A Deliberative Approach to East Asia’s Contested History
Professor Baogang He, Chair in International Studies, School of International and Political Studies,
Deakin University, Australia, baogang.he@deakin.edu.au
Dr David Hundt, Lecturer in International Relations, School of International and Political Studies,
Deakin University, Australia, dhundt@deakin.edu.au
Introduction
History matters.1 The history of East Asia—and in particular the legitimacy of war,
national boundaries and political units—has been fiercely contested for much of the
post-war period. Competing nationalist conceptions and interpretations of history
have encouraged states to lay claim to their own legitimacy while denying that of
others. History not only plays a significant role in nation building and the construction
of national identity, but it has also generated controversy, hindering regional
reconciliation and integration (He 2004b; Moon and Suh 2007).
A nationalist approach to contested history has created serious problems such
as depriving discussions about history of deliberation and reason, inciting needlessly
adversarial emotions, denying and excluding certain groups from debate, creating
endless disputes, intensifying diplomatic rows, and hindering regionalism. An
alternative approach is urgently needed.
Drawing on the theory of “deliberative democracy” we develop a two-step
deliberative approach to the recording of Asia’s contested history. The first is
theoretical. We develop a new politics of history and deliberative approach with the
specification of ideal-type conditions for deliberation. The approach encourages
pluralist rather than nationalist, deliberative rather than emotional, readings of history.
By allowing for an “ethics of difference” (Bleiker 2005), we seek to facilitate a more
open debate about history, and to “democratize” the retelling of the past. Our pluralist
and deliberative approach to discussing, recalling and recording history provides a
deliberation-based “public space” (He 2004a) in which to achieve a minimal,
mutually acceptable account of the war. This in turn fosters movement towards what
Jürgen Habermas terms the most “valid” interpretation of history (see Suh 2007).
The second step is empirical. We first map forms of discussion and debate on
history, and then undertake an empirical testing to ascertain the degree to which civil
society groups and citizens have been involved and deliberation has occurred. We
highlight the Modern History of East Asia project, which entailed the production of a
history textbook for use in China, Japan and South Korea.2 The project, which
involved mainly NGOs and schoolteachers, sought to overcome the “liberation–
invasion” dichotomy that characterizes the retelling of regional history (Hundt and
1
This paper was originally prepared for Association of Korean Political Studies panel at the American
Political Science Association annual meeting, 28–31 August 2008. Revised versions were presented to
a seminar hosted by the Department of International Relations and the Korea Institute, Australian
National University (November 2008), and a Korean Studies Forum hosted by the Sogang University
Graduate School of International Studies (December 2008). The authors are grateful for comments and
feedback from attendees to each of these seminars.
2
The Trilateral Joint History Editorial Committee (TJHEC) finalized the sub-textbook in 2005. The
Korean version, published by Hankyoreh Sinmunsa, carried the title Mirae-reul yeoneun Yeoksa: Han
Jung Il-i hamgye mandeun Dong Asia 3guk-ui Geunhyeondaesa (A History that Opens the Future: The
Contemporary and Modern History of Three East Asian Countries). Hereafter referred to as Modern
History of East Asia, the Korean version is the one used in this paper.
-1-
Bleiker 2007). We contrast MHEA with less inclusive modes of dialogue—and in
particular a dispute between China and South Korea that erupted at precisely the same
time as the MHEA project was underway. By juxtaposing the Goguryeo–Gāogōulì
dispute with the success of MHEA, this paper provides an account of factors leading
to deliberative and non-deliberative dialogues, examines the limits and problems of
the deliberative approach, and discusses the dynamic potential of a deliberative
approach to dialogue.
Writing history in the Region
Before proceeding further it is worth detailing the historical issues that have been
subjected to dispute. Sets of disputes—and it is useful to think in terms of sets
because disputes are often inter-related—revolve around at least three periods in time.
The first set of disputes involves the possession—in the physical and spiritual
sense—of cultural assets derived from long-extinct civilizations. China and the
Koreas, for instance, both claim to be the legitimate heirs to a kingdom that occupied
certain parts of what are now northern China and the Korean peninsula. In addition to
the Goguryeo–Gāogōulì kingdom, issues such as the lineages of Confucius, Sun Yatsen and Mao Zedong, traditional medicine, calligraphy and the Dano–Duanwu
(Dragon Boat) Festival have all become objects for dispute between Korea and China
(Lee 2008). By securing a claim to the history of an ancient civilization, governments
seek to eliminate competing claims in the present to their sovereign right to the
territories where those civilizations existed—and all people, natural resources and
other assets within those territories. What Koreans refer to as the Goguryeo kingdom
encapsulates territory within China’s present borders. While Koreans have not sought
to reclaim that territory, they have laid claim to the history of the kingdom. A variant
of East Asia’s territorial disputes involve islets such as Tokdo/Takeshima (in the Sea
of Japan/East Sea), the Daiyou/Senkakus in the South China Sea, and the Kuriles/
Northern Islands to the north of Hokkaido. In each case, the contestation persists
because one country exercises possession and effective control of the islets while the
other is unwilling to forego its exclusive claims of historical ownership.
A second set of disputes is based on the ways in which certain militaries
maltreated the peoples of neighboring countries prior to and during World War II. An
oft-cited case is the Nanking Massacre/Rape of Nanking. At issue is whether Japan’s
siege and occupation of Nanking accorded with the normal laws of war (such that
they existed at the time), which forbids indiscriminate violence against civilians. A
related issue surrounds the Comfort Women—those women in occupied Asia who
were recruited as prostitutes for use by Japanese soldiers. The main contentions here
are the extent to which the Japanese military was complicit with the recruitment of the
women, and whether this recruitment was coercive and thus illegal (see Soh 1996).
The third set of disputes surrounds contemporary accounts of precisely the
issues outlined above. For instance renditions of history in Chinese and Korean
textbooks that portray Goguryeo as either solely and perpetually a part of China’s
multicultural history, or as the forerunner to the present-day Korean state, produce
outcry from the other country. On the other hand, Chinese and Koreans have united in
their condemnation of Japanese renditions of history that appear to downplay Japan’s
atrocities during the war (Seraphim 2008). In light of this perceived whitewashing of
history, former president Roh Moo-hyun was quoted as saying: “While Japan has
issued statements of regret and apologies for its past wrongdoings at various
occasions, we are led to question their sincerity when they are marred by acts at odds
with their expressions of repentance” (Roh 2007: 11). Some Japanese, in contrast,
-2-
argue that their country has apologized sufficiently in the decades since the end of the
war, and that it is now time for Japan to act like a “normal” country. In addition to
disputing the ways in which Japan portrays the actions of its army in the first half of
the 20th century, Chinese and Korean critics also charge Japan with being
disrespectful of the feelings of its neighbors. China and Korea argue that visits to the
Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese prime ministers lends official sanction to actions of
wartime leaders, some of whom were found guilty of war crimes and subsequently
enshrined at Yasukuni. Some Japanese, in contrast, argue that visiting the shrine is
merely a symbol of remembrance to those who fought and died for Japan.
These many and varied divergences are significant given that the process of
collecting, editing and publishing national history tends to belongs to, and fall under
the control of, the state in East Asia. States have established official institutes to
oversee the process of preparing school history textbooks, and history as a modern
academic discipline has been an indispensable tool for constructing a linearity of
collective memory while also suppressing plural and local reporting methods. Only in
recent years has a loosening of this practice provided an opportunity for civil society
groups to develop a view of national history, bringing it closer to the practice of
Western societies, where history as an academic discipline is widely viewed as
something independent from the state.
History is the spiritual home of the past. From a nationalist perspective,
democracy cannot provide a universally accepted criterion for deciding which people
and territories are to be included in a political community (Whelan 1983). The
nationalist approach appeals to the common tradition, history and culture of the
“nation”, relying on commonalties of biology, psychology and spirituality.
