Clive Frank Boustred
advertisement
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Plaintiffs, USDC: _________________Trial By Jury
Clive Boustred
Petitioner, In Propria Persona Sui Juris
210 Suncrest Dr,
Soquel, CA 95073
Tel: (831) 476-4300
clive@libertyforlife.com
IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION
Clive Frank Boustred,
CASE # ____________________Trial By Jury
RCB (minor son of Clive Frank
Boustred),
OPEN
COMPLAINT
FOR
DAMAGES
FOR
WFB (minor son of Clive Frank VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND COURT
Boustred),
RULES AND PETITION TO THE GOVERNMENT
InfoTelesys, Inc. Nevada and Nevis
FOR A REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES TO CIVIL
Get IT Real, Inc. Nevada and Nevis
RIGHTS COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO
Life Yacht, CopperCards, Santa
Cruz
Cats,
Le
Essence,
Kite
42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1961,
1962, 1964.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents 403 U.S. 388
Yachts.
PLAINTIFFS,
(1971)
18 USC § 1, 241, 242, 2382
v.
Government and County of
19 U.S.C. § 1961-68
Santa Cruz, Government and State
Constitution of The United States of America
of California, Government of the
English Common Law
United States of America, Agents of
11th Amendment U.S. Constitution
the New World Order. (Individual
DEFENDANTS
such
as
AND
PERSUANT
TO
OTHER
Irwin APPLICABLE LAWS AS SO DETERMINED,
Joseph are listed in the complaint), WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
John Does 1 to n.
DEMAND FOR ALL ADJUDICATION IN
DEFENDANT(S). FACT AND LAW BY JURY;
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY.
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CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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With Good Cause Plaintiffs bring this suit before the United States District Court
in San Jose for Trial By Jury.
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Having been literally shot at by the government, repeatedly falsely arrested,
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given sham trials and sentenced to absurd sentences for non crimes, having had his
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children literally violently kidnapped and held hostage and having has as many as seven
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of his businesses destroyed by the government, and having repeatedly been refused
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any right to address grievances, to satisfy exhaustion of remedies, PLAINTIFFS bring
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new matters and matters that the courts refused to address to the court in an attempt to
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find integrity in the courts.
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Complaint submitted under duress, without the means to afford counsel as a
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consequence of nearly five years of outrageous malicious prosecution that shocks the
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conscience.
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INDEX
A. PARTIES .................................................................................................................... 8
PLAINTIFFS ................................................................................................................ 8
DEFENDANTS ............................................................................................................ 8
B. SYNOPSIS OF CASE .............................................................................................. 14
PREVIOUS LAWSUITS ............................................................................................. 17
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES ................................................... 17
1ST LAWSUIT – U.S. Dist. Ct. Case # C05 000996 .................................................... 18
2nd LAWSUIT – U.S. Dist. Ct. Case # C07 00391 ...................................................... 18
The Net Result of Continued Criminal Behavior By Government Officials .................. 19
C. VENUE ..................................................................................................................... 22
Intradistrict Assignment.............................................................................................. 22
D. JURISDICTION ........................................................................................................ 22
E. AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS OR PREJUDICE .................................................................... 23
AUTHORITIES........................................................................................................... 24
F. SUFFICIENCY OF CLAIM ........................................................................................ 31
NO STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS............................................................................. 32
NO JUDICIAL POWER IN THIS CASE ...................................................................... 32
PRO SE LITIGANTS ENTITLED TO WIDE LATITUDE .............................................. 33
G. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... 35
H. PREAMBLE - GOVERNMENT OUT OF CONTROL IN THE CONTROL OF
FOREIGNERS .............................................................................................................. 37
SETTING THE STAGE OF OPPRESSION IN THE UNITED STATES ...................... 41
U.S.A. Worlds Worst Prison State .............................................................................. 43
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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FALSE FLAG OPERATIONS Blowing up Buildings & Murdering Citizens To Incite War
.................................................................................................................................. 51
U.S.A. Illegally Invading other Nations ....................................................................... 55
U.S.A. Outwardly Aggressive By Nature, Murdering Millions...................................... 56
Dictatorial & Fascist By Definition: ............................................................................. 57
U.S.A. Creating the Worlds Worst Ecological Disasters ............................................. 57
U.S.A. Maiming Millions and Killing Thousands, Tens of Thousands and Hundreds
and Thousands of Their Own Citizens ....................................................................... 58
Socialist In Taxation & Law But Not In Services: ........................................................ 61
Illegal Tender Conspiracy Stealing Real Assets With Illegal Tender Created our of
noting......................................................................................................................... 64
Criminal Civil Courts .................................................................................................. 68
Consider Who & What You Work For......................................................................... 69
I. CLAIMS UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED / CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
VIOLATED .................................................................................................................... 70
First Claim For Relief Fraud by Jeremy Fogel ......................................................... 70
Second Claim For Relief Fraud by James Ware ..................................................... 72
Third Claim For Relief Fraud by Richard W. Wieking .............................................. 73
Fourth Claim For Relief Aggravated Battery and Aggravated Assault ..................... 75
Fifth Claim For Relief Battery and Assault ............................................................... 77
Sixth Claim For Relief Misprision Of Felony – Irwin Joseph .................................... 78
Seventh Claim For Relief Treason – Irwin Joseph................................................... 79
Eighth Claim For Relief Aggravated Kidnap / Kidnap / Parental Alienation .............. 80
Ninth Claim For Relief Treason – Jeremy Fogel ...................................................... 98
Tenth Claim For Relief Misprision Of Felony – Jeremy Fogel .................................. 99
Eleventh Claim For Relief Conspiracy ................................................................... 101
Twelfth Claim For Relief Intentional Negligence .................................................... 106
Thirteenth Claim For Relief Liable / Defamation of Character................................ 107
Fourteenth Claim For Relief Slander ..................................................................... 109
Fifteenth Claim For Relief
Intentional/Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress,
Fraud/Deceit, Wrongful Civil Proceedings / Abuse Of Process ................................ 111
Sixteenth Claim For Relief Wrongful Civil Proceedings / Abuse Of Process .......... 113
Seventeenth Claim For Relief
Violation of U.S. Const. 1st Amendment Freedom of
Speech
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Eighteenth Claim For Relief
Violation of U.S. Const. 2nd Amendment [Right to Bare
Arms]
116
Nineteenth Claim For Relief Conversion ............................................................... 117
Twentieth Claim For Relief
Disparagement Of Business Reputation Or Property,
Interference With Business Relations, Pure Economic Loss, Intentional Interference
With Prospective Economic Advantage, .................................................................. 118
Twenty-first Claim For Relief Treason – James Ware ........................................... 119
Twenty-second Claim For Relief Misprision Of Felony – James Ware .................. 121
Twenty-third Claim For Relief Misprision Of Felony – Attorney General & Santa
Cruz County Sheriffs, Counsel & Board ................................................................... 122
Twenty-fourth Claim For Relief Misprision Of Felony – Phyllis J. Hamilton ............ 124
Twenty-fifth Claim For Relief Misprision Of Felony – Troy B. Overton ................... 125
Twenty-sixth Claim For Relief Misprision Of Felony – M. M. Schroeder ................ 126
Twenty-seventh Claim For Relief Misprision Of Felony – TRILLA E. BAHRKE ..... 127
Twenty-eighth Claim For Relief Misprision Of Felony, Alienation of Parental, Kidnap
– William Kelsay
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CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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Twenty-ninth Claim For Relief Misprision Of Felony – Jeff Almquist ...................... 130
Thirtieth Claim For Relief Burglary ........................................................................ 131
Thirty-first Claim For Relief Armed Robbery .......................................................... 133
Thirty-second Claim For Relief Extortion ............................................................... 134
Thirty-third Claim For Relief Public Nuisance ........................................................ 136
Thirty-fourth Claim For Relief Racketeering .......................................................... 137
Thirty-fifth Claim For Relief Mixed War................................................................. 138
Thirty-sixth Claim For Relief Fraud - Banking ........................................................ 146
Thirty-seventh Claim For Relief Usury Banking ..................................................... 152
Thirty-eighth Claim For Relief Treason - Banking .................................................. 153
Thirty-ninth Claim For Relief
Violation of U.S. Const. 7th Amendment [Trial by jury,
Common law]
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Fortieth Claim For Relief
Violation of U.S. Const. Article III Judicial Department
Responsibility
156
Forty-first Claim For Relief Violation of U.S. Const. 8th Amendment: excessive
fines, cruel & unusual punishment ........................................................................... 158
Forty-second Claim For Relief
Violation of U.S. Const. 5th Amendment [Criminal
proceedings, deprivation of life, liberty and happiness] ............................................ 161
Forty-third Claim For Relief Malicious Prosecution ................................................ 163
J. DAMAGES .............................................................................................................. 167
K. COMMON AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................... 170
Constitution for the United States of America........................................................... 170
STATUTES OF LIMITATION DO NOT APPLY ........................................................ 195
MISPRISION OF FELONY ...................................................................................... 195
EVERY PERSON LIABLE FOR CRIMES UNDER COLOR OF LAW ....................... 196
PROCEEDINGS OUTSIDE OF COURT AUTHORITY ARE VOID ........................... 196
PARENT CAN SUE FOR INTERFERENCE WITH PARENTAL RIGHTS................. 196
FEDERAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION ON DIVORCE CLAIMS ........................... 197
CUSTODY MAY BE CHANGED IF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ABRIDGED......... 197
U.S.C. SECTION 1738A AND 42 AND 654, 663..................................................... 197
CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE KIDNAP ..................................................................... 198
FEDERAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER CUSTODY MATTERS.................. 201
CUSTODY IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY SECURED RIGHT – ENABLING FEDERAL
JURISDICTION........................................................................................................ 203
EX PARTE HEARINGS ON CUSTODY ORDERS UNCONSTITUTIONAL .............. 204
IF MOTHER HAS BOYFRIEND CUSTODY AWARDED TO FATHER ..................... 204
FATHER HAS RIGHT TO CUSTODY ...................................................................... 205
JUDGES CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR WILLFUL DEPRAVATION OF CUSTODY
RIGHTS OR ANY CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION ................................................. 205
MUNICIPALITY AND SATE MAY BE SUED ............................................................ 210
POLICE OFFICERS NO IMMUNITY ........................................................................ 210
ATTORNEY’S CAN BE SUED ................................................................................. 210
THE COURT HAS A DUTY TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS .................. 211
EVIL ORDERS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL ........................................................... 211
JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED .............................................................. 211
VOID ORDERS........................................................................................................ 211
NON-LAWYERS ENTITLED TO COURT................................................................. 211
PRO SE TO BE CONSIDERED WITHOUT TECHNICALITY ................................... 212
PROHIBITION OF BIAS .......................................................................................... 213
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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DIRECTORS, THE REAL PARTY OF INTEREST IN CORPORATIONS ENTITLED TO
1ST AMENDMENT SELF REPRESENTATION......................................................... 214
CUSTODY MATTERS DICTATE DUE PROCESS .................................................. 216
CUSDOCY AND CALIFORNIA CODES .................................................................. 217
DUE PROCESS DICTATES GOOD CAUSE ........................................................... 217
DUE PROCESS DICTATES AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND FAIR TRIAL BY JURY . 220
DUE PROCESS DICTATES COMPETENT AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION:
................................................................................................................................ 221
DUE PROCESS DICTATES FAIRNESS:................................................................. 221
Due Process, Fair Hearing & Trial By Jury LAW DEFINED ...................................... 227
VOID JUDGEMENTS MUSTE BE SET ASIDE ........................................................ 240
DUE PROCESS....................................................................................................... 242
NOTICE AND HEARING. ........................................................................................ 247
RIGHTS, INTERESTS, BENEFITS, OR PRIVILEGES EVOLVED, IN GENERAL .... 253
IN REGARD TO CALIFORNIA’S “NO-FAULT” DIVORCE ....................................... 255
TRIAL IN GENERAL ................................................................................................ 258
FEDERAL COURT .................................................................................................. 259
SHAM TRIALS ......................................................................................................... 261
DISCLOSURE AND DISCOVERY; NOTICE OF DEFENSE. ................................... 262
BIAS AND PREJUDICE GENERALLY ..................................................................... 267
QUALIFICATIONS, ACTIONS, AND COMMENTS OF JUDGE, JURY, OR
PROSECUTOR. ...................................................................................................... 267
HABEAS .................................................................................................................. 269
RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE; WITNESSES. ........................................................... 270
INSTRUCTIONS ...................................................................................................... 271
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL .................................................................................. 273
NECESSITY IN GENERAL. ..................................................................................... 275
ADEQUACY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION. .............................. 276
MATTERS CONSIDERED; PRESENTENCE REPORT. .......................................... 279
DISCRIMINATION AND VINDICTIVENESS; SENTENCE ON RETRIAL. ................ 280
EXECUTION OF SENTENCE. ................................................................................. 283
IMPRISONMENT AND INCIDENTS THERE OF...................................................... 283
PARDON AND PAROLE. ........................................................................................ 284
FAIR JUDGE ........................................................................................................... 284
NOTICE AND HEARING ......................................................................................... 286
SPEEDY HEARING RIGHT ..................................................................................... 288
DUE PROCESS 253(1). Nature in general .............................................................. 292
DEPRIVATION OF LIFE OR LIBERTY IN GENERAL. ............................................. 292
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS .................................................................................. 296
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION AND COMMITMENT. ............................................ 302
CONFESSIONS, STATEMENTS, AND ADMISSIONS ............................................ 306
PROMISES OR OTHER INDUCEMENTS; THREATS AND FEAR. ......................... 307
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY..................................................................................... 308
JUDICIAL ERROR. .................................................................................................. 309
HABEAS CORPUS .................................................................................................. 310
JURISDICTION........................................................................................................ 310
LAW SUIT................................................................................................................ 310
RE: CORPORATION ............................................................................................... 312
RELATED TO STATE OR STATE ACTION. ............................................................ 313
INCORPORATION OF BILL OF RIGHTS ................................................................ 315
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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RE: CHILDREN ....................................................................................................... 315
RE: PRISONERS:.................................................................................................... 319
LIBERTIES AND LIBERTY INTERESTS PROTECTED. .......................................... 320
FEDERAL COURT .................................................................................................. 324
PHOTO COPY. ........................................................................................................ 324
DURESS AND COERCION ..................................................................................... 325
DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT OF LAW ....................................................... 325
ENTRAPMENT ........................................................................................................ 325
RESISTANCE .......................................................................................................... 329
SELF-DEFENSE...................................................................................................... 331
FORMER JEOPARDY ............................................................................................. 335
EFFECT OF SETTING ASIDE OR REVERSING CONVICTION AT DEFENDANT'S
REQUEST ............................................................................................................... 336
JURISDICTION........................................................................................................ 339
ARREST AND DETERMINATION ........................................................................... 339
ARREST WITH A WARRANT .................................................................................. 341
ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT. ......................................................................... 343
REASONABLE OR PROBABLE CAUSE ................................................................. 345
MANNER OF MAKING ARREST ............................................................................. 349
USE OF FORCE ...................................................................................................... 350
RESISTANCE TO ARREST..................................................................................... 352
BAIL......................................................................................................................... 355
TEMPORARY DETENTION..................................................................................... 356
CITATION FOR INFRACTION OR MISDEMEANOR ............................................... 362
CUSTODY AND DISPOSITION OR ARRESTEE OR PRISONER ........................... 363
SEARCH AND SEIZURE ......................................................................................... 369
WHAT CONSTITUTES “SEARCH” “OR SEIZURE” ................................................. 381
SEARCH WARRANTS ............................................................................................ 385
SEARCHES OF PREMISES OF EFFECTS ............................................................. 408
VEHICLE SEARCHES ............................................................................................. 408
IDENTITY OR BEHAVIOR OF OCCUPANT ............................................................ 411
CONSENT ............................................................................................................... 413
SCOPE AND MANNER OF SEARCHES AND SEIZURES ...................................... 414
PARTICULAR TYPES OF SEARCHES AND SEIZURES ........................................ 415
SEARCH & SEIZURE REMEDIES........................................................................... 416
CIVIL ACTIONS ....................................................................................................... 418
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION..................................................................................... 419
PERSONS LIABLE .................................................................................................. 420
EXTRAORDINARY WRITS...................................................................................... 421
PRESUMPTIONS; BURDEN OF PROOF ................................................................ 422
BARGAIN WITH PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ............................................................... 427
BAIL AND RECOGNIZANCE ................................................................................... 428
L. PRAYER FOR RELIEF ........................................................................................... 441
M. DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY ........................................................................... 442
N. VERIFICATION ...................................................................................................... 442
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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JURY NOTICE1: Just as the courts consider kidnap a serious offense punishable
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even by death, PLAINTIFF’S also consider it in the same light. Let it be judicially noticed
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that the government has violently and unlawfully kidnapped Plaintiff Clive Boustred’s
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children RCB and WFB and has held them hostage for nearly five years. The Courts
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have consistently and abrasively refusing to follow the Law, Code and Rules, while
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maliciously assaulting and falsely prosecuting Plaintiff.
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What must be done when a good and peaceful person such as Clive Boustred
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files in a U.S. Courts a plea “that I have been shot at had my children kidnapped and
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have been maliciously prosecuted to cover up, please help!” and cannot get any relief
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what so ever, other than more severe abuse from the government? The government
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who after attempting to murder Clive Boustred literally violently kidnapped Clive
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Boustred’s children RCB and WFB and handed his children to Mr. Boustred’s adulterous
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ex wife and former Personals Assistant Stefan Tichatschke a man and woman of ill
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repute, despite a lawful stipulated custody agreement and order dictating that
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Tichatschke may have no contact with RCB and WFB. The government repeatedly
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threw Clive Boustred in jail under absurdly false charges wile locking down Clive’s
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finances so that he could not afford to defend himself. To this day the government
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continues to hold RCB and WFB hostage from their dad Clive Boustred. Clive is the
1 Judicial Notice: This case is filed under the 11 th Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States of America: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” This suit in law and
equity is commenced and prosecuted against the United States and the State of California by
Citizens of Nevada, representing another State and Nevis, representing a Foreign State.
Consequentially the 11th Amendment eliminates and prohibits JUDICIAL POWER in this case, all
matters may only be adjudicated by JURY POWER. Furthermore, Due Process dictates an
impartial decision maker (see Authorities), hence Judges, who are employees and colleagues of
the parties sued in this case, do not qualify as impartial decision makers in this suit.
Consequentially, as in the Grand Jury Process, only an impartial Jury may make any decision
what so ever in this case, other than a simple failure to appear of Real Parties of Interest
DEFENDANTS, in which case the Clerk of the Court must issue a Summary Judgement pursuant
to rules of Court (Title 28, Rule 55 (b)(1)).
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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custodial parent, and RCB and WFB used to live with him. The maliciousness of the
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government extended to ordering Clive to not communicate with his boys for three years.
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A. PARTIES
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PLAINTIFFS
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1.
Clive Frank Boustred,
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2.
RCB (Minor son of Clive Frank Boustred)
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3.
WFB (Minor son of Clive Frank Boustred)
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4.
InfoTelesys, Inc. Nevada and Nevis
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5.
Get IT Real, Inc. Nevada and Nevis
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6.
Life Yacht. Nevis
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7.
CopperCards. California
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8.
Santa Cruz Cats. California
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9.
Le Essence. Nevis.
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10.
Kite Yachts. Nevis
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DEFENDANTS
1.
Defendant Michael Macdonald
resides or works at Santa Cruz Sheriffs, 701 Ocean Street, Santa Cruz, CA
95060 as a Deputy Sheriff.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
2.
Defendant Samuel S. Stevens
resides or works at Santa Cruz Superior Court, 701 Ocean Street, Santa Cruz,
CA 95060 as a Superior Court Judge.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
3.
Defendant Steve Drottar
resides or works at Santa Cruz District Attorneys Office, 701 Ocean Street, Santa
Cruz, CA 95060 as an Ass. DA.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
4.
Defendant Anamaria Tichatschke (Formerly Anamaria Boustred)
resides or works at 33250 Fairway Ave, Soquel, CA 95073 as a house keeper
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
5.
Defendant Steffan Tichatschke
resides or works at 33250 Fairway Ave, Soquel, CA 95073 as an investor
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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6.
Defendant Vicki J. Parry
resides or works at 100 Doyle Street, Suite G, Santa Cruz CA 95062 as an
Officer of the court and member of the State Bar 80508.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
7.
Defendant Mark Tracy and Santa Cruz Sheriffs
resides or works at Santa Cruz Sheriffs, 701 Ocean Street, Santa Cruz, CA
95060 as a Sheriff.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
8.
Defendant Art Danner (Deceased)
resides or works at Santa Cruz Superior Court, 701 Ocean Street, Santa Cruz,
CA 95060 as a Superior Court Judge.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
9.
Defendant M Pool
resides or works at Santa Cruz Sheriffs, 701 Ocean Street, Santa Cruz, CA
95060 as a Deputy Sheriff.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
10.
Defendant Hemmingway (Deceased)
resides or works at Santa Cruz Sheriffs, 701 Ocean Street, Santa Cruz, CA
95060 as a Lieutenant Sheriff.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
11.
Defendant Amy Christy
resides or works at Santa Cruz Sheriffs, 701 Ocean Street, Santa Cruz, CA
95060 as a Sergeant Sheriff.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
12.
Defendant Brozozowski
resides or works at Santa Cruz Sheriffs, 701 Ocean Street, Santa Cruz, CA
95060 as a Deputy Sheriff.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
13.
Defendant Bob Lee
resides or works at Santa Cruz District Attorneys Office, 701 Ocean Street, Santa
Cruz, CA 95060 as a District Attorney.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
14.
Defendant Michael E. Barton
resides or works at Santa Cruz Superior Court, 701 Ocean Street, Santa Cruz,
CA 95060 as a Superior Court Judge.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
15.
Defendant Gregor Guy Smith
resides or works at 214 Duboce Ave, San Francisco, CA 94103-1008 as an
Officer of the court and member of the State Bar.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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16.
Defendant Paul Meltzer
resides or works at Water Street, Santa Cruz CA 95060 as an Officer of the court
and member of the State Bar.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
17.
Defendant Trilla E. Bahrke
resides or works at 2501 North Lake Blvd, P.O. Box 5609, Tahoe City, CA 96145
as a Superior Court Commissioner.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
18.
Defendant Bill Doyle
resides or works at 2501 North Lake Blvd, P.O. Box 5609, Tahoe City, CA
96145-5609 as a Ass. District Attorney.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
19.
Defendant Christopher M. Cattran
resides or works at 2501 North Lake Blvd, P.O. Box 5609, Tahoe City, CA
96145-5609 as a Ass. District Attorney.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
20.
Defendant Barbara J. Fox
resides or works at Santa Cruz Superior Court, 701 Ocean Street, Santa Cruz,
CA 95060 as a Clerk of the Court.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
21.
Defendant Griffin
resides or works at Santa Cruz Sheriffs, 701 Ocean Street, Santa Cruz, CA
95060 as a Deputy Sheriff.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
22.
Defendant Robert Frandeen
resides or works at 125 Water Street, Suite C, Santa Cruz, CA 95060 as an
Officer of the court and member of the State Bar.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
23.
Defendant Raven Harris
resides or works at Santa Cruz Santa Cruz Child Protective Services. 100
Pioneer Street P.O. Box 1320, Santa Cruz, CA 95061
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
24.
Defendant Angela Glass
resides or works at Santa Cruz Santa Cruz Child Protective Services. 100
Pioneer Street P.O. Box 1320, Santa Cruz, CA 95061
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
25.
Defendant Mary Olimpo
26.
Defendant Robert B. Atack
resides or works at Santa Cruz Superior Court, 701 Ocean Street, Santa Cruz,
CA 95060 as a Superior Court Judge.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
27.
Defendant Genworth Financial
resides or works at representation at 1299 Ocean Avenue, Suite 900, Santa
Monica, CA 90401-1000 as insurance agents
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
28.
Defendant Attorney General of The State of California
resides or works at P.O. Box 944255, Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 as Attorney
General of The State of California
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
29.
Defendant Irwin Joseph
resides or works at Santa Cruz Superior Court, 701 Ocean Street, Santa Cruz,
CA 95060 as a Commissioner.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
30.
Jason M. Heath and Santa Cruz County and Santa Cruz County
resides or works at Santa Cruz County 701 Ocean Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95060
as an Attorney
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
31.
Defendant Phyllis J. Hamilton and the Government and associated
entities of United States of America responsible for instituting the position
and acts of said Defendant.
Resides or works at 450 Golden Gate Ave, San Francisco, CA 940102 as a U.S.
District Court Judge.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
32.
Defendant Jeremy Fogel and the Government and associated entities of
United States of America responsible for instituting the position and acts
of said Defendant as a United States District Court Judge.
Resides or works at the U.S. District Court 280 S. 1st Street, San Jose, CA as a
United States District Court Judge
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
33.
Defendant William M. Kelsay
Resides or works at Santa Cruz Superior Court, 701 Ocean Street, Santa Cruz,
CA 95060 as a Retired Superior Court Judge.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
34.
Defendant Jeff Almquist
Resides or works at Santa Cruz Superior Court, 701 Ocean Street, Santa Cruz,
CA 95060 as a Retired Superior Court Judge.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
35.
Defendant Heather Morse
Resides or works at Santa Cruz Superior Court, 701 Ocean Street, Santa Cruz,
CA 95060 as a Retired Superior Court Judge.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
36.
Defendant Barry Baskin
Resides or works at Contra Costa County Superior Court, Contra Costa CA. as a
Superior Court Judge.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
37.
Defendant M. M. SCHROEDER and the Government and associated
entities of United States of America responsible for instituting the position
and acts of said Defendant.
Resides or works at United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth District, San
Francisco as Chief Judge.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
38.
Defendant James Ware and the Government and associated entities of
United States of America responsible for instituting the position and acts
of said Defendant.
Resides or works at the U.S. District Court 280 S. 1st Street, San Jose, CA as a
United States District Court Judge
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
39.
Richard W. Wieking and the Government and associated entities of
United States of America responsible for instituting the position and acts
of said Defendant.
Resides or works at the U.S. District Court 280 S. 1st Street, San Jose, CA as a
United States District Court Clerk
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
40.
Defendant Dennis J. Kehoe
resides or works at Dennis J. Kehoe Law Corp. 311 Bonita Drive, Aptos, CA
95003 as an Officer of the court and member of the State Bar.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
41.
Defendant Dennis J. Kehoe Law Corp.
resides or works at Dennis J. Kehoe Law Corp. 311 Bonita Drive, Aptos, CA
95003 a corporation.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
42.
Defendant John A. Christerson
resides or works at Dennis J. Kehoe Law Corp. 311 Bonita Drive, Aptos, CA
95003 as an Officer of the court and member of the State Bar.
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
43.
Defendant Mark Spurlock
resides or works at Twin Lakes Baptist Church, Inc. 2701 Cabrillo College Drive,
Aptos CA 95003 as an Administrator
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
44.
Defendant Leonard Dueck
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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resides or works at Twin Lakes Baptist Church, Inc. 2701 Cabrillo College Drive,
Aptos CA 95003 as Vice President
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
45.
Defendant Twin Lakes Baptist Church, Inc.
resides or works at Twin Lakes Baptist Church, Inc. 2701 Cabrillo College Drive,
Aptos CA 95003 a corporation
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
46.
Defendant Chase Card Services of Wilmington Delaware.
resides or works at P.O. Box 15298 Wilmington DE 19850-6600a corporation
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
47.
Defendant TROY B. OVERTON
resides or works at P.O. Box 944255, Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 as Deputy
Attorney General of The State of California
The defendant is sued in his/her (Check one or both): individual official
capacity.
19
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 13
1
B. SYNOPSIS OF CASE
2
This case is brought against DEFENDANTS for continued kidnap, racketeering,
3
treason and other charges, in addition to force collection on two earlier cases filed by
4
plaintiffs. The Clerk of the court refused to issue summary judgments on the earlier suits
5
after the failure to appear of any of the DEFENDANTS in those cases. This case brings
6
new charges that were not brought in the previous cases.
7
The government has literally attempted to blow Plaintiff Clive Boustred’s head off
8
in front of his children and repeatedly thrown him in jail under absurdly false charges.
9
They have given him pathetically sham hearings and trials and have kidnapped and held
10
hostage his children for nearly five years while locking down Mr. Boustred’s finances so
11
as to prevent him from defending himself or effectively holding any of the DEFENDANTS
12
accountable for the outrageous crimes that shock the conscience committed against
13
Plaintiffs.
14
While taking Mr. Boustred to trial after trial for absurd false criminal charges that
15
don’t meet any of the constructs of a crime, and for which there never was any evidence
16
of any crime being committed and for which Mr. Boustred had substantial evidence
17
proving his innocence, the Courts continue to refuse to allow Mr. Boustred to take
18
government employees to trial for legitimate, well established and proven serious and
19
outrageous criminal charges.
20
As a direct and proximate cause of crimes committed by DEFENDANTS against
21
Plaintiff, companies Plaintiff Clive Boustred founded, chaired and ran have been
22
destroyed. Mr. Boustred had developed next generation internet (InfoTelesys, Inc.) that
23
not only ushered in new education systems which had the potential of significantly
24
reducing world hunger by providing people the means to education, but also had the
25
potential of eliminating the core construct to corruption in the United States and the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 14
1
World at large, namely providing alternate banking infrastructure to that provided by the
2
privately held Federal Reserve Bank and New World Order oligarchy.
3
infrastructure where non interest baring money would be employed to facilitate
4
transactions and commerce and not where interest on money is employed as it is by the
5
owners of the Federal Reserve Bank and New World Order oligarchy to initiate and
6
cause depressions and wars.
A banking
7
In this case, we will put forward evidence showing that the Federal Reserve Bank
8
owners, lead by the Rothschild’s, embarked on a world dominance plan that has been
9
the underlying cause of the major wars and depressions for the last century and the
10
implementation of communism / socialism in the U.S. and other nations. It is these
11
socialist/communist principals which completely oppose the construct of the U.S.
12
Constitution and underlying English Common Law that have been employed by criminals
13
working for the State to assault Plaintiffs.
14
Following the first government assaults of Plaintiffs, new companies founded by
15
Mr. Boustred, including Kite Yacht, Life Yacht, Le Essence and CopperCards have also
16
been eliminated by the continued criminal behavior of the courts and their refusal to
17
follow the most rudimentary and principal laws and fundamental decency.
18
The government who violently kidnapped Mr. Boustred’s children continues to
19
hold them hostage and continues to lock up Mr. Boustred’s assets while bankers charge
20
usurious interest rates on money Mr. Boustred has had to borrow in order to survive.
21
Plaintiffs have been denied Justice while the government instigated
22
domestic conflict and eliminated Plaintiffs common defence and destroyed
23
Plaintiffs general Welfare, while taking way the Blessings of Liberty and Posterity
24
from Plaintiffs. The government has ignored all the constructs and limitations
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 15
1
placed on them by the Constitution of the United States of America and even
2
international law. The government has made mixed war against Plaintiffs.
3
The government has sold out the Nations currency to international bankers who
4
now easily master and control the government, the economy and military industrial
5
complex. The government has literally given the private bankers the right to add as
6
many U.S. Dollars to their bank account as they want without paying anything for the
7
money other than printing costs if the money is printed.
8
international banksters, principal of whom are the Rothschild’s, have implemented
9
communism and oppression in the U.S. They have instigated wars and depressions so
10
as to allow themselves to steal assets and land through fraud and the misfortune of their
11
victims.
As a consequence, these
12
These agents of the Rothschild’s and international bankers have implemented in
13
the United States of America a classic showcase of the Hegelian Dialectic process that
14
instigates conflict in order to take advantage of change that is ensured by instigating
15
wars and depressions.
16
These agents of the Rothschild’s and international bankers have appointed liars
17
and criminals as Presidents, Vice Presidents, Judges, Attorney Generals and other
18
official State positions. They have implemented a Court system that entertains cases
19
filed by criminals and dismisses legitimate cases filed by honest and decent citizens, a
20
court system that acquits the guilty and convicts the innocent, a court system which
21
claims government officials cannot be held accountable no matter what crime they
22
commit. A court system that claims that “they the State” are supreme and sovereign, the
23
head of our families and our “god”. These government employees who act as agents for
24
the Rothschild’s New World Order oligarchy have committed treason of the worst kind,
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 16
1
bringing effective slavery and oppression not only on themselves but on their children
2
and their children’s children and future generations.
3
This insanity and greed of government officials has brought the United States of
4
America into war after war, and depression after depression. This Nation should be
5
leading the world and not enslaving it.
6
However, we live at the cusp of a new renaissance where the great printing press
7
of the Internet is exposing the banking sham and the conspiracy of the New World Order
8
oligarchy, and where Internet promises to usher in a new era of education and prosperity
9
to mankind.
10
11
12
13
14
Let us open our eyes and make it so instead of letting greed drive
corruption in our Nation.
PREVIOUS LAWSUITS
1. Have you brought any other lawsuits in a federal court while a prisoner: Yes No
2. If your answer to “1.” is yes, how many?
15
Petitioners have filed two previous lawsuits relating to these matters in the San Jose
16
U.S. District Court. Petitioners won both of those lawsuits as a simple matter pursuant to
17
TITLE 28—APPENDIX: RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL
18
CLAIMS: TITLE VII. JUDGMENT: Rule 55. Default (a), (b)(1). The court however refused
19
to follow due process or the law in those cases and this lawsuit is filed to enforce collection
20
on those earlier lawsuits in addition to brining new claims not addressed in those earlier
21
lawsuits.
22
23
24
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
1. Is there a grievance procedure available at the institution where the events relating to
your current complaint occurred? Yes No
25
26
2. Have you filed a grievance concerning the facts relating to your current complaint?
27
Yes
28
29
No
If your answer is no, explain why not
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 17
1
2
3. Is the grievance procedure completed? Yes No
3
If your answer is no, explain why not
4
5
1ST LAWSUIT – U.S. Dist. Ct. Case # C05 000996
6
On March 9, 2005, in San Jose U.S. District Court, Mr. Boustred filed suit against
7
nine judges, seven cops, four District Attorneys and other government employees,
8
lawyers, his ex Anamaria and her lover Stefen Tichatschke (Case # C05 000996). In
9
more than a year and a half of hearings in that case, not a single defendant dared to
10
make any appearance or even pick up pen and paper and deny the many serious
11
charges brought against them.
12
APPENDIX: RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS: TITLE
13
VII. JUDGMENT: Rule 55. Default:
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Plaintiffs won that suit pursuant to TITLE 28—
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and
that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter such
party's default.
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By the Clerk. When the plaintiff's claim against a defendant is for a sum
certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, the clerk upon
request of the plaintiff and upon affidavit of the amount due shall enter judgment for
that amount and costs against the defendant, if the defendant has been defaulted
for failure to appear and if the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person.
2nd LAWSUIT – U.S. Dist. Ct. Case # C07 00391
On or about January 18, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a second case for the fourth false
26
arrest of Mr. Boustred on March 20, 2006.
Defendant Judge Jeremy Fogel had
27
dismissed Plaintiffs 1st Lawsuit after a year and a half of hearings making the ridiculous
28
and absurd claim that the Torts under which Plaintiff had filed his claims were not claims
29
upon which relief could be granted. Mr. Fogel claimed that attempted murder, kidnap,
30
grand theft auto, libel, slander, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, trespass, fraud, and
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
violations of 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 14th Amendments and other laws
2
were not ‘claims upon which relief could be granted’.
3
extensive international career has not seen anything as ridiculous as this claimed by
4
anyone in a relatively senior position. To counter such absurdities in the 2nd lawsuit,
5
Plaintiffs filed, a carbon copy of a successfully filed U.S. District Court San Jose lawsuit
6
for the same false arrest charges, excepting for names and places and minor details,
7
was filed by Plaintiffs. This second case was brought before Judge James Ware.
Frankly Mr. Boustred in his
8
At the first hearing in this second U.S. District Court Case Mr. Ware indicated
9
that he would issue a summary judgment if the police officer who had falsely arrested
10
Mr. Boustred did not make any appearance. However, between hearings before the
11
next scheduled hearing, Mr. Ware quietly dismissed Plaintiffs second case, also claiming
12
such absurdities as Mr. Fogel.
