government policy impacts mining-related
conflicts. Section 3 analyzes how MNC policies mitigate or exacerbate conflicts that arise as a
result of gold mining. Section 4 analyzes the social impact of gold mining in the departments of
Nariño and Antioquia. Section 5 provides recommendations to the government, MNCs, UNDP,
and other groups. Finally, section 6 shares the investigation’s conclusions.
"No one can buy
with gold the
embraces they have
lost.”
-Community Leader,
Asociación de
Víctimas Unidas de
Granada
The investigations’ major findings can be summarized as follows:
1. An emphasis on macro-level development over local development is eroding state
legitimacy and creating social fissures in Colombia. The government pursues largescale, multinational gold mining at the expense of local interests. Conflicts exist between
4
large-scale and small-scale miners, between agricultural and mining communities, and
between environmentalists and miners. Local actors feel that the national government
privileges MNC interests over their interests and are unaware of their rights regarding
gold mining. This diminishes state legitimacy and causes conflict and an atmosphere of
widespread insecurity and fear.
2. State monitoring of the mining industry is weak. The national government functions as
a passive overseer of the mining industry and lacks capacity to manage all mining
concession requests and to monitor lands under concession. Furthermore, major
discrepancies among different government agencies exist. Lastly, there is widespread
confusion among local stakeholders regarding national mining policies and practices.
3. The mining sector is becoming increasingly militarized. Armed actors regularly
finance mines, extort miners, and sell gold to launder coca money. This status quo is
disturbed when MNCs begin mining in areas where armed actors are present. The entry
of MNCs can further increase militarization in mining areas as the Colombian national
army and the private security firms protect MNCs in unstable areas, raising the potential
for violent clashes.
4. MNCs have tremendous influence over the stability of the areas in which they mine.
The government does not have mechanisms to sufficiently address conflicts that arise
when MNCs enter contested areas nor does Colombian law mandate extensive social
regulation for MNCs. Thus MNCs, in addition to adhering to limited government
regulations, also implement sweeping policies that drastically influence the stability of
the regions in which they mine.
5. UNDP has established a strong grassroots presence and enjoys a positive reputation
in Nariño and Antioquia. UNDP’s REDES program operates robust grassroots
programs in areas of conflict in Colombia, has developed a strong rapport with local
community leaders, and is valued by the communities it supports. While REDES works
on a number of topics, at the time of writing it was not comprehensively addressing
mining issues.
In an effort to offer actionable feedback to stakeholders, this report outlines a number of
recommendations to improve Colombia’s management of gold mining. These recommendations
include the following:
The Government of Colombia is urged to:
1. Institute a moratorium on new mining concessions until mining code reforms have been
addressed
2. Create a committee consisting of relevant government agencies to foster horizontal
cooperation and create a coordination law mandating vertical communication among
different strata of government agencies
3. Enhance plans to facilitate legalization for small artisanal miners, and create a
government agency with the function of formalizing small and artisanal miners
4. Engage local communities and stakeholders by consulting local interests when shaping
5
mining policy and increasing presence on the ground
Policymakers and legislators are urged to reform the Mining Code in the following ways:
1. Differentiate standards for small, medium, and large mining
2. Require environmental licenses for the exploration phase of mining
3. Abolish Article 13 of the Mining Code (law 685 of 2001) that declares the mining
industry a public good
4. Create a provision for a “Social License” for exploration and exploitation
5. Add more ‘excluded zones’ of mining to prohibit mining in socially fragile areas
The Colombian Government is urged to fulfill its international obligations and to:
1. Participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and join the World Bank
Institute’s Contract Monitoring Initiative
2. Adopt a precautionary and sustainable approach to using environmental resources
3. Provide local policymakers with information and capacity to make informed decisions
about their environmental resources, taking particular care to engage indigenous
communities in the creation of local development strategies, natural resource
management plans, and effective consultations over land concessions
4. Address impunity in regards to attacks on unions and labor leaders by monitoring arrests
and detentions made in mining areas
Multinational gold mining corporations are urged to:
1. Follow global norms and standards for extractive industries
2. Employ greater transparency in their communications with local communities in regards
to future plans
3. Follow international labor standards
4. Be judicious about usage of armed security
UNDP at the national level is urged to:
1. Convene UNDP teams to share best practices and lessons learned on mining issues
2. Leverage its role to influence national-level policy making on mining during the 20122013 Mining Code reform 3
3. Urge the Colombian state to comply with its international legal obligations, working with
civil society and community leaders to further ensure that the government is adhering to
these obligations.
The UNDP at the departmental level is urged to:
1. Provide training on mining for the UNDP departmental territorial heads
2. Support a diagnostic on the social, environmental, political, and economic implications of
mining in each of the six UNDP departments
3. Act as a “school for mining rights,” supporting legal training for community leaders and
organizations that REDES engages on the ground
4. Integrate work with other UN agencies working on mining issues
6
INTRODUCTION
Gold prices have surged to record levels in recent years,4
dramatically increasing the value of Colombia’s deposits. Rising
global demand for gold, combined with a mining code designed to
promote foreign direct investment (FDI), has spurred a modern
‘gold rush’5 in Colombia. Today, over 200 foreign companies have
received 1,600 concession agreements to explore for gold. 6 With the
Santos administration championing mining as one of Colombia’s
‘locomotives’ of development, the gold rush will only intensify.7
Meanwhile, armed actors are also capitalizing upon rising
gold prices, pushing gold even further into the center of Colombia’s
conflict-resource nexus. Armed actors have long operated in areas characterized by isolation,
large quantities of natural resources, high levels of inequality, low state presence, and weak land
rights. They often use gold to finance violence by extorting companies, looting resources,
kidnapping employees of extractive MNCs, and, more recently, laundering coca earnings.8 As
Colombia prepares for its newest round of peace talks, gold mining is conspicuously absent from
the agenda. Yet as this report will show, gold mining is deeply relevant to the Colombian
conflict.9
“It is clear that mining is
an excellent option for the
country to position itself
as one of the three largest
collectors of resource for
mining investment in Latin
America.”
—Former Director of
Mines
Background
The Spanish conquistadors occupied Colombia in the 16th century in search of the
legendary “Lost City of Gold” or “El Dorado.”10 While the Tomaco people are believed to have
mined gold since 325 BCE,11 Spanish colonizers were the first to exploit it on a major scale.
Indeed, gold extraction laid the foundations of the colonial exploitative economic system. In
order to facilitate gold exploitation, the Spanish implemented a land tenure system designed to
exploit cheap indigenous labor and mining codes designed to force the export of all of
Colombia’s natural resources to Europe.12 By the 1520s, Africans were regularly sent into
Colombia to replace the rapidly declining indigenous population as laborers in the gold mines.13
Historians suggest that the confluence of Spain’s heavy handed gold export legal code and
extractive land tenure system is one of the reasons for the Colombian state’s endemic
weakness.14 Because the Colombian colonial economy depended nearly entirely on gold
production, it did little to stimulate widespread growth or encourage heavy state presence. The
combination of this weak colonial state with an increasing manipulation of local markets and
labor slowly gave rise to protests, which culminated in 1819 with Colombia’s independence.
Upon independence, Colombia’s first president, Simon Bolivar, immediately nationalized
mining and transferred ownership of the Colombian subsoil to the state. 15 Still, gold was
Colombia’s main export for most of the 19th century, and foreign investors played a central role
in its exploitation. Conflicts between MNCs and the communities living in and around mining
areas can be traced back to the late 1800s when British gold mining companies first displaced
existing operations.16 Since then, the booms and crashes of the international price of gold have
7
seen the arrival and departure of British, French, Canadian, American, and other European
companies to and from the gold mining regions of Colombia.
Since independence, the political, economic, and social power in Colombia has been
shared between the elites of two political parties—the Conservatives and the Liberals.17
Exacerbated by immense social and economic inequalities, land conflicts, and the inability of the
state to mediate between social or political groups, the historic rivalry between these parties
culminated in a period of violence known as “La Violencia.”18 During this violence leftist
guerilla groups—most notably the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the
National Liberation Army (ELN)—19 emerged in response to the marginalization of the poor,
elitist politics, judicial ineffectiveness, rural insecurity,20 and an absence of regulations and
protective mechanisms in the rural economic sectors.21 As such, the guerillas’ platform
challenged the elitist status quo and proposed a new political order. Conversely, rightist
paramilitaries22 emerged as local security forces funded by elites to safeguard their interests
against the guerillas.23 The paramilitaries were ideologically opposed to both land and political
reform,24 and they later benefitted from support by the national government 25 in its
counterinsurgency efforts against the guerillas.26 Despite their histories of strong political
principle, whether both groups are still motivated by ideology is a matter of debate.27
Today
Gold mining is central to the conflict in Colombia today. State weakness coupled with
abundant natural resources and widespread inequality incentivizes armed actors across the
political spectrum to capitalize upon extractive resources in order to sustain violence. MNCs’
exploitation of extractive resources has similarly contributed to the prolongation of conflict 28 by
disrupting local economies, triggering rent predation, and situating companies in the midst of
violent conflict over access to land.29
Colombia’s gold industry is primarily characterized by
traditional, small-scale, and informal exploitation.30 In recent years,
“For hundreds of years
this kind of mining has increased in Colombia as many rural
the conquistadors came
and stole the wealth of the Colombians have switched from farming coca to mining gold in
response to successful coca eradication programs and the increased
mines; the same thing is
demand for gold. One study finds a 121% increase in gold mining in
happening today. Today
2009, although exact numbers are difficult to gauge.31 Many gold
they come as
deposits exist in regions with little to no state presence, and the state
multinational
struggles, as it has for centuries, to bring both these geographic
companies.”1
regions and informal mining into its regulatory sphere.32
—Miner from Antioquia
Illegal activity is pervasive in the small-scale mining sector.
Armed groups extort small-scale gold miners, who often lack formal
license to mine, charging them to access equipment, trade, and territory. 33 Additionally, as many
small-scale miners have limited access to legal gold markets, they often resort to
commercializing their gold through informal markets that are regulated by armed groups.34
Reports indicate that informal gold mining has overtaken coca as the main source of funding for
criminal organizations in at least eight Colombian departments, including Antioquia. 35 These
reports suggest that between 80-86% of all gold in the country is mined illegally, and that as
much as 20% of these profits go to armed groups.36
8
Despite the violent nature of gold mining in Colombia, the government continues to
encourage MNCs to explore and exploit gold. The government supplies protection—over 11% of
Colombia’s military troops protect oil and mining activities37—and promotes MNC mining
through a mining code designed to attract FDI. Indeed, a former iteration of the code was even
partially written by lawyers who represented half of the mining companies found in the national
mining registry.38 The last Mining Code39 increased the number of acres with mining
concessions nine fold between 2002 and 2010.40 The newest mining code, still in draft form, is
expected to continue to encourage MNCs to mine in Colombia.41 By restructuring government
offices,42 easing the federally imposed moratorium on concession applications,43 and increasing
the territory set aside as ‘Strategic Mining Areas,’44 the new code will enable an expansion of
MNC mining in Colombia.45
Figure 1: Trends in gold production indicate that Colombia is on its way to matching the gold
production levels of South America’s biggest gold producing countries46
There has never been a more opportune moment to address the risks associated with mining
than today. Firstly, the announcement that President Santos has initiated peace talks with the
leadership of the FARC suggests that there is political will to seriously address the root causes of
the violence. Peace talks, however, can only do this by addressing the economic incentives for
armed groups to prolong the conflict—including gold mining. Secondly, the Colombian mining
program is currently undergoing significant evolutions—including the implementation of mining
code reform, a new Minister of Mines, and greater centralization—thus, there are ample political
spaces for actors to either mitigate or increase the risks associated with mining policies. Thirdly,
increased trade liberalization has resulted in the implementation of Free Trade Agreements
(FTAs) with the US and Canada, which are both major investors in Colombia’s extractive
sector.47 Although these agreements contain human rights, labor, and environmental protections,
they also threaten agricultural production and private sector based rights. Intervention could
mitigate the risks associated with the FTA and encourage sustainable development. Fourthly, the
current wave of foreign gold extraction is in its infancy. At present, there are thousands of
exploration sites and only a few foreign exploitation sites in Colombia. Consequently, input at
this stage has tremendous potential to sculpt a gold mining policy that prevents mining-related
conflict before it becomes endemic to the country.
9
Additionally, UNDP-Colombia’s presence in key strategic locations in Colombia and the
organization’s interest in incorporating mining issues into its local developmental strategies
suggests that it is in an ideal position to both mitigate the mining policy’s negative externalities
and influence the national government’s legislative and political reforms. In what has become a
flagship program of UNDP Colombia, the Reconciliation and Development Program (REDES)
has served as an instrument to “promote development and peace building in the context of
violence and protracted conflict.”48 Funded by the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
(BCPR) at the UNDP headquarters, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), and
other donors, REDES seeks to build peace and promote reconciliation at the local level by
strengthening capacity for local peace-building; building bridges between local governance and
civil society;49 addressing transitional justice and victim’s rights issues;50 and developing
alternatives for community level socio-economic recovery.51 Today REDES operates in six
Colombian departments across the country including Antioquia, Cesar, Huila, Meta, Montes de
Maria, and Nariño. While REDES programs exist in areas of active gold mining and conflict in
Antioquia and Nariño, UNDP has only recently begun to explicitly address mining issues in
Colombia. By incorporating gold mining issues into the REDES program, UNDP can
significantly advance its goals of promoting peace, development, and reconciliation.
The rest of this paper will analyze government policy, MNC policy, and the social impact of
MNC gold mining. First, it will describe the government’s internal fragmentation, weak
monitoring capacity, marginalization of local actors and over-centralization. Then, it will
illustrate MNCs constructive corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies and their destructive
practices. After that, it will assess the impact of such policies and practices on local
communities. Subsequently, the report concludes that despite recent trends towards peace,
Colombian policy regarding FDI in the gold sector is prolonging the conflict in Colombia and
reinforcing the link between resource extraction and violence. Finally, the report offers
recommendations to mitigate the negative externalities associated with mining in hopes that the
industry can be a driver of peace, not conflict.
Methodology
Five researchers from Columbia University conducted the research for this report in June
and July of 2012 in Colombia. The project focused on two departments in Colombia—Nariño
and Antioquia—regions where UNDP’s REDES programs are active and where gold mining is
increasingly prevalent.
Research was qualitative in nature and based on over one hundred interviews,
conferences and forums with a variety of actors as well as legal and official documents related to
mining and the law. Researchers interviewed local level actors (including peasants, miners, and
indigenous leaders), government on all levels (national, departmental, and municipal),
representatives from MNCs, international organizations, and NGOs with efforts made to ensure
that a variety of different perspectives were considered. Researchers constructed questions meant
to clarify the impact of multinational mining on communities. Although they varied slightly
depending on the sector of the interviewee, all questions focused on the same general themes
such as state presence and responsibility, current legal framework regarding MNC extraction,
presence of conflict related to mining, access to information regarding MNC deals and contracts,
solutions to address the issue of MNC mining, and UNDP’s role within this context. In addition
10
to interviews, researchers observed group discussions, meetings, and conferences all on the topic
of mining. Interviews were conducted in Spanish and in English. Where possible, interpreters
were used during interviews and in conferences. Direct quotations translated from Spanish to
English represent a close approximation of the original Spanish meaning.
Researchers focused on a total of eight sites: Samaniego, Los Andes Sotomayor,
Arboleda and La Llanada in Nariño and Anorí, Segovia, San Roque and Caramanta in Antioquia.
These sites were selected in order to create a representative depiction of mining in Colombia.
Thus, the team observed exploration sites (Arboleda, Caramanta and Gramalote) and exploitation
sites (La Llanada and Segovia) to understand early stage and advanced stage gold mining. In
order to better comprehend differing perspectives, the team chose to accompany different
stakeholders to different sites: for example, the team traveled with the UNDP to Anorí and
Samaniego, with representatives from the Ministry of Mines Antioquia to Caramanta, and with
Gran Colombia Gold to Segovia. Lastly, researchers focused on examining the impact of
UNDP’s REDES program, which was accomplished by traveling with UNDP on their missions
to Anorí and Samaniego.
Notes, audio recordings, and photos taken during interviews, site visits, meetings, and
conferences all corroborate the findings in this report. These sources can be made available upon
request. Care was taken to ensure the safety and privacy of interview subjects. In some cases,
subjects wishing to remain anonymous are not cited by their names. In other cases we did not
record our interviews because interviewees asked us not to. A list of interviews is available in
the Appendix C.
Several limitations can be identified to this study. Firstly, as foreign researchers, the
team’s knowledge of Colombia is relatively new and limited simply by the fact that familiarity
with the content is fairly recent. However, researchers hope that this cultural distance enables
greater objectivity. Secondly, interview questions, while revolving around the same themes,
were not entirely standardized. Additionally, our research lacks a quantitative scope due to
limitations of time and resources. Random sampling was not attempted due to time and access
constraints. Official statistics on this subject for most regions are scarce, a reality compounded
by the fact that a significant percentage of gold mining is considered illegal by the state, which
incentivizes individuals to hide or mischaracterize mining or underreport their participation in
and earnings from mining. In some of the communities visited, citizens felt threatened by armed
groups and thus were more likely to hide their more controversial opinions. Lastly, research was
limited by the fact that only two of the five researchers were conversational in Spanish.
Researchers’ lack of Spanish fluency undoubtedly limited ability to catch certain intricacies.
11
GOVERNMENT POLICY
The work of the mining industry is guided by the policy objectives of President Santos,
who sees mining as a central agent for economic development. The Deputy Minister of Mines,
Henry Medina, makes it clear that that the government’s gold mining goals are “ambitious, very
big…We want more business, bigger and better.”52 Colombia is already on its way to
“becoming known as a mining nation,” evidenced by the fact that between 2010 and 2011 gold
production increased by 4.29% (from 53.6 to 55.9 tons) in merely one year.53 In 2011 one out of
every five dollars invested in Colombia from foreigners came from mining, while one in every
five dollars that left the country in exports came from mining.54 Additionally, in 2011 Colombia
produced 55 tons of gold and the government aims to surpass 60 tons by 2012. The trend will
only intensify; as the National Mining Development Plan for 2019 claims, “By 2019 the
Colombia mining industry will be one of the most important in Latin America…gold exports will
increase fourfold.”55
Figure 2: The Ministry of Mines and Energy’s ambitious increase in projected gold output through 2015
Yet while mining is crucial to the government’s economic policy, the Mining Code and
government agencies are ill-equipped to mitigate the significant social risks associated with
mining. Indeed, the government agencies in charge of overseeing mining activity have been set
up to enable MNCs to mine for gold in Colombia at the expense of state monitoring and
legitimacy. The Colombian government relies on several agencies to oversee the mining
industry. The main entities that address mining issues are as follows: The Ministry of Mines and
Energy (MME); the National Agency of Mines ANM (formerly Ingeominas),56 Ministry of
Environment, Housing, and Territorial Development, Ministry of Mines and Infrastructure
Nariño, Ministry of Mines Antioquia; Regional Environmental Entities (CAR), and Local
Municipal Government. Their functions are summarized in a table below. This section will
12
demonstrate how, due a focus on macro-economic growth, infighting between agencies at and
within different levels of government, ineffective monitoring, and marginalization of regional
and local concerns, government policy exacerbates mining-related conflict in Colombia.
ACTORS AND ENTITIES INVOLVED IN MINING
Organization
Role
Level
Ministry of Mines and Energy Coordinates national mining policy
National
(MME)
National Agency of Mines (ANM, Grants mining title concessions, administers the National
formerly Ingeominas)
Colombian Mining Cadaster (CMC), and
oversees royalty payment.
Ministry of Environment, Housing, Oversees applications for environmental National
and Territorial Development
license and operations that unearth over
800,000 tons.
Ministry of Mines and Infrastructure Oversees and enforces miners’ compliance Departmental
Nariño
with regulations in Nariño
Ministry of Mines Antioquia
Regional
(CAR)
Environmental
Oversees and enforces miners’ compliance Departmental
with regulations in Antioquia
Entities Monitors mining projects that unearth less than Departmental
800,000 tons.
Local Municipal Government
Conducts state functions at the municipal level, Municipal
addressing mining if pertinent to local context
Figure 3: Actors and Entities Involved in Mining.
Overlaps and Disagreements
A number of overlaps and disagreements exist within government entities over mining
policy which limits coherent gold mining policy. While the various components of the
Colombian mining apparatus are marketed to international investors as a neat hierarchical
structure, in reality they are uncoordinated and incompatible. For example, the Ministry of
Environment and the MME have fundamentally different philosophies regarding mining in
Colombia. The MME is adamant that it promotes environmentally sustainable mining. Javier
Garcia of the MME stressed that the process of obtaining an environmental license to conduct
mining is strict: “Our position is that there are zones in the country where mining cannot exist.”57
Yet the Ministry of Environment believes the MME discounts environmental sustainability in
favor of attracting big business and bolstering macroeconomic indicators. 58 As a geologist and
advisor to the Ministry of the Environment argued, “The Mining Code was tailored for large
companies… companies also hide the environmental impacts. They present environmental plans,
but these can rarely be properly heeded.”59 The Ministry of Environment fears that the MME
will allow mining in zones that are not legally guaranteed protection from mining but contain
13
fragile ecosystems, tropical rainforests, and endangered species.60 Furthermore it fears the MME
will avoid environmental regulations to attract FDI, and as a
result will threaten Colombia’s status as one of the most
biologically diverse countries in the world. This clash of
ideologies is the greatest hindrance to effective monitoring
and improved environmental policy.
Another conflict exists between Local Environment
Agencies (Corporaciones Autónomas Regionales (CAR)) and
Municipal Governments.
CAR’s often disagree with
municipal governments about whether or not MNCs are
adhering to environmental regulations. A local government
representative in Arboleda, for example, claimed that Gran
Colombia Gold’s exploration activities at the Mazamorras site
contaminated the water source, which in turn destroyed coffee
crops and poisoned cattle to death.61
However, a
representative of Corponariño, the environmental regulatory
entity in Nariño, adamantly denied that the exploration led to
any water pollution, and dismissed the municipal
government’s claims as unfounded.62 Yet another source
associated with the Ministry of Environment in Bogotá
Figure 4: Map of Colombia with
purported
that large-scale foreign mining operations conduct offthe colored areas representing
environmentally protected areas the-books violations63 and rarely live up to the standards outlined
in their work plans.
and the red polygons
The conflicts and disagreements between ministries
representing mining titles
responsible for overseeing mining preclude the government as a
whole to dispense cogent information to miners, MNCs, and communities affected by mining.
These structural inconsistencies increase the probability of conflict when MNCs begin to mine in
communities.
Monitoring
The government functions as a passive overseer of the mining industry and thus fails to
effectively monitor or regulate mining practices. Its agencies reward MNCs with concessions in
areas unfit for mining and fail to enforce mining rules. Further, the government is categorically
unequipped to monitor the massive influx of concessions. This is in part because government
agencies—especially the ANM—are understaffed and overwhelmed with a backlog of title
requests, but also because the agencies are mired in corruption and nepotism. Without effective
monitoring, the government is unable to address conflicts associated with mining.
