NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
'CLINGENDAEL'
WORKBOOK
ON
INTERNATIONAL
NEGOTIATION
Paul Meerts 2009
NEGOTIATION TYPOLOGY
Type
Issues
Examples
Distributive
bargaining
- 1 (often price)
- Zero-sum game
- Win-lose
- Non-cooperative
- Imperfect information
- Alterable values
-Buying/Selling
-Cyprus
-Jerusalem
-Territorial disputes
Integrative
bargaining
- 2 or more
- Variable sum game
- Cooperativedistributive range of
behavior
-Trade agreements
-EU enlargement
Creativity
1. BILATERAL
NEGOTIATIONS
2. MULTILATERAL - Issue management of
NEGOTIATIONS
external and internal
constituencies
WTO, UN, EU
3. PLURILATERAL - Multiple fora, actors,
NEGOTIATIONS
constituencies,
institutions
WTO, OECD, IMF
WB
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Workbook on International Negotiation 2009
Page 2
METHODS OF NEGOTIATION
Based on
Synthesis
(All the ideas are
taken into account)
Synergy
(creativity is the
key to effective
negotiation)
Compromise
(Someone gives up
something)
Advantages
Disadvantages
The negotiators try to
integrate all the
individual’s ideas in the
final agreement. This type
leads to motivation and
commitment
The outcome of the
negotiation is the real
product of the interaction
between negotiators who
are creative.
It is typical of a win-win
Situation
Enables the negotiators to
overcome deadlocks, to
move forward and
Faster
Sometimes irrelevant
elements are included in
the decision and this can
make the outcome
of the negotiation weaker,
more questionable.
This type of negotiation
requires time, flexibility
And open minds
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Risk of frustration for the
one who gave up
something. Lack of
commitment on his (her)
part to the final decision
Page 3
NEGOTIATION LIFE CYCLE
REFLECTION
NN
PLANNING
CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT
ACTION
EVALUATION
CONFLICT AWARENESS
NEGOTIATION
NEEDS ANALYSIS
SELECTION OF TACTICS
SELECTION OF OBJECTIVES
SELECTION OF STRATEGIES
ANTICIPATION OF OTHER
PARTY’S ACTIONS
PLANNING
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Page 4
GUIDELINES
A set of key considerations in pre-negotiation planning and preparation
Stage One: What do we propose to achieve?
Relevant questions to be debated in this regard are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
What is our basic objective?
What is the ideal alternative to achieve that objective?
What are the final implications?
What are the alternative courses of actions (limits of flexibility)?
Who is competing with us?
Do we have enough factual data and information to support our arguments?
Stage Two: How do we go about achieving it?
Relevant questions:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Who will lead the discussion?
Who will check understanding (verify facts)?
What questions should we ask?
What are the emotional issues?
What power do we possess? What power does the other party have?
Who will work to reduce tension and show concern for people?
What is the present level of aspiration and what is the required level?
What negotiation styles, strategies, and tactics are we going to use?
Stage Three: What if we fail?
(1)
(2)
(3)
Do we renegotiate?
What “costs” and “benefits” are important?
What new strategies would be available to us?
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 5
CHAIRING MEETINGS:
POINTS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
1.
setting objectives for the meeting
2.
drawing up an agenda and time frame
3.
summarizing interventions
4.
drawing (sub)conclusions (content and timing)
5.
proposing solutions (content and timing of compromises)
6.
cutting off interventions
7.
questioning the merits of interventions
8.
introducing recesses
9.
informal talks with a limited number of parties
10.
neutrality: dealing with the dilemma of national vs. collective interests
11.
'emoting-blaming-irritating' versus businesslike behaviour
12.
last but not least: building bridges!
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 6
SOME TACTICS
1. AGENDA
21. SECRECY / BACK CHANNEL
2. QUESTIONS
22. NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION
3. STATEMENTS
23. MEDIA CHOICES / LEAKS TO PRESS
4. CONCESSIONS
24. LISTENING
5. COMMITMENTS
25. CAUCUS / ALLIES
6. LIMITED AUTHORITY,
26. FORMAL AND INFORMAL TALKS,
LIMITED CONTROL
FORMAL AND INFORMAL MEMO
7. (VEILED) THREATS
27. ESCALATION / ENTRAPMENT
8. (VEILED) PROMISES
28. TRIAL BALLOONS
9. RECESS
29. LYING WITH STATISTICS
10. DELAYS
30. TEMPORARY INTERMEDIARIES
11. DEADLOCK
31. LOCATION OF NEGOTIATION
12. FOCAL POINT
32. TIMING
13. STANDARDS / PRINCIPLES
33. CHANGE OF NEGOTIATORS
14. TOO LOW – TOO HIGH
34. EMOTIONAL 'BLACK HOLE'
15. DELIBERATE ERRORS
35. SMOKE SCREENS
16. FALL-BACK BARGAINING
36. INCH BY INCH / BIT BY BIT
17. TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT
37. LANGUAGE
18. INFORMATION OVERLOAD
38. TRANSLATORS / INTERPRETORS
19. LET US SPLIT THE
39. ”HINTERLAND" CAMPAIGN,
DIFFERENCE
20. FLATTERY AND CHARM
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
(PERHAPS BRIBING)
40. TIT - FOR – TAT
Page 7
STRATEGIES
DETERMINANTS OF CONFLICT BEHAVIOR
High
High
Assertive
BEHAVIOR
RELATIVE POWER
OUTCOME STAKES
Competitive
(domination)
Collaborative
(integration)
Compromise
(sharing)
Avoidant
(neglect)
Low
Low
Accommodative
(appeasement)
Unassertive
Uncooperative
Cooperative
BEHAVIOR
Negative
Positive
RELATIONSHIP QUALITY
Negative
Positive
INTEREST INTERDEPENDENCE
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Page 8
CONFLICT SITUATIONS AND HANDLING MODES
Four conflict situations are briefly described below. Party A wants your advice on how it can best
handle each situation. Party A knows that it has five basic behavioral options or modes of
handling conflict available to it; it can either avoid, collaborate, compete, compromise or
accommodate. Recommend the one mode which you believe would be most appropriate for Party
A to employ in each situation.
SITUATION 1: Party A sees a lot riding on the outcome of this conflict; in fact, its survival could
literally be at stake. Party A recognizes, however, that it has a significant power advantage over
Party B. The parties see each other's goals and means as being quite incompatible; the goals are
linked in such a way that Party A can achieve its goals only if B does not. Relations between A
and B are very suspicious and hostile. Communications between them are at a very low level.
RECOMMENDED MODE: ________________________________
SITUATION 2: Party A has determined that little would be jeopardized or forfeited if it lost this
particular battle. Party A also sees itself to be outmatched, weak and vulnerable; few bases of
power are available to it for mobilization. Interests between A and B are quite opposed; neither
goals nor preferred means are very convergent. A and B, furthermore, hate each other's guts with
a passion. Their relationship has been, and will perhaps always be, characterized by deep distrust,
suspicion and hostile attitudes.
RECOMMENDED MODE: ________________________________
SITUATION 3: Party A considers it vitally important to obtain an outcome from this dispute,
which fully satisfies its interests. The risks against doing so are perceived to be small, especially
because A is operating from a real position of strength. The goals of A and B are so linked that
either one can really attain its goal, if and only if, the other attains its goal. Everybody will either
sink or swim together. At issue, however, are the means to be used in attaining the goals. A and B
have worked closely with each other in the past and will have to do so also in the future.
RECOMMENDED MODE: ________________________________
SITUATION 4: The issue at stake in this conflict is perceived by A as being more important to B
than to itself. More critical matters are pressing for A. A, in addition, sees itself at a significant
power disadvantage. It seems that A and B really want to achieve the same desired objective, but
differ only over the means of how to accomplish it. Relations between A and B in the past have
generally been trusting and friendly. A would very much like to preserve harmony and stability in
its relations with B. A wants to invest in its prospective negotiations with B.
RECOMMENDED MODE: ________________________________
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 9
CONFLICT MODE INSTRUMENT
(SOURCE: R.H. KILMANN, K.W. THOMAS, 1977)
Instructions
Consider situations in which you find your wishes differing from those of another person. How do
you usually respond to such situations? Following are several pairs of statements describing
possible behavioral responses. For each pair, please circle the "A" or "B" statement, which is most
characteristic of your own behavior. In many cases, neither the "A" nor the "B" statement may be
very typical of your behavior, but please select the response which you would be more likely to
use.
1.
A. There are times when I let others take responsibility for solving the problem.
B. Rather than negotiate the things on which we disagree, I try to stress those things upon
which we both agree.
2. A. I try to find a compromise solution.
B. I attempt to deal with all of his and my concerns.
3. A. I am usually firm in pursuing my goals.
B. I might try to soothe the other's feelings and preserve our relationship.
4. A. I try to find a compromise solution.
B. I sometimes sacrifice my own wishes for the wishes of the other person.
5. A. I consistently seek the other's help in working out a solution.
B. I try to do what is necessary to avoid useless tensions.
6. A. I try to avoid creating unpleasantness for myself.
B. I try to win my position.
7. A. I try to postpone the issue until I have had some time to think it over.
B. I give up some points in exchange for others.
8. A. I am usually firm in pursuing my goals.
B. I attempt to get all concerns and issues immediately out in the open.
9. A. I feel that differences are not always worth worrying about.
B. I make some effort to get my way.
10. A. I am firm in pursuing my goals.
B. I try to find a compromise solution.
11. A. I attempt to get all concerns and issues immediately out in the open.
B. I might try to soothe the other's feelings and preserve our relationship.
12. A. I sometimes avoid taking positions, which would create controversy.
B. I will let him have some of his positions if he lets me have some of mine.
13. A. I propose to a middle ground.
B. I press to get my points made.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 10
14. A. I tell him my ideas and ask him for his.
B. I try to show him the logic and benefits of my position.
15. A. I might try to soothe the other's feelings and preserve our relationship.
B. I try to do what is necessary to avoid tensions.
16. A. I try not to hurt the other's feelings.
B. I try to convince the other person of the merits of my position.
17. A. I am usually firm in pursuing my goals.
B. I try to do what is necessary to avoid useless tensions.
18. A. If it makes the other person happy, I might let him maintain his views.
B. I will let him have some of his positions if he lets me have some of mine.
19. A. I attempt to get all concerns and issues immediately out in the open.
B. I try to postpone the issue until I have had some time to think it over.
20. A. I attempt to immediately work through our differences.
B. I try to find a fair combination of gains and losses for both of us.
21. A. In approaching negotiations, I try to be considerate of the other person's wishes.
B. I always lean toward a direct discussion of the problem.
22. A. I try to find a position that is intermediate between his and mine.
B. I assert my wishes.
23. A. I am very often concerned with satisfying all our wishes.
B. There are times when I let others take responsibility for solving the problem.
24. A. If the other's position seems very important to him, I would try to meet his wishes.
B. I try to get him to settle for a compromise.
25. A. I try to show him the logic and benefits of my position.
B. In approaching negotiations, I try to be considerate of the other person's wishes.
26. A. I propose a middle ground.
B. I am nearly always concerned with satisfying all our wishes.
27. A. In sometimes avoid taking positions that would create controversy.
B. If it makes the other person happy, I might let him maintain his views.
28. A. I am usually firm in pursuing my goals.
B. I usually seek the other's help in working out a solution.
29. A. I propose a middle ground.
B. I feel that differences are not always worth worrying about.
30. A. I try not to hurt the other's feelings.
B. I always share the problem with the other person so that we can work it out.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 11
SCORING THE THOMAS–KILLMANN CONFLICT MODE INSTRUMENT
Circle the letters below, which you circled on each item of the questionnaire.
Competing
(forcing)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
Collaborating
(problem
solving)
Compromising Avoiding
(sharing)
(withdrawal)
A
B
B
B
A
A
B
B
B
A
A
B
A
B
A
B
B
B
B
A
A
A
B
B
A
A
A
B
B
A
A
B
B
A
B
B
A
A
A
B
B
A
B
A
B
A
A
A
B
A
A
A
B
A
Accommodating
(smoothing)
B
B
A
B
B
A
Total number of items circled in each column:
___________
Competing
____________
Collaborating
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
_____________ ____________
Compromising
Avoiding
______________
Accommodating
Page 12
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATING COMPETENCE PROFILE
Instruction
Consider this list of 20 negotiation competences. Please decide on the three most important
competences for successful negotiation and list them below in order of priority.
Also, choose three competences you would like to improve on.
COMPETENCES
1. Ability to build and understand coalitions
2. Explorative in creating options
3. Ability to influence the agenda
4. Active listening skills
5. Understanding the other parties’ needs and concerns
6. Making maximum use of informal sessions
7. Creating moments of personal reflection
8. Controlling personal emotions
9. Clear grip on timing and deadlines
10. Having a thorough knowledge of the real issues
11. Having a good understanding of your mandate
12. Building coherent package deals
13. Understanding the importance of planning and preparation
14. Ability to stand tense moments and having endurance
15. Contributing to a good atmosphere
16. Prioritising on interests and concessions
17. Ability to deal effectively with power blocks
18. Ability to assess the role of the chair person
19. Being persuasive in presenting arguments
20. Understanding of decision making procedures
Most important competences for successful negotiation:
.
2.
3.
1
Competences I would like to improve on:
1.
2.
3.
© Clingendael Institute, R.S. Ton, 2008
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 13
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATING COMPETENCE PROFILE
(© CLINGTON 2008)
Instruction
Consider this list of twenty negotiation competences. In each of the four boxes below:
please rank the competences for successful negotiation from important to less important.
DIMENSION
1. PRODUCT
2. PROCEDURE
3. PROCESS
4. PEOPLE
COMPETENCE
13. Understanding the importance of planning and preparation
16. Prioritising interests and concessions
11. Having a good understanding of your mandate
10. Having a thorough knowledge of the real issues
05. Understanding the other parties’ needs and concerns
03. Ability to influence the agenda
18. Ability to assess the role of the chair person
09. Clear grip on timing and deadlines
20. Understanding of decision making procedures
06. Making maximum use of informal sessions
12. Building coherent package deals
01. Ability to build and understand coalitions
17. Ability to deal effectively with power blocks
15. Contributing to a good atmosphere
07. Creating moments of personal reflection
02. Explorative in creating options
19. Being persuasive in presenting arguments
08. Controlling personal emotions
04. Active listening skills
14. Ability to stand tense moments and having endurance
Other competences with a positive impact on negotiation effectiveness?
Potential negative consequences on negotiation effectiveness?
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 14
QUIZ
Please identify the behavior of skilled and average negotiator
1. When planning for the negotiation, a skilled negotiator will concentrate more on the common
ground (agreement) with the other party than on conflicting areas only.
__________
TRUE
__________ FALSE
2.
Skilled negotiators will not bother to explore many options, they know what they want.
__________
TRUE
__________ FALSE
3. A skilled negotiator, when planning for negotiation, will not link issues sequentially, but plan
for a negotiation process where issues are independent and not linked by a sequence.
__________
TRUE
__________ FALSE
4. Skilled negotiators will be quick to respond. Whenever the other party presents a proposal,
they will immediately respond with a counter-proposal.
__________
TRUE
__________ FALSE
5. Skilled negotiators tend to give an advance indication of the class of behavior they are about
to use. So instead of just asking "do you agree with this?" They would say, "can I ask you a
question - do you agree with this?” Disagreement is the only exception to the rule.
__________
TRUE
__________ FALSE
6. Skilled negotiators will test their assumptions. They will use reflecting and summarizing
more often than average negotiators.
__________
TRUE
__________ FALSE
7. An average negotiator will ask many questions during the negotiation process. A skilled
negotiator will not do so as much.
__________
TRUE
__________ FALSE
8. A skilled negotiator would avoid getting into defend/attack spirals by using emotional and
value-loaded behavior.
__________
TRUE
__________ FALSE
9. To annoy the other party is a good tactic. A skilled negotiator will use more of this than an
average one.
__________
TRUE
__________ FALSE
10. Skilled negotiators tend to share their feelings and experiences more than average negotiators.
__________
TRUE
__________ FALSE
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 15
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A SKILLED AND AN AVERAGE
NEGOTIATOR
How the skilled negotiator plans
Face to face behavior
AMOUNT OF PLANNING TIME
IRRITATORS
Not the amount of planning time is important, The skilled negotiator tends to avoid
But how that time is used.
'irritators'. The average negotiator uses them
fairly regularly.
EXPLORATION OF OPTIONS
COUNTER PROPOSALS
He considers a wider range of outcomes or
Skilled negotiators make immediate counter
options for action.
proposals much less frequently.
COMMON GROUND
DEFEND / ATTACK SPIRALS
He gives more than 3 times as much attention Average negotiators use more than 3 times as
to common ground areas.
much defending/attacking behavior as skilled
negotiators.
LONG-TERM OR SHORT-TERM
BEHAVIOR LABELING
Both show an alarming concentration on the
Skilled negotiators tend to give an advance
short-term aspects of issues.
indication of the class of behavior they are
about to use. Average negotiators don't,
except in the case of disagreeing.
SETTING LIMITS
TESTING UNDERSTANDING AND
Skilled negotiators are more likely to set
SUMMARIZING
upper and lower limits - to plan in terms of a Are used significantly more by the skilled
range. Average negotiators are more likely to negotiators.
plan their objectives around a fixed point.
SEQUENCE AND ISSUE PLANNING
Skilled negotiators tend to plan around each
individual issue in a way which is
independent of any sequence. Average
negotiators place a very heavy reliance on
sequence planning.
ASKING QUESTIONS
The skilled negotiator asks significantly more
questions.
FEELINGS COMMENTARY
The skilled negotiator is more likely to give
Information about internal events (feelings).
About external events (facts, clarifications
e.g.), the average negotiator will give almost
twice as much information.
ARGUMENT DILUTION
The skilled negotiator uses less reasons to
back up each of his arguments.
Reference: “The behavior of successful negotiation”
Situation management systems inc.
l976 copyright by Huthwaite Research Group
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 16
TABLE 6. Characteristics of an effective negotiator rated on a five-point scale.
Rating
Unimpor- Mildly
Important Very
ExtremeCharacteristic
tant
important (3)
important ly impor(1)
(2)
(4)
Mean
tant (5)
Preparation and planning skill
Knowledge of subject matter being negotiated
Ability to think clearly and rapidly under pressure
and uncertainty
Ability to express thoughts verbally
Listening skill
Judgment and general intelligence
Integrity
Ability to persuade others
Patience
Decisiveness
Ability to win respect and confidence of opponent
General problem-solving and analytic skills
Self-control, especially of emotions and their
visibility
Insight into others’ feelings
Persistence and determination
Ability to perceive and exploit available power to
achieve objective
Insight into hidden needs and reaction of own and
opponent’s organization
Ability to lead and control members of own team or
group
Previous negotiating experience
Personal sense of security
Open-mindedness (tolerance of other viewpoints)
Competitiveness (desire to compete and win)
Skill in communicating and coordinating various
objectives within own organization
Debating ability (skill in parrying questions and
answers across the table)
Willingness to risk being disliked
Ability to act out skillfully a variety of negotiating
roles and postures
Status or rank in organization
Tolerance to ambiguity and uncertainty
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
6
10
10
26
21
20
4.8
4.5
4.5
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
1
2
3
1
2
3
3
4
6
8
6
8
6
12
11
7
12
12
11
9
14
8
13
10
11
9
17
16
14
15
11
12
9
9
8
11
4.4
4.4
4.3
4.2
4.1
4.0
3.9
3.8
3.8
3.8
1
0
0
3
1
2
6
12
12
13
15
11
9
4
7
3.8
3.7
3.7
0
4
12
10
6
3.6
0
4
11
12
5
3.6
0
2
0
1
0
3
3
0
2
5
8
8
3
14
15
13
13
12
10
9
8
5
17
5
3
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.3
0
6
16
7
3
3.2
2
2
6
7
13
15
9
4
2
4
3.2
3.0
5
5
7
7
11
14
6
5
3
1
2.8
2.7
Skill in communicating by signs, gestures, and
silence (nonverbal language)
Compromising temperament
Attractive personality and sense of humor (degree to
which people enjoy being with the person)
Trusting temperament
Willingness to take somewhat above-average
business or career risks
Willingness to employ force, threat, or bluff to avoid
being exploited
5
10
8
6
2
2.7
5
6
12
6
5
12
7
7
3
1
2.7
2.7
9
5
5
10
12
13
5
4
1
0
2.5
2.5
6
10
11
3
2
2.5
Source: Adapted by John Hammond from Karrass (1968), pp. 242-244.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 17
NEGOTIATION SKILLS
Karrass
EU survey
Preparation and planning skills
4.8
4
Listening skill
4.4
3
Integrity
4.2
5
Decisiveness
3.9
3
Self-control, especially of emotions
3.8
4
Previous negotiating experience
3.5
5
Competitiveness (desire to win)
3.5
3
Communicating with own organization
3.3
5
Status or rank in organization
2.8
3
Tolerance to ambiguity and uncertainty
2.7
3
Compromising temperament
2.7
3
Trusting temperament
2.5
5
NEGOTIATORS’ SPECIFIC FEATURES IN DIPLOMATIC CONTEXT
AMBIGUITIES
1. Need to remain vague to create “grey areas” which further problem solving
2. Need to avoid confrontation and to support cooperation
ROLE POLYVALENCE
1.
“Statesman”
Assembly or plenary speeches for foreign and domestic audiences
2.
"Team player”
Member of task forces, committees, etc.
3. “Lobbyist”
Informal contacts to sound out other side's position and range of manoeuvre
EMOTIONAL “FLOATER”
1. Limited closeness in order to avoid exploitable friendships
2. Simultaneous seeking and avoidance of interpersonal contact to create spirit of
“constructive tension”
ORGANISATIONAL CONSULTANTS LTD.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 18
EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATING
The ability to differentiate in activities and emotions
(Source: Mastenbroek, Negotiate, 1989)
Substance/interests
lenient
hard
Power balance
bending
trying to
subdued
dominate
jovial
hostile
personal
formal
Climate
Flexibility
exploring
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
repetitive
Page 19
Negotiation Styles: a Self-Assessment Exercise
Please select in each pair of attributes the one, which is most typical of your personality. No
pair is an either-or proposal. Make your choice as spontaneously as possible. There is no
wrong answer. (Source: Casse & Deol, Managing Intercultural Negotiations, 1985)
1. I like action.
2. I deal with problems in a systematic way
3. I believe that teams are more effective than individuals.
4. I enjoy innovation very much.
5. I am more interested in the future than in the past.
6. I enjoy working with people.
7. I like to attend well-organized group meetings.
8. Deadlines are important for me.
9. I cannot stand procrastination.
10. I believe that new ideas have to be tested before being used.
11. I enjoy the stimulation of interaction with others.
12. I am always looking for new possibilities.
13. I want to set up my own objectives.
14. When I start something I go through until the end.
15. I basically try to understand other people's emotions.
16. I do challenge people around me.
17. I look forward to receiving feedback on my performance.
18. I find the step-by-step approach very effective.
19. I think I am good at reading people.
20. I like creative problem solving.
21. I extrapolate and project all the time.
22. I am sensitive to others' needs.
23. Planning is the key to success.
24. I become impatient with long deliberations.
25. I am cool under pressure.
26. I value experience very much.
27. I listen to people.
28. People say that I am a fast thinker.
29. Cooperation is a key word for me.
30. I use logical methods to test alternatives.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 20
31. I like to handle several projects at the same time.
32. I always question myself.
33. I learn by doing.
34. I believe that my head rules my heart.
35. I can predict how others may react to a certain action.
36. I do not like details.
37. Analysis should always precede action.
38. I am able to assess the climate of a group.
39. I have a tendency to start things and not finish them up.
40. I perceive myself as decisive.
41. I search for challenging tasks.
42. I rely on observation and data.
43. I can express my feelings openly.
44. I like to design new projects.
45. I enjoy reading very much.
46. I perceive myself as a facilitator.
47. I like to focus on one issue at a time.
48. I like to achieve.
49. I enjoy learning about others.
50. I like variety.
51. Facts speak for themselves.
52. I use my imagination as much as possible.
53. I am impatient with long, slow assignments.
54. My mind never stops working.
55. Key decisions have to be made in a cautious way.
56. I strongly believe that people need each other to get work done.
57. I usually make decisions without thinking too much.
58. Emotions create problems.
59. I like to be liked by others.
60. I can put two and two together very quickly.
61. I try out my new ideas on people.
62. I believe in the scientific approach.
63. I like to get things done.
64. Good relationships are essential.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 21
65. I am impulsive.
66. I accept differences in people.
67. Communicating with people is an end in itself.
68. I like to be intellectually stimulated.
69. I like to organize.
70. I usually jump from one task to another.
71. Talking and working with people is a creative act.
72. Self-actualization is a key word for me.
73. I enjoy playing with ideas.
74. I dislike to waste my time.
75. I enjoy doing what I am good at.
76. I learn by interacting with others.
77. I find abstractions interesting and enjoyable.
78. I am patient with details.
79. I like brief, to the point statements.
80. I feel confident in myself.
SCORING
Circle the items you have selected and add them up. The total for the four styles should be 40.
Style 1
1
41
8
48
9
50
13
53
17
57
24
63
26
65
31
70
33
74
40
79
2
42
7
47
10
51
14
55
18
58
23
62
25
66
30
69
34
75
37
78
3
43
6
46
11
49
15
56
19
59
22
64
27
67
29
71
35
76
38
80
4
44
5
45
12
52
16
54
20
60
21
61
28
68
32
72
36
73
39
77
Style 2
Style 3
Style 4
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 22
FOUR VALUE ORIENTATIONS
(IMPACT ON COMMUNICATION)
FEATURE
STYLES
ACTION
(A)
CONTENT
They talk about:
. Results
. Objectives
. Performance
. Productivity
. Efficiency
. Moving ahead
PROCESS
(PR)
They talk about:
. Facts
. Procedures
. Planning
. Organizing
. Controlling
. Testing
PEOPLE
(PE)
They talk about:
. People
. Needs
. Motivations
. Teamwork
. Communications
. Feelings
. Team Spirit
. Understanding
They talk about:
. Concepts
. Innovation
. Creativity
. Opportunities
. Possibilities
. Grand Designs
. Issues
IDEA
(I)
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
. Responsibility
. Feedback
. Experience
. Challenges
. Achievements
. Change
. Decisions
. Trying out
. Analysis
. Observations
. Proof
. Details
. Self-development
. Sensitivity
. Awareness
. Cooperation
. Beliefs
. Values
. Expectations
. Relations
. What's new in the
field
. Interdependence
. New ways
. New methods
. Improving
. Problems
. Potential
. Alternatives
PROCESS
They are:
. Pragmatic (down to earth)
. Direct (to the point)
. Impatient
. Decisive
. Quick (jump from one
idea to another)
. Energetic (challenge
others)
They are:
. Systematic (step-by-step)
. Logical (cause and effect)
. Factual
. Verbose
. Unemotional
. Cautious
. Patient
They are:
. Spontaneous
. Empathetic
. Warm
. Subjective
. Emotional
. Perceptive
. Sensitive
They are:
. Imaginative
. Charismatic
. Difficult to understand
. Ego-centered
. Unrealistic
. Creative
. Full of ideas
. Provocative
Page 23
FOUR VALUE ORIENTATIONS (IMPACT ON COMMUNICATION)
A. Communication with an action (A) oriented person:





Focus on the results first (state the conclusion right at the outset).
State your best recommendation (do not offer many alternatives).
Be as brief as possible.
Emphasize the practicality of your ideas.
Use visual aids.
B. Communicating with a process (PR) oriented person:






Be precise (State the facts).
Organize your presentation in a logical order;
* Background
* Present Situation
* Outcome
Breakdown your recommendations.
Include options (consider alternatives) with pros and cons.
Do not rush a process-oriented person.
Outline your proposal (1, 2, 3 . . .).
C. Communicating with a people (PE) oriented person:





Allow for small talk (do not start the discussion right away).
Stress the relationships between your proposal and the people concerned.
Show how the idea worked well in the past.
Indicate support from well-respected people.
Use an informal writing style.
D. Communicating with an idea (I) oriented person:






Allow enough time for discussion.
Do not get impatient when he or she goes off on tangents.
In your opening, try to relate the discussed topic to a broader concept or idea (in other
words be conceptual).
Stress the uniqueness of the idea or topic at hand.
Emphasize future value or relate the impact of the idea or the future.
If writing to an idea oriented person, try to stress the key concepts, which underlie
your proposal of recommendation right at the outset. Start off with an overall
statement and work toward the more particular.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 24
LEADERSHIP STYLES
Leader-centered
“Abdicrat”
group-centered
Use of authority by leader
Freedom of the group
Autocrat
Tells
Sells
Tests
Consults
Joins
Organisational Consultants Ltd.
GROUP ROLES
Leader
Facilitator
Evaluator
Idea
generator
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Gatekeeper
Page 25
NEGOTIATION: TEAM FACTORS
Effectiveness Traits

Awareness of each member's abilities and how to bring these into play to complement
the abilities of others on the team.

Keeping all discussion of differences within the team behind closed doors.

Avoiding any tendency to label differences of opinion between team members in
judgmental terms of right or wrong.

Drawing clear and respected lines of authority.

Group discussion of decisions reached, with final authority resting with the team leader.

Avoiding differences that relate to personality issues rather than to the task at hand.

Knowledge on each member's part of his assigned role and when to contribute to
deliberations at the bargaining table.

Attentive observation and sharing of observations by all team members.

Determined effort to multiply the options for achieving benefits.

Understanding group priorities and a united front in bargaining work to advance those.
Failure Traits

Autocratic team leadership, with a leader arbitrarily imposing his views on team
members.

Refusal by team members to respect the team leader's authority.

Failure to establish a united front on goals and strategy before going into bargaining
sessions.

Open antagonism on the part of any team member to goals the team is pursuing.

Failure of team members to take on their share of responsibility.

Loyalty expressed to personalities rather than to the total team effort.

Overt sympathy expressed for opposition positions by a dissenting team member.