13
Clearly the Courts, knowing that they will loose the case are breaking the law and
14
flat out refusing PLAINTIFFS any right to trial by jury or any trial for that matter, knowing
15
that by simply unlawfully dismissing the case they can keep the case under JUDICIAL
16
POWER indefinitely. However, according to their own law under Title 28 PLAINTIFFS
17
by law have won these cases.
18
19
The Net Result of Continued Criminal Behavior By Government
Officials
20
Plaintiffs filed the 1st and 2nd Lawsuits under the 11th Amendment eliminating any
21
Judicial Power. Plaintiffs won the cases pursuant to TITLE 28 (APPENDIX: RULES OF
22
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS: TITLE VII. JUDGMENT: Rule
23
55. Default). Plaintiffs and had no path other than through the duty of the Clerk of The
24
Court’s Duty under Title 28 Rule 55 (b)(1) to award Summary Judgment, which was
25
denied by the Clerk. Any Appeal through the Judiciary would be just moot as the void
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
dismissals issued by Fogel and Ware since there is no Judicial Power in this case
2
brought against the State and judiciary.
3
Plaintiffs move again in this case to enforce collection and summary judgment on
4
the first two cases Plaintiffs field. Naturally Statutes of Limitation do not apply to this
5
case where the government is employing the courts to delay and deny justice.
6
In the Santa Cruz Superior Court, Commissioners and Judges Plaintiffs
7
successfully sued still insist on presiding over Mr. Boustred’s divorce case, refusing to
8
allow that case to move forward now for five and a half years.
9
commissioner have also refused to enforce lawfully Stipulated Agreements and Orders
10
and have prevented Mr. Boustred from even refinancing his own home, forcing Mr.
11
Boustred to borrow money on credit cards whom have now proceeded to charge Mr.
12
Boustred 30% interest on balances. New companies Plaintiffs started have also now
13
been destroyed as a consequence.
14
upheld blatantly void and illegal orders, including criminal void orders kidnapping Mr.
15
Boustred’s children, they went as far as to continuously sanction and fine Mr. Boustred
16
in blatant violations of rules of court and the law and reflecting such baseless criminal
17
behavior unbefitting of the bench.
These judges and
While the judges and commissioner issued and
18
The net result of the completely out of control behavior of the Courts and
19
government officials has been that instead of building the next generation Internet and
20
education systems InfoTelesys had developed, Mr. Boustred has been forced into five
21
and a half years of defending himself from criminal assaults made by the government,
22
and close to five years attempting to get his kidnapped children back. The government
23
has Made Mixed War against Mr. Boustred and his children and is doing the same to
24
many citizens in this Nation.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 20
1
Mr. Boustred who has worked at the forefront of technology and lead the industry
2
in many areas, undertook an extensive investigation of the nature and cause of the
3
government Making Mixed War against himself and other citizens.
4
findings
5
http://www.libertyforlife.com
are
published
on
the
Liberty
For
Life
Many of these
Association
website
at
6
The underlying or root cause to the extraordinary corruption in the government in
7
the United States can be traced to the fraud and crimes committed during the Woodrow
8
Wilson Presidency in 1913 when private individuals and foreigners were granted the
9
exclusive “franchise” of the U.S. dollar also referred to as “banksters” and or “Agents of
10
the Rothschild’s” and “New World Order” herein.
11
hijacked the dollar is the Rothschild family whose World Dominance plan was formally
12
completed by Whitehouse on May 1, 1776 (May Day).
Principle of these foreigners who
13
Earlier assumption of Lincoln’s War debt by these banksters can also reveals
14
their underlying Hegelian Dialectic meddling in that devastating war which to this day
15
90% of U.S. citizens have no idea what the so-called “Civil War” was fought over. Most
16
citizens even believe Lincoln was honest.
17
See http://www.libertyforlfie.com/constitution/politicians/dishonest_abe.htm
18
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 21
1
C. VENUE
2
Venue is appropriate in this court because the majority of the DEFENDANTS
3
reside in this district, and a substantial amount of the acts and omissions giving rise to
4
this lawsuit occurred in this district.
5
Venue is proper in the Northern District of California, San Jose Division pursuant
6
to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, in that the subject matter of this action arose in this district,
7
furthermore petitioners CLIVE FRANK BOUSTRED, RCB, WFB, Santa Cruz Cats and
8
CopperCards are subject to personal jurisdiction in this district and petitioners
9
INFOTELESYS, INC. and GET IT REAL, INC., Nevada citizens, fall within the general
10
11
U.S. District Court jurisdiction.
Intradistrict Assignment.
12
This lawsuit should be assigned to the San Jose Division of this Court because a
13
substantial part of the events or omissions which give rise to this lawsuit occurred in San
14
Jose/Santa Clara and Santa Cruz Counties.
15
D. JURISDICTION
16
This court house has jurisdiction over this complaint because it arises under the
17
laws of the United States.
18
This action arises under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1988,
19
1961, 1962, 1964) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and 19
20
U.S.C. § 1961-68 and English Common Law and the First Amendment, Second
21
Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Seventh
22
Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Ninth Amendment, Tenth Amendment, Eleventh
23
Amendment, the missing Thirteenth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment and the
24
alleged Sixteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America and
25
Article 1 thereof. Via Trial By Jury only this Court has jurisdiction of the federal claims
26
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331, 1332, 1343(3) 1343(4), 2201, and 2202. Pursuant to the
27
11th Amendment there is no Judicial Power over this claim and the matter can only be
28
decided and tried and any stage of the process by Trial by Jury.
29
Furthermore, Federal Court has jurisdiction over these matters pursuant to:
30
31
(1) National interstate commerce has been destroyed and severely impacted for
a number of national and international corporations as a consequence of
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 22
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
direct and blatant Constitutional violations by California Courts and authorities
against Petitioner with a consequence of destroying the following National
and International Corporations: InfoTelesys, Inc. (Nevada); Get IT Real, Inc.
(Nevada).
(2) This matter involves national and international business contracts, in addition
to Petitioner’s international marriage contract.
Californian Courts have given up jurisdiction over these matters:
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
(3) Remedies have been exhausted in the California Courts.
(4) Californian courts up to the Californian Supreme Court repeatedly refuse to
file motions or bring matters to trial, denying even the most rudimentary due
process at law, even going as far as to sanction Petitioner Clive Boustred for
simply seeking the most elementary rights under the law and due process.
(5) The Santa Cruz Superior Court contractually gave up jurisdiction in this
matter
As Petitioner’s are filing this suit against the State of California and Counties in
16
the State of California, it is impossible to believe that these Petitioners, who have been
17
severely impacted by unlawful Constitutional violations by Californian Courts, would
18
receive fair treatment in California Courts, particularly since Petitioners are suing the
19
Californian Courts for outrageous Constitutional violations against Petitioners.
20
It is in the interests of the Federal Courts and “We the People” of The United
21
States of America to ensure that U.S. citizens and corporations receive fair treatment
22
under the laws of the land and that State Courts conform to and do not violate the
23
Constitution of the United States of America.
24
E. AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS OR PREJUDICE
25
PETITIONERS do solemnly sincerely and truly declare and allege and
26
believe that Judges employed by parties who are DEFENDANTS or directly related
27
to DEFENDANTS have reason for and are biased against PETITIONER.
28
Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment due to the fact that this suit is
29
brought by Citizens of Nevada and Nevis (InfoTelesys, Inc. and Get IT Real, Inc.)
30
against another State (California) and the United States of America, Judges have
31
no power in this case an the case must be tried by jury where the jury determines
32
both the law and fact.
33
Constitution due to the fact that this suit is brought against colleagues and the
34
employer of judges of the U.S. District Court, jurisdiction does not extend toward
35
Judges of the Court and pursuant to the dictates of due process, all matters both
36
regarding fact and law may only be decided by Jury.
Additionally Pursuant to Due Process Clauses of the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 23
1
PLAINTIFFS declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
2
California and the United States of America that the information above and herein
3
is true and correct to the best of our knowledge.
4
5
_________________________________ Date:__________________
6
Clive Boustred
AUTHORITIES
7
8
U.S. Constitution, Eleventh Amendment: “The Judicial power of the United
9
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
10
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
11
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” – Said power resides with the independent
12
Jury.
13
ANALYSIS OF THE 11TH AMENDMENT:
14
What are the two powers through which the courts rule?
15
Judicial power
16
Jury power
17
And note that Judicial power is questionable, however, Jury power may not be
18
reexamined (7th Amendment). Also do not be deceived, the Jury has the power to judge
19
both the law and the fact
20
A classic example of the jury process in which there is absolutely zero judicial
21
involvement from administrative, adjudicative or any decision making power what so
22
ever is the Gran Jury process. There is no judge in a Grand Jury, the jury is made up of
23
"we the people" and decides both fact and law.
24
component of the legal framework mandated by the Constitution as dictated in the Fifth
25
Amendment "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
26
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury".
Grand Juries make up a critical
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 24
1
The very construct of the Constitution, the essence of the formation of the United
2
States of America, is founded on the principle of eliminating tyrannical government; the
3
construct that the government can not do what they want; the principle that all stand
4
equal before the law and that all parties to suits are entitled to impartial decision makers;
5
etc. Consequentially, the establishment of the 11th Amendment is based upon the
6
principle that the judiciary, which consists of a group of individuals whom are employed
7
by the State, naturally has no authority to preside over a case brought against their
8
employer, the State.
9
Suits brought against the State can thus naturally only be adjudicated by Jury
10
where the decision maker in the trial or in any matter leading up to the trial is no party to
11
the suit and where the Jury in accordance with the construct of Trial By Jury, decides
12
both the law and the fact. "The jury has the right to judge both the law and the facts" -
13
Samuel Chase, 1804, Supreme Court Justice and signer of the Declaration of
14
Independence.
15
In a Trial By Jury the judiciary has no function. The judiciary has no power to
16
dismiss a case or weigh the merits of a case that is brought before the court for a trial by
17
jury. Those are functions absolutely and completely reserved for the jury. Clearly the
18
judiciary has no authority to make any decisions in a Trial by Jury, otherwise, it is no
19
longer a Trial By Jury, it becomes a Trial by Judge. If, for example, a judge orders that
20
certain evidence be not presented to a jury, then that judge holds the power to influence
21
the outcome of the trial and it is a trial by judge and not by jury.
22
One of the key reasons the courts are so utterly corrupt in the United States is
23
because judges rush in and take control of trials by jury, thereby exceeding their
24
jurisdiction and according to the law, those judges commit treason. That is they pervert
25
the very construct of law and order and governance in the nation. Judges so readily
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 25
1
commit treason in our courts because they know the appeal process offered to those the
2
commit treason against is made up of appellate courts consisting entirely of judges
3
employed by the State.
4
In other words, judges have completely destroyed the Trial By Jury process
5
within U.S. courts, committing high treason of the very worst kind. Rampant abuse of
6
process and the destruction of the Constitutionally mandated law and order within the
7
nation has resulted.
8
completely out of control that they themselves now make law, ignoring Article 1, Section.
9
8 of the Constitution which dictates that "The Congress shall have Power.... To exercise
The Judiciary and Executive Office have now become so
10
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such district".
11
construct of government in the United States explicitly limits lawmaking power to
12
Congress. The Executive and Judicial branch of government is explicitly prohibited from
13
making law.
14
understood/interpreted by the common man, then it is not law. i.e. there is no judicial
15
construct to interpreting law - if the common person cannot understand the law then it
16
must be sent back to Congress as void, forcing Congress to rewrite the law so that the
17
common man can understand it. Note also that the "Code" is not law, it is code, like a
18
"code of ethics" see LAW and Understanding Law in the U.S.)
19
20
The tricameral
(Note that Common Law dictates that if a law cannot be
Clearly the judiciary has no decision making authority in suits brought against
their colleagues.
21
Commentary regarding Supreme Court Analysis of the 11th Amendment: Many
22
courts including the Supreme Court have made a number of contradictory and clearly
23
blatantly void rulings in regard to the 11th Amendment. Astonishingly, the courts have
24
read into the 11th not only concepts that are absolutely not there, but concepts that
25
scream in the opposite direction to the construct of the Constitution. In particular, the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 26
1
concept of "sovereign immunity of government" and the elimination of accountability of
2
the State.
3
Great error has crept into many judicial decisions in regard to the idea of
4
Sovereign immunity, which is not mentioned once in any way or in any part of the
5
Constitution. Such a concept flies in the opposite direction of the principles and purposes
6
upon which the government of the U.S. was established. There is absolutely no principle
7
of Sovereign immunity under the Constitution, which goes to great lengths to ensure
8
equality and responsibility under the law and is the exact opposite of any suggestion of a
9
sovereign class or of any immunity. To the contrary, government entities and employees,
10
if anyone, are to be held to a higher standard when it comes to responsibility under the
11
law, they are utterly accountable – this after all was the purpose of establishing the U.S.
12
and the underlying construct of the Constitution.
13
Immunity is mentioned only twice in the Constitution:
14
Article IV, Section. 2. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
15
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." thus implying absolute equality of all
16
citizens whether or not they work for the State or not. And in Section 1 of the 14th
17
Amendment: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
18
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
19
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
20
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
21
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
22
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." which further enforces the construct of
23
equality.
24
There is categorically and absolutely zero implication or statement within the 11th
25
Amendment that says or implies that a State cannot be sued or has 'sovereign
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 27
1
immunity', it simply is not there. All the 11th says is that judges have no power (Judicial
2
power). What other decision making power remains? Naturally the other cornerstone of
3
the judicial system: Jury power.
4
There are two ways to decide a case in a Court: Either by Jury or by Judge. The
5
very construct of Trial by Jury was given to our nation so that the very construct of
6
Judicial corruption could be overcome. The very reason we give the Jury the power to
7
decide both the law and the fact is because we know, as the founding fathers knew, that
8
the government and in particular the judiciary, would become corrupt. And how they
9
have!
10
11
Take a look at what "Judicial Power" has attempted to infer as to their absurd
interpretation of the 11th Amendment:
12
- the judiciary goes as absurdly far as to suggest that a State cannot be sued,
13
which is a classic example of the Judiciary attempting to make law because no where
14
does the 11th Amendment or any part of the Constitution say or infer such;
15
- the Judiciary has even tried to make new law saying that “they the government”
16
is Sovereign, that “they the government” can Lord it over “we the people” as “Kings and
17
Queens” who have been put on the throne by God Himself (thereby taking on the very
18
persona of King George who was thrown out by the American Revolution);
19
- And that they the government, like the King and Queen, can do no wrong
20
because, after all, God put them on the nations throne, and God can do no wrong. This
21
is the origins of sovereign immunity under English Common Law which is subordinate to
22
and overruled by our Constitution.
23
The Judiciary's interpretation of the 11th is utterly and categorically and
24
pathetically absurd! The U.S.A. was founded so as to bring accountability to
25
government, there is no king or queen in the U.S., all stand equal before the law.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
As for the Kings and Queens of England’s idea that because the Bible states that
2
God puts authorities on the throne (Romans 13:1 “for there is no authority except that
3
which God has established”), that this some how grants the King or Queen sovereign
4
immunity, it too, is also utterly absurd and illogical. Since such a foolish analysis ignores
5
the fact that und such construct, it implies that God also put people like Hitler or Bush on
6
the ‘throne’. Clearly, such a positioning is not one to be respected, but rather that
7
perhaps God’s reasoning for such, is more likely to chastise us to stand up against such
8
tyrants, to speak out for the common man, and to stand up for justice and to hold
9
tyrannical rulers accountable.
10
The very behavior of Judicial power within the U.S. illustrates the exact purpose
11
of the 11th which is to eliminate Judicial power in suits where judges are parties to the
12
suit. In any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
13
States by Citizens of another State. The Judiciary is employed by the entity against
14
which the suit is brought and therefore obviously has no authority to preside over such a
15
suit as they have good reason for inherent bias.
16
The interesting elements regarding this very case, is that the case is about
17
extreme governmental abuse and exactly the protections guaranteed by the Constitution
18
and that embedded in the 11th Amendment. Without any cause the government literally
19
shot at Clive and his children, falsely arrested and threw Clive in jail, kidnapped his
20
children, then maliciously and outrageously prosecuted Clive to cover up.
21
government went as far as to order Clive to not communicate with his children and then
22
handed the children to a man who is ordered to have no contact with Clive’s children, a
23
man who in his own words admits to having serious problems with drugs, sex and
24
pornography.
25
integrity or worse abuse. The judicial abuses employed in the cover-up in this situation
26
are astounding and rampant, shocking the conscience, and are now deeply embedded
27
in this very case.
The
You don’t get much worse criminal activity. You can’t get much lower
28
What is even more astonishing is that Judge Jeremy Fogel who was initially
29
assigned as the judge to the first Federal suit filed by the Plaintiffs, and who became a
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 29
1
defendant in that case because of blatant violations at law against Plaintiffs, himself
2
wrote an article entitled 'Justice denied is a national problem’ for the San Jose Mercury’s
3
series on “Tainted Trial, Stolen Justice”.
4
enforcement of ethical standards for prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges is
5
essential” he goes on to state “Integrity and professional competence are minimum
6
requirements for all of us who do the public's work”. Good advice, however, Mr.
7
Fogel himself acted on the opposite side of his own advice and critique.
In the article Mr. Fogel states: “Vigorous
8
There are 2 means to trial: 1 by judge (Judicial power) and 2 by jury (Jury
9
power). Recognize that facts determined by Judicial power can be questioned, however,
10
facts determined by Jury power may not be re-examined (7t Amendment – “and no fact
11
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
12
according to the rules of the common law.”).
13
As a further note in exposing the corruption of our courts: No new law is made
14
through judicial rulings. The use of “Judicial Precedence” or “Case Law” by our Courts is
15
totally misplaced. Only the Legislature has any authority to make law. The judiciary has
16
absolutely no authority or power to make law. The underlying Common-Law construct is
17
that no law is law unless the common person can understand it – this is Common-Law
18
(which is not a Code based system). Thus, there is no function for the ‘interpretation of
19
the law’. If a law is ambiguous or difficult to understand, then under Common-Law, it is
20
therefore not law.
21
The one and only function of the judiciary in the area of confusion as to
22
interpretation of a law, is that if a law is not clearly definable and understood by the
23
common man, then the judiciary’s only function is to send the law back to the Legislature
24
to make it clear so that the common person can understand it. In trials by jury, the
25
judiciary has no function, as is the case in Grand Juries.
26
All that is required to bring a matter to trial by jury is a claim on information OR
27
belief by a plaintiff that a wrong has been committed by DEFENDANTS to which relief
28
might be entitled. This is a very low bar which has more than been met by Plaintiffs in
29
this case.
30
This matter must proceed to Trial by Jury. A judge not only has no authority to
31
try matters of fact or law in this case due to the Trial by Jury demand, but also due to the
32
protection from Judicial power as clearly established by the 11th Amendment.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
F. SUFFICIENCY OF CLAIM
2
"By the plain terms of section 1983, two - and only two - allegations are required
3
in order to state a cause of action under that statute. First, the plaintiff must allege that
4
some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person
5
who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law." - Gomez
6
v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980)
7
All that is required to bring a case to trial in Federal Court is a showing that the
8
pleader is entitled to relief:
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the
9
sufficiency of the complaint is tested with regard to the applicable standard in FRCP
10
8(a), which requires that a pleading setting forth a claim for relief contain a short and
11
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint
12
which does not recount all relevant facts or recite the law should not necessarily be
13
dismissed. La Salvia v. United Dairymen, 804 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1986)
14
In light of the fact that FRCP 8(a)(2) merely requires a short and plain statement
15
of the claim, rather than specific facts detailing every allegation, mere vagueness or lack
16
of detail is not a ground for a motion to dismiss. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
17
FRCP 12(b)(6) does not countenance dismissals based merely on a judge's disbelief of
18
a complaint's factual allegations, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), nor is the
19
failure to plead facts showing the plaintiff's theory of liability grounds for dismissal since
20
the defendant can serve interrogatories requiring the plaintiff to particularize the theory
21
of liability.
22
allegations are true, including all facts alleged on information and belief, and must draw
23
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217
24
(9th Cir. 1996) Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). Even if
25
the face of the pleadings suggests that the chance of recovery is remote, the Court must
26
allow the plaintiff to develop the case at this stage of the proceedings. United States v.
27
City of Redwood, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981)
In answering this question, the Court must assume that the plaintiff's
28
The question presented by a motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will
29
prevail in the action, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of the
30
claim. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). If a plaintiff colorably states facts
31
which, if proven, would entitle her to relief, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
32
should not be granted. Dairies v. Kraft Foods, 232 F.3d 979, 994 (9th Cir. 2000)
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 31
1
Over four and a half years of malicious prosecution including seven SLAP
2
cases initiated by DEFENDANTS, all which were either initiated by an attempted
3
murder or by anticompetitive and or other crimes committed by DEFENDANTS,
4
gives rise to literally hundreds of claims upon which relief can be granted in this
5
case. For each Defendant Plaintiffs have shown that there is a least one claim
6
upon which relief can be granted.
7
NO STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
8
Statutes of limitations do not apply in this case due to the fact that
9
DEFENDANTS conspired to maliciously prosecute PLAINTIFFS for the express purpose
10
of covering up crimes committed by DEFENDANTS. DEFENDANTS have consistently
11
and repeatedly denied PLAINTIFFS due process, eliminating any Statute of Limitation.
12
DEFENDANTS acted under the color of law and committed fraud thereby eliminating
13
any statutes of limitation in this case.
14
PLAINTIFFS have been afforded their right to a trial by jury.
15
16
17
Statutes of Limitation only start ticking once
See extensive AUTHORITIES firmly establishing there are no Statutes of
Limitation in this case in the “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” section,
NO JUDICIAL POWER IN THIS CASE
18
11th Amendment: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
19
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
20
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
21
State.” A judge has no power to dismiss InfoTelesys, Inc. and Get IT Real, Inc. from this
22
suit. In fact in accordance with the 11th Amendment there is no judicial power in
23
this suit. Any order by a judge in this case is void and of no force and effect. Jeremy
24
Fogel was clearly and blatantly in excess of jurisdiction when he attempted to dismiss
25
these parties from an earlier suit and he violated Plaintiffs 11th Amendment rights. This
26
matter must proceed immediately to Trial By Jury.
27
See extensive AUTHORITIES firmly establishing there are no Judicial Power in
28
this case in the “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” section. In addition to the extensive
29
argument relating to this topic in section “E. AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS OR PREJUDICE”.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 32
1
PRO SE LITIGANTS ENTITLED TO WIDE LATITUDE
2
“Pro Se (Without a Lawyer, representing self) pleadings are to be considered
3
without technicality; pro se litigants pleadings are not to be held to the same high
4
standards of perfection as lawyers.” - HAINES V. KERNER, 92 S.Ct. 594; JENKINS V.
5
MCKEITHEN, 395 US 411, 421 (1969); PICKING V. PENNA. RWY. CO. 151 F.2d 240;
6
PUCKETT V. COX, 456 F.2d 233.
7
8
“The pleading of one who pleads pro se for the protection of civil rights should be
liberally construed” - BLOOD V. MARGIS, 322 F.2d 1086 (1971)
9
There are decisions in virtually every federal circuits that generously proclaim
10
that pro per petitions should be construed liberally and that pro per petitioners should be
11
held to less stringent standards than lawyers. See, e.g., Price v. Johnston (1948) 334
12
U.S. 266, 292; Chase v. Crips (10th Cir. 1975) 523 F.2d 595, 597; Curtis v. Illinois (7th
13
Cir. 1975) 512 F2d 717; Ham v. North Carolina (4th Cir. 1973) 471 F.2d 406, 407;
14
Hairston v. Alabama (5th Cir. 1972) 465 F.2d 675, 678 n5; Turrell v. Perini (6th Cir.
15
1969) 414 F.2d 1231, 1233; Montgomery v. Brierly (3rd Cir. 1969) 414 F.2d 552;
16
Pembrook v. Wilson, (9th Cir. 1966) 370 F.2d 37, 40; Whittaker v. Overholster (D.C. Cir.
17
1962) 299 F.2d 447, 448. See also Haines v. Kerner (1972) 404 U.S. 519.
18
This right is also protected under the First Amendment Free Speech Clause.
19
And within those rights, the pro se litigant's court submissions are to be construed
20
liberally and held to less stringent standards than submissions of lawyers. If the court
21
can reasonably read the submissions, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal
22
authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's
23
unfamiliarity with rule requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700,
24
70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d
25
251 (1976) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 33
1
(1957)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972);
2
McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); United States v.
3
Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992)(holding pro se petition cannot be held to same
4
standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys); Then v. I.N.S., 58 F.Supp.2d 422, 429
5
(D.N.J. 1999).
6
The courts provide pro se parties wide latitude when construing their pleadings
7
and papers. When interpreting pro se papers, the Court should use common sense to
8
determine what relief the party desires. S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir.
9
1992). See also, United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Court has
10
special obligation to construe pro se litigants' pleadings liberally); Poling v. K.Hovnanian
11
Enterprises, 99 F.Supp.2d 502, 506-07 (D.N.J. 2000).
12
submit pro se briefs on appeal, even though they may be inartfully drawn but the court
13
can reasonably read and understand them. See, Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d 354 (5th
14
Cir. 1998).
15
consequences of technical errors if injustice would otherwise result. U.S. v. Sanchez, 88
16
F.3d 1243 (D.C.Cir. 1996).
Defendant
has the right to
Courts will go to particular pains to protect pro se litigants against
17
See also extensive AUTHORITIES firmly establishing Pro Se, In Propria Persona
18
and Sui Juris equal rights to due process in this case in the “K. COMMON
19
AUTHORITIES” section.
20
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 34
1
G. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2
On March 10, 2003, without probable cause Santa Cruz Sheriffs set ambush,
3
pursued Plaintiffs running up to Plaintiffs vehicle in front of Plaintiffs garage on private
4
property and attempted from point blank range of five to seven feet to blow Plaintiff Clive
5
Frank Boustred’s head off in front of his children RCB and WFB. WFB aged three at the
6
time was in the direct line of fire behind his father, RCB aged seven was two feet off the
7
line of fire.
8
After the assassination attempt failed, the government engaged in a series of
9
outrageous malicious prosecutions against Plaintiff Clive Frank Boustred. Acting under
10
the color of law, filing a barrage of malicious and false charges against, Clive including
11
two false felonies and nine false misdemeanors, DEFENDANTS have sought to drive
12
Petitioners into ruin. Clive has been falsely arrested on multiple occasions and held for
13
five months without even any right to bail. Clive was given patently sham trials where
14
the jury was rigged and he was not allowed to put any evidence proving his innocence
15
before the jury and even had his testimony struck from the record, yet the government
16
was allowed to put hearsay, double hearsay and know lies before the jury along with
17
totally misleading information.
18
One of the most despicable and outrageous acts by the government against
19
Clive following the assassination attempt, was to kidnap his children RCB and WFB.
20
The government’s gunman literally violently chased WFB after shooting at the children,
21
WFB wet his pants in fear, both boys were reduced to a zombie like state of shock. The
22
government then handed the children to a man who was ordered to have no contact with
23
the children, a man who in his own words admitted to having serious problems with
24
drugs, pornography and sex. The government ordered that Clive not communicate with
25
his children for three years. The boys lived with their dad before the government tried to
26
kill their dad in front of them. The government went as far as to repeatedly deny the
27
boys not only access to their father but also access to their grandparents. The
28
government completely ignored and repeatedly covered up blatant & irrefutable crimes
29
committed against Clive & his children
30
Neither Clive nor his children have had any justice or any fair hearing in three
31
and a half years. The California and U.S. District Courts have maintained that the
32
government’s false charge that Clive drove at around forty miles per hour down his
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 35
1
private road justified the government from shooting at Clive and his children, ordering
2
that Clive not communicate with his children for three years, arresting and sentencing
3
Clive to six months in jail, filing Clive’s name and DNA in the California Central Felons
4
Index and also filing Clive’s name in California’s Central Child Abuse Index. Irrefutable
5
proof showed that Clive drove a slow 27 miles per hour down his private road where the
6
Sheriffs without warrant or any probable cause, laid in ambush, unlawfully chased and
7
then attempted to assassinate Clive in front of his children.
8
Clive Frank Boustred was the Founder, President, Chairman, CEO and Key Man
9
of InfoTelesys, Inc. that was well underway in building a next generation internet which
10
amongst other exciting projects was building a global education system that literally had
11
significant and real potential to eliminate world hunger – see the Get IT Ed project on the
12
www.InfoTelsys.com site. The company was in the process of developing and deploying
13
it’s IT-I2 satellite network capable of delivering one gigabit connections anywhere in the
14
world.
15
World Bank and numerous Afghan organizations was destroyed as a consequence of
16
actions by DEFENDANTS. InfoTelesys, Inc. was even approached to build an education
17
system for China’s largest education facility and as a direct consequence to ongoing
18
malicious prosecution InfoTelesys could also not take up that opportunity.
A joint education project in Afghanistan between InfoTelesys, World Vision,
19
InfoTelesys had amongst their team some of the worlds top banking systems
20
experts and was in the process of building a competitor to the privately owned Federal
21
Reserve Bank. History has show that U.S. Presidents who challenged the legality of the
22
privately owned Federal Reserve Bank to take the peoples money and charge us
23
interest on it, were either assassinated or shot at.
24
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 36
1
2
H. PREAMBLE - GOVERNMENT OUT OF CONTROL
IN THE CONTROL OF FOREIGNERS
3
This government fights against the righteous, convicting the innocent and not
4
only acquitting the guilty but literally and supporting and litigating for the guilty! Surely
5
our government is nothing less than a sham engaged in criminal racketeering, a bunch
6
of filthy criminals. No doubt, there are some in our government who have integrity,
7
however, what are they doing about the severe and outrageous criminal nature of those
8
who are clearly committing the most heinous crimes in the name of our government and
9
“We the People”.
10
Extensive study of the problem by Plaintiff Clive Boustred, employing similar
11
analytical techniques he used to architect technological leading strategies, lays out the
12
reasons and cause of government corruption. Convincing evidence shows an ongoing
13
conspiracy associated with the owners of the Federal Reserve Bank, who for more than
14
a century, have conspired to obtain world dominance and a "Novus Ordo Seclorum," or
15
"A New Order of the Ages" more commonly known as the “New World Order” by
16
employing Hegelian dialectic processes causing conflict so as to take advantage of
17
people suffering hardships in said conflict. Central elements to this New World Order’s
18
strategy is the control of a Nations money supply (where they literally create money out
19
of nothing enabling their purchase of almost anything); control of government agencies
20
and politicians, especially judges; implementation of a police state; dominating and
21
censoring media; control of education; and the implementation of communism /
22
socialism including claiming head of family status and the kidnap of children from their
23
opponents.
24
The New World Order conspiracy benefits a very small number of individuals,
25
placing the masses, including every person who is a listed Defendant in this case, in
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 37
1
abject servitude. Judges, Sheriffs, Clerks and District Attorneys also have to pay six to
2
ten months of their salary to the New World Order bankers.
3
To put in perspective the oppressive strategy of the New World Order
4
conspiracy, consider 1994. In 1994 the economy was booming from what has proven to
5
be the world’s larges and most significant industrial revolution ever, the information era.
6
What the Chairman of the New World Orders bank, the Federal Reserve Bank, claimed
7
‘that the Internet bubble that was going to burst’ has proven completely wrong. The
8
Internet bubble was only the froth on the surface of an enormous and exciting industry
9
that will bring huge profit to mankind. Internet has survived and continues its extrodianry
10
growth. Very few of the worlds population own computers, Internet is still in it’s infancy.
11
The oligarchy simply do not want the average man to advance and benefit, they want to
12
dominate and control mankind. Taken not of Greenspan’s recent allegations regarding
13
the real estate market ‘bubble’ – No doubt these banksters are snapping up real estate
14
across the U.S. after they also caused that crash. However, they don’t have to, the by
15
lending money they create out of nothing, they effectively own everyone’s homes
16
anyway.
17
Plaintiffs Clive Boustred and InfoTelesys, Inc. were in the process of deploying a
18
next generation internet called IT-I2™ capable of delivering one gigabit connections
19
anywhere in the world.
20
compete with the New World Orders usurious and corrupt banking systems and it
21
delivered next generation media that would replace the New World Orders control of
22
current media (InfoTelesys, the Media Channel for the New Millennium™) and next
23
generation education that would bring open and significantly improved low cost
24
education to billions of people around the world.
25
InfoTelesys media and education systems were based on “pull” and not “push” media,
IT-I2™ incorporated next generation banking that would
Of particular note is that the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
that is, the consumer could choose content instead of an oligarchy dictating what is
2
broadcast or taught in schools.
3
The President of the United States and many other senior officials, who are part
4
of the New World Order conspiracy were fully aware of InfoTelesys and the capabilities
5
of IT-I2™, the Russian government had provided InfoTelesys with one hundred launch
6
vehicles for the IT-I2™ network in addition to Space Station Mir. The White House was
7
strangely silent regarding proposals InfoTelesys, Inc. made. (See the included Liberty
8
For Life Dot.Bomb Conspiracy News DVD).
9
What is important to not loose sight of, is the exciting era in which we are blessed
10
to live. We are all witnessing the cusp of the new renaissance. Just as the printing
11
press destroyed oligarchic control of people when Martin Luther translated the Bible into
12
languages ordinary people could understand, computers and digital media and networks
13
are translating what in the past was kept secret and used to dominate and control
14
people.
15
oligarch can control. Knowledge will set us free, the future is bright.
Technology is ushering in new knowledge and dynamic education that no
16
By awarding Plaintiffs the summary judgments they have been entitled to and
17
damages they are entitled to in this suit, all mankind will benefit significantly from what
18
InfoTelesys still needs to deploy. These benefits extend also to the DEFENDANTS in
19
this case and even the members of the New World Order oligarchy.
20
There are very few people in the world who know how to build massively scalar
21
networks capable of supporting billions of users. There are not many people in the world
22
who have a firm understanding of problems that face humanity and more importantly
23
have significant real solutions to address many of the more difficult problems. And there
24
are very few people who are able to bring solutions to the extraordinary serious
25
problems facing all of us as a consequence of the Rothschild New World Order
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
conspiracy. Having all skill sets in all three of these domains is extremely unusual.
2
Having the courage to do what Clive is doing is however something only the Lord can
3
provide. Every individual involved in this case aught to be working to help make things
4
easier for Clive Boustred and his sons Richard and William and not just the opposite.
5
The Sheriffs Lieutenant, Hemmingway, who most probably developed the
6
strategy to maliciously prosecute Clive Boustred and who on the day the Sheriffs
7
Shooting Instructor shot at Clive in front of Richard and William, kidnapped the boys,
8
already died of an aneurism.
9
The Judge, Art Danner, who maliciously prosecuted Clive Boustred giving him an
10
absurdly sham trial and sent him to jail for six months without any right to bail for the
11
alleged ‘crime’ of Clive driving at around 27mph down his private road, has already died
12
from a heart attack.
13
The lawyer, Vicki Parry, who repeatedly incited Clive’s ex, Anamaria, to renege
14
on settlement agreements and to make false 911 calls, has landed up in the ICU as her
15
liver fails.
16
These are but three examples illustrating what goes around comes around. Life
17
is short, before we know it, we will all be accounting for what we did with out lives, and
18
that will determine whether we are worthy of walking with our Maker.
19
Plaintiffs hope DEFENDANTS will see the errors of their ways and join with
20
Plaintiffs to fulfill the InfoTelesys mission: “To make the world a better place, showing
21
respect for all creation, while operating with complete integrity, for it is in God we trust.”
22
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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SETTING THE STAGE OF OPPRESSION IN THE UNITED
1
2
STATES
3
Plaintiffs are effectively oppressed by agents of the Rothschild’s and other
4
foreign interests who have ceased control of the U.S. dollar and employed their control
5
of the currency to instigate and fund wars, to crash the markets and to purchase
6
controlling interests in media, industry and government so as to implement a socialist
7
tyrannical dictatorship in the U.S. that is vastly worse than what King George imposed
8
on the American Colony before the Revolution. These agents of the Rothschild’s have
9
placed themselves as socialist sovereigns who lord it over we the people, claiming more
10
sovereign privileges than even King George claimed. As is proven by Plaintiffs first two
11
cases, these so-called officers of the law and courts, claim that they can attempt to
12
murder, assault, kidnap and steal from citizens with complete impunity, with ‘sovereign
13
immunity’.
