THE TUCK SCHOOL AT DARTMOUTH
Innovation of Satellite Radio
E-Ship & Innovation Strategy
Gonzalo Fernandez Castañeda, Ignacio Gonzalez, Michael Kuo, Francis Lee, Phil Kim, Yvan Stern
11/9/2012
Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 2
Part I - Context of the Innovation ................................................................................................................. 2
Radio and Broadcast Industry (1990’s) ..................................................................................................... 2
Radio Ecosystem (Pre-Satellite) ................................................................................................................ 3
In-Car Radio Content Ecosystem ........................................................................................................... 3
In-Car Radio Hardware Ecosystem ........................................................................................................ 4
The Opportunity........................................................................................................................................ 5
Technology Challenges ............................................................................................................................. 5
Part II – Innovation Strategy ......................................................................................................................... 5
The Satellite Radio ecosystem .................................................................................................................. 6
Co-Innovation Risk .................................................................................................................................... 8
Adoption Chain Risk .................................................................................................................................. 9
Value Proposition .................................................................................................................................... 10
Part III - The Disrupter Gets Disrupted........................................................................................................ 11
Direct Streaming to Wireless Enabled Devices ....................................................................................... 11
Response to Disruption: ecosystem reconfiguration and MVF expansion ............................................. 12
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 13
Introduction
Satellite radio was first broadcast in 2001 in the continental United States. The innovative radio service
delivered digitally-encoded audio content to earth-based receivers, either directly from the satellite to
the receiver or from the satellite to a terrestrial repeater, which then amplifies and relay the signal to
the receiver. Satellite radio companies provided a large variety of programming content, most of which
aired commercial free and included music, news, talk and entertainment, regional traffic and weather,
and play-by-play sports. Instead of generating most of their revenues through advertising, as was the
case for traditional terrestrial analog AM/FM radio stations, satellite radio companies adopted a
subscription model where subscribers pay a monthly fee to receive their favorite programs.
Today, Sirius XM Radio Inc is the single operating satellite radio company. Sirius XM is the result of the
merger between Sirius Satellite Radio and XM Satellite Radio in 2007. To develop the innovation of
satellite radio, both firms played a similar and critical role developing the technology ecosystem to
establish the market. This project will analyze how Sirius and XM brought the satellite radio technology
to market and how, following the merger, Sirius XM Radio has had to pivot in response to the advent of
wireless internet radio, which threatens to disrupt this space.
Part I - Context of the Innovation
Radio and Broadcast Industry (1990’s)
The deregulation of radio throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s led to considerable growth in the number of
radio stations. By 1991 the FCC had increased the ownership cap to 21 AM and FM stations. As more
radio stations vied for the same advertiser revenues, many stations began to struggle. According to a
study performed by Mass Media Bureau1, more than half of all radio stations lost money in 1990. It was
estimated that by 1994, 379 stations went silent. The 1996 Telecommunications Act furthered the
deregulation, removing national ownership limits and increasing the number of stations any one
operator could own. This brought a wave of industry consolidation. The new consolidated industry was
heavily laden with debt and the increased debt obligation forced the operators to increase revenues and
cut cost. The operators met this requirement by increasing the frequency of advertising and
standardizing programming formats and playlists. Many newly formed radio conglomerates turned to
syndicated programming, produced by a third party and intended for a national appeal, to deliver the
ratings needed to sell advertising and achieve cost savings.
In terms of segmenting markets, it was economically attractive for terrestrial AM/FM radio stations to
accept a smaller share of the bigger audience through the most popular and standardized programming
formats (e.g. soft rock or country). This approach would allow the stations to reach a wider audience—
and thus more advertising revenue and profit—than they would with a higher share of a niche market.
1
mmstudio.gannon.edu/~gabriel/rapela.html
Hence, listeners to traditional radio stations do not have access to specific segments that today’s XM
Radios offer.
To avoid signal interference, the FCC restricted the number of terrestrial AM/FM radio stations in each
city and regulated power. As a result, most stations had an effective range of 30 miles and even a large
metropolitan area may only have 30 to 40 commercial stations. Although 65% of the U.S. population
lives in the metropolitan area and therefore can enjoy access to dozens of stations, approximately 10%
of the population, or 22 million U.S. radio listeners, have access to five or fewer radio channels.2
Radio Ecosystem (Pre-Satellite)
Prior to satellite radio, the overall ecosystem for radio can be broken down into two sub-ecosystems:
the radio content ecosystem and the hardware ecosystem. Since the two ecosystems have relatively
limited inter-dependency, the analysis has separated the two ecosystems. Further, since satellite radios’
core customer segment is car drivers, our analysis will focus on in-car usage of radio systems.
