Sutton v. United Air Lines
Argued April 28, 1999
Decided June 22, 1999
THE FACTS
Identical twins Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton applied for pilot positions with United Air Lines
in 1992. Both had extensive experience flying commuter planes and were qualified for the
positions. However, both also had poor eyesight which, when uncorrected, did not meet United's
standards. With glasses or contact lenses, their vision was 20/20.
Because of their poor (when uncorrected) eyesight, United rejected their applications. They filed a
lawsuit in federal court pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Under the ADA, a
person is deemed to be covered by the Act's provisions if: (1) they are a disabled person within
the meaning of the ADA; (2) they are qualified for the position they are applying for; and (3) an
employer discriminated against them in its employment decision because of the alleged disability.
THE LAWSUIT
In their lawsuit, Sutton and Hinton claimed that they were "disabled" as defined by the ADA, and
that they qualified for protection under the Act since their uncorrected vision substantially limited
their major life activity of "seeing." They also claimed that United discriminated against them
because of their disability and that they should be given the opportunity to fly commercial planes.
United countered that they did not view the sisters as disabled, just that the two did not meet
United's standards. They made a motion to dismiss, which the trial judge granted.
The judge wrote that including poor eyesight in the category of disability would make the term
"disabled" a meaningless term; Congress did not intend poor eyesight to be included.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Like other courts, it looked to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's interpretive guidelines to define disability. Congress had
given the EEOC a mandate to administer portions of the ADA.
The Tenth Circuit followed the EEOC's guidelines for defining disability by considering the
medical condition (poor eyesight) without regard to assistive medicines or devices. However, it
rejected the EEOC's approach to determining whether the disability substantially impaired a
major life activity by saying that corrective devices should be taken into account. The Court also
sided with United in finding that the airline had not regarded the applicants as disabled.
Furthermore, the Court found that United had not disqualified the two applicants from an entire
class of jobs, just ones as global airline pilots.
ISSUES
1. Whether a person's physical impairment falls under the ADA's definition of "disability" if it can
be corrected.
2. Whether the courts should defer to the EEOC's guidelines which say that the determination of
disability status and major life activity impairment should be made without regard to corrective
medicines or devices
3. Whether a person can seek protection under the ADA if an employer refuses to hire her
because of poor eyesight.
ARGUMENTS FOR SUTTON
¨ The two sisters are actually disabled in the major life activity of seeing. Corrective measures
should not be considered in determining whether poor eyesight substantially limits a life activity.
¨ Since the EEOC is in charge of administering the ADA, Courts should defer to the EEOC's
guidelines rather than independently impose its own interpretation.
¨ Congress' intent was to determine disability without regard to corrective measures.
ARGUMENTS FOR UNITED AIR LINES
¨ Sutton and Hinton are not substantially limited in any life activity, and hence do not qualify for
coverage under the ADA.
¨ Congress did not intend for all physical impairments to be classified as a disability for the ADA's
purpose.
¨ Sutton and Hinton are not excluded from a class of jobs, just the particular job they applied for
with United. They can still fly for other companies and hold other positions within United.
MAJORITY OPINION
(O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, CJ., and SCALIA,
KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ. joined)
The Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the scope of ADA coverage, and held that
the petitioners had not shown they were "disabled" within the ADA's meaning.
¨ The Court rejected the EEOC's authority to promulgate valid guidelines for interpreting the ADA.
There is no need to decide whether deference is due to the EEOC's guidelines.
¨ Three separate measures of the ADA suggest that the determination of whether a disability
substantially limits a major life activity should be made while taking into account corrective
measures. A disability exists for ADA purposes only where an impairment "substantially limits",
not where it "might", "could", or "would" be substantially limiting if corrective measures were not
taken. The question of whether someone has a disability under the ADA is an individualized
inquiry and should be made by looking at the individual's life circumstances. The EEOC's
guidelines run counter to the individualized inquiry and treats people as members of groups.
¨ Congress wrote in the preamble that the ADA was supposed to cover 43 million Americans. If
the Court sided with petitioner's view, then the ADA would cover more than 160 million people.
¨ Petitioners have also failed to allege properly that they are "regarded as" disabled under the
ADA's definition. Creating physical criteria for a job does not violate the ADA per se. Besides, the
petitioners were not barred from an entire class of jobs, just ones as global airline pilots with
United.
CONCURRING OPINION
(GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring opinion)
Justice Ginsburg, while concurring with the majority's opinion, emphasized the importance of the
preamble to the ADA. The fact that Congress wrote that (1) 43 million Americans would be
covered by the ADA, and (2) those covered constituted a "discrete and insular
minority…subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment and relegated to a position of
political powerlessness" suggests that they did not intend those with poor eyesight to be covered.
DISSENTING OPINION
(STEVENS, J. filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, J., joined)
In order to be faithful to the remedial purposes of the ADA, the Court should gives the Act's
provisions a generous, rather than a miserly, construction. Regardless of the number of people
Congress thought the Act would cover, customary application of statutory interpretation should
lead to the conclusion that impairments should be judged without regard to mitigating factors.
The majority's treatment of corrective devices would appear to exclude from ADA coverage those
with such disabilities as amputated legs with prosthetic devices.
Employers could not be sued for having legitimate reasons for placing physical criteria on jobs,
only if they discriminate against someone who can properly fulfill employment tasks. If an
employer discriminates despite the fact that a person can perform a job, regardless of whether
the disability is poor eyesight or not, their actions should be actionable under the ADA. This case
is not about the reasonableness of United's standards, but whether petitioners fall under the
ADA's protected class. Remedial action should be construed broadly so as to effectuate its
purpose. The ADA serves to protect irrational decisions based on disability, not all decisions
based on disability.
It is the majority's decision that treats people as members of a group rather than as individuals.
By excluding all people with poor eyesight from ADA coverage, they are closing off relief without
regard to a person's individual circumstances and abilities.
If United regards petitioners as unqualified because they cannot see well without glasses, it
seems eminently unfair for a court also to use uncorrected vision as the basis for evaluating
petitioners' life activity of seeing.
DISSENTING OPINION
(BREYER, J. filed a dissenting opinion)
While joining in Justice Stevens' dissent, Justice Breyer also believes that if expanded ADA
coverage leads to many lawsuits, additional EEOC regulations can be implemented to refine the
definitional lines. While the majority questions the EEOC's power to do so, there is no indication
that Congress sought to deny the EEOC this ability.