“MAPping The Future” Column in the INQUIRER – 28 December 2009 and 4 January 2010
Letter to COMELEC on the
General Instructions for Automated Election System
By Christian S. Monsod
In a meeting with Honorable Commissioner Rene Sarmiento, we were asked to submit and present our Comments
to the Commission, the date of which was later determined to be no later than December 3, 2009, considering the
very tight schedule.
Our Comments consist of two parts: (1) a general comments on the substance or scope of the GIs; and (2)
comments/suggestions on specific provisions of the Instructions.
(1) General Comments on Substance/Scope of the GIs
(a) The GI for BEI does not provide the continuity plan, i.e. the back-up/contingency system that the
Commission should put in place, pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. No. 9369, in eventualities such as - the
machines are not in place, or do not function, or do not print, or do not transmit.
We, therefore, suggest that the procedures for the back-up/contingency system be already included in the
GI so that they could be immediately incorporated in the briefings, training programs and education
campaigns to be conducted by the Commission, its citizens arms, as well as other groups committed help
in undertaking voter education. Their inclusion as part of the GI would also help in allaying concerns
about a so-called “Failure of Elections” scenario.
In the Harvard Club Forum held in August 2009, as well as in other public fora, the presentors of the
Commission have been saying that the continuity plan includes a manual count of the OMR paper ballots
by the BEI and a manual tallying of votes using a precinct election return (ER). In that forum, Executive
Director Jose Tolentino Jr. said that, since the Commission still intended to automate the canvassing or
vote consolidation, the votes tallied presumably in an election return would be converted into electronic
data by encoding them at the precinct level, with the electronic data thereafter being transmitted
electronically and canvassed in accordance with the Automated Election System protocol. Since this is
something new to the BEIs and to the other stakeholders, all the more reason why the GI, with the
continuity plan, should immediately be disseminated.
(a) The GI’s also do not include the protocol that the Commission must adopt to implement a Random
Manual Audit as required under Section 24 of R.A. 9369. We believe that the same should already be
included and the procedure for the audit should already be clearly spelled-out in the GIs.
We understand that there is yet no clear consensus within the Commission as to whether the Random
Manual Audit should be done after proclamation of winners, or “parallel” to the official machine count.
In this regard, we strongly urge the Commission to implement a “parallel” random manual audit as that is
what we believe to be the real intent of the law. We believe that the post proclamation audit referred to in
Section 27 of R.A. 9369 (or Section 33 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369) is different from the
parallel random manual audit called for in Section 24 of RA 9369 (or Section 29 of RA 8436, as amended
by RA 9369). The former states that the comprehensive assessment and evaluation of the automated
election system used should include:
……"2. An evaluation of their accuracy through a comparison of a
random sample of the AES election results with a manual tabulation, and
the conduct of similar tests;”
The purpose of the post-proclamation audit is to come up with recommendations to Congress on how to
improve the AES in future elections, as contrasted with the purpose of the parallel audit under Section 24,
which is to validate the results of the 2010 elections for proclaiming the real winners. Section 24,
provides:
“Section 24. A new Section 29 is hereby provided, as follows:
“Sec. 29. Where the AES is used, there shall be a random manual audit in
one precinct per congressional district randomly chosen by the Commission
in each province and city. Any difference between the automated and manual
count will result in the determination of root cause and initiate a manual
count for those precincts affected by the computer or procedural error."
We submit that the intent of this provision is to provide a system for correcting any computer or
procedural error before any proclamation is made on the position, or positions, under question.
Otherwise, why require a “determination of root cause” and “initiate a manual count for the precincts
affected”? This provision is one of the critical safeguards on the accuracy of the count, about which there
will naturally be reservations even with a comprehensive education campaign. We realize that a parallel
random manual audit may result in some delay in the proclamation. But a delay of maybe two days from
the target of two to three days will still be an exceptional achievement for the Commission and the AES,
compared to the 30-40 days it took in previous elections to proclaim the president and vice-president
under the manual process. And as we all can agree, the most important objectives of an automated
election system are both speed AND accuracy. Credible elections can only be achieved if the vote count is
accurate and believed to be so by the people.