Nationalists appeal to history because its uniqueness legitimates claims over
territories, and grants at least some power to eradicate disputes. Therefore the
significance of history principally lies in the exclusion or minimization of endless
disputes. Even though nationalists appeal to historical “facts” and “evidence”, Ernest
Renan noted a century ago that: “Getting history wrong is an essential part of being a
nation” (cited in Alterman 1999). These “facts” at the heart of nationalist narratives
may well be fabricated, and often lack deliberative qualities. They tend to assert
partisan claims while ignoring and denying those of others. The state often
monopolizes debate and sets limits to the articulation of the official narrative. The
final determinant is not reason but national interest and power.
With the rise of nationalism in East Asia, the rewriting of history has become
more common. History tends to be written with specific audiences in mind, making
problematic the recounting of events such as war and colonialism that, by their very
definition, imply the involvement of numerous countries. It is thus not surprising that
opinions diverge on how to depict East Asia’s history during the turbulent, roughly
100-year period that began with the Opium Wars and ended with Japan’s defeat in the
Pacific War. No country stood outside that turbulence, so there is no “neutral” space
from which to recall events in a dispassionate manner. Consequently nationalist
viewpoints have dominated the retelling of the region’s history, and there has been
limited progress in writing a more nuanced “regional” history. Whereas the number of
people who directly experienced the traumas of the war is dwindling, the collective
memory remains strong and has been continually replicated in historical accounts
such as school textbooks. The war and its aftermath represent the birth—or re-birth—
of independent nation-states, which consequently have appropriated that trauma and
attempted to use it to forge new, cohesive national identities. In this sense state
-3-
leaders have jealously guarded the recounting of history, exacting a substantial cost in
terms of regional integration.
A Deliberative Approach to Contested History
There is a growing literature on theories of deliberative democracy, resulting from the
“deliberative turn” in the early 1990s (Cohen 1989; Cohen and Sabel 1997; Dryzek
1990, 1996, 2000; Elster 1998; Fung 2003; Fung and Wright 2001; Goodin 2002;
Habermas 1984, 1996). Unlike liberal democracy, deliberative democracy does not
rely solely on the aggregation of preferences and majority voting. It prioritizes to
reasoned argument and discussion in which “interests” are recognized but do not
dominate proceedings. In deliberative democracy, the force of the better argument
should prevail over wealth and political influence. Deliberative democratic theorists
also stress the capacity, right and opportunity of citizens to participate in collective
decisions. Through an equal distribution of the power to make collective decisions,
and equal and effective opportunities to participate in collective judgments,
democratic procedures can shift decisions from money and power to deliberation.
Communication—argument, challenge, demonstration, symbolization and bargaining
—should ensure that arguments and statements are factually true, normatively right
and expressively sincere (Habermas 1984, 1996).
John Dryzek considers the degree to which deliberative democracy can offer a
distinctive approach to the issue of mutually contradictory identity, calling for
deliberative politics in the public sphere. According to Dryzek (2005), engagement in
the public sphere ought to be semi-detached from the state, or dissociated from
sovereign authority. The public sphere, the conditionality of sovereignty and the
transnationalization of political influence feature in his vision of deliberative
democracy in divided societies.
James Fishkin developed an experimental study of the role of deliberative
democracy in managing conflicts over national identity. He organized a “deliberative
poll” about children’s education policy in Omagh, Northern Ireland in January 2007,
where 127 Protestants and Catholics deliberated in small-group discussions and
plenary sessions. The perceptions of participants changed via deliberation. The
proportion that believed that Protestants were “open to reason” increased from 36% to
52%, while the proportion believing Catholics were “open to reason” increased from
40% to 56%. There was also a dramatic increase in the proportion of each community
that viewed the other as “trustworthy”. For Catholics, the proportion rose from 50% to
62%; for Protestants, it rose from 50% to 60%. The experiment confirms that citizens
are open to rational discussion and willing to change their opinions, and that
deliberation can reduce conflict and enhance mutual trust in divided societies (Fishkin
et al 2007).
By building on previous research and applying deliberative democratic theory
to historical disputes, this paper attempts to develop an ideal-type deliberative
approach to contested history. History can be both a burden and/or liberation. All
histories are contemporary histories, according to Croce (1941: 19), or the history of
ideas in the opinion of Collinwood (1946). In the eyes of Oakeshott (1933: 99),
history is instead the product of historians whose writing creates it, while for Carr
(1961) history is a continuing dialogue between historians and their constructed
“facts” and between past events and the present. The nationalist politics of history
often features politicization, the use and misuse of the past, and deliberately
subjective and manipulative interpretations and distortions of history (Heisler 2008).
This paper attempts to develop a new politics of history through public deliberation in
-4-
the transnational public sphere. We see history as a deliberative process whereby
historians, civil society groups and ordinary citizens engage the dialogue and confirm
minimal bare facts as a basis for communication; and thereby prevent history from
being monopolized by a small number of state-sponsored and sanctioned experts.
The main features of the deliberative approach to historical disputes are
explained below and summarized in Table One along with a set of testable empirical
questions (which will be used for empirical testing in later discussion).
Table One: Elements of the Deliberative Approach to Contested History
Perspectives
Ideal Type
Testable Questions
Rather than historians or experts
Can ordinary citizens and civil
Actors
sponsored by the state, citizens and
society groups play significant
civil society groups play leading roles
roles in dealing with historical
in dealing with historical disputes.
disputes? Is it possible to
They develop a regional public sphere
develop a regional public
to overcome nationalist histories.
sphere?
In contrast to the exclusive, secretive
Is it possible to develop a
Process
and manipulative state-led process, the democratic and inclusive
deliberative process is inclusive, open
process to overcome the closed
and deliberative.
extant process?
In contrast to intense, emotional and
To what degree are contentious
Deliberation
adversarial nationalist narratives, the
issues debated? Is it possible to
deliberative approach is reflective and
engage in genuine deliberation
critical, promotes mutual respect for
on historical issues?
the perspective of others, and allows
participants to change one’s views.
If citizens engage in a communicative
Can deliberation achieve the
Outcomes
manner, deliberation can clarify the
bare minimum of facts? Can
bare minimum of facts and develop
regional identities overcome
regional identities to overcome
nationalist histories in East
nationalist historiographies.
Asia?
First, deliberative democracy regards history as a dialogue between the past
and present, and between all parties. It prioritizes reasoned argument and discussion,
while recognizing the importance of power and interests. Within the nationalist
paradigm, the question of “what” has dominated historical inquiries without giving
due space for the question of “who”. In the deliberative democracy paradigm, civil
society groups and ordinary citizens are offered an opportunity to argue and debate,
and they may be willing to change their opinions during the process of deliberation.
Eric Alterman (1999) imagines a perfect world where the warring sides in
ethnic disputes over territory, for an example, in the case of Kosovo, might lay down
their arms and submit themselves to a panel of historical experts who would study the
historical record of a battle that occurred more than 600 years in Kosovo and
determine which side’s claims had greater merit. There would be a ruling, and each
side would give up its unjustifiable demands in the face of superior historical
documentation. Such a deliberative world allows reason and intellectual power to
decide the matter. Alterman’s appproach is deliberative but not democratic. For a
deliberative democrat, the judgment of historical experts is insufficient. The people
and their sheer number matter in history, as Carr (1961) reminded us. This ontological
view constitutes a basis for ordinary citizens and civil society groups to participate in
the process of history-writing so as to achieve sufficiently broad public consensus and
legitimacy to deal with all historical disputes.
A second feature of our approach is an opening up the issue of “the facts”.
Deliberation subjects biased and selective histories to debate. For a deliberative
-5-
democrat, any argument based on history must be subject to rational scrutiny and
criticism, because conflicting versions of history do not constitute a solid basis for
resolution. The solution lies in a compromising spirit whereby each side takes the
perspective of the other seriously. In other words, historical claims and disputes can
be and ought to be examined through a communicative action in a deliberative
process. In this sense, history can be negotiated and be part of a democratic
mechanism (Pingel 2008).