The design of the Mining Code of 2001 hampers the government’s ability to regulate the
mining industry. The Code was devised to maximize foreign ease of access and investment, but
it does so at the expense of effective monitoring. It only offers a vague mandate for the mining
authority to monitor mining activity, but intentionally limits the role of the state in the mining
process.64 According to the MME, the Mining Code restricts the state’s role “…to planning,
regulation, promotion, administration and control of the resources of the mining industry.”65
Indeed, interviews with officials from the MME confirmed that they view their role as limited to
14
improving productivity and competitiveness, job security, and, most of all, to promoting mining
both nationally and internationally.66 The structural designation of government as a laissez-fare
overseer prevents the government from comprehensive monitoring and aggressive law
enforcement.
Yet despite the relegation of the government to the role of a passive overseer, the Mining
Code grants sweeping capacity to the state to displace individuals from their land to facilitate
MNC gold mining. Article 5 of the Code states that the subsoil—including all mineral deposits—
belongs exclusively to the state, and that companies may only exploit the ground by obtaining a
concession from the government. Further, Article 13 enshrines the principle that mining is a
social and public good:
“The mining industry, in all its branches and stages, is hereby declared a public service
and social interest. Therefore, at the request of the interested party and by the established
procedures in this Code, expropriations of property of assets and all other rights
constituted on them that might be necessary for exercise and efficient development can
be decreed in its favor.”67
The articles cited above effectively give enterprises the right to expropriate people from their
land. In other words, because the state owns the subsoil and it has deemed mining to be a social
good, mining activity takes precedence over an individual’s right to his or her private property.
Like the Mining Code,68 the Constitution of
69
1991 similarly espouses the concept that the state
owns the subsoil. Thus, when a company is granted
a mining title, the state is giving that entity the right
to exploit the subsoil for a particular mineral, and,
once that mineral is extracted from the subsoil, it
becomes the property of the enterprise subject to a
royalty fee. If a company needs to move people
from its concession because their presence would
interfere with the advancement of the mining
project there are three options available to “settle
the conflict:” individual negotiation, forced
easement
(servidumbre),
or
expropriation
(expropiación).70
The research in this project has revealed
that foreign companies rely almost entirely on the
first method to resolve land disputes.71 Usually,
companies compensate individuals monetarily, by
relocating them, or through a combination of the
two. These third party agreements are reached
between the company and the owner of the
property above resource-rich subsoil. The
Mauricio Cárdenas, the recently replaced
government plays no role in this process, but rather
Minister of Mines and Energy, speaks about
gold at a mining fair in Bogotá. July 6, 2012.
entrusts mining companies with the management of
conflicts that arise as a result. The government has
no mechanism to ensure fair and reasonable compensation in these contracts, nor does the
government have a set of guidelines or rules by which companies must abide. The government
only becomes involved if a landowner will not accept a company’s offer. In this case, the mining
15
enterprise may obtain permission from the municipal mayor or a court order from a judge to
perform a forced easement or an expropriation.72 Forced easement is a legal term that refers to
the right to use the property of another without possessing it, while expropriation entails the
forceful confiscation and redistribution of private property outside the common law. Both
companies and representatives of the government have emphasized that the latter two legal tools
are measures of last resort.73
Like the MME and the Mining Code, the ANM, responsible for granting mining title
concessions and administering the Colombian Mining Cadaster (CMC), similarly falls short of
regulating the mining industry. The authorized regulator of the industry, as former Minister of
Mines, Carlos Rodado Noriega, noted is akin to “a piñata,” or a pressure cooker in which the
ingredients are irregularities. As Noriega notes, the ANM has awarded dozens of mining
concessions to multinationals, including 19 to AngloGold Ashanti, in páramo environmentally
protected areas days before the law74 which banned mining of any kind in areas containing
páramo75 came into effect.76
The indiscriminate concession granting practice of the ANM is not the only example of
its failure to regulate the mining industry. The ANM is also mandated to enforce commitments
set by miners as established in work plan documents (Plan de Trabajos y Obras (PTO)).77 Yet
these documents are reviewed and approved in offices without a field visit because the capacity
of the ANM is vastly overstretched. With the frequency of auditing visits amounting to less than
one per year, PTOs are effectively self-regulated. Indeed, the director of the ANM recently
expressed that he had only 50 mining inspectors responsible for 4,000 exploitation titles.78
Additionally, the ANM fails to enforce royalty payment from MNCs. Evidence shows
that mining companies often shirk their financial obligations to the state. As Senator García
pointed out, “…the mining companies are not reporting everything, and they are failing to pay
royalties.”79 Yet companies often get away with these practices because the ANM does not have
capacity for enforcement. As the Colombian digital news source La Silla Vacía wrote:
“Ingeominas does not have the necessary tools to do the collection.”80
Many of the logistical difficulties associated with effective monitoring come from the
fact that the Colombian Mining Cadaster (CMC) has major inconsistencies. Semana magazine
quotes the former head of the Ministry of Mines and Energy as calling the CMC, “no un
catastro, sino una catástrofe [not a cadaster, but a catastrophe].” The former Minister also claims
that the CMC system cannot compile statistical reports, has poor monitoring and control
functions, shows concessions overlapping with environmentally protected zones, and is
vulnerable to hacker attacks because its information is not encrypted.81
Furthermore, allegations of nepotism and corruption in government mining agencies are
widespread. The former director of Ingeominas, Mario Ballesteros, was asked to step down after
allegations that some of his most trusted officials were involved with secret negotiations about
extending mining contracts—in some cases witnesses purport that the multinationals drafted the
terms of the contracts.82 His successor, Andrés Rodriguez Ruiz, cited overload as a reason for
the ANM’s failures: “For we tell lies, Ingeominas’ auditing capacity is overwhelmed… The
structure of the company is not adapted to further growth in applications for titles and, moreover,
their budget of 94,000 million pesos is not enough to monitor reported royalties that total 1.6
billion pesos.”83 The ineffectiveness of these agencies has serious implications for individuals
and groups involved in or affected by mining, because they fail to implement controls necessary
to reduce risks of mining-related conflicts.
16
Large-Scale Mining Versus Small-Scale Mining
The government privileges large-scale mining over
small-scale mining, hindering it from addressing key problems
associated with mining. It denounces small-scale mining as
lacking “adequate technology” and defined by “informality
and subsistence character, making it unsafe, uneconomic, not
competitive and environmentally unsustainable.”84 As such,
Colombia does not have a government entity—or anything
beyond programs designed to partially address short-term
qualms of small miners—that works to overcome obstacles
small miners face in acquiring titles. While programs exist to
provide technical and legal advice to small miners without
titles and departmental governments are attempting to facilitate
dialogue between multinationals and small miners, these are
side programs in an overburdened mining sector.
The Mining Code does not differentiate between large,
medium and small mining despite the fact that the resources
and scope of miners differ immensely. In both Nariño and
Antioquia, there are a significant number of small miners
Artisanal miners mine for gold in
without legal titles under the Mining Code. According to the
nd
La Llanada, Nariño July 2 , 2012.
Subsecretary of Mines in Nariño in the historically mining
heavy municipalities upwards of 80% of people rely on
85
subsistence mining. Yet the ANM applies the same criteria to all concessions, regardless of the
fact that subsistence miners and multi-billion dollar gold companies have dramatically different
resources. With substantially fewer financial, legal, and logistical resources than large
companies, these miners do not have the necessary tools to acquire land titles from the ANM.
While the MME has made efforts to hear the complaints of informal small miners86 it has not
devised any tangible policies to address this pressing issue.
Instead, the government often delegates responsibility to MNCs for resolving the issue of
small-scale illegal mining. In Antioquia, for example, 80 to 85 percent of mining is small to
medium scale, and problems arise when large companies receive massive concessions that
overlap with other mining activity.87 To resolve this issue, the Ministry of Mines Antioquia
office facilitates agreements between large companies and small miners so that large companies
incorporate traditional miners onto their titles. These “agreements” usually aim to build
cooperation between the two entities—the logic being that since large MNCs have more wealth,
resources and capacity to follow the Mining Code they are in the best position to help small-scale
miners conduct legal practices. In addition to facilitating dialogue between MNCs and traditional
miners, the Ministry is involved with efforts to educate miners both through governmentsponsored forums and by encouraging MNCs to work with local communities in teaching
environmentally sound mining. Yet addressing small-mining issues is only a minor and
peripheral component of the Ministry’s work.
17
Figure 5: The Concession Agreement Process.
inaccessible to small-scale miners88
This complex and detailed process is
Centralization of Mining Policy
The centralized nature of the Colombian mining industry hinders local monitoring,
alienates departmental and local governments from decision making, and ultimately
compromises state legitimacy by increasing the perception that the Colombian state does not
defend those on the ground directly affected by mining. The government in Bogotá and the
MME focuses on indicators of macroeconomic growth over individual and community concerns
and is virtually absent at the departmental level. Much of this contention arises from the simple
fact that Bogotá is physically and psychologically removed from the realities in the field and has
fixated its policy above all on increased output and investor confidence. The subsecretary of
mines in Nariño admitted Bogota’s failure to account for local dynamics in an interview with
researchers: “The national government has its own agenda.”89 Indeed, the MME remains
ignorant of the fact that the arrival of MNCs conducting gold exploration has provoked violence
in farming communities in Nariño.90 For instance, despite the high level of tension that exists
between mining and farming interests, the Deputy of the MME was quoted saying: “Here there is
18
no conflict [between farmers and mining companies], but there is a healthy coexistence.” 91 The
deputy’s oblivion to this significant conflict exemplifies the MME’s isolation from the
departmental governments.
Furthermore, municipal governments have no interaction with the national government in
Bogotá. In some instances, most notably in Arboleda, communities resent the MME because they
feel its generous concession policy has overlooked its agricultural traditions.92 A community
leader and farmer in Arboleda told authors that the mayor’s office and the Governor of Nariño
are sympathetic to his cause of preserving agriculture, while the MME and the central
government of Colombia cater to MNCs.93 The farmer’s statement is indicative of the
widespread perception that the MME is a far off entity that has failed to understand the needs of
some of its citizens. In a similar vein, a miner in Segovia, Antioquia, told one of the authors,
“The reality of Bogotá is not the reality of Segovia. Bogotá must be more present. It is
impossible to make decisions from an office hundreds of miles away that affect so many
people.”94 Once again, the MME is seen as an aloof bureaucracy that is out of touch with the
realities of society.
The Ministry of Mines is also frustrated with the national government’s efforts to
centralize as much as possible to Bogotá—including passing legislation to send all mining
royalties to the central government instead of Antioquia.95 The Ministry of Mines in Antioquia
faces issues surrounding small informal mining in the context of Bogotá’s ambitious
development plan to embrace large-scale mining. As a result, the government of Antioquia has
had to take matters into its own hands and engage in policies of promoting discourse between
small miners and large companies.96 As in Nariño, the MME has not ignored the conflict
between small and large-scale mining and has held periodic, “mining formalization days” in
different municipalities in Antioquia. These events have the stated purpose of teaching miners
the advantages of working under the security of a title, technical consulting, and legal advice.97
Centralization is only increasing, further estranging local interests from important
decision-making and meaningful policy. At the time of the writing, the ANM was in the process
of consolidating its six regional offices—namely, Antioquia, Bolivar, Cesar, Norte de Santander,
Caldas and Boyacá—to Bogotá. This reform aims to eliminate inconsistencies seen as
unattractive to foreign investors, yet it risks compromising ANM’s already limited capacity to
address local problems.98 For instance, the ANM in Antioquia has a special program that targets
small traditional miners to help them legalize in an accelerated two to three year process. Yet
this paper has shown that centralization obstructs governments from addressing local problems
and creating local solutions. A centralized ANM is likely to further alienate the regions from
Bogota, increasing the possibility that programs like ANM Antioquia’s legalization work will
stall or even terminate.99
While local government at the municipal level and the departmental level generally
reflect the interests of the residents, they lack power to address mining issues and are often
overruled by the national government. This research has shown that, in regards to mining policy,
the interests and goals of municipal governments are generally in line with those of the
departmental office. In the case of Arboleda, for example, the interests of local government
officials accord with the community’s anti-mining agenda.100 Similarly, the leadership of
Caramanta in Antioquia has focused their office’s efforts on educating the municipality about
both the potential benefits and the risks involved with mining rather than adhering to the national
government’s policy as passive overseer of the mining industry. Despite the fact that many
19
municipal governments see mining as incompatible with the municipality’s interests local
governments have few mechanisms to counter national government plans.
Centralization causes fears that the government will allow MNCs to pursue mining at the
expense of populations, increasing the likelihood of displacement when MNCs begin to mine.
The MME is adamant that its policies limit displacement, emphasizing that the policy of
expropriation is not as potentially arbitrary or cruel as it may appear: “Big companies cannot
force people off their land…The idea is that mining benefits all, and to be able to mine, the
company needs to negotiate with the owner. They have to register the negotiation with the
mayor. If there is no settlement, then expropriation can happen.”101 Yet despite the MME’s
claim, municipal governments are skeptical that the MME will protect their communities from
the adverse effects of mining. Feelings of vulnerability are pervasive even amongst municipal
leaders with no particular dislike for the MME. For example, despite the healthy relationship that
exists between exploration company Solvista Gold and the local government of Caramanta,
leaders in Caramanta admitted there is no guarantee that Solvista’s successor will practice ethical
mining or limit displacement. As such, the MME and the national government are neither
viewed as guardians of local interests nor individual rights.102
Furthermore, when it comes to indigenous and
ethnic rights, the government often fails to ensure that
such groups can obtain free prior and informed
consent and know that their communications with
government and mining interests about leaving their
land fulfills the legal criteria of this principle.
Colombian law recognizes indigenous and ethnic
rights,103 but does not include clear mechanisms to
protect them against violation as a result of mining.
In particular, Article 330 provides a vaguely worded
protection of indigenous communities from mining
activities:
“Exploitation of natural resources in the indigenous
territories will be done without impairing the cultural,
social, and economic integrity of the indigenous
communities. In the decisions adopted with respect to
the said exploitation, the government will encourage
the participation of the representatives of the
respective communities.”104
While the language of this declaration is
strong, it is not specific enough to prove effective in
practice. According to research by the United Nations
Independent Expert on minority issues, such
declarations do not adequately define important
features relating to how the consultation should take
place or with whom.105 There have been reports of
projects that have been implemented without consultation or with consultations held with people
who do not legitimately represent communities and their interests.106
Figure 6: Concession polygons have been
superimposed on indigenous reservations
(in hatched purple), Afro-Colombian
reservations (in hatched orange); from
2009-2010
20
Ultimately, disagreements, ineffective monitoring and centralization characterize the
government entities responsible for overseeing mining. In efforts to attract FDI, these structures
put local interests at a distinct disadvantage. This has tremendous implications for state
legitimacy; as a result of the government’s failure to adequately monitor gold mining, citizens
believe the state protects MNCs over its own citizens. Trends to continue to pursue FDI and
further centralize will only diminish state legitimacy further and increase the risks of mining
related conflict.
21
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION POLICIES
As the previous section demonstrated, the government and Colombian law give MNCs a
great deal of autonomy in mining, especially as they explore and exploit Colombian land.
Therefore, the way that MNCs conduct their business is immensely important; they have the
power to exacerbate or mitigate conflict in the communities in which they mine. This section will
discuss MNC policies and demonstrate how such policies can drive conflict or peace.
This study investigated two large and two small MNCs active in Nariño and Antioquia.
The two large firms included: AngloGold Ashanti (majority South African owned), which is the
largest gold mining MNC in Colombia by area of titles owned and Gran Colombia Gold
(incorporated in Canada) which owns the only active gold exploitation site covered by the study.
The two smaller firms, Solvista Gold and Minatura (both with mixed international and local
holdings), are junior exploration companies that intend to develop projects through the
exploration stage and sell them for construction and exploitation. At the time of this study,
Minatura and Solvista Gold are in prospection (pre-exploration) and exploration stages
respectively. AngloGold Ashanti is in advanced exploration stage at one of its sites, Gramalote in
San Roque; and Gran Colombia Gold is in exploitation stage at one of its sites, Segovia. Both
companies have other vast exploration projects as well. Both large MNCs have pursued different
strategies to acquire mining titles in Colombia. AngloGold started applying for concessions in
“free areas” when it entered Colombia in the early 2000s to become the largest gold mining
titleholder in the country and still has a large number of applications pending. Gran Colombia
Gold acquired its titles in 2010 through a complicated legal ruling that transferred over all former
Frontino Gold Mines (which was being liquidated) titles and further consolidated its titles by
acquiring Medoro Resources (See Appendix A for the Segovia Case Study).
Company
Sites Studied
AngloGold Ashanti
Gran
Gold
Gramalote, Antioquia
Los Andes – Sotomayor, Nariño
La Llanada, Nariño
Colombia Segovia, Antioquia
Arboleda, Nariño (assets sold in
August, 2012)
Solvista Gold
Caramanta, Antioquia
Minatura Gold
Anorí, Antioquia
Figure 7: MNCs and Sites Studied
Stage of Mining
Advanced Exploration
Early Exploration
Early Exploration
Exploitation
Exploration
Exploration
Prospection
Ways MNCs Minimize Conflict
Adherence to environmental regulations is one key way that MNCs can avoid conflict.
MNCs have to comply with various environmental obligations under Colombian law, as
22
described above. Out of the MNCs the study covered, only Gran Colombia Gold was required to
submit an Environmental Impact Assessment as it was in exploitation stage at Segovia,
Antioquia. Large MNCs are usually keen to secure the necessary environmental permits needed
for mining activities to operate legally. AngloGold Ashanti has one approved subtraction (special
permit to mine in a restricted zone) in La Colosa, Tolima and is in the process of applying for
subtractions in several other places, without which it cannot proceed with any exploration
activities.107 When companies adhere to environmental standards, they allay fears that a
community’s land will be destroyed and are more likely to gain community support for mining.
MNCs understand that in addition to complying with applicable laws and regulations,
they need to obtain what they call a “social license” in the communities in which they operate.
They realize the necessity of obtaining local buy-in for their projects. For large companies, it is
imperative to maintain a reputation for responsible mining as negative press from one project can
easily jeopardize other projects and possibly the companies’ overall standing in the country. For
example, Gran Colombia Gold’s controversial Segovia project marred its social standing with
the community in Arboleda, Nariño when trying to develop its Mazamorras project, leading to
community resistance (See Arboleda Case Study in Appendix B). The inability to muster
community support contributed to the eventual sale of the project in August 2012. Large
companies are also most likely to be exposed to international best practices for responsible
mining and have in-house resources devoted to obtaining this local support. For junior
companies that intend to sell their projects to bigger companies for exploitation, a stable social
setting is essential to their business as the value of their project depends on this factor. Therefore,
companies often try to go beyond their legal obligations to garner social support for their
projects.
MNC
corporate
social
responsibility (CSR) practices are one way
to obtain this local support. This includes
open and inclusive communication about
projects, steps to mitigate negative
impacts of operations, and programs to
compensate residents for outsider presence
in
their
communities.
Companies
commission studies to diagnose the
negative environmental and social impact
of their presence and plan to take steps to
mitigate those impacts. Gramalote,
AngloGold Ashanti’s subsidiary operating
in San Roque, Antioquia, maintains an
effort to identify, manage, and mitigate the
social impact in all phases of the
project.108 Gran Colombia Gold also
collects data on the profile of the people
present in and around its Segovia
operations.109
Jose David Castellanos, Director of Solvista Gold
All companies studied maintain
Corporation, observes the company’s flagship
some
sort
of CSR programs regardless of
CSR program- transitioning families from
the
stage
of
mining they are in. AngloGold
subsistence to commercial farming- in
th
Caramanta, Antioquia. July 18 , 2012.
23
Ashanti states that it engages communities before entering them and throughout its mining
stages. Prior to entering an area, it presents its mining plans to the mayor (a process called
socialización). According to the company, CSR projects are developed in alignment with the
mayor’s local development plans110 in the areas of education, social development, and
infrastructure.111 Solvista Gold stated that all its social responsibility programs are developed
organically, in accordance with the needs of the local communities.112
Gran Colombia Gold has piloted a CSR program to address the presence of informal
miners in areas where it has titles. Rather than forcing out informal miners inhabiting its
concessions, the company has been attempting to incorporate these miners into company
operations. It still informs the local government of the informal miners’ presence but continues
to negotiate with the miners to convince them to accept their terms. Through third-party mining
contracts the company guarantees the processing and purchase of gold extracted by small miners
for a set monetary amount. In exchange, Gran Colombia Gold requires small miners to organize,
get incorporated, maintain accounting books, and follow labor laws. Since Gran Colombia Gold
is ultimately responsible for activities in its concessions, it requires small miners to follow
environmental obligations such as the nonuse of mercury. The company claims that this way,
small miners are making more money than they did independently. 113 However, there are still
many who refuse to participate in the program.
Small miners involved in Gran Colombia Gold’s third-party mining program now
generate a significant percentage of the company’s gold production. Gran Colombia Gold
identified its employment of former Frontino Gold mining workers as another positive social
impact of its arrival in Segovia. In the wake of the Frontino Gold Mine transfer to Gran
Colombia Gold, the company hired 1,600 former Frontino employees, whose contracts were
ended as part of the liquidation. The miners interviewed from Segovia expressed contentedness
with their arrangement with Gran Colombia Gold, and acknowledged that they could negotiate
with the company if they wanted.114
Ways MNCs Exacerbate Conflict
Yet despite Gran Colombia Gold’s promotion of this CSR policy in Segovia, and other
MNC’s adherence to environmental standards, acquisition of “social licenses”, and
implementation of CSR policies, research shows that
Gran Colombia Gold and other MNC often cause
conflict as a result of mining activity. Segovian
union leaders suggest that uneven subcontractual
employment has divided Segovian miners and
potentially violated labor laws.115 Because informal
miners working for the company do not necessarily
receive official labor contracts,116 they may receive
unfair returns and do not enjoy the same labor rights
as employees. For example, informal miners from
Sur de Bolivar have stated that subcontracted
employment is little better than ‘sharecropping’ since
it removes many of their labor rights.117
A large portion of conflict derives from the
fact that concessions are given to MNCs in territories
Activists protest Gran Colombia Gold and its plans to mine
th
gold in Arboleda, Nariño on August 20 , 2011.
24
already inhabited by farmers or miners. When MNCs work in areas inhabited by non-mining
communities, they are generally able to negotiate access for exploration activities. Landowners
are compensated for minimal inconvenience. While community resistance is generally low at the
exploration stage, neighboring communities and interested parties often mobilize to oppose
MNC presence.118 AngloGold Ashanti, through its subsidiary Gramalote, has purchased large
swaths of land in San Roque, Antioquia where it holds mining concessions, in order to avoid any
expropriations later.119 These lands include farms and factories where people continue to work
uninterrupted and even benefit from enhancements such as pledged renovations from the
company.120 When non-mining communities live or work on lands under concession, MNCs
negotiate with landowners to gain access for exploration activities.