Oversensitivity to imagined personal affronts on the part of a team member.
h-d-k-p i-e-b-m-o f-a-r-t n-s-c q-j-l
Organisational Consultants Ltd.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 26
THE NEGOTIATING MEETING EXERCISE
(SOURCE: P. CASSE, S. DEOL, 1985)
The situation
You are planning your participation in a negotiating meeting. Although you do not know anything
about what is going to be negotiated, you have been asked to organize the meeting so that it will
be as effective as possible.
The Task
You will find on the next page twenty activities (A through T) related to the organization of a
negotiating meeting and presented at random. Your task consists in rank ordering the activities so
that they are placed in a logical order. Start with l for the first activity, then 2 for the second one,
and so on until 20 for the logical last sequence.
The process
Step l:
Take 30 minutes to rank order the twenty activities by yourself.
Step 2:
Meet in teams of four and take 60 minutes to reach a consensus on one common, joint
ranking (do not vote and do not challenge your individual rankings as determined under step l).
Step 3:
The trainer provides the ranking of "experts" in the negotiating field (see figure 5.1).
Write that ranking under step 3.
Step 4:
Determine your individual scores by subtracting the experts ranking from your
ranking (in absolute terms without taking the minuses and plusses into consideration and adding
up the differences.
Step 5:
Your team (four people) should now determine its score by subtracting the experts'
ranking from your own team ranking. Add up the differences (in absolute terms) to find the total
team score.
Step 6:
Calculate the average of your individual scores by dividing the total of your individual
scores by the number of team members (four).
Step 7:
Assess your gain or loss scores in comparing the team scores with the average of the
individual scores. If the team score is lower than the average individual score, the total gain score
is positive. If the team score is higher than the average individual score, then the gain score is
negative.
Step 8:
Identify the lowest score for your team.
Step 9:
See how many individual scores are lower than the team score.
Step l0:
Determine if your negotiating was SYNERGISTIC or not.
(a) the higher the gain score the more synergistic the negotiation;
(b) the more individuals' scores are lower than the team score, the less synergistic
the negotiation is.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 27
Negotiating meeting activities
Step 1
Step 2
Individual Team
ranking
Ranking
Step 3
Experts’
Ranking
Step 4
Difference
Between
Steps 1
and 3
Step 5
Difference
Between
Steps 2
and 3
A. Agree with the participants in the
meeting on the time available.
B. Introduce each other
C. Conclude the meeting
D. Invite the participants to the meeting.
E. Open the meeting.
F. Present and get the agenda of the
meeting approved
G. Decide on improvements for further
meetings.
H. Prepare for the meeting (why a
meeting?)
I. Welcome the participants.
J. Compare the meeting results against
the planned objectives
K. Check the meeting room.
L. Send the minutes of the meeting to
the participants
M. Introduce the purpose of the
meeting.
N. Go through the agenda point by
point.
O. Clarify the objectives of the meeting
with the participants
P. Prepare the documents to be used in
the meeting
Q. Check the accuracy of the minutes of
the meeting
R. Decide on the working methods (how
to) with the participants
S. Set up an action plan to be
implemented after the meeting
T. Distribute the responsibilities among
the participants at the meeting
TOTAL
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Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 28
CULTURAL ASSUMPTIONS: PROFILE OF YOUR OWN COUNTRY?
VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE
TRUSTING
People are basically good and should
be trusted until they prove otherwise;
people are not out to take advantage of you,
usually try to be fair, and can be taken at
their word. Trust is assumed
DISTRUSTING
People are neither basically good nor bad;
they should not be trusted until they prove
they can be; they are not always fair, may try
to take advantage of you, and can’t be taken at
their word. Trust must be earned.
CONCEPTS OF RIGHT & FAIRNESS
UNIVERSALIST
There are certain moral absolutes which
should always apply in any situation; what
is right is always right, and there should be
no exceptions; people do not distinguish
between ingroup and outgroup but try
to treat everyone the same; signed agreements assure compliance; whatever is
agreed to does not change when circumstances change.
PARTICULARIST
People make distinctions between ingroup
members and all others; what’s right is what
helps one’s ingroup; to be fair is to treat one’s
ingroup members well; signed agreements
aren’t necessary between friends; when circumstances change, agreements also change;
friends expect preferential treatment; no one
expects life to be fair.
COMMUNICATION STYLE
DIRECT
People say what they mean and mean
what they say; there is no need to read
between the lines; telling the truth is more
important than saving face and preserving
harmony; words are the primary carrier of
meaning; the goal of the communication
exchange is getting/giving information; yes
usually means yes.
INDIRECT
People don’t alway say what they mean or
mean what they say; you have to read between
the lines; saving face and preserving harmony
are more important than telling it like it is;
what is not said or what is done/not done are
the primary ways of conveying meaning;
preserving and strengthening the relationship
is the goal of the communication exchange;
yes can mean maybe or even no.
OF TIME & PEOPLE
MONOCHRONIC
Time is a limited, finite commodity; you
can run out of time, not have enough time,
be too busy to see or to go out with someone; there is more of a focus on the task
and less on people and establishing relationships; deadlines and schedules are sacred;
interruptions are bad; the needs of people
are subservient to the demands of time.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
POLYCHRONIC
There is always more time; you are never too
busy for close friends and family; there is
more focus on people/relationships than on the
task or schedules/deadlines (which can always
be adjusted); interruptions are normal; time is
bent to meet the needs of people.
Page 29
THE 5 D MODEL: AN ANALYTICAL TOOL PROVIDING KEY INSIGHTS
INTO CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES
Culture is defined as the collective mental programming which distinguishes one group or
category of people from another. This programming influences patterns of thinking which are
reflected in the meaning people attach to various aspects of life and which become crystallized in
the institutions of society.
This does not imply that everyone in a given society is programmed in the same way: wide
differences between individuals and between subgroups of individuals will be found. Statements
about culture do not describe “reality”: they refer to a construct derived from the observation of
differing behaviors and attitudes from which systems of values can be inferred. This construct
enables us to make statistical statements about probable future behaviors and attitudes.
The cultural systems of nations and their subdivisions are very complex. The information
contained in this summary guide is intended as an aide-mémoire for those who have undertaken
training in intercultural management by ITIM. Its use by those who have not received such
training may result in error.
(Source: Institute for Training in Intercultural Management, ITIM, The Hague, 1993, based on
the work of Geert Hofstede) )
Power Distance (PDI)
The extent to which the less powerful members of society accept that power is distributed
unequally
LOW
Low dependence needs
Inequality minimized
Hierarchy for convenience
Superiors accessible
All have equal rights
Change by evolution
HIGH
High dependence needs
Inequality accepted
Hierarchy needed
Superiors often inaccessible
Power holders have privileges
Change by revolution
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 30
Individualism (IDV)
Individualism: People look after themselves and their immediate family only.
Collectivism: People belong to in-groups (families, clans or organizations) who look after them in
exchange for loyalty.
LOW
“We” conscious
Relationships over tasks
Fulfill obligations to group
Loss of “face”, shame
HIGH
“I” conscious
Private opinions
Fulfill obligations to self
Loss of self-respect, guilt
Masculinity (MAS)
Masculinity: The dominant values in society are achievement and success.
Femininity: The dominant values in society are caring for others and quality of life.
LOW
Quality of life-serving others
Striving for consensus
Work in order to live
Small and slow are beautiful
Sympathy for the unfortunate
Intuition
HIGH
Ambitious and a need to excel
Tendency to polarize
Live in order to work
Big and fast are beautiful
Admiration for the achiever
Decisiveness
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 31
Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI)
The extent to which people feel threatened by uncertainty and ambiguity and try to avoid these
situations.
LOW
Relaxed, lower stress
Hard work not a virtue per se
Emotions not shown
Conflict & competition seen as fair play
Acceptance of dissent
Willingness to take risks
There should be few rules
HIGH
Anxiety, higher stress
Inner urge to work hard
Showing emotions accepted
Conflict is threatening
Need for consensus
Need to avoid failure
Need for laws and rules
Confucian Dynamism (CDI)
The extent to which a society exhibits a pragmatic future-oriented perspective rather than a
conventional historic or short-term point of view.
LOW
Absolute truth
Conventional/Traditional
Short term orientation
Concern for stability
Quick results expected
Spending for today
HIGH
Many truths (time, context)
Pragmatic
Long-term orientation
Acceptance of change
Perseverance
Thrift for investment
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 32
NATIONAL CULTURE & INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS
(ADOPTED FROM G. HOFSTEDE, 1989)
CULTURAL PREDISPOSITION EFFECTS ON NEGOTIATION
BEHAVIOR
1. Large Power Distance
Key negotiations have to be concluded by top
authority (centralized control & centralized
decision-making)
2. Collectivism
Need for stable relationship to develop familiarity
between negotiators; Sudden replacement of
negotiator experienced as disturbance of
relationship; Mediator-intermediaries important
(formal harmony does not permit overt conflict)
3. Masculinity
Conflicts more often resolved through fighting
than compromising; Distributive bargaining more
dominant than integrative bargaining.
4. Uncertainty avoidance
Distrusting opponents who show unfamiliar
behavior; Preference for nicely structured
ritualistic procedures.
Organisational Consultants Ltd.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 33
A BASIC MODEL ON NEGOTIATION AND AMBIGUITY
All negotiations are ambiguous at times
Ambiguity can lead to:
(1)
(2)
Tension and Frustration in many
cultures of the Western world
Flexibility and Creativity in many
cultures of the Eastern world
The typical reaction following the
experience of ambiguity, tension
and frustration are:
- Withdrawing
- Adapting
- Being aggressive
The typical reactions following the
experience of flexibility and
creativity are:
- Becoming committed
- Exploring new avenues
- Accommodating
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 34
NEGOTIATION: DIFFERENCES IN VERBAL BEHAVIOR
(SOURCE: J. GRAHAM, 1985)
Average number of times tactic was used in
half hour bargaining sessions in:
Behavior (Tactic)
Promise
Threat
Recommendation
Warning
Reward
Punishment
Normative appeal
Commitment
Self-disclosure
Question
Command
“No’s” (per 30 minutes)
Profit level of first offers (80 max.)
Initial concessions
Japan
United States
Brazil
7
4
7
2
1
1
4
15
34
20
8
5.7
61.5
6.5
8
4
4
1
2
3
2
13
36
20
6
9.0
57.3
7.1
3
2
5
1
2
3
1
8
39
22
14
83.4
75.2
9.4
CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN NONVERBAL NEGOTIATING
BEHAVIORS
(SOURCE: J. GRAHAM, 1985)
Behavior (Tactic)
Japanese
Americans
Brazilians
5.5
3.5
0
Conversational overlaps
(Number per 10 minutes)
12.6
10.3
28.6
Facial gazing
(Minutes of gazing per 10 minutes)
1.3
3.3
5.2
0
0
4.7
Silent periods
(Numbers of periods greater than 10
seconds, per 30 minutes)
Touching
(Not including handshaking, per 30
minutes)
Organisational Consultants Ltd.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 35
TOURNAMENT GUIDE SHEET
VOCABULARY
round
- one part of the whole game, consists of 3 hands.
hand
- part of a round in which cards are dealt and played once.
trick
- part of a hand in which each player puts down 1 card. The player with the
best (highest) card wins the trick and takes the cards.
deal (dealt, dealt)
-
to distribute, to share out the cards.
score
-
the number of points each player wins (1 trick = 1 point).
shuffle
-
to mix the cards between hands so that they are in a random order
You will have a few minutes to study the rules and to practise playing before the tournament starts.
After the rules sheet is taken away, NO MORE VERBAL COMMUNICATION IS ALLOWED!
(no talking and no writing!)
Each `round' consists of 3 `hands'.
In each `hand' you try to win as many 'tricks' (points) as possible.
PLAYING A ROUND:
•
Decide on a dealer, this can be anyone.
•
Decide who is going to write down the scores (points).
•
Deal the same number of cards to each person, one by one. Put extra cards to one side, but don't
forget to put them back with the other cards for the next hand.
•
Write down the score at the end of each hand. (1 trick = 1 point) At the end of each hand
quickly re-shuffle the cards and deal again.
•
Play 3 hands.
•
Count the number of points to find the player with the fewest tricks and the player with the
most tricks in total.
•
After playing 3 hands, wait (in silence!) for instructions from the trainers.
MOVING TABLES:
•
The trainers will tell you when and how to move tables.
As soon as you arrive at the next table, sit down and start a new round (3 hands).
The score starts again from zero for all players.
NO TALKING, NO CHEATING AND NO GAMBLING!
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 36
THE YOHARI WINDOW
THINGS I KNOW
THINGS
OTHER
KNOWS
ARENA
THINGS I DON’T
BLIND SPOT
INSIGHT
THINGS
OTHER
DOESN’T
KNOW
FACADE
(HIDDEN
AREA)
UNKNOWN
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UNCONSCIOUS
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Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 37
NON-VERBAL BEHAVIOR
(source: Barry Austin Goodfield)
The do’s
1.
Talk about what you really feel because it shows anyway. To the extent that non-verbal
behavior communicates our true feelings most clearly, you can increase your credibility in a
negotiation by discussing your feelings.
2.
Be aware of your breathing. Our breathing communicates our level of tension and general
state of emotions.
3.
Be aware of your tension in your jaws. Tension in the jaw when they are pulsing relates to
aggression, and others will pick up on that message.
4.
Be aware of the breathing of the individual with whom you are communicating. This is a
potential source of important information about how those around you are really feeling.
5.
When you speak in a tense or crisis situation, use sentences of normal or longer length. This
will help keep your system in chemical balance (blood oxygen ratio). Moreover, it will
encourage others listening and later responding to you to have the same balance in their
biochemical systems.
6.
Be aware of the eye-blinking rate (flutter rate) of the individual(s) with whom you are
communicating. A high flutter rate is an indicator of an aroused state of system anxiety.
7.
When you become aware of tension building up in your system, get up and move your body.
Moreover, encourage movement in those around you when you see tension in them, unless
that is what you want others to feel.
8.
Be aware of the eye position of others. When you see eyes that are elevated you are looking
at someone who is in an altered state of consciousness.
9.
Be aware of the relationship between eyes and tongue when people are denying their
aggression. Often times they will quickly and unknowingly put their tongue out, and directly
afterwards close their eyes. This is a denial of their anger. This is important information that
you may find useful in negotiating.
10. Be aware of the natural tendency to close-up and close-off in stress and crisis situations.
Others will notice this in themselves and look for it in you, especially if you are in command.
Let others know what your impulse is, try to reassure them that you are not going to act upon
that impulse. E.g.; "That person makes me so angry that I could punch him". This releases
some pressure by acknowledging your system. It also opens the door to deeper emotional
expression from others.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 38
The don’ts in non-verbal communication
11. Don't underestimate the ability of others to read you. Therefore, it is not only good general
policy to be honest; it is tactfully a sound decision. What you feel radiates, remember that.
12. Don't miss aggression, for example, when someone crosses his/her legs in response to
something you said you may have just been kicked. Check to see, and ask if appropriate, is
there disagreement about what you just said.
13. Don't overlook smoking behavior. With a pipe, for example, you can hide in a cloud, bite
down aggression. Or symbolically bit someone while pounding tobacco out, etc. Of course,
the obvious things like blowing smoke in one’s direction are obvious. Gum chewing can fit
in this general area as it is an exercise of the massitor muscles and may relate to the control
of oral aggression.
14. Don't make your main point in a conversation or negotiation when the other person has
his/her eyes elevated. They are physically present, but psychologically absent.
15. Don't expect too much from individuals with slumped shoulders and stooped forward
posture. They are generally individuals with anger difficulties and power problems. Be
careful of assigning too much work or responsibility to these individuals. Their power is
reduced because their breathing is cut in half.
16. Don't overlook breathing patterns:
Fast and shallow = anxiety.
Slow and deep = calm.
Place your breathing with other individuals to learn what they feel, for 30 seconds.
17. Don't accept “YES” as a genuine “YES” if on repeated re-phrasing of the same question
results in the individual closing his/her eyes. Wait, then re-state in a non-threatening manner
your question or statement. If the other individual closes his/her eyes directly, after (one to
two seconds), more than likely that person is concealing their true opinion.
18. Don't accept “YES” as a genuine “YES” if there is a marked breathing change going from
slow to fast. This may just indicate anxiety associated with the question or remark. It may on
the other hand indicate anxiety related to denial or deceit. Re-state your question or remark
throughout the conversation in a non-threatening manner. If you continue to see the anxietybreathing pattern, ask the individual how he/she feels about the question or statement. If they
deny any concern or anxiety, you are probably being deceived.
19. Don't close up your body and expect to encourage openings in others. Position yourself in a
manner where you can have clear breathing. Don't block your breathing by putting your head
down, or bending over and cutting your breathing off. This will communicate a feeling of
closeness to the other person.
20. Don't begin an important conversation without first getting a base line series of responses on
basic emotions. Anger: talk about a situation, which would provoke an angry response.
Example: “My car was parked and when I came back my radio was missing”. Watch the
others reaction to your story. For sadness, talk about a loss. Example: “My dog died two
weeks ago”, etc. Watch, look, get a feeling for the other person, then begin.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 39
EYE MOVEMENTS
Visual – constructed images
(Building an image)
Visual – recalled images
(Remembering an image)
Auditory – constructing words Auditory – remembering words
(Building a dialogue)
(Remembering a dialogue)
Kinesthetic (Internal
& external feeling)
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Auditory – Internal dialogue
(Carrying on an internal
conversation)
Page 40
NON-VERBAL SIGNALS AND NEGOTIATION
Non-Verbal Signals
Potential Cultural
Meanings
Impact on Negotiation
1. Facial Expression
It could mean the person is
- Frowning
– Smiling
– Staring
Others:
– Doubtful or ………………
– Sarcastic or……………….
– Arrogant or……………….
This non-verbal signal can
lead to
– Defensiveness
– Emotional reactions
– Anger
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
2. Gestures
It could mean the person is
- Pointing
– Banging
– Clenching Fists
Others:
– Talking down or….………
– Angry or………………….
– Defiant or………………….
This non-verbal signal can
lead to
– Resistance
– Fight
– Breakdown
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
…………………………….
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
3. Tone of Voice
It could mean the person is
- Low pitch
– High pitch
– Very low tone
Others:
– Self-assured or…..………
– Emotional or…………….
– Secretive or..…………….
This non-verbal signal can
lead to
– Mistrust
– Withdrawal
– Attention
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
…………………………….
4. Sitting
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
It could mean the person is
– Sitting on edge of chair
– Crossing leg
– Balancing foot
Others:
– Nervous or………..………
– Defensive or..…………….
– Irritated or…..…………….
This non-verbal signal can
lead to
– Tension
– New arguments
– Counter argument
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
…………………………….
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
5. Others
It could mean the person is
This non-verbal signal can
lead to
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
…………………………….
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
………………………………
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 41
DIPLOMATIC TRANSPORT
Confidential Instructions for the Swedish Embassy
As first secretary of the Swedish embassy in Addis Ababa you are requested by your ambassador
to sell the embassy's van. Budget cuts are hitting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Stockholm. As
a consequence all diplomatic posts have to cut down their expenses on transportation by 50%.
The ambassador tells you to sell the small van that is being used for group transport . The van has
been used to drive around Development Cooperation experts from Sweden, and now a bus must
be hired to replace the van. Your ambassador wants you to get a price as high as possible,
otherwise he will have to cut down on other transport costs, e.g. he has to sell his own car and buy
a more modest one. An idea he abhors. He gives you one month. At this moment you have only
two more days to go.
The van is a more than six years old Volkswagen, kept rather well. A new one nowadays costs
about 30.000 euro, but to import cars via Djibouti is a time consuming affair. You know that an
Ethiopian dealer is ready to pay euro ………….. , for it in order to sell the van as a kind of taxi
for groups. The price proposed is acceptable, however, a higher price would please your
ambassador. Your career prospects would in fact increase if you could get a higher price
somewhere else.
Two weeks ago (at a cocktail party at the Dutch embassy) you discussed the sale with your British
and Belgian colleagues. They were both interested in the van, although your British colleague
displayed more enthusiasm. Yesterday you heard, however, that he already bought another car.
This morning your Belgian colleague called. He is interested in buying the car. You will meet
him at the tennis court this afternoon.
NOTE:
The bidding is ONLY ON PRICE
Please write down your first price, sequential bids, final price:
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 42
DIPLOMATIC TRANSPORT
Confidential Instructions for the Belgian Embassy
As first secretary at the Belgian embassy in Addis Ababa you are requested by your ambassador to
buy a car in order to be able to solve the problems of transportation involving larger Belgian
delegations paying a visit to Ethiopia. He tells you to buy a second-hand car in order to keep costs
as low as possible.
Going around Addis Ababa you heard from Lufthansa staff that it would cost at least 30.000 euro
to import a van for the transportation of about eight people. That is: to buy a Volkswagen, a
Mercedes would be more costly. Used cars of this kind are difficult to find in Addis Ababa, but
you heard that the Japanese embassy wants to sell a rather well-kept nearly six years old van for
euro ………... This was a firm price.
Two weeks ago you met the first secretary of the Swedish Embassy at a cocktail party at the
Dutch Embassy. He told you that he has a six-year-old Volkswagen van that he wants to sell.
Your British colleague, who participated in the discussion, also showed great interest in the offer.
This morning you called the Japanese Embassy and you learned that their Toyota van is still
available. As it is in a good condition (not too old, and having a comfortable seating arrangement)
you decide to buy it this afternoon. However, as the Swedes offer you a rather well kept German
car, you decide to pass by their embassy first to take a look at it. You will buy their car if the price
is lower than the Japanese offer. You have called your Swedish colleague, and you are going to
meet him at the Hilton Hotel tennis court at the beginning of the afternoon.
NOTE:
The bidding is ONLY ON PRICE!
Please write down your first price, sequential bids, final price:
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 43
BILATERAL INTEGRATED NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT A TRADE AND
COOPERATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
THE REPUBLIC OF SYLDAVIA
(MEERTS & POSTMA)
European Union
You will negotiate on behalf of the European Union with a government representative of
Syldavia about a new trade and cooperation agreement. You will try to reach a negotiated
result that should be as positive as possible by exchanging concessions. Every concession has
a certain value. This value is being expressed by a figure. A high figure means that this
concession is of great value to you. It is up to you to decide how many and which
concessions you are willing to trade for concessions of Syldavia. You calculate your final
result by adding up all the points you have after trading: (A) what you did not give away plus
(B) what you received from the other party.
Value to you
Possible concessions of the European Union:
Better access to the EU market for agricultural products from
the Republic of Syldavia
Technical assistance for industrial technology transfer from
the European Union to Syldavia
Financial protocol (a 'soft' loan of 500 Million Euro)
(another burden to the EU budget)
Special aid programme to restructure the Syldavian
government
Abandoning of the import restrictions on textiles
(southern EU member states have objections)
Generous visa policy for citizens of Syldavia
(Syldavia has a relatively small population).
(A) number of points the EU did not concede to Syldavia:
Value to you
Possible concessions of Syldavia:
Release profits of EU investments (only way to
make worthwhile investments)
Enlarging landing rights of EU carriers (capital Karagrad has
strategic position for flights to the Far East)
Closing of nuclear plant at Chozno, a Chernobyl type of
nuclear plant
Better market access for industrial EU products to the
Syldavian Republic
Better market access for EU services to the Republic of
Syldavia
Political dialogue about the progress of democracy and the
implementation of human rights
(B) number of points Syldavia conceded to the EU:
Total number of value points of the EU after trading (A+B):
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 44
BILATERAL INTEGRATED NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT A TRADE AND
COOPERATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
THE REPUBLIC OF SYLDAVIA
Syldavia
You will negotiate on behalf of the Syldavian government with a representative of the
European Union about a new trade and cooperation agreement. You will try to reach a
negotiated result that should be as positive as possible by exchanging concessions. Every
concession has a certain value. This value is being expressed by a figure. A high figure means
that this concession is of great value to you. You may decide how many and which
concessions you are willing to trade for concessions of the European Union. You calculate
your final result by adding up all the points you have after trading: (A) what you did not give
away and (B) what you received from the other side.
Value to you
Possible concessions of Syldavia:
Release profits of EU investors (reinvestment is important to
Syldavia)
Enlarging landing rights of EU carriers on your national
airport of Karagrad.
Closing of nuclear plant at Chozno (most important supplier
of energy)
Better market access for industrial products from the
European Union to the Syldavian Republic
Better market access for EU services to the Republic of
Syldavia
Political dialogue on the development of democracy and the
implementation of human rights
(A) number of points Syldavia did not concede to the EU:
Value to you
Possible concessions of the European Union:
Better access to the EU market for agricultural products from
Syldavia
Technical assistance for industrial technology transfer (not
our priority at the moment, we need money, not consultants)
Financial protocol (a 'soft' loan of 500 Million Euro (support
is crucial for balance of payments)
Special aid programme for the restructuring of the Syldavian
government services
Abandoning restrictions on textile import form Syldavia to
the European Union
Generous visa policy for citizens of Syldavia (however, a lot
of Syldavian migrant workers are already in the EU)
(B) NUMBER OF POINTS THE EU CONCEDED TO SYLDAVIA:
Total number of value points of Syldavia after trading (A+B):
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 45
BILATERAL COOPERATIVE/COMPETITIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE
OIL DELIVERIES: MIXED BARGAINING
Country A and country B will be negotiating the price of oil to be delivered to country C.
Production costs for both A and B are less than $ 30 a barrel. They will control the oil market of
country C as long as their maximum price will not exceed $ 50 per barrel.
Country A must take into account that B is already selling oil to C at $ 40 per barrel. If A is also
going to sell at this price, both oil producing countries can each expect to retain about half of C’s
oil market on a more or less structural basis.
If A or B is going to sell at a lower price than its competitor, it can expect its market to expand.
By undercutting the market share of the other country, A or B can increase its profit at the
expense of its counterpart. However: neither country can put the other permanently out of the oil
business.
You are a member of the delegation of country A or B. Each month in the coming year the
delegation will be asked to set that month's price for your country 's oil sales to C. Your goal is to
maximise your country's profits on oil sales to country C.
The monthly profit of your country depends on the price you set and on the price set by the other
country involved. You must take into account, however, that third parties can deliver at
competitive prices if your price is over $ 50 per barrel. In other words: this is you maximum price.
The price A and B can charge: $ 30, $ 40, or $ 50 per barrel. Nothing more, or less, or in-between.
There are several decision-making rounds. From the second round onwards envoys from both
parties can negotiate with the other side. They can conclude agreements which have to be ratified
by their own delegation. Delegations decide, not the ambassadors.
Game-master is Secretary-General of OPEC. He or she will decide on the real names of A, B, C:
Country A =
Country B =
Country C =
Note: exercise is a variant made by CLINGENDAEL (1993) of the oil pricing exercise by CASIN, Geneva (1986),
from the original concept of Roger Fisher
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 46
SCORE SHEET
The figures inside each box indicate the profit made during that month.
Price charged by B
$ 50
$ 40
$ 30
A:
$ 110
Price charged by A
$ 40
A:
$ 180
A:
$ 150
B:
$ 110
A:
$ 20
B:
$ 20
A:
$ 80
B:
$ 20
A:
$ 150
B:
$ 180
A:
$ 20
B:
$ 80
A:
$ 30
B:
$ 30
A:
$ 50
B:
$ 150
B:
$ 50
$ 50
B:
$ 150
*Prices in the nine boxes are in million US $
Month
A:
Price chosen
B:
A:
Profit for Month
B:
A:
$ 30
Cum. Total Profit
B:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 47
DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING
(Source: National Institute for Dispute Resolution, 1985)
Distributive bargaining is best described as win-lose bargaining, or
negotiating under conditions of zero-sum conflict. Based on simple
concepts of utility theory and game theory, it represents a reward-cost
model for assessing negotiating issues that are structured such that one
party will gain at the expense of the other. Central to distributive
bargaining is the determination of target points (outcomes desired as a
result of negotiation), resistance points (minimal outcomes that one will
settle for before refusing to bargain further), and the positive and negative
settlement ranges (overlap or non-overlap of target points such that both
parties can achieve a possible settlement above their resistance points).
Determining these points for himself will enable a bargainer to decide what
to aim for in negotiation, and when to "walk away” and reject an
unacceptable offer. The opponent's target and utility points may then be
determined by interrogation, and/or influenced by tactics designed to
persuade the opponent to reveal the resistance point, to modify the
perception of how realistic the target point is, or to convince the opponent
that achievement of the objectives is unlikely.
DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING PLANNING
Establish your own reservation price
Estimate opponents' reservation price
Set your own price target / Select tactic
DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING TACTICS
Strong first offer / No first offer
First and final offer
‘Inch-by-inch’ concessions
Organisational Consultants Ltd.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 48
CONCESSION PATTERNS
Negotiation
Concession 1
Concession 2
Concession 3
Concession 4
Concession 5
1
0
0
0
0
500
2
100
100
100
100
100
3
60
70
90
120
160
4
200
150
100
40
10
5
50
0
430
0
20
Total Concessions
500
500
500
500
500
DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Important to have an effective aspiration level (first position, first bid) and
a fixed Reservation Price (Bottom-Line, or Walk-Away Point or BATNA:
Best Alternative To A Negotiated Agreement, or to No Agreement)
Midpoint between Seller's first bid (S1) and Buyer's first bid (B1) often
close to Final Price
[(S1 + B1)/2] = Midpoint (~FP)
First bids must fall outside of zone of possible agreement
(RPs = Reservation Point Seller, RPb = Reservation Point Buyer)
(---------[------------]-------)
RPs
RPb
Organisational Consultants Ltd.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 49
INTEGRATIVE BARGAINING
Integrative bargaining is usually described as “win-win” bargaining, “nonzero-sum
conflict” or even “problem solving”. Integrative bargaining is most amenable to
negotiating problems when the parties desire to arrive at a solution that is mutually
satisfactory to both sides, and when such a solution is feasible given the issues in
dispute. Rather than to develop target points and resistance points, parties approach
negotiation as a "problem to be solved"; they then mutually develop a strategy for
commonly identifying the problem, searching for alternative solutions, developing
preference orderings for various solutions, and developing joint agreement on a
particular solution that will satisfy both sides.
Integrative bargaining is a significantly different process than distributive
bargaining, requiring distinctly different attitudes and behaviors on the part of
negotiators. In order to be successful in distributive bargaining, negotiators must
distort and manipulate information, use threats and bluffs, and be minimally honest
and trustworthy in their conduct. In contrast, successful integrative bargaining
requires the disclosure of factual and valid information, the absence of threats and
bluffs, and increasing levels of trust and openness in order to be successful.
(Source: National Institute of Conflict Resolution, 1985)
3,4,6,4,7,2 / 8,6,5,3,7,7 + 6,5,4,6,3,2 / 2,2,10,8,5,9
INTEGRATIVE BARGAINING TACTICS
1. BREAK NEGOTIATIONS INTO STAGES
Easy issues first to build confidence in mutual cooperation
2. SEPARATE PROBLEM SOLVING FROM DECISION-MAKING
Often by use of separate negotiation teams
3. LINK ISSUES AND CONCESSIONS
if we give you x - would you be able to give us y?
4. ‘SMOKE SCREEN’
Builds up opposition on minor issue to trade concessions later for more important issues
5. INVOLVE THIRD PARTY
Facilitator, Mediator, Arbitrator
6. CIRCULATE SINGLE NEGOTIATION TEXT
Continuously circulating draft papers as problem-solving devices without commitment on
either party to agree with proposed solution
ORGANISATIONAL CONSULTANTS LTD.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 50
NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES
B’s
reservation value
100
Y
SCORE
FOR A
Z
50
X
A’s
reservation
value
W
0
50
100
SCORE FOR B
Organisational Consultants Ltd.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 51
BILATERAL BARGAINING: “OUR FRIENDS AT THE BANK”
© Paul Meerts, Clingendael Institute ‘08
Simulation Exercise based on a Documentary by Peter Chappell
Problem
This exercise simulates negotiations between the Republic of Uganda and the World Bank in the
mid-nineties of the last century.Yoweni Museveni, ruling Uganda for a decade, calls for the first
elections since he took power. At that moment the Ugandan government is in ongoing
negotiations with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and close countries for
already twenty years.Three of these processes are coming to a close now, while Paul Wolfensohn
is entering the World Bank as its new President.
Wolfensohn has a special interest in concluding an agreement on the three issues. The Bank has
not been very successful in its dealings with Africa, Uganda as a notable exception. For
Wolfensohn Uganda could become a show-case, adding to his prestige as the new president of the
Bank. Museveni, struggling with the rebels of the Army of the land in Northern Uganda and
facing elections testing his popularity for the first time, is in need of a favourable outcome as
well. Though they both would applaud an agreement, they have different perceptions and needs
concerning its content.
Positioning
The Ugandan side wishes for money to be repaid and enlarge the road infrastructure, to
demobilize soldiers of the National Army, and to relief its National Debt.
There are three chief negotiators on the side of Uganda:



The Finance Minister deals with the infrastructure question and has a vested interest in debt
relief;
The Minister of Defence strives for as much money for demobilization as possible. It is also in
his interest, however, to have good roads built in order to enhance the mobility of the army;
The Governor of the Ugandan Central Bank has an interest in debt relief as well and could
live with privatization of his bank, provided he and his main allies can maintain their
positions.
On the other side there are also three main negotiators involved as well:



The Chief Economist of the World Bank for Africa wanting the Ugandans to spend donor
money on primary education in the context of the “Poverty Education Action Plan”;
The Bilateral Donors, being represented by the World Bank Representative in Uganda,
dealing with the question of the Ugandan Military Budget. They ask for more transparency;
The third Negotiator - a Pakistani World Bank Official being an expert in privatizing banks –
is in charge of the bargaining concerning the Central Bank of Uganda. His aim is to get it
done while discharging as much staff as possible.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 52
Programme
After a general introduction, the participants in the game will be divided in six groups: three on
the Ugandan side and three on the World Bank side. Each group will receive a brief instruction.
I Internal: after preparation time, the three groups on either side will unite in one delegation by
negotiating a common position and common strategy and tactics among themselves. They will
have to appoint a delegation leader for the upcoming negotiations with their opponents, and to
divide the different roles: who will speak on what, who will be the good guy / bad guy, who will
keep track of the proceedings, who will watch non-verbal signals, etc.
II External: after this internal bargaining phase, the full Ugandan and World Bank delegations
(each consisting of the three sub-groups) will meet for a first exchange of views. It is up to the
delegations how to do this. Anyway they have to introduce themselves and decide on agenda and
procedure:where are we, what is our aim, which issues will be discussed and when, who will do
this, how much time will we spent on this meeting and each of its issue areas, etc.
III Internal/external: both delegations will have to meet separately again to discuss their first
encounter. On the basis of their evaluation they might revise their position, strategy and tactics.
Negotiators will then split-up in expert groups. Each group of specialists consists of negotiators
from both sides, focussing on one of the major issues: Finance, Defence or Privatization. Groups
will report back to their respective delegations who will decide how to proceed, etc.
After the final negotiations there will be a debrief on procedure, process, people and product
(outcome/substance). Participants will then watch a DVD showing them what happened in reality.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 53
MINILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS
CASE: ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE IN ALGERIA
============================================
Objective
Aim of this multilateral simulation is to practice and sharpen multilateral negotiation skills.
Background
During the last few weeks, violence has been escalating in Algeria. Within the last 14 days
there have been daily attacks on government buildings and civil targets in the capital Algiers
by extremist Islamic groups. Hundreds of Algerian citizens have already been killed as a result
of the recent outburst of violence. The number of injured, including several EU nationals, is
even greater. Many Algerians are trying to escape from the fighting in the capital by fleeing to
the countryside where for the time being, it is still relatively calm but where there are no
adequate relief facilities.
Not only the Islamic fundamentalists (islamists or integrists) are responsible for the daily
abuses of human rights. The Algerian government has taken extremely forceful measures to
curb the violence and has declared a state of emergency. Islamic leaders and their adherents
have been systematically removed from the scene. Independent observers report that soldiers
in the government armed forces are guilty of torturing political prisoners on a large scale. All
political parties are banned and the press has been restrained even further.
Case
The Council has already anticipated the events in Algeria. Yesterday a Council Working
Group has been discussing possible elements of a Common Position (as part of the Union’s
Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP) in the event the situation would get out of
control. Six issues are on the agenda:






Should EU citizens be evacuated from Algeria, and if so, how;
To what extent should the EU affirm its support for the present Algerian government;
Should current EU cooperation and aid programmes for Algeria be suspended or
continued;
Should the EU put itself forward as mediator in the crisis, or is this more of a task for the
United Nations;
Should an arms embargo and/or other sanctions be implemented and how;
And should humanitarian aid be given under all circumstances, with military protection if
the situation requires so?
Procedure
As a diplomat of your country you participate today in the concluding session of the Council
Working Group preparing an emergency meeting of the General Affairs Council of the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs tomorrow. The objective of the meeting is to negotiate a
framework for a Common Position of the Council. For the purposes of this exercise, the
Council consists of only five Member States, namely Spain, France, Germany, the United
Kingdom and Sweden. Decision-making is done by unanimity.
(Copyright Clingendael / Meerts & Postma)
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 54
Sample Individual Score Sheet
In the table below, six negotiation issues are listed. Priority points behind each possible
outcome1 will represent the value of this outcome for you. For each outcome that is agreed
upon, write the corresponding value in the column “points earned”. At the end of the
negotiations, add up your total score. Needless to say, your job is to negotiate in such a way,
that you earn as many value points as possible. However, a final outcome lower than zero
points is unacceptable and should be vetoed.
Issue
Value points Points earned
· Evacuation of EU citizens
If the Council decides upon immediate evacuation
If the immediate evacuation is specifically protected by an ad hoc
coalition led by France
If the immediate evacuation is specifically protected by EU forces
If the immediate evacuation is specifically protected by a NATO
Combined Joint Task Force
If the Council decides that evacuation will take place within the next two
weeks
If the Council decides that evacuation will take place within the next
month
If the Council decides not to evacuate EU citizens
If no decision is taken concerning evacuation
· Support for the Algerian government
If the Council expresses its support for the Algerian government
If the Council condemns only the Algerian government
If the Council condemns only the Islamic insurgents
If the Council does not condemn the Algerian government
If the Council condemns all parties involved in the conflict
· Aid programmes for Algeria
If the Council decides to suspend current aid programmes
If the Council specifically decides to maintain current aid programmes
If the status of the current aid programmes is not mentioned
· Mediation in the conflict
If the Council decides to mediate in the conflict
If the Council allows France to mediate on its behalf
If the Council asks the UN to mediate
If no decision is taken about mediation
· Arms embargo and other sanctions
If the Council decides to impose an arms embargo
If the Council does not mention (the possibility of) an arms embargo
If the Council decides to impose economic sanctions
If the Council does not mention (the possibility of) economic sanctions
· Humanitarian aid
If the Council decides to deliver humanitarian aid immediately
If the Council decides to do so under military protection
If the Council decides not to deliver humanitarian aid
If no decision is taken about the delivery of humanitarian aid
Total value points earned
1
Please note that some of the choices available are mutually exclusive while others are complementary.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 55
CRISIS IN SOUTHERN ARABIA: A SIMULATION EXERCISE
The Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, two Islamic countries on the Arabian
Peninsula, clash on their mutual border in conjunction with internal turmoil in the Eastern part of
Yemen. At the request of Algeria the Security Council has been called together by its President in
order to discuss the situation and to adopt a resolution in order to manage the crisis.
The Two Countries
Saudi Arabia much bigger and richer than its southern neighbour Yemen but has roughly the
same number of inhabitants. Saudi Arabia is rich due to its oil resources. Yemen has some oil that
has been discovered quite recently, but exploration and exploitation will have to be developed
much further. Another source of income for Yemen has been Yemeni migrant workers in Saudi
Arabia. However, more than a million were sent back to Yemen, due to the Yemeni support for
Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. Moreover, the economy of Yemen has been ruined by the
civil war between the North and the South. In this civil war, the Saudis supported the South,
hoping to divide the country. They did not succeed. Furthermore, there are differences in culture
and in religion. The Saudi (Wahhabite) version of Islam is much more orthodox than the Yemeni
variant. Apart from this, the Yemeni in the South were influenced by Western –be it socialistvalues at the time of the socialist Democratic Republic of Yemen.
Historical Background
Historically speaking, the countries were at odds with each other on many occasions. Even in
ancient times, there was a
striking difference between
the mountainous and fertile
Yemen (Arabia Felix)
producing many valuable
agricultural products, like
myrrh and incense, and the
desert areas separating
Yemen (e.g. the Kingdom
of Sheba) from the Mediterranean
civilisations.
Nomadic tribes who roamed
the desert were quarrelling
among themselves until the
Prophet Mohammed united
them and sent them out to
spread Islam over the
world. In the twentieth
century, Ibn Saud, coming
from Nayd in the heart of
Arabia, reunited the tribes
again and conquered the
coastal areas in the East
(El-Hasa) and in the West
(Hedjaz). Then he turned
south and forced the Yemenites to “lease” their three
northern provinces to him
(Asir, Gizan and Najran; the so-called Taif agreement in 1934).
Recent Developments
In 1993, oil was found in Yemen; in 1994 a civil war raged between Northern and Southern
Yemen. The Saudis supported the South. The North, however, won. In January 1995 fighting
started between the Yemeni army and the Yemeni tribes, bribed by the Saudis. Saudi army units
became involved in this, and an all-out war threatened to start. Egypt and Syria started rounds of
mediation between the parties. As a consequence of this action, the Saudis and Yemeni struck a
deal at a meeting in Mecca at the end of February in 1995. June 12, 2000, both countries signed a
border agreement in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The implementation of this agreement might create
additional frictions, as could the implementation of Saudi Arabia’s wish to have a corridor
through the Eastern Part of Yemen (Hadhramaut) to the Arabian Sea.
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A New Crisis Arises:
In this situation, several well-armed tribes in Hadhramaut revolt against the central government in
Sanaa, with weapons provided by Saudi Arabia. They wish to install an independent state. The
Yemeni army sends reinforcements to the border area, in order to prevent the Saudis from
continuing their support for the rebellious tribes. Near the western border of the Sultanate of
Oman, a Saudi Army unit and a Yemeni Army unit exchange fire and heavy fighting breaks out.
Several soldiers on both sides are killed. At the same time, Yemeni Army units crack down on the
rebels, causing a flood of refugees to enter Oman. Saudi Arabia and Yemen accuse each other of
violating human rights and of trying to occupy territory under which large oil deposits are
suspected. Yemen accuses Saudi Arabia of supporting the rebels in order to break up Yemen,
thereby weakening it further. It is well known that Saudi Arabia would like to build an oil
terminal at the Hadhramaut capital of Mukallah in order to diminish the vulnerability of the Saudi
oil export through the entrance of the Gulf and the Red Sea (Bab-el-Mandeb).
The Security Council:
Pakistan, current President of the Council, is worried about a possible distortion of the delicate
balance of power in the Near East. He/she convenes the Security Council with the support of the
Permanent Members. The chair calls upon the Council to adopt a resolution to convince the
parties involved to stop the fighting, to condemn the violation of human rights, to invite
international agencies to send humanitarian aid, and to mandate a regional organisation to install a
peace-keeping force to maintain peace and security in the region. The Security Council meets in
order to try to adopt a resolution on the crisis. The Council will convene in a plenary session in
order to give the member states the possibility to state their individual positions. Consequently,
the Council will go into informal and formal consultations and will finally vote on one or more
resolution(s) and, if necessary, on amendments being proposed. Parties should try to reach
consensus and avoid voting as much as possible.
Note: The Council consists of the five permanent members (veto powers) the Peoples Republic of
China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and ten nonpermanent members: Algeria, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Benin, the Philippines, Pakistan, Romania,
Spain and Germany. The ambassadors will receive individual mandates serving as guidelines for
the negotiations. They are subject mutual concession making. The Caucus numbers indicate a proYemeni (I), a neutral (II), or a pro-Saudi (III) position. A resolution is adopted if 9 out of 15 votes
are in favour and if there is no veto against it. Any amendments will be voted upon before the
resolution has become final. In procedural matters, a veto cannot be used. The decision about
whether or not a matter is procedural is subject to a veto (so-called ‘double veto’). The chair calls
the meeting to order and as it proposed this emergency session of the Council, he/she will speak
up first. After this opening address the permanent members will take the floor, followed-up by the
non-permanent members. The Secretariat will open a Speakers List to determine the order of
interventions in the first plenary session. Unlike in reality Saudi-Arabia and Yemen will not
participate and no initial draft-resolution will be tabled by one of the members and its sponsors.
The resolution will be forged during the negotiation process.
copyright/clingendael/PWM/2004/11th version
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EXAMPLE: you can use the format - not the content (!) - as outline for your resolution
United
Nations
S/RES/931 (1994)
29 June 1994
Security Council
RESOLUTION 931 (1994)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3394th meeting,
on 29 June 1994
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolution 924 (1994) of 1 June 1994 on the situation in the Republic of Yemen
(Yemen),
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the fact-finding mission to Yemen
dated 27 June 1994 (S/1994/764),
Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General, his Special Envoy and the League of Arab States,
Strongly supporting the Secretary-General's call for an immediate and complete halt to the
shelling of the city of Aden, and condemning the failure to heed this call,
Deeply disturbed that no cease-fire has been implemented or sustained despite several cease-fire
declarations by both sides,
Deeply concerned at the situation in Yemen, and, in particular, the deteriorating humanitarian
situation in many parts of the country,
Alarmed by reports of the continuing provision of arms and other matériel,
1. Reiterates its call for an immediate cease-fire;
2. Stresses the importance of the existence and effective implementation of a cease-fire covering
all ground, naval and air operations, including provisions on the positioning of heavy weapons
out of range of Aden;
3. Strongly deplores the infliction of civilian casualties and destruction resulting from the
continuing military assault on Aden;
4. Requests the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy to continue talks under their auspices
with all concerned, with a view to implementing a durable cease-fire and to the possible
establishment of a mechanism acceptable to both sides, preferably involving countries of the
region, to monitor, encourage respect for, help to prevent violations of the cease-fire and to
report to the Secretary-General;
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5. Reiterates its call for an immediate cessation of the supply of arms and other matériel;
6. Reiterates that political differences cannot be resolved through the use of force, deeply
regrets the failure of all concerned to resume their political dialogue and urges them to do so
immediately and without preconditions, thus permitting a peaceful resolution of their
differences and the restoration of peace and stability, and requests the Secretary-General and
his Special Envoy to examine appropriate ways of facilitating these aims;
7. Expresses its deep concern at the humanitarian situation resulting from the conflict, requests
the Secretary-General to use the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant
United Nations agencies, to address urgently the needs of those affected by the conflict, in
particular the inhabitants of Aden and those displaced by the conflict, and urges all concerned
to provide humanitarian access and facilitate the distribution of relief supplies to those in
need wherever they may be located;
8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide a progress report to the Council on the
implementation of the present resolution as soon as possible and in any event within 15 days
of the adoption of this resolution;
9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
(1a) To establish and maintain the closest cooperation with all organisations concerned and to make all feasible advance arrangements with them for
the purpose of ensuring the most effective assistance. (10) Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to draw on the Working Capital Fund in the
amount of $ 200,000 for emergency assistance in any other year, with a normal ceiling of $ 20,000 per country in the case of any one disaster.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
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Steps towards a Security Council Resolution
1.
Preparation of text (in capitals and at conference site)
2.
Informal circulation of text (among selected delegations or groups)
3.
Possible revision of draft text
4.
Constitution of group or sponsors
5.
Deposit of draft by sponsors with Secretariat
6.
Official circulation in working languages
7.
Oral introduction by one or more sponsors
8.
Debate (statements by other delegations); comments by sponsors
9.
Introduction of and debate on amendments
10.
Sponsors’ comments on amendments
11.
Chairman may constitute negotiating group; negotiations
12.
Deposit of revised draft resolution
13.
Debate on revised draft and amendments
14.
Voting on sub-amendments and amendments
15.
Explanations of vote
16.
Voting on draft resolution
17.
Announcement by chairman of result of vote
18.
Additional explanations of vote
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
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Strategy Schedule
Our Priorities / Our Concessions
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Support of other Delegations
Page 61
United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation
‘SpaceBetweenWords’ Workshop by Meerts & Postma, Copyright Clingendael Institute ‘03
Scenario
It is 21 July 1971. Recent natural disasters, such as the severe floods in Central Europe,
droughts in Afghanistan and Western Africa, as well as earthquakes in the USSR, Turkey,
Indonesia and Peru, have prompted the United Nations to consider its structural involvement
in disaster relief operations. Many UN institutions, such as United Nations Children Fund
(UNICEF), the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), the World Health Organisation
(WHO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are in fact already working
in this area, but their efforts are not well coordinated. Note: public opinion demands better
coordination of relief efforts, as it does not want its (voluntary) funds to be wasted.
On the initiative of a number of disaster-stricken developing countries, the General Assembly
of the UN requested the Secretary-General in 1969 to draft a comprehensive report on the
possibilities to rationalise and improve the work of the UN system in disaster relief
operations. This report, which became available at the July 1971 session of the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC), emphasized the urgent need for improved organisational
arrangements in the provision of assistance by and through the United Nations system.
The ambitious US Permanent Representative to the UN, George Bush, immediately followed
up on the Secretary-General’s report by calling for the establishment of a United Nations
Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO), that would “mobilise, direct and coordinate” disaster
relief efforts by UN institutions and non-governmental organisations such as the Red Cross.
The staff of the US Permanent Representation to the UN at Geneva has been making long
hours in redrafting a resolution for adoption by the ECOSOC at its plenary session of 23 July,
the day after tomorrow. Elements of this draft have been discussed in informal meetings with
various member states, the UN Secretariat and other stakeholders. Note: the US is an
extremely powerful player in disaster relief as it pays 40-50% of the yearly efforts in the field.
Procedure
Before the crucial plenary session of 23 July, the draft resolution will be discussed in a
Special Working Group on Disaster Relief, consisting of representatives of the United
States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR), Tunisia, Peru, Indonesia, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and chaired by the UN Secretariat (UNS) in
Geneva. Consensus is needed between the representatives of the member states, the nongovernmental organisations can only try to influence their decisions. The meeting takes place
in formal and informal sessions. The objective of the meeting - and the responsibility of the
chair - is to iron out preferably all of the differences of opinion concerning the mandate,
function and status of UNDRO. Note: the negotiators will never be successful if they are not
willing and able to create packages and trade-offs.
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DRAFT RESOLUTION 15129(LI), as proposed by 7 powers, for consideration at Council
meeting 1790 on 23 July 1971
The Economic and Social Council
Bearing in mind that throughout history natural disasters and emergency situations have inflicted heavy
loss of life and property, affecting every people and every country,
Aware of the varying needs of nations experiencing such disorders, which present new challenges for
international co-operation,
Concerned over the ability of the international community to come to the aid of countries in a disaster
situation,
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 2435(XXIII) of 19 December 1968 and 2717(XXV) of 15
December 1970 on assistance in cases of natural disaster,
Expressing appreciation for the Secretary-General’s comprehensive report, and for its perceptive
examination of all aspects of the question and taking note of the relevant passage in his statement to the
Council on 5 July 1971,
Noting the study, annexed to the Secretary-General’s report, on the legal status of disaster relief units
made available through the United Nations,
Mindful of recent steps taken to improve evolving procedures in the United Nations system, voluntary
agencies and individual Governments in the field of international disaster assistance,
Bearing in mind that assistance to meet the requests of the stricken countries without prejudice to their
individual country programmes under the United Nations Development Programme can be an effective
contribution to the rehabilitation and development of the stricken areas,
Bearing in mind also that the possible response of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and other credit organizations and development agencies to a request from the
Governments concerned for complementary assistance for the stricken areas, without prejudice to the
assistance provided by these organizations for the normal development programmes of the stricken
countries, can be an important element in the reconstruction and development to the stricken areas,
Noting the competence of the United Nations and its agencies, [the United Nations Children’s fund, the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Food Programme,]1 to render
assistance in disasters and other emergency situations,
Noting further the key role which the resident representative of the United Nations Development
Programme should play at the country level,
Recognizing the vital roles in international relief of [the International Red Cross and other]2 voluntary
societies,
Recognizing further the necessity to ensure prompt, effective and efficient response to a Government’s
need for assistance at the time of a natural disaster or other emergency situation, that will bring to bear
the resources of the United Nations, prospective donor countries, and voluntary agencies,
1) Calls on the Secretary-General to appoint a disaster relief co-ordinator, who would report directly
to him, and who would be authorized, on behalf of the Secretary-General:
a) To [mobilize,]3 [instruct]4[direct]5[guide]6 and [co-ordinate]7 the relief activities of the various
organizations of the United Nations system in response to a request for disaster assistance from
a stricken State;
b) [To receive on behalf of the Secretary-General contributions offered to him for disaster relief
assistance to be carried out by the United Nations, its agencies, and programmes, for particular
emergency situations;]8
c) To co-ordinate United Nations assistance with assistance given by intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, [in particular by the International Red Cross]9;
1
Proposed by UNICEF, supported by the Red Cross.
Proposed by the Red Cross, supported by UNICEF.
3
Proposed by the US, supported by the UK.
4
Proposed by Peru, supported by Indonesia
5
Proposed by the US, supported by the UK.
6
Proposed by France, supported by the USSR
7
Proposed by the US, supported by the UK.
8
Proposed by the US, supported by the UK.
9
Proposed by the France, supported by .Tunisia
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2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
d) To assist the Government of the stricken State to assess relief and other needs and to evaluate
the priority of these needs, to disseminate this information to prospective donors and others
concerned; [and to serve as a clearing-house for assistance extended or planned by all sources
of external aid;]10
e) [To promote the study, prevention, control and prediction of natural disasters, including the
collection and dissemination of information concerning technological developments;]11
f) To assist in providing advice to Governments on pre-disaster planning in association with
relevant voluntary organizations [, particularly with the League of Red Cross Societies, and
draw upon United Nations resources available for such purpose]12;
g) To acquire and disseminate information relevant to planning and co-ordinating relief for
disasters, including the improvement and establishment of stockpiles in disaster-prone areas,
and to prepare suggestions to ensure the most effective use of available resources;
h) To phase out relief operations under his aegis as the stricken country moves into the stage of
rehabilitation and reconstruction but to continue to interest himself, within the framework of
his responsibilities for relief, in the activities of the United Nations agencies concerned with
rehabilitation and reconstruction;
i) To prepare an annual report for the Secretary-General, to be submitted to the Economic and
Social Council and the General Assembly;
Recommends that [the function of Disaster Relief Coordinator be implemented by the DirectorGeneral for Economic and Social Affairs]13 [the Disaster Relief Coordinator be endowed with the
title of High Commissioner, and appointed by the Secretary-General normally for a term of five
years, at a level comparable to that of an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations]14 [the
disaster Relief Coordinator will be appointed by the Secretary-General normally for a term of three
years, at a level comparable to that of Assistant Secretary-General]15;
Recommends that a [small]16 [adequate permanent]17 office be created in the United Nations system
for disaster relief matters;
Recommends that this office be headed by the Disaster Relief Coordinator and located in
[Geneva]18 [New York]19, [be a distinct element within the United Nations Secretariat,]20 and [be
augmented as necessary by short-term secondment of personnel for individual emergencies]21 [be
staffed within the limits of the current staff of the Secretariat]22;
Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a study for its fifty-third session, taking into account any
relevant suggestions and the experience gained by the Disaster Relief Coordinator, on ways and
means to enable the Disaster Relief Coordinator adequately to perform the functions entrusted to
him under the present resolution;
Further endorses the plan for a roster of volunteers to be drawn from experienced staff members of
the United Nations system and interested non-governmental organizations, who could be made
available at very short notice;
Recommends that the Disaster Relief Coordinator should [maintain contact]23 [co-ordinate]24 with
the Governments of States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized
agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning available aid in emergency
10
Proposed by the US, supported by the UK.
Proposed by the USSR.
12
Proposed by the France, supported by Tunisia.
13
Proposed by the USSR
14
Proposed by the .US.
15
Proposed by France
16
Proposed by France, supported by the USSR.
17
Proposed by the US, supported by the .UK.
18
Proposed by the USSR, supported by .France
19
Proposed by the US, supported by the UK
20
Proposed by the US, supported by Peru.
21
Proposed by the US.
22
Proposed by the USSR
23
Proposed by France.
24
Proposed by the US
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11
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8)
9)
10)
11)
situations, such as food supplies, medicines, personnel, transportation and communications, as well
as advice to countries in pre-disaster planning and preparedness;
Invites potential recipient Governments:
a) To establish disaster contingency plans [with appropriate assistance from the Disaster Relief
Coordinator]25;
b) To appoint a single national disaster relief coordinator to facilitate the receipt of international
aid in times of an emergency;
c) To establish stockpiles of emergency supplies such as tents, blankets, medicine and nonperishable food-stuffs;
d) To consider appropriate legislative or other measures to facilitate the receipt of aid, including
overflight and landing rights and necessary privileges and immunities for relief units;
e) To improve national disaster warning systems;
[Invites] 26 [Requests] 27 potential donor Governments:
a) To respond promptly to any call by the Secretary-General or by the Disaster Relief Coordinator
on his behalf;
b) To consider and to continue offering on a wider basis emergency assistance in disaster
situations;
c) To inform the Disaster Relief Coordinator in advance about the facilities and services they
might be in position to provide immediately, including where possible relief units, logistical
support and means of effective communications;
Further [invites] 28 [requests] 29 all organizations of the United Nations system and all other
organizations involved to co-operate with the Disaster Relief Coordinator;
Recommends that the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session endorse the foregoing proposals
and recommendations.
25
Proposed by the US.
Proposed by France.
27
Proposed by the US
28
Proposed by France.
29
Proposed by the US
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26
Page 65
ROLE OF MEDIATOR
1.
Control the negotiation process
2.
Identification of appropriate strategies
3.
Facilitation of the communication process
4.
Establishing positive motivation
5.
Establishing credibility
6.
Identification of underlying causes of the conflict
7.
Availability of expertise
8.
Developing creative suggestions / alternatives
9.
Intervention on a neutral / impartial basis
10. Training of negotiators in the process
11. Extension of resources
12. Agent of reality: making aware of reality
13. Acting as scapegoat
14. Protecting the image of the parties
15. Responsibility for the fairness of the parties
© SOAR 1995
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DISPUTE RESOLUTION QUESTIONNAIRE
Name:
Members of the group:
Section A
1.
2.
What role did you play? (Circle one)
1.
2.
3.
What was the relationship between the disputants and the third party?
1. the third party was a peer
2. the third party was a supervisor
3. the third party was a subordinate
3.
Who actually decided the outcome of this case? (Impasse is an outcome.)
1. Disputants
4.
2. Third Party
Who had the to decide this case?
1. Disputants
5.
6.
7.
3. Both
2. Third Party
3. Both
How satisfied were you with the procedure used to resolve the dispute?
1
2
3
4
Very
Dissatisfied
Dissatisfied
Neither
Satisfied
satisfied nor
dissatisfied
5
Very
satisfied
How fair was the procedure use to resolve this dispute?
1
2
3
4
5
Very
unfair
Unfair
Neither
fair nor
unfair
Fair
Very
fair
What was the outcome?
1. Impasse
2. I won
3. Other disputant won
4. Agreement
5. One of the disputants won
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1.
2.
10.
11.
12.
13.
How satisfied were you with the outcome ?
1
2
3
4
5
Very
Dissatisfied
Dissatisfied
Neither
Satisfied
satisfied nor
dissatisfied
Very
satisfied
How fair was the outcome?
1
2
3
4
5
Very
unfair
Unfair
Neither
fair nor
unfair
Fair
Very
fair
How fair was the third party that conducted your case?
1
2
3
4
5
Very
unfair
Unfair
Neither
fair nor
unfair
Fair
Very
fair
Did the issue underlying your case get resolved?
1
2
3
4
Completely
Some
A little
Not at all
How well did the third party understand the situation?
1
2
3
4
5
Very
poorly
Poorly
Neither
poorly nor
well
Well
Very
well
Did the third party have any formal authority ?
1
2
3
4
5
None
at all
Very
little
A fair
amount
Quite
a lot
A lot
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PACIFIC OIL COMPANY (A)*
"Look, you asked for my advice, and I gave it to you," Frank Kelsey said. "If I were you, I
wouldn't make any more concessions! I really don't think you ought to agree to their last demand!
But you're the one who has to live with the contract, not me!"
Static on the transatlantic telephone connection obscured Jean Fontaine's reply. Kelsey asked him
to repeat what he had said.
"O.K., O.K., calm down, Jean. I can see your point of view. I appreciate the pressures you're
under. But I sure don't like the looks of it from this end. Keep in touch -- I'll talk to you early next
week. In the meantime, I will see what others at the office think of this turn of events."
Frank Kelsey hung up the phone. he sat pensively, staring out at the rain pounding on the window.
"Poor Fontaine", he muttered to himself. "He's so anxious to please the customer, he'd feel
compelled to give them the whole pie without getting his fair share in the dessert!"
Kelsey cleaned and lit his pipe as he mentally reviewed the history of the negotiations. "My
word," he thought to himself, "we are getting eaten in little bites in this Reliant deal! And I can't
make Fontaine see it!"
Background
Pacific Oil Company was founded in 1902 as the Sweetwater Oil Company of Oklahoma. The
founder of Sweetwater Oil, E.M. Hutchinson, pioneered a major oil strike in north central
Oklahoma that touched off the Oklahoma "black gold" rush of the early 1900s. Through growth
and acquisition in the 1920's and 30's, Hutchinson expanded the company rapidly, end renamed it
Pacific Oil in 1932. After a period of consolidation in the 1940s and 50s, Pacific expanded again.
It developed extensive oil holdings in North Africa and the Middle East, as well as significant
coal beds in the western United States. Much of Pacific's oil production was sold under its own
name BS gasoline through service stations in the United States and Europe, but also it was
distributed through several chains of "independent" gasoline stations. Pacific was also one of the
largest and best known world-wide producers of industrial petrochemicals.
One of Pacific's major industrial chemical lines was Vinyl Chloride Monomer (VCM). The basic
components of VCM are ethylene and chlorine. Ethylene is a colorless, flammable, gaseous
hydrocarbon with a disagreeable odor; it is generally obtained from natural or coal gas, or by
"cracking" petroleum into smaller molecular components. As a further step in the petroleum
"cracking" process, ethylene is combined with chlorine to produce vinyl choride monomer, also a
colorless gas.
VCM is the primary component of the family of plastics known as vinyl chorides. VCM is
subjected to the process of polymerization, in which smaller molecules of vinyl chloride are
chemically bonded to form larger molecular chains and networks. As the bonding occurs,
polyvinyl chloride (PVC) is produced. Coloring pigments may be added, as well as "plasticiser"
compounds that determine the relative flexibility or hardness of the finished material. Through
various forms of calendering (pressing between heavy rollers), extruding and injection molding,
*
This case was prepared by David Kuechle, as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective
or ineffective handling of an administrative situation.
Copyright © 1985 by IMEDE (International Management Development Institute), Lausanne, Switzerland.
Not to be used or reproduced without permission
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
Page 69
the plasticized polyvinyl chloride is converted to an enormous array of consumer and industrial
applications: flooring, wire insulation, electrical transformers, home furnishings, piping, toys,
bottles and containers, rainwear, light roofing and a variety of protective coatings.
In 1969, Pacific Oil established the first major contract with The Reliant Corporation for purchase
of vinyl choride monomer. The Reliant Corporation was a large, multinational industrial
manufacturer of wood and petrochemical products for the construction industry, headquartered in
Brussels. Reliant was expanding its manufacturing operations in the production of plastic pipe