Dryzek’s pluralist discursive democratization (2006: 154–7) challenges the
state’s monopolization of discourses about history. A deliberative approach thus aims
to democratize nationalist discourses by encouraging critical reflections of history, its
methods and assumptions. Democratic thinking raises new questions, which
nationalist historians rarely ask, or tend to ignore. For example, Lukman Thaib argues
that since the Dutch failed to hold a plebiscite, referenda or election in the 1940s, they
had no right to hand Aceh—a territory which was not theirs in the first place—to
Indonesia upon the independence of the republic. This kind of democratic questioning
of the past seeks to democratize the dead. That is, it aims to represent and express the
voices of the dead people who are the main subject in the retelling of past events. But
problems arise here too: If people in the past, present and even future are to have
equal representation in the writing of history, how can the dead be adequately
included? It may be impossible to ascertain the number of the dead, and it may well
be that the dead are not intellectually capable of partaking in the exercise at hand.
Nonetheless the spirit of democracy pervades the deliberative project and serves as its
guiding ethical principle.
Third, a deliberative approach is transnational and as such stresses the role of
transnational civil society (He 2004a; He and Murphy 2007). To go beyond the
nationalist conception of history, it must be plural. Consequently, one must seek a
minimal understanding and form a regionalist perspective. An ideal-type regional
public sphere on history would encompass transnational networks and organizations,
and equal recognition of others beyond national sovereignty. Recognizing the
potentially disastrous consequences of a return to an age of interstate warfare, JaeJung Suh calls for regional actors to recognize each other as legitimate participants in
a dialogue about the salient past within a common framework of meaning in order to
create a regional public sphere: “East Asia… now stands at a fork between
strengthening the regional public sphere and fracturing it into a contentious public
sphere” (Suh 2007: 382).
In the last decade, many democratic theorists have undertaken the empirical
study of deliberative institutions through several experiments focusing on citizens’
participation (Fishkin 1991, 1995; Fung 2001, 2003). Rather than organizing an
experiment with the input of researchers, this paper will undertake a study of the real
dialogues in a variety form. Below we first map various dialogues, then select two
contrasting cases as a quasi-experimental study.
Mapping Dialogue in Northeast Asia
Despite the propensity of some state leaders to promote a narrowly interpreted view
of history, there have been various attempts to expose East Asian history to scrutiny.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide an exhaustive list of all dialogues, and
instead Table Two provides a typology of dialogues about the region’s history.
We consider the national, intergovernmental and public sphere domains. The
national domain indicates that history is written by and for the purposes of an
individual state, while the intergovernmental domain involves the input of several
-6-
states. The public sphere, in contrast, involves both state and non-state actors in the
recording of history. In terms of the degree of deliberation, we typologize dialogues
as low (or non-existent), moderate and substantial. At the lower end of the spectrum,
we situate dialogues about Northeast Asia’s regional history involving only
nationalist perspectives. The moderate degree of debating, meanwhile, is attached to
those dialogues where nationalist perspectives coexist but prove to be ultimately
inflexible and non-reflexive. At the substantial level, dialogues over history overcome
nationalist perspectives through a process—quite possibly traumatic for the parties
concerned—of critically re-examining all perspectives, including one’s own.
Table Two: Locating Dialogues about East Asian History
Domain
National
Intergovernmental
Regional
Public Sphere
Degree of Deliberation
Moderate
2.
Substantial
3.
* Verification of the
Rape of Nanking
* Northeast Project/
Goguryeo Research
Foundation
4.
* Truth and Reconciliation
Commission
* Yomiuri Shimbun
project
5.
6.
* Tokyo Trials
* San Francisco Peace
Conference
* Treaty of Basic Relations
* Sino–Japanese Joint
Declaration
* Obuchi–Jiang summit
8.
* Obuchi–Kim summit
* Beijing Women’s
Conference
* Modern History of East
Asia
Nil/Low
1.
7.
* Joint history test
9.
Sectors 1, 2 and 3 of the table represent the varying degrees of national-level
dialogues. These dialogues are by definition non-competitive nationalist discourses in
that they only involve the perspectives of only one country. The second set of
dialogues (4, 5 and 6) are typified as competitive nationalist discourses in that they
represent occasions when multiple nationalist narratives coexist but do not accept
each other’s validity. The third set of dialogues (7–9) represent concerted attempts to
overcome nationalist discourses and instead privilege accurate accounts of East Asian
history.
The discussion in this section starts and ends with the two contrasting sectors
of the table—Sector 1, which represents the least reflective accounting of regional
history, and Sector 9, which indicates the optimal conditions for an accurate retelling
of the past. Subsequently, we contrast the national-level efforts to discuss East Asian
history—China’s Northeast project, the Gogyureo Research Foundation, and the
Japanese assessment of the Rape of Nanking—with the MHEA project, which best fits
the conditions for deliberative democracy.
Dialogues at the National Level
When history is re-imagined, re-told and re-written free of competing voices, He
Yinan tells us, it is vulnerable to “mythmaking”. Especially when history is wholly or
predominantly the remit of state elites, critical faculties may be seriously impaired.
-7-
For He, it is precisely this “divergence of national memories created by elite historical
mythmaking” that has “perpetuated and reinforced the problems of history in Japan–
China relations” (2006: 69). A prime example of a nationalist and non-reflective
dialogue about the past occurred when a Japanese rightwing group met to discuss
allegations about the mistreatment of Chinese citizens at the hands of Japanese troops
at Nanking. Dubbed the “Verification of the Rape of Nanking: The Biggest Lie of the
Twentieth Century”, the conference—unsurprisingly, given its name—found no
evidence to support the numerous claims from Chinese and other non-Japanese
sources that the imperial army had wantonly assaulted the citizens of the city and the
troops defending Nanking. This verdict, which sought to restore the reputation of
Japanese troops, sparked an outcry from Chinese citizens (Gong 2001: 48).
A second example is the dispute that engulfed China and the two Koreas in
regards to the historical ownership of the Goguryeo (高句麗, Gāogōulì) kingdom.
Goguryeo is of great historical importance to Korea, being one the three kingdoms
(along with Silla and Baekche) that unified and formed the Koryo dynasty in the
seventh century AD. The issue stemmed from North Korea’s attempt to have
Goguryeo murals listed by UNESCO as a site worthy of world heritage protection.
China responded by asking UNESCO to list Goguryeo castles and tombs, thereby
explicitly stating that Goguryeo belonged to China. It also launched the Northeast
Project (東北工程), which, along with other history projects about China’s
borderlands, intended to strengthen Chinese claims to Goguryeo (Kim 2005: 142–3).
Another foray into deliberation can be found in the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, which was established in 2005 to investigate controversies in Korean
history such as collaboration with the colonial Japanese government prior to and
during World War II. As such, the Commission sought information—via forensic
searches, eyewitness accounts, scholarly research and testimony by perpetrators—
about not only the actions of Japan at the time but also the culpability of Korean
officials in the war effort (Cumings 2007: 262). It had long been suggested that
leaders such as Park Chung Hee—a hero to conservative Koreans for his nationbuilding efforts—had been intimately involved in the colonial state, but the
Commission also uncovered evidence that many more Koreans had collaborated in
some way. While the “truth” component of the Commission’s remit appeared to
challenge the state-centric historiography, the revelations about prominent Korean
officials—some of whose children were still prominent in public life—resulted in
little reconciliation. The commission process exacerbated conflict between
conservatives and their progressive rivals, and fell short of the substantial level of
dialogue necessary for a full and accurate account of regional history. Nonetheless the
airing of differing opinions about Korean history (see Lee 1998: 334–5) represents
movement towards a more pluralist historiography of events in the broader region.
A third example of national-level dialogue occurred when the editor-in-chief
of the Yomiuri Shimbun, Tsuneo Watanabe, broke with conservative ranks in Japan by
calling for a resolution to the history issue. In an interview in 2006 he stressed how
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine acts as a symbolic impediment to better relations with
other countries in the region. Watanabe stated that the “Yasukuni Shrine operates a
war museum that incites militarism and displays exhibits in praise of militarism. It is
wrong for the Prime Minister to visit such a place” (quoted in Cameron 2006: 14).
