Constitutional Arrangements and the Structure of Civil
Society: Still Relevant after all of these years?
Jennifer L. Bailey
Dept. of Sociology and Political Science
Norwegian University of Science and Technology1
This paper looks at NGOs in a comparative context. It asks whether the landscape of NGOs
within the industrialized western democracies varies by countries in ways that fit with be
broad constitutional configurations of those countries. Much comparative politics literature
has focused on the constitutional differences among these countries, other literature focuses
on differences in relations between the state and the market (Schmidt 2002); still others look
at the formal relationships of labor-business and the state. This paper places the emphasis
most squarely on other actors in this governance of societies: interest groups. More
specifically, the paper examines interests groups that fall outside of the focus on traditional
interest groups. It looks exclusively at advocacy groups, here, environmental advocacy
groups. For simplicity and in agreement with much popular usage, these will here be called
Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOs).
Does the landscape of environmental advocacy groups vary to fit the differences in
constitutions? There are many reasons why it should: the key idea of the “political
opportunity structure” is that they “influence the choice of protest strategies and the impact of
social movements on their environment” (Kitschelt 1986). A country’s constitution (in the
broader sense of the nature of its governing institutions) is a description of the distribution of
power within a country.
Groups that seek to influence the policies that emerge from these
structures should in some be impacted by their engagement with them. Governments make
laws and arrangements that shape and regulate these groups, usually in such ways that
existing structures are privileged. Advocacy groups must conform in order to legal and to
have influence. Finally, to the extent that the existing structures of government are
1
Paper prepared for the National Conference in Political Science ("Nasjonal fagkonferanse i
statsvitenskap"), Trondheim, January 3.-5.2007.
1
legitimate, groups that engage with them and mirror them are more likely to be seen as
legitimate as well.
There are other reasons why we should not expect any significant variation. First,
advocacy groups are a part of the “new social movements” that consciously sought to avoid
replicating the old ways of doing things. They were consciously anti-establishment. Second,
these are often a part of international movements. They are a part of an increasingly
globalized civil society, and many work closely with organizations from a variety of other
countries on a regular basis. This suggests that they may absorb as many impulses –
including institutional imperatives -- from international or foreign contexts as from their
home countries. Finally, we may legitimately ask whether the famous constitutional
differences among the western democracies are really significant any longer. This is
especially the case for those many industrial democracies increasing enmeshed in the
European Union. The latter turns out to be surprisingly contested and tricky question, which
is surprising given the amount of ink devoted to elucidating these distinctions in the general
literature.
To investigate these questions, this paper will focus on the United States and Norway.
These two states are representative of different constitutional configurations as well as
distinctive ideological traditions about the proper relationship between the state and civil
society. The paper will first pin down the relevant constitutional features – or Political
Opportunity Structures – and then turn to what I am calling the ENGOs landscape. By this I
mean the general configuration of the ENGO community: the number and type of the NGOs
that exist. For reasons of space and time, the focus here is on only these two countries.
However, in order to draw meaningful conclusions about the general relationship between
constitutional features and ENGOs, the comparison will have to be extended to other
countries. This is the goal of a future version of this paper.
Explaining ENGOs
What constitutional features are relevant for the shaping of ENGOs? There is an enormous
literature addressing the wide range of questions that the word “shape” might imply. Groups
such as these have been studied by the social movement, the political opportunity structure
(POS), and the resource mobilization (RM) literatures. These literatures examine movements
2
and their organizational expressions from a variety of different angles and with a variety of
research questions in mind: how do social movements transform into permanent
organizations? Do movement organizations act differently than other interest groups? What
accounts for their different rates of success? In the process, a wide range of variables have
been drawn upon to explain the development of organizations such as the ENGOs: the
ideological orientation of the groups, the age of the organizations, the resources available to
them, the openness of the political system they confront, the alliance structures of movement
groups. Both the number of case studies and the number of potentially relevant variables have
grown steadily and these often generate contradictory expectations. (Dalton: article)
Eisenger introduced the concept of the political opportunity structure in 1973 (Kriesi
2004). Since then, there have been studies of the relationship between political structures
and social movements and their organizational expression, and scholars have examined the
implications of “closed” and “open” systems (Kitschelt 1986), a characteristic that Dryzek
et al. (2003) have recently picked up, characterizing the US and Norway as open (although
the US is passively and Norway actively so). The POS approach has been theoretically
fruitful but has not proved particularly useful in predicting to the features or success of social
movements. It has run aground on the problems of the number of variables involved and the
question as to what is a fundamental or superficial feature (Rootes 1999).
This paper has a modest goal. It begins with the standard comparative politics
literature on corporatism and pluralism and asks whether this is useful in understanding the
landscape of the ENGO community. This literature is explicitly meant to describe the
general pattern of the relationship between interests groups and formal governmental
structures. By “landscape” I mean the structure of the ENGO community. While it is
tempting to take on such issues as the way these groups behave, their repertoires of action,
the use of symbols and language and their success in achieving their goals – standard
questions within much of social movement, new social movement, and resource mobilization
literature – these are not addressed here.
The question of landscape is a simple one: do pluralist systems general ENGO
communities that look somewhat like that of the more traditional “interest groups” within a
given country? Do pluralist systems have a pluralist-looking ENGO community? Do
corporatist systems have a corporatist-looking ENGO community? Do, then, these basic
concepts in comparative politics literature remain useful in understanding advocacy groups
such as ENGOs?
3
Constitutions
Democracies are a remarkably diverse lot. They solve the problems of representation and
efficiency in different ways, and no two democracies are alike. As different solutions reflect
distinctive political, cultural, historical and ethnic heritages, they in turn perpetuate them.
Democratic political systems distribute power in distinctive ways. These factors shape how
civil society relates to the formal structures of government: how one effects change, where
one applies pressure, what means and methods are considered acceptable. Typologies of
democratic governments focus on the formal structures of government.
Lijphart’s (1999) classificatory scheme has been much used and is very illustrative:
he draws upon 10 elements, which he groups into two main dimensions, distinguishing a
“Westminster model” or “majoritarian” model from a “consensual” one. Lijphart’s (1999:34) 10 elements are: 1) the concentration of executive power, 2) executive-legislative
relationships; 3) two-party versus multi-party systems, 4) majoritarian and disproportional
systems versus proportional systems; 5) pluralist versus corporatist interest group systems, 6).
unitary versus federal government, 7) unicameral vs. bicameral legislatures, 8) flexible versus
rigid constitutions, 9) existence of a judicial review procedure independent of the legislature,
10) the presence of an independent central bank. Given so many different elements with
potentially differing impacts on a social movement and its organizations, what their
combined impact would be in any single case is difficult to predict.