In-Car Radio Content Ecosystem
Figure 1. In-Car Radio Content Ecosystem (Pre-Satellite)
Within this ecosystem, the radio stations aligned various players in the environment to deliver content
to the listeners. For commercial radio stations, they must first receive licenses from the Federal
Communication Commission (FCC) in order to operate. The license can be purchased through a
spectrum auction, where the specific radio frequency spectrums are awarded to the stations that value
them the most. The radio spectrum ranges from 88 MHz to 108 MHz for FM radio, and 530 kHz to 1700
kHz for AM radio.
2
Kaimowitz, Robert B., “XM Satellite Radio,” SG Cown, December 26, 2001
Radio stations must also receive buy-in from their investors to receive start-up funding. Investors must
believe in the business model of radio stations where most commercial station’s revenue comes from
advertising of product and services, while the expenses are mainly in content development and
acquisitions. To attract listeners, radio stations often hire well-known public figures to develop or
administer programs. Radio stations may also design their own contents entirely in house but often
acquire much of their content through third-part program developers, including music, sports broadcast
and talk shows. This requires that radio stations develop or participate in various distribution channels
or networks in order to receive such content.
On the revenue end, radio stations generate income through advertising. Radio stations need to
develop relationships with national, regional, and local advertisers in order to target their audiences.
This requires significant effort to not only attract a strong base of listeners but also attract advertising
clients.
Finally, with the expertise of a radio infrastructure developer, radio stations can build their own or gain
access to shared transmitters, broadcast towers, and other relay tower infrastructure. With these
players in the ecosystem in place, radio stations can push program content to listeners who have access
to in-car radios. The ecosystem for radio hardware is outlined below.
In-Car Radio Hardware Ecosystem
Figure 2. In-Car Radio Hardware Ecosystem(Pre-Satellite)
The in-car radio system is in place almost completely independent of radio stations (there is a network
effect between the number of radio stations available and radio hardware adoption; however, such
analysis is excluded because it does not directly impact the innovation of satellite radio). Prior to the
introduction of satellite radio, AM/FM radio system was pretty much standard in all vehicles. To achieve
this standard, radio manufacturers worked through various channels to deliver radios to the drivers.
This required extensive channel partnerships with car manufacturers, dealers, and retail channels (instore, online, etc.). For example, Alpine electronics has long-term relationship to manufacturer BWM
branded radios. Alpine radios are also available through many after-market part stores such as BestBuy,
AutoZone, Wal-Mart, and many other.
The Opportunity
The degradation of radio content resulting from syndicated programming and increased advertisement
created a market for quality radio programming.
While the AM/FM radio industry became increasingly competitive, listeners suffered as their favourite
radio stations were consolidated and programming content degraded. Satellite radio, on the other hand,
would provide a unique channel to quality programming, extensive content, nationwide access and
limited advertisements.
Technology Challenges
Satellite radio required a completely new technology infrastructure. For example, XM Satellite Radio
used a distribution network consisting of an uplink facility, two satellites, and terrestrial repeaters to
provide digital audio services to mobile and fixed XM proprietary receivers throughout the continental
United States. The satellites are parked in geostationary orbits aligned with the East and the West Coast
of the United States. This alignment would add redundancy which ensures that a terrestrial receiver
would continue to get strong signal in case signals from one of the satellites are obstructed in anyway. A
system of more than 800 terrestrial repeaters in more than 70 major U.S. cities further ensured that the
radio would receive strong signal in urban areas, full of narrow, busy streets with high buildings that
may reflect the signals and therefore reduce the audio quality.
Consumers would need a small antenna on their cars or near a window when in a building, along with a
satellite radio receiver. The proprietary receiver consists of a tuner, which isolates a clean signal from
the satellite or terrestrial repeaters, amplifies and extracts the signal, and a chipset which converts the
signal to audio and displays accompanying information such as song titles and artist names.