However, if a landowner and the company cannot reach an agreement, MNCs can resort
to legal instruments such as easements or expropriations. This increases the potential for
individuals living on land under concession to be displaced.121 Corporations distinguish between
“artisanal miners”— individuals employing traditional methods they have been using for
generations—and “illegal miners”—opportunistic miners that may have links to illegal armed
actors and have been driven to the sector by the international increase in gold prices. MNCs
generally negotiate with artisanal miners to either incorporate them into their operations or
“resettle” them by paying them to move elsewhere. To deal with illegal miners, MNCs are
required by law to file for an amparo administrativo (administrative protection) with the mayor
who may then proceed to use the local police force to close the mine and remove the miners.
Gran Colombia Gold, for example, previously used amparo administrativos to attempt to force
out informal miners unwilling to accept the company’s
terms.
While in most cases MNCs prefer not to use these
legal instruments because of the potential conflicts that they
may cause (as Gran Colombia Gold explained, this tool
came at “great social cost”)122 considering that Antioquia
and Nariño are the departments with the highest number of
internally displaced peoples,123 MNC strategies do little to
address the communities’ justified fear of displacement.
MNC mining is accompanied by an increase in
militarization, which exacerbates conflict in a number of
ways. Firstly, Colombian military is used to protect mining
interests, which diminishes state legitimacy and alienates
individuals who are not connected to mining. In order to
attract foreign investment in mining by companies like Gran
Colombia Gold and AngloGold Ashanti, the national
government has made it a standard practice to provide
extractive industries with military support to ensure security
at mining sites.124 To help pay for the costs of the soldiers
One of Gran Colombia Gold’s private
deployed at their mines, mining companies provide auxiliary
security guards in Segovia, Antioquia.
support such as meals, uniforms, and housing often through
August 1, 2012.
logistics agencies. For example, all of AngloGold Ashanti’s
sites, even those in early exploration phases, have agreements in place for public security forces
to protect communities in and around mining sites.125 A military outpost in Segovia appeared to
be guarding a Gran Colombia Gold gold smelting processing plant. When the government allows
25
companies to pay for their keep, they forgo independence necessary to properly reprimand or
monitor MNC practices, which in turn diminishes state legitimacy.
In addition to having government soldiers at their mining sites, many large MNCs
employ private security. The presence of private security firms has further militarized Colombian
gold mines and in some instances has put former armed actors on the frontlines of the conflict
again. For example, in Arboleda, community members claimed that Gran Colombia Gold hired a
private security company that included former demobilized paramilitaries.126 Interviewees have
also accused members of the Gran Colombia Gold executive board of having links to
paramilitary organizations.127 Other companies, however, claim that they are careful when
employing public or private security forces. For example, Solvista Gold and Minatura both
expressed a reluctance to call in any security forces.128
The government’s policy of granting generous land title concessions to multinationals
coupled with strong support from the national army has exacerbated an already tense security
situation in Colombia. In Segovia, for example, Gran Colombia Gold contends for influence in
the crowded political space occupied by the police, two battalions of the national army, a
civilian-based security council, the FARC, the Urabeños, and criminal gangs, amongst others.
MNC mining operations disrupt the existing value chain by cutting out certain actors that benefit
from the status quo. Illegal armed groups that have increasingly used gold to finance their
activities by investing in or extorting from small mining operations are one such actor.
Given the conflict-ridden history of some of these areas, the arrival of MNCs may
unintentionally benefit from armed actors. The Colombian military has cleared areas of guerilla
presence to enable foreign investment, sometimes turning a blind eye to paramilitary violence.
Both groups have been accused of committing human rights violations along the way. As MNC
entry into some of these areas has been preceded by such operations, MNCs are perceived to be
benefiting from those actions. Furthermore, because human rights violations in some areas
predate or coincide with company presence, companies run the risk of exacerbating past conflict
wounds when they use armed security to protect their projects.
Ultimately, MNCs are given a substantial amount of autonomy in the gold mining
industry. Operating in unstable contexts with intense competition for resources, MNCs can
exacerbate or cause conflicts by forcing displacement, impacting agriculture areas, and
militarizing mining areas. Yet while they have the capacity to cause instability in communities,
adequate CSR programs, effective social licenses, and adherence to environmental regulations
can mitigate conflicts and achieve local support. These positive features of MNC policy offer
hope that MNC gold mining has the capacity to be a driver of peace rather than conflict.
Ways MNCs minimize conflict
Follow environmental regulations
Obtain ‘social license’
Corporate Social Responsibility programs
Incorporating small miners into large mining
operation
Ways MNCs exacerbate conflict
“Resettling” small-scale miners or farmers
Exploring land inhabited by communities
Forced displacement “amparo administrativo”
Employ large-scale private security force
presence
Funding the national army
Conducting mining activity in unstable areas,
especially those with a heavy presence of armed
groups
Figure 8: Ways MNCs mitigate or exacerbate conflict
26
SOCIAL IMPACT
Nariño and Antioquia
Sharing a southern border with Ecuador, the department of Nariño is
notorious for drug trade, high levels of poverty and violence, and low levels of
state presence.129 Nariño’s economy is primarily based on subsistence-level
farming,130 though certain municipalities131 depend heavily on small-scale
mining.132 Recent reports of widespread illegal gold mining133 together with the
most recent UNODC coca cultivation survey pronouncing Nariño the country’s
leading coca producer (producing approximately 27% of the country’s total)134
indicate that a large part of Nariño’s agricultural and mining sectors is informal or
illegal.
As of March 2012, only 3.5% of Nariño’s territory had legal mining titles,
most of which were designated for small-scale mining.135 Despite this, Nariño has
been identified as the fourth department in the nation in terms of mining priority,
after Antioquia, Chocó and Cauca.136 Also by March 2012, there were more than 260 pending
concession solicitations and 26 legalization solicitations covering more than 15.4% of Nariño,
and 24 blocks of strategic mining areas covering approximately 7.5%.137 Nariño’s mining
activity, therefore, stands to increase exponentially from what it has been previously. At the time
of this study, the largest MNCs exploring for gold in Nariño were AngloGold Ashanti and Gran
Colombia Gold, though Gran Colombia Gold sold its assets in Arboleda to Andean Minerals and
Metals Corp in August 2012.138
The arrival of MNCs has been polarizing in Nariño where large-scale mining is new and
unfamiliar. Both MNCs are only in early exploration stage here and have had little to no
communication or consultation with communities. Interviewees from these sites have
consequently expressed widespread confusion about the companies’ intentions, frustration with
their inability to participate in the concession process, and fear for the future. Beyond
quantifiable or observable effects, it is these expressions of confusion, frustration, and fear that
have the biggest potential to cause conflict.
Unlike Nariño’s nascent gold industry, Antioquia’s gold sector is well established. In
fact, from 1971 to 1990 Antioquia contributed more than 73.7% of domestic gold production.139
As of March 2012, Antioquia had 4,522 titles of exploration, exploitation, and requests for
legalization. Most concessions are concentrated in the Northeast—in or near Caucasia or
Segovia.140 Thus, whereas communities and local government officials in Nariño can strategize
the kinds of laws and regulations needed to prevent the harmful effects of mining, Antioquia has
had to act retroactively. Furthermore, gold mining has a markedly higher prevalence of informal
miners and its gold supply chain is more infused with armed actors.141 Isolating MNC activities
is even more difficult due to an environment where extortion is the norm, regulations are not
enforced, 80% of gold production is informal, and security is rarely present.142
“They won't
leave us alone
to decide
whether or not
we want to
give the MNCs
our land”
—Ramiro
Restrepo,
Conalminercol
27
Agriculture and Multinational Mining
The decline of agricultural production is often the obvious effect of extractive
industries.143 For communities that depend on subsistence farming, large-scale mining can
threaten, or even destroy, their livelihoods. In regions like Nariño where land tenure is largely
informal144 or shaped by violence,145 land and the right to grow food often are symbols for
resistance and survival. For example, community leaders in Batania have developed food
sovereignty146 as a key strategy for addressing issues of violence and poverty. There is evidence
in Batania that when legal agriculture loses sustainability or marketability, farmers often turn to
illicit crops or illegal mining. A community leader explained that part of building a peaceful
country for them is “protecting [their] sacred territory.”147 Though crippled by subsistence
farming, community members were unequivocally opposed to the idea of large-scale mining.
“Even if they offered a lot of promises for our land, it would be hard, but what we have is
enough and I would not accept their offer,” explained one.
In addition to stimulating
conflict between local communities and
MNCs, FDI in gold mining can also
stimulate conflict within communities.
Because
MNCs
negotiate
with
individual landowners to obtain access
for exploration, the community as a
whole is powerless to control its fate.
For example, according to one source
there may be two or three individuals in
Batania who would be willing to sell
their land to an MNC, yet the majority
of the community is adamantly opposed
to the entry of MNCs for mining.148
Thus, the decisions of one or two
Researchers view a small coffee plantation located upon land
landholding individuals have the power
owned by Gran Colombia Gold. The company planned to
to dramatically change social fabric,
build a gold exploration site just feet from this spot.
nd
economy, and security of a community.
Arboleda, Nariño. June 22 , 2012.
Moreover, if the companies cannot
reach agreements with landowners, easement provisions in Colombian law can grant companies
forced access or expropriation provisions. Such approaches risk displacing dissenting
individuals. No company has yet used these methods in Nariño—in fact, as mentioned in the
previous section, Gran Colombia Gold expressly stated its unwillingness to resort to such
actions149 as their capacity to take them causes widespread fear,150 yet the fact that law allows
them to do so heightens risk of conflict in communities opposed to mining.
Furthermore, little can be done to persuade a project to leave once it arrives, and protests
often risk spiraling into violence. The case of Arboleda is symptomatic of this. A community
activist at a departmental-level mining forum summarized Arboleda’s problems:
“[Multinational mining] tried to turn Arboleda from a town of producers and
landowners into day laborers. This brought social, economic and environmental
problems. With the presence of large-scale mining comes the presence of armed
28
groups, who bring outrage, violation of human rights, threats to leaders, land
dispossession, death and displacement.”151
Indeed, no concession in Nariño is as polarizing as Gran Colombia Gold in
Arboleda. Nearly every forum, meeting, or conversation the researchers
¨“We are farmers,
had about the effects of multinational gold mining in Nariño referred to it,
our ancestors were
and the antagonism it instilled was palpable. For example, in response to
farmers, and we
2011 violence, Nariño’s governor and Arboleda’s mayor issued a joint
want our children to
statement declaring their opposition to Gran Colombia Gold’s mining
be farmers as well.”
project and other mining projects in agricultural territories: “[Potential]
-Walter Gaviria,
agricultural damages, negative economic impacts, and other general
Secretary for
considerations have led us to oppose the continuation of [mining].”152
Planning, Arboleda
Governor Raul Delgado Guerrero has publically declared his support of
small-scale mining and agricultural production, environmental resources, and the defense of
rural, indigenous, and Afro-Colombian territories and culture over, and possibly even against,
large-scale mining.153
Finally, the overwhelming concern of many interviewees is that increased interest in gold
correlates fairly positively with increased militarization and violence. They claimed that
communities like Arboleda that had been peaceful, or that were recently becoming peaceful,
would become more central to the armed conflict due to their increased strategic value.154
In Antioquia, gold mining similarly impacts agricultural communities. San Roque and
Caramanta, for example, have mixed economic traditions that rely principally on agriculture.
Like Arboleda in Nariño, these two cases are characterized by a great deal of public resistance
and uncertainty. Tamesis, a town that neighbors Caramanta, is part of an opposition movement
against Solvista Gold entering the area. As the case study discusses, the community in
Caramanta is apprehensive regarding the future of their community, since Solvista will turn over
its operation to a gold exploitation company in the next few years. In San Roque, Gramalote
Gold Limited has purchased most of the land that it will use for exploitation from farmers.
Individuals from San Roque pointed out abandoned farms and explained that, after receiving
their compensation from the company, the former owners of those farms had left the area with
their families (See San Roque Case Study, Appendix B).
Small-Scale Mining and Multinational Mining
Actors involved in and methods for small-scale gold mining vary widely, ranging from
illegal gold mining with direct ties to armed groups to fully legal gold mining enterprises. 155 In
practice, most miners interviewed for this report self-identified as either ‘legal’ or ‘informal.’
Unable to meet the same environmental, financial, and legal obligations as big
companies, legal miners sometimes resort to illicit activities like purchasing illegal explosives or
selling gold through illegal channels, thereby further isolating them from the formal sector and
depriving the government from royalty payments.156 Legal miners in Los Andes explained how
difficult it was to access legal explosives, commercialize their gold (they either have to cross the
border to Ecuador or drive the dangerous road to Medellin), or access government support.157
Communities that depend on informal mining often experience a dearth of public service
delivery. Moreover, because many of Nariño and Antioquia’s mineral resources are far from
urban centers, state presence is often weakest and armed group presence is often strongest near
29
the mines. Furthermore, the stigmatization of informal mining obstructs individuals from
accessing public services; miners classified by the state as “illegal” hide from the state rather
than access its support. In some cases, however, small mining can significantly strengthen
public service delivery. The mining cooperative in La Llanada, for example, has encouraged the
investment of mining revenues into the funding of public services, thus reinforcing a mutually
beneficial relationship between the municipal government and the mining community.158
Informal and illegal miners repeatedly cited their desire to legalize, but claimed the
bureaucratic process was “impossible” (often taking more than five years and requiring
information impossible for peripheral economic actors to produce).159 Moreover, legal obstacles
facing informal miners cause fear of penalization and confusion about the concession process. 160
Very few small-scale miners in Nariño
and Antioquia understand the legalization
process, or have the capacity to access it.
This preferential concession process
amplifies
existing
socioeconomic
cleavages between the corporations and
the poor and drives community perception
that the state does not represent them or
their interests.
Indeed, the national government
has expressed concern that “informal”
small-scale gold mining is funding armed
groups. Thus official local and national
government policies conflate mining with
the armed conflict and shut down these
“informal” miners. According to a mayor
Small miner processes minerals recently extracted from a
of a mining town, “the general position is
nd
mine in La Llanada, Nariño. July 2 , 2012.
that the state prevents the MNCs from
negotiating with small-scale miners.”161
Shutting down these “informal miners” has driven some miners to growing coca, as they have
few other economic opportunities. Informal miners and activists are convinced that this
“criminalization of artisanal mining”162 is part of the government’s strategy to “turn the country
into a large-scale mining giant.”163 As land under concession to MNCs often includes territories
already inhabited by miners, this risks increasing internal displacement.164
Thus, especially in Nariño, many small-scale informal miners have found themselves
increasingly at risk of suffering an amparo administrativo or being penalized under the 2010
reforms.165 Though none of the miners interviewed for this paper reported being directly
removed or arrested, researchers heard dozens of second hand accounts. By the end of 2011, for
example, an official claimed to have closed more than 330 unlicensed gold mines and arrested
more than 1,230 people.166 Often carried out by the military, this punitive response to informal
and illegal gold mining directly contrasts with the military support MNCs receive.
Some see MNC presence as a way to mitigate the legal, economic and functional
difficulties that face small scale and informal miners. A spokesperson for AngloGold Ashanti
Colombia states: "In the Department of Nariño, AngloGold Ashanti Colombia has built a good
relationship based on support and collaboration with legal mining cooperatives..."167 Some
miners interviewed similarly espoused the advantages of MNC presence. One miner explained
30
that because MNCs have relatively more of rights, money, and security, “they can support the
illegal miners, who are currently being investigated.”168 Citing promises to fix the roads, provide
education, preserve the environment, and offer employment, this miner emphasized the ways in
which MNCs could help them “leave Colombia to look for a better future.”169
Yet despite such sentiments, companies’ failure to communicate with small-scale miners
causes opposition to MNC mining. A miner opposed to current MNC mining in Los Andes
indicated: “We, the small miners…don’t want to sell, but we are open to what the MNCs have to
say. We want to be consulted with, we want a real dialogue. Anglo Gold hasn’t consulted with
us…but it has talked with others.”170 This quotation demonstrates that many miners may have
been willing to sell to AngloGold Ashanti, but the company’s failure to engage in negotiation or
communicate the advantages of multinational mining to small-scale miners has driven this
possibility even farther afield.
In Nariño, the departmental government has responded positively to small-scale miners’
interests. In preparation for this year’s mining code reform, the department has held multiple
forums and conferences to develop a department-level strategy to address, among other things,
the problems faced by small-scale miners in Nariño.171
In Antioquia, informal economic activities like drug trafficking,
illegal mining and illegal logging have long been endemic to the “If you are doing
department’s economy. The arrival of the guerrillas in the 1970s and gold mining here
paramilitaries in the 2000s located these illegal economies within the larger you are getting
context of the armed conflict. Furthermore, mining zones have high levels of extorted”
informality in land tenure, putting individuals who mine or inhabit gold rich – Anori Municipal
lands at high risk of displacement.172 In Anorí and Segovia, especially, Official
mining has had a direct influence on all economic development; and in many
municipalities in this gold mining region, the murder rate is among the
highest in the world.173 Police protection and judicial capacity are still weak and largely
complicit in local war economies.174 Unregulated small-scale mining causes many problems,
including environmental degradation, high levels of corruption, and violence.
Small-scale miners in this region struggle to formalize their mining activities. At a human
rights and mining meeting in Bajo Cauca, miners cited a variety of reasons for the relative
underdevelopment of small-scale mining including high degrees of multinational influence,
punitive national laws, weak state presence, weak regulation, high levels of violence, isolation
from the political space, centralized regulatory collection, illegal mining legislature, distrust of
the state, and a military build-up against small-scale mining.175 Miners in these regions expressed
widespread distrust of the national government, which is largely perceived as illegitimate. “The
reality in Bogotá is not the reality in these mining zones,” said one Segovian miner.176 Thus, few
miners understand the government’s preference towards criminalizing and militarizing mining
zones in Antioquia over providing public services, investment, and regulation.177 Again, the
prevalent concern is that, “The national government wants to get rid of [small-scale mining] for
MNCs.”178
Unions in the extractive sector and community level activists opposed to mining are
particularly vulnerable to threats, intimidation and murder. Recent reports suggest that at least
twenty trade unionists from the mining and energy sector suffered attacks or attempted
assassinations in 2010179 and 78% of the crimes against trade unionists were committed in
mining and energy areas.180 In Segovia, the assassination of Rafael Tobón Zea, president of the
Sindicato Regional de Trabajadores de la Industria Minera y Energetica
31
(SINTRAMINERGETICA) in 2011, coupled with continued violence and threats against union
leadership, have led many to assume that the corporation may be directly or indirectly
responsible.181 Although Gran Colombia Gold vehemently denies complicity in Segovia’s
violence, its preponderance of force though “both public and private security mechanisms” to
protect their mining sites contributes to the increasing militarization of the region. 182
Afro-Colombian and Indigenous Communities
Decree 1320 of 1998 lays out Colombia’s official procedure for Free
Prior and Informed Consent. The previous consultation laws are
extraordinarily complicated, and very few individuals interviewed for this
report properly understood the process or their rights under it.183 An
indigenous leader interviewed for this report claimed that “if the government
says that the project is important to the country and communities say no, the
companies get to go ahead anyway.”184 Though company officials deny that
previous consultation laws have been violated185 and though the researchers
found no direct evidence of it, there is a pervasive perception that it is the
case.
Nariño has one of the largest indigenous and Afro-Colombian
populations in Colombia. According to a local indigenous leader, a particular
problem faced by these populations in Nariño is that approximately only
49.45% of the department’s collective territory is legally guaranteed prior consultation.186 This
problem is amplified by the fact that collective territory itself covers 63.12% of the department.
According to local officials, the discrepancy in the lack of protective titling is the result of bad
census information, a weak information register, and incomplete maps.187
Indigenous communities can protect themselves from the entry of MNC mining by
becoming an indigenous reservation (resguardo). In Batania, for example, the indigenous
community is trying to legalize as a resguardo in order to “protect the earth” from incoming
mining companies.188 According to the law, communities retain the prerogative to petition the
government to declare an area indigenous, black or mixed, as appropriate.189 When legalized,
the communities living within the boundaries will receive the rights guaranteed to legal owners
of communally owned land—namely, the right of prior consultation.190 Still, indigenous leaders
are skeptical that resguardo status would really bar MNCs from entering Batania to mine. As an
indigenous leader expressed, “In many cases the government doesn’t follow laws, I think there
are many government laws but not in reality…the moment they find [gold] they won’t respect
any laws.”191 Thus despite the fact that laws exist to nominally protect indigenous communities,
individuals feel so abandoned by the national government that they do not believe its laws would
offer protection.192
“If the government
says that the project is
important to the
country and
communities say no,
the companies get to
go ahead anyway.”
–Representative of the
Pasto Indigenous
community
32
RECOMMENDATIONS
The previous analysis demonstrated that social fissures exist in areas where MNCs mine for
gold. Government policy, due to its internal fragmentation, weak monitoring capacity, isolation
of small and informal miners, and failure to consider local problems, exacerbates these conflicts
at the expense of state legitimacy. MNC policies, while often designed with the intention of
supporting local communities, frequently fail to address the conflicts that arise when MNCs enter
communities with large amounts of small mining or farming activities. Furthermore, their
unrestrained use of private and public security militarizes areas where violent armed conflict is
rife. The social impact of these policies, and of MNC gold mining in general, in communities is
dramatic. As this report has demonstrated, MNC gold mining can stimulate fear, insecurity, and
violent conflict. The following section proposes recommendations to policy makers, the
Colombian national government, MNCs, and finally UNDP that, if followed, would build state
legitimacy and mitigate conflicts associated with gold mining.
Recommendations to Policy Makers Drafting the Mining Code
1. Abolish article 13 of the Mining Code (law 685 of 2001)
This article paradoxically declares mining a social and public good and gives titleholders
the right to expropriate and displace people. Yet an activity that by law is controlled by
private companies cannot reasonably be considered a public good. Additionally, nearly every
large-scale gold mining company is in the late stage of exploration; thus, it is difficult to
foresee what will happen in the exploitation stage when massive quantities of earth will be
removed to conduct mining. For all these reasons, this article should be abolished to avoid
future social conflict and displacement.
2. Distinguish between small, medium, and large mining and adopt different standards for each
category
There must be different criteria and requirements for different kinds and scales of
mining.193A small-scale artisanal miner with no access to roads or internet should not be held
to the same legal standards as an S&P 500 multinational gold mining company. The law
should specify regulations that each of these three groups is capable of adhering to.
3. Create a requirement for environmental licenses for the exploration phase
This must be done for three reasons: firstly, there are conflicting accounts of the
environmental harm from exploration; secondly, Colombia is not suffering from a lack of
foreign companies investing in mining—on the contrary it is overwhelmed with requests—so
instituting this policy would not hinder the economy; and, thirdly, requiring a license during
exploration would encourage respect for the environment during all stages of mining, not just
during exploitation.
4. Create provision for a “Social License” for exploration and exploitation
There must be a mechanism to consult all individuals likely to be affected by exploration
since mining is a clear cause of conflict. Colombia is a democracy that guarantees human
rights in its constitution; thus, an instrument that assures the social rights of people to live on
their land must be instituted. This can be thought of as a Social License. Proponents of big
mining argue that mining will bring jobs and aid development—if this is in fact the case then
33
communities can form their own opinion whether they want to partake in the mining
industry.