In Lijphart’s scheme, the corporatist-pluralist element is not understood as generated
by the others, but as a separate element in its own right. At the same time, these ten features
tend to generate two basic clusters: the Majoritarian and the consensual democracies. The
Majoritarian model is pluralist and the consensual model is corporatist. The corporatistpluralist character of industrialized democracies may be a clue to the structure of the ENGO
community as well. Any interest group should be impacted by the distribution of power of
the political system—that is, many of the other elements of Lijphart’s scheme -- in which
they are found. Features such as the concentration of executive power, the executivelegislature relationship, the party system, the unitary or federal structure of the central
government, the structure of the national legislature, and judicial review all have to do with
how power is distributed throughout governing institutions.
4
ENGOs are not the same sort of classic interest groups that are traditionally included
in corporatist systems, such as labor unions and employers associations, and so will be
subject to distinctive shaping forces. (The distinction may be less meaningful in the pluralist
system in which such traditional organizations do not have a special relationship with the
formal governing institutions). Even so, they are likely to be shaped by many of the same
environmental forces that impact interest groups. The organization of the country’s interest
group system as a whole then may be a useful indicator for the impact of various
combinations of these features as well as others Lijphart overlooks. And so this paper
compares the structure of the NGO community with that the structure of the interest group
community. By using this approach, the pluralism-corporatism ranking of individual
countries provides a standard against which to measure the ENGO community.
Numerous studies rank countries along the corporatist-pluralist dimensions, and the
United States and Norway are commonly placed at nearly opposite ends of the spectrum. The
United States is universally characterized as pluralistic (Dryzek 2003; Lijphart.1999; Scruggs
1999). Norway is frequently ranked as one of the most corporatist of European states (Dryzek
2003; Lijphart.1999; Siaroff 1999). Dryzek et al. (2003: 22) note that “Norway is normally
classified as among the strongest of corporatist systems” and that “among developed
countries, Norway is the most institutionally integrative of all kinds of organized interests,
not just business.” As late as 1999, Siaroff ranked Norway as among the three considered to
be “strongly corporatist”; the USA was “not at all corporatist, but rather pluralist.” Lijphart
(.1999) again lists the US and Norway as being nearly polar opposites; relying upon Siaroff’s
data for interest group pluralism in which Norway scores as the least pluralist and the US is
ranked forth most pluralist (after Canada, Greece and the UK) (Lijphart 1999, 177).
This approach is hardly without problems. The literature warns that the corporatismpluralism dimension may be too coarse a distinction to be useful. This becomes evident in
the case studies that focus on the ways in which interest and advocacy groups work within
any given country. At a high level of abstraction, the United States is held to be pluralist,
and Norway is usually characterized as relatively corporatist. “Pluralist” and “corporatist”
are also normative ideals, expressions of what the relationship between state, civil society,
and the market should be (Kjellberg nd.).
But the clear distinction among these fades upon close examination. The existence of,
once, iron triangles, and now policy communities as descriptions of how these systems
actually work has blurred the neat distinctions among them. In addition, even the features
5
that once placed Norway with little debate in the corporatist camp are fading. The recent
national evaluation of the state of Norway’s political system characterized Norway as most
prominently a fragmented state rather than possessing the coherence usually suggested by the
corporatist label.
To complicate matters, while international experts happily classify Norway as
corporatist, a recent Norwegian study (Makt- og demokratiutredningen, Evaluation of Power
and Democracy, conducted between 1997 and 2003) concluded that the 1990s witnessed a
fundamental breakdown (“grunnleggende brudd”) of the traditional form of organizational
life in Norway. While some features remain, organizational life has become competitively
organized, less segmented, and links between organizations and the state less dominant
(Østerud 2003). This need not mean that the Norwegian system is now indistinguishable
from a pluralist system, however. Norwegian Trond Nordby recently described the
Norwegian system as “mixed”, retaining significant corporatist features in the negotiations
for salaries and subsidies such as in the area of agriculture and fisheries, and in
“management”, that is, in the formation and operation of commissions to determine policy
(Nordby 1999).
Corporatism and Pluralism
Corporatism and pluralism are different ways in which civil society and the state
interact. Descriptions of these include descriptions both of the structure and shape of the
interest group community on the one hand and the behavior and functions of those groups on
the other. This paper looks exclusively at the structure and shape of the interest groups
community, what I am here calling the “landscape.” For reasons, of data and time, only a
few of the possible contours of this landscape are examined here: the number and size of
ENGOs, their resources and funding, the cooperation and competition among them and their
ideological spread.
Pluralist systems are characterized by a large number of interest groups that tend to
compete against each other. This structure I assume here is the combined product of many
features of the country, many of which may easily pull in different directions. Because these
groups enjoy no special relationship with the state, and they have thereby no source of
structural power that such a relationship would bring. In this situation, lobbying from
6
outside the state would seem to be a key feature of these groups. This in turn implies that
they rely upon a large membership to give them gravitas, and that they need many resources
– members and other material resources such as money, expertise, and information – to make
an impact. They are less able to turn to structural power of the kind Rokkan refers to in the
famous “numbers count but resources decide”. Instead, their numbers are their resources. In
addition, as counterweights to the state, they need to distance themselves somewhat from the
state, with separate sources of income and their own expertise.
The existence of many organizations suggests the operation of organizational
imperatives regarding the survival and expansion of the organization qua organization:
interest groups should be highly competitive among themselves for members in order to
survive and expand. Membership in organizations can be as high as it is in corporatist
systems, but it not concentrated. The competition to attract members suggests barriers to
cooperation among them, since each is driven to justify its existence by claiming credit for
effective action and relies upon membership for power and survival. The interest group
receives no support from the state and must look elsewhere for money: the alternatives are
within civil society itself (membership fees and various kinds of donations) and within the
market, that is, the business sector. Finally, the need to appeal to large numbers should mean
that the majority of groups and particularly the large groups are fairly mainstream in
ideology. However, the pluralist setting is a choice-rich environment in which the “exit”
option for individuals is highly threatening to groups. This stress individual choice suggest
that there will also be many marginal, more idiosyncratic groups that do not have such an
ideology: they knowingly sacrifice the power that numbers bring for purity. These
characteristics should apply to advocacy groups as well as traditional interests groups.
