The California Wellness Foundation’s Violence Prevention Initiative:
Findings from the Evaluation of the First Five Years
by
Peter W. Greenwood
Jeffrey Wasserman
Lois Davis
Allan Abrahamse
Peter D. Jacobson
James Chiesa
March 31, 2000
Prepared for the Third Biannual Urban Seminar Series
on
Children’s Health and Safety
Sponsored by
The John F. Kennedy School of Government
at
Harvard University
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Introduction
Violence has long been a major issue for citizens of the United States, who experience homicide
and robbery rates that are several times higher than those reported in most other industrialized
countries. In recent years this problem has become particularly acute for youths 15 to 20 years
old whose rates of offending and victimization have more than doubled while those for older
groups have been on the decline
Despite the magnitude of the violence problem in this country, little is known about the potential
success of various strategies for reducing it. All of the recent reviews that have attempted to
identify promising intervention strategies have concluded that the knowledge base is still too thin
to provide compelling evidence in support of any single approach, particularly those in which the
community or neighborhood is the focus of the intervention, as opposed to interventions which
target specific youth1. It is now often suggested that violence will yield only to a multitude of
approaches that can work on several aspects of the problem in unison.
The California Wellness Foundation’s Violence Prevention Initiative (VPI) represents one such
effort. With funding in excess of $35 million for its first five years, the VPI represents an
ambitious attempt to combine policy and media advocacy, community action, individual
leadership, research, and evaluation in one integrated initiative. The evaluation of the first phase
of the VPI was carried out by teams of researchers from RAND and from the Center for
Research in Disease Prevention at Stanford University.
This paper presents findings from the evaluation of the VPI’s first five years (1993–1998). It
begins with the historical context of the Initiative, including the policy environmment in
California at the time it was launched. It then describes the goals and intent of the Initiative, its
structure, and the design of the evaluation. The remainder presents the findings of the evaluation
in regard to both the implementation process and long-term outcomes, and discusses their
implications for future initiatives of this type.
Elliot, Delbert S. (Ed.) (1999). Blueprints for Violence Prevention (Books 1-10). Colorado:
Venture Publishing and C&M Press.
1
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Acknowledgements
This paper reports the findings of the Violence Prevention Institute that was jointly
evaluated by RAND and the Stanford center for Research in Disease Prevention. We would
like to acknowledge the contributions of Dr. June Flora and her colleagues at Stanford.
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BACKGROUND
In 1993, California was, like the rest of the nation, experiencing a peak in an epidemic of
juvenile homicide. The largest cities were particularly hard hit. Various potential causes of this
epidemic have been cited. One respected authority2 hypothesizes that youths recruited to the
crack trade found it necessary to carry firearms, which induced other youths to arm themselves in
self-defense. Thus, disputes that would once have ended in a fistfight now ended in lethal
violence. Other observers have cited causes ranging from economic stagnation and the social
pressures of poverty and racism to a long record of leniency towards juvenile violence on the
part of the criminal justice system.3
Despite the multiplicity of possible causes, actions undertaken to address America’s violence
problem in the 1990s did not extend much beyond punitive, reactive measures. The federal
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 concentrated on longer sentences and
more police. Gun control was seen as a lost cause, and little attention was given to other
measures intended to address the problem prospectively, at its source4.
Against this background, The California Wellness Foundation (TCWF) launched its Violence
Prevention Initiative (VPI). The foundation was established by HealthNet, a network of
California health care providers, as a condition of its 1991 conversion from non-profit to forprofit status. The new foundation faced an immediate requirement to make some $12 million in
grants in its first year of operation.
The staff of the Foundation (a president, a program director, a senior program officer, a program
officer, and a program secretary) launched an intensive planning effort to
•
identify needs and opportunities for focused grant-making support that would enable the
Foundation to meet its philanthropic mission (improving the health and well-being of all
Californians)
•
establish for itself a unique role within the foundation community.
A series of community-level focus groups were conducted by staff across the state, soon after the
Los Angeles civil disorders in 1992. The Foundation also convened a one-day meeting of health
and other experts and conducted a review of the scientific literature. Violence prevention was
among the top five health issues identified through these processes.
The Foundation staff also commissioned white papers addressing the top health issues identified
by the above processes, including a “White Paper on Violence Prevention.” That paper, and the
Blumstein, Alfred, “Youth Violence, Guns and the Illicit Drug Market,” Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology, Vol. 86, pp. 10–36, 1995.
3 See, for example, Elijah Anderson, Streetwise: Race, Class and Change in an Urban Community,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990.
4 Greenwood, Peter, et al. 1998. Diverting Children from a Life of Crime: Measuring Costs and
Benefits. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
2
-4-
Foundation staff ’s analysis of the violence prevention issue, were heavily influenced by a series
of papers published by the Centers for Disease Control in April, 1992, on the topic of violence
prevention.
These papers, along with the work of various activists, researchers, and professionals in the
public health community, suggested the following:
•
Sole reliance on a criminal justice approach to violence was inadequate to reduce the
occurrence of violence.
•
A public health approach—one focused on prevention—could be more productive in
stemming the tide of violence. Additionally, such an approach would add a much needed
balance to the increasing focus on incarceration and other programs that merely reacted
to violence that had already occurred.
The Foundation identified violence prevention as a promising and urgent focus for its first major
initiative. Several factors, in addition to the above considerations, supported that decision:
•
Data demonstrated the increasing toll violence was taking on America’s communities,
and in particular on youth.
•
California communities identified violence prevention as among their top concerns.
•
No organization had leadership experienced in defining, implementing, and evaluating a
public health approach to the serious problem of youth violence. A survey of other major
foundations showed that none had undertaken a comprehensive grant-making effort in
support of violence prevention.
In choosing to focus on violence, the Foundation recognized that, because violence is a
multifaceted problem that is intertwined with major social problems, it poses a daunting
challenge to a public health approach.
In August, 1992, the Foundation convened an ad hoc national advisory committee, composed of
policymakers, clergy, health care professionals, researchers, and youth and community activists.
The board’s purpose was to help develop a comprehensive, statewide initiative for presentation
to the Foundation’s board of directors. Based on input from this 40-member advisory
committee, Foundation staff prepared a final document outlining a proposed, five-year violence
prevention initiative.
In October 1992, the Foundation’s board of directors approved the launch of the Violence
Prevention Initiative with a commitment of some $25 million over five years. In November the
Foundation issued Request for Proposals for the establishment of the Pacific Center for Violence
Prevention and for community action program-planning grants as a first step in implementing the
Initiative. In addition, awards to the first of four cohorts of community grassroots leaders were
made to initiate the Community Leader Fellowship Program, and agreements were executed at
six sites for academic fellowships.
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During the first year of the Initiative, Foundation staff and the Pacific Center conducted research
and planning efforts to determine the feasibility and usefulness of conducting a public education
campaign in conjunction with the Initiative. A decision was reached to incorporate such a
campaign, and in December 1993, the Foundation awarded a four-year grant to Martin & Glantz
LLC, a consulting firm specializing in communication strategies and grassroots organizing.
Several additional grantees have been added to the VPI over the course of the Initiative, bringing
the total amount of funding for the first five years of the project to approximately $35 million.
Approximately $5 million of this total was provided by other funders acting in partnership with
TCWF. Those are
•
Alliance Healthcare Foundation
•
Crail-Johnson Foundation
•
James Irvine Foundation
•
David & Lucile Packard Foundation
•
San Francisco Foundation
•
S. H. Cowell Foundation
•
Sierra Health Foundation
In the years immediately preceding the launch of the VPI the political environment in California
had been characterized by a criminal-justice-only approach to crime, e.g., “Three Strikes,”
legislation to treat adolescents criminals as adults, and even talk of allowing the death penalty to
be imposed on thirteen-year-olds. In that context, it is noteworthy that the general preventionoriented approach toward youth violence embodied in the VPI has made its way into several key
state-level reports and legislative initiatives.5
•
In September 1994, the Little Hoover Commission issued a report entitled The Juvenile
Crime Challenge: Making Prevention a Priority.6 This document presents a detailed
legislative and administrative strategy for improving the state’s youth crime prevention
efforts. Among the recommendations contained in the report:
–
•
That state agencies involved in anticrime activities be directed “to make early intervention
and prevention programs a top priority.”
In 1995, the California Attorney General’s office issued Violence Prevention: A Vision of
Hope.7 Prepared by the Attorney General’s 26-member Policy Council on Violence
Prevention, the report concluded that to achieve a violence-free society, state and local
governments and community organizations must develop and implement policies and
programs that
–
increase the constructive use of the media to deglamorize violence and promote nonviolent
social norms
5Foundation
staff and VPI grantees participated in and helped inform some of these efforts.
Number 127, Sacramento, Calif.: The Little Hoover Commission.
7Crime and Violence Prevention Center, California Attorney General’s Office. 1995.
6Report
-6-
–
reduce deaths and injuries from firearms
–
reduce violence associated with alcohol
–
strengthen communities and schools by expanding local ownership and control
–
support families, recognizing them as the basic institution for developing and nurturing
children
–
foster and support violence-free relationships
–
ensure the development of healthy and responsible youth
–
recognize that all people matter, fostering a respect for diversity
–
advance personal and social responsibility
–
support violence prevention research and evaluation based on the public health model.
The Council developed literally scores of detailed recommendations emanating from the
above initiatives, many of which bear unmistakable resemblance to some of the specific
objectives of VPI grantees. For instance, with respect to the goal of reducing deaths and
injuries from firearms, the Council recommended, among other things,
•
–
that legislation be adopted prohibiting the manufacture and sale of “Saturday Night
Specials”
–
that the penalty for carrying loaded, concealed firearms be increased so that it is consistent
with other concealed-weapons sanctions.
In July 1996 the Governor signed into law State Senate Bill 1760. Specifically, the bill
provided $50 million in grants to counties for the purpose of reducing juvenile crime and
delinquency. The bill stressed the importance of developing a continuum of responses to
the problem of juvenile crime, with a particular emphasis on prevention and early
intervention and treatment.
These state-level reports and initiatives will affect the continuing evolution of California’s
political environment toward one that may be more receptive to the importance of violence
prevention. They represent important contributions as well to the dialogue about violence taking
place beyond California’s borders.
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Goals and Design of the VPI
An important goal of the Initiative from the start has been nothing less than “to reduce youth
violence in California.”8 The Foundation wished to play a role in increasing the health and wellbeing of Californians by enhancing the public’s understanding that societal violence is
remediable and that interpersonal violence is preventable. The hope was that this would increase
the public’s support for and involvement in the implementation of public policies and
community actions that reduce violence.
One of the most innovative aspects of the VPI is that it represents an important attempt to apply a
public health model to youth violence prevention. This model has served as a guide to the
myriad program development and implementation decisions made by the Foundation’s staff and
board.
A public health model, according to the Foundation-sponsored “White Paper on Violence
Prevention,” considers host, agent, and environmental factors in the design of preventive
interventions.
•
The “host” for intentional injury is the at-risk man, woman, or child who may be injured
or who may injure him- or herself or another.
•
The “agent” of intentional injury is most often kinetic energy, delivered by a gun, knife,
blunt object or fist.
•
The “physical environment” includes the home, neighborhood, workplace, school or jail.
•
The “social environment” is shaped by joblessness, oppression, racism, the media, alcohol
and other drugs, family disarray, and despair.
Similarly, in their paper on adopting a public health approach for preventing violence, James
Mercy and his colleagues from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention argue that a
fundamental component of this approach is a
shift in the way our society addresses violence, from a focus limited to reacting to
violence to a focus on changing the social, behavioral, and environmental factors that
cause violence.9
According to this framework, the wave of violence that crested in the late ’80s and early ’90s
should be viewed as nothing less than an “epidemic,” which, if left untreated or if treated with
the wrong elixir, will threaten the very fabric of our society.
As outlined by Mercy et al. (1993), a public health approach for preventing violence comprises
four steps:
8The
California Wellness Foundation, “Violence Prevention Initiative,” December 1996, available
from the Foundation.
9Mercy, J. A., et al. 1993. “Public Health Policy for Preventing Violence,” Health Affairs 12:7–29.
-8-
•
Define the Problem: The first step involves collecting data on the nature and magnitude
of the problem, including information on violence-related morbidity and mortality, the
costs associated with violence, the spatial and temporal distribution of violent incidents,
and so on.
•
Identify Causes and Risk Factors: The next step requires undertaking a variety of
analyses—including epidemiologic studies, rate calculations, and case-control studies—
aimed at determining the underlying causes or risk factors associated with violencerelated morbidity and mortality. Such studies may be used as a vehicle for identifying
particular sub-populations at risk for violence incidents and even specific interventions.
•
Develop and Evaluate Interventions: Based on the information obtained during the first
two steps, a series of interventions should be developed and evaluated. Such
interventions range from observational studies of promising approaches for reducing
violence to randomized controlled trials.
•
Implement Interventions: The final stage in the process involves implementing
interventions shown to be effective in the previous step. However, the evaluation process
should continue during this step to ensure that interventions found to be effective in
demonstration projects remain so once they are introduced on a wider scale.
In reflecting on the implications of a public health approach for violence prevention policy
development, Mercy et al. (1993) recognize the need to
•
invest in prevention
•
address root causes
•
adopt a learn-as-we-go approach
•
emphasize coordinated action
•
intervene early
•
work with the community.
It is important to stress that most experts view a public health approach as a complement to,
rather than a substitute for, what is typically termed a criminal justice approach for combating
violence.10 Even the most ardent proponents of a public health approach understand that for
some individuals and crimes there is no viable alternative to incarceration. In short, a balance
needs to be struck—a balance that ensures the safety of our citizens in the short run while
developing a longer-term solution that addresses the underlying causes of violent behavior.
VPI STRUCTURE
In addition to the goal of reducing youth violence in California, two other important objectives
were also inherent in the Initiative:
10Moore,
M. H. 1993. “Violence Prevention: Criminal Justice or Public Health?” Health Affairs
12:34–45.
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•
To provide leadership in violence prevention in California
•
To be a catalyst for local, state, and national efforts to prevent death and injuries due to
violence.
The Foundation noted a critical need for collaboration among criminal-justice, mental-health,
social-services and public-health professionals and others to develop a coordinated approach to
the control and prevention of violence in California. By assuming a leadership role, the
Foundation hoped to fill that void, and to foster communication and collaboration among those
entities.
Papers from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) suggested a combination of
potential interventions was likely to be most effective in preventing violent injuries, and
promulgated five components in a comprehensive public health approach to violence prevention:
targeting prevention resources to those at risk, surveillance, empowering communities, training
and evaluation.11 In response, the Foundation
•
operationalized the various approaches identified by the CDC through four interactive
components: a community action program, a policy program, a leadership program, and a
research program (see Figure 1.1)
•
established an evaluation process for the Initiative
•
set up a statewide advisory committee to guide the Foundation and its staff on what was
seen as a “robust yet flexible” Initiative that was expected to evolve over the course of the
program.
Position Papers from the Third National Injury Control Conference: “Setting the Agenda for
Injury Control in the 1990s” (Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control, April, 1992).