The Yomiuri “project” concentrated on five issues: the extension of the war
following the Manchurian Incident of 1931; the decision to go to war with the US; the
employment of suicide bombers (kamikaze); efforts to bring the war to an end; and the
Tokyo Tribunal. The “verdict” reached was that a small group of hardliners were
-8-
responsible for strategic blunders and for needlessly prolonging the war. Further, the
Yomiuri researchers apportioned some blame to moderates (who found it difficult to
oppose the hardliners), the emperor (who feared assassination), and also to the Diet
and media—including the Yomiuri itself—for not criticizing the disastrous path of the
war at the time (Takahiko 2007: 45–8; see also Yomiuri Shimbun War Responsibility
Reexamination Committee 2007).
Dialogues at the Intergovernmental Level
Although the national-level dialogues are necessarily limited in the degree of input
they entail, some dialogues at the intergovernmental level also fall short of adequate
accounts of the past. Two events that belong to the lowest end of this category are the
Tokyo Trials, held in 1946 to assess the guilt of Japanese leaders accused of war
crimes, and the San Francisco Peace Conference (1951), which sought to resolve
outstanding issues from the Pacific War.
The Tokyo Trials have provided grist for Japan’s nationalist mill precisely
because they were seen to dispense “victors’ justice” in the aftermath of the war.
Prosecutors drawn from a range of victor nations, including India, Malaysia and
China, charged Japanese leaders such as General Tojo Hideki (military commander
and prime minister) and General Heitaro Kimura (commander of Japanese forces that
brutalized Allied troops in Burma) with war crimes. In total, about 30 Japanese highranking officials were executed or given life sentences for their crimes. While the
evidence against these officials was substantial, for the purposes of this paper it is
worth noting that the Trials did not represent a “dialogue” insofar as the outcomes
appeared to be predetermined. Moreover, political considerations limited the degree to
which the Japanese state’s actions were scrutinized. For instance the emperor and
members of the royal family were spared prosecution, and some officials indicted for
war crimes—such as Nokesube Kishi, prime minister from 1957—were later
rehabilitated and served in the post-war Japanese government (Horvat 2006: 221).
In a similar manner, the San Francisco Peace Conference failed to meet its
ostensible aim of finalizing issues from the war. The US played a critical role in
limiting the scope of dialogue and also its range of interlocutors. Against the backdrop
of the early phases of the Cold War, the host of the Conference sought to promptly
resolve war-related issues. As such some concerns of the Korean and Chinese
governments—not to mention their citizens—were excluded, and the United States
prevented aggrieved parties from making open-ended claims for compensation against
Japan. One set of issues that remained unresolved, for instance, were territorial
disputes such as Tokto–Takeshima. More seriously, a thoroughgoing dialogue about
the war was impossible (Horvat 2006: 216, 221; Torpey 2006).
Moving further along the spectrum of intergovernmental dialogues, there are
cases of the leaders of East Asian states finding a modus vivendi about the past in the
name of better relations in the present and future. Prime examples were the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Japan on the one hand and South Korea
(1965) and China (1972) on the other. The United States played a role in reestablishing economic and political relations between Japan and Korea. This was
crucial to solidifying America’s alliances in East Asia, and the US convinced the two
countries that their shared prosperity hinged on better relations—despite any lasting
antipathy (Cumings 1984: 19–20). Consequently in 1965, precisely two decades after
the end of Japanese rule in Korea, the two countries signed the Treaty of Basic
Relations and embarked on what has proven to be a tempestuous dialogue about their
shared history. Korea’s authoritarian ruler, Park Chung Hee, faced down popular
-9-
opposition to the re-establishment of diplomatic ties due to his belief that Korean
development would benefit from Japanese input. Indeed, it should be noted that the
Korean government, under Park, was the recipient of substantial grants and loans that
aided industrial development from the mid 1960s. In this sense the Korean side was
compensated to some degree—though certainly not to the extent that domestic critics
demanded. The establishment of a bilateral dialogue was thus very much a state-tostate affair: voices critical of the terms of the settlement were almost entirely excluded
from the Korean side—although leftists in Japan were certainly critical of the seeming
absolution of the wartime government’s actions (Hundt and Bleiker 2007: 66–9).
Just as Japan reached a settlement with Korea, it began a process of settling
affairs with Communist China—by then acknowledged as the ruler of the mainland, if
not other Chinese territories—in 1972. Again it is noteworthy that the settlement was
between heads of state rather than all aggrieved parties—although, as Purnendra Jain
notes (2006: 133–4), sub-national governments helped lay the groundwork for
rapprochement at the national level. And in the case of China—unlike Korea—there
was no call for compensation as such. The Sino–Japanese Joint Declaration, the initial
formalization of rapprochement, established a dialogue about the war and its conduct.
Notably, it was agreed that while Japan was indeed the aggressor and had committed
a variety of crimes against its neighbors, the blame for this was sheeted home to the
military clique at the top of the government (He 2006: 73–4). In other words,
convicted war criminals such as Tojo took the blame for the war. This was a
convenient compromise for both parties, allowing the two governments to establish a
new era of bilateral relations. In this spirit, the two sides agreed, “history not forgotten
is a guide to the future” (quoted in Suh 2007: 394; see also Dirlik 1991).
Even more substantive bilateral summits occurred in 1998. The summit
between Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and Korean President Kim Dae-jung,
and the one between Obuchi and Chinese President Jiang Zemin, both produced
statements outlining intentions to forge a new era of amicable relations in the region.
And yet due to crucial differences in the wording of the statements emanating from
the summits, the Obuchi–Jiang summit can be classified as offering a moderate
degree of deliberation at the state level while the Obuchi–Kim summit was more
significant in terms of its impact on regional harmony. Gerrit Gong’s analysis of the
respective summits is insightful. A crucial difference between the two statements,
Gong claims, was that Obuchi offered Kim—but not Jiang—“a written apology… for
past sufferings” that Japan had caused its neighbors prior to and during the war.
Furthermore, “Kim accepted with sincerity this statement of Obuchi’s recognition of
history and expressed his appreciation for it” (2001: 46, 50). According to Gong,
domestic political considerations prevented Jiang—visiting Japan only six weeks after
Kim—from being similarly conciliatory towards Japan (2001: 51).
Dialogues in the Public Sphere
The public sphere, in contrast to the national- and intergovernmental-level dialogues,
offers the potential for a qualitatively different variety of discussions about history.
Even at its lowest level of intensity, the potential impact of deliberation in the public
sphere is striking. A good example is the joint effort between three schools—in Seoul,
Tokyo and Hebei—to conduct a history test for middle school students in the three
countries. The test was conducted as part of efforts to promote the MHEA textbook
(discussed below).
The findings of the test were revealing. Taken as an aggregate, the students
from all three countries averaged about 45% for the test, and on average each cohort
- 10 -
of students correctly answered more than 50% of the questions relating to their own
country. However this figure dropped to 20–30% for question relating to other
countries (Ahn et al 2005). Some questions—such as ones relating to the opening of
trading ports (開港) in the 18th century and Korea’s late Joseon Dynasty—were so
difficult that all three cohorts collectively failed them. Furthermore, some interesting
discrepancies were evident, most notably a tendency for the Korean and Chinese
cohorts to share similar knowledge sets that distinguished them from their Japanese
counterparts. For instance 90% of Chinese and Korean students—as opposed to 20%
of Japanese—knew that Busan was not the capital of Joseon-era Korea, and a similar
discrepancy was also apparent in comparative knowledge of the March First
Movement: Japanese students were far less likely to recognize its significance to
Korean independence. On the other hand, only one third of Chinese and Korean
students knew the meaning of terms such as Tokyo Trials, Showa Emperor and
Russo–Japanese War; the majority of Japanese students correctly identified these
terms.