14
The saddest aspect of these agents of the Rothschild’s is that their servitude to
15
the oligarchy enslaves themselves and their children along with future generations
16
around the world. Most of these Agents of the Rothschild’s also have to work six months
17
of the year to pay interest these banksters demand on our own money. They too are
18
likely to end up in one of the banksters jails, prisons or concentration camps if vaccines
19
or cancer inducing substances propagated secretly bythese banksters do not get them
20
first.
21
The manner in which Agents of the Rothschild’s are treated, is perhaps most
22
clearly demonstrated in how the U.S. Armed Forces are handled. The soldiers are
23
considered cannon fodder, with far more than a million U.S. Gulf War veterans already
24
disabled (mostly from exposure to Nuclear Waste in the form of dirty bomb armor
25
piercing rounds the U.S. manufactures and deploys, and from violent concoctions of
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
vaccines designed as components of biological and germ warfare). According to the
2
Department of Veterans Affairs, more than 73,000 U.S. Gulf War troops are already
3
dead2. The agents of the Rothschild’s are often the first to be eliminated, when disabled
4
they are usually left to rot.
5
The sheer foolishness and stupidity of our government officials who are actively
6
imposing this tyranny is astonishing. Many, if not most of them, have no idea for whom
7
and what they are working.
8
private bank that takes our dollars for nothing and lends them back to us plus interest.
Most don’t even know that the Federal Reserve Bank is a
9
When explaining to these agents the fact that the Federal Reserve Bank takes
10
the U.S. dollar for printing costs or free if digital, and they turn around and lend it back to
11
us at thousands, millions, billions and even trillions more inflated value, many of these
12
agents of the Rothschild’s show a complete lack of comprehension of this extreme
13
crime. They actually often think that the person showing them that their pocket is being
14
picked is foolish!
15
When the great U.S. Industrialist Henry Ford said "It is well enough that people of
16
the nation do not understand our banking and monetary system, for if they did, I believe
17
there would be a revolution before tomorrow morning" surely he was saying it with
18
tongue in cheek, because it certainly is not well enough. If people cannot understand
19
that foreign interests own our dollar and use that ability to manufacture trillions of dollars
20
for themselves out of thin air, thus giving themselves the ability to purchase anything
21
they want, including complete control of all mainstream media, the military industrial
22
complex, most major corporations, government officials (especially politicians and
23
judges), then perhaps the people can understand some of the raw statistics:
2 The Department of Veterans Affairs May 2007, Gulf War Veterans Information System
reports the following: Total U.S. Military Gulf War Deaths: 73,846, Total number of disability
claims filed: 1,620,906 – see http://www1.va.gov/rac-gwvi/docs/GWVIS_May2007.pdf see also
http://www.libertyforlife.com/military-war/73_thousand_us_gulf_war_casualties.htm
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
U.S.A. Worlds Worst Prison State
2
"In 2004, nearly 7 million people were on probation, in jail or prison, or on parole
3
at yearend 2004 -- 3.2% of all U.S. adult residents or 1 in every 31 adults." - U.S.
4
Department of Justice Source: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/correct.htm
5
6
Source: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/correct.htm and World Prison Population List (sixth
7
edition), International Centre for Prison Studies: http://www.kcl.ac.uk
8
However one looks at it, whether total numbers or percentage of population,
9
shown below, the United States of America is the Worlds Worst Prison State by orders
10
of magnitude:
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
2
These raw statistics alone should shut down the Courts throughout the U.S.
3
Judges, lawyers and District Attorneys practicing criminal law in the U.S. aught to be
4
bared from the bar for failing to uphold the law and racketeering to support the prison
5
industrial complex.
6
disgraceful field is unconscionable.
7
The sheer shame and disgrace of persons practicing in this
The reason for this crime is simple:
Prisons are profitable, judges, lawyers,
8
District Attorneys and cops are feeding off the lives of their victims they throw into prison
9
for personal profit. The same way Hitler and his Gestapo did it.
10
The methods Cops, Judges, Lawyers, District Attorneys and Lawyers employ to
11
commit their crimes are simple enough. Firstly the core English Common Law construct
12
of “innocent until proven guilty” has been completely abandoned and replaced with
13
“guilty without any right to prove innocence” (general practice and codified in the Patriot
14
Act), and the mandatory three elements necessary to convict someone of a crime have
15
been abandoned. MENS REA - willful intent, ACTUS REA - act or crime, CORPUS
16
DELICTI - body of the crime, the actual damage, have all but been ignored. Instead, the
17
majority of government prosecutions are for “pre-crime” charges in which there is no
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
Corpus Delecti, no Mens Rea and no Acuts Rea and no real party of interest filing any
2
Verified Criminal Complaint. Prosecutors manufacture charges and put their name at
3
the end of the complaint in complete and arrogant violation of the law. The government
4
then usually proceeds to blackmail their victim with a plea-bargain.
5
In the fraud and black-mail of a plea-bargain, the government on the side offers
6
to drop some false charges and the length of the sentences their faces if the victim
7
agrees to admit guilt or “no contest” for the remainder of the charges.
8
encourage their clients to accept the charges, telling their clients that they will be
9
convicted if they take the matter to trial, no matte how false or absurd the charges are.
10
And they lawyers are right! That’s because the judges simply prevent any evidence
11
proving a persons innocence from coming before the jury while they rig the juries and
12
impose “Judicial Law” in the form of “Case Law” which is no law at all!
Lawyers
13
In Mr. Boustred’s cases the judges went as far as to literally strike Mr. Boustred’s
14
favorable testimony that proved his innocence and allowed the prosecution to submit
15
hearsay, double hearsay and known lies before the jury. The even ordered Mr. Boustred
16
out of the court room and the Jury out of the court room when Mr. Boustred raised any
17
legal or factual issues in his defense! (See Exhibits & Opening Briefs in the Placer case
18
72-002045 and Santa Cruz Case F08656)
19
Police arrest their victims on hearsay and flat out lies, throw them in jail then
20
demand exorbitant bail which goes straight into the sheriffs bank account, without baring
21
any interest to the victim, but certainly baring interest to the Sheriff. The police usually
22
steal the victims vehicle and then demand ransom in the form of outrageous “towing and
23
storage charges”. If the victim does not pay the ransom for their vehicle within 30 days
24
the sheriffs sell the stolen vehicle to cover their ransom.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
When a victim of the government has been arrested and severely punished
2
before any trial, Judges and lawyers trick the victims into entering “pleas” which the
3
judges try to convince themselves is an “acceptance of prosecution” and washing of the
4
crimes the government committed against their victim.
5
Lawyers do nothing to advise their clients of their Constitutional and English
6
Common Law rights, going along with the ‘system’ so that all the insiders can personally
7
profit. The crimes committed by officers of the law are vastly more criminal than 90% of
8
the people they prosecute.
9
The San Jose Mercury New’s Tainted Trials Stolen Justice series in which highly
10
respected legal professionals mostly from universities around the Nation analyzed cases
11
under appeal “The review established that in 261 of the appellate cases reviewed --
12
more than one in every three of the total -- the criminal trial had been marred by
13
questionable conduct that worked against the defendant. In only about one in 20 cases
14
did the defendant win meaningful relief -- either a new trial or a significantly reduced
15
sentence -- from higher courts. The problems occurred at every phase of a trial, and in
16
every part of the system.” The report goes on to state:
17
18
19
20
• Prosecutors. In nearly 100 cases, the prosecution engaged in questionable conduct that
bolstered its effort to win convictions, the examination revealed. Some Santa Clara
County prosecutors withheld evidence that could have helped DEFENDANTS, some
defied judge's orders and some misled juries during closing arguments.
21
22
23
But they did not act in a vacuum. In an adversary system in which defense attorneys and
judges are responsible for guarding against prosecutors' excesses, the newspaper study
found, those checks on the system too often fall short.
24
25
26
27
28
• Defense attorneys. In 100 cases, defense attorneys acted in ways that harmed their
clients. In nearly 50 cases, the attorneys failed to take the most basic of measures, from
properly investigating their case to presenting the evidence they gathered. Defense
attorneys failed in dozens more cases to object as prosecutors or judges engaged in
questionable conduct, in effect excusing the mistakes.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
2
3
4
5
• Trial judges. In more than 150 cases, judges made missteps or questionable rulings that
favored the prosecution. Violating legal precedents, trial judges allowed evidence that
unfairly tainted DEFENDANTS and prohibited evidence that might have supported their
defense. Repeatedly, judges failed to properly instruct jurors on legal principles, instead
offering direction that made a guilty verdict more likely.
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
• The appellate court. The 6th District Court of Appeal, the primary court of review for
Santa Clara County cases, upheld verdicts in more than 100 cases even as it
acknowledged errors had occurred. The appellate court simply concluded those errors
made no difference in the outcome of the case. Sometimes those conclusions were
appropriate, but a review of the appellate record and consultations with experts
established that in more than 50 cases the court misstated facts, twisted logic and devised
questionable rationales to dismiss the error.
13
14
15
16
17
In nearly all the cases, the 6th District designates its opinions as ``not to be published'' -a distinction that means they are not to be cited as legal authority in subsequent cases,
and thus have little relevance beyond the parties to a case. The Mercury News found that
higher courts are extremely unlikely to review unpublished opinions, making the 6th
District the final word on most criminal trials in Santa Clara County.
18
19
20
21
22
The unpublished designation also has served to shield the cases from outside review. Past
academic and journalistic studies of criminal justice, here and elsewhere, have examined
published opinions, even though they represent a tiny proportion of court decisions. The
Mercury News review is unprecedented in its comprehensive analysis of criminal
decisions, published and unpublished alike.
23
24
25
State court statistics show the 6th District over time has published a smaller portion of its
criminal cases -- 2 percent -- than any other appellate district in the state. The statewide
average is 4 percent.
26
27
28
29
Taken together, the Mercury News findings offer a picture of a system that often turns on
its head the presumption that DEFENDANTS are innocent until proven guilty.
Prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges and appellate justices often act in ways that cause
DEFENDANTS' rights to be violated.
30
31
32
33
34
35
The newspaper study points to a ``skewed system that disproportionately bends over
backward to help the DA win,'' said Bennett Gershman, a former prosecutor and
professor of criminal law at Pace University School of Law who has written on
prosecutorial and judicial ethics. ``Admitting and excluding evidence unevenhandedly
and overlooking serious errors is not a pretty state of affairs if one is concerned about fair
trials. Nor if one is concerned about the appearance of justice.''
36
Having had seven absurdly false cases filed against me after the Santa Cruz
37
Sheriffs Shooing Instructor shot at me in front of my children, and having been put
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 47
1
through two utterly sham trials, purported to be trials by jury, and having spent years and
2
around one hundred and fifty thousand dollars on legal fees, I can honestly state, without
3
hesitation, that the Judicial System in California and the United States of America is run
4
by nothing less than a bunch of filthy criminals. Such a sweeping statement is based on
5
the simple fact that anyone working in the system cannot be unaware of the rampant
6
corruption and the complete lack of fairness of the courts and is consequentially guilty of
7
misprision of felony pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4 “Whoever, having knowledge of the actual
8
commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does
9
not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or
10
military authority under the United States, shall be fined not more than $500 or
11
imprisoned not more than three years, or both.” amongst many other crimes.”
12
Our District Attorney’s act as modern day Judas’, vigorously and falsely
13
prosecuting people they know full well are innocent, so as to profit their own personal
14
career. Ass. District Attorneys such as Santa Cruz’s Stephen Drottar, and his former
15
boss Art Danner, surely are the lowest ebb of society, of moral character well below any
16
of the criminals they prosecute. The San Jose Mercury News lists many other examples
17
District Attorneys who under the color of law prosecute people they know full well are
18
innocent.
19
When Santa Cruz’s former DA, Art Danner was caught red handed in crimes, all
20
he did was resign without any consequence, and then he was appointed a Judge by
21
Governor Wilson. Despite the Judicial Nominations Committee rating Art Danner as
22
“Not Qualified” to be a judge he was appointed to the bench. Only 2 out of 678 or so
23
judicial nominees by Governor Wilson were ever rated as Not Qualified. Despite not
24
qualifying, Art Danner went on to preside over a trial where the sheriffs who had literally
25
attempted to blow Mr. Boustred’s head off in front of his children.
Danner acted
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 48
1
criminally in the trial, with complete and
2
utter disregard for the law and justice.
3
SEE Opening Brief included in Evidence
4
CD.CCCCC
5
Case after case shows that
6
criminals are being appointed to senior
7
positions in government, including our
8
current President and Attoerny General.
9
And the judiciary is largely responsible,
10
literally
11
popular vote, and the judiciary is in on
12
the crime.
13
appointing
The
growth
Bush
of
over
the
the
Prison
14
Industry is visually represented in the
15
chart opposite:
16
While
based
on
the
prison
17
industry statistics alone, most judges,
18
DA’s, police and lawyers in the U.S.
19
should be charged and tried for treason,
20
perhaps one of the most disturbing
21
factors, is the massive buildup of
22
Concentration Camps throughout the
23
U.S.
24
While the public is well aware of the many international Concentration Camps the
25
U.S. has built, such as Guantánamo Bay, the buildup of Concentration Camps within the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 49
1
U.S. and the laws to support them goes almost unnoticed. Halliburton Contracts confirm
2
the construction of the Concentration Camps within the U.S.
3
For example, Halliburton subsidiary "KBR has been awarded a contract
4
announced by the Department of Homeland Security’s United States Immigration and
5
Customs Enforcement (ICE) component. The Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity
6
contingency contract is to support ICE facilities and has a maximum total value of $385
7
million over a five year term. The contract provides for establishing temporary detention
8
and processing capabilities in the event of an emergency influx of immigrants into the
9
United States, or to support the rapid development of new programs".3
10
Army Regulation 210—35 “Installations, Civilian Inmate Labor Program” and
11
H.R.6166, the Military Commissions Act of 2006, show us that the U.S. government is
12
absolutely serious about Concentration Camps in the U.S.
13
confirm the same.4
Letters from Congressmen
14
The John Warner Defense Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R.5122,
15
which grants the President the right to commandeer Federal and State National Guard
16
Troops for use against citizen, indicates who it is the government intends to throw into
17
these Concentration Camps. Since 1878, through two World Wars, Depressions, the
18
Posse Comitatus Act protected U.S. citizens from their own military.
19
however, this government believes that the U.S. military must now be deployed against
20
U.S. Citizens. Why?
Somehow,
21
One has to carefully consider what we are all up against, particularly, when one
22
learns that the 9/11 attacks were instigated by people in our own government and were
23
used as the basis for justifying these extreme and outrageous eliminations of liberty.
3
http://www.halliburton.com/default/main/halliburton/eng/news/source_files/press_release/2006/co
rpnws_012606.pdf
4 See http://www.libertyforlife.com/jail-police/us_concentration_camps.htm
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
2
FALSE FLAG OPERATIONS Blowing up Buildings &
Murdering Citizens To Incite War
3
4
Facts surrounding our own government’s complete involvement in blowing up the
5
World Trade Center buildings and crashing a missile into the Pentagon were so blatantly
6
obvious only a complete fool would believe that Bin Laden’s boys with box cutters
7
brought the buildings down! World Trade Center Building Number 7 is of course the
8
most classic example. This 47 story building, shown below, at about half the height of
9
the two towers, demolished itself! No plane hit WTC 7, there were no major fires in WTC
10
7. Containing FBI & CIA Offices and New York City’s Emergency Response Center,
11
WTC 7 was probably the most robust building in New York. However the buildings did
12
contain files on government corruption such as the ENRON files in the FBI and CIA
13
offices in that particularly robust building.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
World Trade Center Building 7
25
Exhibiting Classic Demolition Profile
26
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
The government and their banksters media’s attempt to cover up the facts
2
exposing the complete complicity of senior politicians direct involvement in planning and
3
carrying out the 9/11 attacks is so
4
blatantly obvious, only a moron would
5
not see through the deception. On 9/11
6
Cheney was running the largest war-
7
games exercises ever in the U.S:
8
Northern Vigilance – mock cold war
9
hijack; 2. Vigilant Guardian – insertion
10
of false radar blips on radar
11
screens; 3. Vigilant Warrior
12
– live fly hijack drill. The FAA
13
had
14
'hijacked aircraft" blips on
15
their radar on 9/11.
16
Many
more
than
twenty
government
17
officials have come forward
18
expressing
19
disbelief
20
government
21
Commission Report.
22
1.
their
total
the
official
of
Consider
9/11
the
poor
23
government officials working
24
for the Army auditing the 2.3
25
Trillion
Dollars
that
went
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 52
1
missing from the Pentagon budget. The missile that hit the Pentagon circled around the
2
Pentagon, in a maneuver FAA described as fighter aircraft performance, to strike the
3
Pentagon on the side exactly where these auditors were working on uncovering the
4
missing $2.3 Trillion.5 Now a Boeing 757 is no small plane, however, the flight path of
5
what hit the Pentagon was completely inconsistent with a Boeing 757, while there was
6
no Boeing 757 wreckage at the crash scene, no bodies, and the hole in the Pentagon
7
was far too small for a Boeing 757. The FBI confiscated security camera footage of the
8
missile that hit the Pentagon and the Pentagon refused to release any video footage
9
showing what actually hit the Pentagon. However with these absurd inconsistencies in
10
the government endorsed official 9/11 report, how are the public to believe that with high
11
alert already been called, with planes crashing into the nations primary financial centers
12
etc, how is it that a “commercial” airline can simply waltz in and fly into the most secure
13
building in the U.S. the center of military planning and control in the U.S.
14
happened to the Pentagon’s highly advanced air defenses. Where were the scramble
15
jets?
What
16
Come on, you have to be an absolute imbecile to actually believe that officials in
17
the U.S. government were not explicitly involved in the 9/11 attacks. So who exactly is
18
behind our government? Certainly not all government officials are corrupt, however, with
19
such extraordinarily blatant and obvious complicity to the highest levels, including the
20
Judicially Appointed President and his Vice President, one cannot but question
21
corruption of the entire government.
22
Other officials have come forward revealing vastly more sinister plans for
23
Concentration Camps and the extermination of U.S. citizens who refuse to go along with
5
See http://www.libertyforlife.com/eyeopeners/911/911_rumsfeld_declars_war_on_pentagon.html and
http://www.libertyforlife.com/eye-openers/911/pentagon_cruse_missile_911_vict.html
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
the banksters World Domination Plan, including the identification of extermination
2
facilities which have ominously been labeled with RED/BLUE lines reflecting the Nazi SS
3
classifications for death camps and obviously correlating with CIA RED / BLUE lists.
4
Obviously foremost on these RED/BLUE lists would be government officials who respect
5
the U.S. Constitution. Apparently U.S. troops have been injected with L-Form Bacteria
6
and other bio bombe that will allow the banksters to exterminate them at will while the
7
government is getting the general public accustomed to areal spraying.
8
For those who believe for one moment that they can safely be part of the
9
banksters plan, consider that their entire construct is based on deception and crime.
10
People who operate under such principles can never be trusted. No one is safe.
11
However, there is one element these banksters have not counted on, just as the
12
printing press ushered in the renaissance when people like Martin Luther published the
13
Bible in languages people could read and thereby exposing the lies and corruption of the
14
government, the computers and the Internet promise to usher in an even greater
15
renaissance.
16
Adolf Hitler, whom elements of our government follow, when he wrote the
17
following in MEIN KAMPF, had no idea of the power of internet or computers in the
18
hands of regular people: "In journalistic circles it is a pleasing custom to speak of the
19
Press as a ‘Great Power’ within the State. As a matter of fact its importance is immense.
20
One cannot easily overestimate it, for the Press continues the work of education even in
21
adult life. … With ruthless determination the State must keep control of this instrument of
22
popular education and place it at the service of the State and the Nation."
23
While the banksters have most certainly taken control of the 5 media companies
24
who bring us our news, they cannot take control of the millions of media companies
25
sprouting up in peoples homes across the world. Controlling presses may have been
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
possible in Hitler’s time, however, today pressing computer keys, is such a light
2
operation that it is foolish to even considering controlling it. The cat is out of the bag.
3
Too many people already know what is going on. Information disseminates around the
4
world at the speed of electrons.
5
In this new world the traitors who have sold out to the banksters will stand naked
6
and exposed through the new media. Associating with these banksters is perhaps the
7
most risky position anyone can take. Are citizens of the U.S. on the verge of revolt? Will
8
citizens of other nations come to the aid of the oppressed in the U.S. who rise up against
9
those who commit treason by destroying our lawful government and Constitution of the
10
United States of America.
11
Anyone who has associated themselves with treasonous acts such as the Patriot
12
Act, the Military Commissions Act, the elimination of the Posse Comitatus the theft of
13
citizens land and assets, and 9/11, is at extraordinary risk. Judges, of all people, should
14
realize that they are at the front line of blowback that is guaranteed to occur, unless
15
something such as South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission can be
16
established.
17
18
19
With new media it is impossible for those committing these crimes against the
people, to keep it secret.
U.S.A. Illegally Invading other Nations
20
The U.S. invasions of Iraq, Afghanistan, Surbia etc. were completely illegal.
21
They were no different to Hitler’s invasion of Poland and other Nations. Illustrating the
22
absurdity of the U.S. justification of the invasion of Iraq is the fact that the alleged
23
terrorists, whom according to the government, flew planes into the World Trade Center
24
,had absolutely noting to do with Iraq. Bin Laden was an enemy of Saddam Hussein.
25
Even considering the invented information regarding the Weapons of Mass Destruction
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
that never existed in Iraq, the government’s justification for invading Iraq is utterly
2
without merit.
3
However, the U.S. has pumped close to two thousand tons of weapons of mass
4
destruction into Iraq in the form of armor piercing rounds and bunker busters made out
5
of nuclear waste! In fact in this very court, lying Judge DEFENDANT dismissed a case
6
filed in this court that attempted to get the Nuclear Regulatory Body to issue a ruling
7
regarding the use of “Depleted Uranium”. Since the 1950’s there has been no official
8
position on the use of Depleted Uranium in the U.S. That’s because it is a deadly
9
material. Our own troops are being killed and disabled by DU, birth defects are up 600%
10
in Iraq. May the screams of the millions who will die agonizing deaths and disabilities,
11
including the million plus U.S. troops disabled from the Gulf War, wake up Ware every
12
night.
13
ecological disasters ever, is surely something that much sleep must be lost over.
14
To discard an opportunity to save the world from one of the worlds worst
U.S.A. Outwardly Aggressive By Nature, Murdering Millions
15
The USSA has spent more on war, armaments and Weapons of Mass
16
Destruction in the last decade than what has been spent in all the wars throughout the
17
world combined.
18
Yugoslavia, Kuwait, Iran and Afghanistan and many other nations.
19
Vietnamese and over one million Iraqi’s are dead from U.S. aggression.
The U.S. has invaded and occupied South Korea, Vietnam,
Three million
20
The U.S. has taken over nations by unseating popularly elected government and
21
installing dictators (Chelae, Iraq, etc.). The authorities actively engage in the torture.
22
The U.S. has invaded more of the world than Hitler to which President Bush has direct
23
family ties.
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1
Dictatorial & Fascist By Definition:
2
Since the 1861 War against Southern Independence, Presidents have issued
3
more than 14,000 legislative orders reflecting the absolute rule of a Fascist Dictatorship.
4
The Judiciary, who themselves usurp the legislatures exclusive right to making law,
5
ignore the illegality of the Executive Orders. Supreme Court Judges who are appointed
6
by Presidents, elected the current President over the popular vote of citizens.
7
The actions and plans of the Supreme Court Elected President, Bush, mirrors
8
that of Hitler. Including False Flag operations, concentration camps, torture, Police State
9
and Homeland Security. Bush has given himself the authority to declare Martial Law
10
11
and suspend the Constitution and Habeas Corpus.
U.S.A. Creating the Worlds Worst Ecological Disasters
12
The U.S.A’s explosion of close to two thousand ton's of nuclear waste in the form
13
or armor piercing rounds in Iraq has caused the Worlds worst man made disaster ever.
14
The Uranium in the U.S. armaments starts to vaporize as it leaves the barrel of the gun
15
it’s fired from and on impact fifty to eighty percent of the Uranium will vaporize in a
16
violent intensive heat explosion.
17
vehicles are hit with these DU rounds “crispies” because they are fried like burnt chips.
18
19
Soldiers call the victims who’s tanks and armored
This 3rd U.S. Nuclear Holocaust is only preceded by the use of Agent Orange
and the ecological nightmare the U.S. caused in Vietnam.
20
Of particular interest to those living in the greater Bay Area visit “New Nuclear
21
Weapons Testing In Tracy Outside San Francisco” http://www.libertyforlife.com/military-
22
war/new_nuclear_weapons_testing_san_francisco.htm Many more links on this page.
23
More frightening is the Bush government’s vigorous efforts to develop new
24
biological weapons. The government has allocated $38 Billion into biological weapons
25
development. When one learns that the Anthrax in the Anthrax attacks on politicians
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
following 9/11, came from U.S. military sources, one understands the nature and intent
2
of biological weapons development by Bush and crew. The key to developing biological
3
weapons is not creating the viruses, it is creating the vaccines to protect your own.
4
Insiders report that the banksters intend to kill off many billions. Clearly they have no
5
qualms of killing their own agents, which is fitting with the occult practices these leaders
6
are seen taking part in at the Bohemian Grove, where they conduct public show of mock
7
child sacrifices to their god of Moloch
8
9
10
11
12
13
U.S.A. Maiming Millions and Killing Thousands, Tens of
Thousands and Hundreds and Thousands of Their Own Citizens
Those who world for the government, especially those in the military and police
are instructed to read and consider the documents found at the following URL’s:
“Proof
the
Government
Demolished
the
World
Trade
Center”
at
http://www.libertyforlife.com/eye-openers/911.htm
14
To understand 9/11, starting with the collapse of 47 story World Trade Center
15
skyscraper half the height of the towers, Building Number 7, helps most people
16
understand that massive extremely robust buildings do not simply fall down by
17
themselves – no planes hit WTC 7, there were no major fires in WTC 7 and WTC 7
18
was significantly further away from the towers and behind other buildings that
19
never collapsed – perhaps the contents of WTC 7 are however the most interesting.
20
see “Government Refuses to Consider Cause of 47 story World Trade Center
21
skyscraper
22
openers/911/wtc7demolition.htm
23
controlled demolition, one has to ask who put the explosives in the building, when
24
and why they did it. A good place to start with these questions is the principle director
Building
7
Demolition”
at
http://www.libertyforlife.com/eye-
Once one understands WTC 7 was blown up in a
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
of the company who managed security for the WTC complex, Marvin Bush, President
2
George W. Bush’s brother.
3
4
5
6
“Experts
&
Officials
Coming
Out
-
9/11
An
Inside
Job”
at
http://www.libertyforlife.com/eye-openers/experts_officials_coming_out.htm
“Government
Employees
Convinced
9/11
Inside
Job”
at
http://www.libertyforlife.com/eye-openers/911-inside-job.htm
7
“Department of Veterans Affairs Reports 73 Thousand U.S. Gulf War Vets
8
Dead” and One point Six MILLION U.S troops have filed for disability with already
9
1,220,905 U.S. Gulf War Veterans already classified disabled from service related
10
injuries.
at
http://www.libertyforlife.com/military-
11
war/73_thousand_us_gulf_war_casualties.htm or the official Dept Vet. Affairs Source
12
Report at http://www1.va.gov/rac-gwvi/docs/GWVIS_May2007.pdf
13
“Pentagon Cruse Missile 9/11 Victims” at http://www.libertyforlife.com/eye-
14
openers/911/pentagon_cruse_missile_911_vict.html NOTE: Most of the victims in the
15
Pentagon were employees of the government working on analyzing what
16
happened to $2.3 Trillion Dollars that went missing from the Pentagon’s budget.
17
Those who work for the government are generally the first used as bait in false flag
18
operations. Those in government and the shadow government behind them do not
19
hesitate to murder their own for personal gain. The Hegelian constructs state that "the
20
end justifies the means" and that means literally anyone can be sacrificed, including you.
21
See: “Day Before 9/11 Rumsfeld Declared War On Pentagon Bureaucracy” at
22
http://www.libertyforlife.com/eye-
23
openers/911/911_rumsfeld_declars_war_on_pentagon.html:
24
Donald Rumsfeld declared war on Pentagon Bureaucracy the day before 9/11 when he
25
addressed the TWO POINT THREE TRILLION DOLLARS that went missing at the
Secretary
of
Defense
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1
Pentagon: "According to some estimates we cannot track $2.3 trillion in transactions,"
2
Rumsfeld said he identified the adversary: "the adversary's closer to home. It's the
3
Pentagon bureaucracy," he also added that "In fact, it could be said it's a matter of
4
life
5
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/01/29/eveningnews/main325985.shtml
6
and
death,"
originally
“United States Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta Confirms Cheney's
In
9/11”
at
7
Complicity
8
openers/cheny_implicated_911.html It is also important to note the
9
at
http://www.libertyforlife.com/eye-
Experts Claim Official 9/11 Story is a Hoax
10
http://www.libertyforlife.com/eye-openers/911/experts_expose_911_coverup.htm
11
How The Government Treats Their Own
12
http://www.libertyforlife.com/eye-openers/911/government_employees.html
13
If you are knowingly part of the New World Order conspiracy or are part of a
14
hierarchical organization that demands complete obedience to your superiors consider
15
what people like George W. Bush have lined up for themselves, the Bush family 98,840
16
acre bolt hole in Paraguay: See “Bush Bolt Hole Next To Nazi War Criminals”
17
http://www.libertyforlife.com/constitution/politicians/bush-bolthole.htm
18
If you are still not convinced, perhaps the words of one of the U.S's most
19
decorated soldiers, two-time Medal of Honor recipient Major, General Smedley Butler
20
may help explain that the bankers are the one’s who are using us to commit their crimes
21
"I might have given Al Capone a few hints. The best he could do was operate a racket in
22
three cities. The Marines operated on three continents....`I helped purify Nicaragua for
23
the international banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909-1912. I helped make Mexico
24
and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1916. I helped make Haiti and
25
Cuba a decent place for the National City (Bank) boys to collect revenue in. I helped
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
rape half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street.... In China, I
2
helped see to it that Standard Oil went its way unmolested.... I had ... a swell racket. I
3
was
4
http://www.libertyforlife.com/military-war\butler-mercenary-marines.htm
rewarded
with
honors,
medals,
and
promotions."
More
at
5
6
7
Socialist In Taxation & Law But Not In Services:
The government forces citizens to work six months of the year to pay bankers
8
interest who stole their currency.
The following information comes from an actual
9
calculation reflecting a typical citizens tax burden:
CALCULATING REAL TAX RATES
Gross Employee Pay
Annual
$ 48,443
Monthly
$
4,037
Salary
Federal Withholding Tax
Medicare Employee Tax
Social Security Employee Tax
CA Withholding Tax
CA Disability Employee Tax
TOTAL Withheld From Employee
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
45,000
8,184
653
2,790
2,335
360
14,322
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
3,750
682
54
233
195
30
1,193
Net Take Home Pay
$
30,678
$
2,557
Federal Unemployment - Employer Tax
Medicare Employer Tax
Social Security Employer Tax
CA Unemployment Employer Tax
TOTAL Employer Tax
$
$
$
$
$
653
2,790
3,443
$
$
$
$
$
54
233
287
TOTAL Wages TAX
$
17,764
$
1,480
Tax Rate On Wages
37%
Other Taxes
8% Sales Tax on 60% of Net Take-home
Pay
1% Property Tax Ave Home Value of
$500K
Telephone Tax
Road Tax
Gas Tax
Other Tax Total
Tax Rate on Other Taxes
TOTAL TAX
37%
$
1,473
$
123
$
$
$
$
$
5,000
230
375
347
7,425
$
$
$
$
$
417
19
31
29
619
$
15%
25,189
$
15%
2,099
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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Actual Total Tax Rate
52%
52%
1
2
Most citizens work six months of the year to pay taxes. The tax these citizens
3
pay goes into paying off the interest bankers charge they U.S. for money the
4
government borrowed, money the bankers manufactured out of thin air. On top of this
5
extraordinary 6 month slavery tax, the largest chunk of most citizens remaining income
6
goes into paying interest on mortgages and credit cards. The final income citizens and
7
their families have to survive on is around twenty to thirty percent of their annual salary.
8
It makes no difference if the person is an employee of the government or not.
9
The net effect of the depreciation of the dollar coupled with inflation of real
10
estate, creates and environment where citizens are forced to go to the bank and borrow
11
money to buy their homes, with the net effect of the banks literally owning peoples
12
home. With money made out of fresh air, the agents of the Rothschild’s have invaded
13
and taken control of most peoples homes, companies and land throughout the U.S.,
14
without firing a single bullet. Well ok, they had to shoot a couple of presidents and
15
people who stood in their way.
16
The following graph reflects the Interest rates the owners of the private Federal
17
Reserve Bank charged after manufacturing dollars out of thin air and lending them back
18
to the public (typically, their co-conspirator banks add an additional ten to twenty five
19
percent interest on top of these central banks rates):
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
2
The largest shareholders of the Federal Reserve Bank, the Rothschild’s, put
3
Lenin on a train to Moscow with five million dollars in gold and around 36 of their agents.
4
These terrorists instigated the Bolshevik revolution.
5
The State through the Courts now assume the role of Head of Family and take
6
control of our children's interests. The State now also actively involves itself in religion
7
through "faith based initiatives" while the far worse and foolish imposition of "State
8
controlled education" has been enforced for many decades.
9
10
The State maintains absolute control of media through the FCC who also illegally
traffics in the people's frequency.
11
According to the Treasury Department, the government claims the right to seize
12
all financial instruments, currency, gold, silver and every thing else if they deem an
13
emergency exists.
14
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
2
Illegal Tender Conspiracy Stealing Real Assets With Illegal
Tender Created our of noting
3
The privately owned Federal Reserve Bank, who is not a part of the U.S.
4
government (The Federal Reserve Bank is a much part of the government as Federal
5
Express is), represents the worlds most outrageous and criminal conspiracy that has
6
and is responsible for the most violent wars and depressions throughout the last century
7
and is responsible for the financial ruin of all citizens of the United States of America.
8
9
The Federal Reserve Bank literally has fraudulently and illegally obtained
the so-called right to create U.S. Dollars out of nothing.
10
The Federal Reserve Bank invents money by simply entering it into their account.
11
For paper money the Bank pays the U.S. Mint printing costs to provide them with Notes
12
that claim to be Legal Tender. The owners of the Federal Reserve Bank literally have
13
the so-called exclusive right to add as many U.S. Dollars into their bank as they want.
14
This criminal conspiracy then turns around and lends these U.S. Dollars they created out
15
of nothing to citizens of the United States and unwitting people and corporations around
16
the world.
17
18
19
Federal Reserve Bank owners and co-conspirators have been directly associated
with initiating and fueling the following:
20
21
Instigating Lincoln’s War and the assassination of Lincoln and conversion
of greenbacks into bankers debt.
World War I, which was made possible by the funds available from the
22
Federal Reserve Bank that was fraudulently formed the year before in
23
1913.
24
The French Revolution
25
The Bolshevik Revolution & Socialism/Communism (Funding Hitler,
26
Lenin, Stalin and the U.S.)
27
The Agricultural Depression of 1920.
28
Black Friday Crash on Wall Street of October, 1929 and the ensuing
29
Great Depression (Installing FDR who stole the people’s gold, instituted
30
the FCC to control media, the SEC to control competing stock or notes,
31
the IRS and Social Security for Socialism).
32
33
The assassination of President Kennedy (Who started to abolish the
Federal Reserve Bank)
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
World War II (Tens of millions murdered)
2
The Korean War
3
The Vietnam War (3 million murdered)
4
The conversion of the assets of the United States and its citizens from
5
6
real property to paper assets from 1945 to the present
7
The assassination attempt on President Ronald Regan (When he started
to abolish the Federal Reserve Bank)
8
The market crash in the 1980’s
9
The technology market crash in 1989
10
The FBI bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993
11
The Dot Com / Internet market crash
12
The 9/11 False Flag bombing of the World Trade Center and Pentagon
13
The Gulf War (1 million murdered – 73,000 U.S Veterans dead, 1.2
14
million disabled)
15
The current real estate market crash
16
The deaths of more people than any other institution or organization ever.