Summarizing, in order to make satellite radio into a reality, first movers would have not only have to
make hefty capital investments to develop such technology and infrastructure, but also create a new
ecosystem of players that includes part suppliers, satellite manufacturers, content providers, and
distribution channels. In addition, the consumers also need to be educated about the satellite radio
technology in order to switch from incumbent services. The next section of this analysis will
demonstrate how satellite radio technology was commercialized.
Part II – Innovation Strategy
In 1990, Martine Rothblatt recognized the opportunity for national, digital, radio service and founded
Sirius (then Satellite CD Radio Inc)3. The company’s plan was to develop a subscription based digital
radio service that would broadcast through satellites to listeners with special receivers4. To achieve this,
Rothblatt petitioned the FCC and Congress to allow for a digital audio frequency. Her efforts proved
3
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sirius_Satellite_Radio
4
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/sirius-satellite-radio-inc-history/
successful when in 1992 the FCC allocated a portion of the radio spectrum for a nationwide Digital Audio
Radio Service (DARS). That same year, American Mobile Satellite Corp, who also recognized the
opportunity, founded XM Satellite Radio.
Like satellite television content providers, XM and Sirius needed to obtain a FCC license and access to
dedicated radio frequency band for the new service. After heavy lobbying by satellite radio providers,
the FCC announced that it would set aside the DARS spectrum for two companies. XM Satellite Radio
and Sirius were the two final winners of those licenses in 1997. Granting of the license dictated that
both companies need to build their own satellite for their services and need to launch within a certain
period of time. Since the DARS licenses were granted to only two companies, XM Radio faced relatively
little near-term threats from any other entrants, besides the other licensee, Sirius. Also, in order to
meet the license requirement, a new entrant is expected to spend high capital cost and take four years
to assemble the infrastructure needed to offer the satellite radio service.
Both XM and Sirius envisioned and configured similar satellite radio ecosystem, therefore we’ll discuss
them as one ecosystem below.
The Satellite Radio ecosystem
Advertisers
Content
Providers
FCC
Insurance
Companies
Car OEMs
Satellite Radio Companies (Sirius and XM)
Dealers
Customers
(drivers)
Capital /
Financing
Satellite
Manufacturers
Electronics
Manufacturers
Radio
Retailers
Figure 3. In-Car Satellite Radio Content Ecosystem
Sirius and XM managed to align a great number of different players to make Satellite Radio a feasible
business opportunity. There were, however, no red lights as Satellite Radio presented a potentially
lucrative opportunity for each partner in the ecosystem. The role that each of the players had in the
industry is described in the following lines:

Federal Communications Commission (FCC): provided Sirius and XM with a digital audio radio
service spectrum. If the FCC made additional spectrum available to other players, it would take
at least four years for these players to put the infrastructure in place that would enable them to







offer service. The FCC had prohibited Satellite Radio services from using local programming such
as traffic and weather. The FCC is yellow due to the big effort that Satellite Radio companies had
to make to get the service spectrum.
Capital and Financing: Capital requirements were very high in the industry. Both companies
were public and had raised $2.4 billion in equity and debt by 2003. Sirius had $260 million in
debt and XM had 738 million in debt by the end of Q3, 2003. Both companies had completed
difficult restructurings and raised new capital in 2002. Capital and financing is yellow due to the
great capital requirements.
Satellite manufacturers: both companies signed contracts with aerospace manufacturers such
as Hughes units (now Boeing Space Systems) to develop the satellites. These players are green
because they did not bear the risk and were happy to get more business from the Satellite Radio
companies.
Insurance companies: the satellites were a very expensive piece of the business and were
insured. In 2003, XM had filled a $400 million insurance claim for two defective satellites.
Initially, the insurance companies were green since the Satellite Radio companies were able to
get the satellites insured. As we have seen, the risk of insurance companies not paying a claim
could change the color of these players.
Satellite Radio Companies: XM and Sirius had very diverse operations to be able to provide
satellite radio service to their clients. These operations can be divided in three broad categories:
o Logistics and infrastructure: XM and Sirius operated the satellites (through satellite
ground stations) and owned and maintained a network of repeaters that enabled them
to solve signal issues in cities.
o Content: they had studio assets (Sirius had 76 studios in 2003) and programming
content such as music channels and talk shows.
o Customer service: these activities (which included billing) contributed to XM and Sirius
variable costs and generated expenses that free radios did not have to deal with.