As part of our objective in assisting the Commission the best way we can, we attach as Annex A for your
consideration as a starting point for further review and discussions a proposal for a random manual audit,
including detailed audit procedures, which were drafted by the MAP Election Committee and Namfrel
after several meetings with the Comelec.
(b) Comments on Specific Provisions
As regards our comments on each of the specific sections of the draft forwarded to us, we also attach
hereto as Annex B a paper listing said comments.
We reiterate our appreciation for having been given the opportunity to recommend to you suggestions which we
believe can help make the 2010 automated elections a success. We look forward to a fruitful collaboration in
achieving our common objective.
Very truly yours,
NAMFREL
MAP ELECTION COMMITTEE
LENTE
LIBERTAS
cc: Hon. Rene V. Sarmiento
Commissioner
Hon. Gregorio Larrazabal
Commissioner, Chair Steering Committee
Hon. Jose Tolentino Jr.
Executive Director and Chair, Project Management Committee
Hon. Ferdinand Rafanan
Director IV, Law Department
ANNEX A
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9369
AMENDING RA 8436, BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
AND RA 7166 ETC.
New Section 29 – RANDOM MANUAL AUDIT
PROPOSED MANUAL AUDIT PROCESS
BACKGOUND: The provision of RA No. 9369 pertaining to the “Random Manual Audit” reads as follows:
Section 24. A new Section 29 is hereby provided to read as follows:
“Section 29. Random Manual Audit – where the AES is used, there shall
be a random manual in
one precinct per congressional district randomly
chosen by the Commission in each province and city. Any difference
between the automated and
manual count will result in the determination of the root cause and initiate a manual count for those precincts
affected by the computer or procedural error."
To implement the foregoing New Section 29 of RA 9369 we propose the following:
Timing of the Manual Audit
The manual audit shall be performed at the randomly selected sample precincts immediately after voting
is completed but before the ballot box is closed and sealed. The audit process should be completed, including the
resolution of differences between the automated and manually determined results before the ER’s are completed
and transmitted.
Assignment
The manual audit process shall be performed by the Board of Electoral Inspectors together with the
officially designated representatives of the Citizens’ Arm (NAMFREL).
Audit Objectives
Precinct Level
The audit shall ascertain whether all and only valid and official ballots have been accurately tabulated at
the precinct level and reported in the Election Return.
Municipal or City Level
That all and only official Election Returns have been accurately and completely transmitted and
canvassed at the Municipal or City level.
Provincial Level
That all and only official Municipal/City Certificates of Canvass (CoC) have been accurately and
completely transmitted and canvassed at the Provincial level.
National Level
That all and only official Provincial Certificates of Canvass have been accurately and completely
transmitted and canvassed at the National level.
Error Conditions
Any of the following errors in the AES results would result in differences between the manual audit
results and the automated results:
Precinct Level
Error in tabulated votes for a candidate indicated on the Election Returns.
 Error in mathematical summation:
o
o
o
Erroneous totals
Zero count where there is/are votes
Others
 Inclusion of fictitious or invalid ballots
 Exclusion of valid ballots
 Misposting of votes
o
Vote (s) for one candidate posted as vote (s) for another candidate – or not counted at all
Municipal Level
Error in ER Canvassing of Municipal /City level:




Error in mathematical summation
Inclusion of fictitious or invalid ER’s
Exclusion of valid ER’s
Misposting of votes
Provincial/National Level




Error in mathematical summation
Inclusion of fictitious or invalid CoC’s
Exclusion of valid CoC’s
Misposting of votes
Sampling Plan
For this purpose it is suggested that the COMELEC consult professional statisticians such as those from
the UP Statistical Center.
