Is the World Flat?
The Effects of Globalization and Westernization on Ethnic Conflict
Samuel S. Stanton, Jr., Grove City College
SSStanton@gcc.edu
Joseph J. St. Marie, University of Southern Mississippi
j.stmarie@usm.edu
Shadad Naghshpour, University of Southern Mississippi
s.naghshpour@usm.edu
G. Dale Thomas
Thomas628@aol.com
Prepared for delivery at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, August 31 - September 4, 2006.
Is the World Flat?
The Effects of Globalization and Westernization on Ethnic Conflict
A current popularization of globalization is one of a “flat world.” To be sure, globalization is not
a recent phenomena yet it has received considerable attention from the media and politicians. We
believe that globalization is an integral part of the post-cold war international system. To be sure
globalization has created great wealth but a very real question faced by policy makers in
developing countries is if and how globalization actually benefits their country. On the other
hand westernization as distinct from globalization presents new ideas, products and methods to
various societies. Tensions created by westernization can create problems for the state and social
groups. Globalization creates winners and losers. Westernization either singularly or in tandem
with globalization can create winners and losers in states and societies. It is those who are losers
with whom we are concerned.
While one may argue that the world has indeed been flattened by globalization and westernization
a more appropriate analogy would be of a carpet spread out over messy floor. Certainly there are
flat spots but there are also humps and bumps of differing size and magnitude. These bumps are
the object of this paper. We ask a simple question: do globalization and westernization affect
ethnic conflict and civil war? To this end we will examine how westernization and globalization
and their numerous constituent parts affect ethnic conflict and civil war.
Our research begins with two questions. One, how do globalization and westernization affect
ethnic conflict or civil war. Two, does either of these phenomena affect conflict differently or do
they act in conjunction?
We proceed with our research in several parts. First, we provide analytical distinctions between
our two theoretical concepts. Second, we outline the literature pertaining to our research question
and third propose hypotheses to test. In a fourth section we sketch out the methods we utilize and
present our results. We conclude and explore avenues for further research in a final section.
Globalization and Westernization
Noble Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz provides us with thorough definition of globalization. Stiglitz
contends that globalization is:
Fundamentally, it is the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the
world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of
transportation and communication and the breaking down of artificial barriers to
the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people
across boarders. (Stiglitz 2003)
This definition encompasses the whole of the globalization debate by touching upon some of the
main drivers of the phenomena, namely trade, communication and knowledge dissemination.
While a commonly perceived as the creation of one market globalization encompasses multiple
facts which are not necessarily interrelated. Therefore globalization is a collection of factors each
acting independently yet in many instances interactively. For example, trade tends to go hand in
hand with capital flows but capital need not assist in the expansion of the knowledge base.
Furthermore, we should not view globalization as a recent phenomenon since successive waves of
globalization have occurred throughout history. What we witness today is merely the most recent
iteration of the phenomena.
1
Westernization on the other hand has a more subtle meaning. While modernization and
westernization tend to be closely linked in many respects, for our purposes they are analytically
distinct. Modernization according to Huntington (1996) asserts that, “Modernization involves
industrialization, urbanization, and more complex and diversified occupational structures... a
product of the tremendous expansion of scientific and engineering knowledge beginning in the
eighteenth century.” Conversely Huntington sees the West or westernization as an expansion of
the culture—or in his words civilization—of the West. Following Huntington’s schema (1996:
69-71) western culture includes the following notions:
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A Classical Legacy
Western Christianity characterized primarily by Catholicism and Protestantism
European languages
Separation of Church and State
Rule of Law
Social Pluralism
Representative bodies
Individualism
While not all inclusive these notions create the basis for what we call western culture.
Westernization thusly is simply the process where these characteristics are transferred to other
countries either through economic, social or political contact. This transfer can either be good or
bad, since the good of Western medicine and vaccines can be balanced against plagues like small
pocks and its destruction of native societies. For our research we take a neutral stance preferring
to examine how the influence of the West affects either in enhancing the chances of or decreasing
the chances of ethnic conflict and civil war, as opposed to taking a moral stance on the actions of
western social, economic or state actors.
Are globalization and westernization synonymous? We feel that these two ideas are not only
analytically for our purposes but are different concepts by definition and practical application.
Amartya Sen (2002) argues that globalization and westernization should not be confused as
globalization began hundreds of year before the West’s ascendance and furthermore,
globalization is not a new form of Western imperialism as some have asserted. Wolf (2005 notes
tat the most recent wave of globalization began in the second half of the nineteenth century while
O’Rourke and Williamson (2000) date the present wave of globalization beginning in 1973.
Fukuyama (1989) may be correct in asserting that, “the universalization of Western liberal
democracy as the final form of human government." But, we see significant variation in
democracies around the world especially those with significant western influence. Thus, while
westernization may influence is typically introduces ideas that are transformed to the domestic
arena by local custom and culture.
In sum, we find globalization and westernization to be two theoretically distinct ideas that while
potentially similar in outcomes are analytically distinct and should be treated as discrete factors
when examining global phenomena.
Review of the Literature
The literature on ethnic conflict related to globalization and westernization is nonexistent.
Therefore we begin our review of relevant literature by looking at literatures that relate to
economic development, income inequality and poverty on ethnic conflict and civil war.
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The political science literature is broad in its treatment of ethnic conflict/civil war and economics.
Inequality has been studied by some who attempt to trace conflict behavior back to economic
inequalities (Muller 1985; Paige 1957; Russet 1964). While providing a basis for analysis other
have noted how economic disparities can create the conditions that will destabilize nation-states
(Huntington 1968; Scott 1976). While these authors make significant inroads into the phenomena
of ethnic conflict/civil war these early attempts do not address how global economics can affect
the cases there cases.
A strand in the literature that deal more directly with ethnic groups focuses on nationalism and
how it can create expectations and demands from various groups for a share of the modernization
benefits (Anderson 1983; Conner 1994; Deutsch 1953; Gelner 1983; Gurr 1971) These authors
note how modernization can create the circumstances that make ethnic conflict/civil war possible
yet do not address how globalization or westernization can affect the processes of conflict.
Globalization and Inequality
Various studies have attempted to gauge the impact of globalization on income inequality and
poverty. In general consensus revolves around the following notions:
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Trade is correlated with, and often a source of growth
Growth is on average good for the poor
The US and EU agricultural and textile protection mechanisms harm developing countries.
Foreign Direct Investment is correlated with economic growth
Short term capital liberalization can have adverse effects on the poor.
Staged liberalization can help alleviate negative impacts on the poor.