17
Key to the Rothschild/Weishaupt world dominance plan has been the complete
18
dominance of media. The reason you will not find these facts on regular TV or News
19
Papers was explained by their agent Adolf Hitler in Mein Kampf: "In journalistic circles it
20
is a pleasing custom to speak of the Press as a ‘Great Power’ within the State. As a
21
matter of fact its importance is immense. One cannot easily overestimate it, for the Press
22
continues the work of education even in adult life. … With ruthless determination the
23
State must keep control of this instrument of popular education and place it at the
24
service of the State and the Nation."
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
Other notable quotations relating to this extraordinary world dominance
conspiracy are:
“The masses indulge in petty falsehoods every day, but it would never
come into their heads to fabricate colossal untruths… The bigger the lie
therefore, the likelier it is to be believed.” – Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf
“The individual is handicapped by coming face to face with a conspiracy
so monstrous he cannot believe it exists.” – President J. Edgar Hoover
"The lie can be maintained only for such time as the State can shield the
people from the political, economic and/or military consequences of the lie. It
thus becomes vitally important for the State to use all of its powers to repress
dissent, for the truth is the mortal enemy of the lie, and thus by extension, the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
truth becomes the greatest enemy of the State." Dr. Joseph M. Goebbels,
Propaganda Minister of Nazi Germany.
"Why of course the people don't want war ... But after all it is the leaders
of the country who determine the policy, and it is always a simple matter to drag
the people along, whether it is a democracy, or a fascist dictatorship, or a
parliament, or a communist dictatorship ... Voice or no voice, the people can
always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do
is to tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack of
patriotism and exposing the country to danger." — Hermann Goering, Nazi
leader, at the Nuremberg Trials after World War II
12
The Rothschild/Weishapt/Illuminati world dominance conspiracy was first
13
publically discovered in 1784 when a courier carrying papers for the Illuminati was struck
14
by lightning
15
The Federal Reserve Bank, it’s owners and co-conspirators subject citizens to
16
abject slavery and servitude. The average citizen works more than six months of their
17
year to pay the many forms of tax, for their remaining year, three to four months or more
18
are worked to pay interest to bankers. Citizens take home perhaps one to three months
19
of their annual income. This is the case for the great majority of people around the world
20
whether they work for the government or not. Foolishly we have allowed ourselves to be
21
deceived with a slight of hand the ‘Hegelian magicians’ have managed to confuse us
22
with, in a ‘dialectic processes’ that get us fighting amongst and oppressing each other,
23
while the bankers, or banksters referred to herein, literally steal the bank behind our
24
backs.
25
Roots to this grand conspiracy were initiated by Mayer Amschel Bauer of
26
Frankfurt, Germany, who changed his name to Mayer Amschel Rothschild and who
27
formalized said conspiracy when Adam Weishaupt who was retained by Rothschild to
28
revitalize Zionism completed said conspiracy plan on May 1, 1776.
29
30
May 1, 1776 Whitehouse retained by Rothschild's completes world dominance plan.
31
1776-1790: U.S. Independence - Free Banking -no formal central bank.
32
1791-1811: First Bank of the United States.
33
1816-1836: Second Bank of the United States.
34
1837-1862: Free Banking Era -no formal central bank.
35
1862-1913: System of National Banks (Consequence of Lincoln's War).
36
1914-crrent: A consortium of 12 privately held banks called the Federal Reserve
37
Bank. The largest share holder of the bank are the Rothschild's of London
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
In November, 1910, agents of the conspirators met on Jekyll Island, Georgia to
2
formalize the enactment of said conspiracy in the final form of the Federal Reserve Bank
3
Act which was fraudulently passed during Christmas recess in 1913.
4
Said conspiracy literally handed exclusive money making rights to the privately
5
held Federal Reserve Bank, granting the owners of that bank the so-called right to
6
create out of thin air as many dollars as they want. This ability to make money out of
7
thin air, gave the conspirators the ability to purchase anything they wanted, including all
8
the major media channels, the military industrial complex, many major corporations in
9
addition to buying off many of our government officials.
10
The Tender DEFENDNTS listed above loaned to PLAINTIFFS is in fact ‘fiat
11
currency’, that is the Federal Reserve Bank is not obligated to give in exchange to the
12
holder of a note gold, silver, or any specific tangible property. In other words the Note
13
and Tender DEFENDANTS loaned PLAINTIFFS, is based on and backed by nothing.
14
The Tender loaned by DEFENDANTS was invented and created out of thin air to
15
defraud PLAINTIFFS of real property.
16
prices on real property which in turn forced PLAINTIFFS to borrow said illegal Tender in
17
order to be able to afford what normally would have cost a fraction of the price
18
PLAINTIFFS were forced to pay as a consequence of the conspirator’s fraud. Said
19
conspirators have thus defrauded PLAINTIFFS through deceptively implying that their
20
Notes were legal Tender, claiming on their Notes “THIS NOTE IS LEGAL TENDER FOR
21
ALL DEBTS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE” and baring the signature and seal of the
22
Treasurer of the United States and Secretary of the Treasury of the United States
23
Government, “The United States of America” and images of past Presidents of the
24
United States of America with most ironically “We the People” on certain Notes.
Said fraud having created artificially inflated
25
In fact DEFENDANTS have loaned PLAININTIFF nothing other than Tender
26
invented from stale air, Tender that is factually worthless other than through continued
27
deception. DEFENDANTS having forced PLAINTIFFS to purchase fraudulent Federal
28
Reserve Notes in order to pay DEFENDANTS, thus forcing PLAINTIFFS to exchange
29
real services and real goods to purchase said fraudulent and factually worthless Notes of
30
illegal Tender.
31
Let the JURY NOTE: The images of Past Presidents on said Federal Reserve
32
Bank Notes are Presidents who adamantly and vehemently opposed any private
33
ownership of National Banks such as the Federal Reserve Bank Act and persons whom
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
evidence supports that said bankers agents attempted to or did assassinate (except an
2
agent of the Rothschild’s Hamilton who was not a President).
3
The One Dollar Note also bares an image of the Masonic Pyramid and “all seeing
4
eye” with the Latin “Nuvus Ordo Seclorum” which translates to “A New Order of the
5
Ages”, or New World Order, reflecting said conspiracy. On the side baring the image of
6
George Washington, above top left scallop in the frame surrounding the number 1 in the
7
upper right hand corner of the One Dollar Note, the owl representing the god or Moloch
8
can be found, illustrated below:
9
10
The significance of the owl on the Federal Reserve Bank Note can best be
11
demonstrated by the ceremony the politically elite perform at the annual Bohemian Club
12
Bohemian Grove “Cremation of Care” ceremony representing a human sacrifice in front
13
of the owl god of Moloch.
14
Criminal Civil Courts
15
Practice in the civil courts has reached the astonishingly absurd level where real
16
parties of interest often are not only not present in, many cases they are never present.
17
Instead lawyers and judges meet repeatedly arguing technicalities that bare little if any
18
relation to the real matter brought before the court, not only unnecessarily building up
19
fees and wages, in what can be considered one of the most corrupt industries in the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
nation, but utterly destroying any form of justice, peoples lives, corporations and the
2
Nation itself.
3
Consider Who & What You Work For
4
With these blatant facts and clear argument, attorneys representing the very
5
body responsible for ensuring law and order, the Attorney General’s Office, thinking only
6
of their personal profit and position, will rush down and work with their fellow agents of
7
the Rothschild’s to unlawfully dismiss this case so that every fact and every crime
8
committed against the plaintiffs, by both agents of the State and private parties, can be
9
completely ignored, and the murderers, kidnappers and thieves they defend will go free.
10
Surely we are far worse off than being under the former rule of King George of England
11
that inspired this people to revolution.
12
If the officers of this court can for one moment put aside the delusion that
13
denying this plaintiff the law will some how benefit themselves or their comrades, and
14
realize that this plaintiff actually has a solution to the problems our nation and world
15
faces, could we all not benefit significantly?
16
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 69
1
2
3
I. CLAIMS UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
/ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS VIOLATED
On Information and belief, DEFENDANTS violated the following Constitutional
4
Rights giving rise to the following Claims upon which relief may be granted:
5
First Claim For Relief Fraud by Jeremy Fogel
6
7
8
9
10
11
PLAINTIFFS:
All PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS:
JEREMY FOGEL, Jeremy Fogel,
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
12
On or about October 3, 2006, September 12, 2006 and September 13, 2006 and
13
other dates, in the above named Judicial District, the crime of FRAUD and or
14
INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION, in violation of the United States Constitution
15
and Common Law was committed by JEREMY FOGEL, who did willfully and unlawfully
16
commit FRAUD and or INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION by willful disobedience
17
of a process and law by dismissing a case entitled to summary judgment and by issuing
18
a fraudulent order that was false and misleading for multiple reasons including the fact
19
that JEREMY FOGEL claimed that the tort actions of murder, kidnap, grand theft auto,
20
libel, slander, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, trespass, fraud, and violations of 1st,
21
2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 14th Amendments and other laws were not
22
‘claims upon which relief could be granted’. JEREMY FOGEL had knowledge of the
23
falsity, recklessness and indifference to the truth and intended to induce PLAINTIFF’S
24
reliance on said misrepresentation. JEREMY FOGEL is member of a class in which
25
PLAINIFFS had reason to expect would ordinarily be induced to be able to rely upon;
26
and summary judgment ordinarily occurs when the real parties of interest defending a
27
case fail to make any appearance or plea. JEREMY FOGEL intentionally concealed
28
facts including the fact that PLAINTIFFS were entitled to a summary judgment and he
29
knew or believed that he was not telling the truth; and did not have the confidence in the
30
accuracy of his statement that he stated and he implied that he did; and JEREMY
31
FOGEL knew that he did not have the grounds for the order when he implied that he did.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 70
1
JEREMY FOGEL intentionally concealed facts and failed to disclose facts including the
2
fact that PLAINTIFFS were entitled to a summary judgment by also refusing to answer
3
PLAINTIFFS lawfully and properly filed Motions and Affidavits for summary judgment
4
when JEREMY FOGEL had a fiduciary duty to disclose said facts in particular since
5
PLAINTIFFS filed said Motions and Affidavits Pro Se (In Pro Per) and that JEREMY
6
FOGEL has special knowledge that PLAINTIFF did not have when JEREMY FOGEL
7
had a fiduciary duty to issue said summary judgment and that said summary judgment
8
was a fact basic to the transaction and JEREMY FOGEL knew this fact and legal
9
principle.
10
See JEREMY FOGEL’S orders dated October 3, 2006, September 12, 2006 and
11
September 13, 2006 in UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
12
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION Case Number C 05-00996 JF
13
DAMAGE
14
Damage to PLAINTIFFS stemming from reliance on said misrepresentation placed in
15
said fraudulent order that JEREMY FOGEL intentionally concealed facts and failed to
16
disclose facts including the fact that PLAINTIFFS were entitled to a summary judgment
17
by also refusing to answer PLAINTIFFS lawfully and properly filed Motions and Affidavits
18
for summary judgment when JEREMY FOGEL had a fiduciary duty to disclose said facts
19
in particular since PLAINTIFFS filed said Motions and Affidavits Pro Se (In Pro Per) and
20
that JEREMY FOGEL has special knowledge that PLAINTIFF did not have when
21
JEREMY FOGEL had a fiduciary duty to issue said summary judgment and that said
22
summary judgment was a fact basic to the transaction and JEREMY FOGEL knew this
23
fact and legal principle.
24
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
25
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
26
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
27
As a consequence of the willful and malicious actions of JEREMY FOGELS,
28
PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum certain amount of
29
$66,016,803,250.00.
30
31
32
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 71
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Second Claim For Relief
Fraud by James Ware
PLAINTIFFS:
All PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS:
JAMES WARE, James Ware,
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
8
On or about October 3, 2006, September 12, 2006 and September 13, 2006 and
9
other dates, in the above named Judicial District, the crime of FRAUD and or
10
INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION, in violation of the United States Constitution
11
and Common Law was committed by JAMES WARE, who did willfully and unlawfully
12
commit FRAUD and or INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION by willful disobedience
13
of a process and law by dismissing a case entitled to summary judgment and by issuing
14
a fraudulent order that was false and misleading for multiple reasons including the fact
15
that JAMES WARE claimed that the tort actions of assault, grand theft auto, libel,
16
slander, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, fraud, and violations of 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th,
17
7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 14th Amendments and other laws were not ‘claims upon
18
which relief could be granted’.
19
recklessness and indifference to the truth and intended to induce PLAINTIFF’S reliance
20
on said misrepresentation. JAMES WARE is member of a class in which PLAINIFFS
21
had reason to expect would ordinarily be induced to be able to rely upon; and summary
22
judgment ordinarily occurs when the real parties of interest defending a case fail to make
23
any appearance or plea. JAMES WARE intentionally concealed facts including the fact
24
that PLAINTIFFS were entitled to a summary judgment and he knew or believed that he
25
was not telling the truth; and did not have the confidence in the accuracy of his
26
statement that he stated and he implied that he did; and JAMES WARE knew that he did
27
not have the grounds for the order when he implied that he did.
28
intentionally concealed facts and failed to disclose facts including the fact that
29
PLAINTIFFS were entitled to a summary judgment by also refusing to answer
30
PLAINTIFFS lawfully and properly filed Motions and Affidavits for summary judgment
31
when JAMES WARE had a fiduciary duty to disclose said facts in particular since
32
PLAINTIFFS filed said Motions and Affidavits Pro Se (In Pro Per) and that JAMES
33
WARE has special knowledge that PLAINTIFF did not have when JAMES WARE had a
JAMES WARE had knowledge of the falsity,
JAMES WARE
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 72
1
fiduciary duty to issue said summary judgment and that said summary judgment was a
2
fact basic to the transaction and JAMES WARE knew this fact and legal principle.
3
See JAMES WARE’S orders dated October 3, 2006, September 12, 2006 and
4
September 13, 2006 in UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
5
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION Case Number C07 00391.
6
DAMAGE
7
Damage to PLAINTIFFS stemming from reliance on said misrepresentation placed in
8
said fraudulent order that JAMES WARE intentionally concealed facts and failed to
9
disclose facts including the fact that PLAINTIFFS were entitled to a summary judgment
10
by also refusing to answer PLAINTIFFS lawfully and properly filed Motions and Affidavits
11
for summary judgment when JAMES WARE had a fiduciary duty to disclose said facts in
12
particular since PLAINTIFFS filed said Motions and Affidavits Pro Se (In Pro Per) and
13
that JAMES WARE has special knowledge that PLAINTIFF did not have when JAMES
14
WARE had a fiduciary duty to issue said summary judgment and that said summary
15
judgment was a fact basic to the transaction and JAMES WARE knew this fact and legal
16
principle.
17
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
18
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
19
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
20
As a consequence of the willful and malicious actions of JAMES WARES,
21
PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum certain amount of
22
$3,001,000.00.
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
Third Claim For Relief
Fraud by Richard W. Wieking
PLAINTIFFS:
All PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS:
RICHARD W. WIEKING, Richard W. Wieking
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 73
1
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
2
On or about October 3, 2006, September 12, 2006, September 13, 2006, March
3
19, 2007; April 9, 2007; April 25, 2007, May 7, 2007 and June 4, 2007 and other dates,
4
in the above named Judicial District, the crime of FRAUD and or INTENTIONAL
5
MISREPRESENTATION, in violation of the United States Constitution and Common Law
6
was committed by RICHARD W. WIEKING, who did willfully and unlawfully commit
7
FRAUD and or INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION by willful disobedience of a
8
process and law by refusing to issue summary judgment in cases entitled to such.
9
RICHARD W. WIEKING had knowledge of the falsity, recklessness and indifference to
10
the truth and intended to induce PLAINTIFF’S reliance on said misrepresentation.
11
RICHARD W. WIEKING is member of a class in which PLAINIFFS had reason to expect
12
would ordinarily be induced to be able to rely upon; and summary judgment ordinarily
13
occurs when the real parties of interest defending a case fail to make any appearance or
14
plea. By refusing to issue said summary judgment RICHARD W. WIEKING intentionally
15
concealed facts including the fact that PLAINTIFFS were entitled to a summary
16
judgment and he knew or believed that he was hiding the truth; and did not have the
17
confidence in the accuracy of his statement that he stated and he implied that he did by
18
claiming to be the Clerk of the Court; and RICHARD W. WIEKING knew that he did not
19
have the grounds for not issuing said summary judgments when he implied by refusing
20
to respond that he did. RICHARD W. WIEKING intentionally concealed facts and failed
21
to disclose facts including the fact that PLAINTIFFS were entitled to a summary
22
judgment by also refusing to answer PLAINTIFFS lawfully and properly filed Motions and
23
Affidavits for summary judgment when RICHARD W. WIEKING had a fiduciary duty to
24
disclose said facts in particular since PLAINTIFFS filed said Motions and Affidavits Pro
25
Se (In Pro Per) and that RICHARD W. WIEKING has special knowledge that PLAINTIFF
26
did not have when RICHARD W. WIEKING had a fiduciary duty to issue said summary
27
judgment and that said summary judgment was a fact basic to the transaction and
28
RICHARD W. WIEKING knew this fact and legal principle.
29
30
31
See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION Case Numbers C 05-00996 and C07 00391.
DAMAGE
32
Damage to PLAINTIFFS stemming from reliance on said misrepresentation placed in
33
said fraudulent intentional concealment and failure to disclose fact that PLAINTIFFS
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 74
1
were entitled to summary judgment by refusing to answer PLAINTIFFS lawfully and
2
properly filed Motions and Affidavits for summary judgment when RICHARD W.
3
WIEKING had a fiduciary duty to disclose said facts in particular since PLAINTIFFS filed
4
said Motions and Affidavits Pro Se (In Pro Per) and that RICHARD W. WIEKING has
5
special knowledge that PLAINTIFF did not have when RICHARD W. WIEKING had a
6
fiduciary duty to issue said summary judgment and that said summary judgment was a
7
fact basic to the transaction and RICHARD W. WIEKING knew this fact and legal
8
principle.
9
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
10
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
11
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
12
As a consequence of the willful and malicious actions of RICHARD W.
13
WIEKINGS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum certain
14
amounts of $66,016,803,250.00 and $3,001,000.00.
15
AUTHORITIES
16
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
17
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
18
Fourth Claim For Relief
19
Aggravated Assault
20
21
22
23
24
Aggravated Battery and
PLAINTIFFS:
Clive Boustred, RCB, WEB
DEFENDANTS:
MICHAEL MACDONALD, Michael Macdonald (Santa Cruz Deputy Sheriff)
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
25
On or about March 10, 2003, in the above named Judicial District, the crime of
26
AGGRAVATED BATTERY and AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, in violation of Common Law
27
and the Constitution of the United States of America and the 4th, 5th and 14th
28
Amendments there to and PC § 34 and 37, a felony and misdemeanor respectively, was
29
committed by MICHAEL MACDONALD, who did willfully and unlawfully under the color
30
of law commit said crimes against PLAINTIFFS by discharging his firearm by shooting at
31
PLAINTIFFS with a deadly weapon.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 75
DAMAGES
1
2
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
3
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
4
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
5
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
6
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
7
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
8
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
9
On March 10, 2003 Santa Cruz Shooting Instructor Deputy Sheriff Michael
10
Macdonald ran up to Plaintiff Clive Boustred’s vehicle on Mr. Boustred private property,
11
and from a range of five to seven feet shot at Mr. Boustred. The bullet missed and
12
slammed into the door of Mr. Boustred’s vehicle. WFB, Mr. Boustred’ son aged three
13
was in the direct line of fire just behind Mr. Boustred, his seven year old son RCB was
14
about two feet off the line of fire.
15
Mr. Boustred was returning home from the Santa Cruz Superior Court house
16
where he had just filed a Temporary Restraining Order and Verified Criminal Complaint
17
against his ex wife and former personal assistant for endangering WFB by abandoning
18
WFB in the middle of a learner ski run and for resuming false 911 calls.
19
Before the Deputy sheriff shot at Mr. Boustred, the Santa Cruz Sheriffs were
20
aware Mr. Boustred was returning home from the Santa Cruz Court house. The Sheriffs
21
were also aware that Mr. Boustred’s ex wife Anamaria made false 911 calls and was
22
ordered out of the family home eight months earlier. The Sheriffs were also aware that
23
Anamaria had a stolen million dollar life insurance policy on Mr. Boustred’s life, as Mr.
24
Boustred had formerly filed a complaint detailing the stolen insurance policy with that
25
very same Sheriffs office.
26
27
Deputy Macdonald was prevented from taking a second shot by Sgt. Amy
Christy.
28
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
29
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
30
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
31
32
33
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 76
1
§ 34 Aggravated Battery
2
Aggravated Battery is a battery committed with a dangerous weapon - A
3
FELONY
4
§ 37 Aggravated Assault
5
Aggravated assault is an assault committed with a dangerous weapon - A
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
MISDEMEANOR
Fifth Claim For Relief Battery and Assault
PLAINTIFFS:
Clive Boustred
DEFENDANTS:
BROZOZOWSKI, Brozozowski (Santa Cruz Deputy Sheriff)
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
13
On or about March 10, 2003, in the above named Judicial District, the crime of
14
AGGRAVATED BATTERY and AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, in violation of Common Law
15
and the Constitution of the United States of America and the 4th, 5th and 14th
16
Amendments there to and PC § 33, a felony, was committed by BROZOZOWSKI, who
17
did willfully and unlawfully under the color of law commit said crimes against PLAINTIFF
18
by cutting PLAINTIFFS wrist with handcuffs and by drilling the knuckle of his fist into the
19
nape of PLAINTIFFS neck.
20
DAMAGES
21
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
22
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
23
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
24
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
25
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
26
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
27
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
28
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
29
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
30
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 77
1
2
3
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
4
§ 33 Battery Defined
5
Battery is the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another;
6
§ 38 Simple Assault
7
Simple assault is an assault committed without a dangerous weapon.
8
A MISDEMEANOR
9
Sixth Claim For Relief Misprision Of Felony – Irwin Joseph
10
11
12
13
14
15
PLAINTIFFS:
All PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS:
IRWIN JOSEPH, Irwin Joseph
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
16
On multiple occasions, including on or about 10/09/2007, 07/23/2007,
17
01/06/2006, 12/28/2005, 10/20/2005, in the above named Judicial District, the crime of
18
MISPRISION OF FELONY, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SECTION 4, a felony, was
19
committed by IRWIN JOSEPH, who did willfully and unlawfully commit MISPRISION OF
20
FELONY, IRWIN JOSEPH having knowledge and evidence of the commission multiple
21
felonies cognizable by a court of the United States committed against Plaintiffs, said
22
IRWIN JOSEPH did conceal and did not make as soon as possible known the same to
23
some judge of other person in civil or military authority under the United States, IRWIN
24
JOSEPH did Breach his Duty and acted under color of state or territorial law. Said
25
multiple felonies committed against Plaintiffs being most grievous having been clearly
26
stated and identified in pleading before DEFENDANT, said felonies including but not
27
limited to attempted murder, kidnap and treason.
28
Substantial information having been placed before IRWIN JOSEPH showing said
29
felonies having been committed by DEFENDANTS in U.S. District Court San Jose case
30
number C05 00996 JF RS.
31
Commissioner IRWIN JOSEPH not only intentionally ignored felonies committed
32
against PLAINTIFFS, without subject matter jurisdiction he actively enjoined in the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 78
1
malicious prosecution of PLAINTIFFS and unlawfully fined PLAINTIFF Clive Boustred for
2
simply seeking his constitutional rights. IRWIN JOSEPH’s actions are criminal in nature
3
and form and shock the conscience.
4
DAMAGES
5
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
6
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
7
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
8
parental alienation, lost time, lost business and prosperity, damaged reputation including
9
both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of happiness, loss of domestic
10
tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic liberties such as enjoying life
11
with one’s own children!
12
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
13
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
14
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
Seventh Claim For Relief
Treason – Irwin Joseph
PLAINTIFFS:
All PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS:
IRWIN JOSEPH, Irwin Joseph
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
25
On multiple occasions, including on or about 10/09/2007, 07/23/2007,
26
01/06/2006, 12/28/2005, 10/20/2005, in the above named Judicial District, the crime of
27
TREASON, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1, a felony, was committed by IRWIN
28
JOSEPH, who did willfully and unlawfully commit TREASON. IRWIN JOSEPH having
29
knowledge of the law and the fact that PLAINTIFF Clive Boustred never gave IRWIN
30
JOSEPH general subject matter jurisdiction but only narrowly limited jurisdiction to hand
31
back Clive Boustred’s passport which the Santa Cruz Superior Court has unlawfully
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 79
1
taken from Clive Boustred, IRWIN JOSEPH acted under color of state or territorial law
2
and Breached his Duty and exceeded subject matter jurisdiction in violation of 18 U.S.C.
3
Section 1.
4
Let the JURY NOTE: Irwin Joseph proceeded to not only assume jurisdiction
5
when he had none, he went on to maliciously prosecute PLAINTIFFS by continuing to
6
hold RCB and WFB hostage, but also to prevent PLAINTIFFS from access to
7
PLAINTIFFS capital thereby destroying new businesses PLAINTIFFS had started and
8
incurring significant unnecessary financial expense, hardship and anguish.
9
Joseph’s actions were willful and malicious.
10
Irwin
DAMAGES
11
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
12
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
13
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
14
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
15
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
16
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
17
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
18
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
19
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
20
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
21
22
23
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
24
18 U.S.C. Section 1 “Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have
25
jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason.” U.S. v. Will, 449
26
U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 .Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
27
Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)
28
Eighth Claim For Relief
29
Parental Alienation
30
31
Aggravated Kidnap / Kidnap /
PLAINTIFFS:
Clive Boustred, RCB, WFB with damage to All Plaintiffs
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 80
1
DEFENDANTS:
2
IRWIN JOSEPH, Irwin Joseph
3
SAMUEL S. STEVENS, Samuel S. Stevens
4
MICHAEL E. BARTON, Michael E. Barton
5
ANAMARIA BOUSTRED/TICHATSCHKE, Anamaria Boustred/Tichatschke
6
MARK TRACY, Mark Tracy (Former Sheriff)
7
MICHAEL MACDONALD, Michael Macdonald (Deputy Sheriff)
8
M POOL, M Pool (Deputy Sheriff)
9
HEMMINGWAY, Hemmingway (deceased)
10
AMY CHRISTY, Amy Christy
11
BROZOZOWSKI, Brozozowski
12
BOB LEE, Bob Lee (Santa Cruz District Attorney)
13
STEVE DROTTAR, Steve Drottar
14
STEFAN TICHATSCHKE, Stefan Tichatschke
15
VICKI J. PARRY, Vicki J. Parry
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
JOHN A. CHRISTERSON (CA State Bar 889096), John A. Christerson
DENNIS J. KEHOE (State Bar 34687), Dennis J. Kehoe
LEONARD DUECK (VP Twin Lakes Baptist Church, Inc.), Leonard Dueck
Twin Lakes Baptist Church, Inc.
MARK SPURLOCK, Mark Spurlock
JEREMY FOGEL, Jeremy Fogel,
JAMES WARE, James Ware
23
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON, Phyllis J. Hamilton
24
25
26
27
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, County of Santa Cruz
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, State of California
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, United States of America
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
28
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
29
Without any hearing or proper notice in an Ex Parte emergency hearing on or
30
about February 20, 2002 under the color of law Judge Thomas Kelley issued an order
31
unlawfully modifying the Stipulated Custody Order and Agreement covering the custody
32
of PLAINTIFF Clive Boustred’s children RCB and WFB, this void ex parte order
33
precipitated into the attempted murder of Clive Boustred on March 10, 2003.
34
Following the attempted murder of Clive Boustred on March 10 , 2003, when
35
Santa Cruz Sheriffs Shooting Instructor Michael Macdonald without cause shot at Clive
36
Boustred with WFB aged three also in the direct line of fire and RCB aged seven only
37
two feet off the line of fire and the violent kidnap of RCB and WFB from their father Clive
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 81
1
Boustred the custodial parent, on multiple occasions up until present time, in the
2
above named Judicial District, commit the crime of AGGRAVATED KIDNAP and or
3
KIDNAP and or PARENTAL ALIENATION, in violation of Constitutionally Guaranteed
4
Rights, including PLAINTIFFS 1st, 5th, 9th and 14th Amendment Rights and U.S.C.
5
Section 1738A and 42 and 654, 663, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980,
6
CA PC § 278, 278.5, 280, §40 Aggravated Kidnapping, § 44.1 Second degree
7
kidnapping, § 45 Simple Kidnapping, § 46 False imprisonment, California Civil Code §
8
771, a felony and or misdemeanor was committed by DEFENDANT/S listed above, who
9
did willfully and unlawfully under the color of law commit AGGRAVATED KIDNAP and or
10
KIDNAP and or PARENTAL ALIENATION in addition to INTERFERENCE WITH
11
FAMILY AND POLITICAL RELATIONS of PLAINTIFFS.
12
DAMAGES
13
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
14
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
15
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
16
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
17
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
18
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
19
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
20
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
21
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
22
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
23
24
25
Authorities
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated
herein by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
26
Parent Can Sue For Interference With Parental Rights
27
Either parent can sue for interference with parental rights:
28
STRODE V. GLEASON, 510 P.2d 250 (1973);
29
Federal Court Has Jurisdiction on Divorce Claims
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 82
1
Federal Courts can rule on federal claims (constitutional questions)
2
involved in state divorce cases and award money damages for federal torts or in
3
diversity of citizenship cases involving intentional infliction of emotional distress
4
by denial of parental rights, "visitation", as long as the Federal Court is not asked
5
to modify custodial status:
6
7
8
9
LLOYD V. LOEFFLER, 518 F.Supp 720 (custodial father won $95,000
against parental kidnapping wife)
FENSLAGE V. DAWKINS, 629 F.2d 1107 ($130,000 damages for
parental kidnapping)
10
KAJTAZI V. KAJTAZI, 488 F.Supp 15 (1976)
11
SPINDEL V. SPINDEL, 283 F.Supp. 797 (1969)
12
HOWARD V. KUNEN, USDC Mass CA No. 73-3813-G, 12/3/73
13
(unreported)
14
SCHWAB V. HUTSON, USDC, S.Dist. MI, 11/70 (unreported)
15
LORBEER V. THOMPSON, USDC Colorado (1981)
16
Custody May Be Changed If Constitutional Rights Abridged
17
Custody can be changed if visitation is denied.
18
Wife can be held in contempt if visitation is denied.
19
ENTWISTLE V. ENTWISTLE, 402 NYS 2d 213
20
21
Custody can be changed if wife is "disrespectful" of "visitation" order:
22
MURASKIN V. MURASKIN 283 NW 2d 140 (N. Dakota 1979)
23
24
U.S.C. Section 1738A and 42 and 654, 663
25
The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (28 U.S.C. Section 1738A and 42
26
U.S.C. Section 654, 663) is a federal statute enacted in 1980 to address
27
kidnapping by noncustodial parents and inconsistent child custody decisions
28
made by state courts. The law provides for penalties for kidnapping and requires
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 83
1
states to recognize and enforce the custody decisions of courts in other states,
2
rather than make a second, and possibly inconsistent, decision.
3
California Penal Code Kidnap
4
278. Every person, not having a right to custody, who maliciously takes,
5
entices away, keeps, withholds, or conceals any child with the intent to detain or
6
conceal that child from a lawful custodian shall be punished by imprisonment in a
7
county jail not exceeding one year, a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars
8
($1,000), or both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state
9
prison for two, three, or four years, a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars
10
($10,000), or both that fine and imprisonment.
11
12
278.5. (a) Every person who takes, entices away, keeps, withholds, or
13
conceals a child and maliciously deprives a lawful custodian of a right to custody,
14
or a person of a right to visitation, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county
15
jail not exceeding one year, a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000),
16
or both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16
17
months, or two or three years, a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars
18
($10,000), or both that fine and imprisonment.
19
(b) Nothing contained in this section limits the court's contempt power.
20
(c) A custody order obtained after the taking, enticing away, keeping,
21
withholding, or concealing of a child does not constitute a defense to a crime
22
charged under this section.
23
280.
Every person who willfully causes or permits the removal or
24
concealment of any child in violation of Section 8713, 8803, or 8910 of the Family
25
Code shall be punished as follows:
26
(a) By imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year if the
27
child is concealed within the county in which the adoption proceeding is pending
28
or in which the child has been placed for adoption, or is removed from that
29
county to a place within this state.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 84
1
(b) By imprisonment in the state prison, or by imprisonment in a county
2
jail for not more than one year, if the child is removed from that county to a place
3
outside of this state.
4
§ 44 Aggravated Kidnapping
5
Aggravated kidnapping is the doing of any of the following acts with the
6
intent thereby to force the victim, or some other person, to give up anything of
7
apparent or prospective value, or to grant any advantage or immunity, in order to
8
secure the release of the person under the offender’s actual or apparent control:
9
10
11
12
(1)
the forcible seizing and carrying of any person from one place to
another; or
(2)
the enticing or persuading of any person to go from one place to
another; or
13
(3)
14
A FELONY
15
§ 44.1 Second degree kidnapping
16
A.Second degree kidnapping is the doing of any of the acts listed in
17
the imprisoning or forcible secreting of any person.
Subsection B wherein the victim is:
18
(1)
used as a hostage or shield;
19
(2)
used to facilitate the commission of a felony or the flight after an
20
21
22
23
attempt to commit or the commission or a felony;
(4)
imprisoned or kidnapped for 72 or more hours, except as provided
by RS 14:45 (A) (4) or (5); or
(5)
imprisoned or kidnapped when the offender is armed with a
24
dangerous weapon or leads the victim to reasonably believe he is armed with a
25
dangerous weapon.
26
B.for the purposes of this section, Kidnapping is:
27
(1)
28
29
30
31
the forcible seizing and carrying or any person from one place to
another; or
(2)
the enticing or persuading of any person to go from one place to
another; or
(3)
the imprisoning or forcible secreting of any person
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 85
1
A FELONY
2
§ 45 Simple Kidnapping
3
A.Simple kidnapping is:
4
(1)
5
6
the intentional and forcible seizing and carrying of any person from
one place to another without his consent.
(2)
The intentional taking, enticing or decoying away, for an unlawful
7
purpose, of any child not his own and under the age of fourteen years, without
8
the consent of his parent or the person charged with its custody.
9
(3)
The intentional taking, enticing or decoying away, without the
10
consent of the proper authority, or any person who has been lawfully committed
11
to an orphan, insane, feeble-minded or other similar institution.
12
(4)
The intentional taking, enticing or decoying away and removing
13
from the state, by any parent of his or her child, from the custody of any person
14
to whom custody has been awarded by any court of competent jurisdiction of any
15
state, without the consent of the legal custodian, with intent to defeat the
16
jurisdiction of the said court over the custody of the child.
17
(5)
the taking, enticing or decoying away and removing from the state,
18
by any person, other than the parent, of a child temporarily placed in his custody
19
by any court of competent jurisdiction in the state, with the intention to defeat the
20
jurisdiction of said court over the custody of the child. A FELONY
21
§ 46 False imprisonment
22
False imprisonment is the intentional confinement or detention of another,
23
without his consent and without proper legal authority. A MISDEMEANOR
24
Federal Court Has Jurisdiction Over Custody Matters
25
Federal judges can set aside or overturn state courts to preserve
26
constitutional rights:
27
MITCHUM V. FOSTER, 407 US 225 (1972)
28
Title 28 US Code sec. 2284.