11
- 10 -
Figure 1.1—Structure of the Violence Prevention Initiative
RAND PM945/2 1.1
The California Wellness Foundation Board of Directors
VPI Advisory Committee
Evaluation
The California Wellness Foundation Staff
Policy
Program
Community
Action Program
Pacific
Center for
Violence
Prevention
18
Community
Collaboratives
Entertainment
Industry
Project
Leadership
Program
6
Academic
Sites
40
Community
Fellows
Research
Program
15
Research
Projects
15
Peace
Prize
Awardees
Public
Education
Campaign
Although the VPI is structured, in a formal sense, along programmatic lines, the myriad of
activities that fell under the Initiative’s umbrella can also be categorized along functional lines.
Doing so helps illustrate the fact that in principle—and to an increasing extent, in reality—the
various programs interact with one another to create an integrated approach for achieving the
Initiative’s ultimate goal: reducing youth violence.
Specifically, as Figure 1.2 shows, the Initiative essentially comprises four broad areas of activity:
•
Community mobilization and delivery of violence prevention programs to youth
•
Leadership development
•
Education of policymakers and opinion leaders
•
Conduct of policy-relevant research on violence prevention issues.
Each of these areas of activity is influenced by the other ones. For example, the task of
educating policymakers and opinion leaders has, in part, been accomplished by community
leaders who embrace the violence prevention cause.
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Figure 1.2—Functional Paradigm for Violence Prevention Initiative
PM945/1-1.2
Leadership
development
The
California
Wellness
Foundation
V PI
Community
mobilization
and
services
Education of
policymakers
Reduction
in youth
violence
Research
THE EVALUATION
The Foundation planned from the very start that the Initiative would be evaluated. The
evaluation was designed to achieve the following objectives:
•
Provide information on the Initiative’s implementation and early effects to those
with decisionmaking authority over it so that they could improve the VPI over its
first five years.
•
Document the accomplishments of those supported by the Initiative.
•
Assess the eventual effectiveness of the interventions as rigorously and objectively
as possible, given the nature of the program and the evaluation resources available.
•
Draw lessons for similar subsequent violence prevention efforts.
Ideally, we would report the extent to which the Initiative achieved its ultimate aim of reducing
youth violence in California. However, changes in youth violence can be due to a variety of
causes, so it is difficult to tease out the role of the Initiative in the reductions that have occurred
(and impossible to predict any long-term effects). Although we have made an attempt to isolate
violence reduction effects, our evaluation also rests on the Initiative’s success at achieving
various intermediate effects which might be expected to exert downward pressure on youth
violence levels. These intermediate effects include
•
changes in young people’s attitudes and skills
•
adults’ opinions and support for violence prevention
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•
opinion leaders’ political activism for violence prevention
•
changes in state-level and local policies and social programs
•
changes in the media’s portrayal of the problem of youth violence.
To determine these effects, we used a variety of analytic methods including case studies,
in-depth interviews, and quantitative techniques.
The evaluation was conducted in full cooperation with the Initiative’s other activities. For
example, the evaluation of the Community Action Program used a nine-step evaluation
engagement process based on the assumption that positive working relationships between
evaluators and stakeholders are essential to successful evaluations and utilization of
evaluation findings. The first four steps of the process occurred prior to the first data
collection year. These were
•
articulation of the relationship between evaluators and stakeholders (such as
community anonymity in reports to the funder)
•
agreeing on the focus and the audience (such as determination of focal
geographic area)
•
determining measurable objectives
•
specifying evaluation products (such as tailored reports to the CAPS).
The last five steps made up an evaluation cycle that was repeated three times over the
five years. These steps were
•
interactive evaluation method development (such as opportunity to give feedback
on each evaluation method)
•
collaborative data collection (such as jointly recruiting and working with schools)
•
review of funder reports
•
tailored reports to communities (such as written reports accompanied by site
visits and tailored data analysis)
•
evaluation support (such as presentations to collaboratives, press conferences,
etc.).
The result of the process was enhanced community capacity to address the problems of violence
via utilization of evaluation data.
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Implementation and Outcomes
All of the components planned for the VPI were eventually implemented to one degree or
another. Some comprised more activities than were initially anticipated, while others pursued
narrower agendas than had been initially planned. Overall, the VPI in its entirety appears to be
more than the sum of its parts. There were a considerable number of serendipitous relationships
between the initiative’s diverse parts, that appear to add to its overall impact.
Community Mobilization and Service Delivery12
In their efforts to mobilize their communities to address violence, the Initiative’s 17 Community
Action Programs (CAPs) engaged community adults in a variety of activities. These included
training sessions for community residents on local issues related to violence prevention, letterwriting campaigns to garner support, neighborhood meetings to discuss strategies addressing
violence, and events to facilitate cohesion among community members. The portion of the
community involved, however, was not large:
•
While the fraction of adults in CAP communities who had heard of the CAPs
increased slightly over the funding period to one-third in 1997-98, the level of
participation in CAP-sponsored activities remained low at 7 percent.
•
Slightly higher levels of participation (11 percent) were reported by parents of
adolescents—the focus of many CAP efforts.13
These numbers suggest that most CAPs were only modestly successful at wide-scale mobilization of
community residents to address violence. It should be kept in mind that for some CAPs, community
mobilization did not appear to be a primary goal.
It is unfortunate that participation levels were not higher, as those residents who did participate in
CAP activities perceived higher levels of cohesion among community members and reported higher
levels of violence prevention advocacy. They spent more time with neighborhood youth, more
frequently attended violence prevention meetings, and more frequently contacted public officials and
the media about issues related to violence prevention.
Nevertheless, we should not give the impression that the CAPs had no effects on nonparticipants. There were changes in attitudes across CAP communities as a whole toward issues
related to violence. Two examples:
Here we present a summary of some of the key findings of the Stanford evaluation team who
evaluated the Community Action Program.
13 Ranges over all CAPs for these two participation rates were 0 to 26 percent for all adults and 4
to 44 percent for parents of adolescents.
12
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•
•
Over the intervention period, there was a significant decrease (from 47 percent to 37 percent)
in the portion of residents in CAP communities who thought that keeping a gun in the home
makes the people who live there “more safe.”
At the same time, support for laws to restrict and regulate handgun ownership
significantly increased over time.
To increase local organizations’ capacity to address youth violence, CAPs worked with opinion
leaders including county- and city-level representatives from the media, health and social
services, education, criminal justice, local government, and business. CAPs appeared to be
successful in working with local opinion leaders in the sense that over 90 percent of them were
aware of the CAP and most (53 percent in 1997-9814) participated in CAP activities. Opinion
leaders who reported higher levels of involvement with the CAPs were more likely than others to
report activities or perceptions suggesting increases in the community’s capacity to address
violence. Such leaders experienced higher levels of collaboration with other organizations as
evidenced by more frequent sharing of information and materials and implementation of joint
activities related to violence prevention. They also had more positive perceptions of CAP
success, interacted more frequently with community residents, and reported higher levels of
support for increased resources for youth and higher levels of violence prevention advocacy.
CAPs thus appear to have successfully engaged community leaders in their violence prevention
efforts. Contact with CAPs appeared to prompt opinion leaders to become advocates for and
participants in CAP goals and strategies. The largest apparent successes were among those
opinion leaders who were least familiar with the CAPs to begin with.
Over the intervention period, CAPs increased the number and diversity of violence prevention
activities they offered to youth in their communities. Activities included
•
sponsoring school-based violence prevention rallies and classes
•
implementing peer mentoring, gang diversion, and conflict resolution programs
•
developing summer programs such as educational trips and basketball leagues
•
facilitating access to job training and community job opportunities.
Compared to the participation rate in other health interventions, the percentage of community
youths participating in CAP activities was not high—12 percent in 1997-98. However, that
represented an increase from 8 percent two years earlier, and in some CAP areas, participation
was much higher (59 percent in one area15). Participants in CAP activities also included a high
percentage of high-risk youth who were the focus of many of the CAPs’ efforts.
Up from 42 percent the previous year. It is noteworthy that this participation rate, in contrast
to the others, was for independently selected opinion leaders—persons less familiar with the CAPs.
15 The low end of the range was 4 percent.
14
- 15 -
Participation in CAP-sponsored programs appear to have made a difference in the lives of CAP
youth. In most CAP areas, youths who were most intimately involved with the CAPs were more
likely to report activities or attitudes suggesting lower risk of involvement in violence.
•
They participated at higher rates in positive community activities (e.g., after-school
programs, sports, creative arts).
•
They reported greater use of violence prevention skills and higher levels of
confidence that they could avoid violence.
•
They more frequently discussed with family and friends issues related to violence
prevention (e.g., the dangers of carrying a gun).
•
They were more likely to have friends with more positive violence prevention norms
(e.g., believing it was not okay to carry a gun).
These relationships held even when CAPs sponsored different types of programs (e.g., schoolbased curricula versus a community program). However, involvement in CAP activities was not
associated with changes in ultimate outcomes such as use of violence and risk factors associated
with involvement in violence (e.g., drinking alcohol and carrying a gun). And for a few CAPs,
participation was also not associated with the positive activities and attitudes listed above.
An unanticipated positive outcome of the Initiative was the building of Community Action
Programs’ capacity to conduct evaluations and utilize evaluation data to further violence
prevention efforts. CAPs were involved in all phases of the Initiative’s evaluation. As a result,
CAP project directors reported increased knowledge about how to conduct evaluations (e.g.,
develop measurable objectives and surveys) and a better understanding about how evaluation
data can be effectively used for community violence prevention. More frequent use of
evaluation data was associated with greater learning about evaluation and use of data in more
diverse ways (e.g., sharing evaluation results with community members, media, and policy
makers; and using results for grants and program refinement).
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Leadership Development
The Academic Fellowship Program was successful in training a diverse group of health
professionals in violence prevention. During the first five years of the VPI, six institutions
within California were awarded funds to train 32 Academic Fellows.16 The institutions were a
school of public health, three departments of surgery, a department of child psychiatry, and the
state Department of Health. Each academic fellow worked under the supervision of an
experienced principal investigator.
The program clearly accomplished its goal of increasing the number of health care professionals
trained in violence prevention, especially women (23) and ethnic minorities (19). Other major
strengths of the program have been the following:
•
The fellows have been diverse in their professional backgrounds—child psychiatry,
child psychology, public health, preventive medicine, nursing, and trauma surgery.
This diversity has served not only to enhance the fellowship experience but also to
broaden the fellows’ perspectives on youth violence prevention.
•
The fellows acknowledge the networking opportunities the program and the VPI in
general has afforded them including the chance to get to know and work with senior
researchers in the violence prevention field.
•
Most principal investigators, as well as the Pacific Center’s Academic Fellowship
Coordinator, have shown a strong commitment to ensuring the success of the fellows
and the program. However, we have seen some variation across sites in terms of the
rigor with which requirements have been enforced.
•
The program has been flexible in permitting fellows to pursue their interests in
violence prevention and activism. The program has come to attract persons with an
interest in the health professions (and in some instances, academia) as well as a
commitment and a desire to work within the community. For example, many fellows
have also been actively involved in non-research-related violence prevention
activities, such as giving talks in the community, donating their time to various
county and community programs or organizations, and mentoring high-risk youth.
The Academic Fellows have been recognized for outstanding contributions in their fields. In
addition, they have
•
raised the awareness of violence prevention among their colleagues and other
minority health professionals
•
enabled their institutions to develop new programs or curricula in this area
•
served to increase the visibility of their institutions within the community.
Of these, 25 fellows successfully completed the program during Phase I, 3 have continued into
Phase II, and 4 withdrew from the program prior to completion.
16
- 17 -
Many of the program’s alumni have continued to do work in violence prevention to varying
degrees. Some have brought the VPI’s multidisciplinary, public-health-oriented perspective to
the organizations where they now work. Some, citing the influence of the VPI, have elected to
pursue higher degrees (MPHs, Ph.D.s, or M.D.s), through which they plan to continue their work
on youth violence issues.
The Community Leader Fellowship Program has, by several measures, been successful in
identifying and supporting productive, committed grassroots leaders. During Phase I of the VPI,
the Foundation funded 40 Community Fellows.17 In general, the cohorts have been diverse in
their demographic and background characteristics, as well as in their approaches to youth
violence. Some of the fellows interact one on one with youth and members of their community
on a daily basis, while others are leaders of organizations that support youth services or manage
statewide programs.
Most of the fellows used their award to create new programs or to enhance existing ones in order
to provide direct services to at-risk youth or to mobilize communities to increase youth
opportunities. Community Fellows documented violence victim stories, ran a high school youth
club, published a community resource guide by and for youth, instituted a problem-solving
curriculum in public schools, and established an after-school program for teenage mothers—
among many other activities.
The fellows committed a substantial portion of their time to violence prevention activities; for
example, many devoted more than 40 hours per week. They also demonstrated a strong
commitment to mentoring youth. Many of the fellows had either been informally or formally
mentoring youth prior to the fellowship and continued these activities during their tenure in the
program and beyond. However, the objectives of this component of the fellowship program
initially were unclear, and the degree of emphasis placed by the Foundation on mentoring has
evolved over time.
Overall, the Community Fellows used the fellowship to gain
•
confidence in their leadership and administrative abilities
•
a clearer view of what approaches work and which do not
•
a better understanding of their own strengths and weaknesses and where to obtain
the resources necessary to sustain their work.
The fellowship also has enabled these grassroots leaders to strengthen their links with their peers
in the violence prevention community. Importantly, the program has served to raise the fellows’
visibility within their own community and among policymakers and funders.
Fellows interviewed three to four years after their fellowship ended have continued to be
enthusiastically invested in violence prevention.
17
Two Fellows withdrew before successfully completing the program.
- 18 -
•
As VPI alumni, they have gained access to funding resources and policymakers, as
well as enhanced support from their communities, which has enabled them to
continue their work.
•
Some have turned over portions of programs initiated during the fellowship to others
(including mentored youths) or have trained others to assume responsibility.
•
Others have gone on to seek advanced degrees in order to continue to pursue their
efforts in violence prevention.
The Community Action Programs also helped in developing leadership. CAPs viewed the
development of leaders as critical to youths’ positive growth and development. Different
opportunities were provided for youth to develop leadership skills:
•
leading CAP youth collaboratives
•
planning CAP activities
•
recruiting other youths or adults to get involved in CAP efforts
•
developing and using media and policy advocacy skills to influence residents and
leaders in their community.
As a result of their involvement in these types of activities, youths reported positive changes in
their lives:
•
being seen as a role model by younger youths
•
an increased ability to resolve conflicts
•
making positive contributions to their community.
- 19 -
Education of Policymakers
Over the course of the Initiative, the Pacific Center for Violence Prevention strove to influence
policy directly through interactions between its staff and policymakers, opinion leaders, and
activists. During the last few years, we have become increasingly impressed with the Pacific
Center’s progress in meeting the policy goals of promoting the public health perspective on
youth violence and advocating policies reducing firearm injuries and death among youth.
Evidence of the Pacific Center’s effectiveness in making progress toward meeting the VPI's three
policy goals was found in our analysis of legislative trends in California, Michigan, and Illinois
(see analysis in Appendix). We found that the Center’s efforts relating to firearm legislation met
with the greatest level of success. Bills supported by the Center grew more numerous and
successful both with the passage of time and in comparison with those in two other big states
(Michigan and Illinois). We also found that legislative approaches to firearm violence appears to
have shifted in recent years away from more punitive approaches targeting the criminal use of
firearms toward approaches targeting firearm access and weapon design.