Education and health care are important factors ensuring the poor benefit from globalization
Poverty measure should include education and health as well as income
Elite control of an economy or political apparatus have negative impacts on the poor
Political reform is needed in many developing countries.
Individual studies have addressed these facets of the globalization poverty nexus with relatively
uniform results. Heshmnati (2005) finds a correlation between levels of globalization and
poverty in that globalization reduces poverty and increased the income of the poorest social
groups, while Hertal (2003) including structural factors, concludes that poverty is reduced in all
counties where per capita income rises, however, overall poverty reduction is mixed. Kenny
(2005) finds that while there is convergence in quality of life indicators, indicators for income lag
behind and may not catch up. In lower income countries the poorest tend to have highly
specialized income sources as well as household consumption patterns. Peimer (2002) finds that
income for the poor rises later than others but economic growth attributed t globalization does
tend to reduce poverty.
Using an analysis of globalization trends in economic growth and inequality Dollar (2004) finds
that poorer countries have higher growth rates that rich countries, the number of global poor has
decreased as well as global inequality. Furthermore there is no general trend toward higher
inequality within countries and wages and wage inequality are rising worldwide. The policy
component of income inequality is addressed by Harrison (2005) who finds that the poor are
more likely to share in the economic gains from globalization when government policies are in
place to assist the poor in increasing their wages either through better jobs or increased skills.
Easterly (2005) using a factor endowment model finds that globalization is less important for
alleviating poverty than is productivity growth, which in turn can raise wages in specific sectors.
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To decrease overall poverty all sectors of the economy must increase productivity, a difficult task
for developing nations.
In general the literature on Globalization and inequality show that globalization does in fact assist
in increasing wages and alleviating poverty. However we should use caution as these findings
note how government policy, productivity and a trickle down effect are important components of
decreased income inequality. In sum, globalization does help the poor but it may take time. For
our purposes this literature demonstrates how globalization can and does increase income yet at
the same time may also create social displacement as those who do not benefit from globalization
may become disillusioned. Moreover, traditional elites and power centers may loose power to
new elites or be displaced by economic changes. These factors may increase the potential for
ethnic conflict/civil war.
Globalization and Resource Based Conflicts
One type of conflict that has been analyzed in the literature recently has been resource based
conflict—particularly those in Africa. This type of conflict is of interest to our research since
resources tend to be commodities of one sort or another and are sold in a global market.
Decreasing transportation costs, increasing global integration and accessible resources can lead to
increased ethnic conflict/civil war.
Representing the reasoning that civil war is caused by natural resources in particular oil we have
the works of Collier and Hoeffler, who find that “the extent of primary commodity exports is the
strongest single influence on the risk of conflict” (Collier and Hoeffler 2000, 25). Subsequent
research by the same authors refines the basis of the research yet retains the central thrust that
commodity exports create the conditions for conflict (Collier & Hoeffler 2002; 2005). Collier and
Hoeffler have stirred a debate about the role commodities play in civil war and conflict in
general. Fearon (2004) finds significant problems with the Collier& Hoeffler thesis. Specifically
Fearon finds there is almost no link between primary commodity exports and civil war outbreak;
any association is merely due to the inclusion of fuel in the models; oil exporting states have
weaker governments which can account for civil war better than commodity exports. These finds
echo previous works (Fearon and Laitin 2003) where oil does not affect the incidence of civil
war. Conversely, income is significant and per capita income than $1000 is associated with a
41% greater annual chance of civil war (Fearon 2003, 83). This finding is of significance for this
study as we project that globalization affects income especially among the poor.
Other scholars have investigated this issue. Ross (2004a; 2004 b) has noted how diamonds have
produced conditions conducive to have influenced ethnic/conflict civil war. While more recent
research (Ross 2006) show that the incidence of conflict rose if the nation had commodities
especially diamonds and/or petroleum, yet the mechanisms by which conflict was initiated can
differ from commodity to commodity and nation to nation. Of particular interest to our research
is evidence that exports and perhaps imports affect ethnic conflict/civil war. Legal commodity
export prices can be adversely affected by globalization and terms of trade. Economic shocks
caused by price fluctuations may be the catalyst for ethnic or regional groups to engage in conflict
behavior. Indeed as Hayes (2002) notes, conflict increased in Eastern Congo as the price of the
mineral ‘coltan’ used in cell phone components increased significantly.
Globalization and Openness
Globalization seeks in one way to open markets to the world thus creating one world market. In a
perfectly globalized world no trade barriers would exist nor be tolerated. Economic openness has
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been explored in the political science literature with findings indicative of a lessening of conflict
with increased trade and openness (Russett & O’Neal 2000; Hegre 2000). While these authors do
not deal explicitly deal with ethnic conflict or civil wars their research does highlight the
processes and mechanisms that lead to conflict which may be applicable to ethnic conflict/civil
war. Alternatively, Wei (2000) finds that openness reduces corruption which reduces rents.
However, aggrieved groups, if ethnically based may find conflict with authority’s beneficial, Or
even attempt to buy political influence as in oil exporting countries (Ross 2001).
Empirical studies have found that countries with open economies also have the highest per capita
growth (Frankel & Romer 1999). While economic growth has an affect on the incidence of
armed conflict. Both Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Hegre et al (2001) agree that low growth
rates increase the incidence of conflict. The mechanisms include opportunity costs for rebel
leaders, employment and state distributive policies. Those countries with less growth tend to be
low income and low-income countries which makes them more vulnerable to ethnic based
conflict or civil war. Yet on the other hand, Rodrik (1998) agues that open economies tend to
produce lager government which may in turn be used to provide job, or social policies that are
minority friendly in an attempt to minority acquiescence.
Liberalization or the process of opening a country can have an affect on conflict. Chua (2002)
and Brennen (2003) assert that liberalization can cause destabilization with violence aimed at
minorities who may seem to be benefiting from the process. Sachs and Warner (1995) find that
liberalization can positively affect economic growth. Hegre, Gissinger and Gleditsch (2003)
using the Sachs & Warner measures find that open economies will growth 2.3 % more than
closed economies. This increased growth in turn reduces the chance of armed conflict by about
6% compared to closed economies. These percentages increase over time as the economies
growth rates diverge and the chance of conflict decrease in the closed economy while increasing
in the open economy. Hellman (1998) finds that violence become more probable when the shortterm costs and economic dislocations are not ameliorated by central government polices. This
follows a j-curve sort of process. In sum, liberalization can have serious effects on economic
stability and the maintenance of social order.
Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2003) assert that income shocks are associated with higher rates
of armed conflict. By using rainfall as an instrumental variable to estimate income shocks they
find that that low rates of income growth do heighten the probabilities of conflict. Rodrik (1999)
notes how trade shocks can have deleterious effects on growth rates and unemployment leading to
conflict. Furthermore, if nations attempt to adjust to economic shocks or IMF imposed conditions
to overcome debt- crises they can be a risk for increased protests and conflict behavior (Walton &
Ragin (1990). Gates (2002) found that income shocks and reduced income can be a mechanism
whereby recruitment for opposition groups becomes much easier.
Ethnic Conflict
Calling a conflict an ethnic conflict covers a wide-range of behaviors and factors. We define an
ethnic conflict as a conflict between communal groups that identify themselves in terms of their
ethnicity rather than class, geographic location, etc. In the following discussion we develop the
understanding of ethnicity, and ethnic conflict behavior that will be used throughout the
remainder of this study.
The terms minority and ethnic are used interchangeable for the purpose of this work. Minority
refers to being part of a group that is outnumbered in a civil society. Minority groups in
pluralistic governments often run the risk of being detrimentally affected by state policy or by
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natural situations to the extent that conflict behavior is deemed a useful or necessary step. Gurr
(1985) and Saideman, Lanoue, Campenni and Stanton (2002) use these terms in interchangeably,
since most minority groups in the world today are minorities based open ethnicity. The
politicization of ethnicity and other identities have engendered new levels of conflict in the world
since the 1980s based in part on grievances over inequality and past wrongs that linger. Also,
groups within one state looking at the activity of other groups similarly situated in other states
noticed a success rate in conflict behavior that might make conflict behavior worthy of repeating
in their own state (Gurr 2000, xiv). Thus, ethnic conflict behavior is a protest or rebellion where
at least one party to the dispute is an ethnic group. It is also overshadowed by concerns for
international conflict and often masked by those conflicts.
Given the broad view of ethnicity developed in the social sciences, we can understand ethnic
conflict behavior in many different ways. The Protestant-Catholic conflict in Northern Ireland is
just as much an ethnic conflict behavior as the Tamil-Sinhala conflict in Sri Lanka. The black
versus white conflicts in the U.S. and South Africa are ethnic conflict behaviors, as is the
sectarian conflict between Shias and Sunnis in Pakistan. Ashutosh Varshney explains the
categories of ethnic conflict behavior as being religious, racial, linguistic, or sectarian (2003).
This categorization is based on the idea that group identity; real or imagined is the basis of
conflict behavior.
Before addressing specific theory of ethnic conflict, we address the important concern about any
theory of collective action, namely the assumption of groups acting as rational unitary actors. We
choose to accept two primary arguments for the case of individuals banding together in
cooperative action. One, individuals join collective action when they believe group action will
bring greater benefit than loss by joining the effort (Finkel and Muller, 1998). This appears
important where success is contingent on group treatment (Horowitz, 1985). Two, collective
action problems are regularly solved and we must move beyond them to address important
questions (Lichbach 1994).
A theory of ethnic conflict behavior must also be rooted in an understanding that conflict
behavior is a security issue. Security for a group is threatened by lack of access to resources, lack
of economic opportunity or legal disenfranchisement. Access can be lacking due to political
actions of the state, social action by other groups, or general lack of resources in the society. The
problem is action taken to make a group more secure, makes other groups feel less secure thereby
causing a spiraling effect. A dilemma is created by this spiral of security seeking, as all groups
are left worse off than they would be if no group sought to increase its own security (Jervis,
1978). Snyder and Jervis (1999) explain that security dilemmas can be causes of intrastate
conflict by making either one or both sides to the conflict less secure because of the actions taken
by either side to make themselves more secure. The security dilemma can affect the way in
which collective security measures can be taken to intervene and shorten the duration of the
conflict or alleviate the conflict. The security dilemma can lead to predatory behavior on the part
of elites in the differing ethnic groups in society.
Woodward (1999) argues that the security dilemma does cause intrastate conflict under certain
structural conditions. The three main structures that drive security dilemmas and breed conflicts
are; lack of national majority, anarchy, and deprivation (Woodward 1999, 85). Under such a
structure, political leaders become predatory and are likely to use the security dilemma to spark
civil conflict. The use of community identification and the social ramifications of identity can be
quite profitable to the leadership of ethnic groups.
Posen (1993) argues that the collapse of governments makes the security dilemma more acute.
Posen (1993) applied the security dilemma theory to ethnic conflict study, applying the theory as
6
a means of understanding ethnic conflict behavior in situations of collapsing regimes, or what he
terms “emerging anarchy”, (1993, 27). Posen assumes that in a situation of regime collapse,
security is the first concern of all groups located in the state; hence the security dilemma is a
grave concern. What makes one side more secure makes another side feel less secure and feel
that it is necessary to increase its strength, which in turn makes the original group less secure. In
the end, the actions that made the first group secure have made it less secure and the reaction of
other groups to the first group will only lead to a response from the original group which will
make them less secure. The ethnic security dilemma, then, is the result of one group trying to
take control of the state and causing all groups to be less secure. This is because the ethnic
competition within a state is for the control of the government or state and, where ethnic politics
are primary; it is essentially a contest for domination.
Given these theoretical insights we might expect economic aspects of globalization and
westernization to increase conflict behavior and cultural aspects to decrease conflict behavior.
This would mean that globalization should be more likely to increase conflict and westernization
less likely, as globalization is primarily about economic development. However, there are both
cultural and economic aspects to both of these factors.
Globalization and Westernization Revisited
We assert that globalization is a multifaceted phenomena based upon ultimately on market
principles, specifically those of free market capitalism. Markets are neither kind nor fair, instead
they are hard and sometimes unfair, yet the price setting mechanism markets bring is hard to
improve upon. In this process there are winners and losers, public, private and social. The state
may gain revenue but loose control of export control as newly powerful exporters capture parts of
the state. Alternatively, traditional elites may lose power and foment social discord. Ethnic
groups who are traditionally disadvantaged may either be helped or hurt by globalization and
press for a more equitable share of the states resources or they may gain power and attempt to
repress former oppressors. These and other per numerations, based on ethnic, regional and
religious tensions can be exacerbated by globalization and westernization. The end result may be
ethnic conflict and/or civil war.
The extant literature has delved into the many aspects of ethnic conflict/civil war but this same
literature has not investigated the role that globalization defined as we do above can affect ethnic
conflict/civil war. Furthermore the literature has not examined the same question in light of
westernization. Our primary research question is: do globalization and/or westernization affect
conflict behavior, either singularly or in combination.