29
Federal Courts can rule on federal claims (constitutional questions)
30
involved in state divorce cases and award money damages for federal torts or in
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 86
1
diversity of citizenship cases involving intentional infliction of emotional distress
2
by denial of parental rights, "visitation", as long as the Federal Court is not asked
3
to modify custodial status:
4
5
6
7
LLOYD V. LOEFFLER, 518 F.Supp 720 (custodial father won $95,000
against parental kidnapping wife)
FENSLAGE V. DAWKINS, 629 F.2d 1107 ($130,000 damages for
parental kidnapping)
8
KAJTAZI V. KAJTAZI, 488 F.Supp 15 (1976)
9
SPINDEL V. SPINDEL, 283 F.Supp. 797 (1969)
10
11
HOWARD V. KUNEN, USDC Mass CA No. 73-3813-G, 12/3/73
(unreported)
12
SCHWAB V. HUTSON, USDC, S.Dist. MI, 11/70 (unreported)
13
LORBEER V. THOMPSON, USDC Colorado (1981)
14
15
Right of parents to the care, custody and to nurture their children is of
16
such character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental
17
principals of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
18
institutions, AND SUCH RIGHT IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT PROTECTED BY
19
THIS AMENDMENT AND AMENDMENTS 5, 9, and 14:
20
21
DOE V. IRWIN, 441 f. SUPP. 1247, U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF
MICHIGAN (1977)
22
23
24
25
Parents have fundamental constitutionally protected interest in continuity
of legal bond with their children:
MATTER OF DELANEY, 617 P.2d 886, Oklahoma (1980)
26
27
The United States Supreme Court noted that a parent's right to "the
28
companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children" is an
29
interest "far more precious" than any property right:
30
MAV V. ANDERSON, 345 U.S. 528, 533; 73 S.Ct. 840, 843 (1952)
31
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 87
1
2
3
4
"No bond is more precious and none should be more zealously protected
by the law as the bond between parent and child.":
CARSEN V. ELROD, 411 F.Supp. 645, 649 (U.S. District Court Eastern
Dist. Virginia 1976)
5
6
"A parent's right to the preservation of his relationship with his child
7
derives from the fact that the parent's achievement of a rich and rewarding life is
8
likely to depend significantly on his ability to participate in the rearing of his
9
children. A child's corresponding right to protection from interference in the
10
relationship deprives form the psychic importance to him of being raised by a
11
loving, responsible, reliable adult." - FRANZ V. UNITED STATES, 707 F.2d 582,
12
595-599 (U.S. Ct. App. D.C. Circuit 1983)
13
14
Loss of First Amendment Freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,
15
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Though First Amendment rights are
16
not absolute, they may be curtailed only by interests of vital importance, the
17
burden of proving which rests on their government. - ELROD V. BURNS, 96 S Ct
18
2673; 427 US 347, (1976).
19
Parent's right to custody of child is a right encompassed within protection
20
of this amendment which may not be interfered with under guise of protecting
21
public interest by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable
22
relation to some purpose within competency of state to effect. - REYNOLD V.
23
BABY FOLD, INC., 369 NE 2d 858; 68 Ill 2d 419, appeal dismissed 98 S Ct
24
1598, 435 US 963, IL, (1977).
25
26
The United States Supreme Court noted that a parent's right to "the
27
companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children" is an
28
interest "far more precious" than any property right. - MAY V. ANDERSON, 345
29
US 528, 533; 73 S Ct 840, 843, (1952).
30
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 88
1
A parent's right to care and companionship of his or her children are so
2
fundamental, as to be guaranteed protection under the First, Ninth, and
3
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. - IN RE: J.S. AND C.,
4
324 A 2d 90; supra 129 NJ Super, at 489.
5
6
Parent's rights have been recognized as being "essential to the orderly
7
pursuit of happiness by free man." - MEYER V. NEBRASKA, 262 or 426 US 390
8
; 43 S Ct 625, (1923).
9
10
No bond is more precious and none should be more zealously protected
11
by the law as the bond between parent and child." - CARSON V. ELROD, 411 F
12
Supp 645, 649; DC E.D. VA (1976).
13
14
State Judges, as well as federal, have the responsibility to respect and
15
protect persons from violations of federal constitutional rights. - GROSS V.
16
STATE OF ILLINOIS, 312 F 2d 257; (1963).
17
18
Custody is a Constitutionally Secured Right – Enabling Federal
Jurisdiction
19
The Court stressed, "the parent-child relationship is an important interest
20
that undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
21
interest, protection." A parent's interest in the companionship, care, custody and
22
management of his or her children rises to a constitutionally secured right, given
23
the centrality of family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility.
24
25
26
A child has an equal right to be raised by the father, and must be awarded
to the father if he is the better parent, or mother is not interested:
STANLEY V. ILLINOIS, 405 US 645, 651; 92 S Ct 1208, (1972).
27
28
A parent's right to the custody of his or her children is an element of
29
"liberty" guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment to the
30
Constitution of the United States:
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 89
1
MATTER OF GENTRY, 369 N.W.2d. 889, Mich. Appellate Div. (1983)
2
3
The rights of parents to the care, custody and nurture of their children is of
4
such character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental
5
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
6
institutions, and such right is a fundamental right protected by this amendment
7
(First) and Amendments 5, 9, and 14. - DOE V. IRWIN, 441 F Supp 1247; U.S.
8
D.C. of Michigan, (1985).
9
Ex Parte Hearings on Custody Orders Unconstitutional
10
Ex Parte conferences, hearings or Orders denying parental rights or
11
personal liberties are unconstitutional, cannot be enforced, can be set aside in
12
federal court, and can be the basis of suits for money damages.
13
RANKIN V. HOWARD, 633 F.2d 844 (1980);
14
GEISINGER V. VOSE, 352 F.Supp. 104 (1972).
15
If Mother has Boyfriend Custody Awarded To Father
16
If custodial mother has boyfriend living with her, state can change custody
17
to father.
18
JARRETT V. JARRETT, 101 S.Ct. 329
19
Father has Right to Custody
20
Custody can be awarded to father of girls of "tender years" if mother
21
commits perjury, and is otherwise immoral.
22
BEABER V. BEABER, 322 NE 2d 910.
23
Judges Criminally Liable For Willful Depravation of Custody Rights
24
or any Constitutional Violation
25
Fathers' Rights Case Law Title 42 USC 1983 is for (federal) civil rights
26
violations. "Judges may be punished criminally for willful deprivation of rights on
27
the strength of Title 18 U.S.A. 241 and 242."
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 90
1
2
"Judges may be punished criminally for willful deprivation of rights on the
strength of Title 18 U.S.A. 241 and 242."
3
[The fact that There are federal rules\laws regarding suing including
4
judges for violations of constitutional rights is proof enough that it occurs.]: -
5
IMBLER V. PACHTMAN, 424 U.S. 409; 96 S.Ct. 984 (1976)
6
7
"When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to deprive a person of his
8
constitutional rights, he exercises no discretion or individual judgement; he acts
9
no longer as a judge, but as a "minister" of his own prejudice.": PIERSON V.
10
RAY, 386 U.S. 547 at 567 (1967)
11
12
"Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we have held
13
that qualified immunity (Ed. Note: or "good faith") would be defeated if an official
14
"knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere
15
of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if
16
he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
17
constitutional rights or other injury. . ." - HARLOW V. FITZGERALD, 102 S.Ct.
18
2727 at 2737, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)
19
20
Every person who, under color of any statute ordinance, regulation,
21
custom, or by usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
22
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
23
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
24
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
25
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. EVERY PERSON SHALL BE
26
LIABLE IN AN ACTION AT LAW SUIT IN EQUITY N0 EXCLUSION FOR
27
JUDGES BY ANY ACT OF CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42,
28
SECTION 1985 (3) If two or more persons . . . conspire. . for the purpose of
29
depriving. any person. . . of the equal protection of the laws . . . the party so
30
injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages . . .
31
RECOVERY OF DAMAGES AGAINST ANY ONE OR MORE OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 91
1
CONSPIRATORS
N0
EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES
BY ANY ACT
OF
2
CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1986 Every person
3
who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs . . . are about to be committed,
4
and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same,
5
neglects or refuses so to do . . . shall be liable . . . EVERY PERSON SHALL BE
6
LIABLE FOR ALL DAMAGES NO EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY ANY ACT OF
7
CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1988: - UNITED
8
STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1983
9
10
"We should, of course, not protect a member of the judiciary "who is in
11
fact guilty of using his power to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other
12
personal motive not connected with the public good." - GREGOIRE V. BIDDLE,
13
177 F.2d 579, 581.
14
15
"Government immunity violates the common law maxim that everyone
16
shall have remedy for an injury done to his person or property." - FIREMAN'S
17
INS/ CO. OF NEWARK, N.J. V. WASHBURN COUNTY, 2 Wis.2d 214, 85
18
N.W.2d 840 (1957)
19
20
Immunity fosters neglect and breeds irresponsibility, while liability
21
promotes care and caution, which caution and care is owed by the government to
22
its people." - RABON V. ROWEN MEMORIAL HOSP., INC, 269 NSI. 13, 152
23
S.E.2d 485, 493 (`1967)
24
25
"Actions by state officers and employees, even if unauthorized or in
26
excess of authority can be actions under 'color of law'." -
27
DILGER, 313 F.2d 536 (U.S. Ct. App 10th Circ. - 1963
STRINGER V.
28
29
"A judge is not immune from criminal sanctions under the civil rights act."
30
"State officials acting in their official capacities, even if in abuse of their lawful
31
authority , generally are held to act "under color" of law. This is because such
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 92
1
officials are " clothed with the authority" of state law, which gives them power to
2
perpetrate the very wrongs that Congress intended Section 1983 to prevent. " -
3
EX PARTE VIRGINIA, 100 U.S. 339, 346-347 (1879)
4
5
"The language and purpose of the civil rights acts, are inconsistent with
6
the application of common law notions of official immunity. . . " - JACOBSEN V.
7
HENNE, 335 F.2d 129, 133 (U.S. Ct. App. 2nd Circ. - 1966) Also see"
8
ANDERSON V. NOSSER, 428 F.2d 183 (U.S. Ct. App. 5th Circ. - 1971)
9
10
"Governmental immunity is not a defense under (42 USC 1983) making
11
liable every person who under color of state law deprives another person of his
12
civil rights." - WESTBERRY V. FISHER, 309 F.Supp. 95 (District Ct.- of Maine -
13
1970 "
14
15
16
Judicial immunity is no defense to a judge acting in the clear absence of
jurisdiction." - BRADLEY V. FISHER, U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871)
17
18
As long as a DEFENDANT who abridges a plaintiff's constitutional rights
19
acts pursuant to a statute of local law which empowers him to commit the
20
wrongful act, an action under the Federal Civil Rights statute is established. 42
21
U.S.C.A. 1981 et seq. - LAVERNE V. CORNING, 316 F.Supp. 629
22
23
"The Supreme Court initially discussed judicial immunity in Randall v.
24
Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1869). In Randall, the Court wrote
25
that judges of superior or general jurisdiction courts were not liable to civil actions
26
for their judicial acts, even when such acts, where the acts, in excess of
27
jurisdiction, are done maliciously or corruptly." [Editor's Note: In more recent
28
cases: Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) and Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S.
29
24 it was found that judges were really not acting in a malicious and corrupt
30
manner and the proofs also showed that. Congress by its words and meaning
31
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and that meaning included judges to be held
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 93
1
responsible to an injured plaintiff for the deprivation of Constitutional Rights. Any
2
judge made case finding to the contrary is hereby challenged as unconstitutional
3
and unlawful. No Court has ever challenged the Constitutionality of the Civil
4
Rights Act of 1871, and therefore said Congressionally enacted legislation stands
5
as law. The only way to change an act of Congress is by an act of Congress. No
6
judge can change it and any such findings and changes are not to be upheld in
7
Federal Courts as lawful. No changes in the wording have ever been made to
8
Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 and therefore these
9
Congressionally enacted laws are enforceable in the Federal Courts. The only
10
change made to Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 took place in 1979. At this time the words
11
"or the District of Columbia" were inserted following "Territory". If any judges or
12
persons representing judges had wanted to make a change this would have been
13
an opportune time to do so. No action was ever taken to change the wording of
14
the law and it remains as such today.] - RANDALL V. BRIGHAM, 74 U.S. (7
15
Wall.) 523, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1869).
16
17
"I agree with the substantive standard announced by the Court today,
18
imposing liability when a public-official DEFENDANT "knew or should have
19
known" of the constitutionally violative effect of his actions. This standard would
20
not allow the official who actually knows that he was violating the law to escape
21
liability for his actions, even if he could not "reasonably have been expected" to
22
know what he actually did know. Thus the clever and unusually well-informed
23
violator of constitutional rights will not evade just punishment for his crimes. I,
24
also agree that this standard applies "across the board," to all "government
25
officials performing discretionary functions.," - Harlow at 2739, Justice Brennan,
26
Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmum concurring. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
27
547, Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting
28
29
"Judges are not immune for their nonjudicial activities, i.e., activities which
30
are ministerial or administrative in nature." - SANTIAGO V. CITY OF
31
PHILADELPHIA, 435 F.Supp. 136
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 94
1
2
"It is not a judicial function for judge to commit intentional tort, even though
3
tort occurs in courthouse." - YATES V. VILLAGE OF HOFFMAN ESTATES,
4
ILLINOIS, 209 F.Supp. 757
5
6
"There was no judicial immunity to civil actions for equitable relief under
7
Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 Shore v. Howard. 414 F.Supp. 379
8
"There is no judicial immunity from criminal liability". Id. "Repeated pattern of
9
failing to advise litigants of their constitutional and statutory rights is serious
10
judicial misconduct." - MATTER OF PEEVES, 480 N.Y.S. 2d 463.
11
12
"When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction or acts in face of clearly
13
valid statutes or case law expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity
14
is lost." - RANKIN V. HOWARD, 633 F.2d 844.
15
16
17
"There is no judicial immunity from criminal liability." - SHORE V.
HOWARD, 414 F.Supp. 379
18
19
"State judges, as well as federal, have the responsibility to respect and
20
protect persons from violations of federal constitutional rights." - GOSS V.
21
STATE OF ILLINOIS, 312 F2d. 1279 (U.S.Ct.App. - Illinois - 1963)
22
23
24
"Conduct of trial judge must be measured by standard of fairness and
impartiality." - GREENER V. GREEN, 460 F.2d 1279 (U.S.Ct. App. - Pa. - 1972)
25
26
Judges must maintain a high standard of judicial performance with
27
particular emphasis upon conducting litigation with scrupulous fairness and
28
impartiality. 28 USCA § 2411; - PFIZER V. LORD, 456 F 2d 532; cert denied 92
29
S Ct 2411; US Ct App MN, (1972).
30
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 95
1
"A judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid
2
statutes or case law expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is
3
lost." Id. "Law requires not only impartial tribunal, but that tribunal appears to be
4
impartial." 28 U.S.C.A. 455.- IN RE TIP-PAHANDS ENTERPRISES, INC., 27
5
B.R. 780 (U.S. Bankruptcy Ct.)
6
7
Municipality and Sate may be Sued
8
A parent may bring a suit against a municipality which failed to provide
9
protection against an ex-spouse, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The parent may
10
recover damages for her son's death and her own injuries, where the police force
11
assured her of protection from a violent ex-spouse:
RAUCCI V. TOWN OF ROTTERDAM, No. 89-7693, U.S. Dist. Ct. --N.Y.,
12
13
April 27, 1990
14
Police Officers No Immunity
15
Police officer loses qualified immunity to claim that facially neutral policy
16
has been executed in a discriminatory manner in a domestic violence situation if
17
that police officer knows that the policy has a discriminatory impact:
18
HANSEN V. CITY OF ) LEGAL DEPT., 864 F.2d 1026, 3rd Cir. (1988)
19
Attorney’s Can Be Sued
20
Attorney can be sued for malpractice under consumer protection laws.
21
DEBAKEY V. STAGG, 605 SW 2d 631 (1980)
22
The Court Has a Duty To Ensure Constitutional Rights
23
It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
24
of the citizen, against any stealthy encroachments thereon." -BOYD V. U.S., 116
25
US 616, 635, (1885)
26
" In short, the federal courts could step in where the state courts were
27
unable or unwilling to protect federal rights." - ALLEN v. McCURRY, 449 U.S. 90
28
(1980)
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 96
1
Evil Orders Are Unconstitutional
2
Laws and court procedures that are "fair on their faces" but administered
3
"with an evil eye or a heavy hand" was discriminatory and violates the Equal
4
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
5
YICK WO V. HOPKINS, 118 S.Ct. 356 (1886)
6
Justice Delayed is Justice Denied
7
Justice delayed is justice denied.
8
MAGNA CHARTA, Art.40, June 15, 1215.
9
Void Orders
10
Judge's dismissal for no cause is reversible.
11
FOMAN V. DAVIS, 371 US 178 (1962)
12
Non-Lawyers Entitled To Court
13
Non-lawyers can assist or represent litigants in court.
14
JOHNSON V. AVERY, 89 S.Ct. 747
15
Members of group who are competent nonlawyers can assist other
16
members of group achieve the goals of the group in court without being charged
17
with "unauthorized practice of law"
18
BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY TRAINMEN V. VIRGINIA , 377 US 1;
19
NAACP V. BUTTON, 371 US 415 (1962);
20
SIERRA CLUB V. NORTON, 92 S.Ct. 1561;
21
UNITED MINE WORKERS V. GIBBS, 383 US 715;
22
FARETTA V. CALIFORNIA, 422 US 806.
23
Pro Se To Be Considered Without Technicality
24
Pro Se (Without a Lawyer, representing self) pleadings are to be
25
considered without technicality; pro se litigants pleadings are not to be held to the
26
same high standards of perfection as lawyers.
27
HAINES V. KERNER, 92 S.Ct. 594;
28
JENKINS V. MCKEITHEN, 395 US 411, 421 (1969);
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 97
1
PICKING V. PENNA. RWY. CO. 151 F.2d 240;
2
PUCKETT V. COX, 456 F.2d 233.
3
4
5
The pleading of one who pleads pro se for the protection of civil rights
should be liberally construed:
6
BLOOD V. MARGIS, 322 F.2d 1086 (1971)
7
Ninth Claim For Relief
8
9
10
11
12
13
Treason – Jeremy Fogel
PLAINTIFFS:
All PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS:
JEREMY FOGEL, Jeremy Fogel,
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
14
On multiple occasions, including on or about September 9, 2005, January 27,
15
2006, March 3, 2006, July 12, 2006, July 21, 2006, October 3, 2006, September 12,
16
2006 and September 13, 2006, in the above named Judicial District, the crime of
17
TREASON, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1, a felony, was committed by JEREMY
18
FOGEL, who did willfully and unlawfully commit TREASON. JEREMY FOGEL having
19
knowledge of the law and the fact that PLAINTIFFS in U.S. District Court San Jose case
20
number C07 00391 had filed said case under the 11th Amendment in which said case
21
was filed not only against JEREMY FOGEL’s employer but also his colleagues and that
22
said case was filed by citizens of another State across state borders against the State
23
and thus in accordance with not only due process, but also in accordance with the 11th
24
Amendment of the United States Constitution JEREMY FOGEL had no Judicial power in
25
said case and JEREMY FOGEL thus exceeded subject matter jurisdiction by making
26
rulings in a case in which Judicial power was clearly prohibited JEREMY FOGEL acted
27
under color of state or territorial law.
28
U.S. Constitution, Eleventh Amendment: “The Judicial power of the United States
29
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
30
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
31
of any Foreign State.”
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 98
1
JEREMY FOGEL did Breach his Duty and exceeded subject matter jurisdiction in
2
violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1. “Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have
3
jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason.” U.S. v. Will, 449
4
U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 .Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
5
Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)
6
Let the JURY NOTE: JEREMY FOGEL proceeded to not only assume jurisdiction
7
when he had none, he went on to ignore extremely serious felonies committed against
8
PLAINTIFFS including false arrest, assault, attempted murder, kidnap and JEREMY
9
FOGEL allowed the continued kidnap of RCB and WFB. JEREMY FOGEL’s actions
10
11
were willful and malicious.
DAMAGES
12
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
13
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
14
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
15
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
16
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
17
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
18
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
19
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
20
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
21
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
22
23
24
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
25
Tenth Claim For Relief
26
Fogel
27
28
29
30
31
Misprision Of Felony – Jeremy
PLAINTIFFS:
All PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS:
JEREMY FOGEL, Jeremy Fogel,
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 99
1
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
2
On multiple occasions, including on or about September 9, 2005, January 27,
3
2006, March 3, 2006, July 12, 2006, July 21, 2006, October 3, 2006, September 12,
4
2006 and September 13, 2006, in the above named Judicial District, the crime of
5
MISPRISION OF FELONY, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SECTION 4, a felony, was
6
committed by JEREMY FOGEL, who did willfully and unlawfully commit MISPRISION
7
OF FELONY, JEREMY FOGEL having knowledge and evidence of the commission
8
multiple felonies cognizable by a court of the United States committed against Plaintiffs,
9
said JEREMY FOGEL did conceal and did not make as soon as possible known the
10
same to some judge of other person in civil or military authority under the United States,
11
JEREMY FOGEL did Breach his Duty and acted under color of state or territorial law.
12
Said multiple felonies committed against Plaintiffs being most grievous having been
13
clearly stated and identified in pleading before JEREMY FOGEL, said felonies including
14
but not limited to false arrest, assault, attempted murder, kidnap and treason.
15
Substantial information having been placed before JEREMY FOGEL showing
16
said felonies having been committed by JEREMY FOGELs in UNITED STATES
17
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE
18
DIVISION Case Number C 05-00996 JF
19
DAMAGES
20
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
21
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
22
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
23
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
24
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
25
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
26
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
27
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
28
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
29
listed in the “J. DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
30
31
32
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 100
1
Eleventh Claim For Relief
2
3
PLAINTIFFS:
All Plaintiffs
4
5
6
Conspiracy
DEFENDANTS:
All DEFENDANTS
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
7
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
8
On multiple dates before and on March 10, 2003 to present, in the above named
9
Judicial District, the crime of CONSPIRACY, in violation of Common Law and the
10
Constitution of The United States of America, a felony, was committed by
11
DEFENDANTS, who did by implied actions or willfully and unlawfully commit
12
CONSPIRACY against PLAINTIFFS. Said actions by conspirators make up concerted
13
CONSPIRACY against PLAINTIFFS which reached common objectives and thus infers
14
said agreement by DEFENDANTS to commit CONSPIRACY. DEFENDANTS were fully
15
aware that their concerted actions would cause damage to PLAINIFFS.
16
blatant criminal acts were intentionally undertaken by certain DEFENDANTS as a
17
concerted part of the multiplicity of CONSPIRACY to commit crimes against
18
PLAINTIFFS.
Overt and
19
A well established international conspiracy to form a New World Order obtained
20
control of the U.S. Dollar in 19136. Through confirmation from multiple sources said
21
conspirators set about to establish communism in the United States and other Nations7.
22
DEFENDANTS have enjoined in that well established conspiracy and have committed
23
crimes against PLAINTIFFS which are an integral part of said New World Order
24
conspiracy, including the implementation of a Police State in the United States; the claim
25
made by DEFENDANT judges and DA’s in this case that the Sate holds the position of
26
head of family and is authorized to take children from their custodial parent and modify
27
Stipulated Custody Agreements and Orders which is in conformance with said
28
conspiracy’s implementation of socialism/communism; the loaning to PLAINTIFFS
6
"Secrets
of
the
Federal
Reserve"
By
Eustace
Mullins
available
at
http://www.apfn.org/apfn/reserve.htm
7
See
The
Illuminati
and
the
Council
on
Foreign
Relations
http://www.libertyforlife.com/illuminati_and_council_on_foreigh_relations.htm,
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 101
1
money that co-conspirators created out of nothing and then the charging PLAINTIFFS
2
usurious interest rates on said money (Banking DEFENDANTS having charged
3
PLAINTIFFS interest rates as high as 30%); the denials of Constitutionally protected
4
rights in conformance with said conspiracy’s implementation of socialist fascism /
5
communism within the U.S. amongst other crimes committed which further the goals of
6
said conspiracy which have included the malicious prosecution of PLAINTIFFS so as to
7
silence PLAINTIFFS ability to defend themselves and said CONSPIRIACY had
8
prevented PLAINTIFFS from deploying and develop technology and products that
9
threaten said conspiracy.
10
By kidnapping PLAINTIFF Clive Boustred’s children RCB and WFB while
11
maliciously prosecuting Clive Boustred, conspirators emulate a pattern and practice
12
employed by the New World Order conspirators in Communist U.S.S.R. under Stalin.
13
PLAINTIFFS have been refused any opportunity to depose any of said individuals and it
14
is believed and assumed and alleged that they are part of the conspiracy against
15
PLAINTIFFS.
16
In addition Santa Cruz Superior Court Presiding Judge for 2007, Heather D.
17
Morse, is added as a DEFENDANT in this cause of action as it is alleged and believed
18
and proven that she has actively conspired against Clive Boustred by committing
19
misprision of treason by refusing to prosecute and act of Treason Committed by Irwin
20
Joseph. On or about August 1, 2007 Clive Boustred formally filed a Notice of Treason
21
and proof of said Treason against Irwin Joseph, whom by self admission admitted guilt
22
of Treason when Irwin Joseph who was sued by Clive Boustred insisted on presiding
23
over Santa Cruz Superior Court Case FL 16928 where Clive Boustred was the Plaintiff.
24
As Presiding Judge, Heather D. Morse not only had a duty to remove Irwin Joseph from
25
presiding over a case in which he has a clear personal interest and bias, Morse had
26
lawful responsibility and duty to remove Irwin Joseph from the bench.
27
BARRY BASKIN enjoined in said conspiracy to keep commissioner IRWIN JOSEPH
28
presiding over Clive Boustred’s divorce case where IRWIN JOSEPH consistently
29
conspired without any subject matter jurisdiction to deny Clive Boustred his legal rights,
30
despite IRWIN JOSEPH admitting that he had been sued by Clive Boustred, said
31
BARRY BASKIN concluded that IRWIN JOSEPH was not biased and that as a
32
commissioner IRWIN JOSEPH was entitled to preside over Clive Boustred’s divorce
33
case when Clive Boustred and stipulated that he required a qualified judge and not a
34
commissioner.
Defendant
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 102
1
DEFENDANTS VICKI PARRY, ANAMARIA TICHATSCHKE and IRWIN JOSEPH
2
having repeatedly refused to allow PLAINTIFF Clive Boustred the right to access his
3
own capital and refinance his home did conspire to inflict usurious interest rates against
4
PLAINTIFFS, when said DEFENDANTS were specifically and directly advised
5
repeatedly and on multiple occasions that Clive Boustred was being subject to usurious
6
interest rates as a direct consequence of their refusal to follow the law and lawful court
7
orders.
8
9
Multiple requests to Banking DEFENDANTS to reduce usurious interest rates
were repeatedly denied.
10
Further evidence of the formation and ongoing conspiracy against Clive Boustred
11
by parties listed is extensive and irrefutable and included in the attached Exhibit DVD.
12
The formation of the conspiracy occurred before the Santa Cruz Sheriffs setup ambush
13
to murder Clive Boustred on March 10 2003.
14
PLAINTIFF need only allege and believe said conspiracy exists in order to bring
15
the matter to trial, the judgment and consideration of said evidence being the mater to
16
Trial by Jury. PLAINTIFFS not only allege and believe this to be the case, PLAINTIFFS
17
incorporate evidence herein proving said conspiracy, see Exhibit Liberty For Life
18
Dot.Bomb Conspiracy News DVD Chapter 1: which includes the recorded claim by
19
DEFENDANT Anamaria Tichatschke (formerly Anamaria Boustred) that her lawyer Vicky
20
Parry knew all the judges in the court and could effectively do anything just prior to the
21
assassination attempt on Clive Boustred’s life; Evidence includes the seven maliciously
22
prosecuted cases filed against Clive Boustred by Santa Cruz authorities following the
23
attempted murder, with such outrageous malicious prosecution as sentencing Clive
24
Boustred to six months in jail for driving 27 miles per hour along his own private road
25
and filing a felony charge against Clive Boustred for this non-crime; ordering Clive
26
Boustred to not communicate with his children for three years; amongst a hoard of other
27
outrageous false and malicious prosecutions against Clive Boustred which shocks the
28
conscience. Said evidence is incorporated in files on the DVD in the Liberty For Life
29
v15\abuse folder which are incorporated herein by reference as if part of the whole of
30
this document.
31
Proof of the formation and operation of the conspiracy against Clive Boustred is
32
well established and irrefutable in addition to multiple wrongful acts done pursuant to the
33
conspiracy with extreme damage resulting which includes but is not limited to the
34
extreme damage to Clive Boustred’s corporations InfoTelesys, Inc. Get IT Real, Inc. and
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 103
1
other business ventures and corporations established by Clive Boustred including
2
Liberty For Life Association and the literal kidnap of Clive Boustred’s children.
3
The corporate persons who are PLAINTIFFS in this suit have been prevented
4
from conducting business as a consequence of the malicious prosecution of PLAINTIFF
5
Clive Boustred, the founder, Chairman, CEO and key person of said corporate persons.
6
PLAINTIFFs also allege and believe that other SLAP suits field against Clive
7
Boustred, including but not limited to Santa Cruz Superior Court CASE NO. FL 16028,
8
filed by DEFENDANTS JOHN A. CHRISTERSON, DENNIS J. KEHOE, LEONARD
9
DUECK, Twin Lakes Baptist Church, Inc. and MARK SPURLOCK are also a part of a
10
conspiracy to maliciously prosecute PLAINTIFFS Clive Boustred, Liberty For Life
11
Association and CopperCards and their efforts to eliminate corruption in government and
12
to expose and eliminate the New World Order conspiracy.
13
As further evidence of the blatant and obvious conspiracy against PLAINTIFFS is
14
the fact that both the State of California and the United States of America have
15
repeatedly refused to allow PLAINTIFFS to bring any of the many serious charges and
16
claims that PLAINTIFFS have backed up with substantial irrefutable evidence which
17
included admissions of guilt by some of the DEFENDANTS, to trial. However, the State
18
of California has filed as many as seven false and frivolous cases against PLAINTIFF
19
Clive Boustred an had repeatedly allowed their utterly unsubstantiated cases to be
20
brought to trial where the State gave Clive Boustred such absurdly sham trials that said
21
trials could be used as classroom examples of how utterly corrupt a trial can become
22
when the government appoints criminals to the bench and office. The Opening Briefs
23
and Habeas Corpus’ filed in said cases are incorporated herein by reference and
24
attached to the evidence CD included with this case as part of the evidence of said
25
conspiracy.
26
Additionally DEFENDANTS have displayed deliberate indifference to the rights of
27
plaintiffs, and, based upon the principles set forth in Monell v. New York City Department
28
of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658 (1978), are thereby liable for all injuries and damages
29
sustained by plaintiff as set forth in this complaint.
30
Further evidence relating to said conspiracy is incorporated in each of the other
31
Claims for Relief’s “VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS” section and
32
incorporated herein by reference.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 104
DAMAGES
1
2
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
3
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
4
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
5
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
6
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
7
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
8
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
9
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
10
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
11
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
AUTHORITIES
12
13
14
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated
herein by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
15
The elements of a civil conspiracy are8:
16
• the formation and operation of the conspiracy
17
• the wrongful act or acts done pursuant the conspiracy, and
18
• the damage resulting.
19
The making of a conspiracy does not, by itself, vest the victim with a
20
cause of action against the conspirators. Rather, the existence of a conspiracy
21
may render additional parties liable for the wrong.9
22
Therefore, in order to state a cause of action against a conspirator based
23
on the actions of another conspirator, the plaintiff must allege a cause of action
24
based on those actions10 and must allege (1) the formation and operation of the
25
conspiracy,
26
(2) the wrongful acts done pursuant to the conspiracy, and
8
Mosier v. Souther n Cal. Physicians Ins. Exch., 63 Cal. App. 4th 1022, 1048, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 550, 567 (1998).
9 Okun v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 442, 454, 175 Cal. Rptr. 157, 164, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1099 (1981). See generally ROBERT I. WEIL & IRA A. BROWN, JR., CALIFORNIA
PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL ¶¶ 6:92.10–:11 (1999).
10 Manor Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolwor th, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3d 586, 595, 206 Cal. Rptr. 37,
42–43 (1984), disapproved on other grounds, Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7
Cal. 4th 503, 521 n.10, 869 P.2d 454, 464 n.10, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 475, 485 n.10 (1994).
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 105
1
(3) the damage resulting from such acts.11
2
“A conspirator is responsible for the acts of other conspirators who have
3
left the conspiracy before he joined it, or joined after he left it; statutes of
4
limitations tolled for previous acts when each new act is done” - US v. GUEST,
5
86 S.Ct. 1170; US V.COMPAGNA, 146 F.2d 524.
6
Twelfth Claim For Relief
7
8
PLAINTIFFS:
All Plaintiffs
9
10
11
Intentional Negligence
DEFENDANTS:
All DEFENDANTS
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
12
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
13
On multiple occasions, far to numerous to mention during almost every hearing,
14
pleading or communiqué, in the above named Judicial District, the crime of
15
INTENTIONAL NEGLIGENCE, in violation of Common Law and the Constitution of the
16
United States of America, was committed by DEFENDANTS, who did willfully and
17
unlawfully commit INTENTIONAL NEGLIGENCE, DEFENDANTS having knowledge that
18
their actions were NEGLIGENT and would cause PLAINTIFFS damage.
19
Further evidence relating to said NEGLIGENCE is incorporated in each of the
20
other Claims for Relief’s “VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS” section
21
and Exhibits and incorporated herein by reference.
DAMAGES
22
23
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
24
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
25
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
26
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
27
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
28
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
29
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
11
Schick v. Bach, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1321, 1327–28, 238 Cal. Rptr. 902, 906 (1987).
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 106
1
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
2
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
3
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
4
5
6
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
7
Every person who, under color of any statute ordinance, regulation,
8
custom, or by usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
9
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
10
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
11
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
12
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. EVERY PERSON SHALL BE
13
LIABLE IN AN ACTION AT LAW SUIT IN EQUITY N0 EXCLUSION FOR
14
JUDGES BY ANY ACT OF CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42,
15
SECTION 1985 (3) If two or more persons . . . conspire. . for the purpose of
16
depriving. any person. . . of the equal protection of the laws . . . the party so
17
injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages . . .
18
RECOVERY OF DAMAGES AGAINST ANY ONE OR MORE OF THE
19
CONSPIRATORS
20
CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1986 Every person
21
who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs . . . are about to be committed,
22
and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same,
23
neglects or refuses so to do . . . shall be liable . . . EVERY PERSON SHALL BE
24
LIABLE FOR ALL DAMAGES NO EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY ANY ACT OF
25
CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1988: - UNITED
26
STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1983
27
28
29
N0
EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES
BY ANY ACT
OF
Thirteenth Claim For Relief Liable / Defamation of Character
PLAINTIFFS:
All Plaintiffs
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 107
1
DEFENDANTS:
2
IRWIN JOSEPH, Irwin Joseph
3
SAMUEL S. STEVENS, Samuel S. Stevens
4
MICHAEL E. BARTON, Michael E. Barton
5
ANAMARIA BOUSTRED/TICHATSCHKE, Anamaria Boustred/Tichatschke
6
STEFAN TICHATSCHKE, Stefan Tichatschke
7
VICKI J. PARRY, Vicki J. Parry
8
9
10
11
12
13
JOHN A. CHRISTERSON (CA State Bar 889096), John A. Christerson
DENNIS J. KEHOE (State Bar 34687), Dennis J. Kehoe
LEONARD DUECK (VP Twin Lakes Baptist Church, Inc.), Leonard Dueck
Twin Lakes Baptist Church, Inc.
MARK SPURLOCK, Mark Spurlock
JAMES WARE, James Ware
14
TRILLA E. BAHRKE, Trilla E. Bahrke
15
CHRISTOPHER M. CATTRAN, Christopher M. Cattran
16
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON, Phyllis J. Hamilton
17
18
19
20
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, County of Santa Cruz
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, State of California
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, United States of America
BILL LOCKYER, Bill Lockyer (Former California State Attorney General)
21
PAUL T HAMMERNESS, Paul T Hammerness (Deputy Attorney General)
22
TROY B. OVERTON, Troy B. Overton (Deputy Attorney General)
23
JASON M. HEATH, Jason M. Heath (Assistant County Counsel, Santa Cruz)
24
DANA MCRAE, Dana McRae (County Counsel, Santa Cruz)
25
MARK TRACY, Mark Tracy (Former Sheriff)
26
MICHAEL MACDONALD, Michael Macdonald (Deputy Sheriff)
27
M POOL, M Pool (Deputy Sheriff)
28
HEMMINGWAY, Hemmingway (deceased)
29
AMY CHRISTY, Amy Christy
30
BROZOZOWSKI, Brozozowski
31
BOB LEE, Bob Lee (Santa Cruz District Attorney)
32
STEVE DROTTAR, Steve Drottar
33
ANGELA GLASS, Angela Glass
34
RAVEN HARRIS, Raven Harris,
35
Santa Cruz Board of Directors
36
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 108
1
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
2
On multiple occasions far to numerous to mention starting on March 10, 2003
3
during almost every hearing, pleading or communiqué, in the above named Judicial
4
District, the crime of LIABLE and DEFAMATION, in violation of Common Law and the
5
Constitution of the United States of America, was committed by DEFENDANTS, who did
6
willfully and unlawfully commit LIABLE, DEFENDANTS having knowledge that their
7
actions were LIBELOUS and would cause PLAINTIFFS damage.
