Fall 2007
Yi-Nung Yang
Shi-Chung Chang
訊號控制及對策 (Information, Control and Games)
COURSE OUTLINE
PREREQUISITE: Signal and Systems or Control System, Probability Theory; or consent of instructors.
INSTRUCTORS:
Shi-Chung Chang, Rm. 245, EE-II Bldg. (電二), 2362-5187, scchang@cc.ee.ntu.edu.tw, Monday1-2:00
Yi-Nung Yang, (03)2655201 ext. 5205, yinung@cycu.edu.tw
CLASSES: Thursday 14:20 – 17:20, 電二 225.
TEXT: Required: Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press, 2004.
Optional: Prajit K. Dutta, Strategies and Games, Theory and Practice, MIT Press, 1999.
OBJECTIVES:
This course is designed for senior and graduate level engineering students to study static and dynamic optimization
problems among multiple decision-makers (DMs) in a networked system, where each DM has his/her own objective
function, accesses to public and private information, and possesses individual decision-making authorities. The
course goals are as follows:
(i) to develop students’ common sense for gaming problems and the role of information;
(ii) to equip students with interdisciplinary models, theories, and solution methods from mathematical optimization,
system and control, and economic game; and
(iii) to guide students in applications to networked systems of their interest via case studies.
To achieve the course goal, there are three course segments. The first segment covers the mathematical background
and the basic game theory. The second segment focuses on team and game decision-making with imperfect
information. The final segment includes both lectures and term projects on real application cases such as pricing of
communication network services, market design of supply chain and problems of students’ interest.
TENTATIVE OUTLINE:
I.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Introduction to Game Theory
Models/Game Theory as a Tool for Analysis and Course Outline. (9/20, SCC&YNY)
A Brief Introduction of Mathematical Optimization - Static and Dynamic. (9/27, SCC))
Normal Form (one-shot) games and repeated Games. Solution concepts: the Nash Equilibrium. (10/4, YNY)
Extensive form (multistage) games. (10/11, SCC)
Introduction to Experimental Games (10/18, YNY)
Hierarchical Games (10/25, SCC)
Cooperative Games (11/1, YNY)
II.
8.
9.
10.
Decision-Making with Imperfect Information
Team Decision Problems. (11/8, SCC, Term project white paper due)
Mid-term (11/15, SCC&YNY)
Moral Hazard, Incentives, and Games with Incomplete Information. (11/22, YNY)
III. Market Design
11. Mechanism Design. (11/29, YNY)
12. Auctions. Chapter 23 (12/6, SCC)
III. Engineering Application Case Study
13. Term project proposal discussion/presentation (12/13, SCC, YNY)
14. Game Models and Analysis of Deregulated Electricity Market (12/20, SCC)
Guest speakers: to be announced
15. Game Models and Analysis for Communication Network Services (12/27, SCC)
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Guest speakers: to be announced
16. Cooperation and contracts in supply chain management (1/3, YNY)
Guest speaker: to be announced
17. Term Project Final Presentations (1/10, 1/17, SCC&YNY)
Grading:
Classroom Participation
Homework
Mid Term
Term Project
Total
10%
20%
40%
40%
110%
REFERENCES:
1. T. Basar and G. J. Olsder, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, Society for Industrial & Applied Math; 2nd
Edition, 1998.
2. D. P. Bertsekas, Nonlinear Programming, Second Edition, Athena Scientific, Belmont, MA, 1999.
3. M. Bichler, The Future of e-Markets: Multidimensional Market Mechanisms, Cambridge U. Press, 2001.
4. C. Camerer, Progress in Behavioral Game Theory, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4, 167-188, 1997.
5. A. J. Jones, Game Theory, John Wiley and Sons, 1980.
6. V. Krishna, Auction Theory, Academic Press, 2002.
7. F. L. Lewis and V. L. Syrmos, Optimal Control, Wiley-Interscience, 1995.
8. E. Rasmusen, Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory, Blackwell; 3rd edition, 2001.
9. R. Shelton, Gaming the Market: Applying Game Theory to Create Winning Trading Strategies, Wiley, 1997.
10. V. L. Smith, Economics in the Laboratory, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, 151-169, 1994.
11. H. R. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis, Norton, 3rd edition, 1992.
12. F. Vega-Redondo, Economics and the Theory of Games, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
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