Hypotheses
Our research expectations from which our hypotheses are derived are: 1) Globalization has an
influence on ethnic conflict/civil war; 2) Westernization has an influence on ethnic conflict/civil
war. From these expectations we posit the following hypotheses.
G: Globalization affects the incidence and scope of ethnic conflict/civil war.
The first four hypotheses are based in part on the idea of cultural engagement. States and
societies that are engaged in the international community are less likely to be conflict prone. It
can be argued that engagement of states in international affairs (treaties, diplomacy) makes the
state less likely to engage in conflict behavior with its population. It is also arguable that
engagement of the population internationally makes it less likely to engage in open conflict.
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G1: Participation in Treaties of Weights and Measures decreases the
magnitude of ethnic conflict/civil war.
G2: The number of International Non-Governmental Organizations a country
belongs to decreases the magnitude of ethnic conflict/civil war.
G3: The number of Inter-Governmental Organizations a country belongs to
decreases the magnitude of ethnic conflict/civil war.
G4: The number of foreign embassies present in a country
decreases the magnitude of ethnic/conflict civil war.
The last three globalization hypotheses relate to negative economic aspects of globalization. We
argue that increases of direct foreign investment lead to increased conflict because of inequality
in the distribution of benefits from this investment. Benefit of investment regularly supports
economic and political disempowerment of some parts of the society, in turn fueling conflict
behavior. Negative balance of payments for income, service, imports and exports often force
states to take economic action that is detrimental to society (the lack of a hypothesis for
import/export balance of payments will be explained in data and modeling section of this paper).
Disproportionately these detrimental policies affect groups that the state finds less desirable or
from which the state believes it receives less political support.
G5: The inflow of Foreign Direct Investment as a percentage of GDP
increases the magnitude of ethnic conflict/civil war.
G6: A negative balance of payments for income increases the magnitude of
ethnic conflict/civil war.
G7: A negative balance of payments for services increases the magnitude of
ethnic conflict/civil war.
W: Westernization affects the incidence and scope of ethnic conflict/civil war.
Economic impacts vary between countries, but there are some assumptions about the well-being
of a society that remain in play regardless of whether or not assistance comes with Western
social, political, and religious values attached. However, we feel that increased military aid is
given as often for states that are trying to increase their internal dominance as for states that are
attempting to buttress their defense of delineated territory.
W1: The greater the amount of trade with the West a country has decreases the
magnitude of ethnic conflict/civil war.
W2: The greater the amount of American economic aid a country receives
decreases the magnitude of ethnic conflict/civil war.
W3: The greater the amount of American military aid a country receives
increases the magnitude of ethnic conflict/civil war.
W4: The greater the amount of total Western aid a country receives
decreases the magnitude of ethnic conflict/civil war.
The final four hypotheses rely on value change in a society. Value change can occur as a result of
cultural exchange. As values change based on western ideas, the reliance on conflict as a means
of negative economic, political and social expression diminishes. Increased interaction with the
west increases the opportunity for values to move across borders and across ethnic lines that do
not favor open and mass conflict behavior. Of course we recognize the popular media conception
of the day that western values are responsible for the demise of many grand civilizations. We
also recognize that certain groups in the world are flatly and blatantly anti-west and have as their
greatest desire the destruction of everything western (one need only look at groups such as the
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Taliban to confirm this view exists). But, as a general rule of thumb, we believe that less conflict
will result from greater cultural exchange between the western world and the rest of the world.
W5: The greater the number of Western NGO’s a country hold membership in
decreases the magnitude of ethnic conflict/civil war.
W6: The number of Western embassies in a country decreases the magnitude of
ethnic conflict/civil war.
W7: The number of students attending Western educational institutions
decreases the magnitude of ethnic conflict/civil war.
W8: The number of tourists from the USA and Europe decreases the magnitude
of ethnic conflict/civil war.
Data and Models
Testing our hypotheses requires the use of data from multiple sources. We examined several
sources of data and merged data to form a unique dataset. Our dataset examines 115 countries.
These 115 countries all have at least one ethnic minority group that is politically active. While
our preference would be to conduct a cross-sectional time-series analysis of ethnic conflict in
these 115 countries, data issues kept this from being possible. We do however examine each of
these countries in 6 years (1995-2000). This makes our unit of analysis a country-year. This
provides us with 690 total cases.
The dependent concept in our study is ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflict takes on two distinct forms.
One is protest behavior, behavior designed to influence government to change policy or make
new policy. The second is rebellion, a hostile militarized attempt to change the government
(Saideman, Lanoue, Campenni and Stanton, 2002). We employ two variables—rebellion and
protest—taken from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data1. Rebellion and Protest are group specific
for each country in each year of the MAR data. We took an average of the level of rebellion and
the level of protest in each country in each of the six years in our data. The following tables
(Table 1 and Table 2) show the frequency distribution for each of these dependent variables.
Table 1 indicates the level of measurement of protest is ordinal. The median response is found in
the category of symbolic opposition, the modal category of demonstration is less than 10K. This
indicates more countries experienced a demonstration of at less than 10,000 people as their
average level of protest in a given year than experienced any other single form of protest in a
given year between 1995 and 2000.
Table 2 shows the modal case to be, none reported. The median value for rebellion is also, none
reported. Ethnic rebellion is a rare event. In most countries, in most years ethnic rebellion
simply does not occur. This makes any explanation of ethnic rebellion behavior difficult, but it
also makes it more fruitful.
Our primary independent variables dealing with globalization and westernization factors come
from two datasets. The first dataset is the Globalization Comparative Panel Dataset, 1975-1995
and the second is the Westernization Comparative Panel Dataset, 1975-1995. Both of these
datasets are available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research
(ICPSR)2. These datasets are measured in five year panels. Our dependent variable data and
country year construction is for the years 1995 through 2000. For estimation of the relationship,
1
The MAR is archived at: www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar.html access to this data is provided by a
downloadable program (MARGene) located at: www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/margene.htm.
2
These datasets can be found at: www.icpsr.umich.edu/access/index/html.
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we took the data for each country for the year 1995 and applied it to each country for the years
1995 through 2000. While this does not provide the best possible estimation, we felt this to be
stronger empirically and statistically than creating a static growth rate and extrapolating to create
data for the years 1996 through 2000.