The Pacific Center may also have contributed to legislative successes in the area of shifting the
perspective on youth violence. To better understand progress on this front, we tracked a wide
array of legislation related to reducing youth violence (see Appendix for details.). Several
promising measures supported by the Center first appeared as legislative proposals in 1997.
These included measures to increase after-school activities, a gang violence prevention measure,
and a large grant for local prevention efforts. These advances were part of a movement by
legislators who appear to be more supportive of a broad array of prevention measures. The
observed increase in legislative support for a wide variety of prevention programs presents both
an opportunity and a challenge to the Center as a policy advocate. Our findings also indicate that
increases in prevention bills were accompanied by increases in bills that contained more punitive
measures.
We cannot, of course, be completely confident that the Center’s work is causally related to the
improvements we have seen over the last five years in these areas. Much of the additional
evidence is anecdotal, but in a number of instances, multiple, mutually reinforcing anecdotes
tend to lend credibility to the likelihood of a strong association between Center’s work and
policy shifts. Some of the Pacific Center’s most important accomplishments through 1998 are as
follows:
•
Our case study of the Center confirm that the Center’s efforts have been closely
associated with, and perhaps responsible for, major state-level policy changes in the
area of violence prevention. These changes include a measure that provides $50
million annually for local violence prevention and intervention programs.
- 20 -
•
The Center’s staff worked with representatives from many, if not most, of the 67
cities and 6 counties in California that had passed, or were attempting to pass, local
firearms-related ordinances (e.g., “junk gun” bans, dealer restrictions, and
ammunition sales regulations).
•
The Center was credited by several observers for recognizing the importance of, and
creating good working relationships with, law enforcement officials. The Center also
established close relationships with health care and ethnic organizations and other
interest groups.
•
Staff from the Center spent thousands of person-hours consulting with state and
local policymakers on issues related to youth violence. Though the Center focused
primarily on firearms policy, they also consulted on the other two Initiative policy
goals. The contacts have typically involved
–
supplying policymakers with technical information on the nature and extent of
a problem (e.g., youth access to firearms)
–
discussing political strategies
–
assessing the legal implications of policy initiatives.
•
The Center made a substantial effort in the last two years to involve other VPI
participants as collaborators and allies. With assistance from the Center, CAP
grantees have begun to influence both local and state policies that further the goals
of the VPI. For example, a 1997 bill establishing the California Gang, Crime, and
Violence Prevention Partnership Program was signed into law. The bill, which was
drafted and supported by one of the CAPs, directs $3 million to community-based
organizations working in the area of violence and gang prevention.
•
Continued participation and leadership in monthly firearms strategy meetings have
greatly enhanced the Center’s efforts to coordinate statewide advocacy measures.
Recent advocacy and collaboration with groups like Handgun Control, Inc., the
HELP Network, and congressional staff and legislators have expanded the scope of
these strategic planning meetings to a national scale.
In addition to the policy work of the Pacific Center the public relations firm of Martin & Glantz
LLC was provided with funding to conduct two public-education campaigns, aimed at
policymakers, opinion leaders, community leaders, and the general public. These were: 1) the
Campaign to Prevent Handgun Violence Against Kids; and 2) Resources for Youth. The themes
of the campaigns were the devastating effects of handgun violence against youth in California
and the need for policies to increase public and private investment in comprehensive violence
prevention programs for youth. Each campaign had two components:
•
a mass media component comprising paid advertising, public service
announcements, and an earned media campaign
•
an opinion leader component comprising a database and direct-mail communications
program, candidate education, and statewide videoconferences.
- 21 -
The initial Campaign to Prevent Handgun Violence Against Kids appears to have had a
substantial impact. A statewide videoconference in February 1995 announcing the handgun
campaign served as a pivotal event in the movement to pass local gun control ordinances within
California. Policymakers, researchers, and advocates used the videoconference as an opportunity
to interact on this critical issue. This campaign, importantly, brought together individuals and
organizations (e.g., law enforcement officials, educators, community activists, health care
professionals) who might normally not have worked together on these issues. The timing of the
videoconference and the information provided, especially the findings from the report Ring of
Fire, appear to have been a catalyst for efforts across the state to pass local ordinances restricting
youth access to firearms. The campaign’s key messages such as “handguns are the leading killer
of youth in California” were cited widely by those actively engaged in the gun control debate and
continue to be cited four years later. A content analysis of earned media coverage by the
campaign showed that it was successful in portraying youth as the victims of violent crime. In
three-quarters of the news segments, there were clear messages assigning responsibility of the
violence against youth to gun availability.
The second public education campaign, Resources for Youth, was launched in November 1996
and built on the first. For example, the second campaign formalized the relationships with key
statewide organizations that begun to form during the handgun campaign. These organizations
included the California State Parent-Teacher Association, the League of Women Voters, and the
California Police Chiefs Association, among others.
The earned media coverage for the Resources for Youth campaign appears to have increased the
visibility of those affiliated with the Initiative and the campaign itself. However, the overall
message contained in the print media coverage did not appear to shift strongly towards a publichealth versus a juvenile-justice approach, for two reasons:
•
The campaign had to compete for coverage with simultaneous “get tough” juvenile
justice campaigns spearheaded by state and national politicians. Not losing ground
in the 1997 media environment might thus be counted as an accomplishment of the
Resources for Youth campaign.
•
The second campaign did not have the same advantage as the initial handgun
campaign in having a readily identifiable message to put forth.
Despite the disadvantages, the campaign’s penetration appears to have been relatively high.
Nearly half the opinion leaders surveyed were able to recall key campaign elements, notably the
award-winning public service announcement entitled “Jeremy” and polling data on California
voters’ attitudes toward investment strategies for reducing youth violence. And this second
campaign’s videoconference seems to have been helpful in stimulating further dissemination of
its message:
•
Of those who had attended, nearly three-quarters either had mentioned the
Resources for Youth campaign to others or had shared campaign materials with
others.
- 22 -
•
One out of three attendees reported using the campaign materials in support of their
own violence prevention activities.
Martin & Glantz’s public-education campaign efforts appeared to yield several significant
indirect effects as well:
•
The VPI’s partner organizations used the materials extensively to educate their own
membership.
•
A campaign strategy involving communities and youths in mapping potential
resources raised the community profile of various components of the Initiative
including the CAPs and Community Fellows. It also served as a catalyst for
discussions with community leaders resulting in specific steps by policymakers to
make resources available locally for youth.
•
Between 1993 and 1998, the staff of Martin & Glantz fielded thousands of inquires
from individuals for information on youth violence prevention and gun control
strategies and how they might get involved.
The Policy Program also included an Entertainment Industry Project. This project consisted of a
campaign conducted by Mediascope, Inc., whose objective was to encourage more responsible
depiction of violence in the media. Mediascope undertook numerous activities in this regard:
•
They organized or participated in over 100 informational forums and workshops on
violence in the media that were well attended by various segments of the
entertainment industry. It seems likely that these events have promoted, at least to
a modest degree, positive changes in the climate of receptivity to more constructive
media depictions of violence.
•
Reports on industry rating practices related to the portrayal of violence were
distributed to almost 3000 industry professionals, policymakers, social advocates,
researchers, and members of the press. These appear to have had some influence on
the salience and public discussion of this topic.
•
Mediascope also prepared dozens of issue briefs for distribution to journalists,
legislators, teachers, and others. Topics included youth violence in America, youth
and guns, American public opinion on media violence, and the V-chip technology.
Because of the welter of forces at play, however, we cannot say with confidence whether
Mediascope has had a positive effect on current portrayals of violence in the media, or whether
such an effect is likely to accrue in the future.
Community Action Programs also worked to influence opinion leaders through media and policy
advocacy. CAPs advocated for policies to decrease access to handguns and increase resources
for youth at the local and state level. Most CAPs’ involvement in such advocacy increased over
the course of the Initiative. It resulted in numerous successful policy and media efforts including
•
the passage of school policies to create “beacon centers”
- 23 -
•
city and state policies to allocate additional resources for youth
•
youth-produced television and radio programs promoting the prevention of youth
violence.
It is important to note the several different elements and channels through which the Initiative
was laying the groundwork for policy change. It was not uncommon to find leaders who had
received information from or participated in activities organized by more than one element of the
Initiative. These persons did not always know that these contacts were sponsored by the same
initiative and foundation, but that did not lessen the effectiveness of these contacts (and may
have increased it).
Research
Through its Research Program, the Initiative funded 15 projects addressing all three of its policy
goals.18 The 14 projects evaluated provided a set of findings and research products that should
be of use in developing more effective violence prevention policies. A few examples:
•
Data necessary to formulate and enact effective prevention policies addressing youth
violence in Asian-American communities
•
A plan of action for addressing gang violence-related risk factors that draws on the
strengths of the community
•
Information on violence prevention efforts that can be used in the development of
effective programs and construction of a systematically applicable evaluation
methodology.
Moreover, results of some projects appear to have been used by policymakers or activists or to
have influenced the policy debate.
•
Legal research at the Marin Institute resulted in a model alcoholic-beverages control
act. This model has been influential in attempts to revise state legislation, in local
efforts to overcome state-level policy, and in support of the positions of local
communities in court cases.
•
Researchers at the Prevention Research Center investigated the relations among
advertising, alcohol, and violence in the Latino community and put considerable
effort into disseminating their results to community groups.
•
A researcher at the University of California, Davis, examining the role of firearms in
youth violence, produced the report Ring of Fire. This report documented the
concentration of inexpensive-handgun manufacture in a small number of Southern
California firms; its title has become part of the lexicon of the gun control debate.
One of the 15 grantees was, because of internal difficulties during the grant period, not
evaluated.
18
- 24 -
The projects funded through the Research Program have so far produced or have in process 94
publications. They have been the subject of over 140 presentations by the researchers in forums
of varying types, many of national or international character.
Research was also carried out by the Academic Fellows. Again, just a few examples:
•
Examining the use of criminal justice data in epidemiological studies of domestic
violence
•
Surveying high school students to assess the risk-taking behavior of adolescents
with a history of violence or abusive behavior
•
Conducting a pilot study to examine the relationship between migration and gang
membership
•
Carrying out a statewide survey of health professionals and students on training
received and knowledge of violence prevention as a public health issue
•
Studying resiliency factors among youth
•
Examining psychological and physical abuse in adolescent dating relationships.
Academic Fellows have made presentations before state and national professional associations
and their research has been published in scholarly, peer-reviewed journals.
Violence Reduction
Although the level of youth violence, and homicide in particular, have been declining in most
areas since the VPI was launched, available data do not permit strong conclusions regarding the
Initiative’s contribution to this drop. We would not expect to see an effect at the state level, as
the changes sought at that level were aimed at creating a friendlier climate for violence reduction
strategies that might yield results over the long term. We thus sought effects in CAP
communities. Evidence came from two sources: trends in violent crimes reported to the police
and surveys of community residents.
The rate of violent-crime reported to the police fell in most CAP areas, but they did in most other
parts of the state as well. In five CAP target areas, however, violent crime fell significantly faster
than it did in comparable areas within the same city. These five sites were
–
Stockton (where the CAP grantee was the Boys and Girls Club)
–
San Francisco’s Hunter’s Point neighborhood (Bayview–Hunter’s Point
Foundation)
–
San Francisco Mission District (Real Alternatives Program)
–
the Innercity Struggle neighborhood in Los Angeles
- 25 -
–
the neighborhood associated with the Committee on Assaults Against Women in
Van Nuys.
The utility of these data are limited, however, because the CAPs, like the rest of the Initiative,
focused mostly on youth violence, whereas the violent acts reported to the police are mostly
committed by adults.
3000
Crimes per 100,000 in Intervention Site
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
Figure 1—Violent Crime in Selected CAPs, 1990–1998
- 26 -
Figure 1 plots the crime rate in the seven largest Community Action Programs (CAPs) for which
adequate data were collected19 from 1990 through 1998. Two growth rates have been estimated
for these data, one from 1990 through 1993, the other from 1994 (the year the VPI formally
began) through 1998, and two lines are drawn to display these rates, constrained so that the lines
intersect exactly halfway between 1993 and 1994. As Table 1 indicates, violence was rising very
slightly in the selected areas by about 0.7 % each year. Happily, beginning in 1994 violence rates
began to fall rapidly at a rate of about 11.3 % per year. The change in the growth rate is highly
statistically significant; that is, it is extremely unlikely that there was no real change in the
growth rate between 1993 and 1994. This fact might be seen as providing strong support for the
hypothesis that the VPI funding of these community action programs led to a drop in violence in
those places.
Table 1. Growth in Violence Rate Changed Significantly
After 1993 in CAP Sites
Annual rate Statistical
of change Significance
0.6 %
-10.3 %
-10.9 %
0.0000
Time period
1990 through 1993
1994 through 1998
Change in growth rate
Unfortunately, we cannot rule out alternative hypotheses, because, as we will demonstrate over
and over, nearly the same change in violence rates can be seen almost everywhere else, including
many places where no VPI-funded community action programs were active. To illustrate this
point, the right hand side of Figure 2 shows the violence rate in the part of the city of Los
Angeles that had no VPI-funded community action programs—a large urban area with
characteristics similar to the places selected for VPI funding. The left-hand side of the figure
repeats the graph seen in Figure 1.
19
The two sites in Los Angeles, the two in San Francisco, and San Diego, Inglewood and Pomona.
- 27 -
1200
1000
1000
800
800
600
600
400
400
200
200
0
Crimes per 100,000 in Comparison Site
Crimes per 100,000 in Intervention Site
1200
0
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
Figure 2—Violent Crime in Selected CAP Sites and Los Angeles Net of its CAP
Sites
From Figure 2, we note first that after 1993 violence declined in Los Angeles at a slightly faster
rate than it declined in the CAP sites selected for this discussion. However, the difference is not
statistically significant. In other words, the experience of declining violence seen in the CAP
sites was felt in other places. This observation challenges the hypothesis that the VPI
intervention was the primary reason violence fell in those places it supported.
Table 2. After 1993, Violence Fell at Just About
the Same Rate in CAP and Non-CAP Sites
Growth in violence after 1993
Selected CAP sites
Los Angeles, minus its CAP sites
Difference
- 28 -
Growth
Rate
-10.3 %
-11.1 %
-0.7 %
Statistical
Significance
0.63
It should also be noted that violence rates were rising at a slightly faster rate prior to 1993 in the
selected CAP sites compared to Los Angeles. That is, the change in the growth rates seen
between 1993 and 1994 in the CAP sites exceeded the change seen in Los Angeles. While the
post-1993 experience in both places is about the same, a sharper change was seen in the
intervention sites. Table 3 shows the specific difference. The difference between the violence
growth rates in the selected CAP sites is about 4.8 percentage points greater than that difference
in Los Angeles. However, this suggestive difference is not statistically significant, and we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the difference comes about from chance alone.
Table 3. Change in Growth of Violence for Selected
CAPs and Non-Cap Sites
Growth
Rate
-10.9 %
-6.6 %
4.3 %
Change in violence
Selected CAP sites
Los Angeles
Turnaround
Statistical
Significance
0.18
The material introduced above is typical of the more detailed analyses we conducted for each
site. In almost every place funded by the VPI, violence began to decline following that funding at
a significantly faster rate. However, only in five cases is this decline significantly different from
that in surrounding communities. We cannot distinguish VPI funded sites from the rest of
California on the basis of declining violence rates.