and pipe fittings, particularly in Europe. The use of plastic as a substitute for iron or copper pipe
was gaining rapid acceptance in the construction trades; and the European markets were
becoming significantly more progressive in adopting plastic pipe. Reliant already had developed a
small polychloride production facility at Abbeville, France, and Pacific constructed a pipeline
from its petrochemical plant at Antwerp to Abbeville, a distance of approximately 210 kilometers
(130 miles).
The 1969 contract between Pacific Oil and Reliant was fairly standard for the industry, and it was
due to expire in December of 1972. The contract was negotiated by Reliant's purchasing managers
for Europe, whose offices were in Brussels, and the senior marketing managers of Pacific Oil's
European offices, located in Paris. Pacific's negotiators reported to the vice president in charge of
their company's European offices, which in turn reported back to his corporate headquarters in the
United States. Reliant's negotiators had a similar reporting relationship. However the European
Vice President was located in the same building as the corporate officers.
The 1972 Contract Renewal
In February, 1972, negotiations were undertaken to extend the four year contract beyond the
December 31, 1972 expiration date. Jean Fontaine, Pacific Oil's Marketing Vice President for
Europe, discussed the Reliant account with his VCM Marketing Manager, Paul Gaudin. Fontaine
had been promoted to the European Vice Presidency approximately 16 months earlier after having
served as Pacific's Ethylene Marketing Manager has. He had been with Pacific Oil for 11 years
and had a reputation as a strong "up and comer" in Pacific's European operations. Gaudin had
been appointed as VCM Marketing Manager 8 months earlier. This was his first job with Pacific
Oil, although he had five years of previous experience in European computer sales with a large
American computer manufacturing company. Fontaine and Gaudin had worked well in their short
time together, establishing a strong professional and personal relationship. Fontaine and Gaudin
agreed that the Reliant account had been an extremely profitable and beneficial one for Pacific
and believed that Reliant had, overall, been satisfied with the quality and service under the
agreement. They clearly wanted to work hard to obtain a favorable renegotiation of the existing
agreement.
Fontaine and Gaudin also reviewed the latest projections of world-wide VCM supply which they
had just received from corporate headquarters. The data confirmed what they already knew -- that
there was a world-wide shortage of VCM and that the demand was continuing to rise. Pacific
envisioned that the current demand-supply situation would remain this way for a number of years.
As a result, Pacific believed that it could justify a high formula price for VCM. Fontaine and
Gaudin decided that they would approach Reliant with an offer to renegotiate the current
agreement. Their basic strategy would be to ask Reliant for their five-year demand projections on
VCM and polychloride products. Once those projections were received, Fontaine and Gaudin
would frame the basic formula price that they would offer. It was expected that there would be no
significant changes or variations in other elements of the contract, such as delivery and contract
language. In their negotiations, their strategy would be as follows :
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a) To dwell on the successful long-term relationship that had already been built between Reliant
and Pacific Oil, and to emphasize the value of that relationship for the success of both
companies;
b) To emphasize all of the projections that predicted the worldwide shortage of VCM and the
desirability for Reliant to insure that they would have a guaranteed supplier;
c) To point out all the ways that Pacific had "gone out of its way" in the past to insure delivery
and service;
d) To use both the past and future quality of the relationship to justify what might appear to be a
high formula price;
e) To point out that Pacific's competitors could not offer the same kind of service.
Over the next six months, Gaudin and Fontaine, independently and together, made a number of
trips to Brussels to visit Reliant executives. In addition, several members of Pacific's senior
management visited Brussels and paid courtesy calls on Reliant management. The net result was a
very favorable contract for Pacific Oil, signed by both parties on October 24, 1972.
A Changed Perspective
In December of 1974, Fontaine and Gaudin made a traditional end-of-year review of all existing
chemical contracts. As a matter of course, the Reliant VCM contract came under review.
Although everything had been proceeding smoothly, the prospects for the near and long-term
future were obviously less clear, for the following reasons :
1. Both men reviewed data that they had been receiving from corporate headquarters, as well as
published projections of the supply situation for various chemicals over the next ten years. It
was clear that the basic supply-demand situation of VCM was changing. While the market
was currently "tight" the supply of VCM was expected to expand rapidly over the next few
years. Several of Pacific's competitors had announced plans for the construction of VCM
manufacturing facilities that were expected to come on line in 20-30 months, possibly leading
to an over-capacity situation.
2. Fontaine and Gaudin knew that Reliant was probably aware of this situation. As a result, they
would probably anticipate the change in the supply-demand situation as an opportunity to
pursue a more favorable price, with the possible threat that they would be willing to change
suppliers if the terms were not favorable enough. Of course, this could involve construction of
a new pipeline or finding some alternative means for transporting the materials.
3. Fontaine was aware that in a situation where the market turned from one of high demand to
excess supply, it was necessary to make extra efforts to maintain and "re-sign" all major
current customers. A few large customers (100 million pounds a year end over) dominated the
marketplace, and a single customer defection in an oversupplied market could cause major
headaches for marketing end sales. It would be virtually impossible to find another customer
with demands of that magnitude; instead, a number of smaller customers would have to be
found, and Pacific would also have to compete with spot market prices that could cut profits
to the bone.
4. In a national product development meeting held in the United States several weeks prior,
Fontaine had learned of plans by Pacific to expand and diversify its own product line into
VCM derivative. There was serious talk of Pacific manufacturing its own PVC for
distribution under the Pacific name, as well as the manufacture and distribution of various
PVC products. Should Pacific decide to enter these businesses, not only would they require a
significant amount of the VCM now being sold on the external market, but Pacific would
probably decide that as a matter of principle it would not want to be in the position of
supplying a product competitor with the raw materials to manufacture his product line, unless
the formula price were extremely favorable.
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As they reviewed these factors, Gaudin and Fontaine realized that they needed to take action.
They pondered the alternatives.
A New Contract is Proposed
As a result of their evaluation of the situation in December of 1974, Fontaine and Gaudin decided
to proceed on two fronts. First, they would approach Reliant with the intent of reopening
negotiations on the current VCM contract. They would propose extending the contract five years
from the point of agreement on contract terms. Second, they would contact those people at
corporate headquarters in New York who were evaluating Pacific's alternatives for new product
development and inform them of the nature of the situation. The sooner a determination could be
made on Pacific’s product development strategies, the sooner that Fontaine and Gaudin would
know how to proceed on the Reliant contract.
Gaudin contacted Frederick Hauptmann, the senior Purchasing Manager for Reliant Chemicals in
Europe. Hauptmann had become Reliant's Purchasing Manager approximately four weeks earlier,
after having served in a purchasing capacity for a large German steel company. Gaudin arranged a
meeting for early January in Hauptmann's office. After getting acquainted over lunch, Gaudin
briefed Hauptmann on the history of Reliant's contractual relationships with Pacific Oil. Gaudin
made clear that Pacific had been pleased with the relationship that had been maintained. He said
that Pacific was concerned about the future, and about maintaining the relationship with Reliant
for a long time to come. Hauptmann stated that he understood that the relationship had been a
very productive one too, and also hoped that the two companies could continue to work together
in the future. Buoyed by Hauptmann's apparent enthusiasm alternative pleasure with the current
agreement, Gaudin said that he and Jean Fontaine, his boss, had recently been reviewing all
contracts even though the existing Pacific-Reliant VCM agreement had three years to run, Pacific
felt that it was never too soon to begin thinking about the future. In order to insure that Reliant
would be assured of e continued supply of VCM, under the favorable terms and working
relationship that was already well established, Pacific hoped that Reliant might be willing to begin
talks now for contract extension past December 31, 1977. Hauptmann said that he would be
willing to consider it, but needed to consult other people in Brussels, including senior executives.
Hauptmann promised to contact Gaudin when he had the answer.
By mid-February, Hauptmann telephoned Gaudin to say that Reliant was indeed willing to begin
renegotiation of the current agreement, with interest in extending it for the future. He suggested
that Gaudin and Fontaine come to Brussels for a preliminary meeting in early March. Hauptmann
also planned to invite Egon Zinnser, the Regional Vice President of Reliant's European operations
and Hauptmann's immediate superior.
March 10
Light snow drifted onto the runway of the Brussels airport as the plane landed. Fontaine and
Gaudin had talked about the Reliant contract and the upcoming negotiations for most of the trip.
They had decided that while they did not expect the negotiations to be a complete "pushover",
they expected no significant problems or stumbling points in the deliberations. They thought
Reliant negotiators would routinely question some of the coefficients that were used to compute
the formula price and would wish to renegotiate some of the minimum quantity commitments.
They felt that other elements of the contract would be routinely discussed, but that no dramatic
changes should be expected.
After a pleasant lunch with Hauptmann and Zinnser, the four men sat down to review the current
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VCM contract. They reviewed and restated much of what Gaudin and Hauptmann had done at
their January meeting. Fontaine stated that Pacific Oil was looking toward the future, and hoping
that it could maintain Reliant's a customer. Zinnser responded that Reliant had indeed been
pleased by the contract as well, but that it was also concerned about the future. He felt that
Pacific's basic formula price on VCM, while fair, might not remain competitive in the long-run.
Zinnser said that he had already had discussions with two other major chemical firms who were
planning new VCM manufacturing facilities, and that one or both of these firms were due to come
on line in the next 24 - 30 months. Zinnser wanted to make sure that Pacific could remain
competitive with other firms in the marketplace. Fontaine responded that it was Pacific's full
intention to remain completely competitive, whether it be in market price or in the formula price.
Zinnser said he was pleased by this reply, and took this as an indication that Pacific would be
willing to evaluate and perhaps adjust some of the factors that were now being used to determine
the VCM formula price. He then presented a rather elaborate proposal for adjusting these factors.
The net result of these adjustments would be to reduce the effective price of VCM by
approximately 2 cents per pound. It did not take long for Fontaine and Gaudin to calculate that
this would be a net reduction of approximately $ 4 million per year. Fontaine stated that they
would have to take the proposal back to Paris for intensive study and analysis. The men shook
hands, and Fontaine and Gaudin headed back to the airport.
Throughout the spring, Gaudin and Hauptmann exchanged several letters and telephone calls.
They met once at the Paris airport when Hauptmann stopped over on a trip to the States, and once
in Zurich when both men discovered that they were going to be there on business the same day.
By May 15th, they had agreed on a revision of the formula price that would adjust the price
downward by almost one cent per pound. Gaudin, relieved that the price had finally been
established, reported to Fontaine that significant progress was being made. Gaudin expected that
the remaining issues could be closed in a few weeks and a new contract signed.
May 27
Hauptmann contacted Gaudin to tell him that Reliant was now willing to talk about the remaining
issues in the contract. The two men met in early June. Gaudin opened the discussion by saying
that now that the formula price had been agreed upon, he hoped that Reliant would be willing to
agree to extend the contract five years from its present expiration date. Hauptmann replied that
Reliant had serious reservations about committing the company to a five-year contract extension.
He cited rapid fluctuations in the demand, pricing structure and competition of Reliant's various
product lines, particularly those for the construction industry, as well as what appeared to be a
changing perspective in the overall supply of VCM. Quite frankly, Hauptmann said, Reliant didn't
want to be caught in a long term commitment to Pacific if the market price of VCM was likely to
drop in the foreseeable future. As a result, Reliant only wanted to make a commitment for a twoyear contract renewal.
Gaudin tried to give Hauptmann assurances about the continued integrity of the market. He also
said that if changing market prices were a concern for Reliant, Pacific Oil would be happy to
attempt to make adjustments in other parts of the contract to insure protection against dramatic
changes in either the market price or the demand for Reliant's product lines. But Hauptmann was
adamant. Gaudin said he would have to talk to Fontaine and others in Paris before he could agree
to only a two year contract.
The two men talked several times on the telephone over the next two months and met once in
Paris to discuss contract length. On August 17 in a quick 45-minute meeting in Orly Airport,
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Gaudin and Hauptmann agreed to a three-year contract renewal. They also agreed to meet in early
September to discuss remaining contract issues.
September 10
Hauptmann met Gaudin and Fontaine in Pacific's Paris office. Hauptmann stressed that he and
Zinnser were pleased by the formula price and three-year contract extension that had been agreed
to this far. Fontaine echoed a similar satisfaction on behalf of Pacific, and stated that he expected
a long and productive relationship with Reliant. Fontaine stressed, however, that Pacific felt it
was most important to them to complete the contract negotiations as quickly as possible, in order
to adequately plan for product and market development in the future. Hauptmann agreed, saying
that this was in Reliant's best interest as well.
He felt that there were only a few minor issues that remained to be discussed before the contract
could be signed. Fontaine inquired as to what those issues were. Hauptmann said that the most
important issue to Reliant was the minimum quantity requirements, stipulating the minimum
amount that Reliant had to purchase each year. Gaudin said that based on projections for the
growth of PVC and fabricated PVC products over the next few years, and patterns established by
past contracts, it was Pacific's assumption that Reliant would want to increase their quantity
commitments by a minimum of 10% each year. Based on minima stipulated in the current
contract, Gaudin expected that Reliant would want to purchase at least 220 million pounds in year
1, 240 million pounds in year 2, and 265 million pounds in year 3.
Hauptmann responded that Reliant's projections were different. The same kind of uncertainty that
had led to Reliant's concern about the term of the contract also contributed to a caution about
significantly overextending themselves on minimum quantity commitments. In fact, Reliant's own
predictions were that they were likely to take less than the minimum in the current year ("underlifting" in the parlance of the industry), and that if they did so, they would incur almost a one
million-dollar debt to Pacific. Conservative projections for the following year (1977) pointed to a
similar deficit, but Reliant hoped that business would improve and that the minimum quantities
would be lifted. As a result, Hauptmann and Zinnser felt that it would be in Reliant's best interest
to freeze minimum quantity requirements for the next two years -- at 200 million pounds -- end
increase the minimum to 210 million pounds for the third year. Of course, Reliant expected that
its business would improve significantly more than that, and most likely they would be continuing
to purchase much more than the specified minima. But given the uncertainty of the future, Reliant
did not want to get caught if the economy and the market truly turned sour.
Fontaine and Gaudin were astonished at the conservative projections Hauptmann was making.
They tried, in numerous ways, to convince Hauptmann that his minima were ridiculously low, and
that the PVC products were bound to prosper far more than Hauptmann seemed willing to admit.
But Hauptmann was adamant and left Paris saying he needed to consult Zinnser and others in
Brussels before he could revise his minimum quantity estimates upward. Due to the pressure of
other activities and vacation schedules, Gaudin and Hauptmann did not talk again until late
October. Finally, on November 19, the two men agreed to a minimum quantity purchase schedule
of 205 million pounds in the first year of the contract, 210 million pounds in the second year, and
220 million pounds in the third year. Moreover, Pacific agreed to waive any previous underlifting
charges that may be incurred under the current contract when the new contract was signed.
October 24
Jean Fontaine returned to Paris from meetings in New York and a major market development
meeting held by senior Pacific executives at Hilton Head, North Carolina. After a number of
delays due to conflicting market research, changes in senior management, as well as general
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uncertainty in the petroleum and chemical markets, Pacific had decided not to develop its own
product lines for either PVC or fabricated products. The decision was largely based on the
conclusion --" more gut feel than hard fact"-- that entry into these new markets were unwise at a
time when much greater problems faced Pacific and the petrochemicals industry in general.
Fontaine had argued strenuously that the VCM market was rapidly going soft and that failure to
create its own product lines would leave Pacific Oil in an extremely poor position to market one
of its basic product lines. Fontaine was told that his opinion was appreciated, but that he and other
chemical marketing people would simply have to develop new markets and customers for the
product.
Privately, Fontaine churned on the fact that it had taken senior executives almost a year to make
the decision, while valuable time was being lost in developing the markets; but he decided to bite
his tongue and vent his frustrations on 36 holes of golf. On the return flight to Paris, he read about
Pacific's decision in the October 23 issue of The Wall Street Journal, and ordered a double
martini to soothe his nerves.
December 14
Fontaine and Gaudin went to Brussels to meet with Hauptmann and Zinnser. The Pacific
executives stressed that it was of the utmost importance for Pacific Oil to try to wrap up the
contract as quickly as possible. Almost a year had passed in deliberations, and although Pacific
was not trying to place the "blame" on anyone, they were most concerned that the negotiations be
settled soon.
Zinnser emphasized that he, too, was concerned about completing the negotiations quickly. Both
he and Hauptmann were pleased by the agreements that had been reached so far, and felt that
there was no question that a final contract signing was imminent. The major issues of price,
minimum quantities and contract duration had been solved. In their minds, what remained were
only a few minor technical items in contract language. Some discussion of each of these should
wrap things up in a few weeks.
Fontaine asked what the issues were. Zinnser began by stating that Reliant had become concerned
about the way the delivery pipeline was being metered. As currently set up, the pipeline fed from
Pacific's production facility in Antwerp, Belgium to Reliant's refinery. Pacific had built the line
and was in charge of maintaining it. Meters had been installed at the Antwerp end of the pipeline,
and Reliant was paying the metered amount to Pacific. Zinnser said that some spot checking by
Reliant at the manufacturing facility seemed to indicate that they may not be receiving all they
were being billed for. They were not questioning the integrity of the meters or the meter readers,
but felt that since the pipe was a number of years old, it might have developed leaks. Zinnser felt
that it was inappropriate for Reliant to absorb the cost of VCM that was not reaching its facility.
He therefore proposed that Pacific install meters directly outside of the entry flange to Reliant's
manufacturing facility, and that Reliant only be required to pay according to the meter reading
directly outside the plant.
Fontaine was astonished. In the first place, he said, this was the first time he had heard any
complaint about the pipeline or the need to recalibrate the meters. Second, if the pipeline was
leaking, Pacific would want to repair it, but it would be impossible to do so until spring. Finally,
while the meters themselves were not prohibitively expensive, moving them would mean some
interruption of service and definitely would be costly to Pacific. Fontaine said he wanted to check
with the maintenance personnel at Antwerp to find out whether they could corroborate such leaks.
Fontaine promptly attempted to contact the Operating Manager at Antwerp, or anyone else who
could confirm that leaks may have been detected. However he learned that routine inspection of
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the pipeline had been subcontracted to a firm, which had sophisticated equipment for monitoring
such things, and executives of the firm could not be reached for several days. Fontaine then tried
to raise other contract issues with Zinnser, but Zinnser said that this was his most important
concern, and this issue needed to be resolved before the others could be finalized. Fontaine agreed
to find out more about the situation, and bring the information to the next meeting. With the
Christmas and New Years holidays approaching, the four men could not schedule another meeting
until January 9.
January Meeting
The January 9 meeting was postponed until January 20, due to the death of Mr. Hauptmann's
mother. The meeting was rescheduled for a time when Hauptmann expected to be in Geneva, and
Gaudin agreed to meet him there.
Gaudin stated that the investigation of the pipeline had discovered no evidence of significant
leakage. There were traces of minor leaks in the line, but they did not appear to be serious, and it
was currently impossible to determine what percentage of the product was escaping. The most
generous estimate given to Gaudin had been .1% of the daily consumption. Hauptmann stated that
their own spot monitoring showed it was considerably more, and that Reliant would feel infinitely
more comfortable if the new metering system could be installed.
Gaudin had obtained estimates for the cost of remetering before he left Paris. It was estimated that
the new meters could be installed for approximately $20,000. Tracing end fixing the leaks (if they
existed) could not be done until April or May, and could run as much as $50,000 if leaks were
located at some extremely difficult access points. After four hours of debating with Hauptmann in
2 small conference rooms off the lobby of the Geneva Hilton, Gaudin agreed that Pacific would
remeter the pipeline.
Hauptmann said that as far as he was concerned, all of his issues had been settled; however, he
thought Zinnser might have one or two other issues to raise. Hauptmann said that he would report
back to Zinnser, and contact Gaudin as soon as possible if another meeting was necessary.
Gaudin, believing that Pacific was finally beginning to see the light at the end of the tunnel, left
for Paris.
January 23
Hauptmann called Gaudin and said that he and Zinnser had thoroughly reviewed the contract, and
that there were a few small issues of contract language, which Zinnser wanted to clarify. He said
that he would prefer not to discuss them over the telephone, and suggested that since he was
going to be in Paris on February 3, they meet on that day at the Pacific offices. Gaudin agreed.
Fontaine and Gaudin met Hauptmann on February 3. Hauptmann informed them that he felt
Reliant had been an outstanding customer for Pacific in the past, and that it probably was one of
Pacific's biggest customers for VCM. Fontaine and Gaudin agreed, affirming the important role
that Reliant was playing in Pacific's VCM market. Hauptmann said that he and Zinnser had been
reviewing the contract, and were concerned that the changing nature of the VCM market might
significantly affect Reliant's overall position in the marketplace as a purchaser. More specifically,
Reliant was concerned that the decline in market and price for VCM in the future might endanger
it's own position in the market, since Pacific might sign contracts with other purchasers for lower
formula prices than were currently being awarded to Reliant. Since Reliant was such an
outstanding customer of Pacific - and Fontaine and Gaudin had agreed to that - it seemed to
Reliant that Pacific Oil had an "obligation" to write two additional clauses into the contract that
would protect Reliant in the event of further slippage in the VCM market. The first was a
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"favored nations" clause, stipulating that if Pacific negotiated with another purchaser a more
favorable price for VCM than Reliant was receiving now, Pacific would guarantee that Reliant
would receive that price as well. The second was a "meet competition" clause, guaranteeing that
Pacific would willingly meet any lower price on VCM offered by a competitor, in order to
maintain the Reliant relationship. Hauptmann argued that the favored nations clause was
protection for Reliant, since it stipulated that Pacific valued the relationship enough to offer the
best possible terms to Reliant. The "meet competition" clause, he argued, was clearly
advantageous for Pacific since it insured that Reliant would have no incentive to shift Pacific
suppliers as the market changed.
Fontaine and Gaudin debated the terms at length with Hauptmann, stressing the potential
costliness of these agreements for Pacific. Hauptmann responded by referring to the costliness
that the absence of the terms could have for Reliant, and suggesting that perhaps the Pacific
people were truly not as interested in a successful long-term relationship as they had been
advocating. Fontaine said that he needed to get clearance from senior management in New York
before he could agree to these terms, and said that he would get back to Hauptmann within a few
days when the information was available.
Frank Kelsey's View
Frank Kelsey was Strategic Planning Manager, a staff role in the New York offices of the Pacific
Oil Corporation. Kelsey had performed a number of roles for the company in his 12 years of work
experience. Using his chemical engineering training from college, Kelsey worked for six years in
the research and development department of Pacific's Chemical Division, before deciding to enter
the management ranks. He transferred to the marketing area, spent three years in chemical
marketing, and then assumed responsibilities in marketing planning and development. He moved
to the strategic planning department four years ago.
In late 1975, Kelsey was working in a staff capacity as an advisor to the Executive Product Vice
President of the Pacific Oil Company. Pacific had developed a matrix organization. Reporting
relationships were determined by business areas and by regional operating divisions within
Pacific Oil. Warren Meredith, the Executive Vice President, had responsibility for monitoring the
world-wide sale and distribution of VCM. Jean Fontaine reported to Meredith on all issues
regarding the overall sale and marketing of VCM and reported to the President of Pacific Oil in
Europe, Stan Saunders, on major issues regarding the management of the regional chemicals
business in Europe. In general, Fontaine's primary working relationship was with Meredith;
Saunders only became involved in day-to-day decisions as an arbiter of disputes or interpreter of
major policy decisions. As the negotiations with Reliant evolved, Meredith became distressed by
the apparent turn that they were taking. He called in Frank Kelsey to review the situation. Kelsey
knew that the VCM marketing effort for Pacific was going to face significant problems following
the company's decision to stay out of the PVC/fabrication business. Moreover, his dominant
experience with Pacific in recent years had been in the purchasing and marketing operations, and
he knew how difficult it would be for the company to maintain a strong negotiation Position in
VCM contracts.
Meredith asked Kelsey to meet with Fontaine and Gaudin in Paris and review the current status of
negotiations on the Reliant contract. While Kelsey could "only act in an advisory capacity" -Fontaine and Gaudin were free to accept or reject any advice that was offered, since they were the
ones that had to "live with" the contract -- Meredith told Kelsey to offer whatever services the
men would accept.
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Kelsey flew to Paris on January 2, 1976. He met with Fontaine and Gaudin, and they reviewed in
detail what had happened in the Reliant contract negotiations over the past year. Kelsey listened,
asked a lot of questions, and didn't say much. He felt that offering "advice" to the men was
premature and perhaps even unwise. Fontaine and Gaudin seemed very anxious about the
negotiations, and felt that the new contract would be sealed within a month. Moreover, they
seemed to resent Kelsey's visit, and it seemed to Kelsey that they didn't want to share more than
the minimum amount of information. Kelsey returned to New York, and briefed Meredith on the
state of affairs.
When Fontaine called Meredith for "clearance" to give Reliant both "favored nations" and "meet
competition" clauses in the new contract, Meredith immediately called Kelsey. The two of them
went back through the history of events in the negotiations and realized the major advantages that
Reliant had gained by its negotiation tactics. Meredith called Fontaine back and advised against
granting the clauses in the contract. Fontaine said that Hauptmann was adamant, and that he was
afraid the entire negotiation was going to collapse over a minor point in contract language.
Meredith said he still thought it was a bad idea to make the concession. Fontaine said he thought
he needed to consult Saunders, the European President of Pacific Oil, just to make sure. Two days
later, Saunders called Meredith and said that he had complete faith in Fontaine and Fontaine's
ability to determine what was necessary to make a contract work. If Fontaine felt that "favored
nations" and ”meet competition" clauses were necessary, he trusted Fontaine's judgement that the
clauses would not cause significant adverse harm to Pacific Oil over the next few years. As a
result, he had given Fontaine the go-ahead to agree to these clauses in the new contract.
March 11
It was a dark and stormy night, March 11, 1976. Frank Kelsey was about to go to bed when the
telephone rang. It was Jean Fontaine. Kelsey had not heard from Fontaine since their meeting in
Paris. Meredith had told Kelsey about the discussion with Saunders, and he had assumed that
Fontaine had gone ahead and conceded on the two contract clauses that had been discussed. He
thought the contract was about to be wrapped up, but he hadn't heard for sure.
The violent rainstorm outside disrupted the telephone transmission, and Kelsey had trouble
hearing Fontaine. Fontaine said that he had appreciated Kelsey's visit in January. Fontaine was
calling to ask Kelsey's advice. They had just come from a meeting with Hauptmann. Hauptmann
and Zinnser had reported that recent information from Reliant's corporate headquarters in
Brussels projected significant downturns in the sale of a number of Reliant's PVC products in the
European market. While Reliant thought it could ride out the downturn, they were concerned
about their future obligations under the Reliant contract. Since Reliant and Pacific had already
settled on minimum quantity amounts, Reliant wanted the contractual right to resell the product if
it could not use the minimum amount.
Kelsey tried to control his emotions as he thought about this negative turn of events in the Reliant
negotiations. He strongly advised against agreeing to the clause, saying that it could put Pacific in
an extremely poor position. Fontaine debated the point, saying he really thought Reliant might
default on the whole contract if they didn't get resale rights. "I can't see where agreeing to the right
to resale is a big thing, Frank, particularly given the size of this contract and its value to me and
Pacific."
Kelsey: "Look, you asked for my advice, and I gave it to you. If I was you, I wouldn't make any
more concessions. Agreeing to a resale clause could create a whole lot of unforeseen problems.
At this point I think it's also the principle of the thing!"
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Fontaine: "Who cares about principles at a time like this! It's my neck that's on the line if this
Reliant contract goes under! I'll have over 200 million pounds of VCM a year to eat in an