Content providers: in addition to the content developed in their own studios, Satellite Radio
companies redistributed several channels (generally in talk or information formats) from third
party content programmers. These content providers are yellow because it was very costly to
get the top programs and shows.
Advertisers: although most of Satellite Radios’ revenue came from the subscriptions, advertising
represented also a share of the companies’ total revenues. Satellite radio provided advertisers
with greater segmentation of the audience and potentially more affluent people. We considered
that the advertisers were yellow because, even if they had an attractive proposition, Sirius and
XM did not manage to get much revenue from them.
Electronics manufacturers and distributors: XM and Sirius had agreements with many
manufacturers and distributors of electronic devices. The distributors sold the radios to end
customers, dealers or OEMs. These two groups of players are yellow due to their initial risk
aversion to a new product with uncertain sales. Some of the companies that manufactured and
distributed satellite radios were:
o Manufacturers: Kenwood, Sony, Alpine, Panasonic, etc.



o Distributors: Best Buy, Circuit City, CarToys, Sound Advice, etc.
Car OEMs: XM and Sirius established strategic partnerships with OEMs that included General
Motors, Ford, Daimler Chrysler, Honda and Toyota. Generally, the Satellite Radio companies
subsidized part of the cost of the installation of the radios and compensated the OEMs (with
equity or sharing part of the revenues from subscriptions) in exchange for exclusivity and
promotion of the service. We considered that these players were yellow because it was very
costly for the Satellite Radio companies to reach agreements with them.
Car dealers: Car dealers would have to install aftermarket receivers in cars that did not have
OEM receiver built-in. We considered that these players were yellow for the same reason we
explained for OEMs.
Customers: the customers were car and truck drivers. They had the option of acquiring the
Satellite radio when they bought the vehicle (through OEMs and dealers) or to buy the radio
from an electronic device distributor and getting it installed in their vehicle.
We have already explained how the ecosystem for car-radio looked like before and after Satellite Radio
and what challenges XM and Sirius had to overcome. Now we will explain how both companies
managed to overcome these challenges. In particular, we will analyze how XM and Sirius solved the CoInnovation and Adoption Risks and aligned the value proposition for all players.
Co-Innovation Risk
Having established themselves as leaders in their respective innovation ecosystem, both XM and Sirius
had to now bring the innovation to life.
Because of the uncertainty linked to technological innovations and an untested business model in the
radio space, Sirius and XM needed to reduce the co-innovation risk. This included working together to
develop unified standards for satellite radio in 2000. In 2001, after having raised $2B in funding, Sirius
built and launched three satellites, a transmitter network that covered the entire nation, and partnered
with automobile companies to include its radios in the new models. The players that had co-innovation
challenges were:



Car OEMs: The integration of Sirius radios in a car required almost no technological
advancement from car manufacturers as they were compatible with the car’s capabilities at the
time. The only change to the car OEMs was the slight adjustment of the manufacturing process
to install Sirius radios instead of regular radios.
Sirius Radio Contract Manufacturers: After designing Sirius radio units, Sirius partnered with
numerous reputable electronics manufacturers to guarantee their customers a steady supply of
Sirius radios.
Satellite and Infrastructure: Many of the high risk components of the technology required for
the business was handled by Sirius itself. Sirius devised new satellite orbits and systems. It also
invented new studio layouts and acoustics with glass walled studios to optimize transmission of
signals to satellites.
By possessing the expertise and handling more risk within the technically complex part of the ecosystem,
Sirius was able to successfully minimize the co-innvation risk and launch the business. XM followed a
similar strategy.
Adoption Chain Risk
In order for Sirius and XM to succeed, they needed to obtain buy-ins from every party involved in its
ecosystem.
Sirius and XM’s subscription based revenue generation model was an untested model in the radio
industry. However cable TV companies had used a similar model to disrupt the broadcast network TVs
and eventually gain dominance in the 1980’s. Many case studies have shown that customers have the
willingness to pay monthly fees for superior content that is present in cable TV programs compared to
the inferior advertisement driven traditional TV programs. To convince the downstream value chain to
adopt satellite radio, Sirius and XM took significant steps to mitigate adoption chain risks.