5. Add more excluded zones of mining
The constitutional court ruled that there could be more excluded zones in 2002, and the
court’s decision gives environmental authorities the power to create more off limit zones.194
Marking environmentally delicate areas off-limits to mining is essential as gold mining lasts
for a maximum of 60 years and unearths thousands of tons of earth to the point of no reuse,
but Colombia’s bio-diversity is precious and will last far longer.
Recommendations to the Government of Colombia
The consistent complaint voiced across the areas visited over the course of this research
project was a lack of presence and perceived relevance of the national government and, at
times, even the departmental government. In Segovia, a miner at Sandra K said, “the reality
of Bogotá is not the reality of Segovia.”195 These words capture the sentiment of all strata of
society from farmers to advisers of the Ministry of Environment. In particular, the Ministry
of Mines and Energy suffers from an extremely poor perception in Colombia; however,
increasing visibility, presence and monitoring can rectify this.
1. Enhance current national policy plans to aid the legalization process of small artisanal miners
and create a government agency with the purpose of formalizing small and artisanal miners
In Segovia, Gran Colombia Gold prides itself on creating contracts with small miners.
The Ministry of Mines in Antioquia similarly has a program to facilitate dialogue between
small miners and companies with large concession agreements. The MME periodically
makes appearances in major cities and has small initiatives such as “miner legalization days.”
However, these various initiatives must be unified and coordinated into a coherent process
that can be applied at all levels of government. A solution could be to create an agency
whose sole purpose would be to go into the field and document miners without a title and
either help them acquire a concession agreement or set up a contract with the company that
owns the title to their mine. Such a process is not unreasonably ambitious: Gramalote
Colombia Limited, for example, has detailed information on every miner on their title,
because they understand that if they do not negotiate with these actors before entering the
exploitation phase the community will erupt in social unrest. Why should the government not
take the same approach? This will prevent large-scale social unrest especially as gold
companies enter the exploitation phase in the next five years.
2. Strengthen engagement of local communities and stakeholders by consulting local interests when
shaping mining policy and increasing presence on the ground
The government has undergone a process of consolidating agencies into Bogotá—for
example, the National Agency of Mines (ANM) had six regional offices, which have been
liquidated and moved to Bogotá. However, this sort of standardization risks further
separating the national government from the conflicts that occur in mining areas. As the UN
Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action, Extractive Industries and Conflict
(UNIFTPA) argues, “Where communities and stakeholders are poorly engaged, marginalized
or excluded from the dialogue in the Extractive Industry development process, they are
almost certain to begin to oppose the development.”196 Thus, if stakeholders and
communities are adequately engaged, extractive industry related conflict is less likely.
34
3. Issue a moratorium on new mining concessions until the mining “piñata” has been repaired
To avoid increased conflict, the government should cease granting new concessions until
the inconsistencies of the Colombian Mining Cadaster are resolved, reforms to the Mining
Code are made, and the ANM has had the time to finish reviewing its backlog of requests.
4. Set up a committee consisting of relevant government agencies to foster horizontal cooperation
and create a coordination law mandating vertical communication among different strata of
government agencies
The report has shown that there is significant disagreement and lack of coordination
between government agencies. Not only must different agencies work together, like the
Ministry of Environment and the MME, but offices at different levels within agencies must
also coordinate. Ideological differences must be overcome by the creation of a committee
consisting of members from all the different agencies involved with mining in order to
promote a constructive dialogue (the MME, the ANM, the Ministry of Environment, the
Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Agriculture). Additionally, the Ministry of Mines in both
Antioquia and Nariño do not feel the presence of the MME. Colombia needs a law mandating
coordination between state and federal bodies.
5. Have the state adopt mechanisms to actively monitor private industry in gold mining
Currently, the state acts as a passive regulator to private industry. The Mining Code, a
generous tax policy, a standardized process, increased security and centralization were all
instituted in the last decade to attract foreign companies to the mining industry. Yet while
this policy has attracted FDI, it has done so at the expense of its citizenry.
Recommendations for the Government of Colombia to Meet International Standards
Civil society members are increasingly concerned that expanded mining in
Colombia has led to violations of Colombia’s international legal obligations.197 The
Colombian government must come into compliance with these international obligations
as the government’s current development plans are severely threatening citizens’ rights
across the nation. It is recommended that the government proactively address labor,
civil/political rights, the environment and resource management, and indigenous rights
violations.198
1. Address impunity in regards to attacks on unions and labor leaders
Colombia is obligated to protect the rights of workers and unions under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)199 and International Labor Organization (ILO)
conventions 87,200 and Convention 98201 which give citizens the right to join unions and the
right to protection against anti-union discrimination. By allowing an epidemic of violence
against organized labor and by not taking action against those perpetrating these crimes, the
Colombian government is violating its obligations under the UDHR and ILO conventions.
2. Protectively monitor arrests and detentions made in mining areas
The close working relationship between corporate mining firms and the Colombian army
has created a major potential conflict of interest for the Colombian army. This conflict of
interest may create a situation where civilians are arrested, detained, or exiled arbitrarily for
the benefit of mining companies. This type of arbitrary detention is explicitly outlawed by
international law.202
35
3. Provide local policymakers with information and power to make informed decisions about their
environmental resources, taking particular care to engage indigenous communities in the creation
of local development strategies, the creation of natural resource management plans, and in holding
effective consultations over land concessions.
Currently the Colombian government has not effectively provided local citizens with
sufficient information or agency in the environmental decision-making process (as required
by the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 10, which Colombia has
adopted).203 As a signatory of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP)204 the Colombian state is obligated to engage in the creation of strategies
for development and natural resource management (UNDRIP205) for indigenous populations.
Additionally UNDRIP requires the state to hold effective consultation with indigenous
communities over the concessions process (UNDRIP).206
4. Adopt a precautionary and sustainable approach in enterprises utilizing environmental
resources.
Under a wide variety of international obligations the Colombian government has agreed
to take a precautionary approach to protecting the environment.207 Current Colombian
national government policy is not necessarily doing so and must be reformed. This issue is
particularly relevant to mining, as mining often can have a significant impact on the land and
water being mined. This precautionary and sustainable approach is further obligated in
indigenous communities.208
5. Participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the World Bank Institute’s
Contract Monitoring Initiative
Many of the challenges facing the Colombian government in mining could be positively
affected by an increase in transparency. Improved transparency would provide civil society
with a stronger opportunity to join the decision-making process. To improve transparency,
the Colombian government should join Publish What You Pay’s (PWYP) flagship initiative
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the World Bank Institute’s
Contract Monitoring Initiative.209
6. Respect the cultural and land rights of indigenous and minority communities, and establish an
effective mechanism for the redress of adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural and
spiritual impact.
International law defines a community’s land and way of life as part of its culture. As
mining concessions affect the land and culture of indigenous and minority groups, the
Colombian government is obligated to protect these communities’ lands.210 The national
government must respect their cultural rights and allow indigenous and minority groups in
Colombia to choose to mine the land on a small scale, as many of these communities have for
generations, or not mine their land at all.211
UNDRIP requires signatory states to provide an effective mechanism for the redress of
adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural and spiritual impact on minority and
indigenous groups.212 While indigenous groups who have entered formal agreements with
mining companies to move off their land receive payment, they are not wholly compensated
for the adverse cultural and spiritual impact of losing their land. The Colombian state must
establish a mechanism to provide redress for this significant loss.
36
Recommendations to MNCs
1. Follow global norms and standards for extractive industries
MNCs must follow global norms and standards for the extractive industries in principle
and practice. AngloGold Ashanti is a founding member of the International Council on
Mining & Metals (ICMM), an industry initiative to improve sustainable development
performance in the mining and metals industry. AngloGold Ashanti is also a participant in
the UN Global Compact, a voluntary initiative for businesses that are committed to aligning
their operations and strategies with 10 universally accepted principles in the areas of human
rights, labor, environment and anti-corruption. Other large MNCs like Gran Colombia Gold
must also become members of ICMM and the UN Global Compact.
Given Colombia’s long history of human rights violations in its civil conflict, it is of
particular importance that MNCs working in Colombia demonstrate a commitment to uphold
universal human rights principles. Companies must adhere to Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy”
Framework (or the Ruggie Principles) endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011.
In addition, companies must follow the IFC's Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
Rights, which is a joint state/industry/civil society initiative offering practical guidance for
strengthening human rights safeguards in company security arrangements in the extractive
sector and the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which provide voluntary
principles and standards for responsible business conduct in areas such as employment and
industrial relations, human rights, environment, information disclosure, combating bribery,
consumer interests, science and technology, competition, and taxation.
2. MNCs must employ greater transparency and clarity in its communications
Given that three out of four companies studied in this research have not passed the
exploration stage, communities have a right to complete and honest communication about the
companies’ future plans. Junior exploration companies must inform communities of the
uncertainties associated with the sale of their projects. They must inform communities of the
possibilities of resettlement or environmental impact by buyers once projects move into
exploitation. Large companies must also inform communities of these risks well before they
start exploitation. If there are specific plans for integrating residents into company operations
or resettling them, companies must inform communities early.
Companies must refrain from exclusively shaping the narrative and allow the local
government to lead communication efforts. Residents are often suspicious of company
messaging, especially when it is accompanied by CSR projects. Information is more likely to
be perceived as credible when it is complemented by the local government. This will also
induce local governments to demand complete and honest communication from companies.
3. MNCs must follow international labor standards and employ better employment practices
Companies must provide benefits to workers consistent with the standards of the ILO.
They must refrain from hiring temporary contract workers and guarantee permanent jobs and
accompanying benefits to their labor forces. Selective contract employment has the potential
to disrupt the social fabric of communities by bringing quick but temporary wealth to some,
leading to problems such as prostitution and alcoholism, and fueling resentment among
others. Temporary labor can also induce people to give up low-paying but sustainable
37
professions, causing unemployment later. Companies must allow its employees to organize
and engage in collective bargaining.
4. MNCs must be judicious about usage of armed security
Companies must avoid the use of private security for its employees and operations. The
use of private security positions companies as yet another armed actor in areas where armed
conflict is rampant. It fuels the perception that companies are forcibly encroaching on land
that communities have lived and worked on for generations. In sites and situations where the
use of private security is deemed essential, companies must vet security employees to ensure
no history or association with illegal armed groups. Accusations of employee links to
paramilitaries or other armed groups cause communities to despise their presence and fuel
suspicion that the companies are colluding with groups with violent histories in their areas.
Recommendations to UNDP
At national level UNDP should consider:
1. Leveraging its role to influence national-level policy making on mining during the 2012-2013
Mining Code reform in the ways listed in the mining code reform section of this document
As mining reform is currently being debated until 2013, there is a unique opportunity
today to make a lasting positive impact on mining in Colombia. UNDP should not miss
this opportunity and should consider encouraging better practices in the mining code as
identified in this document (see mining code reform under Government
Recommendations).
2. Convening UNDP teams to share best practices on mining issues and lessons learned
In order to build a rich and comprehensive understanding of how mining is affecting
development in Colombia today, the national UNDP team should encourage learning
across UNDP departmental teams. Departmental teams should be convened to share their
knowledge on this topic. It is recommended that UNDP host a workshop on mining in
order for team members to share expertise and better understand the complexities and
impact of mining across Colombia.
3. Encourage the Colombia state to comply with its international legal obligations
UNDP should encourage the Colombian national government to abide by its legal
obligations as outlined in “Recommendations for the Government of Colombia to meet
international standards.” It should work with the state to disseminate information about
these obligations to civil society and community leaders to further ensure that the
government is adhering to these obligations.
At the departmental level, UNDP should consider:
1. Providing training on mining for the UNDP departmental territorial leaders
Given the expected growth in the mining sector, UNDP must increase its understanding
of this key sector in order to help ensure that mining has a positive impact on Colombia’s
development and serves as a driver of peace and not conflict. One key way to ensure this
is to prepare Territoriales (UNDP departmental leaders) with a detailed understanding of
mining.
38
2. Supporting a diagnostic on the social, environmental, political, and economic implications of
mining in each of the six UNDP departments
Departmental leaders should undertake diagnostics in their departments focused on the
social, environmental, political, and economic impacts of mining. These will provide
UNDP departmental offices with a refined understanding of the local issues that they face
within their departments and help them identify how best to create programs to support
the communities they are working with.
3. Acting as a “school for mining rights,” supporting legal training for community leaders and
organizations that REDES engages on the ground
Responding to the demand that many interviewed community leaders shared, UNDP
should provide communities with training on mining law and mining rights similar to
their current work teaching vulnerable communities human rights. Issues that should be
addressed include previous consultation laws; effective negotiation with large mining
firms (including MNCs); the process of legalizing informal mines; the rights of
agricultural workers and land ownership rights; community mobilization and effective
debate on mining issues; and environmental land rights.
4. More thoroughly integrating work with other UN agencies
UNDP should consider more thoroughly partnering with other UN agencies to ensure that
the impact of mining is comprehensively addressed. In particular the UNDP should
partner with UN High Commissioner for Refugees to work on displacement as many
populations in UNDP departments have been internally displaced as a result of
mining. Furthermore, due to the interconnection between gold mining, armed actors, and
coca crops, UNDP should consider working with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime,
which currently operates programs in areas where the UNDP is working encouraging
farmers to shift from growing coca to cacao.213 UNDP should consider convening the
various UN agencies into a UN Interagency Group as occurred in Montes de Maria for
the REDES program there in 2009.214
Recommendations for Future Research
1. Undertake more in-depth diagnostics of how the arrival of foreign multinationals in gold
mining are affecting the stability of Antioquia and Nariño
Due to the limited resources of this project the research team was unable to undertake
systematic economic, social, and political diagnostics on Antioquia and Nariño. A
quantitative study as well as a more comprehensive qualitative study is needed to better
understand the shifting dynamics at play in these departments.
2. Evaluate Colombia’s mining code against other countries in Latin America
A better understanding of mining polices in other nations will elucidate best practices and
identify potential pitfalls of mining policy in Latin America. In particular countries such as
Peru, Costa Rica, and Chile should be compared and contrasted due to the differentiated
approach each of those countries has taken in regards to mining.
3. Study how and to what extent armed actors are involved in the gold mining process in
Antioquia and Nariño
While our study was unable to significantly interview or evaluate how armed actors are
connected to the extraction process due to access and safety issues, future studies should
attempt to better understand the nuances of these actors and their motives as they play a
39
significant role in the resource extraction process and have a substantial impact on stability in
Colombia.
4. Evaluate the success of multinational firms’ Corporate Social Responsibility programs
Though our research investigated a few firms and their CSR programs, future
investigators should consider doing a more comprehensive evaluation of the success of CSR
programs in Colombian gold mining.
5. Investigate how the arrival of MNCs in gold mining affects other departments
Expanding the approach of this investigation to other departments in Colombia will help
give a richer and more comprehensive understanding of the effects of MNCs in gold mining
across Colombia. In particular, departments with high levels of gold mining like Choco,
Cauca, and Santander should be researched.
40
CONCLUSION
The five authors of this paper set out with one research question: how has gold mining
conducted by foreign multinationals in Colombia impacted local societies as a driver of conflict
or peace building? To answer this question, the authors focused their research on two
departments in particular: Nariño and Antioquia. Actors of every type were interviewed,
including the CEO of a gold company, endangered union leaders, UNDP office heads, and top
government officials. The resulting paper drew from these interviews, field visits and extensive
research in order to provide recommendations to MNCs, the United Nations and the government
of Colombia.
The research in this project has revealed that FDI in the gold industry is a driver of
conflict and substantial reform is needed to ameliorate the situation on the ground. One of the
most important observations is that the nature of the conflict differs according to an area’s
cultural and geographic background. This observation may be reduced to one simple question:
does the area at issue have an agricultural or mining history? This investigation has shown that in
agricultural areas, such as Arboleda in Nariño, conflict occurs when companies arrive and
perform exploration because mining is not a part of the culture and is viewed with suspicion and
hostility. However, in areas with a history of mining, such as Segovia in Antioquia, conflict
transpires between small artisanal miners and large companies who own the rights to large
polygons of land.
This paper has shown that conflict is driven by the national government’s pursuit of FDI
at the expense of local communities, a poorly designed and shortsighted mining law, an
overzealous desire to cater to the needs of large companies, weak government monitoring
capacity, an increasingly militarized mining sector, and MNCs’ deficient understandings of the
social situation on the ground. The proposed solutions include reforming the Mining Code,
making changes in the government both administratively and philosophically, greater action on
the part of the international community, and improved CSR on the part of mining companies.
Colombia has suffered from the ‘natural resource curse’ for several hundred years—this has
caused the displacement of millions and the deaths of tens of thousands. As the country looks
forward, it should be careful not to pursue development at the expense of local individuals and
communities. If Colombia avoids the negative social impacts of mining, FDI has the potential to
lead to peace.
41
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The researchers would like to gratefully acknowledge individuals and organizations without
whose support this research would not have been possible.
First and foremost we would like to thank Bruno Moro and Silvia Rucks of UNDP Colombia for
welcoming us into Colombia and connecting us with their teams in the country. A warm thank
you must also be extended to Dr. Roderick Brett who helped to refine our research approach. We
are deeply grateful to Carlos Iván Lopera and Borja Paladini Adell for hosting us in their
respective offices in Antioquia and Nariño and for providing crucial guidance, logistical support,
and hospitality.
Furthermore, we are forever indebted to all our colleagues at UNDP Colombia for sharing their
knowledge and showing us great kindness throughout the course of this study. In particular, we
thank Alessandro Preti, Patricia Toro, Carlos Ernesto Pérez, Jorge Iván Rincón, Felipe Andres
Herrera, Adriana Ordóñez, Ana María Pérez, Dario Fernando Tobar, Pablo Andres Londoño
Medina, and Nathaly Ibarra.
Additionally the support of Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Marc Jacquand, Jessica Baen, and Alba
Traveras at The Center for International Conflict Resolution was invaluable to our research.
Their leadership made it possible for us to pursue and complete this study. We would not have
been able to conduct our research without the resources we received from the School of
International and Public Affairs at Columbia University and specifically the Center for
International Conflict Resolution (CICR), the Institute for Latin American Studies, and the
Office of Career Services.
We are also indebted to interpreters Pedro Noriega del Angel, Juan Sebastian Jaramillo, David
Celemin, Lileth Lopez, Cindy Rendon and Ingrid Arteaga who enabled us to understand the
complex opinions and grievances of the many actors we interviewed.
Lastly, we would like thank the following individuals and organizations for their crucial advice,
hospitality, and insight:
Rossana Dudziak, Isabela Echeverry, Susie and Chris Ferguson, Ana Maria Lopez, Juan Camillo
Pryor, Presbítero Miguel Ángel Salazar Rincón, Camillo Santa, Katherine Sutton, Natalia
Tejada, and members of the Christian Peace Team.
42
APPENDIX A: CASE STUDIES
Arboleda
“We are campesinos, our ancestors were campesinos, and we want our children to be
campesinos as well.”
- Community leader and farmer215
The municipality of Arboleda is historically a farming community situated upon an
important archeological site. Its 83 families engage primarily in subsistence farming and smallscale coffee production.216 Several farmers sell their certified organic coffee to Nespresso, an
operating unit of the Swiss company Nestle. Despite the fact that the Department of Nariño has
experienced some of the highest levels of violence in Colombia, the municipality of Arboleda
has been peaceful, with little to no presence of armed actors in the area.
However, ever since Gran Colombia Gold entered the municipality through its
subsidiary, Mazamorras Gold, the municipality has seen a steady increase in conflict. In
November 2010, the company launched a community engagement policy focusing on promoting
the company and galvanizing support for mining in Arboleda. It advertised the company’s “good
work” through films, hired propagandists to promote the company, and organized festivals such
as a “miner day” complete with games, prizes and ubiquitous imagery of the Virgin Mary (the
patron saint of mining). Additionally, the company promised to build roads and schools for the
municipality.217
In January 2011, the company started exploring on ten platforms in its 5976 hectareconcession.218It planned to eventually set up 90 platforms after obtaining agreement from
farmers inhabiting the land to give the company exploration permits.219 Additionally, it hired
approximately 150 community members to work on the sites. In a community where seasonal
coffee growing is the main source of livelihood, community members were excited to receive the
extra income and work.220 These jobs, however, were informal and short-term.221
As exploration progressed, conflict took root in the community. Community leaders
observed that wealth inequality between new employees of Gran Colombia Gold and farmers led
to social unrest and the influx of new wealth increased liquor consumption, prostitution, and
other social problems. Additionally, community members reported contamination of local water
and the lowering of water levels in the agrarian region. 222 According to activists, some livestock
became ill and died, and coffee bean crops showed signs of weakening.223 As the coffee
production community’s main source of income, reports of environmental damage were deeply
alarming to community members.224
This conflict came to a head in November 2011 when community members organized a
demonstration to protest Gran Colombia Gold’s presence in the region. The company’s private
security forces reportedly retaliated by assaulting three individuals, including a young girl. The
conflict culminated in a woman being handcuffed to a truck naked whilst protestors threatened
her with rape.225 Community members, in turn, retaliated by occupying the mining camps and,
after a clash with mine workers, burned the camps down. When company employees reentered
the area on November 10th accompanied by riot police226 opposition leaders threatened to burn
the new camps down again.
Community members actively opposed to mining have reported that they have received
threats since exploration began. According to a community leader, after the demonstration,
43
“Very visible community leaders started to get threatening phone calls and text messages.”227
The community leader cited approximately 15 allegations of physical violence against individual
community leaders ranging from actual violence, to verbal threats of violence, to slander. In
addition, three community leaders vocally opposed mining had their capitches (laboratories used
to process sugar into panela) destroyed.228
More seriously, allegations were made to the Office of the Attorney General that small
groups of paramilitaries entered Arboleda with the onset of multinational involvement.
Community leaders reported that a group of about 25-30 paramilitaries had begun to organize in
the area around the around Arboleda and were responsible for the violence and threats against
those vocally opposed to mining. A human rights activist stated that while it is difficult to get
direct evidence that those perpetrating the violence had paramilitary links, certain individuals are
“coming in the night and the early morning [into the community] and committing atrocities… in
the community where there is the most resistance to the mines.” Several families, she said, had
been displaced after feeling too threatened to stay in Arboleda.229
After the violence Gran Colombia Gold agreed to leave for one month in January 2012
and to impose a moratorium on further mining. The company subsequently claimed that it signed
the exit agreement under coercion and duress. In August 2012, Gran Colombia Gold sold its
Arboleda assets to Andean Minerals and Metals Corp, claiming it wanted to focus on its
Antioquia projects.230 This sale is unlikely to suspend gold exploration in Arboleda or halt the
trajectory from farming to mining in the municipality. Moreover, the President of Andean
Minerals and Metals Corporation is Joseph Oro, formerly the Vice President, Exploration and
Corporate Development of Gran Colombia Gold. This link further suggests that gold mining in
Arboleda will continue along its conflict-ridden trajectory, with the company essentially
changing names but not changing hands with the recent sale.
44
Los Andes Sotomayor
“The biggest problem in small mining is that we don’t have access to resources to do mining
well and sustainably. We are in conflict with the government to receive what we need.”231
– Small miner, Los Andes Sotomayor
Unlike Arboleda, the municipality of Los Andes Sotomayor is a traditional mining
community. Mining represents, by one estimate, 35% of the local economy. 232 Illegal mining is
very common here, although exact numbers are impossible to ascertain. Around 85 legal miners
are part of the Cooperativa de Mineros de Los Andes LTDA, which jointly own about nine mines.