Population (suggested)
 The sampling population shall include all voting precincts in the Philippines. Risk rating of precincts
may vary but stratification may not be necessary for this purpose.
 Stratification
No stratification is needed.
Sample size will be 1 clustered precinct in each district chosen randomly.
Sampling Unit - Precinct
Sample Selection Method – Random using a randomizing formula
Audit Procedures
Audit at Precinct Level
1. Verify validity and completeness of votes in ballot box.
a. Check whether ballot number falls under the number series of ballots issued by the precinct.
b. Perform a sequence check on ballot numbers. Identify missing, duplicate or out-of range ballots
c. Verify votes that exceed the number of candidates to be chosen per position. Consider such
ballot as invalid.
2. Manually tally votes on valid ballots.
3. Compare manual totals with computerized Election Return (ER) duly signed by all authorized persons.
4. In the event of discrepancies, determine the root cause/s of differences.
5. Discuss action required with Comelec (Board of Electoral Inspectors) based on the root cause of
differences. Action required will depend on the nature of the root cause of the difference (s) identified. If
the cause of difference is minor and deemed to be isolated, the machine counts for all precincts in the
district are presumed to be correct.
If the cause is systemic and found repeatedly in all or most of the samples, all the precincts in the
district shall be deemed to have the same or similar errors and should all be subjected to a recount
before results are transmitted.
Audit at Municipal/City Level
1. Using the ER of the audited precincts above, compare the precinct total votes per candidate with
corresponding numbers used in the Municipal/City canvassing (e.g., using the ER file directly transmitted
to the Citizen Arm).
2. Perform the following automated tests on all ERs for the test-Municipality/City
a. Total ER valid votes per position <= Total voters
b. Total ER valid votes per position <= Total ballots issued
3. Re-perform the summarization of the ER file for the Municipality or City independently.
4. Compare the totals per audit versus the computerized Certificate of Canvass (CoC) for the Municipality
or City that has been duly signed by all authorized persons.
5. In the event of discrepancies, determine the root cause/s of differences.
6. Discuss action required with Comelec based on the root cause of differences.
7. Defer further processing of CoC’s until the root cause of differences is determined and resolved
satisfactorily.
Audit at Provincial Level
1. Using the CoCs of the audited municipalities/cities above, compare the total votes per candidate with
corresponding numbers used in the Provincial canvassing (e.g., using the CoC file directly transmitted to
the Citizen Arm).
2. Perform the following automated tests on each and every Municipal CoCs for the test-Province
a. Total valid votes per position <= Total voters
b. Total valid votes per position <= Total ballots issued
3. Re-perform the summarization of the Municipal CoC files for the Province.
4. Compare the totals per audit versus the computerized Certificate of Canvass (CoC) for the Province that
has been duly signed by all authorized persons.
5. In the event of discrepancies, determine the root cause/s of differences and discuss with COMELEC.
Audit at National Level
1. Using the CoCs of the audited provinces above, compare the total votes per candidate with corresponding
numbers used in the National canvassing (or using the CoC file directly transmitted to the Citizen Arm).
2. Perform the following automated tests on all Provincial CoCs for the test-Province
a. Total valid votes per position <= Total voters
b. Total valid votes per position <= Total ballots issued
3. Re-perform the summarization of the Provincial CoC files.
4. Compare the totals per audit versus the computerized National Certificate of Canvass (CoC)
5. In the event of discrepancies, determine the root cause/s of differences and discuss with COMELEC.
ANNEX B
(A) COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC PROVISIONS - GI FOR BEIs
Sec 9:
 The provision needs to be updated to reflect the COMELEC’s recent decision to increase the number of
precincts per cluster to 7
On Sec 15:
 Given that each cluster may include a max of 7 precincts, it is quite probable that the 3rd paragraph of Sec
15 will apply in many clustered precincts on Election Day. The said paragraph states that only one
watcher from the citizen’s arm will be present in the polling place. In the event that par 3 will be applied,
who will choose the watcher to be present in the polling place from among the different accredited
citizen’s arms of the COMELEC
On Sec 18:
 It should be noted that BEIs will not be given any forms for preparing an election return manually. It
should be noted that Form A9-TS refers to 1 copy of an election return but this will be used during the
testing and sealing of the machine, not on election day. So, in the event that the machines in the polling
place are unable to print the required ERs how will the BEIs produce the ERs? Will the BEI be authorized
to make their own ERs manually using any available paper in the area or will the COMELEC have extra
election forms available in case ERs need to be prepared manually?