Theoretically, the existence of pluralism should be a decent predictor to the landscape of
ENGOs since no groups are supposed to enjoy a close relationship with the state and they do
not have functions beyond that of persuading the autonomous but neutral state to adopt their
agenda.
The corporatist system is characterized by far fewer interest groups but the groups
here tend to be individually larger. The corporatist system is characterized, too, by peak
organizations that serve as a bridge and key contact point between civil society and the state.
The relatively fewer number of organizations suggests less competitive behavior among
organizations, and an accordingly weaker imperative to attract membership away from other
7
groups. Still, having a large number of members would be an asset to the ENGO, for
lobbying is also important in this system.
The corporatist system also gives the included interest group an important source of
structural power vis a vis civil society: the included group is the avenue by which civil
society interests are inserted into the system. This makes membership in them highly
attractive. Membership in specific interests groups such as unions may even be mandatory.
Environmental groups by their nature – as advocacy groups – do not have the structural
power of the traditional interest group. Their membership is not concentrated in particular
industrial or business sectors and they do not have recourse to weapons such as the strike that
the traditional interest group would have. At the same time they exist in an environment in
which interest groups, the state and the business sector are organized in this way. Predicting
the impact on ENGOs becomes then more difficult: the imperatives of prevailing structures
might lead to and ENGO sector that mirrors the dominant corporatist system. On the other
hand, the essential difference among traditional interest groups and advocacy groups may
mean that there is simply a limit to which these groups can mimic traditional interest groups,
with the result that they turn to other avenues in order to be heard. They could then take on
more pluralist features or turn to extra-legal alternatives. The key variable here might be the
degree to which the political system is open or closed, a feature that strictly speaking lies
outside the determined focus here on the corporatism-pluralism dimension. The open system
accommodates new interests, the closed one does not. Dryzek (et al) characterizes Norway as
an open system (as is the United States). This suggests that ENGOs are included in structures
that still have a strong stamp of corporatism to them. To the degree that that is so, the
attractiveness of those included organizations should be enhanced.
Finally, corporatism and pluralism rest on different governing philosophies. Together
with the structural setting, these philosophies shape interaction with the states. Behind the
pluralistic/adversarial United States is the political tradition of “classic” liberalism in which
the principal division is between government on the one hand and Civil Society on the other.
Civil Society tends in this tradition to mean
anything but government: businesses, schools, clubs, unions, media, churches,
charities, libraries, and other nongovernmental forms of organization through which a
community’s members relate to each other . . . It refers to a cluster of things that bear
a family resemblance to each other but share no common essence, apart from being
distinct from government (Scalet 2002).
8
No surprise then that the denomination “non-governmental organization” (NGO) is
rooted in US literature on Civil Society.
In this tradition, the notion of Civil Society as a counterweight to the state dominates.
The greatest threat to democracy and to Civil Society is seen to emanate from the state, and
elaborate formal institutional arrangements have been made to answer this (separation of
power and checks and balances). The role of the market is in this connection more
ambiguous and under-theorized. To be sure, the potential power of the market is not wholly
ignored, and “modern liberals” or “egalitarian” liberals (Kymlicka 2002) make the case for a
much more activist state to address problems rooted in the private sector. Still the US system
grows out of the classical 18th century version of liberalism and the dominant vision tends to
view the market as a source of strength that gives CS the weight to stand against the state.
The market is accordingly a more acceptable ally than the state. In fact, I would argue, in the
vision of classical liberalism, the market and society tend to collapse into one another. The
result is a pluralist political system, conceptualized in much the same terms as markets with
interests groups competing in much the same manner as do firms. In combination with the
ingrained principle of the sanctity of private property, the market becomes not a threat, but
the source of liberation from a (barely) necessary evil (Wills 1999), the state.
In the continental European tradition, I propose (following Sabine 1952), the principal
threat to democracy differs. While need to safeguard liberty lies at the heart of the AngloAmerican tradition, the need to combat of inequality lies at the heart of the continental
European tradition. And whereas civil society, in alliance with the market, stands as the
guardian of liberty for the first tradition, it is exactly these that pose the greatest threat to
equality according to the second. In the line of thought that leads from Rousseau through
Hegel and on to Habermas, the state broadly conceived is the arena of politics in which the
individual rises above private (and thereby necessarily corrupted) interest. Here, “a private
association of citizens, merely because it is private, is inimical to the public interest”
(Ehrenberg 1999; Kymlicka 2002; Sabine 1952).
Underlying all models of democratic corporatism, it seems fair to say, is a closer
working relationship among the points of the triangle made up of the state, civil society and
the market:
corporatism is characterized by both a high level policy concentration and interest
aggregation/representation along functional lines. Government policy makers consult
extensively at various levels of the policy process, with a small number of ‘peak
9
associations’, hierarchically organized, encompassing and functionally distinct
interest associations (Scruggs, 1999:3).
Focusing on what he proposes to be a distinctly Scandinavian heritage, (Targårdh 1997)
proposes that the underlying Nordic political tradition is that of “statist individualism”2 in
which individuals find in the state a natural ally against the market that is the most potent
source of danger to the democracy. It is the market or the economic sector that produces
inequality and injustice in society. In this tradition, there is much more theoretical space for a
common good that is not the sum of or generated by the various particularistic goods. Its
manifestation is the political style often associated with the democratic corporatist state – the
style of low voltage, more consensual politics: in essence, the stronger notion of limitations
on the pursuit of the individual good. In this tradition, there is much greater space for a state
with a larger, and more independent role.
ENGO Landscapes
This section is still some what preliminary.
It relies very heavily on two sources. The
American data is drawn largely from the study by Brulle (2000) who collected systematic
data on 87 US environmental organizations. The Norwegian data comes from the 1995
Environmental Survey (Stømsnes 1995) and related publications. The Norwegian survey
focused on 12 of the “most central environmental organizations in Norway.” This data has
been supplemented by some more recent data. This is, however, incomplete.
The number of ENGOs
A snapshot of the landscape of US environmental organizations lends some support to the
notion that the pluralist organization of interest groups is also reflected in the organization of
the environmental movement. There is a wide range of environmental organizations from
which the potential environmental enthusiast may choose. Brulle 2000 (102-4) states that
over 10,000 environmentally oriented organizations are registered with the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) as tax-exempt organizations. Of these, he finds 6,164 groups dedicated to the
Trägårdh (1997:255) writes that “Nordic political cultures, although at a superficial level similar to those of
“the West,” in fact differ rather dramatically at the level of first principles”.