While guerilla groups were extremely powerful in this area from 1996-2000, their control has
since dissipated.233
Land in Los Andes is currently under concession to AngloGold Ashanti. The company is
in early exploration phase there and occasionally enters the community and hires local miners on
short contracts to explore for gold.234 Legal and illegal small miners continue to mine for gold
within the areas under concession to the company. Although the company has attempted to buy
titles from local miners, the majority of small miners in Los Andes Sotomayor are not interested
in selling to AngloGold for several reasons.235 First, miners feel that an MNC would not recycle
profits back into the community. Second, they feel that AngloGold has failed to communicate
adequately with the community. Without adequate consultation and space for negotiation, they
would be opposed to any deal. As a small miner explained, “We, the small miners… don’t want
to sell, but we are open to what the MNCs have to say. We want to be consulted with, we want a
real dialogue. AngloGold hasn’t consulted with us.”236 Furthermore, the sentiment that
multinational mining will destroy the delicate social cohesion in the community is pervasive. As
a member of the Cooperative explained, “Everything will change when MNCs come—
prostitution will come, the economy will change, the environment will change, lots of people
from the outside will come to work, and paramilitaries will come.” 237 Community members feel
powerless compared to MNCs. For instance, the mayor is concerned that an MNC could
sidestep local government because they enjoy national government support and have the
financial resources to “pay the army” to protect their interests.238
Small miners believe that they do not receive enough support from the government,
especially compared with the support MNCs receive. We heard the sentiment, “small miners
should not have to adhere to the same requirements that big miners have to adhere to” many
times during the visit.239 They complain that it is impossible to buy explosives—a necessary
component of underground mining. Prohibitive prices, strict, or impossible, regulations, and the
bureaucratic process involved in acquiring them compels small miners to use dangerous illegal
homemade explosives or explosives purchased from armed groups. Small miners are also not
able to commercialize their gold locally and are forced to travel long distances to sell their gold.
These constraints are forcing miners in the area to cease mining and could compel them to turn
to other sources of income like cocaine.
45
La Llanada
“We are all owners”240
- Head of La Llanada Mining Cooperative
La Llanada is a recently established gold mining town close to Los Andes. Created
around an American MNC’s mines in the 1970s, La Llanada is lauded by many as, “a national
example for the adoption of clean production technologies…strategic alliances, and alternatives
to the cultivation of illicit plants.”241 While the areas surrounding La Llanada have strong
histories of armed conflict,242 La Llanada has been characterized by relative peace, leading some
to describe it as a light of green amidst of a sea of red. 243 Today, its economy revolves around
mining, producing 1,820 ounces of gold annually to the Central Bank.244
Illegal mining is pervasive in La Llanada and is constantly under threat by the army
which perpetually closes illegal mines. Legal mining activity in La Llanada revolves around its
unified cooperative, Codmilla, which started in the 1970s. Today, the cooperative shares
ownership of four titles, is responsible for obtaining the environmental license and other legal
documents, and helps its associates to buy explosives, sell their gold, access capital, and receive
training and education. The cooperative is stringent about worker benefits, good working
conditions, and agreeable relationship with local government. Codmilla helps to sustain
approximately 372 families and more than 1,860 individuals.245
While several multinational mining companies have approached the La Llanada
cooperative to buy its mines, the cooperative has categorically refused to sell its titles.246
AngloGold Ashanti offered to build schools, aqueducts, roads and give 1% of its profits to the
cooperative. These promises are not attractive to La Llanada’s miners and mining leadership.
Unlike miners we met in Los Andes Sotomayor who were interested in leasing their land as long
as profits were recycled back into the community and miners benefited somewhat from the deal,
La Llanada’s cooperative insists that no circumstance would motivate them to sell their titles to a
foreign company.
This is primarily because gold mining in La Llanada supports the local economy, is a
source for growth, and encourages conflict resolution. Furthermore, cooperative members
believe their small-scale mining practices are more sustainable than large-scale multinational
mining, both environmentally and for long-term development. Multinational mining, they argue,
“destroys.”247 Cooperative leaders expressed fears that big mining would exploit gold resources
so quickly it would eradicate the mines of gold within a few years, thus devastating an economy
largely based in mining. They project small scale mining, on the other hand, to be profitable for
at least 20 more years.
Despite the adamancy with which the La Llanada cooperative rejects MNC influence, La
Llanada will eventually have to deal with AngloGold Ashanti. Because the national government
grants concessions with no input from local communities or governments, the community has no
choice but to accept the MNCs presence in La Llanada. An additional concern for miners is that
the cooperative’s title expires in 2020. Because the national government is responsible for
granting concessions, miners in La Llanada fear that the national government will allow the title
to transfer to an MNC. While the cooperative enjoys local government support, it believes that
the national government would privilege MNCs over the cooperative.248Similarly, while
Codmilla is generally positive about the national armybecause it helps them acquire mining
explosives and feel safe,members of the cooperative also believe that the army supports MNCs’
46
interests over those of the local community. The perception that AngloGold Ashanti has more
access to public security demonstrates a breakdown in state legitimacy, public belief in the
national government, and in public service delivery.
Lastly, the community is concerned that mining in general is not sustainable in the long
term. A member of the cooperative, for example, expressed concern about complete dependence
on mining as a form of development, because it increases food insecurity. Since becoming a
mining town, La Llanada has always imported its food. Because gold might run out in twenty to
fifty years, diversifying their economy is necessary. 249Ultimately, despite the fact that mining is
currently a force for good in La Llanada, mining will not be sustainable forever, whether it is
carried out by MNCs or by a community-based cooperative like Codmilla.
Samaniego
“If the MNCs were here they would need the ELN’s support.
- Samaniego community leader250
The municipality of Samaniego is situated at the crossroads of several different armed
actors. One town in the municipality, the town of Samaniego, is an army stronghold, but just next
to it is Batania, located in territory controlled by the ELN and situated near an ELN base camp.
Individuals in Samaniego have been, and are still, deeply affected by the conflict in their
community. The biggest problems in Batania and the rest of the Sector Montanos are the
presence of armed groups, the absence of the state, and the proliferation of illegal economic
activities of all sorts. These illegal economic activities displace the ‘sustainable’ agricultural
processes that are indigenous to the community. Extortion, displacement, and death threats are
widespread.
During the research visit, community members were extremely hesitant to talk about
mining, going to lengths to avoid talking about mining directly. Despite the claim by several
community members that there is no gold in the area, there is certainly a large degree of “illegal”
artisanal mining. One community leader the researchers interviewed claimed that his particular
community depended on it 100 percent.251 While this figure is most definitely an exaggeration,
hesitance to discuss the issue of mining with foreign researchers despite high levels of mining
activity indicates the level of fear rooted so deeply in the community. Simply put, community
members in Samaniego are terrified- terrified that their lives would be threatened if the
government learned of their illegal status, terrified of losing their land and being displaced if
gold is discovered by multinationals or other powerful actors, and terrified of the repercussions
they could face should armed actors learn what they said. In one meeting researchers observed,
for example, community members asked all foreigners (researchers and UNDP staff) to leave the
room while they showed maps of their land, demonstrating the fear that foreigners will capitalize
upon their resources. In another demonstration of the community’s anxiety that outsiders would
take advantage of community land, researchers heard of pervasive fears that plans from a
decades old topography study could facilitate widespread awareness that gold exists in the
region.252
Miners are generally unaware of the processes to legalize their mines. While some
leaders believed mining could provide more employment for their community, citizens generally
admitted that they knew little about their legal rights in regards to mining and expressed little
confidence in the national government and legal system.
47
While MNCs are only minimally present in Batania, there have been reports of MNCs
informally exploring the territory. The specter of the arrival of MNCs is affecting the residents
who fear their arrival and guard information about gold reserves and gold mining on their land.
People are very confused and scared about what they have heard about other communities.253
Community leaders expressed a fear of MNCs ruining their environment and displacing them
from their land.254 Furthermore, as the organization SEPAVSI made clear, although previous
consultation is normally conducted, it is often done “immorally.” Companies identify leaders that
support them to “consult” with, bribe or intimidate.255
UNDP runs successful programs in the municipality. The researchers’ observed a town
meeting where UNDP staff educated the community on what food autonomy would look like in
their community and what they needed to develop a sustainable model. Additionally, the UNDP
provides support to indigenous groups on strategies to protect their land and to develop steps to
turn their land into a reserve, which would give them more rights.
Samaniego and the surrounding areas represent a community where the Colombian state
faces major threats. Even though Samaniego hosts a large presence of government troops there
are still incidents of armed actors threatening local civilians. It would be very difficult for largescale mining to operate here without assent from armed groups. According to a member of
Batania’s leadership, “if the MNCs are here they need the ELN’s support.”256 Many of the
surrounding areas of Samaniego such as Batania are controlled by the ELN and other armed
actors are active in the area as well. Though the researchers did not witness direct violence, they
saw weapons and evidence of armed groups. The researchers observed a woman who was being
extorted by a group of thugs in the area. Three weeks after the research visit, there were serious
violent clashes in the community. An army barrack suffered an explosion in the town of
Samaniego. The next month, a UNDP field officer received threats from an unknown source
admonishing him and his organization not to return to the community to continue work.257 The
tenuous conflict situation here suggests that the arrival of an MNC has the potential to upset the
already delicate local balance of power.
Caramanta
“Solvista Gold are good people, I know they’re good people, but I have no idea what’s going to
happen once the company leaves”
– Caramanta resident258
The municipality of Caramanta is historically an agricultural town reliant on subsistence
farming. Its small economy produces sugarcane, livestock, coffee, potatoes, and bananas, among
other products. Solvista Gold is in the early stages of exploration in Caramanta. It will probably
take 2-3 years of drilling before exploration is concluded, after which the company plans to sell
its concessions to a larger company for exploitation.
Caramanta was chosen as a site in the study because the Ministry of Mines Antioquia
praised Solvista Gold for following best practices in mining, so much so that a junior member in
the Ministry facilitated our visit in order to demonstrate responsible companies exist in the gold
mining industry. Accompaniment by the Ministry’s representative allowed researchers privileged
insight into how the Ministry of Mines Antioquia handles inspections of mining projects.
48
Solvista Gold has several active CSR programs in Caramanta. Its flagship initiative,
“Projectors Productivos” is welcomed by community members who, with the company’s help,
are able to move from subsistence farming to surplus. The company’s projects in neighboring
Tamesis, Guayabal, and San Pablo help families develop small gardens to grow banana, pepper,
lettuce, beans, and cilantro, amongst other crops that families sell locally. In order to receive
capital, farmers are obligated to enter into two-year contracts with the company, signed off by
the municipality, agreeing to a certain number of man-hours in exchange for seeds and
equipment. In addition, the company employs experts to follow up and advise families on
technical farming issues.
The company maintains an open and respectful relationship with the community. The
company’s director, Jose David Castellanos told the researchers before the visit, “our door is
always open, you can talk to us. If you have a problem we’ll meet with you.”259 This
philosophy was evidenced during the research visit when Castellanos conducted a community
meeting with farmers involved in his Projectos initiative. Community members were positive
about the program and eager to speak about their experiences and issues.260
In addition, the company makes a significant effort to keep the community informed
about its progress, an effort poignantly exemplified by the open relationship between Castellanos
and Caramanta’s mayor, who expressed doubts about the longevity and environmental impact of
mining in Castellanos’ presence but admitted his desire to learn more.
Furthermore, Solvista does not drill in areas that are heavily populated. Unlike Arboleda,
where Gran Colombia Gold installed exploration platforms less than thirty feet from the local
school, Solvista’s platforms are far from any inhabitation. Also unlike Gran Colombia Gold,
Solvista refrains from employing or using security teams.
That said, the company’s wealth and connection leads to a power dynamic that puts the
company at a distinct advantage. For example, the company’s sole security employee was hired
after a long career in the military. When Solvista employees encountered a brief incident wherein
children threw rocks in protest at Solvista employees, the security employee called national army
soldiers (through his connections from his former career) who arrived instantly to protect
company employees. Solvista’s wealth gives it unparalled power to win support of the local
government. As Melissa Moriarty, Director of Corporate Relations for the company explained,
Solvista’s CSR programs help the local government fulfill “their development goals” without
having to “to do the footwork.”261 In this way, Solvista uses its financial resources to earn
support from the local government.
These dangers are compounded by the fact that Solvista is only a first stage company.
After it completes its exploration project in 2-3 years, it plans to sell titles to a bigger company.
There are no guarantees that the company will be as responsible or continue its support of
projects in communities and the government’s development goals. This fact is not known widely
in the community. As a community member and participant of Solvista’s CSR programs
admitted, the community has no idea what will happen after the exploration finishes and Solvista
sells its titles. Those who are aware of this sale are terrified and uncertain about the future.262
Despite the general support of Solvista in Caramanta, factions of society are deeply
opposed to MNC involvement in general and gold mining in particular in their community. In the
neighboring town of Tamesis, for example, there is a strong opposition movement. Tamesis
activists organized a three-day protest that began the day after the researchers’ visit. The mayor
of Tamesis is part of the opposition movement and adamantly opposes the entry of multinational
mining in his town.263 Furthermore, environmental and peasant groups adamantly oppose
49
mining and have organized to stop it. Like the community in Arboleda, these groups see mining
as a direct threat to, “our culture, our Andean forests that protect water, forests, biodiversity,
landscape."264 Moreover, groups worry that powerful moneyed interests will take advantage and
threaten the safety of those who are opposed to mining. “We fear for the safety of ourselves and
our families and communities as we are persecuted for not agreeing to an extraction project
proposed by those who would further their personal interests by coming to our land to get rich
from mining.”265
During the visit, the representative from the Ministry of Mines Antioquia made no
attempt to examine opposition to mining or to research any adverse effects of Solvista’s
program. He took no notes or pictures and did not employ a methodological approach to his
study. He did not ask company representatives questions and did not appear to employ a critical
approach in his investigation. Researchers could only conclude that the representative’s approach
was, if not standard, at least commonplace of the Ministry’s inspections. Therefore, we had to
conclude that other Ministry assessments of responsible mining were similarly based on onesided research investigations.
Ultimately, the case of Caramanta reveals the uncertainty of the future. Neither the
mayor, nor civil society, nor company leaders are certain about the future of Caramanta once
Solvista finishes exploration. As such, the Caramanta is in many ways a metaphor for the state of
Colombian mining today. Caramanta is, like the rest of the country, at the cusp of exploitation.
Exploration, when done responsibly, has a minimal environmental and social impact but
exploitation can have dire consequences that are far more serious. Even if Solvista’s program
represents the best possible practices in Colombian gold mining, it is still an exploration
company, and there is no guarantee that the exploitation company that succeeds it will employ
similarly responsible programs.
Anorí
“The national government wants to get rid of us for MNCs”266
—Anorí Miner
Anorí has been a gold mining hub since the mid-19th century when the area exploded
with gold discoveries. While large-scale mining stalled before the 19th century began, artisanal
miners have continued to mine for gold since. Anorí’s recent history has been characterized by
more dangerous economic activity, however. Indeed, Anorí has had one of the highest coca
production rates in Colombia.267 While coca production has decreased radically in recent years,
it still represents a large chunk of the municipality’s underground economy. The FARC’s 36th
front remains heavily involved in the drug trade here, storing coca in nearby mountains and
selling it to a range of groups including BACRIMS and the paramilitaries of the United SelfDefense Forces of Colombia (AUC).268 Although some recent stability exists in Anorí town, the
municipality is rife with conflict. On our visit, researchers interviewed women who had been
displaced and women who were being threatened and extorted by armed actors.
Increasingly in Anorí, gold has replaced coca as a lootable resource, which the FARC and
other armed groups use to gain money and power. For example, the 36th Front of the FARC is
based in the area of Anorí with the highest number of small-scale alluvial mines.269 Miners who
work these mines are forced to make payments to armed groups. According to Insight, the
50
FARC charges some 3 million pesos to each miner that enters their territory and then around 1
million per month as upkeep. Miners who do not pay these charges risk having their equipment
destroyed, or worse. A municipal representative also made this claim to researchers, arguing “if
you are doing gold mining here you are getting extorted.”270
Small miners in Anorí share grievances with the other small miners interviewed in
Nariño and Antioquia. They feel that the government “stigmatizes” and “persecutes” small
miners. They feel vilified by the police. As a small miner explained “the police think we’re all
criminals, if they see us on the streets they give us a hard time.”271 Efforts to legalize the land
they mine on are disregarded. As one miner said, “it’s very tough to get mining titles.” Of the
2000 requests made, none so far have been granted.272Furthermore, Anorí miners feel persecuted
by the national government.273For this reason, miners in Anorí have considered starting a
campaign to reduce the stigmatization of “illegal” mining.
Miners in Anorí face tremendous personal security obstacles. For example, the journey
from the town of Anorí to mining areas puts miners at risk of extortion and violence. Miners
interviewed admitted that they were stopped on the road to the mines by armed groups and often
forced to pay a fee to pass every day. Robbers also inhabit these roads. One miner, for example,
showed the researchers a wound on his arm that he received when he was attacked by robbers.
Another individual who worked in the mines described her daily six-hour commute (three hours
each way) to the mine as constantly terrified of being stopped on the road at any point.
In this complex context, over 80% of Anorí’s land is under concession to MNCs.274
Junior exploration company Minatura is in prospection stage here with two titles of 1500 and
4000 hectares, respectively. It plans to move to exploration stage by next year once it obtains
approval from the Ministry of Mines Antioquia and the environmental authority
CorpoAntioquia.275 According to the miners association, Minatura’s involvement represents “an
ugly situation.” There are fears that Minatura comes to mine, it will do so without regard to the
local community because “MNCs see the title and just go ahead…but they have to engage small
miners.”276
REDES is currently working to build coalitions within the community including initiating
a victims’ rights group to address issues in the community and to create a stronger nexus
between civil society actors, community leaders and local government. They also have created a
group that stands for peace and unity within the area. The researchers observed a UNDP
facilitated candlelit public peace demonstration that included members of the local municipal
council, church leaders, and mining leaders. UNDOC has a program supporting farmers who
have switched from growing coca to growing cacao. Additionally, REDES has recently started
to organize a mining group to address local mining issues. For example in an association
meeting, researchers observed UNDP staff work with the mining association to organize, decide
what kind of support the association would like from UNDP, discuss the issues the individual
miners faced in their community, understand their perspectives about MNC mining, and identify
the benefits and pitfalls of mining in their community.
51
San Roque
“People are scared about their future”277
- Employee, San Roque
Like Anorí, San Roque has a long mining history that dates back to colonial times. The
town originally emerged as a mining hub after the Spanish discovered gold close by. Today, 80
percent of the population is engaged in agriculture and livestock, making up 76% of the
municipalities GDP. The municipality’s reliance on farming will shift dramatically in the future,
however, because AngloGold Ashanti plans to exploit land in its 320,000 hectare concession. 278
Currently, the company is in “advanced exploration stage” through its subsidiary Gramalote.
Community members believe they will be able to maintain their way of life and
livelihoods for the foreseeable future. As one community member explained, “[AngloGold] is
buying farms and often letting people continue their work, it’s the same as it was, it is just that
Gramalote owns the land now.”279 Another individual, the owner of a panela (processed sugar)
factory, shared this sentiment. He told researchers that he sold his land 10 years ago to
AngloGold Ashanti, but that the company assured him he could continue his work making
panela regardless. In addition, the company promised to give him funds to renovate his factory
with new walls and a real roof.280
In reality, however, the company future actions are uncertain. When researchers asked a
company representative whether the panela factory owner would be able continue working, she
acknowledged that he would have to move off his land as soon as the company begins to exploit
the land for gold. Furthermore, as the Gramalote project expands, residents could be forced to
change professions or leave the area. As AngloGold’s President, Rafael Herz clarified, there is a
chance of “economic resettlement from the area and potentially into another economic activity,
becoming employees of the company and/or servicing the company such as transportation or
catering.”281 This discrepancy between community expectations and company plans has
tremendous implications for the stability of San Roque.
During the researchers’ visit to AngloGold’s site in Providencia in the municipality of
San Roque, company representatives were alarmed when they learned that researchers were
communicating with residents. While the company previously denied countless requests for
meetings, during our visit they became very interested in meeting with us, so much so that they
tried to ascertain our location and met us where we were conducting interviews. This gave
researchers the impression that the company was trying to prevent them from acquiring
information about the project. This impression was bolstered when the tone of a community
leader to whom the company introduced the researchers shifted dramatically once the Gramalote
representative left. The leader initially talked about the benefits of Gramalote’s CSR programs
and his satisfaction with the company’s presence. However, as soon as the company
representative left, he became much more candid; he accused the company of being duplicitous
sand expressed his fear that future company operations would displace everyone in the area and
destroy the environment. He claimed that residents were not fully aware nor did they fully
understand the consequences of large-scale mining in their area. At the end of the interview he
made a strong plea for UNDP support and training on mining issues and rights.
52
Segovia
“If you want to survive in Segovia, you have to be a diplomat.282”
—Miner at Sandra K, Segovia
Gold mining activity in Segovia predated the arrival of the Spanish conquistadors in the
16 century. It was initially named Tierradentro, which literally means “in the earth,” signifying
the prevalence of gold in the area. In the 19th century, Segovia’s lucrative potential drew the
attention of an English gold mining company named Frontino Gold Mines, which obtained a
special title from Antioquia in 1854. The title was unique because it gave the enterprise full
ownership over both the topsoil and the subsoil.283 Soon after this acquisition, Frontino broke
ground on what would become its largest mine, El Silencio with over 800 km of tunnels.
Frontino went bankrupt in the late 1970s, after which Segovia went through a complex
period of liquidation while Frontino miners continued to unofficially exploit gold. Finally, in
2010, a newly formed Canadian enterprise named Gran Colombia Gold Corp. obtained full rights
over Segovia, and it has been in control ever since. Today, Gran Colombia Gold operates four
underground mines in the exploitation stage: Providencia, El Silencio, Sandra K, and Carla. 284
The company is simultaneously exploiting and repairing Segovia’s oldest mine, El Silencio,
which is 150 years old and 44 levels deep;285 and it is also exploiting its newest mine, Sandra K,
which is 12 years old and 3 levels deep. In totality, Gran Colombia Gold estimates that their total
operations produce 8,000 ounces of gold per month, which is smelted into bars that are about 1.5
feet long and weigh 88 pounds. The bars are flown by helicopter every day to Medellín where, as
of August 2012, 80% of it is exported to India.286
The legality of the Gran Colombia Gold sale is hotly contested. After Frontino Gold
Mines declared bankruptcy in 1979, Frontino signed a notarized document in New York City,
which handed over control of all its holdings to the miners in order to pay off salaries and
pensions owed to its workers and settle the massive debt, which totaled 200 million USD. Even
today, many believe that this document, which is nicknamed “The New York Act,” offers proof
that Segovia was effectively handed over to the workers. While the government of Colombia
pronounced Frontino’s holdings in a state of liquidation and theoretically assumed control, in
practice, the miners of Segovia continued to work as they had under the English multinational
between 1980 and 2010.287 These 30 years of unregulated activity witnessed the arrival of
hundreds of new miners afflicted with what Segovians metaphorically call “gold fever.”