On Sec 30:
 There should probably be an express provision in the rules which defines the term “illiterate and disabled
voters.” If the intention is to minimize/limit the number of voters who can avail of assistors, it should be
made clear that not knowing how the machine works or not knowing how to fill the ballot will not entitle
a voter to assistance. Experience in ARMM showed that BEI often assisted the voters because many
complained that they did not know what to do with the machine/paper ballot given to them since we were
using a new system. This practice compromised the secrecy of the ballot, and is something pollwatchers
should seek to prevent. It should be noted that RA 9369 defines a disabled voter as “a person with
impaired capacity to use the AES”. Some people would argue that “Impaired capacity” could include
people who don’t know how to use the machine or how to fill up the new ballot. These would include
members of vulnerable sectors such as indigenous peoples, who are first time voters and may not be
reached by the voter’s education program. However, the law does not appear to allow this.
 Maybe the COMELEC could place some form of voter’s education material (i.e. a tutorial video played
on a loop) outside the polling place to teach voters how to properly fill in the ballots and what they have
to do once they enter their respective precincts.
On Sec 33:
 Will the testing of the machines be done simultaneously or one at a time?
o If it will be done simultaneously, where will it be done? (does this mean that the machines will
already be set up at their respective polling places 3 days before election day for purposes of
testing? If so, security of the machines for the entire 3-day period might be difficult to manage.
Does COMELEC have enough manpower/resources to secure all the machines, or do they expect
the watchers to take charge of securing the machines (as they said on TV)?
o If it will be done one at a time, is there really enough time to test all the machines?
On Sec 36:
 If the BEI chair fails to remove the coupon before the ballot is fed into the PCOS, how will the ballot be
treated? Is there a procedure to allow the BEI or any authorized person to try to retrieve the ballot to
verify things listed under Sec 36 b2?
On Sec 37:
 Is the “no replacement ballot” policy legal? The Omnibus Election Code expressly allows the voter to get
a replacement ballot in case “a voter should accidentally spoil or deface a ballot in such a way that it
cannot lawfully be used” (Sec 197, OEC). There isn’t anything in RA 9369 which amended or expressly
repealed this provision and a COMELEC Resolution cannot repeal the law. Moreover, the “no
replacement ballot” policy may disenfranchise a lot of voters.
 When a ballot is rejected, will the voter be given an explanation as to why it was rejected? If not, how
will he know how to protest the rejection of his ballot?
 Will there be SMARTMATIC personnel present in every polling place to explain why a particular ballot
has been rejected?
 The procedure is silent on when the BEI will retrieve and review the contents of the rejected ballots since
the procedure for counting does not even mention the rejected ballots. If the rejected ballots will never be
counted, what’s the point of filing a written objection/protest?
On Sec 39 (Procedure for Counting and Transmission):
 Is this a typo in par a and in par b.? Sec 32 does not contain a par 4. On the assumption that it is referring
to Sec 34 (which is likely ), par 4 only talks about the BEI Chairman plugging in the machine and
entering his security key. The entering of the PIN codes by the other BEI members is discussed in other
paragraphs. This may be a minor matter but it would help if the rules spelled out the procedure to be
followed by the BEI; otherwise the BEI might take shortcuts and compromise the security of the votes.