Car OEMs: Initially, car OEMs did not have much incentive to replace traditional radios with
Sirius satellite radios as it was an unproven market. However, the Satellite Radio companies
were able to incentivize various car OEMs by sharing revenues gained from the monthly
subscription fees. This lowered the cost of change for Car OEMs. This strategic partnership
strategy allowed Sirius XM to make deals with car manufacturers such as GM, DaimlerChrysler,
Ford, and Mercedes Benz.
Aftermarket Retailers: Aftermarket retailers are generally risk averse and will only display
products that sell in the market on their shelves. By demonstrating demand for Sirius’ products
through consumer and car OEMs demand, Sirius XM was able to open a new sales channel
through aftermarket retailers.
Consumers: Just as cable TV thrived under a subscription model, consumers were interested in
superior content when listening to radios as well. Sirius and XM signed deals with celebrity talk
show hosts and gained exclusive rights to sports content for most major sports in the US,
including NBA, NFL, NHL, NASCAR, and many others. By acquiring/developing superior content,
investing heavily to ensure a reliable infrastructure, and providing access to the satellite radio to
potential customers throughout the nation upon its initial launch, Sirius was able to quickly grow
its customer base from the start. Sirius’ partnership with car OEMs also helped to quickly gain
customers as pre-installed Sirius radios eliminated the hassle of buying and installing the units
separately. The comprehensive content and exclusive rights played a significant role in
generating consumer demand and differentiating Satellite radio from traditional radio.
Advertisers: As it has been explained before, Sirius and XM had an special value proposition
for advertisers since they could reach listeners throughout the nation with the same radio
channel and could provide more segmented audience.
Value Proposition
Figure 4. Satellite Radio Value Propositions
Looking at Figure 4, it is clear that the value proposition for satellite radio was highest for the satellite
radio companies but most other partners stood to benefit as well. The exception for this is the car
dealers who had little incentive to install after-market satellite receivers in cars. Satellite Radio
companies identified this and chose to subsidize installation costs for car dealers in those cases in which
they did not have OEMs factory installed options. This effectively shifted dealers from a negative surplus
to a positive one.
As we have explained in this section, both Sirius and XM faced challenges to bring the Satellite radio to
market. XM was able to launch the service before Sirius and took the lead in terms of subscribed
customers. By 2003, Sirius had only amassed 75,000 subscribers compared to XM’s 500,000. However,
Sirius experienced strong sales after the introduction of the ‘plug-and-play’ receiver in 2004 and caught
up to XM in 2007 (with 8.3 million subscribers compared to XM’s 9 million).
In 2007 the two companies merged to create Sirius XM radio. By combining forces they were able to
provide more content and lower their costs. Although the merger promised a bright future ahead, Sirius
XM faced a new business reality with a weak economy and new competitors. In the following years, they
had to continue evolving and innovating to keep the company alive.
Part III - The Disrupter Gets Disrupted
Direct Streaming to Wireless Enabled Devices
In July 2008, both Pandora and Last.fm, two of the most popular personalized internet radios back then,
released apps for IPhone that allowed their clients to stream their personalized radio stations to their
mobile devices. One year later, in May 2009, Spotify and other apps for Android, BlackBerry and
Windows Phone followed.
The implications of these releases were important for Sirius XM Radio. First, it meant that the core
elements of the satellite radio business model, nationwide availability, sound quality and selection were
contested and not exclusive anymore. High quality radio was available wherever there was 3G signal or
a Wi-Fi connection, in devices that were widely available and that many clients of Sirius XM already
owned. Second, personalized radio became a standard: while Pandora and Last.fm recommended new
music based on your tastes, Spotify allowed users to broadcast exactly what they were looking for. Sirius
XM customized channels were no longer unique, and a market with very attractive business prospect,
was open to competition.
The first four columns of the table below represent XM’s view on the competitive landscape for satellite
radio in early 2000. Satellite radio was clearly differentiated from other broadcasting technologies. But
internet radio changed massively in 2008-2009, as it can be seen on the last column, eliminating what
made satellite radio special.
Satellite
Radio
Terrestrial
Broadcasters
Satellite TV and
Cable TV
Internet Radio
(2004)
Internet radio
(2008)
Programming
Wide choice
of formats
Homogeneous
Wide choice of
formats
Homogeneous
Wide choice of
formats
Audio Quality
High
High
High
Medium
High
Fixed
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Mobile
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Availability
Go anywhere
coverage
Source: Company Documents, via HBS XM Satellite radio case (A)
It can be seen that the company did not foresee Internet radio as a competitor, but it ended up being a
substitute. The situation became worse as 3G and 4G signals became widely available, and prompted a
plunge in Sirius XM ‘s stock after Goldman Sachs analyst Mark Wienkes stated this reality in an
investment report in 2008.