2
10
preservation of national resources3, 742 dedicated to combating or preventing pollution, 381
concerned with land acquisition for preservation, 410 concerned with wildlife sanctuary or
refuge, 352 concerned with ecology of conservation advocacy, and hundreds of others. It is
noteworthy from the perspective of this paper that there are many organizations in all
categories. This basic picture is confirmed by other sources: The 1991 Conservation
Directory (NWF 1991) lists approximately 500 larger groups and the most recent on-line
National Environmental Directory has listings for over 13,000 (National Environmental
Directory 2006). Brulle (2000: 107) notes that environmental groups far out number civil
rights groups (3,169 registered) and peace groups (5,846 registered).
Since many small groups do not register with the IRS, such a figure underestimates
the total number of groups in the United States. This may be particularly important in the US
context since the environmental movement there is characterized and energized by many
local, ad hoc and ephemeral groups. Carmin (1999) in particular stresses the number of these
groups and their importance to the US environmental movement as a whole. Schlosberg
(1999), writing on the environmental justice movement in the United States, emphasizes its
diversity. The plurality of the movement, with its local orientation and diverse tactics, is
understood as “strategic advantages in organizing.”
On the other hand, there is a relatively limited number of large, relatively wellfinanced national organizations that do tend to dominate the environmental movement. In
1981, for example, many of the major groups organized themselves as the Group of 10 or the
Big Ten. Even so, Brulle still finds that there are fully 280 environmental groups with
budgets of over a million dollars. The US certainly does seem to have a pluralistic
environmental movement, giving the potential activist or supporter a rich choice
environment.
It is surprisingly difficult to get hard numbers for much smaller Norway. The Forum
for Environment and Development (ForUM for utvikling og miljø) brings 54 organizations
together under the banner of sustainable development, but this list is too broad to be really
useful in this context, including as it does many groups that simply have a green aspirations
along side their primary concerns (such as the small radical party, the Red Voting Alliance)
(FUM 2006). The Norwegian ENGO the Future in Our Hands provides a large list of links to
Norwegian groups and this paper estimates a rough number of Norwegian groups based on
this list. Excluding explicitly official bodies and political parties gives us a list an admittedly
3
These are IRS categories. Each category has a distinctive IRS code.
11
crude list of roughly 59. However, deciding what bodies to include is a key difficulty
precisely because the public-private distinction is not a sharp one.
The Norwegian NGO landscape is somewhat like we might expect in a corporatist
setting but is certainly not an exact fit, and the small size of the country obviously has an
impact here. Only of few of the Norwegian organizations dominate the landscape. The
Norwegian Society for the Preservation of Nature (Norges Naturvernforbund, NNV), the
Norwegian chapter of Friends of the Earth, is the most senior of the explicitly environmental
groups and was once the largest. It stands in the center of a web of relationships. As NNV
material describes it, Nature and Youth (Natur and Ungdom) is an independent (frittståend)
youth organization but has formal links to NNV. Blekkulf’s Environmental Detectives
(Blekkulfs Mijødetektiver) is the corresponding children's organization (NNV 2006). While
the occupation of niches based on age among these dominant organizations is at least
reminiscent of organizations of the corporatist system, alternatives to membership in these do
exist. This is hardly surprising because these organizations don't have the traditional role of
interest groups in this system in distributing specific goods among its members. There is thus
no direct personal cost to "exit".
There seems to be one principal rival to NNV, The Future in Our Hands (Fremtid i
våre hender, FIVH). They are today roughly the same size, with FIVH today claiming a
larger membership than NNV (20,850 compared to 20,000) (FIVH 2006; NNV 2006). As
subsequent sections will explain, FIVH looks increasingly like US activist groups. Bellona
has a high profile in the country, but this is a foundation rather than a mass membership
organization as are NNV and FIVH.
The major Norwegian environmental groups examined by Strømsnes et al. (1995) are
listed in Table 1. Beyond FIVH, alternatives are either fairly small groups or are not directly
competitive with NNV and FIVH. They have different niches. The largest of all
organizations listed is The Norwegian Trekking Association (Den Norske Turistforening),
which is first and foremost dedicated to outdoors activities. Over the years it has become
more concerned with environmental issues but remains primarily concerned with out door
activities and is not considered to be a competitor to the usual ENGOs. Greenpeace Norden
has traditionally been small, although today claims more Norwegian members than ever
(3000 as opposed to the 600-1000 figure usually attributed to them) (Greenpeace-Norden
2006). The Bellona Foundation (Miljøstiftelsen Bellona) is not a membership organization
but claimed 3000 supporters in 1996. It is a very active organization and its leader, Frederic
12
Hauge one of the most prominent environmentalist personalities in Norway. But Bellona is
distinctive from the other ENGOs and considered by many to be outside of the environmental
“movement” as such. The WWF-Norway claims a membership of 6000 in 2007 (WWFNorge 2006). Environmental home defense (Miljøheimvernet) is mostly an association of
many organizations that are not environmental groups per se but wish to support
environmental activities. (Strømsnes et al 199?) Miljøvernforbund, which styles itself as the
"Green Warriors of Norway" is a small group based in Bergen (about 1,500 paying
members). It does not seem to claim an official membership, but encourages individuals to
pledge to undertake specific environmentally-friendly activities.
Table 1 about here
Given the fact that the US is the third largest country in the world in terms of
population (now over 300 million) and Norway is one of the smallest (with a population of
just over 4.6 million), the number of organizations should indeed differ. So we turn to
primitive statistics, and an old Norwegian favorite, to better compare: the per capita
calculation. Using a conservative figure of 10,000 organizations for the US, I find that a
Norway comparably populated with ENGOs would have approximately 150 ENGOs. My
most generous list yields only 59 (see above).
The numbers problem is however further complicated by comparing the federal nature
United States to unitary Norway. This US feature (as well as shear size) may serve to
multiply the levels at which citizens organize themselves, which in turn inflates the numbers
of groups. In Norway, it seems that the aspect of local democracy is covered by the chapter
organization of the major groups. Counting chapters separately would bring Norway closer to
the 150 figure. Still, the organization of local groups within national organizations with a
national board and leadership at least recalls corporatist organization principals. While some
US ENGOS, such as the Sierra Club and the Audubon also share this organization, these
local chapters are just a few among many at this level.