It should be noted that the rapid fall in violence seen above is not just a local and isolated event.
Violent crime has fallen annually in the nation, the state, and in most cities, since about 1993.
For the most part, the drop is a real one, not caused by an increase in the number of victims who
fail to report crime or a decrease in the number of reports that law enforcement agencies choose
to record.
According to a recent report, “Americans age 12 or older experienced fewer violent and property
crimes in 1997 than in any other year since the 1973 inception of the National Crime
Victimization Survey.”20 This survey is national in scope, and cannot tell us much about what
happened in California, let alone in California cities and neighborhoods. However, its
conclusions are based on a sample of households and do not depend on the willingness of victims
to report incidents to law enforcement agencies or on how thoroughly those agencies record
those incidents and make their statistics public.
Figure 3 shows the homicide victimization rate for each year from 1981 through 1997 for
California and for the City of Los Angeles.21
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization, December 1998, NCJ 173385.
Calculated by the author using data from the California Homicide File provided by the
California Department of Justice.
20
21
- 29 -
Los Angeles
California
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Figure 3—Homicide Rate in California and Los Angeles, 1981–1997
In both the state and the city, the homicide rate in 1997 fell far below anything seen in the
previous sixteen years. The data upon which Figure 3 is based come from law enforcement
agencies (homicide victims cannot, by definition, participate in victimization surveys), but unlike
many other crimes, we believe most homicides are reported to the police or to the medical
examiner, and much attention is paid to these records. The dramatic fall in homicides since about
1993 cannot be attributed to an increasing failure to report and record them.
Our failure to detect a difference between most of the sites funded by the VPI and similar areas
nearby does not mean the VPI programs were ineffective in reducing violence. Violence did
begin to decline at a faster rate almost everywhere VPI programs existed, and it is plausible to
believe that these programs had something to do with that drop. But because violence dropped
almost everywhere else as well, it is impossible to distinguish the drop “caused by” VPI-funded
programs from other factors that may have played an important role. Among the factors (in no
particular order of possible importance) that have been credited for the drop in violence, we
mention:
1.
Community action programs like those funded by the VPI exist in many places, and if the
VPI funded programs were effective, we must believe that some of the others were too.
- 30 -
2.
The violence-reducing effectiveness22 of governmental policies such as mandatory
sentencing (“Three Strikes”) and community policing may have obscured the
effectiveness of community action programs everywhere.
3.
Changes in drug marketing, which is sometimes blamed for having caused the sharp
increase in violence starting in the mid 1980s, may have played an opposite role in the
early 1990s.
4.
The economy is much better today than it was when the VPI began.
Furthermore, we could use only relatively gross measures of violence in the communities
served—data collected by agencies—and had no way to observe the behavior of the precise
population the funded community action programs were intended to affect. Thus, our analysis
used relatively gross measures to evaluate what may have been a relatively subtle effect, in an
environment where many other things were taking place. We cannot prove the effectiveness of
these programs, but we also cannot rule it out.
If between 1993 and 1998 violence had remained at the high levels seen in 1993 in most places,
we might have been able to detect a significant and unique decline in violence in those places
where VPI-funded programs existed. The strong and nearly universal downward trend in
violence has probably obscured any unique contribution of these programs. While the failure to
find a statistically defensible proof that these programs “caused” the drop in violence is a
disappointment, what actually happened is reason for celebration.
Adults surveyed in CAP communities—both CAP participants and nonparticipants—perceived
that community conditions had improved over the Initiative’s course and reported lower levels of
exposure to youth violence over the intervention period. Youths, on the other hand, did not see a
drop in violence. The utility of these data are also limited, in this case, by the lack of comparison
sites. We do not know whether the trends reported by adults and youths are better than, the same
as, or worse than those that adults and youths in similar non-CAP communities would have
reported.
Our inability to find a more widespread violent-crime reduction effect and youths’ reports of
continued exposure to youth violence without decline may be due to limitations in the data or
analysis or to insufficient passage of time. However, it may be that the investment of money,
effort, and time by the CAPs was simply insufficient to effect changes detectable even at the
neighborhood level. Programs in other states that have been associated with violence reduction
have typically been more intensive and more explicitly focused on violent behavior than the
CAPs have been.
22
Crime and Delinquency in California, 1997, pp vi-vii.
- 31 -
Conclusions
The California Wellness Foundation and the VPI’s co-funders spent $35 million over five years
in an attempt to reduce youth violence in California.23 Did they succeed? This question cannot
be answered yet. As discussed above, some important indicators of violence are headed
downward, but there are problems with the meaningfulness of all available measures. And many
of the Initiative’s impacts may not be realized for some time yet. These limitations prevent us
from concluding with confidence that the Violence Prevention Initiative has to date resulted in
less youth violence in California.
While we cannot measure effects on violence directly, we can measure what the Initiative has
achieved in other terms. We find that there are many links between the diverse activities funded
by the Initiative and changes in legislation, in the information available, or in personal behavior
and attitudes that are consistent with violence reduction. For some of these changes (Martin &
Glantz’s indirect effects on local gun law passage, the effects of the model alcoholic-beverage
control act), knowledgeable sources verify a causal link. For others (the effect of CAPs on
youths, of the Leadership Program on its participants), those affected have told us so. For still
others (the effect of CAPs on community attitudes, the Pacific Center’s influence on statewide
policy), the links are more hypothetical but nonetheless plausible.
We have cited here only a few examples. The Initiative funded direct services to hundreds of
youths, resulted in hundreds of publications (brochures, policy briefs, journal articles, etc.)
addressing violence prevention, involved hundreds of individual contacts with policymakers and
opinion leaders, and funded dozens of research projects. Given the quantity and nature of the
activities undertaken, it would be surprising if the Initiative had not already had some violence
reduction effect. It would be even more surprising if actions taken to date had no future effect.
That is because many of the Initiative’s programs involve investments in the future—
•
in the careers of community leaders, health professionals, and researchers working
for violence prevention
•
in building the capacities of community organizations
•
in adding to a mass of research findings growing towards criticality
•
in incrementally changing the mindsets of undecided policymakers, preparing them
for an eventual convincing stroke.
The Foundation spent somewhat more on violence prevention than the $30 million it provided
for the Initiative, since grants also went to organizations whose activities complemented the VPI
but which were not officially part of it.
23
- 32 -
In gaining some perspective on these accomplishments, it is worth keeping the following in
mind:
•
No private organization had previously undertaken such a concerted effort on such a
large scale to reduce violence. There was thus no obvious model to turn to, no fully
relevant source of guidance and lessons learned.
•
Smaller-scale efforts or public-sector programs have not been able to demonstrate
clear effects on crime and violence reduction.
•
Simply ensuring that $35 million is spent on what is intended is a major task.
While we have reservations about the strategies employed by some of the grantees,
most appeared to be making good-faith efforts to maximize the violence prevention
value of their VPI funds.
•
While $35 million is a lot of money for one initiative to spend, it is not a lot of money
to spend in a state the size of California. It amounts to roughly 20 cents per resident
per year, or something over a dollar per young person.
The individual programs and projects are not the whole story. Many of the VPI participants with
whom we talked genuinely felt that they had become part of an integrated movement. The
Foundation took numerous steps—conferences, retreats, regional meetings, an electronic
network, etc.—to encourage interaction and ensure that the VPI grantees perceived themselves as
part of a larger effort. There were also many instances of collaboration among grantees. The
Community Action Programs, for instance, have worked with other components, and the CAPs
worked together on gun control advocacy. This collaboration can reasonably be ascribed to the
Initiative, without which these organizations may not have come into contact. The Initiative also
brought together people from different backgrounds or disciplines who would otherwise have
been unlikely to work together. At least as importantly, the VPI touched many others across the
state who were not formally part of the Initiative. It helped bring community coalitions,
professional organizations, youth groups, and local and state agencies together in a growing
movement against youth violence. In short, where the VPI is concerned, the whole seems to be
greater than the sum of the parts.
The Initiative continues with many of the same elements that proved successful in its first five
years. One of the challenges it may eventually have to contend with is the inevitable upturn in
violence rates. Historically, periods of decline in violence have been followed by periods of
increase, and it is unlikely that the current downturn will be exempt from that pattern. Will the
VPI’s contributions to community violence prevention assets and the state policy environment be
sufficiently lasting and robust to damp the upward pressure on violence? The Foundation might
well give some thought to preparing for this eventuality. At a minimum, it might put in place
some “early warning” indicators and an evaluation strategy that will be able to show whether
violence rates in areas of VPI focus are increasing less quickly than those elsewhere.
- 33 -
Lessons for Future Initiatives of this Type
What lessons might be drawn from the first phase of the VPI? Here, we restrict ourselves to four
key lessons for initiatives elsewhere:
•
Limit the responsibilities of the grantees. Few VPI grantees were able to do
everything they were expected to. The CAPs, for example, were asked to do policy
and media advocacy, build coalitions, provide direct services to youths, and
participate in integrative VPI activities. The Pacific Center was given three
ambitious policy goals to work towards. The Community Leader and Academic
fellows were expected to fulfill a number of requirements. The reasons for setting all
these responsibilities are easy to identify and quite understandable. The
Foundation’s approach to violence prevention was admirably broad, and it was
correctly worried about accountability. However, the VPI experience suggests that
the individual elements of future initiatives might benefit from greater focus.
•
Give evaluation a high priority in designing the elements of an initiative. The
Foundation made sure that an evaluation component was in the VPI from the start.
The components, however, were not always designed to allow confident conclusions
to be reached about the effects of their actions. We believe it important
–
to design intervention strategies at least quasi-experimentally where possible
–
where strategies need to be chosen among, to choose those permitting strong
evaluations.
Though it may seem obvious to many observers that the VPI has had a broad,
positive effect, movements make headway by convincing skeptics and the undecided.
Designing initiative components from the outset to promote rigorous evaluation
should help in that regard. One way a funding agency can facilitate this is to
interact with the evaluator during the design stage; input should also be sought
from potential grantees.
•
Allow plenty of time and resources to support integration. Though we have
emphasized the synergistic nature of the VPI’s structure, it has taken more time,
money, and effort than expected to approach true integration. At the outset, the
Foundation itself was unsure of integrating its multipronged effort. Many
participants didn’t understand the VPI structure, and there were background- and
discipline-related communication barriers to overcome. Once progress was made, it
was often partially eroded by the difficulty the components had at sustaining an
institutional memory. Community Leader and Academic fellows were out of the
Initiative after two years. CAPs experienced turnover in staff and participating
youths. And, as mentioned above, choices had to be made between spending time on
community needs and spending time on Initiative integration.
- 34 -
•
Allow plenty of resources for technical assistance and time for skill development,
and judge effectiveness accordingly. In the VPI, technical assistance was
underfunded at the outset. Most CAPs were unfamiliar with policy advocacy; many
needed help with program content, organization, and staff retention and
development. From that starting point, success for many of the CAPs should
probably be gauged by new skills attained and used, consistency administering
programs, and mastery of different aspects of violence prevention, rather than
effects within the community. Similar conclusions may be drawn regarding the
Community Leader Fellowship Program.
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Appendix : Legislative Case Studies
In a further effort to gauge the Pacific Center’s impact on state-level policy change, we
conducted a quantitative analysis of legislation proposed in California during the past four
biannual legislative sessions (i.e., from 1991 to 1998). Additionally, we conducted a similar
analysis using legislative data from Illinois and Michigan.
The primary criterion for selecting the comparative study sites was the existence of a public
policy advocacy group engaged at the state level in eliminating youth violence. We also wanted
to visit states where youth violence legislation was actively under consideration or recently
enacted. On both of these dimensions, Michigan and Illinois appeared to be attractive
candidates. Because of resource limitations, we wanted to restrict the amount of travel needed to
conduct the interviews. Although we would have preferred a better geographical distribution,
other states that might have been equal or even better candidates were ruled out. For example,
Massachusetts appeared to be a good alternative, but we judged the political climate to be too
unlike California’s to offer a meaningful comparison. In New York, which is more similar to
California in its diversity than either Michigan or Illinois, we were unable to identify an
appropriate statewide violence prevention organization, thus eliminating it from consideration.
The two states selected, Michigan and Illinois, met both of the primary criteria. Both states have
active statewide public policy groups engaged in advocating public health models for responding
to youth violence, and controversial legislation has been considered recently in each state. In
Michigan, for instance, the legislature has been debating a “shall issue” law, meaning that
citizens would be allowed to carry concealed weapons. In addition, these states have diverse
populations, and as Midwestern states, offer an interesting comparison as to whether California
initiatives can be transported to the Midwest.
We conducted seven interviews with Michigan policymakers or public policy advocates.
Although we used a triangulation strategy (Yin, 1994) to obtain information about the same
questions from different respondents, we eventually limited the number of Michigan interviews
because the story was so consistent across respondents that we saw no purpose in going further.
The group interviewed comprised three legislators, three violence prevention/gun control groups,
and one district attorney. Although limited in number, our interviews in Michigan revealed a
clear picture of the state’s general policymaking environment with respect to youth violence and
the barriers to enacting strong gun control legislation.
We conducted eleven interviews with policymakers and public policy advocates in Illinois. The
group interviewed was comprised of five legislators and six policy advocates. Some of the
interviews were conducted during a site visit to Chicago, while others, particularly with Illinois
state legislators, were conducted subsequently by telephone.
Our approach to conducting the legislative analysis was comprehensive in the sense that we
considered all relevant bills. Previous legislative studies typically focused on “key bills” that
were especially visible, successful, or related to salient issues in a given legislative session. The
- 36 -
latter approach has been used, for instance, by the California Senate Office of Research, which
provides annual previews of key legislation, and David Steinhart of Commonweal, who analyzed
key youth crime and violence prevention bills in a recent report (Steinhart, 1998). While these
types of analyses provide detailed descriptions of key bills, these bills are often atypical of the
larger body of proposed legislation in the areas of interest. Our analysis attempted to measure
the legislative success of all bills related to the Pacific Center’s three policy goals.
We examined bills proposed in California and the two comparison states both before the start of
the VPI and during its development to answer three basic questions:
•
How successful was legislation directly supported by the Pacific Center?
•
How successful was the broader category of violence prevention or “public health”
approaches to legislation?
•
How well did the prevention proposals fare relative to more criminal justice oriented
measures?
To capture changes in legislation related to the Pacific Center’s efforts to influence the policy
process, we examined legislative activity in the three study states during the last four complete
California legislative sessions, with the 1991-92 session serving as our baseline. Legislation
relevant to the Pacific Center’s three policy goals was initially screened to meet the following
inclusion criteria:24
Policy Goal I—Shift Society’s Definition of Youth Violence to Include a Public Health
Perspective
Criterion: Legislation that explicitly attempts to address youth violence through either control
of violent behavior by youths or the provision of resources intended to prevent or divert violent
behavior by youths.
This criterion includes traditional criminal justice approaches of deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation. It also includes preventive approaches delivered by both the criminal justice
system and a wider net of human service agencies such as schools and community-based
agencies. The target of these approaches must be juveniles, which excludes the larger set of bills
aimed at non-age-specific criminal offenses.