We analyzed the evolution of internet radio in the following diagram:
Satellite Radio
HQ, Wide Geographic
Availability, variety of
content providers
Mobile broadband,
smartphones
and content)
Performance (Quality, Availability
Widely available mobile
broadband, variety of
content providers, HQ
Internet Radio via
wireless connection
No mobile
broadband
2008
Performance
demanded by
average user
2012
Time
Internet Radio had been around since 1994, but back then it required a wired connection to the internet.
It was not until 2008, with the widespread adoption of high bandwidth wireless that internet radio
became a real threat to Siruis XM:

3G technology: although it had been around since 2002, it wasn’t until five years later when it
became widely available. It was at this point when Satellite broadcasting lost its competitive
edge, as any internet signal could be carried to any 3G device in almost every part of the country.

Smartphones: 3G capable smartphones were available by 2005, but it wasn’t until application
developers adopted these new platforms that Internet Radio on Smartphones became a reality.
This happened when Apple launched its IPhone 3G in 2008. Users were addicted to new apps
and quickly adopted streaming services.

Internet Radio providers: Pandora and Last.fm got involved in app development when the
IPhone 3G became available. Others followed over time (Spotify, GrooveShark). They delivered
personalized contents, a wide selection, and audio quality good enough for 99% of the users.
Response to Disruption: ecosystem reconfiguration and MVF expansion
Once that internet radio showed up as the reference competitor for Sirius XM, the company reacted by
focusing in what they could do and the newcomers could not, and that was interesting for current
clients, following an “Old Technology” strategy:

Add More Content: Sirius XM had become a large content producer for its satellite radio clients.
It featured many music channels, but also specialized channels featuring famous people, like
Howard Stern, Opie and Anthony, Bubba the Love Sponge, Scott Ferrall, Bob Dylan or Oprah
Winfrey. It also offered exclusive sports programming (NFL, Premier League, Canadian Football
League and NASCAR, NBA, NHL, PGA Tour, and Indy Racing League). No internet radio can
provide access to these kinds of contents, so they leveraged these partner relationships to offer
listeners a differentiated experience.

Expand into Internet Radio: In 2009, Sirius XM developed an application that allowed
subscribers to listen to Sirius XM content from any computer or smartphone for a small monthly
fee. This eliminated the need for additional receivers for clients, and, more importantly, reduced
the incentive to change to other providers. However, due to copyright limitations, not all Sirius
XM content is available on this platform. Later on, Sirius XM developed SiriusXM OnDemand,
which provided users personalized access to specific episode recordings.
With these actions, Sirius XM managed to demonstrate that Internet Radio and Satellite Radio were not
mutually exclusive, and although Internet Radio might grow to become the dominant broadcasting tool
in the future, the niche that Sirius XM addresses has allowed the company to survive.
Conclusion
Sirius Radio recognized an opportunity for a technology that could improve the listeners experience in a
space where competing solution were continually being degraded. For Satellite Radio companies,
capitalizing on this opportunity required a diligent analysis and management of the innovation
ecosystem. To this end, Sirius and XM formed strategic partnerships to ensure that the co-innovation
risk and adoption risk were mitigated.
Satellite radio is an example of an ecosystem development success. However, it is unclear the degree to
which FCC regulations, which limited licenses to two operators, protected the ecosystem from
reconfiguration in the early 2000’s. Today; however, Sirius XM faces a competitive threat from outside
the Satellite Radio ecosystem that is immune to the regulations that had protected Satellite Radio
operators in the past. In response, Sirius XM has had to add more content and expand its MVF to include
online streaming applications. As wireless technologies evolve, Sirius XM will face increased pressure
from internet based substitutes and will have to rely on the five levers of ecosystem reconfiguration to
continue to grow.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brown, Alastair, Eisenmann, Thomas, Satellite Radio, Harvard Business Review, November 20, 2003
Goes, David B., Ofek, Elie, XM Satellite Radio (A), Harvard Business Review, March 1, 2004
Sirius XM Radio, Inc., Global Data,
Sirius XM Radio Inc., Market Line
Wikipedia, www.wikipedia.org
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