13
Table 1
Norwegian Environmental Organizations
Organization
Year of
Number of
founding
members
Den Norske
Turistforening
1995
Framtiden I våre
hender (FIVH)
1995
2001
2007
1868
Greenpeace
1971
Chapters
Source of
Funding
Staff
47%
members;
29.6% state
support;
8.9% Lottery
2.6%; private
support
18 (including
one person
doing
alternative
service)
Private
donations
8
42
180,000
1974
20,000
15,000
20,850
30
600
3,100
140
2007
Kvinner og Miljø
1991
Miljøheimevernet
1991
1995
50,000
Miljøstiftelsen Bellona
1986
1995
3000
2007
?
Natur og Ungdom
1995
6000
1999
1967
6500
2007
5000
NOAH
1989
1995
700
Norges
Naturvernforbund
1914
1999
20,000
1995
30,000
2007
20,000
Økologisk
Landbrukslag (Norsk
Økologisk
1971
1200
Landbruklag)
1995
WWF
Verdens naturfond
1970
1995
6000
2001
4000
2007
>6000
Miljøvernforbund
1993
1500 “paying
(Green Warriors of
members”
Norway
Source: Reppen 1996?, various home pages accessed year indicated
14
60% from
business
14 unpaid
130
12
100
21
32
“self
financed”
15, status
unknown
The size of ENGOs
It is difficult to count the membership of US (or any) environmental movement as a whole.
In the US, “[s]ince number of members is a measure of an organization’s political strength,
there is an incentive to exaggerate it” (Brulle 2000:242). One can add that since there are no
legal implications to exaggerating the number members, there is little barrier to doing so.
Brulle (2000: 242) reports that the total membership of environmental organizations in the
United States is between 19 and 41 million. Relying on IRS data for tax exempt
organizations, he examined 87 of the major American environmental groups.4
These he
groups into 7 categories based on their ideological stance. Of these, two, the Wildlife
Management5 and the Preservation6 categories are clearly the largest in terms of membership
with Reform Environmentalism7 in third place.
Table 2
Distribution of members by discourse
Category
Wildlife
Management
Conservation
Preservation
Reform
Environmentalism
Deep Ecology
Environmental
Members
5,168,120
Number of
Percentage of
organizations
sample
surveyed
membership
7
42.3
Average per
Organization
861,353
1.063,000
3,977,115
1,915,400
8
18
31
8.7
32.6
15.7
132,575
248,570
95,770
62,400
18,775
8
9
0.5
0.2
12,480
3,755
4
Much of his data were obtained from their tax returns to the Internal Revenue Service (“Return of
Organizational Exempt From Income Tax”, form (IRS 990). This data set is known to underestimate corporate
grants and Brulle has adjusted for this estimating income by extrapolating from the organizations’ annual reports
(Brulle 2000: 285-9). More current tax returns for some of these organizations can be viewed at the Foundation
Center at http://foundationcenter.org/. Many organizations post these on their homepage.
5
The groups in this category were: Boone & Crockett Club, Ducks Unlimited Incorporated, National Wildlife
Federation, Quail Unlimited Inc., Rock Mountain Elk Foundation, Trout Unlimited, Whitetails Unlimited.
6
Among these 18 are some that are quite well known, and some of these are members of the Big Ten:
Appalachian Mountain Club, the Audubon Naturalist Society of the Central Atlantic States, Conservation
International Foundation, Defenders of Wildlife, International Wildlife Foundation, the Mono Lake Committee,
the National Audubon Society Inc., National Parks and Conservation Association, Nature Conservancy Inc.,
North American Bluebird Society, North American Wildlife Foundation Inc., Save the Redwoods League,
Sierra Club, Treepeople Inc., Wilderness Society, Wildlife Conservation Society, Wildlife Society, World
Wildlife Fund Inc.
7
He includes 31 of these organizations, including some of more famous of the US groups and the Big Ten:
Earth Island Institute Inc, Environmental Defense Fund Incorporated, Friends of the Earth Inc, Greenpeace,
National Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund Inc, and the League of Women
Voters.
15
Justice
Ecofeminism
7,830
6
<0.1
Total
12,212,640
Source: Brulle 2000: 243 (modified to include number of organizations surveyed)
3,915
182,650
The three most important categories then tend to be populated by fairly large groups. But
there are many of them.
Selle and Strømsnes (1996) have noted that membership in Norwegian environmental
organizations is relatively low, particularly interesting for a country with such a green image
as Norway has abroad.
The relatively small size of the Norwegian groups – but what Selle and Strømsnes
(1996) and Dryzek et al. (2003) argue has been a disproportionately large impact of the
environmental movement – suggests that environmental issues have been absorbed into preexisting mechanisms and organizations, rather than remaining the providence of advocacy
groups that inject themselves unwanted into old processes of decision-making thereby
directly challenge existing interest organizations. In addition, it is tempting to see the
remarkable under representation of Labour Party members in the mainstream environmental
organizations in Norway as supportive of this general point. In addition to what Jenssen
(1994) points out are good ideological reasons as to why this should be so, the Labour Party
was the single most important party in for many years, and was intimately associated with the
construction of the corporatist structure. But since Lijphart also scores both Denmark and
Sweden, both with much larger environmental organizations, as almost as corporatist as
Norway, these are not conclusive arguments.8
Cooperation and Competition among ENGOs
The vast majority of ENGOs participate in some sort of network or are members of an
umbrella organization or two. But are their relations primarily cooperative or competitive?
The information here is at present mostly anecdotal.
8
Per Selle suggests that sporting organizations and those dedicated to outdoor recreational activities tend to
siphon off many potential members as well. This is especially the case because of the particularly pragmatic
orientation of many environmental groups and their tendency to be oriented towards local, particularly farming,
communities. See Selle 2000. (“Norsk miljøvern er annleis”, Nytt Norsk Tidskrift 4/2000.
16
Clearly US organizations are bound together in networks and alliances. The most prominent
of these is the Groups of 10, later expanded to include other groups, and changing its name to
the Green Group.9 There are however, many other networks and alliances, such as the
Endangered Species Coalition (with 377 members in 2001). ENGOs frequently join forces
on specific issues, such as climate change or whaling; they publish reports, sign letters,
purchase joint advertising and submit Congressional testimony. Each remains, however, very
much independent. They also network extensively internationally. The Friends of the Earth,
Greenpeace, the WWF and others are in addition explicitly international organizations.