Table 1: Average Level of Protest
Response
Frequency
Percent
Valid Percent
None Reported
Verbal
Opposition
Symbolic
Opposition
Demonstration
Less than 10K
Demonstration
Less than 100K
Demonstration
More than 100K
Totals
Missing
Totals
157
22.8
23.1
Cumulative
Percent
23.1
84
12.2
12.4
35.4
175
25.4
25.7
61.2
190
27.5
27.9
89.1
55
8.0
8.1
97.2
19
2.8
2.8
100.0
680
10
690
98.6
1.4
100.0
100.0
Table 2: Average Level of Rebellion
Response
Frequency
Percent
Valid Percent
None Reported
Political Banditry
Campaigns of
Terrorism
Local Rebellion
Small-scale
Guerilla Activity
Intermediate
Guerilla Activity
Large-scale
Guerrilla Activity
Protracted Civil
War
Totals
Missing
Totals
422
60
61.2
8.7
62.3
8.9
Cumulative
Percent
62.3
71.2
32
4.6
4.7
75.9
37
5.4
5.5
81.4
46
6.7
6.8
88.2
19
2.8
2.8
91.0
29
4.2
4.3
95.3
32
4.6
4.7
100.0
677
13
690
98.1
1.9
100.0
100.0
There were many variables that could be used to test our hypotheses, we chose based on the
strength of the overall model and on issues of covariation and autocorrelation. Where possible
we tried to include all variables in a subset, but this was not always possible. For instance, there
are three variables that measure balance of payments, one each for income, services and
imports/exports. However, we could not include all three because of covariation and
autocorrelation issues without mathematical distortion of the values that would have raised issues
of their real causal relation with ethnic conflict. In cases such as this one the level of covariation
and autocorrelation was tested to determine which individual variable or variables inclusion in the
model was the source of the problem. In the example cited, balance of payment for
imports/exports was the source of the problem and was removed from consideration. This does
10
not mean that we feel trade issues are not important in studying globalization; a control variable
exists in our models that scale the openness of trade for each country in each year of the study.
The following variables are the independent variables in our models:
Globalization Independent Variables
Weight/Measure is a variable that indicates the percentage of overall weights and measures
treaties that a country is party to in 1995.
Non-Governmental Organization measures the percentage of NGOs that a country was a member
of or that citizens of a country were a member of in 1995.
International Organization measures the percentage of governmental international organizations
that a state was a member of in 1995.
Embassy represents the total percentage of possible embassies a country had in 1995, the possible
total is twice the number of countries recognized in that year.
Foreign Direct Investment represents the proportion of the country’s GDP comprised of foreign
direct investments in U.S. dollars. The resulting proportion is divided by 10,000 to facilitate use
of the coefficient (probabilities are unaffected).
Balance of Payments Income is the percentage of GDP comprised of wage and benefit payments
and income investments in U.S. dollars.
Balance of Payments Services represents the percentage of the GDP made up of sale, barter, gift
or grants of services in U.S. dollars.
Westernization Independent Variables
Trade with West counts the total imports and exports with western countries in billions of U.S.
dollars standardized by the GDP of the country.
American Economic Aid measures total economic aid from the U.S. to a country standardized by
the GDP of the country.
American Military Aid is the total military aid from the U.S. to a country standardized by the
GDP of the country.
Western Overseas Direct Aid is the official total of western development and welfare aid for
development in U.S. dollars and standardized by the GDP of the country.
Western NGOs measures the percentage of western based NGOs that citizens of a country or the
government of the country are members of in 1995.
Western Embassies counts the total number of western state embassies present in a country.
Students number of students from a country attending western universities standardized by the
population of the country.
11
Tourists counts the number of tourists from Europe and the U.S. standardized by the population
of the country.
No study is complete without consideration of factors that are generally found to contribute to the
dependent variable in prior research. Also we must include variables that act as experimental
controls, as we are not able to conduct our research in a clean laboratory. We include Gross
Domestic Product measured in billions of U.S. dollars, Population (in millions) of country in the
given year, and Group Concentration (the average spatial concentration of ethnic groups in a
country in a given year).
Three economic measures are included that are important to understanding the effects of
globalization and westernization. These are: Economic Freedom a measure of the overall
economic freedom of a country. Scores range from total economic freedom (1), characterized by
a free market with little government involvement and regulation, to repressed (4); Trade Policy
tariffs a country levies against imports and exports, based on World Bank Data or on a country’s
average tariff rates or from revenue raised from tariffs. The values range from 1 (very low) a
tariff rate of less than or equal to 2.5 % to 5 (very high) a tariff rate of over 20 %; Property Rights
measures the ability for individuals to accumulate property in a country. The values range from 1
(very high), where individuals are guaranteed the right to private property, to 5 (very low)
meaning that the state has outlawed private property or that the country is experiencing such
chaos that no possibility of protecting private property rights exists.
Three measures of differences between majority populations and minority ethnic group
populations are included. The first is an index of average cultural differentials between groups in
a state, which looks at how much cultural difference exists between ethnic minority groups and
the majority population. The second is an index of economic differentials, which measures
whether ethnic minority groups are economically advantaged or disadvantaged (and to what
extent) compared with the majority population. The final variable used is an index of average
political differentials measuring the extent of political advantage or disadvantage of ethnic
minority groups in comparison to the majority population.3
Finally, to ensure that fixed and random effects are controlled for in our model, we include
dummy variables for each year in the dataset and a dummy for whether or not the country in
question is part of the global north or global south. Wald testing of correlation preempted us
from including a dummy for each individual country. But, we believe that it is important to
consider whether or not a country is considered to be part of the industrialized, developed global
north, or part of the under-industrialized, developing global south. Countries in the global south
have different circumstances of economic and political importance than do countries in the global
north. 91 of the 115 countries in our dataset are found in the global south (with six cases for each
country in the data set, this represents 79.1% of all cases in our data).
We do not have sufficient time intervals in the data to consider creating a time-series model. This
left us the option of a straight snap-shot test or a panel study. Because we have a continuous time
3
We realize that many readers are wondering why we do not include a measure of either the form of
government (presidential, parliamentary, mixed) or type of government (democratic, autocratic,
transitional). We are not measuring something that supports consideration of the form of government. As
for type of government, the control variable “economic freedom” considers type of government as one
element in its scaling, also a quick check of an autocracy-democracy variable found it to be statistically
insignificant when added to the models.
12
line, we chose the former and included dummies for each year to account for random effects that
might occur in the data due to covering six years.
The models are maximum likelihood estimators for ordinal data (ordered logistical regressions).
We ran one model for protest and one model for rebellion. To determine the best specification of
the models using the variables incorporated in our dataset, we employed Wald testing to ensure
that inclusions of variables did not produce coefficients simultaneously equal to zero, and used
differences in BIC’ (Bayesian Information Criterion (prime)) to determine the best fit of variables
in the model. The BIC’ for the model containing all the variables was smaller than the BIC’ for
any of the models with one or more variables removed, indicating that the full model is the best
fit.