Policy Goal II—Reduce Youth Access to Alcohol and Other Drugs
Criterion: Legislation that explicitly attempts to reduce youth access to, and/or use of, alcohol
and illicit drugs through either direct control of youth behavior or the provision of resources
intended to prevent or divert youth access and use. Also included is legislation aimed at the
sales and marketing of alcohol to minors and any regulation or taxation of alcohol intended to
specifically reduce youth access.
We limited legislative activity to bills proposed. We excluded from our analysis any resolutions,
constitutional amendments, or other types of legislation not defined as a bill.
24
- 37 -
This criterion provides a broad definition of approaches aimed at reducing the use of alcohol and
drugs by youths through prevention, treatment, and punishment. It also includes approaches
targeting environmental factors that contribute to minors’ use such as advertising and furnishing
to minors by adults.
Policy Goal III—Reducing Firearm Injury and Death
Criterion: Legislation that regulates, taxes, or provides penalties for the use, sale, transfer,
design, and manufacture of firearms and ammunition with the intended effect of reducing
firearm-related injury and death.
This criterion includes almost all of the bills directly related to firearms, with the exception of
the use of firearms by law enforcement officials (unless criminal in nature) and bills related to
hunting.
One potential criticism of these criteria is that they include overly broad interpretations of the
three Pacific Center goals, which are focused on prevention and not punishment. We
nevertheless chose to adopt this approach for several reasons. First, we wanted to ensure that
important bills were not missed in the initial screening. Second, and more importantly, we
wanted to compare the relative success of alternative approaches to violence prevention. For
example, both penalty enhancements for violent crimes and community-based violence
prevention programs are intended to prevent future violence; yet they represent widely different
strategies toward achieving this goal.
Search Terms. To locate the entire population of bills meeting our selection criteria, we
conducted a Lexis search for all bills proposed in each state between 1991 and 1998 using the
following search terms:
•
Youth Violence —“Youth or juvenile and crime or violence.”
•
Firearms —“Firearm or weapon or gun or handgun or ammunition or bullet.”
•
Youth Access to Alcohol and Drugs—“Alcohol or beer or drug.”
Using the same terms, we conducted a second electronic search on California’s state bill
information Web site.25 We identified bills that were missed by the electronic searches by
reviewing other sources such as news and legislation reports by the research units in both
legislative houses. David Steinhart’s 1998 review of key violence prevention legislation was
also reviewed for relevant bills. Results of these searches are reported in Table 2.1 below. We
found that the Lexis search captured 57 percent of the bills meeting the above criteria and that
the missed bills were evenly distributed by year and type of strategy. The California Web site
search captured a larger proportion of the bills meeting the above criteria and identified 83
percent of the relevant bills identified.
25
The state bill information Web site URL is http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/bilinfo.html.
- 38 -
Table 2.1
Search Results by Data Source in California
Data Source
Total bills located
Total meeting criteria (% of total)
Year
Total
91/92
93/94
95/96
97/98
81
524
297
591
1,493
32
(40%)
152
(29%)
93
(31%)
170
(29%)
447 (30%)
27
(84%)
n/a
83 (55%)
48
(52%)
88
(95%)
2 (2%)
98 (58%)
256 (57%)
133
(78%)
23 (12%)
344 (83%)
Of bills meetin inclusion criteria
Percent found on Lexis
Percent found on CA Website
Percent found outside of electronic
searches
5 (16%)
123
(86%)
6 (4%)
31 (7%)
To report the progress of relevant bills in California, we present the full sample of California
bills found in all three searches. Since our two comparison states, Illinois and Michigan, do not
provide a data source comparable to the California Web site, we are limited to results from the
Lexis searches and use these results to compare total proposed and enacted bills across the three
states. Although the limited Lexis search underreports total bills proposed, we were able to
compare the different strategies used in each state and to compare the relative success of these
proposed strategies over time. Descriptions of the full sample in California are provided below
in Tables 2.3–2.5.
Measuring Legislative Progress. We measured both total bills proposed and the progress of
these bills in the legislature. While including only enacted bills provides an accurate assessment
of changes in the law, this method fails to capture bills that may have gathered support in one or
both houses but later failed to reach consensus in both houses or were vetoed by the Governor.
The decision to consider all proposed bills instead of only enacted bills allows us to measure
overall support and interest by legislators for violence prevention as well as the strength of the
public health approach in each session.
For each policy goal, we categorized bills according to the strategies used to address the issue.
For example, we disaggregated violence prevention bills into ten categories that covered the
broad areas of local prevention resources, penalty enhancements, and juvenile justice planning.
Average Success. Most proposed bills are not carried past the first committee, and each bill
must go through numerous legislative steps and iterations before reaching the Governor’s desk
for final approval. Table 2.2 depicts our approach to measuring the average success of a piece of
legislation. The approach uses a six-point scale to calculate average bill success for each
strategy category. Proposed bills were assigned a value of 1 through 6 depending on the
progress of each bill in the legislative process. To calculate the average success score for a
particular strategy, we simply summed the success scores for each of the proposed bills and
divided this value by the number of bills proposed in the strategy category.
- 39 -
Coding Reliability. Coding reliability was tested at two stages of the coding process. The first
stage determined whether the bills located in the initial searches met the criteria for inclusion.
Here, researchers agreed over 95 percent of the time. The second stage involved the coding of
individual bills by strategy. The two coders agreed over 90 percent of the time on the strategy
assigned to each bill and over 95 percent on bill success. At each step, discrepancies in coding
were discussed and agreed upon in order to enhance reliability for the final analysis of data.
Table 2.2
Bill Success Scale
Success
Score
1
2
3
4
5
6
Definition
bill proposed; not passed by any committee
bill passed at least one committee in originating house; not
passed on floor
bill passed on floor of originating house; no action in other
house
bill passed at least one committee in other house; not
passed on floor
bill passed both houses; blocked by governor or failing
consensus
bill enacted into law
Findings Related to Reducing Firearms Injuries and Death Among Youths
State-Level Policy Advocacy. The California Legislature has afforded numerous opportunities
for firearms-related reform in recent years. Many bills relating to gun control have been
introduced over the last few sessions. In the 1993–94 session, 87 bills targeting firearms were
proposed. The bills ranged from sentence enhancements for criminal use of guns to measures
aimed at modifying a 1989 ban on assault weapons. Another significant change in firearm
policies was seen in the 1995–96 session. For the first time in 25 years, Republicans were in
control of the Assembly. Republicans used this opportunity to push a series of bills that both
enhanced penalties for the criminal use of firearms and eased restrictions on the carrying of
concealed weapons.
In the last legislative session, we witnessed yet another significant shift in policy relating to gun
violence. On April 9, 1997, the Los Angeles Times reported the passage of seven key gun control
bills by the Assembly Public Safety Committee. In what the article described as “Gun Day in the
Capitol,” testimony was heard from victims of firearm injuries who were advocating the passage
of gun control legislation. Although interest in the issue of firearm violence was certainly not
new to the Capitol, both the large number of bills and the innovative nature of these bills
represented significant changes in gun control legislation for the state. Additionally, in the
- 40 -
1997–98 legislative session, the Democrats took control of both houses, which resulted in
continued support of gun control legislation.
A mixed picture emerges regarding the Pacific Center’s role in the increased level of gun control
activity at the state level. On the one hand, our interviews with legislative staff confirmed that
the Center provided sustained and valuable assistance in drafting model bills and in providing
information on policy issues. Eric Gorovitz’s expertise on gun control law was the most
frequently mentioned contribution of the Pacific Center in this regard. On the other hand,
several key policymakers reported little to no familiarity with the Center’s research and
advocacy work. Approximately 30 percent of the persons we interviewed had no contact with
the Pacific Center. Among these persons, several thought the Center was associated with
Handgun Control, Inc.
At the Capitol, success on gun control legislation was limited. Although the Pacific Center
deserves credit for advocating a bill banning Saturday Night Specials, Governor Wilson
ultimately vetoed the bill twice. The Governor claimed that not enough evidence was presented
to persuade him that banning the guns would reduce violent crime. Without evidence of the
benefits of gun control legislation, there is no effective counter to studies publicized by the gun
industry. For example, a controversial econometric study conducted by Lott and Mustard (1997)
estimates that allowing citizens to carry concealed weapons actually reduces crime through
deterrence. Although methodological concerns in that study have been identified and debated,
the authors have been effective at promoting the idea that appropriate uses of handguns by
private citizens may increase social welfare. Lott and Mustard have placed increased pressure on
gun control advocates to produce evidence that their policy solutions reduce crime in the long
run. In public radio and panel debates, Lott, in particular, has used his quantitative analysis to
argue for “shall-issue” laws that require the issuance of concealed-weapon permits to all eligible
applicants.
Despite these shortcomings, the Pacific Center’s activities may have had a more subtle but
profound effect on the gun control debate. By focusing on incremental changes in gun control
laws, the Center has enhanced the salience of gun control on the legislative policy agenda. In
one interview, a gun control advocate explained that as a general rule, most persons are opposed
to the concept of government confiscation of legal firearms. But when phrased as a series of
rational measures to reduce firearm injury through trigger locks and consumer protection laws,
gun control draws much more support from the public. The progress of legislation in the latest
session that is consistent with the Pacific Center’s objectives bears this out. Gains were made on
swing votes in both houses, and the position of legislators on gun control was correlated with
greater success in the 1998 elections.
A recurring theme from our interviews with both state and local policymakers and policy
advocates is that Pacific Center staff tend to concentrate their advocacy efforts in Northern
California. One interviewee indicated that the Pacific Center’s presence was all but absent in
geographic areas facing some of the tougher challenges with respect to passing gun control
measures—San Diego, outlying areas of Los Angeles, Long Beach, Santa Barbara, Bakersfield,
and Fresno. Given Southern California’s large population and endemic youth violence problem,
the dearth of Pacific Center activities in this area represents a serious limitation to their efforts to
affect policy change. We also heard from a number of individuals who felt that the Center’s
presence in Sacramento could be strengthened. “They’re not here enough,” stated one Capitol
staff, “so Handgun Control, Inc. is viewed as the leader.”
- 41 -
Findings Related to Shifting the Public’s Perception of the Youth Violence Problem
In the past few years, many commentators (see, e.g., Mercy et al., 1993; Edelman and Satcher,
1993; Gladwell, 1996; Prothrow-Stith, 1996) have begun to argue that youth violence should be
viewed from a public health perspective as opposed to a criminal justice one. These
commentators have argued that the public health model for preventing violence is preferable to
the traditional approach, which relies solely on the criminal justice system of incarceration after
the violence has occurred. Moore (1995) adds that the public health perspective brings the
advocacy power and legitimacy of the medical profession into the policy debate.
The public health model is appealing on several dimensions. First, it focuses on developing
strategies for preventing violence and its associated consequences (Mercy et al., 1993). Second,
it offers a scientific approach to developing interventions to solve youth violence rather than the
punitive approach inherent in the criminal justice model. Third, the public health model
integrates various disciplines and community-based organizations in developing and testing
different intervention strategies (Mercy et al., 1993). Fourth, it provides a model that can be
evaluated based on whether it works to prevent youth violence.
In theory, this seems to be a cogent and desirable approach. But despite the attractiveness of the
public health approach, we have been unable to find guidance in the scholarly literature on how
to translate the theory into practice. In the language of social science, there is no guidance on
how to operationalize this model. That is, scholars have not specified how the public health
model should be developed and implemented and what the appropriate interim outcome
measures should be.
To reach the goal of shifting the public’s perception of the youth violence problem toward a
public health perspective, we expect that organizations in favor of this approach will need to
convince the public that the public health perspective is a potentially more effective approach
than incarceration. Doing so will likely require a set of specific public health objectives that can
be measured and a strategy for meeting those objectives.
A variety of approaches have been proposed and in some cases initiated to reduce negative
attitudes and feelings that lead to aggressive and harmful behavior by young people. These
include preventive programs for at-risk youth that attempt to identify and control violence-prone
young people at an early age (see, for example, Greenwood et al., 1998[Revised ed.]). Such
programs often seek to change children’s attitudes and beliefs regarding alternative means of
resolving conflict. Efforts have also been made to reduce feelings of fear in neighborhoods so
that young people do not feel a strong need to arm themselves. This policy approach requires
reducing both actual and perceived levels of danger in communities. Other policy measures
include greater enforcement of existing laws to increase faith in the police, investments in drug
treatment and prevention to reduce both drug-induced and drug-related violence, and efforts to
increase economic and educational opportunities in general for young people and their families
and communities.
The Pacific Center struggled for some time to develop a set of specific objectives and a strategy
for meeting the policy goal of incorporating a public health perspective in the youth violence
policy debate. Initially, the Center focused its advocacy efforts in this area on beacon, or
second-shift, schools. Over time, however, its focus broadened to include all initiatives aimed at
increasing the level of financial resources available to communities for prevention programs.
- 42 -
The Center thus advocated the passage of legislation intended to fund local programs (including
second-shift schools) and a state youth violence prevention authority. The Center develops much
of its policy strategy in this area in conjunction with Commonweal, the Center’s subcontractor
on juvenile justice policy. David Steinhart of Commonweal converses weekly with Center staff
and provides them with regular updates on state juvenile justice issues.
In the past few years, the Pacific Center has taken advantage of a significant opportunity at the
state level to promote a package of youth violence prevention policies. Recent drops in youth
crime and a Democratic majority in both legislative houses contributed to an increased interest in
legislation aimed at providing youth resources for violence prevention. Moreover, there appears
to be an emerging consensus that more needs to be done on the prevention front. As an observer
in the Capitol commented, “We have probably reached the point where we’ve maxed out on
punishment.” Even Republican lawmakers, realizing that there are decreasing benefits associated
with additional penalties, are looking for promising youth violence prevention programs.
To its credit, the Pacific Center has moved away from an initial, narrow focus on full-service
schools toward advocating increased funding for local programs. In a number of interviews with
legislative staff, we found that the Pacific Center and Commonweal had influenced several bill
proposals by disseminating information and drafting model legislation. For example, the Center
contributed to the passage of the California Youth Prevention Authority bill in both houses,
though the legislation was vetoed by former Governor Wilson. It also provided active support
for a bill that allocates $50 million for the After School Learning and Safe Neighborhood
Partnership Program, which, along with the California Gang, Crime, and Violence Prevention
Partnership Program, were both signed into law late last year.
The Center still needs to take the next step and identify both promising and effective
demonstrations of how outside funding for local initiatives can work. In one of our interviews, a
justice system expert commented, “We need to be absolutely up to date on program efficacy.
We are selling a product that we are less than 100 percent confident in. We need to have the
ability to assemble all of the program evaluation data.” Although effective model programs do
not always transfer well to different sites and the current state of our collective knowledge on
effective programs is limited, we believe that a renewed effort by the Pacific Center to identify
and assess alternative prevention options would greatly enhance its ability to move skeptical
lawmakers toward support for prevention-oriented programs.