Numerous US groups are members of the World Conservation Union. Schlosberg (1999:
123) emphasizes the determined independence of the groups that make up the environmental
justice movement. These rely on networking and alliance building to a greater extent than do
the Big Ten and a driven by the mantra of “Decentralization, diversification, and
democratization.”
Group of 10 or the Big Ten is one of the most striking examples of cooperation. They
the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society, the National Resources Defense Council, the
Friends of the Earth, the Environmental Policy Institute, the Izaak Walton League, the
Wilderness Society, the Environmental Defense Fund, the National Parks and Conservation
Association and the National Wildlife Federation.10 These are relatively wealthy with a large
numbers of supporters. They consciously included only organizations that lobbied Congress,
thus excluding “non-political” organizations such as the WWF, and direct action groups such
as Greenpeace. Greenpeace has probably been the most important alternative to the “G-10”
over the years and while the membership and budgets of the G-10 groups grew tremendously
over the Reagan years, Greenpeace with its more confrontational style, was the fastest
growing and one of the absolutely largest environmental organizations in the United States
until its membership declined precipitously in the late 1990s (Dowie 1995: 74).
Despite the appearance of unity and cooperation, there is evidence to suggest the competitive
core of the relationships among these groups. Dowie (1995:68-75) reports that when the G10 first met in 1981, not only had the leaders of these groups for the most part not met each
other, but that their staffs were openly hostile to each other.11 He maintains that the
9
Renamed in approximately 1991 when the group expanded to the Union of Concerned Scientists, Zero
Population Growth, the World Resources Institute, and the Children’s Defense Fund (Dowie 1995: 74).
10
Dowie 1995: p. 69, Schlosberg, 1999, p. 3 (footnote 3)
11
Dowie (1995: 69-70) writes that the initiative for founding the G-10 came from Robert Allen, executive
director of the Kendall Foundation. Allen relates that he was warned by photographer and environmental
activist Ansel Adams, an iconic figure within the US environmental movment, that “you’ve about to go to work
17
organizations never truly learned to work together although they have learned to tolerate each
other. Although the group did expand, Dowie reports that economic conditions of the early
1990s pushed these groups into greater competition with each other. In addition, the G10/Green Group was resented by those not included in it, earning from them the sobriquet the
“gang of 10.” Dowie (1995) reports that Greenpeace refused to join the G-10 because size
requirements excluded many groups. Schlosberg (1999: 123) writes that environmental
justice groups see themselves as alternatives to the Big Ten “which are structured more like
the interest groups of conventional pluralist thinking and design.”
It clear that US ENGO community has a history of ideological and personal feuding.
The story of David Brower is instructive here. Once its leading figure, the “arch Druid” was
removed executive director of the Sierra Club for his radical policies and authoritarian style
of decision-making. Brower went on to found or co-found the Friends of the Earth and the
Earth Island Institute and the League of Conservation Voters. Paul Watson12 was removed
from Greenpeace – or left by his own violation, depending on the version you read – and
founded the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society. Greenpeace has in particular been beset by
internal problems. Dissatisfied members of American organizations tend to vote with their
feet: They leave organizations with which they disagree and found their own. Relations
between groups can be chilly for this reason. An extensive search of printed US NGO
literature does not yield many direct comments by the larger organizations about other
environmental groups. There is a good deal, however, in more informal publications and
communications (Bailey 2005).
While there, is at least on some level, ostensive cooperation amongst them and a kind
of organic unity based on differing function, these organizations continue to compete directly
and indirectly against each. These organizations often share mailing lists and even direct mail
firms, yet they effectively compete for members. The competitive element has been
sharpened lately by the declining success of direct mail operations across the board and
because of the large defection rate in membership after the first year even in the heyday of
direct-mail success. The literature of these groups tends to claim exclusive credit for
advances made rather than highlighting their cooperation with and links to other groups.
with the biggest egos on the planet. The don’t get paid much so the drive is ego and the righteousness is selfrighteousness.” Allen found the warning all too true: “I’ve never seen such territoriality and rivalry. Some
rivalry is healthy, but this was counterproductive.” While the G-10 had some good meeting, “the organization’s
staffs disliked each other so immensely that it was hard to get them to collaborate on anything we decided to do
together.”
12
Greenpeace, SSCS and Watson are all Canadian in origin, but are all actors in the US setting nonetheless.
18
The Norwegian ENGOs, less reliant on membership for money, may be less
competitive with each other. It is possible, however, that they compete with each other for
state funding. Norwegian activists less frequently exercise the “exit” option, although there
are some examples. Hauge, founder of Bellona, was formerly a member of Natur og
ungdom.
Norwegian groups are also highly networked, both among themselves and
internationally. As noted above, NNV has specific links to Nature and Youth and a children’s
organization. While US groups often have affiliation, Nature and Youth is one of the
principal Norwegian groups in its own right. The Forum for Environment and Development
(ForUM for utvikling og miljø) brings 54 organizations together under the banner of
sustainable development. The FIVH site provides a wide variety of linkages to other
Norwegian organizations, as do many US environmentalist home pages. Bellona, on the
other hand provides many links to its business partners rather than to environmental
organizations. (This section is not finished).
A final point comes in here. Looking at formal organizations, umbrella groups and
alliances may not adequately capture the relationships among the various groups. The
potential impact is illustrated by a related issue: that of whether Norwegian groups are in fact
incorporated into Norwegian corporatist structures. While Reitan’s (2001) study of the
inclusion of environmental groups in commissions suggests that environmental groups are
not incorporated in corporatist structures, Bortne et al. 2002 argues that this does not
adequately reflect the close relations between Norwegian NGOs and the state and Dryzek et
al. (2003) characterize the Norwegian state as actively inclusive of ENGOs.
The ideological spread of ENGOs
The choice-rich environment of the United States should work to expand the diversity
of groups on offer to the would-be environmentalist. Both Scholsberg (1999) and Dowie
(1995) argue that the better established environmental groups became somewhat tame and
inflexible, sparking dissatisfaction in environmentalist ranks and leading to the formation of
new groups. Since meaningful numbers are had to come by, it suffices to say here that the
US environmental scene seems to be diverse in terms of both discourse and in terms of the
number of specialized, niche organizations.