These results represent an opportunity for each group of students—and their
teachers—to reflect in isolation on their shortcomings in terms of knowledge of
regional history. The knowledge gaps revealed by this isolated foray into the public
sphere indicate areas where educators might usefully focus efforts to identify the
“bare minimum of facts” required for the writing of a regional history.
One of the many topics discussed at the Beijing Women’s Conference was the
Comfort Women, an issue about which new information was still emerging. Ueno
Chizuko, a Japanese scholar and feminist, took part in the Conference and viewed it is
an opportunity for the public sphere to deliberate on the issue free of the strictures of
the state-dominated narrative (Chizuko 1999).
The Kim Dae-jung government initiated the so-called Modern History of East
Asia project in 2001 in collaboration with its Japanese counterpart. As befits the
public sphere, educators, scholars and NGO representatives from China, Japan and
South Korea compared different understandings of the turbulent relations between the
three countries during and after the end of the 19th century (TJHEC 2005). This
project was intended to supplement, but not replace existing history textbooks in each
country. The objective thus differed from those of normal history textbooks. Most
history textbooks either recount national histories or cover specific events from a
particular, nationalist perspective. The authors of the MHEA sub-textbook, by
contrast, sought to provide a single unified narrative of one of the most controversial
set of events in East Asian history (Hundt and Bleiker 2007: 83–6; see also Ahn
2005).
Two Cases Compared
This section contrasts two cases—the Goguryeo dispute and MHEA—to highlight the
differentiated effects and potential of dialogue.
Goguryeo
State-sanctioned actors dominated the Goguryeo–Gāogōulì dispute. The Northeast
Project was one of several projects conducted under the aegis of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences early in the decade: other components of the project
focused on China’s borders with Russia and Mongolia, as well as Tibet and Xinjiang.
The Korean side berated China for “stealing” Korean history, and responded by
establishing the Goguryeo Research Foundation (Go 2006: 112–13; Mohan 2005). In
both countries, public opinion was strongly supportive of the government—but also
- 11 -
very much separated from the “official” writing of history. In this sense the dialogue
was not inclusive, as there was no means for ordinary citizens and civil society actors
to provide input to the dispute.
In terms of process, the claims of China and South Korea reflected their
sharply divergent views on the disputed territory’s place in their respective national
histories. China claimed that Gāogōulì was but one territory that formed part of the
Chinese empire. In this view, China is a multicultural nation that has readily absorbed
minority peoples into a super-state. Everything within Chinese territory belongs to
China, and every history that has evolved inside Chinese realms belongs exclusively
to China. Consequently it was a cause for consternation for Koreans when China laid
claim to not only Goguryeo but also the Gojoseon, Gando and Balhae kingdoms,
which are, in the view of Koreans, integral parts of their national history (Lee 1998:
330–1; Song 2004: 95, 110). For different reasons, neither side could retreat from a
position in which they had invested so much political capital.
These procedural constraints had implications for the potential for deliberation
to ameliorate the differences between the two sides’ claims to the history of the
disputed territory. Modern conceptions of the nation-state, which imply exclusive
sovereignty over a fixed territory and a population sharing a common language or
culture, were applied to events that occurred at a time when borders and sovereignty
were far looser concepts (Ryuichi 2006: 406–10). It is questionable at best to apply
the contemporary ideal-type conception of the nation-state to modes of political
organization in the distant past, especially given that the Sino–Korean border was
only formalized in its current terms early in the 20th century. As recently as the mid19th century, the border lay in the Amnok (Yalu) and Tuman rivers, allowing a
relatively free flow of people between the countries. It was only Chinese concerns
about the encroachment of Russia and Japan into Manchuria that encouraged a more
formal policing of the border regions (Zabrovskaya 2007: 285–6). Highly sensitive to
issues of sovereignty, neither China nor South Korea was willing to countenance a
thoroughgoing dialogue that could potentially weaken their status as modern nationstates.
The outcome of the Goguryeo dispute was a compromise whereby China
toned down its claims to the kingdom. According to the Korean government’s account
of the dispute, verbal agreement was reached in 2004 whereby China would avoid
“additional distortion of interpretation of Goguryeo’s history,” and “make efforts to
correct existing distortions” (MOFAT 2007). The Korean side, in the ensuing three
years, monitored China’s compliance with the verbal agreement, noting efforts to
remove signs and other forms of information perceived as offensive to Korea.
Furthermore, China suggested that the dispute be resolved through academic
exchanges, with one suggestion being that the kingdoms be considered a “shared
history” (一史兩用) that both China and Korea could recollect in their own manner
(Ha 2006: 12).
Another outcome was the merging of the Goguryeo Research Foundation into
the Northeast Asian History Foundation (NEAHF) in 2006. And at the instigation of
then-president Roh Moo-hyun, the NEAHF was charged with producing an East
Asian history syllabus that would be added to Korean school curricula as an
independent subject (Roh 2007: 13; see also Ahn 2006). The NEAHF invited
prominent international scholars to partake in research over contentious issues in
regional history (see Ha 2008).
Modern History of East Asia
- 12 -
The MHEA project involved a transnational editorial committee consisting of 54
academics, history teachers and researchers from China (17), Japan (14) and South
Korea (23), meaning that it qualified as a truly public sphere. It resulted from an
international conference in Najing in March 2002 and ended in May 2005 holding
over 10 transnational meetings. The project drew on sources from all three countries,
including testimony from survivors of that period. Its semi-detachment from the state
resulted in the production of a textbook that included sensitive issues such as the
Comfort Women, the Yasukuni Shrine and the importance of history teaching (see
TJHEC 2005: 230–5). In this sense it was truly the product of a regional public
sphere, providing a people’s history rather than a history retold from a statist
perspective. Topics were presented in a way that encourages readers to draw their
own conclusions about the significance of particular issues. Nonetheless, participants
were cognizant of the responsibility placed upon them to produce a meaningful
textbook. In the words of Suh Jung-seok, professor of sociology at Sungkyunkwan
University and a Korean representative on the joint committee, “no matter how liberal
and progressive scholars may be, in the case of Korea and Japan they couldn’t help
but be concerned about the response from civil society, and China was also in a
position where it had to consider issues from China’s perspective” (quoted in Ahn et
al 2005).
In contrast to the discourse on Goguryeo, MHEA contains some elements of
inclusion and democratic principle. Rather than a restrictive dialogue within a
nationalist framework, participants from Japan, China and South Korea engaged in
dialogue and exchanged opinions. That said, the exercise was not as inclusive as it
might have been. For instance consideration was given to the inclusion of North
Korea and the Philippines, but no agreement on the terms of their involvement was
possible. Japanese participants opined that Taiwan’s inclusion was vital to
understanding not only the colonial experience under Japanese rule but also the
division of nation-states in the postwar period. However China, which considers
Taiwan to be part of its sovereign territory and thus an internal matter, vetoed the
inclusion of representatives from the island (see Ahn et al 2005). In this sense the
degree of inclusiveness and democracy to which the project could aspire was limited.
In the interests of consensus, key stakeholders are granted a degree of veto
power. Sungkyunkwan University’s Suh, in an interview following the completion of
the textbook, argued that an emphasis on Japan’s invasion of the Asian mainland was
unavoidable: “In terms of Japan’s invasion of China and its atrocities, there was
detailed explanation, and it was important that this point was emphasized in a joint
history textbook for the three countries. That could have been the key factor behind
China’s decision to participate in the joint textbook project” (quoted in Ahn et al
2005).
In terms of deliberation, the authors of MHEA exhibited a substantial degree
of rational discussion, tolerance and fairness. In part this was because they used
materials from all three countries. For instance, the section on relations between Japan
and its neighbors during World War II contained the following diverging points of
emphasis. A Korean textbook states: “The Japanese empire not only physically
plundered Koreans in this way but also forcibly enslaved them and consigned them to
hard labor in mines and factories.” This account is juxtaposed with an extract from a
Chinese textbook, which states: “The Japanese invaders used arms to maintain
colonial control in the occupied zones. They established institutions such as a military
police, a police force, courts and prisons to repress the Chinese people.” In contrast, a
Japanese textbook is cited as indicating a quite different perspective: “By winning this
- 13 -
series of wars [against Western colonial powers], Japan delivered the dream of
independence to most people in Southeast Asia and India” (all quoted in TJHEC
2005: 232).