8
Further evidence relating to said LIBEL is incorporated in each of the other
9
Claims for Relief’s “VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS” section and
10
11
Exhibits and incorporated herein by reference.
DAMAGES
12
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
13
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
14
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
15
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
16
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
17
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
18
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
19
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
20
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
21
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
Fourteenth Claim For Relief Slander
PLAINTIFFS:
All Plaintiffs
DEFENDANTS:
29
IRWIN JOSEPH, Irwin Joseph
30
SAMUEL S. STEVENS, Samuel S. Stevens
31
MICHAEL E. BARTON, Michael E. Barton
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 109
1
ANAMARIA BOUSTRED/TICHATSCHKE, Anamaria Boustred/Tichatschke
2
STEFAN TICHATSCHKE, Stefan Tichatschke
3
VICKI J. PARRY, Vicki J. Parry
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
JOHN A. CHRISTERSON (CA State Bar 889096), John A. Christerson
DENNIS J. KEHOE (State Bar 34687), Dennis J. Kehoe
LEONARD DUECK (VP Twin Lakes Baptist Church, Inc.), Leonard Dueck
Twin Lakes Baptist Church, Inc.
MARK SPURLOCK, Mark Spurlock
JAMES WARE, James Ware
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON, Phyllis J. Hamilton
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, County of Santa Cruz
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, State of California
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, United States of America
BILL LOCKYER, Bill Lockyer (Former California State Attorney General)
15
PAUL T HAMMERNESS, Paul T Hammerness (Deputy Attorney General)
16
TROY B. OVERTON, Troy B. Overton (Deputy Attorney General)
17
JASON M. HEATH, Jason M. Heath (Assistant County Counsel, Santa Cruz)
18
DANA MCRAE, Dana McRae (County Counsel, Santa Cruz)
19
MARK TRACY, Mark Tracy (Former Sheriff)
20
MICHAEL MACDONALD, Michael Macdonald (Deputy Sheriff)
21
M POOL, M Pool (Deputy Sheriff)
22
HEMMINGWAY, Hemmingway (deceased)
23
AMY CHRISTY, Amy Christy
24
BROZOZOWSKI, Brozozowski
25
BOB LEE, Bob Lee (Santa Cruz District Attorney)
26
STEVE DROTTAR, Steve Drottar
27
ANGELA GLASS, Angela Glass
28
RAVEN HARRIS, Raven Harris,
29
Santa Cruz Board of Directors
30
31
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
32
On multiple occasions, far to numerous to mention during almost every hearing,
33
pleading or communiqué, in the above named Judicial District, the crime of LIABLE, in
34
violation of Common Law, was committed by DEFENDANTS, who did willfully and
35
unlawfully commit LIABLE, DEFENDANTS having knowledge that their actions were
36
LIBELOUS and would cause PLAINTIFFS damage.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 110
1
Further evidence relating to said SLANDER is incorporated in each of the other
2
Claims for Relief’s “VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS” section and
3
Exhibits and incorporated herein by reference.
4
DAMAGES
5
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
6
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
7
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
8
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
9
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
10
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
11
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
12
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
13
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
14
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
15
16
17
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
18
Fifteenth Claim For Relief
19
Emotional Distress, Fraud/Deceit, Wrongful Civil Proceedings /
20
Abuse Of Process
21
PLAINTIFFS:
22
23
Intentional/Negligent Infliction of
All PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS:
24
VICKI J. PARRY, Vicki J. Parry
25
ANAMARIA BOUSTRED/TICHATSCHKE, Anamaria Boustred/Tichatschke
26
IRWIN JOSEPH, Irwin Joseph
27
SAMUEL S. STEVENS, Samuel S. Stevens
28
MICHAEL E. BARTON, Michael E. Barton
29
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 111
1
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
2
On or about February 20, 2003 and other dates, in the above named Judicial
3
District, the crime of INTENTIONAL/NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
4
DISTRESS and or FRAUD/DECEIT and or WRONGFUL CIVIL PROCEEDINGS /
5
ABUSE OF PROCESS, in violation of Common Law and the Constitution of The United
6
States of America, was committed by DEFENDANT/S listed above, who did willfully and
7
unlawfully commit said crimes.
8
On or about February 20, 2003, in violation of Rules 7-103 and 7-108 of the
9
Rules of Professional Responsibility and Conduct of The State Bar of California and
10
without any basis for an urgency and without giving proper notice in violation of section §
11
240 of California’s Family Code and also without any legal basis, DEFENDANT Vicki J.
12
Parry called an unethical and unlawful ex parte hearing to “clarify” an order prohibiting
13
Petitioner Clive Boustred’s former personal assistant and his wife’s lover, DEFENDANT
14
Stefan Tichatschke, from contact with RCB and WFB. Vicki J. Parry unlawfully secured
15
a void Order unlawfully granting Stefan Tichatschke the right to have contact with
16
Petitioner’s RCB and WFB.
17
On repeated occasions, DEFENDANTS Samuel S. Stevens, Art Danner
18
(Deceased), Michael E. Barton, Trilla E. Bahrke, William M. Kelsay, Irwin Joseph, Phyllis
19
J. Hamilton, DEFENDANT, Michael Macdonald, Amy Christy, M Pool, Mark Tracy,
20
Hemmingway (Deceased), Brozozowski, Griffin, Steven Drottar, Bob Lee, Bill Doyle,
21
Christopher M. Cattran, Anamaria Boustred, Steffan Tichatschke, Genworth Financial,
22
Gregor Guy Smith, Robert Frandeen, Paul Meltzer, Vicki J. Parry, Jason M. Heath,
23
Raven Harris, Angela Glass, and Jon Doe’s 1 to n. Intentionally and/or Negligently
24
Inflicted Emotional Distress and committed Fraud and engaged in Racketeering against
25
DEFENDANTS.
26
DEFENDANTS' conduct as described herein was not only outrageous it was
27
intentional and malicious, or at the least grossly negligent, exhibiting a reckless
28
disregard for plaintiffs' rights and conspiring against plaintiffs, causing plaintiffs to suffer
29
humiliation, mental anguish, financial burdens, excessive court hearing and need to
30
answer false charges, stress and emotional and physical distress and plaintiffs were
31
injured financially and in mind and body all to their damage in amounts according to
32
proof. DEFENDANTS owed a duty to plaintiffs not to cause the harm as herein alleged.
33
DEFENDANTS breached said duty.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 112
1
The aforementioned acts of DEFENDANTS were willful, wanton, malicious and
2
oppressive and justify the awarding of exemplary and punitive damages in amounts
3
according to proof.
4
Further evidence relating to said crimes are incorporated in each of the other
5
Claims for Relief’s “VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS” section and
6
Exhibits and incorporated herein by reference.
7
DAMAGES
8
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
9
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
10
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
11
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
12
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
13
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
14
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
15
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
16
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
17
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
18
19
20
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
21
Sixteenth Claim For Relief
22
Of Process
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
Wrongful Civil Proceedings / Abuse
PLAINTIFFS:
Clive Boustred, RCB and WFB
DEFENDANTS:
DENNIS J. KEHOE (State Bar 34687), Dennis J. Kehoe
Dennis Kehoe Law Corp.
JOHN A. CHRISTERSON (CA State Bar 889096), John A. Christerson
LEONARD DUECK (VP Twin Lakes Baptist Church, Inc.), Leonard Dueck
Twin Lakes Baptist Church, Inc.
MARK SPURLOCK, Mark Spurlock
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 113
1
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
2
On or about October 18, 2007 and October 31, 2007 (Halloween) and on other
3
occasions, in the above named Judicial District, the crime of WRONGFUL CIVIL
4
PROCEEDINGS / ABUSE OF PROCESS, in violation of Common Law and the
5
Constitution of the United States of America and the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th,
6
13th, 14th Amendments thereto, was committed by DEFENDANT/S listed above, who did
7
willfully and unlawfully commit said crimes and civil violations.
8
DEFENDANTS engaged in the blatantly wrongful institution of civil proceedings
9
by filing an absurd case against Respondent Clive Boustred where DEFENDANTS
10
sought to prohibit Clive Boustred from communicating with his own children RCB and
11
WFB and where DEFENDANTS did prohibit Clive Boustred from attending or
12
communicating with approximately four thousand members of the Church where Clive
13
Boustred is a member.
14
DEFENDANTS have also caused other significant damage to Clive Boustred, RCB and
15
WFB, including SLANDER, LIBEL, GRAND THEFT AUTO, MALICIOUS PROSECTION,
16
PARENTAL ALIANATION and KIDNAP, which is also alleged and charged herein.
17
DEFENDANTS actions were malicious and intentional,
DAMAGES
18
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
19
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
20
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
21
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
22
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
23
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
24
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
25
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
26
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
27
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
28
29
30
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 114
Violation of U.S. Const. 1st
1
Seventeenth Claim For Relief
2
Amendment Freedom of Speech
3
U.S. Constitution, Amendment II: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
4
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bare arms, shall not be
5
infringed.”
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
PLAINTIFFS:
Clive Boustred, RCB and WFB
DEFENDANTS:
DENNIS J. KEHOE (State Bar 34687), Dennis J. Kehoe
Dennis Kehoe Law Corp.
JOHN A. CHRISTERSON (CA State Bar 889096), John A. Christerson
LEONARD DUECK (VP Twin Lakes Baptist Church, Inc.), Leonard Dueck
Twin Lakes Baptist Church, Inc.
MARK SPURLOCK, Mark Spurlock
County of Santa Cruz
State of California
Judge Paul R. Burdick
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
20
On or about October 18, 2007, John A. Christerson (CA State Bar 889096),
21
Dennis J. Kehoe (State Bar 34687), Leonard Dueck (VP Twin Lakes Baptist Church,
22
Inc.) filed a “CH-100 Request for Order to Stop Harassment” seeking the following: That
23
“Clive Boustred is not allowed to contact or communicate with any students and/or
24
families and/or employees of Twin Lakes Christian School or Twin Lakes Church by
25
telephone, letter, electronic communication or otherwise.”.
26
violation of Petitioner Clive Boustred, RCB and WFB’s First Amendment rights. On
27
October 18, 2007, Judge Paul R. Burdick issued an order restricting Petitioner Clive
28
Boustred from communicating with four thousand members of the Church where Clive
29
Boustred is a member or from entering the property of said Church. Twin Lakes Baptist
30
Church, Inc. filed to have the case heard on Halloween. The Case was brought before
31
the Honorable Judge Robert Atack. The court found insufficient evidence to support the
32
issuance of any restraining order and the order restraining Clive Boustred was dissolved.
Said lawsuit was filed in
33
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 115
1
DAMAGES
2
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
3
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
4
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
5
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
6
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
7
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
8
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
9
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
10
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
11
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
12
13
14
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
15
Eighteenth Claim For Relief Violation of U.S. Const. 2nd
16
Amendment [Right to Bare Arms]
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
PLAINTIFFS:
Clive Boustred
DEFENDANTS:
DENNIS J. KEHOE (State Bar 34687), Dennis J. Kehoe
Dennis Kehoe Law Corp.
JOHN A. CHRISTERSON (CA State Bar 889096), John A. Christerson
LEONARD DUECK (VP Twin Lakes Baptist Church, Inc.), Leonard Dueck
Twin Lakes Baptist Church, Inc.
MARK SPURLOCK, Mark Spurlock
County of Santa Cruz
State of California
Judge Paul R. Burdick
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
31
On or about October 18, 2007, John A. Christerson (CA State Bar 889096),
32
Dennis J. Kehoe (State Bar 34687), Leonard Dueck (VP Twin Lakes Baptist Church,
33
Inc.) filed a “CH-100 Request for Order to Stop Harassment” seeking the following: That
34
“Clive Boustred is not allowed to contact or communicate with any students and/or
35
families and/or employees of Twin Lakes Christian School or Twin Lakes Church by
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 116
1
telephone, letter, electronic communication or otherwise.”.
2
violation of Petitioner Clive Boustred’s Second Amendment rights.
3
2007, Judge Paul R. Burdick issued an order violating Petitioner Clive Boustred’s 2nd
4
Amendment Rights by ordering, without any cause what so ever the following:
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
Said lawsuit was filed in
On October 18,
“(7) No Guns or Other Firearms
You cannot own, possess, have, buy or try to buy, receive or try to receive, or in any
other way get a gun or firearm.”
“(8) Turn in or Sell Guns or Firearms
You must:
. Sell to a licensed gun dealer or turn in to police any guns or firearms that you possess
or control. This must be don within 24 hours of being served with this order.
. File a receipt with the court within 48 hours of receiving this order that proves guns
have been turned in or sold. (You may use Form CH-145 for this)
“Warning and Notices to the Restrained Person in (2) [Clive Boustred] You
Cannot Have Guns or Firearms
You cannot own, have, possess, buy or try to buy, receive or try to receive, or otherwise
get a gun while this Order is in effect. If you do, you can go to jail and pay a $1,000 fine.
You must sell to a licensed gun dealer or turn in to police any guns or firearms that you
have or control in accordance with item (8) above. The court will require you to prove
that you did so. If you do not obey this Order, you can be charged with a crime.”
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
Nineteenth Claim For Relief Conversion
PLAINTIFFS:
Clive Boustred
DEFENDANTS:
Santa Cruz Deputy Sheriff Griffin
Santa Cruz Sheriffs
Twin Lakes Baptist Church, Inc.
The County of Santa Cruz
The State of California
The Attorney General of The State of California,
John Does 1-n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
36
On or about September 9, 2003 Deputy Griffin, the County of Santa Cruz and
37
State of California and John Does 1-n committed CONVERSION by unlawfully taking
38
Clive Boustred’s vehicle from the Twin Lakes Church’s parking lot and County and
39
Sheriff employees did repeatedly refuse to return said vehicle and did unlawfully extort
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 117
1
money in exchange for said vehicle from Clive Boustred.
Said DEFENDANTS did
2
willfully and unlawfully commit said crimes in violation of Common Law and United
3
States Constitution and the 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th and 14th Amendments.
DAMAGES
4
5
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
6
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S sustained damage in a sum to be determined per proof,
7
including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish, lost time, lost business and
8
prosperity, damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the
9
pursuit of happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of
10
basic liberties and the fees and fines the Sheriffs and their agents demanded PLAINTIFF
11
pay to recover his vehicle which the Sheriffs stole with the cooperation of Twin Lakes
12
Baptist Church, Inc.
13
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
14
15
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
16
17
Twentieth Claim For Relief Disparagement Of Business
18
Reputation Or Property, Interference With Business Relations,
19
Pure Economic Loss, Intentional Interference With Prospective
20
Economic Advantage,
21
PLAINTIFFS:
22
All Plaintiffs
23
DEFENDANTS:
24
25
All DEFENDANTS
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
26
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
27
On or about multiple dates between March 10, 2003 and present, in the above
28
named Judicial District, the crime of DISPARAGEMENT OF BUSINESS REPUTATION
29
OR PROPERTY, INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS RELATIONS, PURE ECONOMIC
30
LOSS,
31
ADVANTAGE, in violation of Common Law and the Constitution of United States of
INTENTIONAL
INTERFERENCE
WITH
PROSPECTIVE
ECONOMIC
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 118
1
America and the 1st, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 14th Amendments, was committed by
2
DEFENDANT/S listed above, who did willfully and unlawfully commit said crime/action
3
DAMAGES
4
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
5
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
6
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
7
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
8
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
9
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
10
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
11
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
12
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
13
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
Twenty-first Claim For Relief
Treason – James Ware
PLAINTIFFS:
All PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANT:
JAMES WARE, James Ware
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
23
On multiple occasions, including on or about March 19, 2007; April 9, 2007; April
24
25, 2007, May 7, 2007 and June 4, 2007, in the above named Judicial District, the crime
25
of TREASON, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1, a felony, was committed by JAMES
26
WARE, who did willfully and unlawfully commit TREASON.
27
knowledge of the law and the fact that PLAINTIFFS in U.S. District Court San Jose case
28
number C07 00391 had filed said case under the 11th Amendment in which said case
29
was filed not only against JAMES WARE’s employer but also his colleagues and that
30
said case was filed by citizens of another State across state borders against the State
31
and thus in accordance with not only due process, but also in accordance with the 11th
JAMES WARE having
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 119
1
Amendment of the United States Constitution JAMES WARE had no Judicial power in
2
said case and JAMES WARE thus exceeded subject matter jurisdiction by making
3
rulings in a case in which Judicial power was clearly prohibited JAMES WARE acted
4
under color of state or territorial law.
5
U.S. Constitution, Eleventh Amendment: “The Judicial power of the United States
6
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
7
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
8
of any Foreign State.”
9
JAMES WARE did Breach his Duty and exceeded subject matter jurisdiction in
10
violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1. “Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have
11
jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason.” U.S. v. Will, 449
12
U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 .Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
13
Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)
14
Let the JURY NOTE: JAMES WARE proceeded to not only assume jurisdiction
15
when he had none, he went on to ignore extremely serious felonies committed against
16
PLAINTIFFS including false arrest, assault, attempted murder, kidnap and JAMES
17
WARE allowed the continued kidnap of RCB and WFB. JAMES WARE’s actions were
18
willful and malicious.
19
Let the JURY also NOTE: In a case heard before PLAINTIFFS case on or about
20
April 9, 2007 in which JAMES WARE had subject matter jurisdiction, JAMES WARE in
21
that case claimed he had no subject matter jurisdiction
22
DAMAGES
23
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
24
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
25
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
26
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
27
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
28
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
29
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
30
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
31
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
32
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 120
1
2
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
3
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
4
Twenty-second Claim For Relief
5
Ware
6
7
8
9
10
Misprision Of Felony – James
PLAINTIFFS:
All PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANT:
JAMES WARE, James Ware
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
11
On or about January 18, 2007; January 25, 2007; February 26, 2007; March 19,
12
2007; April 9, 2007, April 25, 2007; May 7, 2007 and June 4, 2007, in the above named
13
Judicial District, the crime of MISPRISION OF FELONY, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
14
SECTION 4, a felony, was committed by JAMES WARE, who did willfully and unlawfully
15
commit MISPRISION OF FELONY, JAMES WARE having knowledge and evidence of
16
the commission multiple felonies cognizable by a court of the United States committed
17
against Plaintiffs, said JAMES WARE did conceal and did not make as soon as possible
18
known the same to some judge of other person in civil or military authority under the
19
United States, JAMES WARE did Breach his Duty and acted under color of state or
20
territorial law. Said multiple felonies committed against Plaintiffs being most grievous
21
having been clearly stated and identified in pleading before JAMES WARE, said felonies
22
including but not limited to false arrest, assault, attempted murder, kidnap and treason.
23
Substantial information having been placed before JAMES WARE showing said
24
felonies having been committed by JAMES WARE in U.S. District Court San Jose case
25
number C07 00391.
26
DAMAGES
27
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
28
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
29
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
30
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
31
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 121
1
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
2
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
3
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
4
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
5
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
6
7
8
9
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
Twenty-third Claim For Relief
Misprision Of Felony –
10
Attorney General & Santa Cruz County Sheriffs, Counsel &
11
Board
12
13
14
PLAINTIFFS:
All PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS:
15
BILL LOCKYER, Bill Lockyer (Former California State Attorney General)
16
PAUL T HAMMERNESS, Paul T Hammerness (Deputy Attorney General)
17
TROY B. OVERTON, Troy B. Overton (Deputy Attorney General)
18
SAMUEL S. STEVENS, Samuel S. Stevens
19
MICHAEL E. BARTON, Michael E. Barton
20
ART DANNER, Art Danner (Deceased)
21
ROBERT B. ATACK, Robert B. Atack
22
JON N. ANTON, Jon N. Anton
23
JASON M. HEATH, Jason M. Heath (Assistant County Counsel, Santa Cruz)
24
DANA MCRAE, Dana McRae (County Counsel, Santa Cruz)
25
MARK TRACY, Mark Tracy (Former Sheriff)
26
MICHAEL MACDONALD, Michael Macdonald (Deputy Sheriff)
27
M POOL, M Pool (Deputy Sheriff)
28
HEMMINGWAY, Hemmingway (deceased)
29
AMY CHRISTY, Amy Christy
30
BROZOZOWSKI, Brozozowski
31
BOB LEE, Bob Lee (Santa Cruz District Attorney)
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 122
1
STEVE DROTTAR, Steve Drottar
2
ANGELA GLASS, Angela Glass
3
RAVEN HARRIS, Raven Harris,
4
Santa Cruz Board of Directors DDDD
5
John Does 1 to n.
6
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
7
On multiple dates starting on or about March 10, 2003 to present, in the above
8
named Judicial District, the crime of MISPRISION OF FELONY, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
9
SECTION 4, a felony, was committed by DEFENDANTS, who did willfully and unlawfully
10
commit MISPRISION OF FELONY, DEFENDANTS having knowledge and evidence of
11
the commission multiple felonies cognizable by a court of the United States committed
12
against Plaintiffs, said DEFENDANTS did conceal and did not make as soon as possible
13
known the same to some judge of other person in civil or military authority under the
14
United States, DEFENDANTS did Breach their Duty and acted under color of state or
15
territorial law. Said multiple felonies committed against Plaintiffs being most grievous
16
having been clearly stated and identified in pleadings before DEFENDANTS, said
17
felonies including but not limited to false arrest, assault, attempted murder, kidnap and
18
treason.
19
20
21
Substantial information having been placed before DEFENDANTS showing said
felonies having been committed by DEFENDANTS in multiple court cases.
DAMAGES
22
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
23
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
24
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
25
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
26
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
27
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
28
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
29
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
30
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
31
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 123
1
2
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
3
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
4
Twenty-fourth Claim For Relief
5
Phyllis J. Hamilton
6
7
8
9
10
Misprision Of Felony –
PLAINTIFFS:
All PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS:
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON, Phyllis J. Hamilton
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
11
On or about July 5, 2005, May 6, 2005, August 10, 2005, September 13, 2005
12
and December 5 , 2005 in the above named Judicial District, the crime of MISPRISION
13
OF FELONY, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SECTION 4, a felony, was committed by PHYLLIS
14
J. HAMILTON, who did willfully and unlawfully commit MISPRISION OF FELONY,
15
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON having knowledge and evidence of the commission multiple
16
felonies cognizable by a court of the United States committed against Plaintiffs, said
17
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON did conceal and did not make as soon as possible known the
18
same to some judge of other person in civil or military authority under the United States,
19
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON did Breach her Duty and acted under color of state or territorial
20
law. Said multiple felonies committed against Plaintiffs being most grievous having been
21
clearly stated and identified in pleadings before PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON, said felonies
22
including but not limited to attempted murder, kidnap and treason.
23
Substantial information having been placed before PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON
24
showing said felonies having been committed by DEFENDANTS in U.S. District Court
25
San Jose case number C0500995 - PJH.
26
DAMAGES
27
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
28
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
29
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
30
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
31
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 124
1
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
2
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
3
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
4
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
5
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
6
7
8
9
10
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
Twenty-fifth Claim For Relief
B. Overton
11
12
PLAINTIFFS:
All PLAINTIFFS
13
14
Misprision Of Felony – Troy
DEFENDANTS:
TROY B OVERTON, Troy B Overton
15
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
16
On or about August 8, 2006 and on other dates in the above named Judicial
17
District, the crime of MISPRISION OF FELONY, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SECTION 4, a
18
felony, was committed by TROY B. OVERTON, who did willfully and unlawfully commit
19
MISPRISION OF FELONY, TROY B. OVERTON having knowledge and evidence of the
20
commission multiple felonies cognizable by a court of the United States committed
21
against Plaintiffs, said TROY B. OVERTON did conceal and did not make as soon as
22
possible known the same to some judge of other person in civil or military authority
23
under the United States, TROY B. OVERTON did Breach her Duty and acted under
24
color of state or territorial law. Said multiple felonies committed against Plaintiffs being
25
most grievous having been clearly stated and identified in pleadings before TROY B.
26
OVERTON, said felonies including but not limited to attempted murder, kidnap and
27
treason.
28
Substantial information having been placed before TROY B. OVERTON showing
29
said felonies having been committed by DEFENDANTS in U.S. District Court San Jose
30
case number C0500996.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 125
1
DAMAGES
2
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
3
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
4
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
5
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
6
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
7
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
8
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
9
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
10
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
11
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
12
13
14
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
15
Twenty-sixth Claim For Relief
16
Schroeder
17
18
19
20
21
Misprision Of Felony – M. M.
PLAINTIFFS:
All PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS:
M. M. SCHROEDER, M. M. Schroeder
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
22
On of about February 8, 2007 in United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
23
District case number 06-89076 in the above named Judicial District, the crime of
24
MISPRISION OF FELONY, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SECTION 4, a felony, was
25
committed by M. M. SCHROEDER (Chief Judge), who did willfully and unlawfully commit
26
MISPRISION OF FELONY, M. M. SCHROEDER having knowledge and evidence of the
27
commission multiple felonies cognizable by a court of the United States committed
28
against Plaintiffs, said M. M. SCHROEDER did conceal and did not make as soon as
29
possible known the same to some judge of other person in civil or military authority
30
under the United States, M. M. SCHROEDER did Breach her Duty and acted under
31
color of state or territorial law. Said multiple felonies committed against Plaintiffs being
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 126
1
most grievous having been clearly stated and identified in pleadings before M. M.
2
SCHROEDER, said felonies including but not limited to attempted murder, kidnap and
3
treason.
4
Substantial information having been placed before M. M. SCHROEDER showing
5
said felonies having been committed by DEFENDANTS in U.S. District Court San Jose
6
case number C0500996.
7
DAMAGES
8
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
9
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
10
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
11
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
12
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
13
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
14
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
15
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
16
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
17
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
18
19
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
20
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
21
Twenty-seventh Claim For Relief
22
TRILLA E. BAHRKE
23
24
25
Misprision Of Felony –
PLAINTIFFS:
All PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS:
26
TRILLA E. BAHRKE, Trilla E. Bahrke
27
CHRISTOPHER M. CATTRAN, Christopher M. Cattran
28
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
29
On multiple occasions including on or about September 3, 2003, September 3,
30
2003 and in the Judicial District of Placer County California, the crime of MISPRISION
31
OF FELONY, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SECTION 4, a felony, was committed by TRILLA
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 127
1
E. BAHRKE and CHRISTOPHER M. CATTRAN, who did willfully and unlawfully commit
2
MISPRISION OF FELONY, TRILLA E. BAHRKE and CHRISTOPHER M. CATTRAN
3
having knowledge and evidence of the commission multiple felonies cognizable by a
4
court of the United States committed against Plaintiffs, said TRILLA E. BAHRKE and
5
CHRISTOPHER M. CATTRAN did conceal and did not make as soon as possible known
6
the same to some judge of other person in civil or military authority under the United
7
States, TRILLA E. BAHRKE and CHRISTOPHER M. CATTRAN did Breach their Duty
8
and acted under color of state or territorial law. Said multiple felonies committed against
9
Plaintiffs being most grievous having been clearly stated and identified in pleadings
10
before TRILLA E. BAHRKE and CHRISTOPHER M. CATTRAN, said felonies including
11
but not limited to attempted murder, kidnap and treason.
12
Substantial information having been placed before TRILLA E. BAHRKE and
13
CHRISTOPHER M. CATTRAN showing said felonies having been committed by
14
DEFENDANTS in SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR
15
THE COUNTY OF PLACER Case No. 72-002045
16
TRILLA E. BAHRKE and CHRISTOPHER M. CATTRAN not only intentionally
17
ignored and concealed serious felonies that were committed against PETITIONERS,
18
TRILLA E. BAHRKE and CHRISTOPHER M. CATTRAN jointly actively engaged in
19
maliciously prosecuting PETITIONERS under the color of law.
20
DAMAGES
21
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
22
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
23
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
24
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
25
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
26
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
27
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
28
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
29
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
30
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
31
32
33
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 128
1
Twenty-eighth Claim For Relief
2
Alienation of Parental, Kidnap – William Kelsay
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Misprision Of Felony,
PLAINTIFFS:
All PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS:
WILLIAM M. KELSAY, William M. Kelsay
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
HRG ON OSC RE REQUEST TO TAKE CHILDREN TO FAMILY REUNION
FILED BY CLIVE BOUSTRED
04/14/2006
11
12
13
PETITIONERS REQUEST TO TAKE THE MINORS TO PENNSYLVANIA FOR A
FAMILY REUNION IS DENIED.
14
15
On or about April 14, 2006, in the above named Judicial District, the crime of
16
MISPRISION OF FELONY, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SECTION 4, a felony, was
17
committed by WILLIAM M. KELSAY, who did willfully and unlawfully commit
18
MISPRISION OF FELONY, WILLIAM M. KELSAY having knowledge and evidence of
19
the commission multiple felonies cognizable by a court of the United States committed
20
against Plaintiffs, said WILLIAM M. KELSAY did conceal and did not make as soon as
21
possible known the same to some judge of other person in civil or military authority
22
under the United States, WILLIAM M. KELSAY did Breach his Duty and acted under
23
color of state or territorial law. Said multiple felonies committed against Plaintiffs being
24
most grievous having been clearly stated and identified in pleading before DEFENDANT,
25
said felonies including but not limited to attempted murder, kidnap and treason.
26
Substantial information having been placed before DEFENDANT showing said
27
felonies having been committed by DEFENDANTS in U.S. District Court San Jose case
28
number C05 00996 JF RS.
29
DAMAGES
30
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
31
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
32
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 129
1
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
2
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
3
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
4
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
5
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
6
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
7
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
8
9
10
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
11
Twenty-ninth Claim For Relief
12
Almquist
13
14
15
16
17
Misprision Of Felony – Jeff
PLAINTIFFS:
All PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS:
JEFF ALMQUIST, Jeff Almquist
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
18
On or about July 4, 2007, in Santa Cruz Superior Court PETITIONER Clive
19
Boustred filed “MOTION TO OBTAIN COPIES OF GOVERNMENT EXHIBITS” for the
20
purpose of prosecuting felonies committed against Clive Boustred, and “ORDERS TO
21
SHOW CAUSE” and “MOTIONS TO DISMISS CASE.” in Santa Cruz Superior Court
22
Case F 06858, in the above named Judicial District, the hearings were brought before
23
Judge JEFF ALMQUIST who did under the color of law commit the crime of
24
MISPRISION OF FELONY, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SECTION 4, a felony.
25
ALMQUIST, who did willfully and unlawfully under the color of law commit MISPRISION
26
OF FELONY, JEFF ALMQUIST having knowledge and evidence of the commission
27
multiple felonies cognizable by a court of the United States committed against Plaintiffs,
28
said JEFF ALMQUIST did conceal and did not make as soon as possible known the
29
same to some judge of other person in civil or military authority under the United States,
30
JEFF ALMQUIST did Breach his Duty and acted under color of state or territorial law
31
and did conceal said felonies. JEFF ALMQUIST not only committed MISPRISON OF
JEFF
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 130
1
FELONY he actively refused to dismiss a clearly fraudulent and malicious case when
2
clear and convincing evidence of said fraud was put before him. Said multiple felonies
3
committed against Plaintiffs being most grievous, including but not limited to attempted
4
murder, kidnap and treason. JEFF ALQUIST not only breached his duty un 18 U.S.C.
5
Section 4, he refused to allow PLAINTIFF the right to obtain copies of government
6
exhibits used in a sham trial against PLAINTIFF so that PLAINTIFF could prosecute the
7
Deputy Sheriff who had attempted to murder PLAINTIFF Clive Boustred and who nearly
8
murdered PLAINTIFFS RCB and WFB.
9
Substantial information having been placed before JEFF ALMQUIST showing
10
said felonies having been committed by DEFENDANTS in Santa Cruz Superior Court
11
Case F 06858.
12
DAMAGES
13
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
14
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
15
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
16
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
17
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
18
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
19
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
20
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
21
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
22
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
23
24
25
26
27
28
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
Thirtieth Claim For Relief
Burglary
PLAINTIFFS:
Clive Boustred
29
DEFENDANTS:
30
Santa Cruz Sheriffs
31
ADT Alarm Company
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 131
1
John Does 1 to n.
2
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
3
On or about November 2003, in the above named Judicial District, the crime of
4
BURGULARY, in violation of Common Law and the Constitution of the United States of
5
America and the 4th, 5th and 14th Amendments there to and PC § 62, a felony, was
6
committed by Sheriffs who did break into Clive Boustred’s home and unlawfully search
7
Clive Boustred’s home without warrant, said DEFENDANTS did willfully and unlawfully
8
under the color of law commit said crimes against PLAINTIFFS. The picture opposite
9
shows how the Sheriffs ripped up PLAINTIFFS
10
attic when they burgled and illegally searched
11
PLAINTIFFS home.
DAMAGES
12
13
As a proximate consequence of the willful
14
and
malicious
actions
15
PLAINTIFF’S
16
damage in a sum to be determined per proof,
17
including severe and extreme emotional stress
18
and anguish, parental alienation, lost time, lost
19
business
20
prosperity, damaged reputation including both
21
slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
22
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of
23
general welfare, and the loss of basic liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own
24
children!
have
of
sustained
investments,
lost
DEFENDANTS,
extraordinary
business
and
25
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
26
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
27
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
28
29
30
31
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
§ 62 Simple Burglary
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 132
1
Simple burglary is the unauthorized entering of any dwelling, vehicle, watercraft,
2
or other structure, movable or immovable, with the intent to commit a felony or any theft
3
therein, other than as set forth in section 60.
4
5
6
7
Thirty-first Claim For Relief Armed Robbery
PLAINTIFFS:
Clive Boustred, RCB and WFB
DEFENDANTS:
8
MICHAEL MACDONALD, Michael Macdonald,
9
AMY CHRISTY, Amy Christy,
10
11
BROZOZOWSKI, Brozozowski
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
12
On or about March 10, 2003, in the above named Judicial District, the crime of
13
ARMED ROBBERY, in violation of Common Law and the Constitution of the United
14
States of America and the 4th, 5th and 14th Amendments there to and PC § 64, a felony,
15
was committed by above listed DEFENDANTS, who did willfully and unlawfully under the
16
color of law commit said crimes against PLAINTIFFS and did rob RCB and WFB from
17
Clive Boustred.
18
DAMAGES
19
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
20
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
21
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
22
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
23
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
24
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
25
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
26
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
27
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
28
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
29
30
31
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 133
1
§ 64 Armed robbery
2
A.
Armed robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to another
3
from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by using force
4
or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon.
Whoever commits…
5
B.
6
*FELONY
7
Thirty-second Claim For Relief
8
PLAINTIFFS:
9
ALL PLAINTIFFS
10
Extortion
DEFENDANTS:
11
MICHAEL E. BARTON, Michael E. Barton
12
MARK TRACY, Mark Tracy (Former Sheriff)
13
STEVE DROTTAR, Steve Drottar
14
AMY CHRISTY, Amy Christy
15
SAMUEL S. STEVENS, Samuel S. Stevens
16
ART DANNER, Art Danner (deceased)
17
ANAMARIA BOUSTRED/TICHATSCHKE, Anamaria Boustred/Tichatschke
18
STEFAN TICHATSCHKE, Stefan Tichatschke
19
VICKI J. PARRY, Vicki J. Parry
20
21
22
23
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, County of Santa Cruz
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, State of California
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, United States of America
MICHAEL MACDONALD, Michael Macdonald (Deputy Sheriff)
24
M POOL, M Pool (Deputy Sheriff)
25
HEMMINGWAY, Hemmingway (deceased)
26
BROZOZOWSKI, Brozozowski
27
BOB LEE, Bob Lee (Santa Cruz District Attorney)
28
IRWIN JOSEPH, Irwin Joseph
29
30
31
TRILLA E. BAHRKE, Trilla E. Bahrke
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
32
On or about March 10, 2003, March 12, 2003, March 13, 2003 and on multiple
33
dates up to present, in the above named Judicial District, the crime of EXTORTION, in
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
violation of Common Law and the Constitution of the United States of America and the
2
4th, 5th and 14th Amendments there to and PC § 66, a felony, was committed by above
3
listed DEFENDANTS, who did willfully and unlawfully under the color of law commit said
4
crimes against PLAINTIFFS in order to extort silence and immunity from damages by
5
threatening Clive Boustred with false arrest, kidnap and hostage taking of Clive
6
Boustred’s children RCB and WFB, with violence by placing Clive Boustred amongst the
7
most violent criminals while holding Clive Boustred under false arrest amongst other
8
outrageous crimes.