19
Table 3: Distribution of Environmental
Groups by Discourse (Brulle’s sample)
Category
number
Percentage
Wildlife
Management
Conservation
Preservation
Reform
Environmentalism
Deep Ecology
Environmental
Justice
Ecofeminism
Source: Brulle 2000: 242
7
8,1
8
18
31
9,2
20,7
35,6
8
9
9,2
10,3
6
6,9
It is worth noting that the US environment movement has also spawned a set of
organizations that claim to be environmentalist but which are not accepted into the
environmentalist community, the Wise Use movement. Rooted in the American West and its
“Sagebrush Rebellion” against the Federal government and the new environmental laws, the
wise use movement claims policies that harmonize with ideas of sustainable use. The groups
that form this movement, however, have different ideological roots than does what is more
commonly called the environmental movement. It is based on a coalition of “loggers,
ranchers, miners, farmers, fishermen, oil and gas interests, real estate developers, and offroad vehicle enthusiasts” (Brick 1996).13 It pushes free “market environmentalism,
privatization of public lands, and the removal of environmental regulation” (Brulle 2000:
128). These organizations are difficult to distinguish by name from groups accepted into the
environmentalist community, and they also use direct mail campaigns to raise funds.
Reppen’s (1996) analysis of the view of nature of the Norwegian organizations,
characterizes an important segment of the Norwegian environmental movement (Greenpeace,
Natur og Ungdom, NOAH and FIHV) as rather radical, with NOAH the most radical of those
surveyed. NNV is much more moderate. WWF-Norge is slightly more radical than NNV.
Brulle places the American versions of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth among the
“reform environmentalist” groups, and WWF as preservationist (Brulle 2000:286-7), with
three categories together comprising 26 percent of his sample as more radical. While this is a
13
Cited by Brulle 2000:128.
20
fairly crude method, it does harmonize with Bortne et al.’s (2002) characterization of the
Norwegian environmental movement as a whole as both close to the state and locally
oriented. The word “radical” should give us pause in this connection. NU is one of the most
active and uncompromising of the Norwegian groups, but is very much anthropocentric. Its
chief spokesperson has evoked philosopher Sigmund Kvaløy Sætereng (not Deep Ecology
guru Arne Ness) to explain its support for whaling. It adopts a sustainable use approach
centered on the traditional relationship between Norwegians and the land: “if you deny a
people its culture, Nature and the environment will suffer” (Sørensen 1994).
The resources of interest groups
“Resources” is a broad word that can include a wide range of both material and
ideological components. Sections above have looked at the numbers of members. Here the
focus is on the financial resources and professional staffs of ENGOs in the US and Norway.
Again Brulle’s (2000) survey of US organizations yields very useful information.
The three leading types of organizations maintain sizable professional staffs.
21
Table 4
Distribution of Staff by Discourse
Category
Size of Staff
Wildlife
Management
Conservation
Preservation
859
Percentage of total
Staff
13.7
306
3,061
*(1061)
1,971
Average per organization
172
4.9
48.7
Reform
Environmentalism
Deep Ecology
38
Environmental
46
Justice
Ecofeminism
4
Total
6,285
Source: Brulle 2000: 243.
* Without the Nature Conservancy
31.4
44
235
*(88)
86
0.6
0.7
10
9
<0.1
2
95
Brulle (2000:244) has also very kindly looked at the annual income and net worth of his
selected organizations:
Table 5
Income and Net Worth by Discourse
Category
Total Income
Average
Total net
(dollars)
income per
worth
organization (millions of
(millions of
dollars)
dollars)
Wildlife
181.77
25.97
40.2
Management
Conservation
59.92
7.49
60.0
Preservation
619.10
34.39
1335.6
*301.6
Reform
206.72
6.89
130.1
Environmentalism
Deep Ecology
3.65
0.52
0.
Environmental
3.78
0.47
1.0
Justice
Ecofeminism
1.59
0.27
1.0
Total
1076.53
1569,66
Source: Brulle 2000: 244-45 (modified)
*Without Nature Conservancy
22
Average Net Worth Per
Organization
(millions of dollars)
7.50
5.70
74.20
*17.73
4.60
0.10
0.10
0.30
These figures do not capture a potentially significant difference between the US and
Norwegian contexts. The private foundation is extremely important in the US context. Its
importance is discussed below in the section on funding.
From the incomplete figures in Table one, it is clear that Norwegian groups tend to be
much smaller. Even if we take into account the dramatic size difference between the United
States and Norway, it is clear that Norwegian organizations as a rule do no not maintain the
large organizations required to provide a counterweight to the state. A closer look at the
functions ENGOs perform in each country should throw further light on this issue. I expect
to find that many of the larger US groups produce their own research, scientific or political,
to a greater extent than their Norwegian counterparts. In addition, the dispersion of veto
points in the US system should spawn bigger staffs that can target an array of these. They
should be much more engaged in the legal system and do more lobbying of a broader array of
actors.
Source of Funding
In the pluralist system, the dividing line between the state and civil society is thought
to be much sharper than in the corporatist system. This should mean, among other things,
that civil society organizations are not tied to the state by state support. Because market
based organizations – business -- and civil society have theoretically the same sort of
relationship with the state and both generate interest groups, it is logical to expect some sort
of synergy among these two. These notions do tend to be true of the US environmental
movement. As the table below indicates, the US environmental movement tends to get most
of its money from public support (membership fees and individual contributions), from
program services and from foundations grants. Foundations grants can represent an indirect
method of receiving support from private enterprise, since these foundations are frequently
founded and supported by large corporations and business figures. Important foundations
include the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation,
the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Pew Charitable Trusts. Some of
the foundations themselves founded the Environmental Grantmakers Association, which has
since grown to 187 members (Brulle 2000: 254-5). Direct gifts from corporations are small.
23
Brulle’s (2000:252) study confirmed an earlier study by (Snow 1992) that found that 43% of
the income of environmental groups came from membership dues and individual
contributions, and 6% from government grants (federal and state). Snow asked 265
environmental leaders to rate the importance of various sources of income. Of those
surveyed, 65% stated that contributions (large and small) from individuals were “crucial” to
the organizations, 67% stated that foundation grants were “crucial” and 10% stated that gifts
from corporations were “crucial” (Brulle 2000 252, citing Snow 1992: 64). None listed
support from the government as crucial.