This same era also saw a dramatic increase in mercury use, which is a cheap, easy, but
highly toxic way to extract gold from nonprecious minerals like sulfur. By 2009, Segovia had
the highest concentration of mercury not just in Colombia, but in the world.288 On a visit to the
site, researchers visited an artisanal gold extraction plant where the miners were using mercury
and witnessed a miner who was clearly sick with mercury poisoning—his eyes were bulging out
of his head, as is symptomatic of the condition. Additionally, the water pump at El Silencio,
Frontino’s largest and oldest mine, had become damaged and the bottom of the mine was
submerged in water by 2010.
Much to the dismay of many of the former Frontino miners, a Colombian court ruled on
two occasions that the New York Act bore no legal weight in Colombia, and, in 2010, authorized
a full transfer of Frontino’s assets to Zandor Capital in exchange for 200 million USD.289 Later
that year Gran Colombia Gold acquired Zandor. A noteworthy detail is the fact that the president
and CEO of Gran Colombia Goldis Maria Consuela Arajuo, who was former President Uribe’s
th
53
Foreign Minister until she stepped down after it was alleged that her father and brother had close
links with violent paramilitary groups. Another important fact is that Gran Colombia Gold has
been allowed to keep Frontino’s special title wherein it retains ownership of both the topsoil and
the subsoil. Thus, Segovia is a legal anomaly, as the Mining Code of 2001 does not apply to this
site.
To say the least, Gran Colombia Gold’s acquisition produced a great deal of controversy
and disagreement in Segovia. As will be discussed in greater detail below, members of the
miners labor union in Segovia—Sintramienergética Nacional—were split over whether to accept
the court ruling regarding the New York Act, and many miners who had worked for generations
in the same mines felt a sense of ownership over their operations. The current head of
Sintramienergética Nacional, for example, expressed his frustration at the presence of Gran
Colombia Gold because he perceives the sale of Frontino as illegal and unethical. 290 A powerful
example of this difference of opinion arose over the course of interviews with current and former
members of the union—some have chosen to protest the presence of Gran Colombia Gold as
unlawful, while others have accepted the decision of the courts and entered into contracts with
the Canadian multinational.291
When Gran Colombia Gold first got the title in 2010, they used amparo administrativo,
which is a legal tool where enterprises enlist the national army to forcibly kick miners off their
title. However, according to David Camacho, lead council for Gran Colombia Gold, these
methods produced social unrest and fostered resentment in the community; so Gran Colombia
Gold invented the “contract method” whereby they approach small miners on their title and offer
to “legalize” them under the following conditions: They must sell their gold to the company at
55% of market price; get an accounting book; salary employees and provide legal required job
benefits like social security, health coverage, and pension; and follow environmental standards
and cease using mercury.292
The company offers to help the miners get started by providing startup money and
accountants. Miners interviewed who have taken part in a contract claim to be extremely happy
with their arrangement. One miner, for instance, claims that consistent salary and job benefits
have attracted over one hundred new miners to his operation and he has made more money under
contract with Gran Colombia Gold than he had before the contract, despite only receiving 60%
market value price. Before the Gran Colombia Gold legalization process, he explained, it was a
“hit or miss” form of payment—in other words, money was earned only when gold was found,
and in bad times the likelihood of going into debt was high. Legalization, in contrast, offers
stability and a constant revenue stream.293
Gran Colombia Gold purports that it has “legalized” 3,000 miners in such a fashion
operating on their titles; however there are still 2,000 miners that have not formed a contract and
are thus still considered “illegal”. Company representatives emphasized that if anything illegal
occurs on their title, then the company is automatically at fault even if an entity is operating on
their own accord. For example, if a miner is illegally operating on Gran Colombia Gold’s title
and is violating environmental laws, the company would receive a fine.
Mining in Segovia operates in a highly politicized and violent context. Armed actors
including FARC, Paramilitaries, and BACRIM are active in the region. Armed groups
commonly extort miners—even one of Segovia’s municipal counselors admitted this to
researchers in an interview, explaining that miners pay extortion taxes to criminals and armed
groups, including miners on Gran Colombia Gold’s title that are engaged in contracts with the
company.294 Furthermore, violent conflict is a daily occurrence in Segovia. While Gran
54
Colombia Gold is adamant that no employee of the company is affected by the violence, the
researchers encountered evidence of the opposite.295 Rafael Tobon Zea, the former president of
the Sintramienergética Nacional union, was murdered in 2011, and the current union leader
regularly receives death threats and has lived in exile from Segovia with two body guards
escorting him at all times.296 The current union leader believes that his position as union leader
has led to these threats and, in the presence of the researchers, implicated Gran Colombia Gold
as linked with the violence.297 Six of his colleagues have been killed between January and July of
2012, and, on August 19, the union leader told El Tiempo that he has moved into a mine for
security purposes; however, despite this precaution, someone threw a grenade into his mine on
August 19 killing one man.298
When the researchers questioned miners at Sandra K why the union leader was in danger,
they responded that he has taken the radical view that Gran Colombia Goldis involved with
violence and the court ruling against the New York Act was coerced. One former
Sintramienergética Nacional union member explained that it is pointless to argue over these
issues and that, “If you want to survive in Segovia, you have to be a diplomat.”299 The miners
also emphasized that the mixture of armed actors and criminals in Segovia is far too complex to
pinpoint to one person or entity; and accusing the company is nothing short of insanity in their
view. Both miners from Sandra K and representatives of Gran Colombia Gold adamantly deny
any involvement with the violence against the union.300
Gran Colombia Gold relies on a heavy private security apparatus to guard its offices, dining
club, and the mines. Guards carry revolver pistols as weapons and are usually female.
Additionally, every official for the company has a personal bodyguard when they stay in
Segovia. The national army has a base down the road from company offices, which is fortified
with sandbags and heavy machine guns. Additionally, there are two national army guards that
protect the part of the processing plant where gold is smelted into bars.
The Segovia story is emblematic of the problems of mining in Colombia in general. On a
large scale, it demonstrates the difficulties of mining in tenuous political environments. Where
so much political risk exists, especially at a time when gold prices are rising and actors have
incentives to switch from coca to gold, tensions are incredibly high; the Segovia case shows the
immense potential for conflict when money, extractable resources and armed groups come to a
direct head.
55
APPENDIX B: LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS INTERVIEWED
Due to the sensitive nature of the research conducted, the study has left the names and details
of particular communities and individuals out of the paper.
"Audencia Publica--Comision de Derechos Humanos Senado La Republica," Caucasia
Acuerdos de Prosperidad, Alta Consejeria para las Regiones y la Participacion
Ciudadana, Pasto, Narino, June 30, 2012
Agencia Nacional Minera
Agencia Nacional Minera
AngloGold Ashanti
Asesoría Contable Moriones & Cia
Asociación de Víctimas Unidas de Granada
Asomina
Asomineros
Batania Reserve (Resguardo)
Camara Colombiana de Mienra
Casa de la Mujeres
Casa de los Pastos, Pasto
Codmilla Cooperative of La Llanada
Colombian Jursists
Comite de Integracion del Maizo Colombiano (CIMA
CorpoNariño
Ecodula
Gran Colombia Gold
Head of Social Programming, Office of Corporate Sustainability, Gran Colombia Gold
Junta Accion Communal, Provedencia
Junta Communal, Vajo Canada
Junta for Communal Action, Batania
Justapaz
Los Andes Sotomayor Mining Collective
Mauricio Cabrera, Advisor, Ministry of Environment, Bogota, June 30, 2012
Mesa de Mineria en los Acuerdos de Prosperidad, Alta Consejeria para las Regiones y
la Participacion Ciudadana, Pasto, Narino, June 29, 2012
Minatura
Minera La Provi S.A.S.
Miners Association of Anorí
Mining Conference “Mesa de Mineria,” Pasto, June 29, 2012
Ministry of Mines
Ministry of Mines—Nariño
Ministry of National Parks
Municipal Counsel of Segovia, Segovia
56
Municipal Government of Arboleda
Municipality of Los Andes Sotomayor
Municipality of San Roque
Narino Gobernacion
OCO Global
Office of Corporate Sustainability, Gran Colombia Gold
Office of Mines, Los Andes Sotomayor
Office of the Mayor, Los Andes Sotomayor
ONUDI
Prodepaz
ProExport
Rede de Reservas Naturales, Pasto
Ricaurte Rudea Abogados
Secretariate of Mines Antioquia
Servicio de Pastoral Social de La Vicarìa San Juan Bautista Diòcesis de Ipiales
Sintramienegetra Union of Segovia
Solvista Gold
Sugar Cane Processing Company, Providencia
SWIPCOL
The Association for Responsible Mining and Fair Trade Colombian Southwest
(ASOMIRCOL)
TierraAdentra, Segovia
UNDP
University of Los Andes
University of Rosario
US Department of Commerce
USAID, US Embassy
Volcanic Observatory, Ingeominas
57
Figure 10: Titles (October 2010) and Mining
Requests (May 2009)
58
APPENDIX C: THE MINING CODE OF 2001 AND THE CONCESSION
PROCESS
The government of Colombia has an extremely generous policy regarding granting
concession rights to mine: 70% of the Andean region is under request with a total of 14,500
requests and 9,250 titles granted of which 2,147 have environmental licenses.301 As of 2004, due
to the upsurge in prices of precious minerals, mining activity increased dramatically. In 2004,
Colombia had 2,200 mining titles; today Colombia has 9,250 titles, and about 25% of these are
for precious metals.302 The Ministry of Mines and Energy in Bogotá is responsible for all matters
regarding mining policy in Colombia. The regulatory law governing mining activities is Law 685
of 2001, or el Código de Minas (hereby referred to as “the Mining Code”). Law 1382 of 2010
amended about thirty articles of the Mining Code including an increase in duration of the
exploration period and surface area fees—this applies to any titles effective after February 9,
2010. However, the Supreme Court of Colombia deemed Law 1382/10 unconstitutional and
ruled that the law should temporarily remain in use until new reforms could be made in May of
2013.303
The Obtainment of Mining Titles and the ANM
Articles 317 and 324 of the Mining Code vested all mining authority to the Ministry of
Mines and Energy, including the power to grant mining titles. However, Resolution no. 18 0074
of January 27, 2004 delegated articles 317 and 324 of the Mining Code to the Institute of Mining
Environmental and Nuclear Research and Geoscientific Information (Ingeominas). Ingeominas
was in turn liquidated in November of 2011 and split into two entities: the Institute of Geology
and Mining, and the National Agency of Mines (ANM). Today, ANM holds the Colombian
Mining Cadaster (CMC) and grants exploration titles to applicants.304 As of 2004, Ingeominas
and the ANM have granted 1,600 gold exploration titles.305
The CMC holds detailed maps of all known concessions in all stages of mining, including
“free areas,” or land not under concession, that is not protected either environmentally under law
2 of 1959,306 or otherwise safeguarded such as areas that fall under the organizational legal
system of the Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial (POT), which all urban centers and towns fall
under. With some exceptions307, a mining concession cannot infringe upon territory that is
environmentally or POT protected. However, in rural areas there are no social protective
mechanisms such as a license or permission from the community to conduct mining activities.
Prior consent for mining exploration is needed only for indigenous or Afro-Colombian
communities.
Before obtaining a title, all companies must complete a work plan document called Plan
de Trabajos y Obras (PTO), which contains technical details regarding the company’s plans for
the construction and exploitation phases. The PTO includes expected damages, and government
officials have characterized the legal tools for displacement as far from arbitrarily kicking people
off their land.308 However, given that the Colombian gold mining industry is still in its infancy
and most companies have not begun the exploitation phase, it has been difficult to find any
examples of companies causing displacement—most of the multinational companies are in the
advanced exploration stage and involved with meticulous negotiations to buy up property from
local populations in order to avoid future conflict.
Steps Involved in the Mining Process
59
In Colombia, every mining contract follows a standardized format wherein the recipient
of a title may request minor changes. A simplified summary of the basic steps of this process are
listed below:
• An entity wishing to obtain a mining title must complete a series of preliminary requirements
including the completion of a work plan and purchasing registration certificates from the
ANM
• Once all the necessary prerequisites have been completed, the ANM grants a land concession
on “free land” from the mining cadaster and the recipient obtains a title
• This title, which is a right to conduct mining activity in the subsoil, lasts for periods up to 30
years and may be extended for an additional 30 years upon request (for a total of 60 years)
subject to demonstrating national interest in the continuance of relevant mining
• Law 1382 of 2010 reduced this extension to 20 years (for a total of 50 years)309
• The concession agreement is comprised of three stages: exploration, construction and
exploitation
— Exploration: Comprises the first three years of the concession wherein the titleholder
must perform technical exploration of the area. Mining companies perform perforations
that can extend several kilometers underground—these perforations are extremely small
(only about six inches in diameter) and are designed to assess underground gold potential.
This may be extended for two years upon request. Law 1382 of 2010 extended the
exploration phase and allows the titleholder to request subsequent two year extensions for
up to a total of eleven years.
— Construction: Once exploration is completed, the title holder may build the necessary
infrastructure to perform exploitation; this has a three year term which may be extended
for one additional year
— Exploitation: During the remainder of the initial term minus the two previous phases, the
title holder may perform exploitation activities; however, there are further requirements
that precede exploitation including the completion of an Environmental Impact
Assessment310
This outline only explains the superficial steps in the concession agreement process;
nonetheless, it conveys some of the complexity involved in obtaining a title from the ANM.311 A
mere handful of specialized lawyers actually understand the Mining Code and the intricacies
involved with compliance. Any entity seeking to get a mining title, even small-scale artisanal
miners in the farthest corners of Colombia, must adhere to the same process and legal standards
listed above.
Closure of the Mining Project and Exports
While the ANM is responsible for the handling of mineral resources and is the only
authority that can grant mining titles in Colombia, it is not responsible for the exportation of
those minerals. Once the gold has been extracted, other government agencies regulate the
exportation process, which include Proexport, DIAN, the Foreign Minister, and the Minister of
Finance. Additionally, the ANM has a small and brand new unit whose purpose is to promote
mining in Colombia. This organization will also be tasked with communicating to companies
seeking to mine in Colombia that they must comply with environmentally sound practices.
Today, Colombia only knows 52% of its geological potential, so there is much room for further
research.312
60
APPENDIX D: MINING CODE REFORM AND GRIEVANCES
Article and Description
Articles 5: State ownership of
resources
Article 13: Public utility
Article 14: Contracts through
National Mining Register
Article 31: Special Reserves
Article 34: Areas Excluded from
Mining
Article 36:
Restriction
Chapter XIV:
provisions
Exclusion
Ethnic
and
group
Reason for Individual or Community Grievance
This article could possibly conflicts with ethnic
communities’ Constitutional guaranteed collective
land rights and land restitution processes in much of
the country.313 Moreover, several interviewed
individuals expressed fear of reprisals for opposing
MNC projects.314
This article could potentially violate the
fundamental rights of ethnic communities to apply
the principle of public utility.315 Though mining is a
public utility, information and contract negotiation
is not publically accessible, and major policies are
not shared or discussed with or revealed to the
public.316 Another grievance is that by favoring
mining over agriculture as a public good, the state
is setting Colombia up for food insecurity.317
The National Mining Register favors MNC
applications.318
This article creates the possibility for small mining
communities to access protection as ‘special
reserves.’ As far as our research revealed, only one
community in the eight we researched was able to
access this “express request.”319
This article creates protected zones that include
small-scale mining that has existed for generations.
Also, the information system is so bad that borders
between excluded areas and mining titles are not
clear, and many environmental permits have
already been granted on excluded areas. There are
also concerns that environmental licensing is not
needed for exploration.320
This article guarantees that when mining titles are
granted to MNCs, small miners will be excluded,
even if the miners have occupied the land for
generations, “without payment or compensation.”321
This chapter not discussed with indigenous
communities,322 violating the Constitutional
guarantee of previous consultation.
Chapter XVII: Illicit exploration
This chapter criminalizes small-scale mining.323
and exploitation
Chapter XVIII: Easement and These chapters contribute to Colombia’s
Servitudes and Chapter XIX: displacement problem by providing legal
61
Expropriation
Articles207 and 208:
Environmental regulation
Article 227: a royalty tax of 0.4%
for private exploiters of the subsoil
is a decrease from 10-15% prior to
this code
Article 231: Prohibits new taxes
on the industry
Article 256: Security
Chapter XXIV: Social
Development
Article 289: Procedural Norms
Article 317: Mining Authority
Article 321: Eliminates the state
role in auditing and assessment.
Article 278: Adoption of Terms of
References and Guides
Article 336: National System of
Mining Information
Article 343: Advisory Council on
Mining Policy
mechanisms for companies to displace communities
or individuals.
These articles guarantee environmental licensing
for a title for the entire period of the concession,
without the ability to revoke the decision.
These articles render mining’s profitability
questionable. They also prohibit the government
from taxing companies for environmental damages
and limit the role of the state.324 There are concerns
that companies do not report all of their earnings,
and that the regulation to ensure that the correct
royalties and taxes are paid are not sufficient. There
have also been reports that several large companies
have filed for several small titles, rather than one
large title, in order to receive a smaller tax burden.
This article allows industries to access public and
private security agencies, and possibly “funnel
funds to paramilitary organizations.”325326
This chapter efforts to help communities, but is
inoperative in practice.327
This article makes it illegal for a common citizen to
challenge a mining contract.
This article brought about the liquidation of
Minercol, the state mining union.328
This article leaves decisions regarding ecosystems,
the environment, labor, and human rights “in the
hands of private capital.”329
This article needs to actually be implemented. The
state of mining is so confusing very few people or
companies can access the law.330
The information system is confusing, designed
poorly, and wrong. The community cannot access
the information.331
The advisory council excludes major stakeholders,
including: the Ministry of National Parks, ethnic
representatives, farming representatives, the
Ministry of Agriculture, and small mining
representatives.332
62
APPENDIX E: INTERNATIONAL LAW
Charter
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR)333
Principles Colombia Violates
Article 9: “…no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile.”
Article 23.4: “the right to form and to join trade
unions for the protection of his interests”
The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR)334
Article 27: “persons belonging to [ethnic, religious
or linguistic minorities] minorities shall not be
denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture,
to profess and practice their own religion, or to use
their own language.”
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Right’s General Comment No. 23335
General Comment No. 23 further defines cultural
rights in Article 7 of the ICCPR, stating, “culture
manifests itself in many forms, including a particular
way of life associated with the use of land resources,
especially in the case of indigenous peoples.”
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)336
Article 7 requires that participatory states prevent or
provide redress for “(a) Any action which has the
aim or effect of depriving [indigenous groups] of
their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural
values or ethnic identities; (b) Any action which has
the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands,
territories or resources.”
Article 10 provides that: “indigenous peoples shall
not be forcibly removed from their lands or
territories. No relocation shall take place without the
free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous
peoples concerned and after agreement on just and
fair compensation and, where possible, with the
option of return.”
Article 11.2 provides that: “States shall provide
redress through effective mechanisms, which may
include restitution, developed in conjunction with
indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural,
intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken
without their free, prior and informed consent or in
violation of their laws, traditions and customs.”
Article 29.1 provides that: Indigenous peoples have
the right to the conservation and protection of the
63
International Labor Organization (ILO)
conventions337
environment and the productive capacity of their
lands or territories and resources. States shall
establish and implement assistance programmes for
indigenous peoples for such conservation and
protection, without discrimination
Article 30.2 provides that: “States shall undertake
effective consultations with the indigenous peoples
concerned, through appropriate procedures and
in particular through their representative institutions,
prior to using their lands or territories for military
activities.”
Article 32.1 provides that: “Indigenous peoples have
the right to determine and develop priorities and
strategies for the development or use of their lands
or territories and other resources.”
Article 32.2 provides that: “States shall consult and
cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples
concerned through their own representative
institutions in order to obtain their free and informed
consent prior to the approval of any project affecting
their lands or territories and other resources,
particularly in connection with the development,
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other
resources.”
Article 32.3 provides that: “States shall provide
effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any
such activities, and appropriate measures shall be
taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic,
social, cultural or spiritual impact.
Convention87, Article 2: provides that: “Workers
and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall
have the right to establish and, subject only to the
rules of the organization concerned, to join
organizations of their own choosing without previous
authorization.”
Convention98, Article 1 provides that: “Workers
shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of antiunion discrimination in respect of their
employment.”
Convention169, Article 15.1 provides that: “The
rights of the peoples concerned to the natural
resources pertaining to their lands shall be specially
safeguarded. These rights include the right of these
peoples to participate in the use, management and
conservation of these resources.”
Article 16.1 provides that: “peoples concerned shall
64
United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment (Stockholm Declaration)
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
(Rio Declaration)339
not be removed from the lands which they occupy.”
Article 16.2 provides that: “Where the relocation of
these peoples is considered necessary as an
exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place
only with their free and informed consent. Where
their consent cannot be obtained, such relocation
shall take place only following appropriate
procedures established by national laws and
regulations, including public inquiries where
appropriate, which provide the opportunity for
effective representation of the peoples concerned.”
Article 16.3 provides that: “Whenever possible, these
peoples shall have the right to return to their
traditional lands, as soon as the grounds for
relocation cease to exist.”
Article 16.4 provides that: “When such return is not
possible… these peoples shall be provided in all
possible cases with lands of quality and legal status
at least equal to that of the lands previously occupied
by them…. Where the peoples concerned express a
preference for compensation in money or in
kind, they shall be so compensated under appropriate
guarantees.”
Article 16.5 provides that: “persons thus relocated
shall be fully compensated for any resulting loss or
injury.”
Principle 13: “In order to achieve a more rational
management of resources and thus to improve the
environment, States should adopt an integrated and
coordinated approach to their development planning
so as to ensure that development is compatible with
the need to protect and improve environment for the
benefit of their population.”338
Principle 10: “Environmental issues are best handled
with participation of all concerned citizens, at the
relevant level. At the national level, each individual
shall have appropriate access to information
concerning the environment that is held by public
authorities, including information on hazardous
materials and activities in their communities, and the
opportunity to participate in decision-making
processes. States shall facilitate and encourage
public awareness and participation by making
information widely available. Effective access to
judicial and administrative proceedings, including
65
redress and remedy, shall be provided.”
Principle 15: “In order to protect the environment,
the precautionary approach shall be widely applied
by States according to their capabilities. Where there
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.”340
United Nations World Charter for Nature341
Article 1.4: “Ecosystems and organisms, as well as
the land, marine and atmospheric resources that are
utilized by man, shall be managed to achieve and
maintain optimum sustainable productivity, but not
in such a way as to endanger the integrity of those
other ecosystems or species with which they
coexist.”342
Millennium Development Goals343
Goal 7: “Integrate the principles of sustainable
development into country policies and programs and
reverse the loss of environmental resources.”