Findings
Tables 3 (Globalization) and 4 (Westernization) contain the findings for our models. Only Table
4 displays results for the control variable for the year (only the year 1995 was statistically
significant at the .10 level and only for Rebellion). Since the models are MLE models, the
coefficients do not equal the amount of change caused in the dependent variable by a one unit
change in the independent variable. Instead they represent a value that can be placed in a
standardization formula to explain how much likelihood there is of an increase in the value of the
dependent variable if the value of the independent variable increases. After discussing the actual
results of the models, we will turn to a discussion of the real effect of the independent variables
that are statistically significant on the dependent variables.
For protest resulting from globalization variables, the Log Ratio Chi-Square value is 158.65 and
is significant at the .000 level. Given the normal distribution of the LR Chi-square we can use the
Cragg and Uhler R-square to explain variance in the dependent variable explained by the
inclusion of the independent variables in the model. The Cragg and Uhler R-square value is .267,
indicating that the inclusion of the variables in this model explains nearly 27% of the overall
variation of protest in this model.
The results for rebellion as the dependent variable in the model yields a Log Ratio Chi-Square
value of 125.71, significant at the .000 level. The Cragg and Uhler R-Square value is .235,
indicating that approximately 23.5% of all variation in rebellion is explained by the inclusion of
the independent variables in this model.
For protest, 3 of the globalization variables are statistically significant and overall 8 variables in
the model are statistically significant. For rebellion, 4 of the globalization variables are
significant and overall 10 of the variables are significant.
In relation to our hypotheses the findings give us mixed results. 6 of the globalization factors
produced statistically significant results for one or both forms of ethnic conflict. But, four of
these results are in the opposite direction of our hypothesis—most notably the increase in
percentage of embassies actually increases the level of both protest and rebellion.
13
Table 3. Results for Globalization
Variable
Protest
Rebellion
-.0022
-.0098**
Weights/Measures
.0028
.0034
.0013
.0785***
Non-Governmental
.0161
.0234
Organizations
-.0552*
-.0085
International Organizations
.0304
.0367
.0332***
.0213*
Embassies
.0104
.0128
.0074
.0159**
Foreign Direct Investment
.0071
.0071
.0079*
.0084
Balance of Payments Income
.0051
.0086
-.0058
-.0002
Balance of Payments Services
.0087
.0110
-.0002
-.0012**
GDP
.0001
.0005
.0374***
.0015**
Population
.0008
.0006
.1758*
.1084
Group Concentration
.1069
.1307
.1752
1.085***
Economic Freedom
.2321
.2892
.2169**
.1308
Trade Policy
.1037
.1332
-.4627**
-.2951
Property Rights
.1572
.1886
.4551***
.1719
Cultural Differences
.1116
.1396
-.0537
-.2329*
Economic Differences
.0745
.0913
.0808
.2549**
Political Differences
.0846
.1036
.1856
1.398**
Global South
.3181
.4421
N for Protest = 511, N for Rebellion = 509 *p>.1, **p>.05, ***p>.01 Std. Error in italics
An increase in the percentage of weights and measures treaties that a country signs has no affect
on protest, but does show a lowering effect on the scope of rebellion. An increase in the number
of NGOs that citizens or the state belong to shows no effect on protest, it does show an increasing
effect on the scope of rebellion. An increasing in membership in IOs shows a decreasing effect
on protest, but no effect on rebellion. Increasing levels of Foreign Direct Investment has no
relation with protest but does increase rebellion. Negative balance of payment of income leads to
lower levels of protest, but has no relation to rebellion. Balance of payment of services has no
effect on either form of protest. As for our hypotheses, these results support our hypotheses on
weights and measures, international organization membership, and foreign direct investment.
These results do not support our hypotheses on NGOs, embassies, or balance of payments. Fuller
attention to interpreting the results will be given in our conclusions.
As for the control elements of the model, population, group concentration, trade policy, property
rights, and cultural differences were statistically significant in relation to protest. There are some
surprises in the relationships indicated by coefficients for these variables. It is mildly surprising
14
that economic and political differences were not significant in relation to protest, as both are
statistically significant in relation to rebellion. However, it is very surprising that as the value of
property rights increases (indicating that property rights are lower) we see an accompanying
decrease in protest, this is at least counterintuitive and we will return to this in the conclusions.
In relation to rebellion, GDP, population, economic freedom, economic differences, political
differences, and being in the global south are all statistically significant. There do not appear to
be any surprises in the findings regarding rebellion. For instance, as GDP increases, rebellion
decreases, as political differences increase, rebellion increases.
In terms of the substance of these findings, we turn to the use of post-estimation evaluation of
standardized coefficients.4 Table 4a shows how much a one standard deviation increase in the
standardized value of the statistically significant variables in the globalization model will change
the value of protest based on full XY standardization of the logit coefficient. Table 4b shows the
same information for rebellion.
Table 4a: Effect of One Standard Deviation Increase on Protest (Globalization)
Variable
Change in Protest
International Organizations
-.729
Embassies
1.91
Balance of Payment Income
1.16
Population
1.85
Group Concentration
1.19
Trade Policy
1.29
Property Rights
-.622
Cultural Differences
1.51
The values in the Change in Protest column indicate how much we can expect protest to increase or
decrease if the given independent variable increases in value by one standard deviation. This is somewhat
arbitrary considering that protest is measured ordinally, but useful in showing general patterns. For
instance, if the percentage of IOs that a country belongs to increases one standard deviation we can expect
to see a nearly one point drop in the value of protest. However, if the percentage of embassies increases
one standard deviation we can expect protest to increase nearly 2 points.
Table 4b: Effect of One Standard Deviation Increase on Rebellion (Globalization)
Variable
Change in Rebellion
Weights and Measures
-.671
Non-Governmental Organizations
3.09
Embassies
1.51
Foreign Direct Investment
1.21
GDP
-.285
Population
1.26
Economic Freedom
2.33
Economic Differences
-.676
Political Differences
1.41
Global South
1.83
Similarly, in Table 4b, we can note that a one standard deviation increase in percentage of weights and
measures treaty recognition reduces rebellion by nearly 1 point. If the economic freedom score increases
4
Post-estimation evaluations were performed using the SPOST commands created by J. Scott Long and
Jeremy Freese for use with STATA. These commands can be downloaded into stata directly using that
program’s net search function, or you can find them archived at: www.indiana.edu/~jslsoc/stata.