On the one hand, the input of the Chinese and Korean delegations ensured an
emphasis on morality—how Japan’s invasions violated the sovereignty of other East
Asian countries—while the more legalistic Japanese account emphasizes that East
Asian countries did not exercise full sovereignty over their territories prior to Japan’s
invasion. On the other hand, Obinata Sumio (professor of literature at Waseda
University and a Japanese participant in MHEA) recollected that: “There were fierce
debates between the Koreans and the Chinese… [surrounding] the ways in which to
view relations between the countries from about 1880 to the Qing–Japanese War [of
1894–5]. Korea argued that not only Japan but also Qing China strongly intervened in
Joseon, but China responded that that was a different type of intervention to that of
Japan” (quoted in Ahn et al 2005). The project provided an opportunity for
participants to put forward contentious views on such issues and attempt to reach a
reasoned compromise.
A third issue that was deliberated upon was that of the victims of the war. In
general the narrative took the form of Japanese aggression and Chinese–Korean
victim-hood. It was commonly deemed as an insult to both Chinese and Koreans that
an aggressive Japan was also a victim of the war. After an exchange of opinions and
perspectives, the notion of victim-hood was relaxed to incorporate Japanese citizens
too. Japanese victims included opposition politicians, anti-war activists, conscripts,
Koreans living in Japan and dragooned into the armed forces, and ordinary citizens
who suffered the privations of a needlessly long and expensive war. Chinese and
Korean participants were encouraged to recognize that the war had deleterious
implications for all countries in the region. As Obinata noted, “Only by comparing
three countries or looking for connections between them is it possible to adopt an
adequate viewpoint and open new horizons. In particular East Asia became a venue
for war as a result of Japan’s invasions. And after the war it resulted in military
tensions amidst the severe Cold War structure. Understanding this history is
impossible in a history textbook with only a single national unit” (quoted in Ahn et al
2005).
The outcome of the project can be judged a success by virtue of the
completion of the joint history textbook and its subsequent sales performance. In the
six months following the publication of MHEA in May 2005, 60,000 copies were sold
in Korea, 70,000 in Japan and 110,000 in China (Bao 2006). By contrast, just over
1,000 copies of the Japanese rightist group’s revisionist history textbook were sold in
the same period. The project achieved a real conversation in which a bare minimum
of facts were confirmed. More importantly, the project was a significant step towards
an East Asian community (Ji 2006). It went beyond nationalist frameworks and
achieved a common history of East Asia (He 2004b), and thus paved the way toward a
regional approach to history from the perspective of renmin/minjung (people), not of
the nation-state (guojia/kukka). This was an attempt at a regional solution via the
construction of new regional identity, and was part of a wider effort by international
civil society to play a role in national identity questions in East Asia (see He 2004a).
Table Three summarizes the differences of two cases discussed above.
Perspectives
Actors (Significant
role for citizens/civil
Table Three: Comparing two Cases of Dialogue
Goguryeo
MHEA
Inadequate—Dialogue attached firmly
Substantial—NGOs and
to state: Northeast Project part of
scholars represented in all
- 14 -
society in dealing
with history disputes)
Process (Develop a
democratic and
inclusive process)
Deliberation (Engage
in genuine
deliberation on
historical issues)
Outcomes (Achieve
“bare minimum of
facts”)
CASS series of studies on border
regions; GRF sponsored by Korean
government; pubic opinion in keeping
with official position but cannot
directly influence direction of debate
Inadequate—Little development of
inclusive process, although NEAHF
welcomes international scholars
Inadequate—In highly nationalist
atmosphere, little potential for
participants to alter position on issues
Inadequate—No agreement on
minimum of facts, but shift to “shared
history”? NEAHF emerges as more
pluralist version of KRF
delegations; thus meet criteria
of being at least semi-detached
from state
Adequate—But exclusion of
some potential participants
(e.g. Taiwan)
Adequate—More tolerant
approach on some issues
(victim-hood, sovereignty
versus morality), but some still
too sensitive for discussion
Adequate—Production of
textbook, and successful sale of
the textbook
Discussion: Explanatory Factors, Limits, and Dynamism
Why did the two cases discussed above emerge at precisely the same time but have
such divergent outcomes? Several factors account for the different outcomes of the
two cases.
Explaining difference
First, the issues mattered. MHEA, which was mainly about the war and suffering, was
a collective response to the Japanese rightwing groups’ revisionist history. By contrast,
Goguryeo was about the ownership of an extinct regime, which is directly related to
the current territories of nation-states. Such an issue elicits the greatest degree of
animosity from other countries in the region, and encounters thorny problems in
achieving consensus. It is unrealistic and unfair to expect a group of people to
willingly cede territories over which they have exercised ownership for a lengthy
period of time purely based on competing historical claims.
Second, state-funded research on the disputed kingdom by one side invited
suspicion and even hostility from the other. In China, three heads of the department of
propaganda in northeast China provinces were involved in the project. And some
Koreans regarded an article of Li Danglong (2003) published in Guanming Daily as
“a declaration of war” (see MOFAT 2007). By contrast, civil society groups and
ordinary citizens were involved in the MHEA project. For example, all Japanese
participants belonged to progressive NGOs, ordinary citizens from Japan and China
provided eyewitness accounts of events during the war, and some Chinese participants
paid their own airfares to attend the meetings. Most participants were reflective,
critical and willing to change their position and take the opinions of others seriously.
Third, the success of MHEA can be partially attributed to what Dryzek calls
“semi-detachment”, whereby actors are relatively free from solely nationalist
discourses and progress toward transnational civil society. MHEA also enriched the
concept of semi-detachment in that (1) civil society groups took the initiative, while
the states endorsed the outcome; (2) delegations from Japan, China and Korea
developed complex and different relations with their governments—for instance while
the government and civil society groups in Korea collaborated closely, in Japan such
links were relatively loose.
Fourth, the two contrasting processes made a difference too. The nationalist
insularity of Goguryeo contributed to the intensification of disputes, while the
relatively democratic, deliberative and inclusive process of MHEA contributed to its
- 15 -
success. Instead of the nationalist monopoly of discourse and the disregard for the
opinion of others, MHEA took the form of a genuine, non-adversarial dialogue that
dealt with difference. It was a process of genuine communication rather than
insularity, and it was deliberative rather than arbitrary. The working principle was that
all three parties must be treated as equals and must be willing to revise their own
opinions if others put forward a compelling and valid argument. The textbook also
adopted a parallel form—that is, individual section and chapters provided accounts
from Japanese, Chinese and Korean sources in order to demonstrate respect for
cultural equality. Such a form of history writing is unprecedented in East Asia.
The limits of dialogue
Lest we be accused of naiveté or excessive optimism, it is worth reiterating that the
majority of the dialogues described in our mapping exercise did not fall in the most
desirous sectors of Table Two. There are limits to the deliberative approach. First,
simply bringing people together is no elixir for resolving longstanding disputes, as a
deliberative forum held in Melbourne recently illustrated. The organizers sought to
assemble Turks and Armenians to discuss the genocide of the Armenians in the 1920s,
but the Armenian side refused to participate in the forum and offer their views as to
whether a massacre occurred.
Second, in the case of MHEA, the necessity to achieve a minimum of facts
resulted in the exclusion of any number of important issues. For instance, the common
development of civil rights movements and democratization are not mentioned in the
textbook; and the dispute over Goguryeo fell outside the textbook’s objectives. While
Western and Japanese imperialism was properly scrutinized, there was no mention of
other forms of power and domination in the region such as the function of US
hegemony or China’s imperial power legacy with regards to its claims to Tibet,
Xinjiang and Taiwan (ICG 2005: 13; Wasserstrom 2006: 82).