 The rules should spell out the contingency plans so that the BEIs and the watchers will know what to
expect in case the machine fails to count or transmit. The phrase “undertake the necessary corrective
measures” does not really tell us anything.
o What will be done if the PCOS machine refuses to accept any of the ballots being fed to it, even if
they are valid?
o When will the BEI resort to using the machines from other precincts (assuming that this is even
possible)?
o When will the BEI resort to using one of the extra PCOS machines the COMELEC has on
standby?
o If they will resort to using the extra machines, do the ballots have to be re-fed into the new
machine? If so, who will feed the ballots into the new machine? Shouldn’t the GI answer these
questions?
 NOTE: there are 2 provisions labeled Section 39
On Sec 42:
 What will be done with the PCOS machines? Will they be left at the polling place or delivered to the
treasurer together with the ballot box?
NOTE: The GI jumps from sec 43 to sec 61
Sec 61 is just a repetition of Sec 42 with a few changes. So, which provision will be followed?
(B) COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC PROVISIONS - GI FOR CANVASSING
On Sec 9:
 Why is the composition of the BOCs made known only on May 5, 2010? In past elections, such
information was made public at least a month before the election (in 2007, composition of BOCs was
announced on April 9, 2007). Won’t the late notice make it more difficult to verify the qualifications of
the members of the BOCs?
On Sec 19:

Par 4 of Sec 19 states that “The citizens’ arm accredited by the Commission, and civic, religious,
professional, business, service, youth and other similar organizations shall collectively, with prior
authority of the Commission, be entitled to two (2) watchers to serve alternately.”
o Does this mean that only one citizen’s arm will be accredited by the COMELEC to be present
during the canvassing process?
o Does this sentence also mean that no matter how many citizen’s arms groups and other civic
society groups may be present, ALL of them will only have 1 watcher present during the
canvassing at any given time?

Par c allows watchers, without distinction, to file protests before the BOC. If I remember correctly, the
OEC only allows watchers of candidates/political parties to file protests and pre-proc controversies. Does
sec 19 constitute legal basis to allow watchers of citizen’s arms to file protests and pre-proc controversies
before the BOCs as well?
On Sec 23:
 Since the electronically transmitted results will serve as the official results of the elections, when will the
BOCs actually refer to the printed ERs and COCs? The present procedure does not provide for any
instance when and for what purpose the printed copies of the ERs and COCs will be used.
On sec 24:
 COMELEC expanded the prohibition against pre-proclamation controversies to all elective officials when
the OEC only applies this prohibition to National Elective Positions. Is this legal?
On Sec 29:
 Par e refers to a USB key as a backup source for the electronic results, but the GI for BEIs refer to a
memory card to be used as a backup source. Which type of technology will be used as a backup, a USB
key or a memory card?
On Sec 34:
 Par 3 is incomplete. It merely states: “After determining that the untransmitted election return/precinct
results can no longer be electronically transmitted. In the latter case, check the results per precinct to
determine whether the complete results have been transmitted;” What is the MBOC supposed to do after
determining that the results can no longer be transmitted? Do we assume that they will follow the same
procedure as the PBOC and refer to the backup copy of the results in the USB/memory card?
 NOTE: same comment applies to Sec 37 and 41
On Art VII:
 Why is there a special procedure for Taguig-Pateros?
On Sec 47:
 Is COMELEC empowered to define a new election offense via a mere resolution? Or is the offense of
electoral sabotage already covered by existing election offenses, in which case this provision is redundant
and unnecessary?
 RA 9369 defines and punishes the crime of electoral sabotage, but the acts enumerated under RA9369 are
different from the acts enumerated under Sec 47 of the GI.
(This letter to the COMELEC was sent jointly by NAMFREL, MAP Working Group for Elections, LENTE and
LIBERTAS. Atty. Monsod, former Chair of the COMELEC, coordinated the drafting of the letter. He no longer
sits on the MERALCO Board but continues serving as Consultant. Feedback at map@globelines.com.ph. For
previous articles, please click
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