Findings Related to Reducing Youth Access to Alcohol and Other Drugs
The Center had identified three specific objectives related to youth alcohol and drug access:
increasing alcohol prices through taxes, promoting local control of alcohol sales, and limiting
youth-oriented alcohol advertising. To achieve these objectives, the Pacific Center has largely
relied on the efforts of the Center on Alcohol Advertising (CAA) and the Marin Institute. For
example, Jim Mosher of the Marin Institute analyzes key legislation for the Pacific Center. The
CAA, which is a Trauma Foundation–sponsored project, continues to promote the Hands-OffHalloween Campaign and has more recently lobbied local governments to restrict alcohol
advertising. A policy advocate close to CAA commented that the campaign has been effective
- 43 -
because it provides community action groups with a process for initiating political action and it
provides a tangible target for action in neighborhoods with youth violence problems.
Although the Center disseminates material from these two sources, it has done little on its own to
fulfill its goal of reducing youth access to alcohol and drugs. For example, in the Center’s
quarterly reports, the only activities mentioned in this regard are a few public presentations and
meetings involving Center staff. In our April 1998 site visit to the Pacific Center, Andrew
McGuire informed us that this goal was dropped from the Center’s scope of work for the next
three-year grant period.
Clearly, the focus of the Pacific Center during its first five years of existence has been on
firearms. While the Center could be justly criticized for failing to distribute its efforts more
evenly across the three policy goals, staff from the Center argue that there was a strong rationale
for focusing a disproportionate share of their resources on firearms. Essentially, they believe that
it was unrealistic to think that they could do justice to the three policy goals in five years.
Moreover, they believe that a narrow focus helped create a movement that in turn would produce
social change in all three policy areas. As one staffer put it, “If we did it right with guns, then we
could shift to other issues.” In fact, one of the reasons for devoting a substantial level of
resources to support local gun control ordinances was that they saw this as a way to achieve, in
the words of the staffer, “victory after victory.” These successes were viewed as a key ingredient
for building the movement. Finally, they believed that pursuing objectives related to all three
policy goals would create confusion on the part of other VPI components, in particular, the
CAPs, which, for the most part, are newcomers to the policy arena.
Comparative Case Studies: Michigan and Illinois
General Policymaking Environment in Michigan. Attempts to address youth violence in
Michigan are clearly dominated by a criminal justice approach. Respondents described the
policymaking environment as being “one of retribution” with a “get tough” mentality and
punitive approach for juvenile offenders. Some policymakers felt that they were under pressure
from the legislature to adopt more and more draconian measures to deal with youth violence. An
example of this type of “get tough” legislation is the 1997 Juvenile Justice Reform Act that
permitted prosecutors to try certain youths as adults in circuit court. The law also gave probate
court judges discretion in sentencing youth as adults for certain offenses. In addition to an
increase in punitive laws, over the past ten years the state has also cut funding for violence
prevention and substance abuse services, while concurrently increasing spending on the
construction of additional youth detention facilities.
There was no deviation in our interviews from this characterization. In fact, the head of the
statewide anti-youth violence group stated that the criminal justice approach was more dominant
now than ten years ago. This respondent added that: “The first place funding was cut in
Michigan was in terms of preventive services…Being ‘mean-spirited’ is seen as a virtue…In
Michigan, the way people think violence should be combated is to give non-criminals guns and
let them shoot it out…[There is] a mindset in Michigan that an armed society is a polite society.”
- 44 -
Similarly, passing legislation restricting firearms has also been extremely difficult in Michigan
for several reasons. First, Michigan has a state constitutional provision giving every person the
right to keep and bear arms. To this extent, pro-gun lobbyists have been successful in framing
gun ownership as a “patriotic issue” rather than a public health or public safety issue. Although
court decisions have made it clear that the state has a right to limit individual rights to protect the
public health, this view has not prevailed in the legislature. In fact, legislation was recently
introduced that would expand individuals’ ability to obtain concealed weapons permits (known
as the “shall-issue” law). It is important to note, however, that the shall-issue law was opposed
by the organization representing local police chiefs and was not enacted. Second, as a local
violence prevention advocate noted, the public health community takes on violence issues one at
a time, tending to be very specific and compartmentalized, rather than articulating a broader
public health approach. Third, there is no area of the state identified with gun control measures,
and a strong rural component where gun control is anathema.
The Role and Strategies of Public Health Groups. Several public health groups have emerged
at the state and local levels over the past several years in Michigan in an attempt to combat the
increasingly common criminal justice mentality of many lawmakers.
Statewide
The statewide coalition is three years old and is a multidisciplinary group comprised of
professionals in law, medicine, and public health. Because the current board of directors is
struggling with how to balance individual rights with public protection and safety, it is not an
anti-gun coalition and does not take issue with legal ownership of guns. Instead, it approaches
youth violence from a public health perspective to prevent illegal gun use, although the board
does not want to be labeled as “gun control zealots.” Its objective is to change how people think
about gun use away from criminal justice and toward public health.
Methods for meeting this public health objective include public education and advocacy
(educating legislators). For example, the organization issued a report with policy
recommendations for how to reduce gun violence in homes, schools, worksites, and the streets.
From a public health perspective, the organization wants to look at broader interventions than
just incarceration, such as gun safety and distribution and changing the environment in which
guns are used (that is, working with neighborhood groups). The organization has not yet
developed any outcome measures to evaluate whether its activities have been successful.
The respondent from the statewide organization noted that neighborhood coalitions are very
important for violence prevention efforts. The goal is to develop a strategy for building
networks, distributing information, and sharing materials; but there is little collaboration or
communication now between local coalitions. While the group would like to emulate the model
for violence prevention that has been effective for tobacco control and drunk driving, it has not
yet taken a leadership role in organizing various local community violence prevention coalitions
into a broad statewide anti-violence coalition. According to this respondent, one problem in
organizing local coalitions is that many local groups are hesitant to address gun issues directly
because they see it as a confrontational, scary, and intimidating issue. She added that some local
groups think that talking about guns is the wrong way to address violence and want to address
people’s anger instead of their guns.
- 45 -
The group also commissioned an opinion poll showing that Michigan residents do not favor laws
that allow carrying concealed weapons, but it had trouble bringing the poll results to legislators’
attention. Indeed, the group’s director indicated that the organization had not been effective in
lobbying legislators, in part because of the board’s concern for gun ownership rights. Thus,
rather than attempting to educate the legislature about youth violence as a public health issue, the
organization has tried to educate legislators about specific issues, such as the facts about gun
violence. As a result, the debate over the shall-issue law was devoid of any public health
component.
Local
At the local level, we interviewed the director of the state’s most active local collaborative. This
organization eschews any attempt at statewide activity, focusing instead on building “…the
capacity of small neighborhood groups by allowing residents to make decisions about activities
for their own neighborhoods.” This group’s strategy is to increase the community’s awareness
and understanding of violence and prevention, coordinate current programs among program
grantees, change attitudes and behaviors, and influence local policies and practices to support
safe neighborhoods.
To achieve these goals, the collaborative provides small grants and technical assistance to
neighborhood groups, engages in public awareness campaigns, and develops community
linkages. Guiding this approach is the view that the role of government is to channel resources
to the community and to be a catalyst for community–level activities. The respondent argued in
favor of “a systematic power shift away from government toward the communities.” The
respondent’s preferred model is the community-driven government.26 Of course, the respondent
added, the key issue would be who receives the money at the local level. From a practical
perspective, it is most likely that such funds would be allocated through local government, but
elaborating further is beyond the scope of this report.27
In support of a local strategy, the respondent argued that the policy environment at the state level
prevented primary prevention legislation, but such measures can be enacted at the local level.
For example, in Flint, there is a daytime curfew law that targets youth truants. As a result, the
collaborative is not looking for legislative solutions. It would rather use legislative power to
It is interesting to note that one of the legislators we interviewed, who is commonly aligned with
the criminal justice approach, was sympathetic to a community-driven violence prevention model.
He stated, however, that no one had come forward in the legislature to argue in favor of a
community-based allocation strategy. Both of these statements were contradicted by our other
legislative respondent, who argued that it was unlikely that a community would get the money and
freedom to act. She argued that neighborhood associations from Detroit had come forward but had
been shut out of the process. Nonetheless, as we discuss below, this may be a potentially effective
strategy for public health advocates to pursue.
27 Interestingly, the respondent argued that the paradigm shift to public health is secondary to the
philosophical shift regarding local control over government. “Both the public and the government
have to legitimize the authority of a community to take care of its own needs. We are still far from
that point.”
26
- 46 -
obtain resources to distribute to the community. However, the collaborative has worked with the
statewide organization on various educational issues and conferences.
For purposes of the Foundation’s three goals, we asked about the link between drugs, alcohol,
and violence.28 We think the response is worth quoting at length:
“There is a close link. That is why [we] have aligned with substance abuse agencies to
focus on primary prevention. Primary prevention will help solve the problem of
violence, because many of the issues are the same. At the primary prevention level,
there is an overlap between the criminal justice and public health model. In a
progressive community, you would see the two approaches combining to work together.
Where you see a difference in approach to the problems of substance abuse and violence
is at the secondary and tertiary levels. At those levels, substance abuse is addressed in
the medical model and violence is addressed through a criminal justice model.”
A recent University of Michigan evaluation of this group’s activities found that the capacity of
neighborhood groups has been enhanced, but that recruitment of new members has not met
expectations. Existing neighborhood groups are expanding their funding sources and activities.
More importantly, participants in funded activities reported positive experiences. These
programs appear to be reaching youth who had not previously participated in structured
activities.
Assessment
Still in their infancy, these groups have not been very successful in shifting the dialogue about
youth violence from a criminal justice orientation to a public health framework for several
reasons. One reason for this failure in shifting the dialogue is the absence of a statewide
“umbrella” violence prevention advocacy group that can act as a clearinghouse to build networks
among local coalitions and rapidly disseminate and share information. With a few exceptions,
local coalitions and collaboratives have remained largely isolated from one another—there is no
cohesive or coordinated statewide strategy among public health advocates for addressing youth
violence or guns. As a result, the voice of the public health community is not as strong as it
could be and is certainly absent in the legislature. As one respondent noted, “Society hasn’t yet
made the correlation between youth violence and health care costs. Until we address that, we
will not make progress.” Our results suggest that public health advocates have not succeeded in
articulating that message to the public.
Second, violence prevention groups and other policymakers all seemed to have difficulty in
clearly articulating how to operationalize the public health model for violence prevention.
Although most groups were well versed in the theoretical aspects of the public health model,
there appears to be little consensus among groups about how to apply the model in communitybased settings. The result is that when groups such as the prosecutors’ office express interest in
trying to apply a public health model, they have little guidance on how to actually pursue it.
In Wayne County (Detroit), 61 percent of the children brought before juvenile court (for some
sort of criminal charge) had a substance abuse problem.
28
- 47 -
A final factor limiting the ability of public health groups to shift the dialogue toward public
health is the lack of adequate outcome measures for violence prevention interventions and a lack
of evaluation of current public health violence prevention initiatives. By and large, most
evaluations of violence prevention programs are process-oriented. Few studies in the literature
have published outcome-oriented measures. When we asked public health groups how they
developed their intervention ideas, no one mentioned relying on empirical evidence of “what
works.” The absence of hard evidence about the success of violence prevention and gun control
programs makes it very difficult for groups to deliver their message effectively to the legislature
and/or funders.
The Role of Legislators. The Michigan legislature is dominated by a conservative Republican
viewpoint.29 This view is likely to perpetuate the criminal justice approach used to address youth
violence and constitutes a serious barrier to the adoption of a public health model. Essentially,
there is no debate between the criminal justice and public health approaches—the public health
approach is not on the legislative agenda and is not part of legislative deliberations.30 For
example, most legislators agreed with the need to build more juvenile jails and to give
prosecutors the discretion to try youthful offenders as adults if over age 14. In fact, one
legislator characterized the environment as punitive and could not recall any public health
oriented legislation dealing with youth violence. By way of corroboration, person in the District
Attorney’s office we interviewed said that the policy environment is one of retribution. “The
District Attorney is getting pressure from the legislature to adopt more and more draconian
measures.” As a result, money for violence prevention and substance abuse services, or for
rehabilitation services, is not likely to appear in the near future.
While some legislators do not see the merits of increased punishment, they also fail to see how
youth violence or gun violence is a public health problem. The following is perhaps not
representative of the Michigan legislature, but it does indicate the difficulty facing public health
advocates. A pro–criminal justice legislator said that he “…does not consider youth violence to
be a disease, so public health measures are not appropriate.” This respondent considers public
health to be a “bastardization” of the process, but did suggest that community policing might be
a feasible alternative that could satisfy both liberals and conservatives.
Most public health groups have not tried to educate legislators on the public health model.
Rather, they have tried to educate them on the facts about gun violence, a strategy that has not
worked very well. The reality is that there is no public health voice being heard at the state level,
and no pressure to act based on public health strategies emanating from local communities or
grass roots organizations. In fact, one pro–public health legislator said that she obtains most of
We did not interview anyone from the executive branch. However, Governor Engler is on record
as favoring a criminal justice approach. Yet Wayne County (Detroit) is developing a Juvenile PreTrial Diversion Program for nonviolent juvenile offenders based on teaching kids life skills and
educating their parents. This is an explicitly public health approach, with funding expected from
the Governor’s Discretionary funds (not subject to legislative approval).
30 Curiously, a legislator supporting the proposed shall-issue law accused public health advocates
of distorting the issue by arguing that more guns equals more children dying. In all likelihood,
this reference to public health is not the same as arguing for a public health approach during
legislative deliberations.
29
- 48 -
her information from national sources, and that the public health community has been
ineffective.31
Conclusion. The lack of strong violence prevention or gun control legislation in Michigan is the
result of several factors: a strong conservative Republican presence in the legislature; the lack of
a strong statewide umbrella violence prevention group; fragmentation and isolation among local
violence prevention coalitions; the absence of a clear method for operationalizing the public
health model for violence prevention; and lack of adequate interim outcome evaluation
measures. While there is a small window of opportunity for addressing youth violence by
channeling resources to local communities or through the schools, there is clearly no one to carry
the message, either among advocacy groups or within the legislature.
General Policymaking Environment in Illinois. Until recently, the Illinois policymaking
environment could easily be characterized as being dominated by the criminal justice model.
One legislator characterized Illinois as “an NRA state.” But, unlike Michigan, it appears that a
public health voice is at least being heard at the state level and is part of the legislative debate.32
However, as one legislator put it, “The proponents of the criminal justice model have a louder
voice in the legislature.” For example, the recent juvenile justice bill in Michigan was entirely
punitive. By contrast, a similar bill in Illinois contained some public health prevention initiatives
and some funding for public health organizations.33 As another example, one respondent noted
that a comprehensive anti–gun law was passed in Committee. Though the bill is not expected to
move further, this represents a significant advance in raising the public health approach and the
sponsor expects it to generate further public health debate.
Even though legislators supporting the public health model complained that public health
advocates were not organized or centralized, testimony from health care professionals has helped
shift the terms of the debate to include prevention. Nevertheless, “The pro-gun voices are more
organized and influential than the general, non-specific gun control efforts,” and public health
gets little respect.34 More than one legislator argued that this has resulted in a standoff for the
past five years, with neither side getting much accomplished on gun control. As a result, the
debate has shifted to juvenile justice issues, where both sides get something, even if the criminal
justice approach predominates.