Third, in the case of Beijing’s Women Conference, Chizuko’s recollection of
the Conference offers a cautionary tale about the limits of the public sphere: “When
I... urged Japanese and Korean feminism to overcome national boundaries, I was
confronted by vociferous protest” (1999: 145). In particular Korean (and Korean–
American) participants chided Chizuko’s exhortation for them to overcome
nationalism in the name of feminist or activist solidarity in the public sphere. For her
Korean counterparts, nationalism was not incompatible with feminism. This reminds
us that it is possible for a “contentious regional sphere” to emerge in East Asia rather
than a “public sphere of regional dialogue” (Suh 2007: 383). That is, merely
providing a venue for dialogue does not guarantee that all perspectives are considered,
nor that a reasoned and critical account of history will be reached. It is quite possible
to envisage competing nationalist imageries clashing heatedly in the public sphere.
Fourth, at both the public sphere and the state levels we expect the appeal of
the maximalist interpretation of sovereignty to persist. And as long as the rising superstate of China’s remains anxious about the porous nature of its borders and about its
possible encirclement by the United States and its allies, it is unlikely that state elites
will ease restrictions on narratives about the sanctity of soil, borders and history. They
will also resist attempts to accept what are generally perceived as domestic issues—
such as the China–Taiwan rivalry, the inter-Korean conflict, and alliance relationships
with the US—becoming subject to discussions about regional history. We should
perhaps be thankful that the region’s numerous non-official historians have become
adept at ignoring the limits placed on their freedoms.
- 16 -
Despite the many and varied obstacles to dialogue, our study provides some
grounds for optimism. In particular it appears that movement between sectors is
possible, with dialogues at one point in time creating the basis for more inclusive
deliberations at later stages. Our sample of regional dialogues is too limited to
ascertain direct causality, but as Table Four illustrates, at least three shifts between
sectors are discernible.
Table Four: Dynamics of Dialogue
Domain
National
Intergovernmental
Regional
Public Sphere
Nil/Low
1.
* Verification of the
Rape of Nanking
* Northeast Project/
Gogyureo Research
Foundation
4.
Degree of Deliberation
Moderate
2.
Substantial
3.
* Northeast Asia History
Foundation
* Yomiuri Shimbun
investigation
5.
6.
* Shared history
* Obuchi–Kim summit
8.
9.
7.
* MHEA
First, the Yomiuri Shimbun’s groundbreaking “verdict” on the Japanese
wartime government was a reaction to events such as the Verification of the Rape of
Nanking. Thus a dialogue in Sector 1 instigated a reaction in Sector 3. Given that the
Yomiuri is a mainstream conservative newspaper, this represents a shift in Japanese
consciousness about the war and its impact on the region. At the very least, it has
reduced the potential support base for revisionist Japanese politicians who have
sought to rehabilitate the legacy of Tojo and other war criminals. It has also bolstered
moderate leaders who seek to improve ties with Korea and China.
A second, twofold movement resulted in the aftermath of the Goguryeo
dispute. First, the Northeast Project and the founding of the Goguryeo Research
Foundation encouraged the Korean government to establish the NEAHF, with its
more pluralist remit—a shift from Sector 1 to Sector 2. As noted in this paper, the
legacy of this shift is still unclear: closer examination of the new East Asian history
syllabus is required. The second shift resulted from the compromise over Goguryeo’s
“shared history”. This is a potentially fruitful way in which to resolve issues
surrounding ancient civilizations, and as such represents a shift to Sector 5 in Table
Three. However such a shift requires the Korean side to be comfortable with the
notion of shared history, and any suggestion of insincerity—that China is merely
waiting until a point when it is strong enough to ignore the complaints of its smaller
neighbor—will strain ties once again.
A third shift—from Sector 6 to Sector 9—appears to have resulted from the
Obuchi–Kim summit of 1998, which created a momentum for reconciliation that
eventually resulted in the MHEA project. While much credit is apportioned to Korean
presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun for the sub-textbook, the input of Japan
was crucial too. Indeed, to a great extent any shift towards a more inclusive historical
- 17 -
narrative will require a similar spirit from the Japanese side to that which the late
Prime Minister Obuchi displayed during his term in office.
Conclusion
This paper has proposed a deliberative approach to contested history in East Asia, and
highlighted its achievements, limits and dynamic development. Through mapping and
comparative testing, it has confirmed the value of deliberative approach; and the
trends of dynamism towards a deliberative dialogue prove the emergence of a new
politics of history through public deliberation. It can be concluded that deliberative
democracy has the potential to be a truly dynamic rather than static process; and that
deliberative dialogues offer some hope for a departure from nationalist mentalities and
a secular shift towards a consciousness of common regional history and a common
future in East Asia.
References
Ahn, Su-chan. 2005. “‘Mirae-reul yeoneun Yeoksa’ Jippilwiwon Interview Jeonmun (Full-length
Interview with Editorial Committee of ‘History that Opens the Future’).” Hankyoreh Sinmun,
15 May. Available at: <http://www.hani.co.kr/section003000000/2005/05/003000000200505151341001.html> (accessed 13 August 2006).
Ahn, Su-chan, Park Jung-eon and Lee Sang-su. 2005. “Han–Jung–Il Junghaksaeng Iut Yeoksa
‘gamgam’ (Korean, Chinese and Japanese middle schoolers ‘ignorant’ on Regional History).”
Hankyoreh Sinmun, 13 May. Available at: <http://www.hani.co.kr/section003000000/2005/05/003000000200505131943039.html> (accessed 24 April 2008).
Ahn, Yonson. 2006. “Competing Nationalisms: The Mobilisation of History and Archaeology in the
Korea–China Wars over Koguryo/Gaogouli.” Japan Focus, 9 February. Available at:
<http://www.japanfocus.org/> (accessed 30 July 2008).
Alterman, Eric. 1999. “Untangling Balkan Knots of Myth and Countermyth.” New York Times, 31 July,
Section B, Column 1: 9.
Bao, Yin. 2006. “Modern History of East Asia Causes a Big Response.” Available at:
<http://www.china.com.cn/txt/2006-05/16/content_6210462.htm> (accessed 12 August 2008).
Bleiker, Roland. 2005. Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Carr, Edward Hallett. 1961. What is History? New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Cameron, Deborah. 2006. “Shrine could be Straw that breaks Koizumi’s Back.” Sydney Morning
Herald, 22 February: 14.
Chizuko, Ueno. 1999. “The Politics of Memory: Nation, Individual and Self.” History & Memory 11
(2): 129–52.
Cohen, Joshua. 1989. “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” In The Good Polity, eds Alan
Hamlin and Philip Pettit. New York: Blackwell: 17–34.
Cohen, Joshua and Charles Sabel. 1997. “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy.” European Law Journal 3
(4): 313–42.
Collingwood, R. G. 1946. The Idea of History. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Croce, Benedetto. 1941. History as the Story of Liberty. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- 18 -
Cumings, Bruce. 1984. “The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy:
Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles and Political Consequences.” International Organization 38
(1): 1–40.
____. 2007. “Why Memory Lingers in East Asia.” Current History (September): 257–62.
Dirlik, Arif. 1991. “‘Past Experience, if Not Forgotten, is a Guide to the Future’; Or, What is in a Text?
The Politics of History in Chinese–Japanese Relations.” boundary 2 18 (3): 29–58.
Dryzek, John S. 1990. Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy and Political Science. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
_____. 1996. Democracy in Capitalist Times: Ideas, Limits and Struggles. New York: Oxford
University Press.
_____. 2000. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
_____. 2005. “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia.”
Political Theory 33 (2): 218–42.
_____. 2006. Deliberative Global Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Elster, Jon, ed. 1998. Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fishkin, James S. 1991. Democracy and Deliberation. New Haven: Yale University Press.