15
(remember that this represent greater economic repression) one standard deviation we can expect a 2.33
point increase in rebellion. Also, we can note that just being in the global south can lead to a nearly 2 point
increase in the level of rebellion.
We now turn our attention to westernization. Table 5 gives the results for the westernization
model in relation to protest and rebellion.
For protest resulting from westernization variables, the Log Ratio Chi-Square value is 99.45 and
is significant at the .000 level. Given the normal distribution of the LR Chi-square we can use the
Cragg and Uhler R-square to explain variance in the dependent variable explained by the
inclusion of the independent variables in the model. The Cragg and Uhler R-square value is .231,
indicating that the inclusion of the variables in this model explains nearly 23.1% of the overall
variation of protest in this model.
The results for rebellion as the dependent variable in the model yields a Log Ratio Chi-Square
value of 147.50, significant at the .000 level. The Cragg and Uhler R-Square value is .344,
indicating that approximately 34.4% of all variation in rebellion is explained by the inclusion of
the independent variables in this model.
For protest, 2 of the westernization variables are statistically significant and overall 8 variables in
the model are statistically significant. For rebellion, 7 of the westernization variables are
significant and overall 13 of the variables are significant.
In relation to our hypotheses these findings also give us mixed results. 7 of the westernization
factors produced statistically significant results for one or both forms of ethnic conflict. But, of
these results 4 are in the opposite direction of our hypothesis—most notably the relationship
between western trade and conflict and the relationship of western embassies with conflict.
Included in the reported results is the year 1995. Only in this one year did the results show a
correlation between the time period and conflict behavior in the westernization model. It is
interesting to note that the correlation is with rebellion and that no relationship exists with protest
in the model.
We hypothesized that as western trade increased we would see a decrease in conflict behavior.
However, in relation to both protest and rebellion we see an increase in conflict behavior when
there is an increase in the percentage of GDP represented by trade with western states. This is an
interesting finding that will be discussed at greater length in the conclusions.
We also hypothesized that as the number of western embassies in country and state embassies in
western countries increased a decrease in conflict would result. This hypothesis has been shown
false for both protest and rebellion.
We do find support for our hypotheses in relation to rebellion when we consider western overseas
development aid, western NGO membership, and students attending western universities. The
strongest of these is the relationship with students attending western universities, a sign that
cultural engagement does contribute to lowering conflict. The relationships do not exist in the
protest model.
The findings show a negative relationship between increased western tourism and rebellion, but
no relationship with protest. We find this of particular interest considering the findings regarding
students attending western universities and will discuss this in more detail in the conclusions.
16
Table 5. Results for Westernization
Variables
Protest
Rebellion
.0006**
.0007***
Western Trade
.0003
.0002
-.4838
1.044**
American Economic Aid
.4285
.4857
.4002
-.6649
American Military Aid
.3907
.4785
-.0136
-.0738*
Western Overseas Development
.0482
.0539
Aid
-.0003
-.0516**
Western NGOs
.0029
.0186
.0192***
.0847***
Western Embassies
.0055
.0138
-.0040
-.1696***
Students
.0161
.0404
-.00004
.0002**
Tourists
.00004
.0001
-.0004**
-.0006**
GDP
.0002
.0003
.0024***
.0005
Population
.0007
.0007
.4671***
.9741***
Group Concentration
.1285
.2033
-.1564
.1035
Economic Freedom
.2419
.3417
.0958
-.1946
Trade Policy
.1124
.1539
-.3538**
-.6503**
Property Rights
.1792
.2661
.3014**
.2084
Cultural Differences
.1378
.2190
-.1123
-.2381**
Economic Differences
.0825
.1211
.2937**
.6733***
Political Differences
.1035
.1565
.4490
.8473**
Year 1995
.3264
.4285
-.1151
.4311
Global South
.3102
.5395
N for Protest = 396, N for Rebellion = 394 *p>.1, **p>.05, ***p>.01 Std. Error in italics
GDP, property rights, group concentration, and political differences were found to be statistically
significant in relation to both forms of conflict. The direction of the relationships offer no
surprises. As GDP increases conflict decreases, as property rights deteriorate conflict increases,
where ethnic minorities are more spatially concentrated conflict increases, when political
differences are increased conflict increases.
In relation to protest, increasing cultural difference was found to increase conflict. In relation to
rebellion, increasing economic difference was found to increase conflict. Also, in the year 1995
we see a increase in rebellion.
Table 6a shows how much a one standard deviation increase in the standardized value of the
statistically significant variables in the globalization model will change the value of protest based
17
on full XY standardization of the logit coefficient. Table 6b shows the same information for
rebellion.
Table 6a: Effect of One Standard Deviation Increase on Protest (Westernization)
Variable
Change in Protest
Western Trade
1.28
Western Embassies
1.61
GDP
-.752
Population
1.43
Group Concentration
1.60
Property Rights
-.704
Cultural Differences
1.30
Political Differences
1.46
The results in table 6a indicate that if you increase western trade by one standard deviation,
protest should increase 1.28 points on its scale. Again, protest and rebellion are ordinal scales so
the exactness of these results is of little value, however the general trends these results show are
important. These results also show that as property rights deteriorate, protest will increase by
.704 or nearly 1 point for each standard deviation increase in the value of property rights.
In table 6b the results indicate that the single biggest change in rebellion can be created by
increasing the percentage of western embassies by one standard deviation. If the increase occurs
we should see an 8 point increase in rebellion (not surprising considering that a one standard
deviation increase in western embassies is nearly 25%). It also shows that a one standard
deviation increase (4.3%) in western ODA should lead to an decrease in rebellion of nearly 1
point, while an increase in western trade of one standard deviation (an infinitesimal percentage)
should lead to a nearly 2 point increase in the level of rebellion. This finding will be discussed at
greater length in the conclusions.
Table 6b: Effect of One Standard Deviation Increase on Rebellion (Westernization)
Variable
Change in Rebellion
Western Trade
1.73
American Economic Aid
1.64
Western ODA
-.729
Western NGOs
-.0002
Western Embassies
8.07
Students
-.199
Tourists
2.16
GDP
-.636
Group Concentration
2.63
Property Rights
.526
Economic Differences
-.676
Political Differences
2.37
Year 1995
1.35
Conclusions
The first issue to address in our conclusions is data. This project is in its early stages and data
collection has become the major focus. As stated earlier, much of the data used for the
independent variables is constant across years. As more accurate data by country and year is
collected the results should change. Whether these changes will be substantial remains to be
seen. Second, we recognize that using the Minorities at Risk dataset to generate our country
18
years includes some selection bias. However, we still feel strongly that what selection bias does
is exist is outweighed by the substantial number of countries that are included in the data.