Illinois is split geographically and philosophically between Chicago and its environs and the
downstate, rural areas. Generally, there is considerable support for gun control and youth
violence prevention measures in the Chicago area, and great antipathy to these efforts in the
downstate area. In the Northern Illinois area, at least ten cities have enacted restrictions against
The legislator was quick to add that very little information has been forthcoming from the
University of Michigan that would be useful to public health advocates in the legislature. The
respondent also looks to California as a model.
32 As a caveat, one pro–public health legislative respondent did not agree that the public health
voice was being heard during legislative debates.
33 The distinction should not be overstated. By all accounts, the Illinois bill is predominantly a
criminal–justice–based approach.
34 The clearest example of this was Illinois’ premarital AIDS testing law, which was enacted
despite objections and information from public health officials that the law was entirely
misdirected. The law was subsequently repealed.
31
- 49 -
handgun shops. And the city of Chicago has initiated litigation against gun sellers and
manufacturers for the negligent distribution of handguns.
The Role and Strategies of Public Health Groups
Statewide
As in Michigan, the public health anti-violence coalition is relatively recent, starting in 1997.
The primary statewide organization has been in existence since 1993. According to the
organization’s director, the focus is on developing a strategy for policy initiatives at both the
state and local levels. On the state level, the group’s goals have largely been blocked by the
more powerful National Rifle Association. Since Illinois state law does not preempt local handgun restrictions, the organization works with local coalitions and municipalities to regulate gun
violence. The director noted that his organization has been successful at the local level on
assault–weapon bans and the confiscation of automobiles involved in gun crimes, but we were
unable to obtain specifics.
According to more than one legislative respondent, the Illinois State Public Health Association
has not been visible on this issue. One legislator who favors a pro-gun (in his words) approach
suggested that the anti-gun sentiment resulted from liberal legislators and physician groups.
Local
The statewide group has cooperated with neighborhood groups, but has not made the local
strategy a priority. In fact, obtaining funds for community initiatives is not one of the
organization’s strategies. According to another policy entrepreneur, local groups fight among
themselves for funding, turf, etc. As a result, Illinois apparently has little of the communitybased operations seen in Michigan and California and remains a top-down model.
From what we were able to determine, there is no local group comparable to the violence
prevention collaborative described in Michigan. The closest organization we found is the
Chicago Project for Violence Prevention, started in 1995, but it only provides technical support
to community-based organizations rather than attempting to organize them. We spoke to several
local organizations in Chicago broadly interested in youth violence, but not involved in
community or neighborhood projects. For example, the Chicago Youth Program is a peer role
model mentoring program designed to help educate kids. According to our interviews, these
groups have not collaborated much until very recently.
An organization somewhat analogous to the Pacific Center is the Violent Injury Prevention
Center located in Chicago. It is a child advocacy organization that offers several programs
ranging from data collection to providing information to statewide policymakers. It also offers a
community-based injury prevention program.
Assessment
According to several legislators, part of the problem is in how the public health message has
been articulated. Instead of providing a coherent overview of what the public health approach
- 50 -
would entail, the message tends to be compartmentalized, one issue at a time. For example,
advocates differ on whether youth violence originates from poverty, unemployment, or social
disorganization, and want to approach these concerns through separate debates over welfare
reform. This does not allow the debate to be framed within a broader public health policy
context. Moreover, as one legislator noted, the criminal justice “sound bite” has the advantage of
sounding tough and offering short-term solutions (even if not so effective in reality), while the
public health “sound bite” is more amorphous and operates over a much longer time frame.
The Role of Legislators. As noted above, there are indications that the public health model is
now on the policy agenda and creating a debate between the criminal justice and public health
models, even if the former still predominates. On gun control debates, a change occurred when
health care professionals voiced their experiences. But the anti–gun control message remains
more influential and organized than the more-general gun control efforts. Legislators we
interviewed confirmed that the public health issues are compartmentalized as opposed to
operating within a broad public health framework. That is, each separate issue, such as drugs
and alcohol abuse, engenders a separate debate on public health versus criminal justice. Thus,
there is minimal discussion of prevention within a broader public health framework.
Nonetheless, the legislators we interviewed, both pro–criminal justice and pro–public health,
confirmed that a shift in attitude was under way. While there was less agreement on how far the
debate had shifted, it seems clear that the direction is toward more gun control to discourage
youth violence. Both sides noted, however, that there was not yet a coherent strategy for local
community involvement or for allocating money to local communities for violence prevention
activities. More problematic is the fact that few Illinois legislators express interest in youth
violence, as noted below in the paucity of legislation introduced during the 1990s to deal with
youth violence.
For two reasons, it is useful to note the strategy used by legislators interested in a public health
approach. First, it provides insight into how the paradigm shift might occur within a legislature.
And second, it provides insight into a broader strategy of melding the criminal justice and public
health models into a combined approach that might be more powerful than either one standing
alone. The particular legislation would impose penalties against individuals for illegal gun use
and would enhance penalties for gun runners after a legal purchase, both criminal justice
remedies. But it would also regulate dealers to curtail illegal sales by adding a civil liability
penalty, a more traditional public health approach. This approach is modeled on Chicago’s
success with incorporating both elements, the sponsor hopes to make it difficult for opponents of
the public health approach to block the legislation.
Conclusion. In some ways, Illinois represents a middle ground between California and
Michigan. While not as advanced as California in incorporating the public health model into the
policy debate, it is certainly much farther along than Michigan. A reasonably consistent picture
emerges in which the public health voice is beginning to be articulated and heard. As best we
can determine, this results from both active legislators interested in generating public health
policies and the activities of public health policy entrepreneurs. Most importantly, a solid
infrastructure of organizations and supportive legislators appears to be in place for incremental,
if not substantial, progress in voicing the public health approach.
- 51 -
LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS
In the following subsections, we summarize the findings from our legislative analysis. The
findings are organized according to the Center’s three policy goals. For each goal, a description
and analysis of California legislation is provided first followed by a comparison of trends in
California with those in Michigan and Illinois.
Findings Related to Shifting the Public’s Perception of the Youth Violence Problem
Table 2.3 shows the ten proposed legislative strategies to address youth violence in the rows
grouped by three broad approaches. The cells in this table show total proposed and enacted bills
for each of the strategies by legislative session. A description of the strategies is provided in
Appendix 2.B.
Table 2.3
Youth Violence Bills in California by Strategy, 1991-1998
Proposed
91/
92
A. Prevention & Early Intervention
Local Prevention Grant
Early Intervention/Diversion
B. Suppression/Corrections
Detention and Probation Programs
Street Enforcement
Waiver to Adult Court/Corrections
Penalty Enhancements
Bricks and Mortar
Sealed Records
C. Planning and Other
Planning
Other
Session Total
95/
96
1
8
3
1
10
12
14
21
6
2
12
1
14
3
2
4
8
2
8
4
13
3
7
22
3
4
34
4
30
27
13
14
1
1
8
2
1
53
5
3
41
2
7
85
10
20
187
3
1
97/
98
Enacted
93/
94
Total
91/
92
93/
94
95/
96
97/
98
1
3
4
4
9
4
1
2
5
3
12
1
10
9
8
11
7
29
3
11
78
5
1
6
1
1
2
5
3
2
4
2
1
6
2
4
1
1
31
2
3
18
Total
Planning bills represent an important set of bills for youth violence but were placed with the
“other” category because they generally do not provide direct service funding and the approach
is not clearly defined. For example, AB 2428 (Epple) in 1993 established a task force to review
the juvenile justice system and make suggestions for reform. Senate Bill 483 (Schiff), which
was vetoed by the Governor, would have directed the Board of Corrections to appoint a
committee to determine how to consolidate juvenile justice programs and the feasibility of
developing a Department of Juvenile Justice.
The number of youth violence bills grew from 8 in the first legislative session to 85 in the most
recent one. These bills focused overwhelmingly on deterrent and corrective approaches within
the criminal justice system, and in fact represent 66 percent of all violence-related bills
introduced in California since 1991. An important strategy within this category is the criminal
penalty enhancement, which became an increasingly popular legislative response to youth
violence during the eight-year period. Relatively few of these bills were proposed in the first
two sessions (5), however, proposals for penalty enhancements later increased in frequency to 22
- 52 -
in the 95/96 session and then to 27 in the 97/98 session. Various types of legislative mandates
that waive juveniles to adult courts and corrections for serious crimes also emerged as a popular
theme during this period.
Along with increases in these “get tough” proposals we observed a similar upward trend in early
prevention and intervention proposals. These included initiatives such as the California Gang
Crime and Violence Prevention Partnership, AB 963 (Keeley), enacted in 1997, and AB 2261
(Aguiar), which continued funding of $50 million annually for county prevention and
intervention programs. Proposed prevention bills increased from none in the 91/92 session to 22
in the most recent session. Figure 2.1 shows that average success of these bills remained
relatively high and more than half (13) of the bills proposed for early prevention and intervention
were either passed by both houses or enacted into law. We observed a corresponding upward
trend in proposed bills and average success for planning and “other” bills. These bills included
several progressive steps toward violence prevention such as system reorganization and juvenile
justice planning.
Figure 2.1 - Average Success of Youth Violence Bills
(CA)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Prevention and
Early
Intervention
91/92
Suppression
/Corrections
93/94
95/96
97/98
Planning and
Other
At the same time, we observed a general decrease in the average success for punitive measures
towards youth violence, despite the large growth in bills proposed from 6 in the 91/92 session to
52 in the 97/98 session.
Violence Prevention in Comparison States. Proposed youth violence measures were both
more numerous and more successful in California than in the other two states. We found 65
proposed bills in California using the Lexis search compared to 17 in Illinois and 7 in Michigan.
Moreover, of the proposed bills, 35 percent were enacted in California (18 bills) compared to
only 12 percent in Illinois (2 bills) and none in Michigan. The results of the Lexis searches for
each of the three states are shown in Appendix 2.A. In California, bills varied widely among the
ten strategies considered. In contrast, bills in Illinois focused almost entirely on punitive
strategies within the criminal justice system and only one Illinois bill addressed early prevention
and intervention. No prevention, early intervention or diversion bills were proposed in Michigan
during the entire period. We observed that in California the emphasis in proposed bills has
shifted over time toward preventive approaches (i.e., local prevention and early
intervention/diversion) from none in the 91/92 session to 25 percent of all bills aimed at youth
- 53 -
violence in the last session. In contrast, proposed youth violence prevention bills in the other
two states either decreased or remained constant over time.
Given the increase and success of California local prevention and early intervention/diversion
bills in the last session, we find evidence that the legislative strategy toward youth violence has
shifted from a punitive approach toward a more preventive approach. Part of this increase in
total proposals and success for prevention bills was driven by measures specifically supported by
the Center, such as second shift schools and local violence prevention grants. Proposed bills for
these specific measures increased in the latest session and, on average, were more successful
than alternative approaches to violence.
Findings Related to Reducing Youth Access to Alcohol and Other Drugs
Table 2.4 shows total proposed and enacted bills according to nine strategies aimed at reducing
drug and alcohol use by minors. The five bills categorized as “other” include bills creating task
forces on drug issues and a bill that would have prohibited Internet sales of alcohol.
- 54 -
Table 2.4
Youth Drug and Alcohol Bills in California by Strategy, 1991-1998
Proposed
A. Prevention & Early Intervention
Local Prevention Grant
Other Prevention/Intervention
School Safety Plan
B. Suppression/Corrections
ABC Licensing
Penalty for Sales and Furnishing to
Minor
Advertising
C. Planning and Other
Penalty Enhancement for Use by
Minor
DUI Penalty for Minors
D. Other
Session Total
Enacted
91/
92
93/
94
95/
96
97/
98
3
1
5
1
2
2
4
3
1
14
6
1
3
3
5
7
5
1
2
0
2
2
0
1
19
1
5
49
1
8
5
1
2
11
2
8
Total
91/
92
93/
94
95/
96
97/
98
2
1
2
2
1
3
2
0
9
4
1
1
2
1
1
3
1
1
5
3
1
8
Total
1
2
19
Table 2.5
Firearm Bills in California by Strategy, 1991-1998
Proposed
91/
92
A. Access and Product Regulation
Monitor Access by Regulation
Product Regulation
Taxation
Local Control
B. Suppression/Corrections
Place and Manner
Access Restrictions for High-Risk
User
C. Planning and Other
D. East Current Restriction
E. Other
Session Total
1
6
93/
94
95/
96
Enacted
97/
98
91/
92
93/
94
95/
96
97/
98
1
1
3
1
1
6
2
4
18
31
5
6
4
10
5
2
2
4
2
2
16
15
5
10
3
6
26
33
1
2
6
8
7
7
11
87
12
2
44
8
2
66
35
15
216
2
7
19
11
11
Total
Total
1
9
6
0
0
1
3
2
2
10
15
3
4
25
13
4
1
1
13
1
68
Similar to violence prevention bills, the number of relevant bills increased from a low of 5 in the
91/92 legislative session to 19 in the 97/98 one. Proposed bills have largely addressed the issue
through substance abuse prevention and education programs, as opposed to punishment of minor
use. Examples of these types of programs include funding for DARE, community education
grants, and substance abuse programs for youths in detention. Only five proposed bills
specifically provided increased penalties for minor’s use of alcohol or drugs.
Proposals to reduce youth access to alcohol increased since 1991. In the 91/92 session only one
bill, AB 1738 (Chacon), proposed to reduce access through greater community-level
enforcement of liquor sales by the state Alcohol and Beverage Commission (ABC). This bill
- 55 -
failed to move out of committee. Proposals increased in the 97/98 session for measures seeking
to reduce access through strategies such as increased penalties for furnishing and sales to minors.
Of the nine bills proposed to reduce access in the last session, two were enacted into law. One of
these, SB 805 (Alpert), increases penalties for furnishing alcohol to minors and the other, AB
849 (Sweeney), limits the concentration of liquor outlets through ABC licensing.
Figure 2.2 shows the average success of drug and alcohol bills during the four sessions. While
we observed no apparent trend over time in the average success of prevention and intervention
bills, these bills were relatively successful during the entire period. Thirteen of the 21 proposed
bills were eventually enacted. The 14 bills proposed to prevent youth access to alcohol were less
successful on average but the success of these bills was highest in the 97/98 session.
Alternatively, only three minor’s punishment bills were proposed in this period; the first,
proposed in 1993, was enacted. The second two, proposed in 1997, would have enhanced
penalties for minor’s use of alcohol and driving under the influence. Both of these bills failed to
move out of their house of origin.
Figure 2.2 - Average Success of Youth Drug and Alcohol
Bills (CA)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Prevention /
Intervention
91/92
93/94
Access by Minors
95/96
97/98
Punishment of
Minor Use
Youth Alcohol and Drug Bills in Comparison States. In contrast with violence prevention
initiatives, we observed less proposed legislation in California than in the other states using the
somewhat limited Lexis search. We identified only 17 drug and alcohol bills in California, 6 of
which were enacted. In Illinois, 28 bills were proposed and 8 enacted, and in Michigan, 38 bills
were proposed and 3 were enacted. Approaches to youth alcohol and drug use in California and
in Illinois were evenly distributed among prevention, youth access, and punishment approaches.
In contrast, Michigan’s approach focused on punishment in bills targeting minors drinking and
driving and minors possessing alcohol.