DAMAGES
9
10
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
11
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
12
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
13
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
14
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
15
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
16
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
17
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
18
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
19
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
20
21
22
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
23
§ 66 Extortion
24
Extortion is the communication of threats to another with the intention thereby to
25
obtain anything of value or any acquittance, advantage, or immunity of any description.
26
The following kinds of threats shall be sufficient to constitute extortion:
27
28
29
30
31
32
(1)
A threat to do any unlawful injury to the person or property of the
individual threatened or of any member or of any person held dear to him;
(2)
A threat to accuse the individual threatened or any member of this family
or any other person held dear to him of any crime;
(3)
A threat to expose or impute any deformity or disgrace to the individual
threatened or to any member of his family or to any other person held dear to him;
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
2
(4)
A threat to expose any secret affecting the individual threatened or any
member of his family or any other person held dear to him;
3
(5)
4
Thirty-third Claim For Relief
5
6
7
8
9
10
A threat to do any other harm
Public Nuisance
PLAINTIFFS:
All Plaintiffs
DEFENDANTS:
All DEFENDANTS
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
11
On or about March 10, 2003 and repeatedly up to the present time, in the above
12
named Judicial District, the crime of PRIVATE AND PUBLIC NUISANCE, in violation of
13
Common Law and the Constitution of the United States of America and the 1st, 2nd, 4th,
14
5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 13th, 14th Amendments thereto, was committed by
15
DEFENDANT/S listed above, who did willfully and unlawfully commit said crimes and
16
civil violations.
17
A suit for nuisance may be supported by any of the three DEFENDANTS mental
18
states: (1) intentional interference with PLAINTIFFS rights; (2) negligence; or (3)
19
abnormally dangerous activity or other conduct giving rise to strict liability.
20
From a Public Nuisance perspective, the harm caused to the public at large is
21
both the threat of violence from Sheriffs. DEFENDANTS actions in bringing outrageous
22
lawsuits against Clive Boustred imposes a general and significant public nuisance and
23
threat at large, imposed on each and every individual who simply lives within California.
24
The actions by DEFENDANTS are legal terrorist threats against any person who simply
25
gets divorced or lives in California, DEFENDANTS behavior is baseless and immoral
26
and not only terrorizes the public at large but kills any persons desire to get married.
27
The crime committed by DEFENDANTS amongst other crimes is Malicious Prosecution.
28
From a Private Nuisance perspective, DEFENDANTS imposed an unreasonable
29
interference with Clive Boustred, RCB and WCB on their land. By illegally entering and
30
shooting at PLAINTIFFS which is abnormally dangerous, the DEFENDANTS forced the
31
destruction of business Clive Boustred ran and the complete elimination of PLAINTIFS
32
right to Justice, ensuring domestic conflict, eliminating PLSINTIFFS common defence,
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
and demoting PLAINTIFFS general Welfare, and the Blessings of Liberty and eliminating
2
PLAINTIFFS Posterity.
3
established to eliminate, DEFENDANTS are the essence and epitome of a PUBLIC and
4
PRIVATE NUISANCE
DEFENDANTS represent everything the Constitution was
5
It is alleged that DEFENDANTS actions were intentional as they previously
6
engaged in abnormally violent activity and they imposed a highly likely abnormally
7
dangerous situation. The violence caused by DEFENDANTS not only destroyed the
8
basic right to enjoy basic liberty on ones’ own land, the DEFENDANTS have made Clive
9
Boustred, and the public at large fearful of enjoying their lives free of violent and
10
intrusive government intervention.
11
DAMAGES
12
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
13
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
14
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
15
parental alienation, lost time, lost business and prosperity, damaged reputation including
16
both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of happiness, loss of domestic
17
tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic liberties such as enjoying life
18
with one’s own children!
19
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
20
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
21
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
Thirty-fourth Claim For Relief
Racketeering
PLAINTIFFS:
All Plaintiffs
DEFENDANTS:
All DEFENDANTS
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
2
On or about March 10, 2003 and to present DEFENDANTS engaged in
3
racketeering in the divorce and prisons industry by acting under the color of law so as to
4
cause conflict that creates revenue for said DEFENDANTS, said behavior of Sheriffs,
5
Judges, DA’s, Lawyers, and other State employees and private parties reflects an
6
overall pattern and practice that is willful and unlawful and malicious and intended to
7
generate personal gain for DEFENDANTS. The RACKETEERING in the legal industry
8
and prison industrial complex is illustrated by the raw statistics which show that the U.S.
9
has more people in jail, prison and on probation than any other nation in the entire world,
10
and is illustrated by this case and many other cases where government employees
11
acted with wanton disregard to the law and with criminal intent under the color of law.
12
DAMAGES
13
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
14
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
15
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
16
parental alienation, lost time, lost business and prosperity, damaged reputation including
17
both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of happiness, loss of domestic
18
tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic liberties such as enjoying life
19
with one’s own children!
20
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
21
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
22
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
23
24
25
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
26
27
28
29
30
31
Thirty-fifth Claim For Relief Mixed War
PLAINTIFFS:
All Plaintiffs
DEFENDANTS:
All DEFENDANTS
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
2
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
3
Affidavit of Information: DEFENDANTS literally shot at Plaintiffs Clive Boustred,
4
RCB, WFB on March 10, 2003, then violently assault Plaintiff Clive Boustred and falsely
5
imprison him repeatedly since March 10, 2003, depriving him of any liberty. On March
6
10, 2003, DEFENDANTS did unlawfully commit kidnap of RCB and WFB from Clive
7
Boustred and did unlawfully hand his children to a man, Stefan Tichatschke, who was
8
bared from any contact with RCB and WFB. On March 12, 2003 DEFENDANTS did
9
unlawfully without any cause what so ever order Clive Boustred to not communicate with
10
his own children for three years and prevented RCB and WFB from having any contact
11
with their grandfather and uncle and with total and absolute criminal intent on behalf of
12
the sheriffs, District Attorneys and Judges who committed kidnap and have held RCB
13
and WFB hostage to this date.
14
committed assault on a minor by outrageously interrogating RCB aged seven in an
15
attempt to make RCB falsely testify against his father, repeatedly attempting to put
16
words in RCB’s mouth while they held RCB and his three year old brother hostage after
17
attempting to murder their dad in front of the boys. On multiple occasions since March
18
10, 2003, the government unlawfully gave Clive Boustred absurdly sham hearings and
19
trials filing as many as seven absurdly false and malicious cases against Mr. Boustred
20
and rigged the juries in said trials and unlawfully allowed State witnesses to submit
21
known lies, hearsay and double hearsay in the record, while unlawfully striking Clive
22
Boustred’s testimony proving his innocence and unlawfully refused to allow Clive
23
Boustred to submit any evidence or arguments proving his innocence before the jury,
24
while also unlawfully refusing to allow Clive Boustred to put the law before the jury. The
25
government has repeatedly unlawfully falsely arrest and falsely imprisoned Mr. Boustred
26
without any legal or probable cause and did unlawfully repeatedly denied Mr. Boustred
27
any right to bail what so ever. On October 17, 2007, in violation of his 1st Amendment
28
rights, the government unlawfully ordered Clive Boustred to not communicate with four
29
thousand fellow members of the church Clive Boustred is a member of!, all while
30
unlawfully repeatedly ordering Clive Boustred to have no arms.
31
destroyed Mr. Boustred’s companies and career, outrageously slandered and libeled his
32
good name and kidnapped his children while agents of the private institution who control
33
our government, media and military industrial complex, turned around and charged Mr.
34
Boustred usurious interest rates on money Mr. Boustred had to borrow in order to
On or about September 9, 2003, the government
The government has
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
survive the government assault. Plaintiffs solemnly declare that DEFENDANTS make
2
Mixed War against Plaintiffs.
3
Petitions Ignored
4
Both the United States District Courts and the California Superior and Supreme
5
Courts have outright refused to provide plaintiffs with the most elementary due process
6
and have blatantly and repeatedly refused to allow plaintiffs to address grievances and
7
bring these more than sufficiently stated claims to trial.
8
Santa Cruz Superior Court has repeatedly flat out refused to allow plaintiffs to
9
bring any matter and properly framed claim to trial, when they have allowed themselves
10
in purely criminal behavior to bring Plaintiffs to trial on completely unsubstantiated
11
matters upon which there is absolutely no claim upon which relief could be granted. And
12
in these outrageously and blatantly sham trials the California State Courts have
13
proceeded to deny Plaintiffs any right what so ever to put forward evidence disproving
14
the States claims, and then the State has gone on and sentenced Plaintiff Clive
15
Boustred to jail sentences for claims/charges that are not even any crime! For example
16
the Santa Cruz Superior Court Judge and Nationally renowned criminal who was rated
17
as “Not Qualified” by the Judicial Nominations Committee, the former Judge Art Danner
18
and Santa Cruz County sentenced Plaintiff Clive Boustred to six months in jail without
19
any right to bail or any right to file an appeal or a Writ of Habeas Corpus for the charge
20
of Plaintiff Clive Boustred driving at 27 miles down his private road even when the
21
allegation brought against Mr. Boustred by the State Sheriffs Deputy was only an alleged
22
40 mph!
23
Plaintiff asks the court why every neighbor of his who drives at 40 mph and
24
above down their private road is not also being sentenced to 6 months in jail? Obviously
25
form these cases, it is necessary for the Sheriffs to first attempt to murder you before
26
you can be sentenced to such a crime!
27
28
The audacity and sheer criminal behavior of Sheriffs, District Attorneys judges
and incompetent Commissioners in these cases is beyond belief.
29
Consider That The Declaration of Independence Requires Only
30
Minor Modifications To Apply To The Current Government – While
31
significantly more problems can be added:
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
In every stage of these oppressions we have petitioned for redress in the most
2
humble terms; our repeated petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A
3
government, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant, is
4
unfit to be the ruler of a free people.
5
We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all men are created equal; that they
6
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life,
7
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
8
The history of the present Federal Government of the United States of America
9
and the State Government of California is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations,
10
all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these plaintiffs.
11
To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world.
12
Justice is denied, domestic conflict is ensured, common defence eliminated, the
13
general Welfare demoted, and the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity is
14
eliminated.
15
16
They have refused to assent to laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the
public good.
17
They have passed laws of no immediate and pressing importance, laws which
18
completely oppose the most elementary constructs of justice and laws that are designed
19
to violently oppress in obtuse remission of the existing laws of the Constitution of the
20
United States of America and English Common Law.
21
They have passed laws that have neither been ratified nor met even the most
22
rudimentary construct of fairness, such as the Federal Reserve Banking Act where the
23
people’s money is handed at no cost save mere printing cost if the money is printed and
24
not simply entered into a ledger and they have handed the peoples money to foreigners.
25
They have become agents of foreign bankers enslaving the people to servitude and not
26
only constant debt but also to malicious and false imprisonment and war.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
A pattern of practice of hiring individuals entirely unfit for office and even individuals who
2
knowingly engaged in criminal acts and repeated lies of such low base character that
3
they would not be fit to even teach in any public school, however said individuals are
4
promoted to the highest ranking officers in the various branches of government, both the
5
judicial, executive and legislative branches.
6
Having outright adopted communistic and socialistic form of government in blatant
7
treason the U.S. Constitution.
8
They have refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of
9
people, unless those people would relinquish the right of representation in the
10
legislature, a right inestimable to them, and formidable to tyrants only.
11
They have completely rigged the vote count machines and when voting system.
12
When their rigged vote is not to their liking they ignore the popular vote and get
13
the judges they appointed to the supreme court to appoint them to political office.
14
They have refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be
15
fraudulently elected; whereby the legislative powers, incapable of annihilation, have
16
returned to the people at large for their exercise; the people remaining, in the mean time,
17
exposed to all the dangers of invasions from without and convulsions within.
18
They have dissolved representative courts and Grand Juries repeatedly, for
19
opposing, with manly firmness, their invasions on the rights of the people.
20
They have almost completely abandoned the Grand Jury process.
21
They have obstructed the administration of justice, by refusing his assent to laws
22
23
24
25
26
for establishing jury powers.
They have made judges dependent on their will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.
They have erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of officers
to harass our people and eat out their substance.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
2
They have invented massive new agencies to oppress the people of not only this
nation but the world in general.
3
4
They have kept among us, in times of peace, massive standing armies, without
the consent of our legislatures or people.
5
6
They have invaded other nations and oppressed and murdered millions of people
all around the world.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
They have affected to render the military independent of, and superior to, the civil
power.
They have sought to and have employed the military to oppress citizens.
They have build massive jails and prison complexes and filled them mostly with
citizens who are guilty of no crime under the true law.
They have invented codes so as to fine and imprison people outside of the law of
the land.
They have abandoned the Common Law construct of innocent until proven guilty
and replaced it with guilty without any right to prove innocence.
16
They have combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our
17
Constitution and unacknowledged by our laws, giving their assent to their acts of
18
pretended legislation:
19
For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us;
20
For protecting them, by a mock trial, from punishment for any murders
21
which they should commit on the inhabitants of these states;
22
For cutting off our trade with all parts of the world;
23
For imposing taxes on us without our consent;
24
For depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury;
25
For transporting us beyond seas, to be tried for pretended offenses;
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
For abolishing the free system of English laws in a neighboring province,
2
establishing
3
boundaries, so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for
4
introducing the same absolute rule into these colonies;
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
therein
an
arbitrary
government,
and
enlarging
its
For taking away our charters, abolishing our most valuable laws, and
altering fundamentally the forms of our governments;
For suspending our own legislatures, and declaring themselves invested
with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.
They have abdicated government here, by declaring us out of their protection
and waging war against us.
They have plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts dumping hazardous waste in
the ocean, and destroyed the lives of our people.
13
They are at this time transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to
14
complete the works of death, desolation, and tyranny already begun with circumstances
15
of cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally
16
unworthy the head of a civilized nation.
17
They have constrained our fellow-citizens, taken captive on the high seas, to
18
bear arms against their country, to become the executioners of their friends and
19
brethren, or to fall themselves by their hands.
20
They have excited domestic insurrection among us, and has endeavored to bring
21
on the inhabitants of our frontiers the merciless terrorists, whose known rule of warfare is
22
an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions.
23
In every stage of these oppressions we have petitioned for redress in the most
24
humble terms; our repeated petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
government, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant, is
2
unfit to be the ruler of a free people.
3
Nor have we been wanting in our attentions to our American brethren. We have
4
warned them, from time to time, of attempts by their legislature to extend an
5
unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our
6
emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and
7
magnanimity; and we have conjured them, by the ties of our common kindred, to
8
disavow these usurpations which would inevitably interrupt our connections and
9
correspondence. They too, have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity.
10
We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity which denounces our separation, and
11
hold them as we hold the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends.
12
We, therefore, the representatives of the United States of America, in General
13
Congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of
14
our intentions, do, in the name and by the authority of the good people of these States
15
solemnly publish and declare, That these United States are, and of right ought to be,
16
FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the
17
Federal Government and Federal Reserve Bank and that all political connection
18
between them and the Federal Government and Federal Reserve Bank, and ought to
19
be, totally dissolved; and that, as free and independent states, they have full power to
20
levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and do all other acts
21
and things which independent states may of right do. And for the support of this
22
declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually
23
pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor.
24
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
DAMAGES
2
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
3
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
4
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
5
parental alienation, lost time, lost business and prosperity, damaged reputation including
6
both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of happiness, loss of domestic
7
tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic liberties such as enjoying life
8
with one’s own children!
9
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
10
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
11
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
Thirty-sixth Claim For Relief
Fraud - Banking
PLAINTIFFS:
Clive Boustred
DEFENDANTS:
19
Chase Card Services of Wilmington Delaware
20
Federal Reserve Bank
21
22
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
23
On multiple dates including and before December 15, 29 and 30 of 2007, in the
24
above named Judicial District, the crime of FRAUD, in violation of the Constitution of The
25
United States of America Article 1 and 9th Amendment, was committed by
26
DEFENDANT/S listed above, who did willfully and unlawfully commit FRAUD against
27
PLAINTIFF by loaning PLAINTIFF illegal Tender that was created fraudulently out of
28
nothing by co-conspirators the Federal Reserve Bank who’s owners are part of a grand
29
New World Order conspiracy. Said crimes have caused inflated and unrealistic prices
30
on goods, services, and assets in the United States, replacing the real value of said
31
goods, services and assets with imaginary figures that effectively transfer ownership of
32
said goods, services and assets to the conspirators who own the Federal Reserve Bank.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
Said Federal Reserve Bank Notes failing to meet Constitutionally mandated legal
2
Tender having been fraudulently sold and loaned to PLAINTIFFS under the claim that
3
they were Legal Tender, when in fact said Note originated from a grand conspiracy
4
initiated by Mayer Amschel Bauer of Frankfurt, Germany, who changed his name to
5
Mayer Amschel Rothschild and who formalized said conspiracy when Adam Whitehouse
6
who was retained by Rothschild to revitalize Zionism completed said conspiracy plan on
7
May 1, 1776. In November, 1910, agents of the conspirators met on Jekyll Island,
8
Georgia to formalize the enactment of said conspiracy in the final form of the Federal
9
Reserve Bank Act which was fraudulently passed during Christmas recess in 1913.
10
Said conspiracy literally handed exclusive money making rights to the privately
11
held Federal Reserve Bank, granting the owners of that bank the so-called right to
12
create out of thin air as many dollars as they want. This ability to make money out of
13
thin air, gave the conspirators the ability to purchase anything they wanted, including all
14
the major media channels, the military industrial complex, many major corporations in
15
addition to buying off many of our government officials.
16
The Tender DEFENDNTS listed above loaned to PLAINTIFFS is in fact ‘fiat
17
currency’, that is the Federal Reserve Bank is not obligated to give in exchange to the
18
holder of a note gold, silver, or any specific tangible property. In other words the Note
19
and Tender DEFENDANTS loaned PLAINTIFFS, is based on and backed by nothing.
20
The Tender loaned by DEFENDANTS was invented and created out of thin air to
21
defraud PLAINTIFFS of real property.
22
prices on real property which in turn forced PLAINTIFFS to borrow said illegal Tender in
23
order to be able to afford what normally would have cost a fraction of the price
24
PLAINTIFFS were forced to pay as a consequence of the conspirator’s fraud. Said
25
conspirators have thus defrauded PLAINTIFFS through deceptively implying that their
26
Notes were legal Tender, claiming on their Notes “THIS NOTE IS LEGAL TENDER FOR
27
ALL DEBTS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE” and baring the signature and seal of the
28
Treasurer of the United States and Secretary of the Treasury of the United States
29
Government, “The United States of America” and images of past Presidents of the
30
United States of America with most ironically “We the People” on certain Notes.
Said fraud having created artificially inflated
31
In fact DEFENDANTS have loaned PLAININTIFF nothing other than Tender
32
invented from stale air, Tender that is factually worthless other than through continued
33
deception. DEFENDANTS having forced PLAINTIFFS to purchase fraudulent Federal
34
Reserve Notes in order to pay DEFENDANTS, thus forcing PLAINTIFFS to exchange
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
real services and real goods to purchase said fraudulent and factually worthless Notes of
2
illegal Tender.
3
Let the JURY NOTE: The images of Past Presidents on said Federal Reserve
4
Bank Notes are Presidents who adamantly and vehemently opposed any private
5
ownership of National Banks such as the Federal Reserve Bank Act and persons whom
6
evidence supports that said bankers agents attempted to or did assassinate (except an
7
agent of the Rothschild’s Hamilton who was not a President).
8
DAMAGES
9
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
10
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
11
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
12
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
13
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
14
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
15
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
16
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
17
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
18
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
19
20
21
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
22
“The Congress shall have the Power.....To coin Money, regulate the Value
23
thereof,” – Constitution of the United States of America, Article 1, section 8. Congress
24
has no authority to delegate this responsibility to third parties such as the Federal
25
Reserve Bank.
26
“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of
27
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and
28
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law,
29
or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
30
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on
31
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's
32
inspection Laws; and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on
33
Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 148
1
such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of Congress.” - Constitution of
2
the United States of America, Article 1, Section. 10.
3
permissible as Tender in Payment of Debts.
Only gold and silver Coin are
4
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
5
deny or disparage others retained by the people.” Constitution of the United States of
6
America, Amendment IX
7
" I sincerely believe the banking institutions having the issuing power of money
8
are more dangerous to liberty than standing armies" - Secretary of State Thomas
9
Jefferson
10
"If the American people ever allow the banks to control the issuance of their
11
currency.. the banks and corporations that will grow up around them will deprive the
12
people of all property, until their children wake up homeless on the continent their fathers
13
conquered.” - Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson
14
15
"[A Private National Bank is] condemned by the silence of the constitution" James Madison
16
"The bank, is trying to kill me, but I will kill it!" "You are a den of vipers and
17
thieves. I intend to rout you out, and by the eternal God I will rout you out." - President
18
Andrew Jackson
19
20
21
22
“I sincerely believe the banking institutions having the issuing power of money,
are more dangerous to liberty than standing armies.” - President Andrew Jackson
“Paper is poverty… it is only the ghost of money, and not money itself.” President Andrew Jackson
23
“If the American people ever allow the banks to control the issuance of their
24
currency… the banks and corporations that will grow up around them will deprive the
25
people of all property, until their children wake up homeless on the continent their fathers
26
conquered.” - President Andrew Jackson
27
"The bold effort the present bank had made to control the government are but
28
premonitions of the fate that await the American people should they be deluded into a
29
perpetuation of this institution or the establishment of another like it." - President Andrew
30
Jackson
31
32
Congressional Bills to establish a new national bank were twice vetoed by
President Tyler in 1841.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 149
1
President James A. Garfield was inaugurated in 1881, he said "Whoever controls
2
the volume of money in any country is absolute master of all industry and commerce".
3
On July 2, 1881 Garfield was shot, he dies on September 19.
4
In exchange for financial support for his presidential campaign, Woodrow
5
Wilson's agreed that if elected, he would sign the Federal Reserve Act. In December
6
1913, while many members of Congress were home for Christmas, the Federal Reserve
7
Act was rammed through Congress and signed by President Wilson. Regarding his
8
actions Wilson later admitted. "I have unwittingly ruined my country".
9
PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON: "A great industrial Nation is controlled by its
10
system of credit. Our system of credit is concentrated. The growth of the Nation and all
11
our activities are in the hands of a few men. We have come to be one of the worst ruled,
12
one of the most completely controlled and dominated Governments in the world - no
13
longer a Government of free opinion no longer a Government by conviction and vote of
14
the majority, but a Government by the opinion and duress of small groups of dominant
15
men". (Just before he died, Wilson is reported to have stated to friends that he had been
16
"deceived" and that "I have betrayed my Country".
17
On June 4, 1963, President Kennedy signed a Presidential decree, Executive
18
Order 11110. This order virtually stripped the Federal Reserve Bank of its power to loan
19
money to the United States Government at interest. President Kennedy declared the
20
privately owned Federal Reserve Bank would soon be out of business. This order gave
21
the Treasury Department the authority to issue silver certificates against any silver in the
22
treasury. This executive order still stands today. In less than five months after signing
23
that executive order President Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963.
24
Nine American Presidents have been the targets of assassination:- Andrew
25
Jackson in 1835 (opposed a private national bank), Abraham Lincoln in 1865 (opposed a
26
private national bank), James Garfield in 1881
27
William McKinley in 1901, Harry S. Truman in 1950, John F. Kennedy in 1963 (opposed
28
a private national bank), Richard Nixon in 1974, Gerald Ford twice in 1975, and Ronald
29
Reagan in 1981 (opposed a private national bank)
(opposed a private national bank),
30
"Mr. Chairman, we have in this Country one of the most corrupt institutions the
31
world has ever known. I refer to the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve
32
Banks, hereinafter called the Fed. The Fed has cheated the Government of these United
33
States and the people of the United States out of enough money to pay the Nation's
34
debt. The depredations and iniquities of the Fed has cost enough money to pay the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 150
1
National debt several times over. .... This evil institution has impoverished and ruined the
2
people of these United States, has bankrupted itself, and has practically bankrupted our
3
Government. It has done this through the defects of the law under which it operates,
4
through the maladministration of that law by the Fed and through the corrupt practices of
5
the moneyed vultures who control it. " - Congressman McFadden on the Federal
6
Reserve Corporation Remarks in Congress, 1934
7
Representatives by the Honorable Louis T. McFadden of Pennsylvania. Mr. McFadden
8
served as Chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee for more than 10 years.
9
There were two assassination attempts against McFadden.
Floor of the House of
10
"It is well enough that people of the nation do not understand our banking and
11
monetary system, for if they did, I believe there would be a revolution before tomorrow
12
morning" – Industrialist Henry Ford
13
"Why did we give a monopoly of creating money out of thin air to a private
14
corporation? The result is exactly the same as if someone was picking your pocket
15
every year, because that is exactly what they [the Federal Reserve Bank] are doing."
16
Franklin Sunders, Author, Tax Honesty.
17
"Whether money is metal, paper or digital, is not the issue, the issue is interest.
18
The function of currency is to provide a trading mechanism for the barter of real assets
19
and services. There can be no interest charged for the mere provision of a mechanism
20
to barter. A service fee, yes, but interest, absolutely not." - Clive Boustred, Founder,
21
Chairman & CEO InfoTelesys & Chairman of Liberty For Life Association- InfoTelesys
22
was building a next generation Internet that would incorporate interest free currency
23
accessible anywhere in the world through the satellite network the company was
24
building. The InfoTelesys team consisted of numerous extraordinarily qualified
25
individuals including many top banking technology and satellite experts. While working
26
for Sun Microsystems, Clive provided the systems architecture for one of the worlds
27
largest banking systems and consulted to many of the top banks around the world.
28
"Our misunderstanding is the belief that money is a real asset, to the extent
29
where we have allowed this deception to become reality. Money, cash, currency is only
30
a tool, a Note that represents real assets or services in a transaction. The ability to
31
manufacture money, whether the note is printed on metal, paper or digitally is something
32
that must be in the free domain. Just as corporations are free to offer notes representing
33
the ownership or stock of a corporation. If we give any person or entity the exclusive
34
right to control the representation or production of notes representing assets and
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 151
1
services, we give that person complete control of everything, unless we specifically
2
dictate that the note may bare no interest and the valuation of assets and services
3
remain free and dynamic. Our lack of understanding of money has resulted in centuries
4
of servitude and the last hundred years of violent wars." – Clive Boustred, Chairman
5
InfoTelesys, Inc.
6
"We shall have World Government, whether or not we like it. The only question
7
is whether World Government will be achieved by conquest or consent." - Paul Warburg,
8
Council on Foreign Relations and Architect of the Federal Reserve System: Feb 17,
9
1950 in an address to the U.S. Senate.
10
11
12
13
"Who controls money controls the word”. – Henry Kissinger Counsel on Foreign
Relations
"Let me issue and control a nation's money, and I care not who writes its laws" Meyer Amchel Rothschild
14
15
16
17
Thirty-seventh Claim For Relief
Usury Banking
PLAINTIFFS:
Clive Boustred
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 152
1
2
3
4
DEFENDANTS:
Chase Card Services of Wilmington Delaware
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
5
On multiple dates including and before December 15, 29 and 30 of 2007, in the
6
above named Judicial District, the crime of USURY, in violation of Common Law, was
7
committed by DEFENDANT/S listed above, who did willfully and unlawfully commit
8
USURY against PLAINTIFF charging PLAINTIFF as much as 30% interest.
9
10
11
See VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS in the Thirty Sixth
Claim For Relief “Fraud Banking” incorporated herein by reference.
DAMAGES
12
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
13
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
14
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
15
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
16
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
17
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
18
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
19
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
20
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
21
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
See AUTHRITIES in the Thirty Sixth Claim For Relief “Fraud Banking”
incorporated herein by reference.
Thirty-eighth Claim For Relief
Treason - Banking
PLAINTIFFS:
Clive Boustred
DEFENDANTS:
Chase Card Services of Wilmington Delaware
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 153
1
2
3
Federal Reserve Bank
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
4
On multiple dates including and before December 15, 29 and 30 of 2007, in the
5
above named Judicial District, the crime of TREASON, in violation of the Constitution of
6
The United States of America Article 1 and 9th Amendment, Section, was committed by
7
DEFENDANT/S listed above, who did willfully and unlawfully commit TREASON against
8
PLAINTIFF by loaning PLAINTIFF illegal Tender that was created fraudulently out of
9
nothing by co-conspirators the Federal Reserve Bank.
10
11
12
See VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS in the Thirty Sixth
Claim For Relief “Fraud Banking” incorporated herein by reference.
DAMAGES
13
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
14
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
15
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
16
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
17
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
18
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
19
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
20
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
21
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
22
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
23
24
25
26
27
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
See AUTHRITIES in the Thirty Sixth Claim For Relief “Fraud Banking”
incorporated herein by reference.
28
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2. Principals. (a) Whoever commits an offense against the
29
United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission,
30
is punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if
31
directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is
32
punishable as a principal.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 154
Violation of U.S. Const. 7th
1
Thirty-ninth Claim For Relief
2
Amendment [Trial by jury, Common law]
3
7th Amendment: In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
4
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
5
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
6
according to the rules of the common law.
7
8
9
10
11
12
PLAINTIFFS:
All Plaintiffs
DEFENDANTS:
IRWIN JOSEPH, Irwin Joseph
JEREMY FOGEL, Jeremy Fogel,
JAMES WARE, James Ware
13
SAMUEL S. STEVENS, Samuel S. Stevens
14
MICHAEL E. BARTON, Michael E. Barton
15
16
ART DANNER, Art Danner (deceased)
TRILLA E. BAHRKE, Trilla E. Bahrke
17
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON, Phyllis J. Hamilton
18
19
20
21
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, County of Santa Cruz
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, State of California
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, United States of America
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
22
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
23
Starting from March 10, 2003 to present, in the above named Judicial District,
24
DEFENDANTS listed above repeatedly violated PETITINOERS 7th Amendment Right to
25
a Trial By Jury, DEFENDANTS listed above, who did willfully and unlawfully under the
26
color of law commit said crime / action. Of the two cases the government took to trial,
27
FL 06858 and CT 72-002045, both trials were such extraordinarily and outrageous
28
shams that they failed to be Trials By Jury, but were instead trials by a judge and
29
commissioner respectively where said judge and commissioner acted criminally and
30
prevented all the substantial evidence proving Clive Boustred’s innocence from getting
31
before the jury and where they specifically prevented and even struck Clive Boustred’s
32
testimony and any important argument in his defense that proved his innocence. The
33
Courts have flat out refused to give PETITIONERS any Trial By Jury which is Petitioners
34
right under the 7th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 155
1
See Santa Cruz Superior Court Case FL 16028, F 06858, and CV 148542,
2
Placer County Superior Court case Ct 72-002045 and UNITED STATES DISTRICT
3
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION
4
Case Numbers C 05-00996 and C07 00391.
5
DAMAGES
6
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
7
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
8
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
9
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
10
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
11
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
12
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
13
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
14
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
15
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
16
17
18
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
19
Fortieth Claim For Relief
20
Judicial Department Responsibility
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
Violation of U.S. Const. Article III
PLAINTIFFS:
All Plaintiffs
DEFENDANTS:
All DEFENDANTS who are members of the Judiciary
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 1: The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.
Section 2… The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury;
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 156
1
DEFENDANT Art Danner, rated as Not Qualified by the California Judicial
2
Nominations Committee was in blatant violation of the U.S. Constitution, Article III,
3
Section 1, allowed to preside as a judge in the Santa Cruz Superior Court. Art Danners
4
criminal past was and is well published and know and specifically made know by Plaintiff
5
to DEFENDANTS. DEFENDANTS failed to act in accordance with the law and caused
6
extraordinary violations against Plaintiffs.
7
DEFENDANT JAMES WARE is nationally renowned for the lies he told which
8
raised him to a position where he was appointed as a judge. Also known as “Lying
9
Judge Ware”, JAMES WARE is categorically not qualified to be a judge, however, he is
10
allowed to preside over some of the most significant and serious cases filed in the court.
11
JAMES WARE not only presided without subject matter jurisdiction over PLAINTIFFS
12
cases, he does so over every case that his brought before him. PLAINTIFFS witnessed
13
JAMES WARE dismissing a Depleted Uranium case that was brought before him where
14
the court had the opportunity of literally preventing a continued nuclear holocaust and
15
the most heinous deaths of not only many civilians but what will be millions of our own
16
soldiers.
17
Depleted Uranium.
Far more than a million U.S. troops are disabled largely from the use of
18
DEFENDANTS Art Danner (Deceased) Trilla E. Bahrke both failed to give
19
Plaintiff Clive Boustred a Trial by Jury and instead corrupted the process so that the trial
20
was not by jury but by a corrupted mix of trial by judge and jury where the jury was not
21
allowed to make decisions at law or in regard to evidence in accordance with the
22
Constructional guarantee.
23
DEFENDANT IRWIN JOSEPH is not even a judge, however he insists on
24
presiding over PLAINTIFFS cases when PLAINTIFF has specifically denied such and
25
demanded a qualified judge. PLAINTIFF narrowly allowed in writing JOSEPH to hand
26
PLAINTIFF back his passport that the Court had illegally taken, however, JOSEPH and
27
other judges claim that this narrow defined simple function authorizes the unqualified
28
and criminally intended IRWIN JOSEPH to preside over PLAINTIFFS cases.
29
DEFENDANTS JEREMY FOGEL, JAMES WARE, IRWIN JOSEPH, SAMUEL S.
30
STEVENS, MICHAEL E. BARTON all flat out refused to allow PLAINTIFFS any trial
31
what so ever.
32
All above listed DEFENDANTS are sitting in bad behavior due to multiple
33
treasonous and outrageous violations of the construct of the Constitution committed by
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 157
1
said DEFENDANTS as listed herein and in the rest of this claim dictate that these
2
criminals be immediately removed from the bench and office.
3
DAMAGES
4
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
5
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
6
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
7
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
8
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
9
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
10
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
11
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
12
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
13
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
14
15
16
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
17
Forty-first Claim For Relief Violation of U.S. Const. 8th
18
Amendment: excessive fines, cruel & unusual punishment
19
8th Amendment: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
PLAINTIFFS:
Clive Boustred
DEFENDANTS:
IRWIN JOSEPH, Irwin Joseph
JEREMY FOGEL, Jeremy Fogel,
JAMES WARE, James Ware
27
SAMUEL S. STEVENS, Samuel S. Stevens
28
MICHAEL E. BARTON, Michael E. Barton
29
30
ART DANNER, Art Danner (deceased)
TRILLA E. BAHRKE, Trilla E. Bahrke
31
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON, Phyllis J. Hamilton
32
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, County of Santa Cruz
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 158
1
2
3
4
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, State of California
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, United States of America
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
5
On or about March 12, 2003 and on multiple occasions up to present, in the
6
above named Judicial District, the above listed DEFENDANTS violated PETITIONERS
7
rights under the 8th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America by
8
inflicting cruel and unusual punishment and excessive fines on Clive Boustred. In Santa
9
Cruz Superior Court Case FL 16028, F 06858, and CV 148542, Placer County Superior
10
Court case Ct 72-002045 and Marin County Superior Court DEFENDANTS listed above
11
repeatedly denied Plaintiffs protection under the 8th Amendment and demanded
12
excessive bail and fines and imposed cruel and unusual punishment on Plaintiffs.
13
On or about March 10, 2003 in Santa Cruz Superior Court Case F 06858
14
DEFENDANT Michael E. Barton, Art Danner and John Does 1-n set excessive bail at
15
fifteen times the legal schedule of the alleged charges when there was absolutely no
16
evidence supporting the alleged charges and when there was substantial evidence
17
proving the alleged charges were false.
