Grieco, Joseph. 1988. Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the
Newest Liberal Institutionalism. International Organization 42 (3):485-507.
Grieco claims that liberalism has attributed to realism a concept of the state that is not present in
realist theory. Liberal literature takes as its unit of analysis a rational-egoist state, defined as one
seeking to maximize absolute utility, and hence one that does not consider the effects of
cooperation on other states. Realism, in contrast, defines states as “positional, not atomistic”
(487). Uncertain as to whether other states are friends or foes, realist states worry not only about
absolute gains for themselves, but also about relative gains for other states. As Grieco argues
“the fundamental goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances
in their relative capabilities” (498). Therefore, while liberals conclude that rational-egoist states
may cooperate to achieve absolute gains, realism cautions that, even if absolute gains are
assured, states that are concerned about relative gains may be unwilling to cooperate (499).
Critiques:
(1) Grieco concedes that relative-gain problems will differentially affect state’s calculations
about whether to cooperate by a variable, k. Although k must always be positive in his
estimation, it can be very small. Even if relative-gains concerns are always present,
therefore, absolute gains or other considerations may outweigh them, and cooperation
may ensue.
(2) Bargaining may solve relative gains problems. As long as bargaining procedures are
available, some relative gains problems may be eliminated before a final decision has to
be made. As Keohane asserts, that is exactly the purpose of international regimes;
“International regimes by no means substitute for bargaining; on the contrary, they
authorize certain types of bargaining for certain purposes” (Keohane, 107). International
regimes may therefore diminish the incidence of relative gains problems in cooperation
by providing norms for bargaining.
(3) Bargaining problems themselves may be misinterpreted as relative gains problems. In
other words, relative gains problems may not be as prevalent as Grieco suggests. In the
tests of realist versus liberal predictive capabilities Grieco devises, it is difficult if not
impossible to separate what he regards as relative-gains problems from what Fearon
views as bargaining problems. The failure of cooperative agreements among allies, for
instance, does not necessarily prove the dominance of relative gains problems, but may,
instead, support Fearon’s theory that a long shadow of the future makes enforcement
easier but bargaining harder. The anticipation that an agreement will be durable (for
instance, because common interests and nesting will make it difficult to defect) will, in
Fearon’s configuration, increase the incentives for states to hold out in a costly “war of
attrition,” not because an agreement is impossible, but because it is vital. Discord among
allied states, therefore, is a necessary but insufficient condition to prove the prevalence of
relative gains problems.
(4) Relative gains problems, although insurmountable when decisions are viewed in
isolation, may be neutralized through continued interaction. Grieco views cooperation as
an all-or-nothing enterprise; he defines state interactions atomistically, apart from
previous or future interactions. One of the key points of liberal theory, however, is that
states do not interact in a vacuum. International regimes, through the aegis of reputation,
confer on each decision the weight of all future decisions. Relative gains in individual
agreements are pertinent to what Keohane refers to as myopic self-interest, where
“myopic self-interest refers to governments’ perception of the relative costs and benefits
to them of alternative courses of action with regard to a particular issue, when that issue
is considered in isolation from others” (Keohane, 99). The existence of international
regimes, however, means that issues can rarely be considered in isolation from others,
and gives states incentives to cooperate even when they will gain relatively less from an
agreement. Over the course of continued interactions, states may assume that relative
losses in individual agreements will counteracted by gains in others. The relative gains
problem then loses much of its potency.
(5) Uncertainty may lead states to discount capabilities as they would intentions. Grieco
argues that relative-gains are a problem because, “states are uncertain about one another’s
future intentions, thus; they pay close attention to how cooperation might affect relative
capabilities in the future” (Grieco, 500). It seems clear that states cannot predict changes
in government or ideology that might turn an ally into an enemy. Similarly, however,
states cannot predict how relative gains today will influence future capabilities. Even if a
relative gain in the present is completely translated into increased military capability, that
increase will not remain stable in the future any more than government or ideology will.
A small gain today may therefore be completely offset by, for example, a future
economic downturn or foolhardy war. If uncertainty can lead states to doubt their
friends’ intentions, surely it can also lead them to doubt their friends’ continued capacity.