Since the general approach to the use of alcohol and drugs by the Center was on youth access,
we compared the success of youth access bills (outlet licensing and regulation, penalty for sales
and furnishing, and advertising) over time with the two other states. Figure 2.3 above presents
the success scores for access bills in each session. Since total proposals in each of the three
states are few, it is difficult to determine significant trends for any of the three states.
- 56 -
Figure 2.3 - State Comparion of Avearge Success on
Youth Access to Alcohol Bills
Average Success Score
7
6
5
4
California
Illinois
3
Michigan
2
1
0
91/92
93/94
95/96
97/98
Although access bills in California do appear to be most successful in the 97/98 session,
particularly in comparison with the other states, the small number of bills proposed (14) in
California over this period, again, makes it difficult to note any significant trend in success.
As noted previously, the Center has identified three specific objectives related to youth alcohol
and drug access: increasing alcohol prices through taxes, promoting local control of alcohol
sales, and limiting youth-oriented alcohol advertising. During the last three sessions, three bills
were proposed to promote increased control of alcohol sales, one of which was enacted into law.
The two bills aimed at alcohol advertising, AB 2096 (Tucker) in 1995 and AB 1234 (Aroner),
both failed to move out of committee in the last session.
Unlike bills directly addressing violence, interest in youth-related drug and alcohol bills has
remained relatively small and stable over time. Activity in California increased in the final
session with 19 proposed bills and 8 enacted bills. Most of this recent activity focused on
prevention, intervention, and treatment of drug and alcohol use by minors. Alternatively, very
little activity was seen in all three states on bills aimed at reducing minors’ access to alcohol and
drugs. This evidence suggests that the Pacific Center’s influence on state policy measures to
reduce access to drugs and alcohol was minimal.
Findings Related to Reducing Firearm Injuries and Deaths
California legislators proposed 216 bills aimed at firearm violence and injuries in the last four
legislative sessions. The approaches adopted in these bills range widely from punishment aimed
at criminal use of firearms to the regulation of specific firearms such as assault weapons and
Saturday Night Specials. We used strategies identified in Zimring’s typology (1991) to
categorize firearm measures: (1) place and manner restrictions, (2) selective ownership, and (3)
supply reduction aimed at dangerous weapons. We further divided this typology to better
- 57 -
describe the breadth of legislation. The “selective ownership” category was divided into a
category for monitoring access through regulation and a category for restricting access for highrisk users. Penalty enhancements aimed at use of firearms in other crimes were distinguished
from place and manner restrictions because they involve a unique “get tough” approach to
reducing firearm injury. The ten strategies identified in California legislation are shown in Table
5. We placed 15 bills into an “other” category. These included bills related to gun safety course
requirements for sale, gun buyback programs, and firearm research bills.
Much of the activity occurred in the 93/94 session when a total of 87 bills were proposed.
Although total bills proposed decreased in the 95/96 session, they again rose in the 97/98 session
to 66. In addition to variation in total proposed bills by session, we also observed variation by
strategy over this period. In the 93/94 session, restrictions aimed at high-risk users, place, and
manner were the most frequently proposed bills. In the last two sessions, proposals for this
approach generally decreased and were eventually surpassed by two other groups of bills:
penalty enhancements and firearm access/product regulations. The largest single strategy among
the 216 bills proposed during this period was penalty enhancements for using a gun in the
commission of a crime (22).
These trends are highlighted in Figure 2.4, which shows average success for each of the four
basic approaches. Average success for penalty enhancements decreased during the eight-year
period. The one penalty enhancement bill proposed in the 91/92 session, AB 2934 (Friedman)
was enacted. In the latest session, 21 penalty enhancement bills were proposed but only five
were enacted. Among the rest of the penalty enhancement bills, only two moved out of their
house of origin.
Figure 2.4 - Average Success of Fiream Bills
(CA)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Access and Product Regulation
High Risk Users, Place, and Manner
91/92
93/94
Penalty Enhancement
95/96
97/98
Ease Restrictions
We observed an opposite trend for access and product regulation bills. In the first session, seven
bills were proposed but only two successfully moved out of both houses.
In the last complete session, 26 bills aimed at access and product regulation were proposed and
16 bills were either enacted (9) or successfully passed on both house floors (7). Among these
bills were several successful initiatives supported by the Pacific Center. A ban on Saturday
Night Specials, AB 488 (Caldera) and SB 500 (Polanco), successfully passed in both houses but
were later vetoed by the Governor. The success of these and several other important gun control
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measures supports the argument that access and product regulation became more popular and
successful as a strategy in the last legislative session.
Firearm Bills in Comparison States. The most striking comparison among states is the overall
number of bill measures proposed in California. Our full sample included 216 firearm bills and
the Lexis search yielded only slightly less, 207 bills proposals. In contrast, 138 bills were
proposed in Illinois and only 46 were proposed in Michigan. This difference is even more
striking when we look at the number of bills enacted. Only six bills were enacted in Illinois and
only 3 bills were enacted in Michigan during this time period. In California, 57 of the 207 bills
located through Lexis were enacted.
Unlike California, we found no apparent trends over time in Michigan (the state with the fewest
proposed bills) where over one-third of the bills (17) focused on monitoring access to firearms
through regulation. Few bills were aimed at product regulation, taxation, and local control.
Additionally, these bills did not increase in frequency or success over time. Legislation in
Illinois was more evenly distributed among the various strategies.
While we found that legislators in both Michigan and Illinois placed greater legislative emphasis
on access and product regulation over time, the share of these bills in terms of all the proposed
strategies decreased as punitive and other strategies became more popular. In contrast, these
types of bills increased as a percentage of total bills over time in California. This increase is
most evident in the last session. This finding indicates that the emphasis on access and product
regulation bills (which are supported by the Pacific Center and other components of the VPI)
increased in California while it decreased in the comparison states.
Figure 2.5 shows the average success of access and product regulation bills in the three states.
Although legislators in both Michigan and Illinois have placed greater emphasis on access and
product regulation bills, these bills have been much less successful than in California. Almost all
of the bills proposed to reduce access and regulate products in Michigan and Illinois failed
passage in the house of origin. In California, however, we found that these bills were
considerably more successful, with an average success score between three and four over the
four sessions. More importantly, the success of access and product regulation bills increased
during the period in which the Center and the greater VPI began to educate policymakers. In
contrast, success in the comparison states remained constant. Thus, we find evidence that the
general strategy supported by the Pacific Center became both more popular among legislators
and more successful within the California legislature.
Interest in firearm bills in the California legislature changed significantly over the eight-year
period studied in terms of both total proposed bills and the nature of the proposed strategies.
Bills focused on access and product regulation were first proposed in the 91/92 session but
appear to have become more successful as a strategy in the latest session. Alternatively, while
total proposals for penalty enhancements for criminal use (which represent the largest single
legislative approach to firearms) also increased, the legislature became less supportive of these
bills.
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Although traditional firearms bills such as penalty enhancements and restrictions aimed at highrisk users continue to be the most frequent legislative response to firearm-related violence,
access and product regulation bills significantly increased in recent years in terms of legislative
emphasis. While there was a similar increase in interest in the state
Average Success Score
Figure 2.5 - Average Success of Gun Access and
Product Regulation Bills
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
California
Illinois
Michigan
91/92
93/94
95/96
97/98
of Illinois in these bills, we do not see a corresponding increase in success. We conclude that
among the three types of legislation specifically supported by the Pacific Center, firearm
measures have been the most successful in terms of both total proposed bills and the degree of
their success.
CONCLUSIONS
It is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a causal link between the Pacific Center’s activities over
the last five years and the progress we have witnessed in California on a number of important
fronts, including the passage of significant gun control measures and a collective recognition that
more resources need to be devoted to violence prevention. Nevertheless, the actions of the
Pacific Center are undeniably correlated with these achievements.
A substantial amount of evidence to support this claim came from our case study of the Pacific
Center, which relied on extensive interviews with both Pacific Center staff and with
policymakers throughout the state, as well as on a review of relevant documents.
Additional evidence in support of the Pacific Center’s progress in meeting its goals—in
particular, those related to reducing access to firearms and advancing the public health
perspective on youth violence—can be found by looking at the results of the Michigan and
Illinois case studies and of the legislative analysis.
In both Michigan and Illinois, the dominant political environment is based on a criminal justice
model, with public health barely on the agenda. At the same time, there appears to be a more
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active and effective public health advocacy approach in Illinois, though one that is far short of
what we see with the Pacific Center. If we make a qualitative assessment across the three states,
we might conclude as follows. Based on a continuum of public health advocacy, we see that
Michigan’s is incipient, Illinois’ is more advanced but only modestly effective in changing the
legislative climate, while the Pacific Center’s activities are much more advanced and much more
effective. In this context, we define effectiveness as changes in the policy environment,
including the local gun control ordinances enacted in California, and the progress of statewide
legislation, at least partially in response to the Pacific Center’s advocacy.
Thus, we see almost no progress in Michigan, an emerging shift in Illinois, and a vibrant debate
in California. It seems likely that the relative strength of public health advocacy across these
states is an important explanatory factor for these trends.
This suggests that the investment in public health advocacy can generate considerable returns in
terms of shifting the public debate from criminal justice to public health. While it is premature
to assess the effects of shifting the paradigm, it is conceptually feasible to argue that policies
designed to reduce firearm injuries and death among youth and policies designed to reduce youth
access to alcohol and other drugs are unlikely to be pursued in a criminal justice environment.
Neither Michigan nor Illinois has evidenced much interest in these other policies because they
are so focused on a criminal justice model. It is therefore plausible to argue that shifting the
public debate to the public health model is a precondition to generating policies on these other
dimensions.
Further evidence of the Pacific Center’s effectiveness in making progress toward meeting the
three policy goals was found in our legislative analysis. Here, we found that its efforts in the
area of firearm legislation met with the greatest level of success. Bills supported by the Center
were more numerous and successful both over time and in comparison with Michigan and
Illinois. Although, Illinois legislators proposed similar access and regulation bills in recent
years, however, the success of these bills was negligible. We also found that the legislative
strategy on firearm violence appears to have shifted in recent years away from more punitive
approaches targeting the criminal use of firearms toward approaches targeting firearm access and
weapon design.
The Pacific Center may have also contributed to legislative successes in the area of violence
prevention. To better understand progress on this front, we tracked a wide array of legislation
related to reducing youth violence. That is, since the prevention-oriented policies supported by
the Center often compete with alternative strategies such as harsher sentencing and police
suppression, we included all bills related to youth violence as a method of comparing the
strategies. Several promising measures supported by the Center first appeared as legislative
proposals in 1997. These included measures to increase after-school activities, a gang violence
prevention measure, and a large grant for local prevention efforts. These advances were part of a
larger movement by legislators who appear to be more supportive of a broad array of prevention
measures. The observed increase in legislative support for a wide variety of prevention
programs presents both an opportunity and a challenge to the Center as a policy advocate. Our
findings also indicate that increases in prevention bills were accompanied by increases in bills
that contained more punitive measures.
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The latter finding, along with the results of our case studies, points to the need to turn up the
volume of the public health voice in the policy debate. By this we mean that state-level debates
over youth violence are usually framed by proponents of the criminal justice system and not by
public health advocates. Too often, as noted in our case studies, the public health alternative is
either a whisper or is not heard at all in policy debates.
The lack of a strong statewide public health voice has three consequences for the policy debate
over youth violence. First, it dilutes the public health mission and the ability to influence events.
This means that the terms of the debate and the policy outcomes are essentially ceded to the
criminal justice proponents. Second, it impedes the preservation of a strong public health role.
If no alternative is presented, it should come as no surprise that the paradigm shifts slowly, if at
all. Third, it reinforces the message that the criminal justice model is the correct strategy.
The challenge for public health advocates in general, and for the Violence Prevention Initiative
in particular, is twofold. First, they need to promote the legitimacy of the public health model
generally. It is just as important to educate average citizens as it is to educate and influence
policymakers. The public needs to be reminded why public health matters and why investing in
public health is a wise use of taxpayer funds.
Second, advocates need to undertake the often thankless task of building a network of support
that forces legislators to consider the public health approach/voice in policy debates. Most
importantly, advocates must educate legislators and other policymakers about the role that public
health plays in youth violence. A sustained public health voice in state-level policymaking is
essential for achieving commonly shared public health goals and objectives.
Despite the conceptual elegance of the published literature arguing for a paradigm shift in
thinking about youth violence from criminal justice to public health, it is something that is much
easier said than done. We still have inadequate outcome measures to quantify whether the shift
has occurred and the role of policy entrepreneurs in the process. Trying to pin down the specific
actions public health advocates must take to engender this shift and how to measure their
progress is likely to prove to be very elusive. Some policy advocates have focused on allocating
funds to local communities as an important outcome measure, while others look at the number of
health care professionals involved in the policy debate, changes in the type of legislation
introduced and enacted, and the media coverage. To be sure, these approaches are not mutually
inconsistent, but they need to be reconciled and specified before they can be measured. Finally,
the Pacific Center and other violence prevention advocacy groups need to make better use of
policy analytic tools and existing research on effective violence prevention methods to
strengthen their case with policymakers. In this sense, the criminal justice model has an inherent
advantage in simplicity, ease of explanation, and clear outcome measures that can be evaluated.
This is not to suggest abandoning the effort. To the contrary, events in California suggest the
desirability of articulating an alternative to the criminal justice model of dealing with youth
violence. It is to suggest, however, that achieving the paradigm shift will take some time. But
the Pacific Center’s work over the last five years represents an important step in the right
direction.
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Over the past few years, we have become increasingly impressed with the Pacific Center’s
progress in meeting the policy goals related to changing society’s perspective on youth violence
to include a public health perspective, and advocating for public policies that reduce firearm
injuries and death among youth. As noted above, although we cannot be completely confident
that a causal relationship exists between the Center’s work and the improvements we have seen
over the past five years in these areas, there is clearly a strong association between the two.
At the same time, we believe that a number of steps can be taken that would significantly
enhance the Pacific Center’s effectiveness as it moves forward. In particular, we believe its
efforts would benefit from establishing a clearer, and perhaps more public and explicit, set of
objectives, especially in the area of bringing a public health perspective to bear on youth
violence. For example, although the Center has moved away from an exclusive focus on
promoting full-service schools to a more general one that attempts to increase the level of
resources going to local violence prevention programs, it has not established target funding
levels or articulated a strategy for getting “from here to there.” In addition, the Center needs to
devote substantially more resources to disseminating information to local and state policymakers
and policy advocates on effective interventions. Although the Center has advanced the public
health perspective to violence prevention policy, greater focus on a well-defined strategy will
serve to increase the visibility and role of this approach.
The Center’s effectiveness in the policy arena could be enhanced further by placing greater
reliance on research and policy analysis. That is, we have found that while the Center’s
decisions to pursue a particular policy objectives (e.g., supporting the enactment of local gun
control ordinances) often seem reasonable on face value, they are typically not supported by any
systematic analysis of policy alternatives. Such an exercise would enable the staff to assess the
pros and cons of alternative approaches to a particular problem and provide policymakers and
advocates with a rational basis for action. Along these lines, the Center should make a concerted
effort to better integrate the research-oriented projects it undertakes with its policy advocacy
activities.
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