66
APPENDIX F: MINING VALUE CHAIN BY TYPE OF MINER
Source: Jorge Ramirez and Juan Carlos Munoz Mora, “Informalidad e ilegalidad en la
explotacion del Oro y la Madera en Antioquia,” (Medellin: Centro de Analisis Politico—
Universidad Eafit, 2012)
Taxes and Royalties
By 2007 Colombia exported $332 million dollars in gold and by 2009 had increased by 4.6 times
those sales to export $1,537 million dollars. In 2010, the economy could end with total mining
exports valued at 15,000 million dollars, making it the main line of Colombian sales.
— Mario Alejandro Valencia, www.reclamecolombia.org344
Titleholders must pay a surface fee for the exploration and construction phases. This fee
under law 685 of 2001—which applies to concession agreements entered into before February 9,
2010—is equivalent to one daily Colombian minimum wage per hectare (about $10.80 at the
time of this writing) per year for areas up to 2,000 hectares. This amount increases to two daily
minimum wages per hectare per year for areas between 2,000 and 5,000 hectares; and, finally,
67
three daily minimum wages for areas between 5,000 and 10,000 hectares. However, concession
agreements granted after February 9, 2010 abide by Law 1382 of 2010. Under this system,
titleholders pay a surface fee equivalent to one Colombian minimum daily wage per hectare per
year for the first five years of exploration. Thereafter, the surface fee increases by 0.25 of one
daily minimum wage per hectare per year; and, in the construction phase, the concession holder
continues to pay the fee from the last year of exploration.345
Law 141 of 1994 created a National Royalty Fund and established the framework for the
liquidation, distribution and use of royalties received from mining activities. During the
exploitation phase, the titleholder pays a royalty equivalent to a determined percentage of the
value of the production depending on the extracted mineral. In the case of gold and silver, this
amount is 4% of the value. In a statement issued in 2010 by Unidad de Planeación Minero
Energética (UPME) (the Mining and Energy Planning Unit)—a special administrative unit of the
national government of Colombia under the Ministry of Mines and Energy346—the royalties and
compensations distributed in 2009 totaled to $1,527,498,000, which is a dramatic increase from
2001 when that amount was a mere $209,055,000. Note that this does not include the fees that
municipalities collect for building materials during the mining projects. Mining companies also
contributed significantly in terms of taxes and contributions, and, according to Fedesarollo—a
private non-profit foundation dedicated to research on issues of economic and social policy in
Colombia347—in the year 2006, mining companies paid 1,074 billion.348
68
REFERENCES
1
The other four locomotives are housing, infrastructure, agriculture and innovation
See Appendix A for stakeholder analysis on major actors involved in gold mining as it relates
to the ongoing peace process in Colombia and Appendix B for more detailed analysis on case
studies
3
For more detailed recommendations on mining code reform, see Appendix E
4
Jorge Ramirez and Juan Carlos Munoz Mora, “Informalidad e ilegalidad en la explotacion del
Oro y la Madera en Antioquia,” (Medellin: Centro de Analisis Politico—Universidad Eafit,
2012), 35
5
Nadja Drost, “Gold Rush,” Pulitzer Center, September 2011, available:
http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/colombia-la-toma-gold-minig-rush
6
The Mining Journal, “Going for Gold,” Mining Journal Special Publication, August 2011,
Available: http://www.miningjournal.com/__data/assets/supplement_file_attachment/0008/280619/Colombia1108scr.pdf
7
Mining Leaders, “An Eiffel of Opportunity,” The International Forum for Mining Executives,
August 2012, available: http://www.mining-leaders.com/qanda_bnp/
8
Alexandra Guqueta, “Political and Economic Dimensions of the Colombian Conflict”
9
Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, “The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict
Transformation,” Berghof Research Center for Conflict Management, 2005, 5; Oeindrila Dube
and Juan Vargas, “Are All Resources Cursed? Coffee, Oil, and Armed Conflict in Colombia,”
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 2006; Joshua Angrist and Andriana Kugler, “Rural
Windfall or a New Resource Curse? Coca, Income, and Civil Conflict in Colombia,” National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2005, available: http://www.nber.org/papers/w11219; and
Oeindrila Dube and Juan Fernando Vargas, "Resource curse in reverse: The coffee crisis and
armed conflict in Colombia," Documentos CEDE, Universidad de los Andes—CEDE, 2006
10
Ibarra (2003) and G. Poveda, “La minería Colonial y Republicana. Cinco siglos de variantes y
desarrollos, (Bogotá: Biblioteca Virtual del Banco de la Rep blica, 2005)
11
David Bushnell, A Nation In Spite of Itself (University of California Press, 1993).
12
See Rodas Decree of 1600 and Mon y Velarde Decree of 1770. Fierro 32, Cuellar and
Chomsky (2005), 31
13
John J. McCusker, “Colombia: History of World Trade Since 1450,” Vol. 1, (Detroit:
Macmillan Reference, 2006), available:
http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/ps/i.do?action=interpret&id=GALE%7CCX3
447600088&v=2.1&u=columbiau&it=r&p=GVRL&sw=w&authCount=1
14
David Bushnell. Colombia before Independence: Economy, Society, and Politics under
Bourbon Rule The Hispanic American Historical Review, 77. 4 (Nov 1997): 718-719
15
Fierro (2012)
16
Stefano Tijerina, comment on Paula Lopez-Gaundi, “Colombia’s Gold Rush: the silver lining
for guerillas and paramilitaries,” Council for Hemispheric Affairs (September 2011), available:
http://www.coha.org/colombias-gold-rush-the-silver-lining-for-paramilitaries-and-guerrillas/
17
R. Kirk, “More Terrible than Death: Massacres, Drugs, and America’s War in Colombia.
(New York: Public Affairs, 2003), 17
18
Kirk (2003), 26
2
69
19
During the National Front—when only two political parties were legally established—the only
avenue for dissent was taking up weapons, leading to a mass proliferation of leftist guerilla
groups: the FARC, ELN, EPL, ADO, PRT, MIR, PCMI, Jega, ERP, ORP, PLA, FUAR, MOED,
M-19, and Quintin Lame
20
UNDP, El Conflicto, “Callejon con Salida,” Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano Para
Colombia -- 2003, (Bogotá : PNUD, September 2003), available:
http://hdr.undp.org/es/informes/nacional/americalatinacaribe/colombia/colombia_2003_sp.pdf,
28
21
Nazih Richani, “Multinational Corporation, Rentier Capitalism and the War System in
Colombia.” Journal of Latin American Politics and Society, 2005
22
Varying in form, self-defense groups can take the form of private armies/security, organized
groups like the AUC, disorganized groups like the various BACRIM, individual assassins,
nacrotraffickers, and collaborators
23
Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia
(New York: State University of New York Press, 2002)
24
M and O. Albertus, “Land Reform as Counterinsurgency Policy: Evidence from Colombia,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2012
25
Vanessa Joan Gray, “The New Research on Civil Wars: Does It Help Us Understand the
Colombian Conflict?” Latin American Politics and Society; 50 (3), 2008: 63-91, 68
26
Decree 3398, in place from 1965 to 1989, legalized the arming of civilians by the Defense
Ministry; and Law 48, instituted in 1968, authorized the executive the right to create civil patrols
27
P. Hough, “Guerilla Insurgency as Organized Crime: Explaining the So-Called Political
Involution of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,” Politics and Society 39 (3), 2011:
379-412 and Alfredo Rangel Suarez, “Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection
Economy of Colombia,” Journal of International Affairs 53, 2000: 577–601
28
Richani (2002) discusses Sur de Bolivar, an important gold mining area, and its war system
that includes guerillas, paramilitaries, multinationals, and national corporations1. Though it is
difficult to assess the quantitative role MNCs play in the local conflict, there is evidence that
their interests are linked with right-wing violence (114-115)
29
Richani (2002), 53
30
Ramirez and Mora (2012), 58
31
Ramirez and Mora (2012), 37
32
Ramirez and Mora (2012), 26
33
Victoria Webster, Field notes, Anorí, July 17, 2012
34
Juan Carlos Loaiza Charry and Juan Fernando Laverde, Director and Advisor, Personal
Interview, Secretariate of Mines Antioquia, Medellin, July 12, 2012
35
Geoffrey Ramsey, “Overtaking Coca for Colombia’s Gangs: Report, Insight Crime, September
12, 2012, available: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/colombian-armed-groups-cocamining
36
Ramsey (2012)
37
“Seguridad para los ‘locomotores,” Semana (June 18, 2011), available:
http://www.semana.com/nacion/seguridad-para-locomotoras/158751-3.aspx
38
The lawyers also represented the Canadian Energy Research Institute (CERI) and the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Cuellar and Chomsky (2005), 55 and
Fierro, 36
70
39
The most recent code was passed in 2001 as Law 685
Cuellar and Chomsky (2005)
41
The new code is almost ready for ethnic group consultation. Natilia Orduz, “Las polemicas del
Codigo Minero que tendra que enfrentar Renjifo,” La Silla Vacia, September 2, 2012, available:
http://www.lasillavacia.com/historia/las-polemicas-del-codigo-minero-que-tendra-que-enfrentarrenjifo-35697
42
“Today there is a whole organizational framework created to support the mining institution. It
is comprised of 36 mining planning districts throughout the country, 3 national agencies, 7
national mining associations, 6 departmental administrators, 22 foreign mining companies,
hundreds of small scale mining operations, 9 university programs, etc. See Gomiam, “Face
Sheet: Small Scale Gold Mining in Colombia,” Small Scale Gold Mining in the Amazon, June
2011, available: http://www.gomiam.org/content/images/stories/pdf/colombia.pdf
43
Colombia Gold Report, “Colombia Gold Story Gathering Place: 2011 Review and 2012
Preview,” Colombia Gold Letter, 2011, available:
http://www.colombiagoldreport.com/news_detail_colombia_gold_sector.php?ID_new=6&title=
Colombia%20gold%20story%20gathering%20pace
44
Resolution No. 0045 of June 20 2012 says that 313 mining areas are to be set aside to be
auctioned to third parties for natural resource extraction
45
Luz Mery Duitama Muñoz, Engineer, Agencia Nacional Minera, Personal Interview, Medellin,
July 12, 2012
46
Anuario Estadístico Minero Colombiano.
47
Arno Kopecky, “The Only Risk is Wanting to Stay,” International Affairs, 2011, available:
http://walrusmagazine.com/articles/2011.05-international-affairs-the-only-risk-is-wanting-tostay/2/
48
V. Bouvier. Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War. Borja Paladini Adell with Raul
Rosende, Juan Chaves, and Gabriel Turriago. “The International Community Meets the Local
Community in Montes de Maria.” 2009. United States Institute of Peace Press, 340
49
As exemplified in Samaniego, Nariño; San Francisco, Grenada, and Anorí, Antioquia
50
As demonstrated in Samaniego, Nariño; San Francisco, Grenada, and Anorí, Antioquia
51
UNDP Colombia. “UNDP Colombia and BCPR Strategic Partnership Mid-term
Review.” September 22, 2011. As seen in Batania, Nariño
52
“Estamos abriendo los espacios para que entren inversionistas,” Ministerio de Minas y Energía
26 Mar. 2012, 24 Sept. 2012
<http://www.minminas.gov.co/minminas/index.jsp?cargaHome=2&opcionCalendar=3&id_event
o=366>.
53
“Lo bueno y lo malo que ha pasado en dos años en la locomatera minera,” El Tiempo 25 Sept.
2012, 27 Sept. 2012 <http://m.eltiempo.com/economia/lo-bueno-y-lo-malo-que-ha-pasado-endos-anos-en-la-locomotora-minera/12250093/1/home>
54
“Estamos abriendo los espacios para que entren inversionistas,” Ministerio de Minas y Energía
26 Mar. 2012, 24 Sept. 2012
<http://www.minminas.gov.co/minminas/index.jsp?cargaHome=2&opcionCalendar=3&id_event
o=366>.
55
Fierro, 46
56
Despite the name change from Ingeominas to ANM, members of government and miners still
refer to the agency by its old name.
40
71
57
Javier Garcia, Directorate of Mines, Ministry of Mines, Personal Interview, Bogotá , June 15,
2012
58
Mauricio Cabrera, Advisor, Ministry of Environment, Bogotá , June 30, 2012; Mario
Alejandro Valencia, “Colombia: Paradiso de las Transnacionales Mineras,” Ma Valencia 31 Oct,
2010, 24 Sept. 2012 <http://mavalencia.blogspot.com/2010/10/colombia-paraiso-de-lastransnacionales.html>
59
Cabrera (June 30, 2012)
60
Cabrera (June 30, 2012)
61
Farmer and Community Leader, Personal Interview, Arboleda, June 22, 2012
62
Giovanni Muñoz Areualo, Geologist, Personal Interview, CorpoNariño, Pasto, July 3, 2012
63
Cabrera (June 30, 2012)
64
“The mining authority, directly or through the auditors that he might authorize, will exercise
the monitoring and surveillance[…]” Artículo 318 Ley 685 de 2001
65
Fierro, 48
66
Javier Garcia, Directorate of Mines, Ministry of Mines, Bogotá , June 15, 2012
67
Artículo 5 y 13 Ley 685 de 2001
68
Artículo 7 Ley 685 de 2001
69
Artículo 332 la Constitución de 1991
70
Julio César Rojo, Director, Agencia Nacional Minera, Bogotá, July 4, 2012
71
See the case studies of Caramanta or San Roque as examples. Gramalote Limited (a subsidiary
of AngloGold Ashanti) claims to have never employed the use of forced easements or
expropriation
72
See the following articles from the Mining Code: 4, 15, 166 to 185 is the “Servitudes and
Easements” section. From article 166: “For the efficient exercise of the mining industry in all
phases and stages, the necessary servitudes or easements can be established on properties located
within or outside the area, object of the mining title.”
73
Interviews with: Julio César Rojo, Director, Agencia Nacional Minera, Bogotá, July 4, 2012;
Gramalote Limited; Solvista; AngloGold Ashanti; the ANM of Antioquia
74
Refers to law 1382 of 2010, which went into effect February 9, 2010
75
Páramos are rare alpine tundra ecosystems only found in northeast South America
76
“La olla podrida de Ingeominas,” Semana Jun. 4, 2011, Sept. 14, 2012
<http://www.semana.com/nacion/olla-podrida-ingeominas/157933-3.aspx>
77
PTOs must contain technical details as to what the miner intends to do for the next 30, 60 or
even 90 years
78
Fierro, 39-41
79
Fierro, 113-114
80
La Sila Vacia, 2009
81
“La olla podrida de Ingeominas,” Semana 4 Jun. 2011, 24 Sept. 2012
<http://www.semana.com/nacion/olla-podrida-ingeominas/157933-3.aspx>
82
“Las razones ocultas de la crisis en Ingeominas,” Semana 25 Oct. 2010, 26 Sept. 2012
<http://www.semana.com/economia/razones-ocultas-crisis-ingeominas/146413-3.aspx>.
83
“Quién controla la locomotora minera,” Semana 9 Oct. 2010, 26 Sept. 2012
<http://www.semana.com/nacion/quien-controla-locomotora-minera/145734-3.aspx>.
84
Beatriz Duque Montoya, former Director of Mines, Luz Marina Preciado Ramírez, Specialized
Professional; Hernán José Sierra Montes, University Professor in Fierro, 52-53.
72
85
Rojas (June 26, 2012)
This was observed by researchers at a June 29th meeting in which miners and community
leaders aired their grievances to government leaders. Mesa de Mineria en los Acuerdos de
Prosperidad, Alta Consejeria para las Regiones y la Participacion Ciudadana, Pasto, Nariño, June
29, 2012
87
Juan Carlos Loaiza Charry and Juan Fernando Laverde, Director and Advisor, Secretariate of
Mines Antioquia, Personal Interview, Medellin, July 12, 2012
88
For more detailed information on the concession process, see Appendix D
89
Rojas (June 26, 2012)
90
See the Arboleda case study for an example of Gran Colombia Gold Corp.’s Mazamorra
project culminate in open riots and violence
91
“Estamos abriendo los espacios para que entren inversionistas,” Ministerio de Minas y Energía
26 Mar. 2012, 24 Sept. 2012
<http://www.minminas.gov.co/minminas/index.jsp?cargaHome=2&opcionCalendar=3&id_event
o=366>
92
Secretary of Planning, Municipal Government of Arboleda, Personal Interview, Arboleda,
June 22, 2012
93
Farmer and Community Leader, Personal Interview, Arboleda, June 22, 2012
94
Miner at Sandra K Mine, Personal Interview, August 1, 2012
95
Charry and Laverde (July 12, 2012)
96
Charry and Laverde (July 12, 2012)
97
Internet, 21 Sept. 2012. Available:
http://www.minminas.gov.co/minminas/index.jsp?cargaHome=2&opcionCalendar=3&id_evento
=366
98
Luz Mery Duitama Muñoz, Engineer, Agencia Nacional Minera, Medellin, July 12, 2012.
99
Muñoz (July 12, 2012)
100
Walter Gaviria, Secretary of Planning, Municipal Government of Arboleda, Arboleda, June
22, 2012.
101
Garcia (June 15, 2012)
102
Mayor of Caramanta, Personal Interview, Caramanta, July 18, 2012.
103
Artículos 171, 246, 286, 329, 330 y 357 la Constitución de 1991. There are a total of 710
indigenous reservations, which cover 27% of Colombia’s total land. Fierro, 153-4.
104
Artículo 330 la Constitución de 1991
105
Gay McDougall, “Statement by the UN Independent Expert on Minority Issues on the
Conclusion of Her Official Visit to Colombia,” UNHCR (February 2010), available:
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=9821&LangID=E
106
Fierro, 155-8
107
Luisa Aramburo, Lawyer, AngloGold Ashanti, Personal Interview, Bogotá , July 9, 2012
108
Andres Bedoya, “Proyecto Gramalote,” Social Manger, Gramalote, 2012
109
David Camacho, Legal Director, Gran Colombia Gold, Personal Interview, Medellin, July 24,
2012
110
Ramiro Santa, President, AngloGold Ashanti, Personal Interview, Bogotá , July 11, 2012
111
Inspector, San Roque Municipality, Personal Interview, San Roque, July 26, 2012
112
Melissa Moriarty, Investor Relations, Solvista Gold, Personal Interview, Caramanta, July 18,
2012
86
73
113
Camacho (2012)
Personal Communication, Segovia, August 22, 2012
115
President and Vice President, Personal Interview, Sintramienegetra Union of Segovia,
Medellin, July 13, 2012
116
The company has not answered our request to view an example of a contract.
117
Victoria Webster, Field note, Barrancabermeja, May 29, 2012
118
Melissa Moriarty, Investor Relations, Solvista Gold, Personal Interview, Caramanta, July 18,
2012
119
Luisa Aramburo, Lawyer, AngloGold Ashanti, Personal Interview, Bogotá , July 9, 2012
120
Owner of sugarcane processing factory, Personal Interview, Providencia, San Roque,
Antioquia, July 26, 2012
121
Colombia has one of the highest levels of displacement in the world, with are over four
million persons displaced internally. (CODHES, CODHES Informa: Tapando el sol con las
Manos, no. 74, Bogotá, September 25, 2008. Retrieved July 12, 2012 from:
http://www.semana.com/documents/Doc-1766_2008930.pdf)
122
David Camacho, Legal Director, Gran Colombia Gold, Personal Interview, Medellin, July 24,
2012
123
Angelica Rettberg, “Private Sector and Forced Internal Displacement in Colombia,”
Fundacion Ideas para la Paz. 2010, 7
124
Rafael Herz, President, AngloGold Ashanti, Personal Interview, Bogotá , July 11, 2012
125
Herz (2012)
126
Planning Secretary, Municipality of Arboleda, Personal Interview, Arboleda, June 22, 2012;
Community Members, Personal Interviews, Arboleda, June 22, 2012
127
President, Sintramienergetra Union of Segovia, Personal Interview, Medellin, July 12, 2012;
Community Members, Personal Interviews, Arboleda, July 12, 2012
128
Melissa Moriarty, Corporate Relations, Solvista Gold, Personal Interview, Caramanta, July
18, 2012; Darney Ceballos, VP, Environmental and Social Engineering, Minatura, Personal
Interview, Medellin, July 17, 2012
129
18.89 percent of Nariño's population of 1.5 million lives in extreme poverty. See UNDP,
“Regional Document for Accelerating Progress Toward the MDGs: Department of Nariño,
Colombia,” Government of Nariño and UNDP (2010), available:
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/MDG/MDG%20Acceleration%20Framework/M
AF%20Reports/LAC/Colombia/NARIÑO_EN.pdf
130
UNDP (2010), 13
131
La Llanada, Cumbitara, Los Andes, Samaniego, Santacruz, Mallama, Genoa, Barbacoas,
Santabarbara, and Tumaco
132
DANE, “Informe de Coyuntura Economica Regional: 2010,” Departmento Administrativo
Nacional de Estadistica (2010), available:
http://www.dane.gov.co/files/icer/2010/Nariño_icer__10.pdf
133
Mesa de Mineria en los Acuerdos de Prosperidad, Alta Consejeria para las Regiones y la
Participacion Ciudadana, Pasto, Nariño, June 29, 2012
134
UNODC, “Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey 2012,” accessible:
http://www.dane.gov.co/files/icer/2010/Nariño_icer__10.pdf
135
Servicio Geologico Colombiano, “Actualidad Minera Nacional y Departamental: PastoNariño, Republica de Colombia, March 2012.
