1.
Title of subject
Internet Agent Economics
2.
Subject code
TIA1301
3.
Status of subject
Major
4.
Credit hour
3
28 Hours of Lectures
14 Hours of Tutorial
LAN credit hours equivalence: 2.67
5.
Semester
Trimester 3 (Beta Level)
6.
Pre-Requisite
Computer programming I (TCP 1231)
7.
Methods of teaching
28 Hours of Lectures
14 Hours of Tutorial
8.
Assessment
Coursework: 50 %
Final Exam: 50 %
Total: 100%
9.
Teaching staff (Proposed)
Kiu Ching Chieh
10.
Objective of subject
This course is to introduce concepts of game theory and economics as
frameworks used to model the interactions of Internet agents for
applications.
11.
Synopsis of subject
It covers concepts of game theory and economics implementation for
Internet agents and the analysis of the potential impact of billions of
such agents on technology and society. Topics include web auctions,
automated negotiation, comparison-shopping, recommender systems,
and privacy.
Kursus ini meliputi konsep teori permainan dan ekonomi dilaksanakan
ke atas rekabentuk agen Internet dan penganalisaan potensi kesan
berbilion-bilion agen begini ke atas teknologi dan masyarakat. Topiktopik termasuk lelong web, rundingan automatik, beli-belah
perbandingan, sistem pengesyor dan keperibadian.
12.
By the end of the subject, students should be able to:
 Understand the concepts of non-cooperative game theory.
 Understand the strategies of strategic and extensive games to solve
problem with perfect information and imperfection information.
 Understand the various game theoretical concepts and its
application
 Understand how to solve various scenarios that are variants of
known scenarios and devise algorithms to solve them.
 Know how to use game theoretical concepts in modeling and
analyzing interactive internet agents, multi-agents system, auction
and bargaining system.
Learning Outcomes
13. Details of subject
Topics Covered
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Introduction to Game Theory
What is game theory?, What is game?, Game theory
assumptions, Zero-sum game, Non-zero-sum game,
Classification of games and solutions, Terminology
and notation.
Utility Theory
Preferences, Utility representation, Lotteries,
Expected utility, Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions, Risk aversion
Introduction to Extensive Form and Strategic
Form Games
Elements of basic models, Extensive form, Perfect
recall, Finite and infinite game, Informational
categories, Strategic form, Classic examples of
normal form and extensive form games, Converting
extensive to strategic form, Several chance moves
game, three players game
Nash Equilibria, Dominance, Symmetry and
Minimax
Pure strategy, Mixed strategy, Behavior strategy,
Elimination of Dominated Strategies, Strict
dominance and weak dominance, pure strategy Nash
equilibrium, strict Nash equilibrium, mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium, symmetric game solution,
minimax.
Perfect Equilibria in Extensive Form
Backward induction, Rollback equilibrium, Subgameperfect equilibrium, Critiques of backward induction
and subgame perfect, Nash equilibrium in extensive
game, perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Modeling Incomplete and Imperfect Information
Static Bayesian games, dynamic Bayesian game,
perfect Bayesian equilibria.
Total Contact Hours
Hours
2
2
4
8
8
4
28
14. Text
References
1.
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to
Game Theory, Oxford University Press,
2004.
2.
Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein,
A Course in Game Theory, Cambridge
Mass, The MIT Press, 1993.
3.
Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. Game
Theory. Cambridge Mass., MIT Press,
1999.
4.
Avinash K. Dixit, Susan Skeath, Game of
Strategy, W.W.Norton, 1999.
5.
Prajit K. Dutta, Strategies and Games:
Theory and Practice, Cambridge
Mass., MIT Press, 1991.
6.
Saul Stahl, A Gentle Introduction to
Game Theory, American Mathematical
Society, 1999.