_____. 1995. The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
_____, Tony Gallagher, Robert Luskin, Jennifer McGrady, Ian O’Flynn and David Russell. 2007. “A
Deliberative Poll on Education: What Provisions do Informed Parents in Northern Ireland
Want?” Available at: <http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/nireland/2007/omagh-report.pdf>
(accessed 15 May 2008).
Fung, Archon. 2003. “Survey Article: Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices
and Their Consequences.” Journal of Political Philosophy 11 (3): 338–67.
_____ and Erik Olin Wright. 2001. “Deepening Democracy: Experiments in Empowered Participatory
Governance.” Politics and Society 29 (1): 5–41.
Go, Seong-bin. 2006. “Jungguk-ui Hanguk-e daeHan Insik: Sujikjeok Insik-eul neomeoseo
Supyeongjeok Insik-euro-ui Baljeon Jeonmang (China’s Perceptions of Korea: Prospects of
Advancing beyond Vertical Perceptions to Horizontal Perceptions.” Gukka Jeollyak 12 (4):
105–34.
Gong, Gerrit W. 2001. “The Beginning of History: Remembering and Forgetting as Strategic Issues.”
Washington Quarterly 24 (2): 45–57.
Goodin, Robert E. 2002. Reflective Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ha, Do-hyeong. 2006. “Han–Jung Jeongsang Huidam-ui Seonggwa-wa Uimi (Results and Significance
of the ROK–China Summit Meeting).” Jeongse-wa Jeongchaek (November): 11–13.
Ha, Michael. 2008. “History backs Korea’s Dokdo Sovereignty.” Korea Times, 31 July. Available at:
<http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/08/251_28582.html> (accessed 3
August 2008).
Habermas, Jürgen. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of
Society. Thomas MaCarthy, trans. Boston: Beacon Press.
_____. 1996. Between Facts and Norms: Contribution to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy.
William Rehg, trans. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- 19 -
He, Baogang. 2004a. “Transnational Civil Society and the National Identity Question in East Asia.”
Global Governance 10 (2): 227–46.
_____. 2004b. “East Asian Ideas of Regionalism.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 58 (1):
105–25.
_____ and Hannah Murphy. 2007. “Global Social Justice at the WTO? The Role of NGOs in
Constructing Global Social Contracts.” International Affairs 83 (4) 707–27.
He, Yinan. 2006. “National Mythmaking and the Problems of History in Sino–Japanese Relations.” In
Japan’s Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power, ed. Peng Er Lam. Abingdon, Oxon:
Routledge: 69–91.
Heisler, Martin O. 2008. “Introduction: The Political Currency of the Past: History, Memory, and
Identity”, Annals of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science 617: 14–
24.
Horvat, Andrew. 2006. “A Strong State, Weak Civil Society and Cold War Geopolitics: Why Japan
Lags behind Europe in Confronting a Negative Past.” In Rethinking Historical Injustice and
Reconciliation in Northeast Asia: The Korean Experience, eds Gi-Wook Shin, Soon-Won
Park and Daqing Yang. New York, NY: Routledge: 216–34.
Hundt, David, and Roland Bleiker. 2007. “Reconciling Colonial Memories in Korea and Japan.” Asian
Perspective 31 (1): 61–91.
International Crisis Group. 2005. North East Asia’s Undercurrents of Conflict. Seoul: International
Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 108, 15 December.
Jain, Purnendra. 2006. “Forging New Bilateral Relations: Japan–China Cooperation at the SubNational Level.” In Japan’s Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power, ed. Peng Er Lam.
Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge: 128–48.
Ji, Yannan. 2006. “Chinese, Korean and Japanese Scholars talk about Modern History of East Asia.”
Available at: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/report/2005-07/19/content_3237203.htm> (accessed
13 August 2008).
Kim, Taeho. 2005. “Sino–ROK Relations at a Crossroads: Looming Tensions amid Growing
Interdependence.” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 17 (1): 129–49.
Li, Danglong. 2003. “Shilun Gaojuli Lishi yanjiu de Jige Wenti (On the issues of Goguryeo Historical
Research).” Guangming Daily, 24 June. Available at:
<http://www.chinazangnan.com/show.aspx?id=45&cid=19> (accessed 11 August 2008).
Lie, John, and Andrew Eungi Kim. 2008. “South Korea in 2007: Scandals and Summits.” Asian Survey
48 (1): 116–23.
Lee, Sunny. 2008. “Internet Rumors roil China–Korea Ties.” Asia Times, 9 August. Available at:
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JH09Ad02.html> (accessed 9 August 2008).
Lee, Tae-Young. 1998. “Problems in the Writing of Korean History Textbooks.” Korea Journal 38 (1):
323–36.
MOFAT. 2007. Issues in Focus: Goguryeo. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea.
Available at: <http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/political/hotissues/goguryeo/index.jsp>
(accessed 14 August 2008).
Oakeshott, Michael. 1933. Experience and Its Modes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 20 -
Pingel, Falk. 2008. “Can Truth be Negotiated? History Textbook Revision as a Means to
Reconciliation.” Annals of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science
617: 181–98.
Mohan, Pankaj. 2005. “China’s Northeast Asia Project (Tongbuk Kongjong) and the Reality of
Kogoryo.” In Intellectual Engagements with Korea: Diversity in Korean Studies in
Australasia, eds Changzoo Song and Inshil Choe Yoon. University of Auckland: Korean
Studies Association of Australasia: 80–5.
Moon, Chung-in, and Seung-won Suh. 2007. “Burdens of the Past: Overcoming History, the Politics of
Identity and Nationalism in Asia.” Global Asia 2 (1): 32–48.
Roh, Moo-hyun. 2007. “History, Nationalism and Community.” Global Asia 2 (1): 10–13.
Ryuichi, Narida. 2006. “‘Dong Asia’-ui Ganeungseong (The Possibility of ‘East Asia’).” Changjakgwa-Bipyeong 131: 401–18.
Seraphim, Franziska. 2008. “Negotiating War Legacies and Postwar Democracy in Japan.” Totalitarian
Movements and Political Religions 9 (2–3): 203–24.
Soh, Chunghee Sarah. 1996. “The Korean ‘Comfort Women’: Movement for Redress.” Asian Survey
36 (12): 1226–40.
Song, Ki-Ho. 2004. “China’s Attempt at “Stealing” Parts of Ancient Korean History.” Review of
Korean Studies 7 (4): 93–122.
Suh, J.-J. 2007. “War-like History or Diplomatic History? Contentions over the Past and Regional
Orders in Northeast Asia.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 61 (3): 382–402.
Takahiko, Tennichi. 2007. “The Yomiuri Project and Its Results.” Asian Perspective 31 (1): 43–60.
Torpey, John. 2006. “Dynamics of Denial: Responses to Past Atrocities in Germany, Turkey and
Japan.” In Rethinking Historical Injustice and Reconciliation in Northeast Asia: The Korean
Experience, eds Gi-Wook Shin, Soon-Won Park and Daqing Yang. New York, NY:
Routledge: 173–91.
Trilateral Joint History Editorial Committee. 2005. Mirae-reul yeoneun Yeoksa: Han Jung Il-i hamgye
mandeun Dong Asia 3guk-ui Geunhyeondaesa (A History that Opens the Future: The
Contemporary and Modern History of Three East Asian Countries. Seoul: Hankyoreh
Sinmunsa.
Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. 2006. “Asia’s Textbook Case.” Foreign Policy 152: 80–2.
Whelan, Frederick G. 1983. “Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem.” In Liberal
Democracy: Nomos XXV, eds J Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman. New York: New York
University Press: 13–47.
Yomiuri Shimbun War Responsibility Reexamination Committee. 2007. From Marco Polo Bridge to
Pearl Harbor: Who was Responsible? Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun.
Zabrovskaya, Larisa. 2007. “A Brief History of the Sino–Korean Border from the 18th Century to the
20th Century.” In Korea Yearbook: Politics, Economy and Society, eds Rüdiger Frank, James
E. Hoare, Patrick Köllner and Susan Pares. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV: 283–97.
- 21 -