114
74
136
Project Accompagnement Solidarite Colombia, “Los nariñenses se miran en el Congreso de
los Pueblos,” October 18, 2012, available: http://www.pasc.ca/fr/node/3668
137
Servicio Geologico Colombiano (2012)
138
Gran Colombia Gold Corp, “Management’s Discussion and Analysis for the Quarter Ended
June 30, 2012,” August 14, 2012, available: http://www.grancolombiagold.com/files/GCM%20%20MDA%20-%20June%2030%202012%20(Final).pdf
139
Ramirez and Mora (2012), 37
140
Ramirez and Mora (2012), 65
141
Ramirez and Mora (2012), 97
142
See Appendix G for a chart of Antioquia’s gold value chain
143
FT (2012), 12
144
FT (2012)
145
Rettberg, A. “Private Sector and Forced Internal Displacement in Colombia,” Fundacion
Ideas para la Paz (Bogotá : 2011), 7
146
The community prefers the word ‘sovereignty’ over ‘autonomy’
147
Victoria Webster, Field notes, Batania, June 22nd, 2012
148
Victoria Webster, Field notes, Batania, June 22nd, 2012
149
David Camacho, legal director of Gran Colombia Gold, Personal Interview, Medellin,
Antioquia, July 24, 2012
150
Pushkar Sharma, Field notes, Batania, June 22, 2012
151
Nariño Mining Code Forum, Nariño Gobernacion, Pasto, Nariño, June 26, 2012
152
Rodolfo Pantoja, “Oposicion en Nariño a proyecto minero: firman documento Gobernacion y
Alcaldia de Arboleda,” Diario del Sur, Novemer 24, 2011, available:
http://www.censat.org/articulos/10030-noticia/10357-oposicion-en-Nariño-a-proyecto-minerofirman-documento-gobernacion-y-alcaldia-de-arboleda
153
Raul Delgado Gerrero, “Memorias del Foro Mineria, Sostenibilidad Ambiental y Desarollo,”
Gobernacion de Nariño, March 26-27, 2012
154
Maria Antonia Rodriguez Arias, “Resistir y Persistir: Una Mirada Subalterna de la
Explotacion Minero Energetica en el Departmento de Nariño,” Foro Mineria (May 2012)
155
Alliance for Responsible Mining, “La Llanada’s Coodmilla,” accessible:
http://www.communitymining.org/index.php/en/colombia/coodmilla
156
Mine Owner, Los Andes Sotomayor, Personal Interview, June 27, 2012; Former mayor and
legal miner, Personal Interview, Los Andes, Nariño, June 27, 2012
157
Mine Owner, Los Andes Sotomayor, Personal Interview, June 27, 2012 (2012)
158
Coodmilla leader, Personal Interview, La Llanada, Nariño, July 3, 2012
159
Mine Owner, Los Andes Sotomayor, Personal Interview, June 27, 2012 (2012)
160
Victoria Webster, Field Notes, Batania, June 22, 2012
161
Community member, Los Andes, Sotomayor, Personal Interview, June 27, 2012 (2012)
162
Mesa de Mineria en los Acuerdos de Prosperidad, Alta Consejeria para las Regiones y la
Participacion Ciudadana, Pasto, Nariño, June 29, 2012
163
Mesa de Mineria en los Acuerdos de Prosperidad, 2012
164
87% of all displaced persons originate from mining and energy producing municipalities
(35% of total municipalities), and 80% of the human rights violations and violations of
International Humanitarian Law that have occurred in Colombia in the last 10 years were
75
committed in these places. See SINTRAMINERCOL, “La Violacion de los derechos humanos
en el pais está estrechamente ligada con el modelo económico existente en Colombia,” accessed
July 15, 2012 from www.acantioquia.org/...foro/EXPOSIC_SINTRAMINERCOL.doc) and
Amanda Tello, “Gold Rush in Colombia,” Witness for Peace. July 12, 2012, accessible:
http://witness4peace.blogspot.com/2012/07/gold-rush-in-colombia-part-1.html
165
Mesa de Mineria en los Acuerdos de Prosperidad, Alta Consejeria para las Regiones y la
Participacion Ciudadana, Pasto, Nariño, June 29, 2012
166
Leah Gardner, “Small Scale Miners in Nariño Face Crackdowns as Foreign Companies Set
Sites on Colombia,” Upside Down World, April 11, 2012, accessible:
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/colombia-archives-61/3567-small-scale-miners-in-Nariñoface-crackdown-as-foreign-companies-set-sights-on-colombia
167
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/colombia-archives-61/3567-small-scale-miners-in-Nariñoface-crackdown-as-foreign-companies-set-sights-on-colombia
168
Cumbitara Miner, Personal Interview, Pasto, June 26, 2012
169
Cumbitara Miner, Personal Interview, Pasto, June 26, 2012
170
Mine Owner, Los Andes Sotomayor, Personal Interview, June 27, 2012 (2012)
171
Nariño Mining Code Forum, Nariño Gobernacion, Pasto, Nariño, June 26, 2012
172
Ramirez and Mora (2012), 70-71
173
USAID (2009)
174
Ramirez and Mora (2012)
175
"Audencia Publica--Comision de Derechos Humanos Senado La Republica," Caucasia, July
14, 2012.
176
Julien Barbey, Field notes, Segovia, August 1, 2012.
177
"Audencia Publica--Comision de Derechos Humanos Senado La Republica," Caucasia, July
14, 2012
178
Anorí Mining Cooperative Meeting, UNDP, Anorí, July 19, 2012
179
International Confederation of Trade Unions, “Informe anual sobre las violaciones de los
derechos sindicales Colombia–2011,” ITUC, available: http://survey.ituccsi.org/Colombia.html?lang=es
180
F. Ramírez, F. “Gran minería y derechos humanos en Colombia,” Notes on the International
Seminar on mining, territory and conflict in Latin America, National University, Bogotá,
Colombia, October 6, 2011
181
RCN Antioquia, “Un concejal de Segovia denuncio una alianza entre transnacionales mineras
y bandas criminals,” Renradio, March 2, 2012, available:
http://www.rcnradio.com/node/134736#ixzz20IY3SsWn
182
David Camacho, Legal Director, Gran Colombia Gold, Personal Interview, Medellin, July 24,
2012
183
Farmers (or campesinos) have the right to their legal land, and can apply to own land
communally in what is known as a campesino reserve. This does not give them the right of
previa consulta, but it does increase the autonomy over land communities own. Because
knowledge of previa consulta laws is limited, for example, some farmers mobilize against
companies for not giving them previa consulta (even though they do not have the rights to it).
Afro-Colombians have the right to communal land and previa consulta, but their governing
structure is less autonomous than indigenous communities, who are granted the most rights under
the constitution. Some indigenous gropus (i.e. the Pastos) do not receive the same rights as other
76
indigenous groups, nor are all indigenous communities’ territories recognized as reserves. See
President, Casa de los Pastos, Personal Interview, Pasto, June 21, 2012
184
President, Casa de los Pastos, Personal Interview, Pasto, June 21, 2012
185
Ramiro Santa, President and Vice President of Corporate Affairs, Personal Interview,
AngloGold Ashanti, Bogotá , July 11, 2012
186
President, Casa de los Pastos, Personal Interview, Pasto, June 21, 2012
187
Director, Rede de Reservas Naturales, Personal Interview, Pasto, June 29, 2012
188
Pushkar Sharma, Field notes, Batania, June 22, 2012.
189
Servicio Geologico Colombiano, “Actualidad Minera Mineral Nacional y Departmental:
Pasto – Nariño,” Prosperidad para Todos, March 2012.
190
Victoria Webster, Field notes, Batania, June 23, 2012.
191
Governor, Batania Reserve (Resguardo), Personal Interview, Batania, June 23, 2012
192
Until the territory is officially legalized as a resguardo, the indigenous population will not
receive prior consultation should their territory be granted to an MNC. As of June 2012, both the
mayor and the governor had lent their support to this process, and all of the community members
and UNDP officials interviewed for the paper were convinced it would soon be legal. The
constant presence of armed groups in the area, however, makes their future uncertain.
193
A number of factors can be taken into account including but not limited to: the duration of
continual use of the mine, has it been passed down among family, the total annual production of
the mineral in question, the number of individuals employed in the operation, and the depth of
the mine
194
Fierro, 222-3
195
Miner at Sandra K mine, August 1, 2012
196
The UN Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action, Extractive Industries and
Conflict (New York: UNIFTPA, 2010) 5
197
La democracia, la libertad sindical y el modelo de dominación en Colombia, Sinaltrainal,
Bogotá , July 27, 2012; Acuerdos de Prosperidad, Alta Consejeria para las Regiones y la
Participacion Ciudadana, Pasto, Nariño, June 30, 2012
198
For a comprehensive list of relevant international standards, see Appendix F
199
Article 23.4. United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” 10 Dec. 1948
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml>
200
Article 2
201
Article 1. International Labour Organization. “ILO Conventions and Recommendations,”
<http://www.ilo.org/ipec/facts/ILOconventionsonchildlabour/lang--en/index.htm>
202
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 9. United Nations, “Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,” 10 Dec. 1948 <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml>
203
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Rio de Janeiro, June 14 1992.
204
United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, “Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples” 13 Sept. 2007 <
http://social.un.org/index/IndigenousPeoples/DeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples.aspx>.
205
, Articles 10, 11.2, 30.2, 32.1, 32.2, 32.3; ILO Convention 169, Articles 15.1, 16.1, 16.2, 16.3,
16.4, and 16.5. International Labour Organization. “ILO Conventions and Recommendations,”
<http://www.ilo.org/ipec/facts/ILOconventionsonchildlabour/lang--en/index.htm>.
206
Article 11.2 and 30.2
77
207
Stockholm Declaration Principle 13207; Rio Declaration Principle 15. United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, Rio de Janeiro, June 14 1992; United Nations World
Charter for Nature Article 1.4United Nations General Assembly, “World Charter for Nature,” 28
Oct. 1982 http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r007.htm>. Millennium Development
Goal 7United Nations, “Millennium Development Goals,” 30 Aug. 2012 <
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ.shtml>.
208
UNDRIP, Article 29.1. United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, “Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” 13 Sept. 2007 <
http://social.un.org/index/IndigenousPeoples/DeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples.aspx>.
209
World Bank Institute, “Transparent Contracting and Procurement,” 30 Aug. 2012 <
http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/content/transparent-contracting-and-procurement>. EITI is a
voluntary initiative undertaken by governments, brings together a variety of stakeholders
including (governments, companies, civil society groups, investors and international
organizations) to strengthen governance by improving transparency and accountability in the
extractives sector. Publish What You Pay, “Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,” 30
Aug. 2012 <http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/activities/advocacy/extractive-industriestransparency-initiative>
210I
nternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 27. United Nations, “Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,” 10 Dec. 1948
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml>
211
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Right’s General Comment No. 23. Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “General Comment No. 23: The rights of
minorities (Art. 27)” 8 April 1994 <
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/fb7fb12c2fb8bb21c12563ed004df111?Opendocument>.
212
UNDRIP, Article 32.3. United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, “Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” 13 Sept. 2007
<http://social.un.org/index/IndigenousPeoples/DeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples.aspx
>
213
This program is active in Anorí, Antioquia.
214
V. Bouvier. Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War. Borja Paladini Adell with Raul
Rosende, Juan Chaves, and Gabriel Turriago. “The International Community Meets the Local
Community in Montes de Maria.” 2009. United States Institute of Peace Press. 340.
215
Farmer and Community Leader, Personal Interview, Arboleda, June 22, 2012
216
Farmer and Community Leader (22 June 2012)
217
Secretary of Planning, Municipal Government of Arboleda, Personal Interview Arboleda,
June 22, 2012
218
Secretary of Planning (22 June, 2012)
219
Farmer and Community Leader (22 June 2012). According to Giovanni Muñoz of
CorpoNariño, there are 23 perforation sites in Arobleda. Giovanni Muñoz Areualo, Geologist,
CorpoNariño, Personal Interview, Pasto, July 3, 2012
220
Community Leader, Comite de Integracion del Maizo Colombiano (CIMA), Personal
Interview Pasto, June 21, 2012
221
Human Rights Activist, Comite de Integracion del Maizo Colombiano (CIMA), Personal
Interview, Pasto, June 28, 2012
78
222
Community Leader, Comite de Integracion del Maizo Colombiano (CIMA), Personal
Interview Pasto, June 21, 2012
223
Community Leader, Comite de Integracion del Maizo Colombiano (CIMA), Personal
Interview Pasto, June 21, 2012
224
Community Leader, Comite de Integracion del Maizo Colombiano (CIMA), Personal
Interview Pasto, June 21, 2012
225
Community Leader, Comite de Integracion del Maizo Colombiano (CIMA), Personal
Interview Pasto, June 21, 2012
226
Riot police are part of the Mobile Anti-Distrubances Squadron or Escaudrón Móvil
Antidistrubios (ESMAD) which operates under the command of the Operative Directorate of the
Colombian National Police.
227
Community Leader, Comite de Integracion del Maizo Colombiano (CIMA), Personal
Interview Pasto, June 21, 2012
228
Community Leader, Comite de Integracion del Maizo Colombiano (CIMA), Personal
Interview Pasto, June 21, 2012
229
Human Rights Activist, Comite de Integracion del Maizo Colombiano (CIMA), Personal
Interview, Pasto, June 28, 2012
230
David Camacho, Legal Director, Gran Colombia Gold, Personal Interview, Medellin, July 24,
2012
231
Mine Owner, Los Andes Sotomayor, Personal Interview, June 27, 2012
232
Mine Owner, Personal Interview, Pasto, June 21, 2012
233
Mine Owner, Los Andes Sotomayor, Personal Interview, June 27, 2012 (July 27, 2012)
234
Mayor, Municipality of Los Andes Sotomayor, Personal Interview, Pasto, June 28, 2012
234
Mine Owner, Los Andes Sotomayor, Personal Interview, June 27, 2012 (June 27, 2012)
235
Mayor, Municipality of Los Andes Sotomayor, Personal Interview, Pasto, June 28, 2012)
235
Mine Owner, Los Andes Sotomayor, Personal Interview, June 27, 2012 (June 27, 2012), June
28th
236
Mine Owner, Los Andes Sotomayor, Personal Interview, June 27, 2012 (June 27, 2012)
237
Director, Office of Mines, Personal Interview Los Andes Sotomayor, June 27, 2012
238
Mayor, Municipality of Los Andes Sotomayor, Personal Interview, Pasto, June 28, 2012)
239
Mine Owner, Los Andes Sotomayor, Personal Interview, June 27, 2012 (June 27, 2012)
240
President La Llanada Cooperative, Personal Interview, La Llanada, July 1, 2012
241
Responsible Mining, “Coodmilla: La Llanada,” Commumity Mining (accessed June 18,
2012), available: http://www.communitymining.org/index.php/en/colombia/coodmilla
242
A Brookings Institute study recently indicated that Nariño’s security is far worse today than it
had been three years ago. See Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Coca and Insecurity in Nariño, Colombia,”
(February 22, 2011), Brookings, available:
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/02/22-colombia-guerrilla-felbabbrow.
http://www.nocheyniebla.org/files/u1/44/niebla44.pdf
243
Departmental Director Nariño, UNDP, Personal Communication, Pasto, June 17, 2012
244
La Llanada Municipality, Official Website, “La Llanada” (accessed September 30, 2012),
available: http://www.lallanada-Nariño.gov.co/index.shtml
245
Alliance for Responsible Mining, “Coodmilla La Llanada,” Community Mining (accessed
June 15, 2012), available: http://www.communitymining.org/index.php/en/colombia/coodmilla
79
246
Barro Blanco, Antioquia Gold, and Anglo Gold Ashanti have all approached the Cooperative
to buy their mines.
247
Head of Mining Cooperative, La Llanada (July 1, 2012)
248
Cooperative Members, Codmilla Cooperative of La Llanada, Personal Interview, La Llanada,
July 2, 2012
249
Miner, La Llanada Cooperative, Personal Interview, La Llanada, July 1, 2012
250
Community leader, Personal Interview, Batania, June 23, 2012
251
Leader, Junta Communal, Vajo Canada, Personal Interview, Pasto, June 29, 2012
252
Victoria Webster, Field Notes, Samaniego, June 21-24, 2012
253
Victoria Webster, Field Notes, Samaniego, June 21-24, 2012
254
Teacher, Personal Interview, Batania, June 23, 2012
255
Representatives, Servicio de Pastoral Social de La Vicarìa San Juan Bautista Diòcesis de
Ipiales, Personal Interview, Samaniego, June 23, 2012
256
Governor, Batania Reserve (Resguardo), Personal Interview, Batania, June 23, 2012
257
UNDP Field Officer, Personal Correspondence, September 4, 2012
258
Julien Barbey, Field Notes, Tamesis, July 18, 2012
259
Jose David Castellanos S. and Wilder Garcia Haro, Gerente General and Exploration
Manager, Solvista Gold, Personal Interview, Medellin, July 13, 2012.
260
Public Meeting at School in Guyabal Vereda with community members befitting from
Solvista’s CSR programs, July 18, 2012
261
Melissa Moriarty, Investor Relations, Solvista Gold, Personal Communication, Caramanta,
July 18, 2012
262
Julien Barbey, Field Notes, Tamesis, July 18, 2012
263
Maria Guzman, Corporate Social Responsibility, Solvista Gold, Personal Communication,
Caramanta, July 18, 2012
264
“Las organizaciones populares de Antioquia defienden los ríos y la vida,” Notagen, Noticias
de Colombia, (accessed September 30, 2012), available:
http://notiagen.wordpress.com/2012/03/27/las-organizaciones-populares-de-antioquia-defiendenlos-rios-y-la-vida/
265
“El Campesinado de Caramanta y la región acorralados por la minería a gran escala, convoca
apoyo urgente,” Caramanta, July 2008 cited in Land and Conflict, Mining Watch Canada and
CENSAT-Agua Viva for InterPares, September 2009 available at
http://www.interpares.ca/en/publications/pdf/Land_and_Conflict.pdf
266
Miners, Miners Association of Anorí, Personal Interview, Anorí, July 18, 2012
267
http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/2049-mining-and-crime-intersect-incolombia-gold-rush-town
268
http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/2049-mining-and-crime-intersect-incolombia-gold-rush-town
269
http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/2049-mining-and-crime-intersect-incolombia-gold-rush-town
270
Pushkar Sharma, Field Notes, Anorí, July 18th, 2012
271
Pushkar Sharma, Field Notes, Anorí, July 18th, 2012
272
Miners Association (July 19, 2012)
273
Miners Association (July 19, 2012)
80
274
Pushkar Sharma, Field Notes, Anorí, July 18th, 2012
275
Darney Ceballos, Vice President of Environmental and Social Engineering, Minatura,
Personal Interview, Medellin, July 17, 2012
276
Miners Association (July 19, 2012)
277
Employee, Ecodula, Personal Interview, San Roque, July 26, 2012
278
http://www.b2gold.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/B2Gold-Gramalote-Feb-27-2009.pdf
279
Guillermo (July 26, 2012)
280
Owner, Sugar Cane Processing Company, Personal Interview, Providencia, July 26, 2012
281
Herz and Santa (July 11, 2012)
282
Senior Miner at Sandra K, Tierra Adentra, Personal Interview, Segovia, August 1, 2012
283
Recall that the Constitution of 1991 deemed the state the owner of all the subsoil of Colombia
and declared that mining is a social and public utility. Thus, when companies obtain a mining
title today, they are only granted the right to mine the subsoil for 30-year periods
284
As of August 2012 Carla is not in use
285
Following the exit of Frontino, thousands of miners worked El Silencio with no oversight or
regulation. In 2004, 5,000 miners crammed in the El Silencio tunnels broke the water pump,
which caused water levels to rise to level 14 over the next 6 years. When Gran Colombia Gold
took over operations in 2010, they installed a new pump. Today El Silencio has been drained to
level 27. Gran Colombia Gold hopes to be back down to level 44 in 2014, at which point they
will continue tunneling
286
Albert Monterrosa, Office of Corporate Sustainability, Personal Interview, Gran Colombia
Gold, Segovia, August 1, 2012
287
Today, miners in Segovia misleadingly refer to any time before 2010 as “Frontino,” despite
the fact that the company had no presence after 1980
288
Wednesday August 1, 2012 GranColombia Gold Trip Oseas Garcia Rivera ONUDI “Oro sin
mercurio mucho mejor!”
289
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/FCColombiaGoldMines/
290
President and Vice President, Sintramienegetra Union of Segovia, Personal Interview
Medellin, July 13, 2012
291
Former union members and miners at Sandra K, Segovia, August 1, 2012
292
Despite repeated requests, the authors have not been able to obtain a copy of a contract
293
Interview with Hugo Alberto Serna Tejada, Minera La Provi SAS, 31 July 2012
294
Municipal councilman, Segovia, 31 July 2012
295
Miner at Sandra K, TierraAdentra, Segovia, August 1, 2012
296
President and Vice President, Personal Interview, Sintramienegetra Union of Segovia,
Medellin, July 13, 2012
297 President and Vice President, Personal Interview, Sintramienegetra Union of Segovia,
Medellin, July 13, 2012
298
“El concejal que vive en una mina por miedo a ser asesinado,” El Tiempo
[http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR12143484.html] August 19, 2012
299
Senior Miner at Sandra K, Tierra Adentra, Personal Interview, Segovia, August 1, 2012
300
Julien Barbey, Field Notes, Segovia, August 1, 2012
301
Mauricio Cabrera, Advisor, Ministry of Environment, Bogotá , June 30, 2012
302
Julio César Rojo, Director, Agencia Nacional Minera, Bogotá, July 4, 2012
81
303
At the time of this writing the amendments are unknown
Bernardo P. Cárdenas, Legal Overview of Colombia’s Mining Industry (Bogotá: Alianza
W.J., 2010) 1
305
Cárdenas, 3
306
There are four categories of environmentally protected land: Zonas de Reserva Forestal
(Forest reserve zones), humedales (wet lands), páramo (alpine tundra ecosystems), and parques
nacionales naturales (national parks).
307
Under special conditions individuals or companies may mine in protected areas if those titles
were in existence before law 2/59 or if the enterprise can prove that it can mine with minimal
environmental harm (with the exception of parques nacionales naturales which may never be
explored or exploited)
308
Julio César Rojo, Director, Agencia Nacional Minera, Bogotá, July 4, 2012.
309
Only titles entered into after February 9, 2010 must abide by law 1382 of 2010
310
The EIA includes: a description of the project; natural renewable resources to be used; a
report of possible environmental impacts; and measures that will be taken to prevent, mitigate,
correct or compensate them
311
Margarita Ricaurte, Lawyer, Ricaurte Rudea Abogados, Bogotá , July 5, 2012
312
Julio César Rojo, Director, Agencia Nacional Minera, Bogotá, July 4, 2012
313
President, Casa de los Pastos, Personal Interview, Pasto, June 21, 2012
314
Sur de Bolivar Miners, Personal Interview, May 2012, Bogotá ; ACVC, Personal Interview,
May 2012; Mining representatives, Forum on Human Rights, Bajo Cauca, July 14, 2012; Union
representatives, Forum on Union Violence, Bogotá , Colombia, July 31, 2012
315
Jairo Alberto Guerrero Davila, President, Personal Interview, Casa de los Pastos, Pasto, June
21, 2012
316
Nariño Mining Code Forum, Nariño Gobernacion, Pasto, Nariño, June 26, 2012
317
Victoria Webster, Field notes, Barrancabermeja, May 29, 2012
318
Victoria Webster, Field notes, Los Andes, June 27, 2012
319
Victoria Webster, Field notes, La Llanada, July 1, 2012
320
Pedro Segura, Director, Rede de Reservas Naturales, Pasto, June 29, 2012
321
Nariño Mining Code Forum, Nariño Gobernacion, Pasto, Nariño, June 26, 2012
322
Cuellar and Chomsky (2005), 60
323
Audencia Publica, Comision de derechos humanos senado la republica, Caucasia, Bajo
Cauca, July 14, 2012.
324
Cuellar and Chomsky (2005), 61
325
Cuellar and Chomsky (2005), 60
304
327
Audencia Publica, Comision de derechos humanos senado la republica, Caucasia, Bajo
Cauca, July 14, 2012
328
La democracia, la libertad sindical y el modelo de dominación en Colombia, Sinaltrainal,
Bogotá , July 27, 2012.
329
Cuellar and Chomsky (2005), 61
330
Victoria Webster, Field notes, Los Andes, June 27, 2012
331
Nariño Mining Code Forum, Nariño Gobernacion, Pasto, Nariño, June 26, 2012
332
Nariño Mining Code Forum, Nariño Gobernacion, Pasto, Nariño, June 26, 2012
82
333
United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” 10 Dec. 1948
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml>
334
United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” 10 Dec. 1948
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml>
335
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “General Comment No. 23: The rights
of minorities (Art. 27)” 8 April 1994 <
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/fb7fb12c2fb8bb21c12563ed004df111?Opendocument>.
336
United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, “Declaration on the Rights of
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