The second issue to address is exactly what we found. Tables 7a and 7b summarize our findings
in relation to our hypotheses. In the globalization model we have significant findings in relation
to 5 of the 7 hypotheses, and 3 of the hypotheses are supported by our findings. In the
westernization model we have significant findings in relation to 7 hypotheses, but only 3 of the
hypotheses are supported by our findings.
Table 7a. Summary of Globalization Hypotheses
Variable
Hypothesis
Protest
Rebellion
Overall
Weights and
Decreases Conflict
+
+
Measures
NGOs
Decreases Conflict
IOs
Decreases Conflict
+
+
Embassies
Decreases Conflict
Foreign Direct
Increases Conflict
+
+
Investment
Balance of
Payments
Increases Conflict
Income
Balance of
Payment
Increases Conflict
Services
In protest, rebellion and overall columns, + is positive support for hypothesis, - is negative support for
hypothesis, if blank no statistically significant relationship existed.
Table 7b. Summary of Westernization Hypotheses
Variable
Hypothesis
Protest
Rebellion
Overall
Western Trade
Decreases Conflict
American
Decreases Conflict
Economic Aid
American
Increases Conflict
Military Aid
Western ODA
Decreases Conflict
+
+
Western NGOs
Decreases Conflict
+
+
Western
Decreases Conflict
Embassies
Students
Decreases Conflict
+
+
Tourists
Decreases Conflict
In protest, rebellion and overall columns, + is positive support for hypothesis, - is negative support for
hypothesis, if blank no statistically significant relationship existed.
It is interesting to note that both of our models go further in explaining ethnic rebellion than
ethnic protest. We had five statistically significant findings in relation to protest, and 11
statistically significant findings in relation to rebellion. This does lend credence to the ethnic
security dilemma theory, as this theory has shown itself in previous research to be a better
explanation of violent conflict behavior than non-violent behavior.
The results suggest a mixed set of findings regarding both economic and cultural engagement
theories of globalization (Table 7a). Foreign direct investment appears to incite conflict behavior,
but negative balance of payments for income calms conflict behavior. Culturally, increased
19
contact via embassies and NGOs only leads to increased conflict behavior, but increased
participation in weights and measures treaties and IOs calms conflict.
The results also offer a mixed bag in regard to both economic and cultural theories of
westernization (Table 7b). Western trade increases conflict, while Western ODA calms conflict.
American economic aid appears to increase conflict. Contrary to globalization, memberships in
western NGOs leads to decreased conflict. But western embassies increase conflict. Students
studying in the west decrease conflict, but tourist from the west visiting countries tends to
increase conflict.
At this point we turn to some of the more interesting overall findings in the paper. We will look
first at economic issues, then turn to cultural issues, and finally to interesting findings from
control issues we used.
In globalization we see that foreign direct investment does indeed lead to increased magnitude of
rebellion. We find this to not be surprising considering this type of investment heavily favors
economically advantaged segments of society and leave many minority ethnic groups with
diminished economic opportunities. However, we hypothesized only partially correct that if
western countries provided economic and social development aid (Western ODA and American
Economic Aid) that the engagement would alleviate conflict. Apparently western aid in general
is good for countries seeking to lower conflict levels, but the appearance of American aid—even
economic in nature—apparently carries with it negative baggage that leads to increased
magnitude of conflict. But, not all western economic activity is appreciated, much like the
foreign direct investment of globalization, increased western trade leads to increased ethnic
conflict.
Three interesting questions arise when we consider the more cultural engagement aspects of
globalization and westernization. One, why does an increase in the percentage of embassies in a
country and that the country sends abroad related to an increase in the magnitude of ethnic
conflict. Two, why does increased membership in non-governmental organizations in general
lead to increased ethnic conflict, while increased membership in western based NGOs leads to a
decrease in conflict (specifically a decrease in ethnic rebellion—the most violent form of
conflict)? Finally, what is the difference between students traveling abroad and tourists from
abroad visiting a country?
We are at a loss to explain the findings regarding embassies in relation to conflict. We find
nothing to suggest a mathematical anomaly. We also find nothing in the literature to suggest that
increased political engagement (which we believe embassies represent) should lead to increased
levels of conflict behavior. Anyone who pays attention to the world events will quickly recognize
that foreign embassies serve as focal points for demonstrations and attacks by citizens who hold
the government and/or people of the foreign state represented accountable for issues in their own
country. But, these events are rare and rarely the sole domain of ethnic minority groups, being
broad based when they do occur. In the end, would anyone recommend to a government that they
should not place embassies in developing countries at all because it might lead to increased levels
of ethnic conflict?
Membership in NGOs is generally seen as a sign of a maturing citizenship that is globally aware
and shifting in values from self-preservation and economic gain to increased social awareness.
But why did we find that increased memberships in NGOs in general increases conflict levels, but
increased membership in western based NGOs decreases conflict levels? Is there a fundamental
difference in the scope and nature of non-western based NGOs and western-based NGOs? In
20
fact, how many non-western based NGOs actually exist? This is another puzzling finding, not a
mathematical anomaly, and will require more research to explain. But it would seem that there
must be something in the norms and traditions of western based NGOs that makes membership in
them likely to decrease the level of conflict. Also, interestingly the findings regarding NGOs
showed them to have no significant affect on protest, only in relation to rebellion was the
relationship significant.
The question of foreign students studying in the west versus western tourists traveling in the
developing world is the easiest of the puzzling results to clarify. Tourists do not engage
culturally unless they are on extended vacations. Tourists stay in certain areas and often have no
real immersion in the society or real contact with citizens of the country they are visiting. On the
other side of this equation, students do become immersed in the culture of the country where they
attend school. Students take cultural values and lessons with them if and when they return to
their home country. Apparently engagement in western cultural values leads to a decrease in the
magnitude of conflict behavior.
To sum up our efforts, we have begun an interesting project that seeks to find out if globalization
factors or westernization factors are more important to understanding ethnic conflict behavior.
What we have found is that both are important to understanding ethnic conflict behavior and
often similar factors from globalization and westernization have divergent effects on ethnic
conflict. It also appears that both globalization and westernization factors are better at explaining
changes in the level of violent ethnic conflict (rebellion) than they are at explaining non-violent
ethnic conflict (protest). Future research needs to focus on updated data and on nuances of
western economic aid versus general global economic aid, and the question of why western based
NGOs apparently lead to lowered conflict, while general NGOs lead to increased conflict.
21
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