24
Table 6
Funding Sources of U.S Environmental Organizations
Source
Total Contribution
Percent of Total
(in millions of dollars)
Public Support
428.27
39.8
Program Services
91.25
8.6
Membership Dues
83.99
7.8
Government Grants
92.69
8.6
Foundations Grants
146.77
13.6
Other
233.14
21.7
Total
1076.11
Source: Brulle 2000: 252
In Norway, “there is a political consensus that the ‘third sector’ [which includes
environmental organizations] should therefore receive financial support from government”
(Dryzek et al. 2003: 23), and Strømsnes and Selle (1996) and Bortne (2002) characterizes the
Norwegian environmental sector as very much tied to the state. Dryzek et al. (2003:23)
record that as of 2000, 19 environmental groups were receiving operating and project grants
from the state, administered by the Ministry of the Environment and that this support has
expanded consistently over time. Table 1 reflects this, although this data is incomplete at the
moment. It is of interest that groups such as smaller and more alien Greenpeace Norden
advertises itself as an independent actor, not beholden to money from the state or private
business, that outsider Bellona relies heavily upon its partnerships with business, and that the
most traditionally Norwegian of the group, the NNV does not project any distinct profile with
respect to funding. Greenpeace, WWF-Norway and FIVH all include on their homepages
financial statements and yearly reports that should categories of income, very reminiscent of
groups in the US setting. FIVH, which seems to be developing in a way the more directly
resembles US actors, remains distinctively Norwegian in its source of income: receiving
nearly 30 of its income in 2005 from the state and another 2.6% from the state lottery.
The immensely important role of foundations merits closer attention here. The United
States has a plethora of private research organizations, including those focused on the
environment that are financed in part by foundations, corporations and private contributions.
The foundations are themselves founded by wealth patrons or corporations but are largely
independent from them in decisions regarding funding. These operate independently from
25
agencies such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (and its various
departments such as the National Weather Service). They finance research as well as other
activities by the ENGOs. The Worldwatch Institute, for example, relies upon private and
corporate donations and the sales of its publications. Interesting from the perspective of this
paper, WWI receives support from the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (WWI
2004). Norwegian research institutions, on the other hand, are primarily state financed.
there is little, if any, parallel and exclusively private funded research and think tank sector.
This includes the universities. Cicero (Center for International Climate and Environmental
Research, Oslo) was founded by the government as an independent research organization. It
is linked to the state university in Oslo. Its projects are funded primarily by the state-funded
Research Council of Norway (Cicero 2006). The distinction blurs a bit, however, upon
further examination: The World Resources Institute, which bills itself as an “environmental
think tank” received significant funding from private and corporate sponsors and donations
but still received 26% of it revenues directly from the US government in 2005 (WRI 2006).
The importance of maintaining distance from the state, including the generation of
supposedly “independent” (from the state) research has not been a major feature of the
Norwegian environmental movement. Even so, Norwegian environmental groups are doing
more in the way of such research. FIVH issues research reports critical of Norwegian policy
and Bellona works closely with industry to find pragmatic solutions to environmental
problems.
The cooperation among grant makers in the United States is an intriguing feature from
the perspective of this paper. It represents the efforts of civil society organizations to reign in
the competitiveness of the various environmental organizations and the chaos of pluralism.
This aspect merits further attention.
Conclusion: A Deceptively Simply Question
This paper had modest goals and even these remain unfinished. This conclusion is
accordingly preliminary.
First, this paper sought only to look at the landscape of the ENGO community in two
countries. In this the paper differs from many projects that seek to account for the shape,
strategies and tactics and success of social movements. These are obviously related
26
questions, but they are not the same questions. The social movement and resource
mobilization literature has turned up a large number of variables that seek to account for the
different shapes and successes of the movements. It has become clear that there are far too
many variables to predict these things for any given country. This paper chose to go back to
basics, the fundamental distinctions between corporatism and pluralism, as a way of
capturing the net effect of all of these variables on interests groups in Norway and the United
States.
The two countries largely meet expectations: the US landscape is more pluralistic that
the Norwegian, the Norwegian landscape somewhat corporatist. There are many more
organizations (even per capita) in the US. The US landscape includes many niche
organizations but also many large ones that compete directly with each other to capture
membership and influence. There are many large organizations in the primary ideological
categories. Even so, the Norwegian context does offer alternatives. It is possible that the
dependence of Norwegian organizations on state support – and broad acceptance in Norway
for this arrangement – acts as a brake on the multiplication of ENGOs, since the state would
not support much in the way of duplication.
There are some signs that each system strains a bit at the leash to move towards the
other. Some Norwegian organizations are beginning to take on more US-like characteristics.
Publishing budgetary information, as do FIVH, Greenpeace and WWF, mimics US practice
in which IRS 990 forms are public information. They are increasingly used in Norway and
the United States to demonstrate independence and increase legitimacy. These acts suggest a
much greater interest in legitimating the group in the eyes of the public, a tactic more
important it would seem in the pluralist system than in a corporatist one. At the same time,
the move by The Environmental Grantmakers Association to impose order on the ENGO
community (very much against their will) suggests a Civil Society initiative to move away
from the biting competition of the pluralist system.
The question posed here is of modest interest, although it does contribute to the
general literature on political opportunity structures. However, the expanded version of this
chapter is meant to be one aspect of a larger question: just how compatible are western
environmental organizations? Do they work easily together or do national differences
impede cooperation. Further work will turn to those questions.
27
Useful Internet Addresses
Bellona: http://www.bellona.no/
Fremtid I våre hender. http://www.framtiden.no/index.php?show=17&expand=17
Den norske turistforening: http://www.turistforeningen.no/index.php?fo_id=9
Greenpeace-Norden: http://www.greenpeace.org/norway/
Grønn hverdag/Miljøheimevernet: http://www.gronnhverdag.no/artikkel.php?id=2801
National Environmental Directory: http://www.environmentaldirectory.net/software.htm
NOAH:
http://www.dyrsrettigheter.no/?module=Articles&action=ArticleFolder.publicOpenFolder&I
D=291
Norges Naturvernforbund: http://www.naturvern.no/cgibin/naturvern/imaker?id=1612&nnfnodate=1
Natur og undom: http://www.nu.no/omnu/sentralstyret/
Worldwatch Institute: http://www.worldwatch.org/node/23
Økologisk landbruklag: http://www.oikos.no/newsread/news.asp?N=5034&wce=index
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