oversupplied market! It's my neck on the line, not yours! How in the world can you talk to me
about "principle" at this point?"
Kelsey: "Calm down, Jean! I can see your point of view! I appreciate the pressures on you, but I
really don't like the looks of it from this end. Keep in touch - let me ask others down at the office
what they think, and I'll call you next week.”
Kelsey hung up the telephone, and stared out of the window at the rain. He could certainly
empathize with Fontaine's position – the man's neck was on the block. As he mentally reviewed
the two year history of the Reliant negotiations, Kelsey wondered how they had gotten to this
point end whether anyone could have done things differently. He also wondered what to do about
the resale clause, which appeared to be the final sticking point in the deliberations would
acquiescing to a resale clause for Reliant be a problem to Pacific Oil? Kelsey knew he had to take
action soon.
Assignment
Write down your analysis of this case on factors like
1. the negotiation process, strategy and tactics
2. the actors in the process, relationships and emotions
3. the interests involved, context and power:
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Pacific Oil Company (B)
Kelsey called Meredith the next day. They both agreed that a resale clause would be a
dangerous commitment and an even more dangerous precedent for Pacific Oil.
They made an appointment for a conference call to Saunders for the following morning.
When they talked to him, they learned that Saunders had approved the concession, that
Fontaine had already talked to Hauptmann and told him it was O.K. to include it in the revised
agreement.
Pacific Oil Company (C)
March 12, 1976
Upon learning that Jean Fontaine had, once again, defied his advice and made another
important concession to Reliant company negotiators, Warren Meredith, Vice President for
Marketing for Pacific Oil comany, picked up the telephone and reserved a first-class seat for
himself on TWA’s 6:00 PM flight to Paris. He then placed calls to Stan Saunders, Pacific
Oil’s President in Europe, and Jean Fontaine, the Company’s Vice President for Marketing for
Europe.
Meredith told both men that he was disturbed about the status of negotiations with the Reliant
Corporation and that he wanted to meet them at Pacific’s headquarters in Paris at 11.00 AM
the next morning. Fontaine said he would meet Meredith at Orly Airport when his plane
arrived and drive him to the offices.
Meredith then left his office and walked down the hall, hoping to see Arthur Moody, the
President of Pacific, to brief him on developments.
As he proceeded toward the President’s office he saw Moody coming toward him – heading
for the men’s room.
After a brief “good morning”, the two men conversed and Moody agreed that that Meredith
should interevene, saying in parting:
This looks mostly like an in-company problem. I will trust your good judgment to do
the rights thing in straightening matters out. Just be careful not to lose Reliant. We
need them!
After boarding the flight, Meredith settled down with a Martini and a report prepared by Frank
Kelsey which documented contractual relations since negotiations of the first contract between
the companies, signed in 1969. Meredith became increasingly agitated as he traced the series
of concessions made so far by Fontaine and Gaudin in their efforts to extend the existing
contract. These, coupled with the apparent willingness of Saunders to bless each of their
moves, indicated to Meredith that his principal job the next morning was to straighten out the
decision making process within his own company.
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Conceptualizations of the Negotiation Process
Christer Jönsson
Department of Political Science, Lund University
[prepared for 4th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Canterbury, UK, 8-10
Sept, 2001, section 33: International Negotiations]
The study of international bargaining and negotiation has developed into a vital and
productive subfield of IR research. One bibliography, covering literature up to 1988 (Lakos,
1989), has more than 5,000 entries; and the rate of publication continues apace. Occupied by
academicians as well as practitioners, international negotiation is a field that has yielded a
substantial body of middle-range theory. To be sure, theoretical bags have been packed for
trips that never took place, and many journeys have been undertaken without any theoretical
luggage, but on the whole the field of international negotiation boasts a considerable amount
of empirical studies guided by theory.
Students of international negotiation have drawn on insights from diplomatic history,
economics, management, sociology, anthropology, social psychology, Iaw and other fields;
and have employed methods ranging from laboratory experiments and gaming to content
analysis and interviews. The pioneering works of Thomas Schelling (1960) and Anatol
Rapoport (1960) were inspired by game theory while aiming at a synthesis with other fields of
knowledge. Game theory was useful in revealing the nature of bargaining situations, available
strategies and possible outcomes, but offered less guidance to the analysis of negotiation
processes. The back-and-forth communication, the exchange of proposals and signals, the
tactics and techniques used, the patterns of concessions and retractions—in short, the
dynamics of mutual persuasions attempts that we usually associate with negotiations—were
insufficiently caught by early game theory.
In their efforts to tracé and better understand processes of international negotiation, scholars
have come to abandon the early focus on symmetrical, bilateral encounters between equally
rational actors, as envisioned by game theory. "The power of the weak"—the observation that
the "stronger" party does not always "win" in asymmetrical negotiation encounters—has
received attention (see, e.g., Habeeb, 1988; Zartman and Rubin, 2000). The complexity of
multilateral negotiations (see, e.g., Zartman 1994; Hampson with Hart, 1995) and third-party
intervention in the form of mediation (see, e.g., Touval and Zartman, 1985; Bercovitch and
Rubin, 1992; Bercovitch, 1996; Kleiboer, 1998; Crocker et al., 1999) are prominent areas of
study. The role of cultural factors represents another research focus. A voluminous literature
on national negotiating styles has emerged, often based on the experiences of professional
negotiators (see, e.g., Binnendijk, 1987; Smith, 1989; Schecter, 1998; Pye, 1992; Solomon,
1999; Graham, 1993); and the meeting of different cultures in international negotiations has
been analyzed from the perspective of intercultural communication (see, e.g., Fisher, 1980,
1988; Cohen, 1990, 1997). The institutionalization of continuous international negotiations is
an aspect of increasing concern. Students of negotiations on different issues, such as arms
control, trade and environmental protection, have noted tend to develop a culture, behavioral
norms and a language of their own. The European Union constitutes the most prominent
example of institutionalized negotiations in today's world (see International Negotiation,
1998; Journal of European Public Policy, 2000).
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In short, no overarching theory of international negotiation processes has been developed;
instead, the literature today offers a variety of approaches, which highlight different dynamic
aspects and have been used alone or in different combinations in studies of international
negotiations. My primary purpose in this paper is to attempt an overview of extant approaches
in order to identify strengths and weaknesses, areas of concentration and gaps. I will
distinguish eight perspectives, according to which the essence of international negotiation
processes is, respectively, (1) establishing a contract zone, (2) using tactical instruments, (3)
reducing uncertainty, (4) balancing contradictory imperatives, (5) timing, (6) coordinating
internal and external processes, (7) communicating, and (8) developing social relations. These
approaches can be placed along a continuum, with (1) being closest to, and (8) most removed
from, the game-theoretical tradition. At the risk of oversimplification and streamlining, each
perspective will be treated separately below.
Establishing a contract zone
One central feature of our common understanding of negotiation is that the parties initially ask
for more than they expect to get. If we add the assumption that the parties know how far they
are willing to go in terms of concessions, we can, for each party, construct a continuum
ranging from its maximum objective to its minimum acceptable outcome or "resistance point."
The crucial problem then is to identify a space where these continua overlap, that is, where
both parties prefer an agreement to breaking off negotiations. This space is often called
"contract zone"—"bargaining range" and "settlement range" are other labels used. The
exchange of proposals and other signals, in this conception, serves to gradually reveal whether
a contract zone exists and, if so, where it is located.
This understanding of the negotiation process applies most readily to bilateral, distributive
negotiations on single, easily measurable issues. The difficulties of identifying maximum
objectives, resistance points and contract zones in multilateral negotiations on complex,
abstract issues can be staggering to analysts and negotiators alike. Yet one notion, originating
from this perspective, that has gained wide currency in the negotiation literature is that of
BATNA (the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) (Fisher and Ury, 1981; Raiffa, 1982).
Negotiators are supposed (and recommended) to determine their resistance points by
comparing the value of an agreement at any stage of the negotiations with the value of no
agreement; only if a negotiated solution is better than their BATNA will (or should) they agree.
Using tactical instruments
Another perspective focuses on the attempts by each party to outwit the other by means of
"strategic moves," such as commitments, threats and promises, designed to constrain the
opponent's behavior by affecting his expectations of one's own behavior. This "manipulative"
(Young, 1975: 317) conception of negotiation owes much to Thomas Schelling's (1960, 1966)
pioneering work. His analysis of commitments, "the power to bind oneself," through which
bargaining parties eliminate some of the options open to them, has been especially influential.
To be effective, Schelling argues, a commitment must not only be communicated and made
intelligible to the other side, but has to be made credible as well.
Schelling's seminal treatment of the credibility problem, which called attention to the
"rationality of irrationality" and "threats that leave something to chance," has been followed
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up by other scholars. For instance, Robert Jervis (1970), drawing on Erving Goffman's (1969)
analysis of "expression games," has suggested a basic distinction between signals and indices.
Signals are issued for manipulative purposes; they have no inherent credibility, as they can be
used as easily by a deceiver as by an honest actor. Indices, by contrast, are less easily
manipulated; they are believed to be inextricably linked to the actor's capabilities or intentions
and to be untainted by deception. Indices, according to Jervis, are used by negotiators to verify
or falsify the opponent's signals. Yet once the sender becomes conscious of the fact that the
adversary perceives certain behavior as an index, possibilities of manipulation emerge. If the
receiver, in turn, becomes conscious of the adversary's manipulation, "multiple cycles if
manipulation" may ensue (Jervis, 1970:41-65).
The "contract zone" and "manipulative" perspectives share a view of the negotiation process
as a battle of retreat. Agreement is seen to be the result of a series of incremental steps away
from the parties' opening proposals; through mutual concessions convergence may be
achieved. The two complementary perspectives are therefore sometimes referred to as the
"concession-convergence" approach to negotiation. The game-theoretical heritage is evident in
their assumptions of rational choice and exogenously given interests as well as the primary
focus on bilateral encounters. These assumptions are relaxed in the following approaches.
j
Reducing uncertainty
This approach proceeds from the structural uncertainty experienced by negotiating parties,
especially—but not only—in multilateral negotiations; that is, "the nature of the possible
outcomes and not just the probability associated with different outcomes is unknown"
(Winham, 1977: 101). Trial-and-error search, information processing and uncertainty control
are basic elements in this understanding of negotiations. The central focus of the joint
decision-making process is to reduce the variety inherent in the complex and
multidimensional bargaining situation. An important element in this process is the search for a
formula, "a shared perception or definition of the conflict that establishes terms of trade, the
cognitive structure of referents for a solution, or an applicable criterion of justice" (Zartman
and Berman, 1982: 95). A formula can be something akin to Schelling's (1960: 57-58) idea of
"focal points"—mutually recognized keys to coordinated solutions, based on prominence,
conspicuousness and uniqueness. It may also be a captivating metaphor, such as "the common
heritage of mankind" formula guiding the Law of the Sea negotiations on the exploitation of
the seabed. A formula, in short, "helps give structure and coherence to an agreement on
details, helps facilitate the search for solutions on component items, and helps create a
posttive, creative image of negotiation rather than an image of concessions and compromise"
(Zartman and Berman, 1982: 93).
In this perspective, negotiation appears as a deductive exercise. Only after a formula has been
established, can a structured search for solutions of more precise problems—the "detail
phase"—begin (Zartman and Berman, 1982: 147). One technique that has been identified as
particularly helpful in the detail phase of multilateral negotiations is the use of a "single
negotiation text" (SNT) (Fisher and Ury, 1981: 118-22; Raiffa, 1982: 205-17). After listening
to the stated positions of all the parties, one participant, in a mediator or leadership role (often
a chairperson), drafts a text, which is then circulated for criticism, modifications and
refinements. Successive rounds of redrafting and feedback may eventually produce an agreed
document, as in the Camp David negotiations in 1978 and the Law of the Sea negotiations. In
sum, a distinguishing feature of viewing negotiations as uncertainty reduction is that "the
development of common perceptions becomes more important than the exchange of
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concessions" (Winham, 1977: 97). Creativity and reconceptualizations are considered more
important than outwitting the opponents.
Balancing contradictory imperatives
One conceptualization of international negotiations that resonates among practitioners is that
of a series of dilemmas with no fixed, invariably acceptable solution (cf. Snyder and Diesing,
1977: 207-56). The essence of the negotiation process is thus to find the appropriate mix of
contradictory imperatives along several dimensions. One basic dilemma concerns firmness vs.
flexibility. If you are too firm, you may invite hostility and stalemate; if you are too flexible,
you may be exploited by the opponent. It has been suggested that "early firmness followed by
later flexibility" is the optimal mix (Druckman, 1995: 79). Notions of "firm flexibility" or
"flexible rigidity" have been introduced to denote combinations of firmness with respect to
ends and basic interests and flexibility with respect to means and tactics (Pruitt, 1995: 103-9;
Pruitt and Rubin, 1986: 153; Pruitt and Lewis, 1977: 183-84).
Several dilemmas of this kind can be identified, be they openness and honesty vs. secrecy and
deception; explicitness vs. ambiguity; manipulating risk vs. minimizing risk; or aggregating
vs. disaggregating issues. One debate in the academic literature concerns specific vs. diffuse
reciprocity (cf. Keohane, 1986). Whereas the celebrated tit-for-tat strategy rests on specific
reciprocity, a strategy of diffuse reciprocity labeled GRIT (graduated response in tension
reduction) (Osgood, 1962) prescribes a series of conciliatory actions not assuming immediate
reciprocation aimed at fostering trust and convincing the opponent of good faith. A number of
studies (Pruitt and Rubin, 1986: 162-64; Larson, 1987; Jönsson, 1990: 141-44) have pointed
to the successful application of GRIT in international negotiations. To summarize, the view of
negotiations as a series of dilemmas implies an indeterminate process. Practitioners therefore
frequently conclude that negotiation defies scientific generalizations. To use an analogy once
suggested by star negotiator Richard Holbrooke, negotiation, like jazz, is based on skills of
improvisation.
Timing
Another approach that fïnds strong support among practitioners emphasizes the importance of
timing in negotiations. There are two variants of this perspective. One distinguishes stages in
the negotiation process, the other focuses on ripeness. The notion that negotiations proceed
through several identifiable stages, each with a pattern of characteristic and/or appropriate
behavior, is common in the literature. Theorists adhering to the "concession-convergence"
paradigm typically postulate an early contentious stage and a later problem-solving phase,
with varying numbers of stages in between (Pruitt and Rubin, 1986: 137). Those who see the
reduction of uncertainty as the essence of negotiations distinguish three stages: a diagnostic, a
formula and a detail phase (Zartman and Berman, 1982). The notion of stages is sometimes
combined with efforts to identify turning points, "events or processes that mark the passage of
a negotiation from one stage to the next" (Druckman et al., 1991: 56; cf. Druckman, 1986).
Negotiation analysis has, in fact, extended beyond the negotiating table and identified prenegotiation and post-agreement stages as well. The pre-negotiation phase has attracted
increased attention (Saunders, 1985; Stein, 1989). In pre-negotiations, the parties attempt to
identify the problem and ways to deal with it, produce a commitment to negotiate and set the
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parameters for the negotiations. At the other end, a post-agreement bargaining phase follows
the conclusion of many agreements—the point where most negotiation analyses end. For
instance, the Oslo and Dayton agreements marked the starting point rather than the end point
of bargaining between the parties. "Compliance bargaining" concerning the terms and
obligations of international agreements (Jönsson and Tallberg, 1998: 372) takes place in such
institutional settings as the European Union and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
A somewhat different approach to the question of timing proceeds from the concept of
ripeness (Zartman, 1985). Negotiation or mediation is most likely to bring results at a moment
when the conflict or issue is ripe for solution. The definition of a ripe moment has two
components. First, the parties experience a "mutually hurting stalemate," that is, a realization
that neither can benefit but will suffer from continued conflict or status quo. Second, they
perceive the possibility of a way out by means of a negotiated solution. "Parties must conclude
that, in the absence of an agreement, time does not work in their favor, and that they would be
worse off in absolute terms, in relative terms, or both" (Haass, 1991: 93).
The ripeness notion has intuitive appeal, and it has been built on, refined and criticized by a
number of scholars and practitioners. Dean Pruitt (1997: 239), in his "readiness theory,"
defines a "motivationally ripe moment" in terms of the parties being motivated to achieve deescalation as well as optimistic that the other party will reciprocate cooperation. Christopher
Mitchell (1995) emphasizes the importance of an "enticing opportunity," the prospect of
future gains, in assessing ripeness. On the basis of a study of international mediation efforts in
Zimbabwe, Stephen Stedman (1991: 235-42) concludes that it is not necessary for all actors in
a conflict to perceive a mutually hurting stalemate and that ripeness, paradoxically, can come
from a situation where both sides believe that a settlement will produce a victory for them.
Like Jo Husbands (1991), he points to the significance of domestic political processes and
cycles in the determination of a ripe moment. Louis Kriesberg (1991: 1-2) and Jeffrey Rubin
(1991: 239) caution that claims about timing and ripeness can be used to attempt to
manipulate the pace and direction of negotiations. In short, efforts to apply and specify
ripeness have tended to emphasize the subjective aspects of a concept that may seem to
connote an objective condition (see, e.g., Kleiboer, 1994; Aggestam and Jönsson, 1997: 77274; Mooradian and Druckman, 1999).
Coordinating external and internal processes
It is sometimes said that every bilateral international negotiation encompasses at least three
bargaining processes: the external one between the two parties, and two internal ones within
each of the parties. Practitioners, in particular US negotiators, usually emphasize the problems
of internal bargaining, arguing they spend as much or even more time achieving consensus
within their own side (cf. Winham, 1979: 116-19; Zartman and Berman, 1982: 207; Martin,
1988: 49-50). Although practitioners often accuse theorists of neglecting the internal aspect of
international negotiation, the nexus between internal and external negotiations has been a
perennial theoretical concern. For instance a recurring game-theoretical idea holds that a
bilateral negotiation might be represented as one main game with a number of subgames or
"auxiliary games," the playing of which influences the playing and outcome of the main game
(Midgaard, 1966). Similarly, the notion of "intraorganizational bargaining" in labor
negotiations can be translated into intra-alliance and internal bargaining in the international
arena (Walton and McKersie, 1965: 281-351, 389-91; cf. Jönsson, 1979). In psychological
terms, international negotiators occupy "boundary roles" at the intersection of external and
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internal bargaining: while representing their own state vis-a-vis the opponents, they at the
same time come to represent the opponent vis-a-vis their own government (Druckman, 1978).
Robert Putnam's (1988) conceptualization of "two-level games" has gained wide currency and
has been applied to a number of international negotiations (Evans et al., 1993). Internal
bargaining concerning "ratification," broadly understood, parallels interstate negotiations. The
"win-set" in any international negotiation is thus determined not only by strategies at the
interstate level, but by preferences and coalitions as well as institutions at the national level. A
narrow win-set internally (due, for example, to varying interests and opposing views in a vital
democracy) may be an asset externally, whereas a broad win-set internally (due, for example,
to lack of opposition in an authoritarian state) may be a liability. The side that can credibly
point to domestic conditions that limit their bargaining range—be they the parliamentary
situation, strong interests groups or public opinion— has an advantage over the side that
cannot in the same way narrow down the win-set. Some international negotiations have the
character of "multi-level" rather than two-level games. Thus, changes in EU agricultural
policy have been analyzed as the result of a "three-level game"—parallel negotiations within
GATT with the EU as one party, among the EU member states, and between various interests
within key member states (Patterson, 1997).
Communicating
Bargaining and negotiation can be seen as subclasses of social communication. One might
argue that "without communication there is no negotiation" (Fisher and Ury, 1981: 33) or that
"in essence, international negotiation is communication" (Stein, 1988: 222). Yet the linguistic
or nonlinguistic aspects of communication in international negotiations have received scant
attention; in fact, "much of the existing literature derives from theoretical approaches that are
particularly insensitive to language and communication" (Bell, 1988: 233). Both verbal and
nonverbal messages are exchanged in international negotiations. Diplomatic "body language"
ranges from the venue and the format of the negotiations or the level of delegations to the
mobilization and movement of military troops and hardware. Indeed, activity as well as
inactivity and words as well as silence may be perceived as messages in bargaining situations.
Whatever a negotiator says and does or fails to say and do is willy-nilly scrutinized and
interpreted by the opposite side.
Diplomatic signaling (Cohen, 1987; Jönsson and Aggestam, 1999) thus seems a pertinent yet
not sufficiently explored area of research. One study (Jönsson, 1990), which draws on
attribution theory and semiotics in analyzing inherently ambiguous communication in
international bargaining, characterizes negotiators as "intuitive semioticians." There are recent
efforts to apply semantics (Cohen, 2000) and Jürgen Habermas's critical theory of
communicative action (Risse, 2000) to the argumentative processes of international
negotiations. Shared meanings (or the lack thereof) and "the power of the better argument"
then become foci of attention. On the whole, however, the communication aspects of
bargaining warrant more research.
Developing social relations
Negotiation, finally, can be seen as a dynamic social process. This perspective, which
emanates from studies of small groups, emphasizes the social context and dynamics of
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negotiations. The relationship between the negotiating actors changes in the course of
negotiations, as new meanings are created and identities formed in the process. In contrast to
game theory's "undersocialized" conception of human action, this approach assumes that
negotiators are inherently social actors and that negotiation processes and outcomes are
shaped to a considerable degree by the social context (Kramer and Messick, 1995).
Social context and dynamics have been purged from laboratory simulations of negotiations
and have been largely absent from analyses of international negotiations. To some extent, this
may reflect a cultural bias. Recalling the different evaluations of social relations in lowcontext and high-context cultures, one might surmise that a social process perspective would
have been more prominent, had Chinese or Japanese rather than American scholars been the
principal producers of negotiation theory. All the same, the relevance of a social process
perspective to international negotiations has been suggested by some authors (Greenhalgh,
1987; Saunders, 1987). Especially high-level negotiation encounters, such as Anwar Sadat's
1978 visit to Jerusalem and the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik in 1986, are seen as
instrumental in developing mutual trust and changing perceptions and relationships. Beyond
that, "negotiations can constitute a confidence-building measure in and of themselves" (Haass,
1991: 95).
In multilateral negotiations the social dynamics frequently produce informal communication
networks (cf. Hopmann, 1996: 262-65; Pfetsch, 1998; Jönsson et al., 1998, Meerts 1999).
Transnational networks of experts, "epistemic communities," with shared beliefs and values
have figured prominently in several issue-areas. In the field of environmental protection, for
example, an "ecological epistemic community" has been built in the course of many rounds of
negotiation, the members of which embrace ecological principles as their core set of beliefs
about cause-and-effect relationships (Haas, 1989: 384-85).
Conclusion
Whereas international negotiation represents a vital and variegated research area, it lacks a firm,
generally accepted theoretical foundation. Game theory originally promised to provide such a
basis. Yet game theory—its indisputable heuristic value notwithstanding—has perhaps been more
important because of its shortcomings than because of its success. The rewards of game theory
have thus been indirect, as was the case with the sons who were told by their father to dig for
buried treasures in the vineyard: They found no treasures, but they improved the soil (Rapoport,
1960: xii, 360).
Empirical findings and theoretical ideas related to bargaining processes abound. The range of
available negotiation techniques has been explored in considerable detail. Increasing efforts
are put into the study of multilateral negotiations and mediation, as opposed to the previous
emphasis on bilateral encounters. Transdisciplinary research is flourishing. Despite all these
positive developments, there is still a dearth of efforts to combine insights from different
approaches and perspectives. To that extent, the field can be said to represent an archipelago
of conceptual and theoretical islands. The lack of bridges concerns two areas in particular.
First, research has so far failed to reconcile strategic-choice perspectives and perspectives
emphasizing cognitive and social processes. Whereas the strategic-choice perspective posits
purposive and instrumental actors, furthering their own interests while taking the actions of
others into account, cognitive and social process perspectives highlight information
processing, joint search for commonalities and socialization. These are often construed as
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rival, mutually exclusive approaches. Yet, to the extent that international negotiations
encompass elements of both—as several scholars and practitioners maintain—they would
seem to be complementary. A second shortcoming concerns the neglect of the ongoing
structure-agent discussion in IR. The prevalent actor-oriented perspectives have largely
neglected the structural parameters of international negotiations, be they institutions, norms or
varying international systems. Frameworks that explicitly and theoretically combine agent and
structure are needed to provide a fuller view of international bargaining and negotiation.
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Patterson, Lee Ann (1997) "Agricultural Policy Reform in the European Community: A
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Pfetsch, Frank P. (1998) "Negotiating the European Union: A Negotiation-Network
Approach," International Negotiation 3, 3: 293-317.
Pruitt, Dean G. (1995) "Flexibility in Conflict Episodes," Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 542: 100-15.
Pruitt, Dean G. (1997) "Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks," International Negotiation 2, 2:
237-50.
Pruitt, Dean G. and Steven A. Lewis (1977) "The Psychology of Integrative Bargaining," in
Daniel Druckman, ed., Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives (Beverly Hills,
CA/London: Sage).
Pruitt, Dean G. and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (1986) Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and
Settlement (New York: Random House).
Putnam, Robert D. (1988) "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games," International Organization 42, 3: 428-60.
Pye, Lucian W. (1992) Chinese Negotiating Style: Commercial Approaches and Cultural
Principles (Westport, CT: Quorum Books).
Raiffa, Howard (1982) The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press).
Rapoport, Anatol (1960) Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press).
Risse, Thomas (2000) "'Let's Argue!' Communicative Action in World Politics," International
Organization 54, 1: 1-39.
Rubin, Jeffrey Z. (1991) "The Timing of Ripeness and the Ripeness of Timing," in Louis
Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson, eds, Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press).
Saunders, Harold H. (1985) "We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of
Pre-negotiating Phases" Negotiation Journal 1, 3: 249-62.
Saunders, Harold H. (1987) "International Relationships—It's Time To Go Beyond 'We' and
'They'," Negotiation Journal 3, 3: 245-74.
Schecter, Jerrold L. (1998) Russian Negotiating Behavior: Continuity and Transition
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998).
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Schelling, Thomas C. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press).
Schelling, Thomas C. (1966) Arms and Influence (New Haven/London: Yale University
Press).
Smith, Raymond (1989) Negotiating with the Soviets (Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press).
Snyder, Glenn H. and Paul Diesing (1977) Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision
Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press).
Solomon, Richard H. (1999) Chinese Negotiating Behavior: Pursuing Interests Through 'Old
Friends' (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press).
Stedman, Stephen John (1991) Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in
Zimbabwe, 1975-1980 (Boulder, CO/London: Lynne Rienner).
Stein, Janice Gross (1988) "International Negotiation: A Multidisciplinary Perspective,"
Negotiation Journal 4, 3: 221 -31.
Stein, Janice Gross [ed.] (1989) Getting to the Table: The Processes of International
Prenegotiation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press).
Touval, Saadia and I. William Zartman [eds] (1985) International Mediation in Theory and
Practice (Boulder, CO: Westview).
Walton, Richard E. And Robert B. McKersie (1965) ,4 Behavioral Theory of Labor
Negotiations (New York: McGraw-Hill).
Winham, Gilbert R. (1977) "Negotiation as a Management Process," World Politics 30, 1:87114.
Winham, Gilbert R. (1979) "Practitioners' Views of International Negotiation," World Politics
32, 1: 111 -35.
Young, Oran R. (1975) Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation (Urbana, IL: University
of Illinois Press).
Zartman, I. William (1985) Ripe for Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press).
Zartman, I. William [ed.] (1994) International Multilateral Negotiations: Approaches to the
Management of Complexity (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass).
Zartman, I. William and Maureen R. Berman (1982) The Practical Negotiator (New Haven/
London: Yale University Press).
Zartman, I. William and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (2000) Power and Negotiation (Arm Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press).
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References to the Exercises and Abridged Bibliography
Note: see also the References above and the list of PIN books hereafter
Journals:

International Negotiation, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers

Negotiation Journal, New York: Plenum Press

Group Decision and Negotiation, Netherlands: Springer

The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Thousand Oaks: Sage Periodicals Press

PINpoints Newsletter, Laxenburg: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Axelrod, R. (1984)
The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books
Bazerman, M.H. & Neale, M.A. (1992)
Negotiating Rationally, New York: Free Press
Berridge, G.R. (1995)(2001)
Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, London [etc.]: Prentice Hall
A Dictionary of Diplomacy, London: Palgrave (with James, A.)
Berton, P. & Kimura, H. & Zartman, I.W. (ed) (1999)
International Negotiation, London, etc.: Macmillan Press Ltd.
Carnevale, P. & De Dreu, C.K.W. (2006)
Methods of Negotiation Research, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
Casse, P. & Deol, S. (1985)
Managing Intercultural Negotiations, Washington D.C.: SIETAR International
de Caillières, F. (2000, originally published 1716),
On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes, Houghton Mifflin Co.
Von Clausewitz, C. (1987)
On War, Reinbek/Hamburg: Rowohlt
Deutsch, M. & Coleman, P.T. (eds.) (2000)
The Handbook of Conflict Resolution, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Druckman, D. (1973)
Human Factors in International Negotiations, Thousand Oaks: Sage
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Dupont, C. (1982)
La négociation (2nd ed.), Paris: Dalloz
Feltham, R.G. (2004)
Diplomatic Handbook (12th ed.), New York: Addison Wesley Longman
Goodfield, B.A. (1999)
Insight and Action, London: University of Westminster Press
Hampson, F.O. (1994)
Multilateral Negotiations, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
Hofstede, G. (1980)
Culture's Consequences, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publishers
Höglund, K. (2008)
Peace Negotiations in the Shadow of Violence, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
Holsti, K.J. (1991)
Peace and War, Cambridge University Press
Hoppman, T. (1998)
The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflict,
University of South Carolina Press
Iklé, F.C. (1987)
How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper & Row
Karrass, C. (2000)
The Negotiating Game, New York: HarperBusiness
Kaufmann, J. (1996)
Conference Diplomacy, London: Macmillan Press
Kolb, D.M. (1999)
Negotiation Eclectics, Cambridge: PON Books
Lang, M.D. & Taylor A. (2000)
The Making of a Mediator, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers
Le Poole, S. (1991)
Never Take No for an Answer (2nd. ed.), London: Kogan Page
Lewicki, R.J. & Barry, B. & Saunders, D.M. (2006)
(Essentials of) Negotiation (3 Volumes), (4-5th. ed.), Boston & New York: McGraw-Hill/ Irwin
Mastenbroek, W. (1989)(2002)
Negotiate, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Negotiating as Emotion Management, Heemstede: Holland Business Publications
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Meerts, P.W. (2008)
Transboundary Bargaining, http://www.e-ir.info/?p=543
Culture and International Law (ed.),
The Hague: Hague Academic Press / T.M.C. Asser Press Cambridge University Press
Melissen, J. (1999)
Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, London: Oxford University Press
Nicolson, H. (1963)
Diplomacy, London: Oxford University Press
Nierenberg, G. (1976)
The Complete Negotiator, New York. NY: Nierenberg & Zeif Publishers
Pfetsch, F.R. (2007)
Negotiating Political Conflicts, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan
Pruitt, D.G. (1981)
Negotiation Behavior, Orlando: Academic Press
Saner, R. (2006)
The Expert Negotiator, The Hague: Kluwer Law International
Schneider, A.K. & Honeyman, C., (eds.)(2006)
The Negotiator’s Fieldbook, Washington D.C.: American Bar Association
Shell, R. (2000)
Bargaining for Advantage, Penguin
Sun, Tzu (1981, originally published ca. 490 BC)
The Art of War, London: Hodder & Stoughton
Tallberg, J. (2007)
Bargaining Power in the European Council, Report # 1 www.sieps.se,
Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies
Thomas, K.W. & Kilmann, R.H. (1974)
Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Survey, Tuxedo NY: Xicom
Wagner, L.M. (2008)
Problem-Solving and Bargaining in International Negotiation, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
de Wickefort, A. (1997, originally published in 1680-1681, translated into English in 1716)
The Ambassador and his Functions, Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy
Young, H.P. (ed.)(1991)
Negotiation Analysis, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
Zartman, I.W. (ed.)(2006)
Negotiating with Terrorists, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
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ABOUT TRAINER AND INSTITUTIONS
Paul W. Meerts, 1946, Political Scientist (M.A. University of Leiden 1973, Doctor Honoris
Causa of the National University of Mongolia 2001) is Special Advisor to the General-Director
and Analyst of International Negotiation Processes at the Netherlands Institute of International
Relations 'Clingendael'. He has been Deputy General-Director (1990-2006) and Director of
Training (1983-1990) at Clingendael Institute, Training Coordinator (1978-1983) of the
Netherlands Society of International Affairs, and Research Fellow at the Universities of
Groningen and Leiden (1974-1978). Since 2006 he is Visiting Professor in International
Negotiation Analysis at College of Europe (Bruges) and in International Negotiation Practice at
the University of Economics (Prague), as well as in International Negotiation Techniques at the
UNESCO Institute for Water Education (Delft) for the years 2009-2013.
Consultancy: since 1980 Paul Meerts has been advisor to Ministries of Foreign Affairs and
Universities of Eurasian countries on the establishment of Diplomatic Training Programmes and
Diplomatic Academies. He participated in the Advisory Boards of several Diplomatic Academies.
Training: since 1989 Paul Meerts has trained junior and senior diplomats, military officers, other
national and local civil servants as well as university students in international negotiation
techniques in over eighty countries on four continents. He wrote a multitude of simulation games.
Publications: since 1986 he had a series of articles and chapters published on international
negotiation processes and (co-)edited books like ‘Negotiating European Union’ and ‘Culture and
International Law’. He is a member of the Steering Committee of the Processes of International
Negotiation (PIN) Programme of the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
and advisor to the Editorial Board of the ‘International Negotiation’ Journal.
Email: pmeerts@clingendael.nl, tel. +31 (0) 70 3746643 (Clingendael), GSM +31 (0) 651212076
Clingendael, The Netherlands Institute of International Relations, is a non-for-profit
Academic Research and Diplomatic Training Institute financed by the Dutch Ministries of
Foreign Affairs and Defence, implementing projects for all Dutch Ministries, foreign
governments, the United Nations, NATO, the European Commission, and others. The Institute
has four major programmes: the Clingendael Diplomatic Studies programme, the Clingendael
European Studies Programme, the Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme (including a
Conflict Research Unit) and the Clingendael International Energy Programme. Editor of the
Workbook is coordinator of the Clingendael International Negotiation Group (CLING).
Address: Clingendael Institute, Clingendael 7, 2597 VH The Hague, The Netherlands,
www.clingendael.nl tel. +31(0)70 3245384, fax +31(0)70 3282002.
BIC: RABO NL 2U; IBAN: NL 77 RABO 03 57 21 79 50; SWIFT 1299.
PIN, the Processes of International Negotiation Project of the International Institute of
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria, is a network of some six thousand
practitioners, researchers and trainers on international negotiation. It publishes books and
organises roadshows, as well as the newsletter PINpoints (twice a year). Subscription to
PINpoints is free of charge, write to pin@iiasa.ac.at. Members of its Steering Committee:
Mark Anstey (South Africa, sociologist), Rudolf Avenhaus (Gemany, mathematician), Franz
Cede (Austria, international lawyer) Guy-Olivier Faure (France, sociologist), Fen Hampson
(Canada, political scientist), Paul Meerts (Netherlands, political scientist), Gunnar Sjöstedt
(Sweden, professor, economist), William Zartman, (US, political scientist). Contact person is
mr. Ariel Macaspac Penetrante, email: macaspac@iiasa.ac.at. PINpoints can be obtained as
hard copy or downloaded from www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/PIN.
Workbook on International Negotiation 2010
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A/RES/53/101
20 January 1999
Fifty-third session
Agenda item 149
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
[on the report of the Sixth Committee (A/53/630)]
53/101. Principles and guidelines for international negotiations
The General Assembly,
Recalling the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Reaffirming the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations 1 and of the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes,2
Taking into account the objectives of the United Nations Decade of International Law,
Considering that international negotiations constitute a flexible and effective means for, among
other things, the peaceful settlement of disputes among States and for the creation of new
international norms of conduct,
Bearing in mind that in their negotiations States should be guided by the relevant principles and
rules of international law,
Conscious of the existence of different means of peaceful settlement of disputes, as enshrined in
the Charter and recognized by international law, and reaffirming, in this context, the right of free
choice of those means,
Bearing in mind the important role that constructive and effective negotiations can play in
attaining the purposes of the Charter by contributing to the management of international relations,
the peaceful settlement of disputes and the creation of new international norms of conduct of
States,
Noting that the identification of principles and guidelines of relevance to international
negotiations could contribute to enhancing the predictability of negotiating parties, reducing
uncertainty and promoting an atmosphere of trust at negotiations,
Recognizing that the following could offer a general, non-exhaustive frame of reference for
negotiations,
1
Resolution 2625 (XXV), annex
Resolution 37/10, annex
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1. Reaffirms the following principles of international law which are of relevance to international
negotiations:
(a) Sovereign equality of all States, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social,
political or other nature;
(b) States have the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any
State, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
(c) States have the duty to fulfil in good faith their obligations under international law;
(d) States have the duty to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
(e) Any agreement is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force
in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter;
(f) States have the duty to cooperate with one another, irrespective of the differences in
their political, economic and social systems, in the various spheres of international
relations, in order to maintain international peace and security and to promote
international economic stability and progress, the general welfare of nations and
international cooperation free from discrimination based on such differences;
(g) States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;
2. Affirms the importance of conducting negotiations in accordance with international law in a
manner compatible with and conducive to the achievement of the stated objective of negotiations
and in line with the following guidelines:
(a) Negotiations should be conducted in good faith;
(b) States should take due account of the importance of engaging, in an appropriate
manner, in international negotiations the States whose vital interests are directly affected
by the matters in question;
(c) The purpose and object of all negotiations must be fully compatible with the principles
and norms of international law, including the provisions of the Charter;
(d) States should adhere to the mutually agreed framework for conducting negotiations;
(e) States should endeavor to maintain a constructive atmosphere during negotiations and
to refrain from any conduct which might undermine the negotiations and their progress;
(f) States should facilitate the pursuit or conclusion of negotiations by remaining focused
throughout on the main objectives of the negotiations;
(g) States should use their best endeavors to continue to work towards a mutually
acceptable and just solution in the event of an impasse in negotiations.
83rd plenary meeting
Adopted 8 December 1998
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THE NINE-DOT EXERCISE
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The challenge in this exercise is to connect all nine dots above by using no more
than four straight, connected lines. Once you begin drawing your lines, you should
not lift your pen off of the paper, and you are not allowed to retrace your lines.
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