18
On or about March 12, 2003, DEFENDANT Michael E. Barton inflicted cruel and
19
unusual punishment on Plaintiffs Clive Boustred, RCB and WFB by ordering that Clive
20
Boustred not communicate with his sons RCB and WFB for three years, this punishment
21
was totally without merit or based on any probable cause or facts that even remotely
22
related to ordering that Clive Boustred not communicate with his sons and was inflicted
23
with malice as cruel and unusual punishment violating Plaintiffs 8th Amendment Rights.
24
On repeated occasions since March 12, 2003 DEFENDANTS listed above
25
inflicted outrageous and cruel punishment on Plaintiffs Clive Frank Boustred, RCB and
26
WFB by denying plaintiffs the right to live together, to enjoy each others company, to
27
communicate, to have the common interactions between father and child, said actions
28
were malicious and cruel and unusual punishment inflicted upon Plaintiffs.
29
DEFENDANTS Art Danner (Deceased) and John Does 1-n inflicted cruel and
30
unusual punishment on Plaintiffs by sentencing Clive Frank Boustred to six months
31
imprisonment for the non crime of driving at 27 mph down his private road without any
32
right to bail despite a formal appeal having been filed and despite no final judgment after
33
Art Danner gave Clive Boustred a sham trial and where Clive Boustred was falsely found
34
guilty of three of the four false charges.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 159
1
In Placer County Case Number Ct 72-002045, DEFENDANT Trilla E. Bahrke and
2
John Does 1-n gave Clive Boustred a sham trial then had Clive Boustred arrested
3
without any right to bail and held for twenty one days before issuing a cruel and unusual
4
sentence for twenty one days for the afore mentioned SLAP suit. This sentence was
5
after the Santa Cruz Sheriffs, including but not limited to Deputy Griffin, stole Clive
6
Boustred’s vehicle off his church’s parking lot and after the Santa Cruz District Attorney
7
filed four new false charges against Clive Boustred in Santa Cruz Superior Court Case
8
number M19946 on the six month eve of the Santa Cruz Sheriffs assassination attempt
9
against Clive Boustred.
10
Plaintiff Clive Boustred was subject to strip searches in jail and forced to allow
11
Sheriffs to look up his anus. Such behavior on behalf of the sheriffs is demeaning, cruel
12
and unusual and flat out sick and perverted.
13
Plaintiff Clive Boustred was subject to unhealthy and filthy conditions in the Santa
14
Cruz Jail which was ridiculously overcrowded and diseased including rampant Staff
15
infections amongst inmates which went completely ignored by the sheriffs.
16
DEFENDANT IRWIN JOESEPH and SAMUEL S. STEVENS and MICHAEL E.
17
BATON have repeatedly unlawfully fined and punished Clive Boustred for not legal
18
reason what so ever, said DEFENDANTS acted criminally with malice under the color of
19
law.
20
Plaintiffs have not listed herein all the 8th Amendment violations DEFENDANTS
21
made against Plaintiffs as Plaintiffs remain under the duress and cruel and unusual
22
punishment that the DEFENDANTS have intentionally inflicted against Plaintiffs as
23
Plaintiffs are overburdened from simply responding to the paperwork that has been
24
thrust on Plaintiffs, let alone dealing with the emotional, financial and physical burdens.
25
DAMAGES
26
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
27
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
28
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
29
parental alienation, lost time, lost business and prosperity, damaged reputation including
30
both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of happiness, loss of domestic
31
tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic liberties such as enjoying life
32
with one’s own children!
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 160
1
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
2
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
3
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
4
5
6
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
7
Violation of U.S. Const. 5th
8
Forty-second Claim For Relief
9
Amendment [Criminal proceedings, deprivation of life, liberty
10
and happiness]
11
5th Amendment: No Person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
12
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
13
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time
14
of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
15
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
16
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
17
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
18
19
20
21
22
23
PLAINTIFFS:
Clive Boustred, RCB and WFB.
DEFENDANTS:
IRWIN JOSEPH, Irwin Joseph
JEREMY FOGEL, Jeremy Fogel,
JAMES WARE, James Ware
24
SAMUEL S. STEVENS, Samuel S. Stevens
25
MICHAEL E. BARTON, Michael E. Barton
26
27
ART DANNER, Art Danner (deceased)
TRILLA E. BAHRKE, Trilla E. Bahrke
28
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON, Phyllis J. Hamilton
29
MARK TRACY, Mark Tracy (Former Sheriff)
30
MICHAEL MACDONALD, Michael Macdonald (Deputy Sheriff)
31
M POOL, M Pool (Deputy Sheriff)
32
HEMMINGWAY, Hemmingway (deceased)
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 161
1
AMY CHRISTY, Amy Christy
2
BROZOZOWSKI, Brozozowski
3
BOB LEE, Bob Lee (Santa Cruz District Attorney)
4
STEVE DROTTAR, Steve Drottar
5
TRILLA E. BAHRKE, Trilla E. Bahrke
6
CHRISTOPHER M. CATTRAN, Christopher M. Cattran
7
8
9
10
11
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, County of Santa Cruz
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, State of California
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, United States of America
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
12
Without any indictment of a Grand Jury DEFENDANTS Michael Macdonald, Amy
13
Christy, M Pool, Mark Tracy, Hemmingway (Deceased), Brozozowski, Griffin, Samuel S.
14
Stevens , Art Danner (Deceased), Michael E. Barton, Trilla E. Bahrke, Steven Drottar,
15
Bob Lee, Bill Doyle, Christopher M. Cattran, County of Santa Cruz, County of Marin,
16
County of Placer, County of Marin, Attorney General of The State of California, Attorney
17
General of The United States of America, The State and Government and associated
18
entities of The State of California, The State and Government and associated entities of
19
The United States of America and Jon Doe’s 1 to n held Plaintiff Clive Frank Boustred to
20
answer for multiple infamous crimes, without probable cause or any evidence and said
21
DEFENDANTS deprived Plaintiffs of liberty, property, without due process of law.
22
On or about March 10, 2003 and repeatedly up till present time, in the above
23
named Judicial District, the above listed DEFENDANTS repeatedly denied Clive
24
Boustred, RCB and WFB their constitutional rights under the 5th Amendment to liberty
25
and or property, said DEFENDANTS did so without due process of law under the color
26
of law and did willfully and unlawfully and maliciously commit said crime.
27
On information and belief the above listed DEFENDANTS repeatedly on multiple
28
occasions between 2002 and present denied Plaintiffs the most rudimentary due
29
process rights violating Plaintiffs 5th Amendment rights in Criminal and civil proceedings
30
and depriving Plaintiffs of liberty and happiness.
31
Further evidence relating to said violations of PETITINOERS Constitutional rights
32
is incorporated in each of the other Claims for Relief’s “VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS &
33
ULTIMATE FACTS” section and Exhibits and incorporated herein by reference.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 162
1
DAMAGES
2
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
3
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
4
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
5
parental alienation, lost time, lost business investments, lost business and prosperity,
6
damaged reputation including both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of
7
happiness, loss of domestic tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic
8
liberties such as enjoying life with one’s own children!
9
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
10
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
11
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
Forty-third Claim For Relief Malicious Prosecution
PLAINTIFFS:
Clive Boustred, RCB and WFB.
DEFENDANTS:
IRWIN JOSEPH, Irwin Joseph
JEREMY FOGEL, Jeremy Fogel,
JAMES WARE, James Ware
22
SAMUEL S. STEVENS, Samuel S. Stevens
23
MICHAEL E. BARTON, Michael E. Barton
24
25
ART DANNER, Art Danner (deceased)
TRILLA E. BAHRKE, Trilla E. Bahrke
26
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON, Phyllis J. Hamilton
27
MARK TRACY, Mark Tracy (Former Sheriff)
28
MICHAEL MACDONALD, Michael Macdonald (Deputy Sheriff)
29
M POOL, M Pool (Deputy Sheriff)
30
HEMMINGWAY, Hemmingway (deceased)
31
AMY CHRISTY, Amy Christy
32
BROZOZOWSKI, Brozozowski
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
BOB LEE, Bob Lee (Santa Cruz District Attorney)
2
STEVE DROTTAR, Steve Drottar
3
TRILLA E. BAHRKE, Trilla E. Bahrke
4
CHRISTOPHER M. CATTRAN, Christopher M. Cattran
5
6
7
8
9
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, County of Santa Cruz
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, State of California
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, United States of America
Jon Doe’s , 1 to n.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE FACTS
10
On or about March 10, 2003 and repeatedly up till present time, in the above
11
named Judicial District, the above listed DEFENDANTS repeatedly denied Clive
12
Boustred, RCB and WFB their constitutional rights under the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th,
13
9th, 10th, 11th and 14th Amendments, DEFENDANTS committed said crimes willfully
14
under the color of law with the intent to maliciously harm PLAINTIFFS. DEFENDANTS
15
filed as many as seven false and malicious criminal cases against PLAINTIFFS.
16
In response to the attempted murder of Mr. Boustred by the Sheriffs, the
17
government set about maliciously and outrageously prosecuting Mr. Boustred.
In a
18
blatant and outrageous conspiracy. As many as seven false and fraudulent cases were
19
filed against Mr. Boustred.
20
violently assaulted and prosecuted Mr. Boustred and his children.
Sheriffs, District Attorneys and Judges ganged up and
21
After the sheriffs attempted to murder Mr. Boustred, Santa Cruz District Attorney
22
Bob Lee and his Ass. Stephen Drottar along with the sheriffs and judges in Santa Cruz
23
immediately filed two false felonies and two false misdemeanors against Mr. Boustred
24
for “Assault With a Deadly Weapon”, and “Driving Feloniously along his private road at
25
an alleged 40mph” when evidence proved Mr. Boustred drove slowly at 27mph. The
26
Sheriffs filed an absurdly false police report amongst other things making a completely
27
fraudulent charge that Mr. Boustred had committed a Felony 278.5 PC kidnap, and
28
giving this as the reason the Sheriffs had to ‘chase’ Mr. Boustred – the Sheriffs were in
29
the possession of Mr. Boustred’s Stipulated Custody Order which showed that Mr.
30
Boustred had legal custody of his children, despite the fact that Mr. Boustred was
31
following the law when he filed a TRO against his ex for endangering WFB on the
32
learner ski run. The misdemeanors they filed against Mr. Boustred after they shot at him
33
and his children were “Child Endangerment” and “Resisting Arrest” as Mr. Boustred
34
“froze” when Deputy Sheriff Brozozowiski cut Mr. Boustred’s wrist with a handcuff while
35
drilling the knuckle of his fist into the nape of Mr. Boustred’s neck. The Sheriffs and
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 164
1
Judge Michael E. Barton kidnapped Mr. Boustred’s children WFB and RCB, with Barton
2
ordering that Mr. Boustred not communicate with his own sons for three years. The
3
Sheriffs handed WFB and RCB to Anamaria and her boyfriend Stefen Tichatschke,
4
despite a lawful court order barred Tichatschke from having any contact with WFB and
5
RCB. Barton even prevented WFB and RCB’s father and uncle form communicating
6
with their grand father and uncle.
7
One month after holding WFB and RCB completely isolated from their dad, Ass.
8
DA Steven Drottar and Investigator Michael Linsey with the cooperation of Anamaria and
9
without letting Mr. Boustred know, interrogated RCB, aged seven, in an outrageous and
10
criminal attempt to put words in RCB’s mouth so as to use RCB as a false witness
11
against his father.
12
This is merely an abbreviated version of some of the crimes the government
13
committed against Mr. Boustred, his children and companies. It ignores all the detail
14
regarding the other three false arrests where the government held Mr. Boustred without
15
any right to bail and the utterly and the absurdly sham hearings and trials they gave Mr.
16
Boustred.
17
18
In order to cover up the extreme malpractice of the attempted murder of
19
Petitioner, Authorities in Santa Cruz County and the State of California embarked on an
20
ongoing malicious prosecution of Petitioner Clive Boustred, some examples of this
21
assault against Mr. Boustred are:
22
23
24
2 false felonies & 8 false misdemeanors have been filed against
Petitioner in 6 separate cases.
3 times Petitioner has been falsely arrested & imprisoned for a total of 5
25
months, twice without any right to bail & once with bail set at 15 times the
26
legal schedule.
27
Petitioner’s Motions, Habeas Corpus’ and Appeals have been ignored
28
and denied at all levels of Californian Courts without any hearing or
29
showing of good cause. In jail the Santa Cruz Sheriffs even refused to let
30
Petitioner file any Habeas Corpus.
31
32
Without any basis at law or hearing in the interests of the children,
Petitioner was ordered to not communicate with his children RCB aged
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 165
1
seven and WFB aged three for three years. Petitioner’s children continue
2
to be unlawfully held from Petitioner.
3
Petitioner was given a sham trials where the jury was palpably tampered
4
with and where Petitioner was not allowed to put either the facts or law
5
before the jury: any and all evidence in favor of Petitioner was thrown out
6
- including such forms of evidence as the sheriff’s own recordings and
7
reports which irrefutably proved Petitioner’s innocence; in the trial,
8
prosecution’s witnesses were allowed to submit known lies and hearsay
9
into the record while Petitioner’s factual testimony was literally struck from
10
the record and Petitioner was ordered to not testify to the truth nor to put
11
forward any defense theory favorable to Petitioner; Petitioner was also
12
prevented from bringing his witnesses before the jury. Petitioner was
13
fraudulently found guilty under the color of law.
14
Santa Cruz Superior Court insisted on allowing biased judges to preside
15
Petitioners divorce case (SC Sup. Ct. FL 16028) and has moved the case
16
off calendar, effectively locking up petitioner remaining assets and holding
17
Petitioner hostage.
18
California’s courts refuse to file Petitioner’s plea’s & motions, they even
19
refuses to allow petitioner to depose opposing parties or authorize
20
Petitioners subpoenas, provide trial transcripts or even allow Petitioner to
21
photocopy his proceedings.
22
hearing and Orders to Show Cause are ignored, when a hearing is given,
23
Californian courts they simply sanction Petitioner.
24
Although most of Petitioners Motions for
Six months after shooting at Petitioner, after unlawfully impounding
25
Petitioners vehicle off his church’s parking lot, Santa Cruz Sheriffs literally
26
ran around Petitioners Church and Petitioner’s children’s school with mug
27
shot lineups to identify the ‘criminal Clive’ with new false charges,
28
destroying petitioners relationship with his church.
29
(M19946) was at least dismissed.
30
31
That false case
Santa Cruz Sheriffs have even unlawfully entered and searched
Petitioners home.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 166
1
Petitioner has had to borrow money to hire six lawyers who were
2
unfortunately neither prepared nor able to stand up to the criminal nature
3
of the Californian courts. Petitioner can no longer afford attorneys & has
4
struggled to put forward this pleading.
5
As a consequence of this malicious prosecution, Petitioner has been
6
driven into bankruptcy & effectively eliminated along with his corporations
7
& means to support. This case only provides a partial listing of all the
8
malicious prosecution PLAINTIFFS have suffered. As a consequence of
9
the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, PLAINTIFFS are naturally not able to
10
properly prosecute the DEFENDANTS.
11
Further evidence relating to said MALICIOUS PROSECUTION is incorporated in
12
each of the other Claims for Relief’s “VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ULTIMATE
13
FACTS” section and Exhibits and incorporated herein by reference.
14
DAMAGES
15
As a proximate consequence of the willful and malicious actions of
16
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF’S have sustained extraordinary damage in a sum to be
17
determined per proof, including severe and extreme emotional stress and anguish,
18
parental alienation, lost time, lost business and prosperity, damaged reputation including
19
both slander and libel, interference with the pursuit of happiness, loss of domestic
20
tranquility, loss of general welfare, and the loss of basic liberties such as enjoying life
21
with one’s own children!
22
Damages incurred by Plaintiffs as a direct or indirect consequence to the above
23
mentioned and referenced actions by DEFENDANTS are also incorporated herein as
24
listed in the “K DAMAGES” section of this Complaint.
25
26
27
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITES in section “K. COMMON AUTHORITIES” are incorporated herein
by reference in addition to the following AUTHORITIES:
28
29
J. DAMAGES
30
As a direct and proximate result of acts by DEFENDANTS as alleged herein,
31
Plaintiffs suffered damages including but not limited to those damages listed here under
32
which have caused, and continue to cause, plaintiffs injuries. Plaintiffs are informed and
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 167
1
believe and thereon allege that these injuries will result in permanent disability to them.
2
As a result of these injuries, Plaintiffs have suffered general and specific damages in
3
amounts not yet fully ascertained:
4
Plaintiffs CLIVE FRANK BOUSTRED, RCB, WFB, and team members of
5
corporate Plaintiffs, suffered great physical and emotional injuries all of which have
6
caused, and continue to cause, plaintiff great mental, physical and nervous pain,
7
suffering and alienation. CLIVE FRANK BOUSTRED, RCB, WFB and team members of
8
corporate Plaintiffs, are informed and believe and thereon allege that these injuries will
9
result in some permanent disability to them.
10
As a further proximate result of the acts of DEFENDANTS, CLIVE FRANK
11
BOUSTRED, InfoTelesys, Inc. and Get IT Real, Inc., Life Yacht, CopperCards, Santa
12
Cruz Cats, Le Essence and Kite Yachts were prevented from attending to usual
13
business and occupation and thereby lost earnings and revenue and in fact said
14
corporations have been destroyed as a direct and proximate result of the acts of
15
DEFENDANTS to damage in amounts not yet fully ascertained. As a further proximate
16
result of DEFENDANTS' actions, plaintiff's present and future earning capacity has been
17
greatly impaired in amounts not yet ascertained.
18
DEFENDANTS' actions, plaintiff Life Yacht has lost the 90ft C1 Dock in the Santa Cruz
19
Harbor and moneys invested to secure said C1 Dock which is a once in a lifetime
20
acquisition, valued at not less than two million dollars with future earning not yet
21
ascertained.
As a further proximate result of
22
Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that they will be deprived
23
from attending to their usual business for a period in the future which cannot yet be
24
ascertained, and will thereby sustain further loss of earning in amounts not yet
25
ascertained.
26
As a further proximate result of DEFENDANTS' acts, plaintiffs have been
27
damaged in that have been required to expend money and have been prevented from
28
earning money or continuing to develop products and service and having been delayed
29
in deployment of advanced products services and technology and have lost significant
30
and major contracts and agreements with international and local enterprises and have
31
lost the ability to obtain funding for projects and future projects and have lost
32
extraordinary and significant competitive advantages and have lost domain names,
33
patents and trademarks and have and will continue to incur costs and associated losses
34
as in amounts not yet ascertained.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 168
1
As a further proximate result of the acts of DEFENDANTS, plaintiffs were
2
prevented from attending to their usual occupation and thereby lost earnings causing
3
damage in amounts not yet ascertained.
4
5
6
7
As a further proximate result of DEFENDANTS' actions, plaintiffs present and
future earning capacity has been greatly impaired in amounts not yet ascertained.
As a further proximate result of the acts of DEFENDANTS, plaintiffs will continue
to incur, business, legal, medical and related expenses in amounts not yet ascertained.
8
Minor children RCB and WFB were and continue to be held captive by
9
DEFENDANTS after being violently seized by the government from their father Clive
10
Boustred. Defendant Twin Lakes Church, Inc. has enjoined in the kidnap and holding
11
hostage of RCB and WFB. The kidnap and holding hostage of RCB and WFB is willful
12
and malicious and without legal right or probable cause and is intended to oppress and
13
cause injury to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of punitive damages
14
against DEFENDANTS.
15
DEFENDANTS' conduct was not only outrageous it was intentional and malicious
16
and shocks the conscience and is grossly negligent, exhibiting a reckless disregard for
17
plaintiffs' rights and conspiring against plaintiffs, causing plaintiffs to suffer humiliation,
18
mental anguish, financial burdens, excessive court hearings and the need to answer
19
multiple false charges frivolous motions, false imprisonment, kidnap, stress and
20
emotional and physical distress and plaintiffs were injured financially and in mind and
21
body in amounts not yet fully ascertained.
22
On information and/or belief DEFENDANTS intentionally conspired against and
23
maliciously prosecuted DEFENDANTS and kidnapped RCB and WFB so as to cause
24
Defendant damages listed herein resulting in pecuniary and nonpecuniary injury to
25
plaintiff. Said damages were incurred as a direct and proximate result of the Conspiracy
26
and Malicious Prosecution of DEFENDANTS.
27
DEFENDANTS owed a duty to plaintiffs not to cause the harm as herein alleged.
28
DEFENDANTS breached said duty. The acts of DEFENDANTS were willful, wanton and
29
malicious and were intended to oppress and cause injury to Plaintiffs and justify the
30
awarding of exemplary and punitive damages in amounts according to proof.
31
Additionally DEFENDANTS have displayed deliberate indifference to the rights of
32
plaintiffs, and, based upon the principles set forth in Monell v. New York City Department
33
of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658 (1978), are thereby liable for all injuries and damages
34
sustained by plaintiff as set forth in this complaint.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 169
1
2
3
4
K. COMMON AUTHORITIES
Constitution for the United States of America
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish
5
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general
6
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
7
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
8
Article. I.
9
Section. 1.X###X All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
10
11
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
Section. 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every
12
second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have
13
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
14
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty
15
five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when
16
elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.
17
the
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which
18
may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be
19
determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for
20
a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual
21
Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the
22
United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by
23
Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but
24
each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made,
25
the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island
26
and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania
27
eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and
28
Georgia three.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
2
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority
thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.
3
4
The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall
have the sole Power of Impeachment.
5
Section. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from
6
each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof [X###X], for six Years; and each Senator shall
7
have one Vote.
8
9
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall
be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class
10
shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the
11
fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be
12
chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the
13
Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments
14
until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies [X###X].
15
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and
16
been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant
17
of that State for which he shall be chosen.
18
19
The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have
no Vote, unless they be equally divided.
20
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the
21
Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United
22
States.
23
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that
24
Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the
25
Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two
26
thirds of the Members present.
27
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office,
28
and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States:
29
but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment
30
and Punishment, according to Law.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
Section. 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
2
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress
3
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
4
Senators.
5
6
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on
the first Monday in December [X###X], unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.
7
Section. 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications
8
of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a
9
smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance
10
of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.
11
12
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.
13
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
14
same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of
15
the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be
16
entered on the Journal.
17
Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other,
18
adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall
19
be sitting.
20
Section. 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their
21
Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall
22
in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during
23
their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the
24
same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other
25
Place.
26
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be
27
appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been
28
created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person
29
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his
30
Continuance in Office.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
2
3
Section. 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives;
but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
4
before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States;X###X If he approve he
5
shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have
6
originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If
7
after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent,
8
together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
9
approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of
10
both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for
11
and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall
12
not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been
13
presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the
14
Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.
15
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of
16
Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to
17
the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by
18
him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of
19
Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
20
Section. 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts
21
and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
22
United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
23
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
24
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
25
26
27
28
29
Indian Tribes;
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of
Weights and Measures;
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1
2
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the
United States;
3
To establish Post Offices and post Roads;
4
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
5
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;
6
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
7
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences
8
9
10
11
12
against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a
longer Term than two Years;
13
To provide and maintain a Navy;
14
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
15
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
16
Insurrections and repel Invasions;
17
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such
18
Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States
19
respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to
20
the discipline prescribed by Congress;
21
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not
22
exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of
23
Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like
24
Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the
25
Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful
26
Buildings; — And
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1
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
2
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
3
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
4
Section. 9. The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now
5
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one
6
thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not
7
exceeding ten dollars for each Person.
8
9
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.
10
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
11
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or
12
Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.
13
No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.
14
No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of
15
one State over those of another; nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to
16
enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.
17
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made
18
by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
19
Money shall be published from time to time.
20
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any
21
Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any
22
present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign
23
State.
24
Section. 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant
25
Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and
26
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
27
impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
28
29
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws;
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1
and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be
2
for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the
3
Revision and Controul of the Congress.
4
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops,
5
or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or
6
with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as
7
will not admit of delay.
8
Article. II.
9
Section. 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
10
America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice
11
President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:
12
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number
13
of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may
14
be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of
15
Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
16
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of
17
whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall
18
make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they
19
shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States,
20
directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the
21
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be
22
counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number
23
be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have
24
such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall
25
immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then
26
from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in
27
chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State
28
having one Vote; a quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two
29
thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every
30
Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the
31
Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal
32
Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President [X###X].
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1
2
The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which
they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.
3
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of
4
the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any
5
Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and
6
been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.
7
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or
8
Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the
9
Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death,
10
Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall
11
then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a
12
President shall be elected [X###X].
13
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which
14
shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected,
15
and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of
16
them.
17
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or
18
Affirmation: — "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President
19
of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the
20
Constitution of the United States."
21
Section. 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
22
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the
23
United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the
24
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he
25
shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except
26
in Cases of Impeachment.
27
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
28
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and
29
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
30
and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
31
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
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1
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in
2
the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
3
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the
4
Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next
5
Session.
6
Section. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the
7
Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
8
expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in
9
Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn
10
them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public
11
Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the
12
Officers of the United States.
13
Section. 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall
14
be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
15
Crimes and Misdemeanors.
16
Article. III.
17
Section. 1. The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme
18
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
19
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
20
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not
21
be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
22
Section. 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
23
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
24
under their Authority; — to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;
25
— to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; — to Controversies to which the United
26
States shall be a Party; — to Controversies between two or more States; — between a State and
27
Citizens of another State [X###X]; — between Citizens of different States; — between Citizens of
28
the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the
29
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
30
31
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other
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1
Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and
2
Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
3
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial
4
shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not
5
committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by
6
Law have directed.
7
Section. 3. Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying War against
8
them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted
9
of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in
10
11
open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder
12
of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person
13
attainted.
14
Article. IV.
15
Section. 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
16
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
17
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
18
Section. 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
19
20
Citizens in the several States.
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from
21
Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State
22
from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
23
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into
24
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such
25
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or
26
Labour may be due [X###X].
27
Section. 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new
28
State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be
29
formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the
30
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.
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1
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
2
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing
3
in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of
4
any particular State.
5
Section. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
6
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the
7
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic
8
Violence.
9
Article. V.
10
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
11
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds
12
of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case,
13
shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
14
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as
15
the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no
16
Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in
17
any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no
18
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate [X###X].
19
Article. VI.
20
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this
21
Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the
22
Confederation.
23
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
24
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
25
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
26
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
27
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several
28
State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the
29
several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious
30
Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
31
States.
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1
Article. VII.
2
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.
The Word, "the," being interlined between the seventh and eighth Lines of the first Page, The Word "Thirty" being partly
written on an Erazure in the fifteenth Line of the first Page, The Words "is tried" being interlined between the thirty second and
thirty third Lines of the first Page and the Word "the" being interlined between the forty third and forty fourth Lines of the second
Page.
Attest William Jackson
Secretary
done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth
11
Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of
12
the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth In witness whereof We have
13
hereunto subscribed our Names,
14
15
16
17
Go. W ASHINGTON — Presidt.
and deputy from Virginia
New Hampshire {
JOHN LANGDON
18
NICHOLAS GILMAN
19
Massachusetts {
20
NATHANIEL GORHAM
21
RUFUS KING
22
Connecticut {
23
W M. SAML. JOHNSON
24
ROGER SHERMAN
25
New York . . . .
26
27
28
ALEXANDER HAMILTON
New Jersey {
W IL: LIVINGSTON
29
DAVID BREARLEY.
30
W M. PATERSON.
31
JONA: DAYTON
32
Pennsylvania {
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
B FRANKLIN
2
THOMAS MIFFLIN
3
ROBT MORRIS
4
GEO. CLYMER
5
THOS. FITZ SIMONS
6
JARED INGERSOLL
7
JAMES W ILSON
8
GOUV MORRIS
9
Delaware {
10
GEO: READ
11
GUNNING BEDFORD jun
12
JOHN DICKINSON
13
RICHARD BASSETT
14
JACO: BROOM
15
Maryland {
16
JAMES MCHENRY
17
DAN OF ST THOS. JENIFER
18
DANL CARROLL
19
Virginia {
20
JOHN BLAIR
21
JAMES MADISON jr
22
North Carolina {
23
W M. BLOUNT
24
RICHD. DOBBS SPAIGHT
25
HU W ILLIAMSON
26
South Carolina {
27
J. RUTLEDGE
28
CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY
29
CHARLES PINCKNEY
30
PIERCE BUTLER
31
Georgia {
32
W ILLIAM FEW
33
ABR BALDWIN
34
In Convention Monday, September 17th, 1787.
35
Present
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1
The States of
2
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, MR. Hamilton from New York, New Jersey,
3
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.
4
Resolved,
5
That the preceeding Constitution be laid before the United States in Congress
6
assembled, and that it is the Opinion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to
7
a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the
8
Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent and Ratification; and that each Convention
9
assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof to the United States in Congress
10
assembled. Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, that as soon as the Conventions
11
of nine States shall have ratified this Constitution, the United States in Congress assembled
12
should fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed by the States which have ratified the
13
same, and a Day on which the Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and the Time
14
and Place for commencing Proceedings under this Constitution. That after such Publication the
15
Electors should be appointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected: That the Electors
16
should meet on the Day fixed for the Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes
17
certified, signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the United
18
States in Congress assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the
19
Time and Place assigned; that the Senators should appoint a President of the Senate, for the
20
sole purpose of receiving, opening and counting the Votes for President; and, that after he shall
21
be chosen, the Congress, together with the President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute
22
this Constitution.
23
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention
24
Go. W ASHINGTON — President.
25
W. JACKSON Secretary.
26
27
U.S. Constitution Bill of Rights
28
Congress OF THE United States begun and held at the City of New-York, on Wednesday
29
the Fourth of March, one thousand seven hundred and eighty nine. THE Conventions of a
30
number of the States having at the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive
2
clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of public confidence in the Government,
3
will best insure the beneficent ends of its institution RESOLVED by the Senate and House of
4
Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, two thirds of both
5
Houses concurring, that the following Articles be proposed to the Legislatures of the several
6
States, as Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, all or any of which Articles, when
7
ratified by three fourths of the said Legislatures, to be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of
8
the said Constitution; viz.: ARTICLES in addition to, and Amendment of the Constitution of the
9
United States of America, proposed by Congress, and ratified by the Legislatures of the several
10
States, pursuant to the fifth Article of the original Constitution.
11
Article the first [Not Ratified]
12
After the first enumeration required by the first Article of the Constitution, there shall be
13
one Representative for every thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to one hundred, after
14
which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall be not less than one
15
hundred Representatives, nor less than one Representative for every forty thousand persons,
16
until the number of Representatives shall amount to two hundred; after which the proportion shall
17
be so regulated by Congress, that there shall not be less than two hundred Representatives, nor
18
more than one Representative for every fifty thousand persons.
19
Article the second [Amendment XXVII - Ratified 1992]
20
No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives,
21
shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.
22
Article the third [Amendment I]
23
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
24
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
25
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
26
Article the fourth [Amendment II]
27
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
28
29
people to keep and bare arms, shall not be infringed.
Article the fifth [Amendment III]
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1
2
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the
Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
3
Article the sixth [Amendment IV]
4
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
5
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
6
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
7
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
8
Article the seventh [Amendment V]
9
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
10
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
11
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
12
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
13
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
14
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
15
compensation.
16
Article the eighth [Amendment VI]
17
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
18
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
19
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
20
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
21
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
22
Article the ninth [Amendment VII]
23
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
24
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined
25
in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
26
Article the tenth [Amendment VIII]
27
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
28
punishments inflicted.
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1
Article the eleventh [Amendment IX]
2
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
3
disparage others retained by the people.
4
Article the twelfth [Amendment X]
5
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
6
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
7
8
ATTEST: Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, Speaker of the House of Representatives
9
10
[Article. XI.] [Amendment XI]
11
[Proposed 1794; Ratified 1798]
12
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
13
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
14
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
15
[Article. XII.] [Amendment XI]
16
[Proposed 1803; Ratified 1804]
17
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-
18
President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves;
19
they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the
20
person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as
21
President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each,
22
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the
23
United States, directed to the President of the Senate; — The President of the Senate shall, in
24
the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes
25
shall then be counted; — The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be
26
the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no
27
person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding
28
three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose
29
immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by
30
states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 186
1
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states
2
shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President
3
whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next
4
following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other
5
constitutional disability of the President. — The person having the greatest number of votes as
6
Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of
7
Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the
8
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-
9
thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to
10
a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that
11
of Vice-President of the United States.
12
Article XII [Amendment XIII-I]
13
[Proposed 1810; Ratified 1819]
14
If any Citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive or retain any Title of Nobility or
15
Honour, or shall, without the Consent of Congress, accept and retain any present, Pension, Office
16
or Emolument of any kind whatever, from any Emperor, King, Prince or foreign Power, such
17
Person shall cease to be a Citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of holding any
18
Office of Trust or Profit under them, or either of them.
19
20
21
NOTE: Following the British invasion and burning of the White House and the unlawful
Civil War, there is question as to whether any Amendments to the Constitution are lawful.
22
23
Article XIII. [Proposed 1861; Endorsed by Lincoln while president-elect; Unratified [1]
24
No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the
25
power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that
26
of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State.
27
Article. XIII. [Amendment XIII-II]
28
[Proposed 1865; Ratified 1865]
29
Section. 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
30
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
31
to their jurisdiction.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
Section. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
2
Article. XIV. [Unratified Amendment XIV]
3
[Proposed 1866; Allegedly ratified 1868. See Fourteenth Amendment Law Library for argument
4
proving it was not ratified.]
5
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
6
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
7
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
8
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
9
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
10
Section. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
11
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians
12
not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and
13
Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
14
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
15
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in
16
any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation
17
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to
18
the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
19
Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of
20
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or
21
under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an
22
officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial
23
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
24
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
25
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
26
Section. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
27
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing
28
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall
29
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
30
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and
31
claims shall be held illegal and void.
32
33
Section. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
Article. XV. [Amendment XV]
2
[Proposed 1869; Ratified 1870]
3
Section. 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
4
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
5
6
7
Section. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
Article. XVI. [Unratified Amendment XVI]
8
[Proposed 1909; Unratified - Secretary of State Knox fraudulently claimed ratification in 1913]
9
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source
10
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or
11
enumeration.
12
[Article. XVII.]
13
[Proposed 1912; Ratified 1913; Possibly Unconstitutional (See Article V, Clause 3 of the
14
Constitution)]
15
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by
16
the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each
17
State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State
18
legislatures.
19
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive
20
authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the
21
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments
22
until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
23
24
25
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any
Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.
Article. [XVIII.]
26
[Proposed 1917; Ratified 1919; Repealed 1933 (See Amendment XXI, Section 1
27
Section. 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or
28
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof
29
from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is
30
hereby prohibited.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
2
Section. 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.
3
Section. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an
4
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the
5
Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the
6
Congress.
7
Article. [XIX.]
8
[Proposed 1919; Ratified 1920]
9
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
10
States or by any State on account of sex.
11
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
12
[Unratified Article.]
13
[Proposed 1926; Unratified]
14
Article —
15
16
17
Section. 1. The Congress shall have power to limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of
persons under eighteen years of age.
Section. 2. The power of the several States is unimpaired by this article except that the
18
operation of State laws shall be suspended to the extent necessary to give effect to legislation
19
enacted by the Congress.
20
Article. [XX.]
21
[Proposed 1932; Ratified 1933]
22
Section. 1. The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of
23
January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the
24
years in which such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of
25
their successors shall then begin.
26
27
28
Section. 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting
shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.
Section. 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the
29
President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President
30
shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a
2
President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither
3
a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as
4
President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act
5
accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.
6
Section. 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the
7
persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of
8
choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the persons from
9
whom the Senate may choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved
10
11
12
13
upon them.
Section. 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October following the
ratification of this article.
Section. 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an
14
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within
15
seven years from the date of its submission.
16
Article. [XXI.]
17
[Proposed 1933; Ratified 1933]
18
Section. 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby
19
repealed.
20
Section. 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of
21
the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof,
22
is hereby prohibited.
23
Section. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an
24
amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the
25
Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the
26
Congress.
27
Article. [XXII.]
28
[Proposed 1947; Ratified 1951]
29
Section. 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no
30
person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a
31
term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 191
1
President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any person holding the office of
2
President when this Article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who
3
may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this
4
Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the
5
remainder of such term.
6
Section. 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an
7
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within
8
seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress.
9
Article. [XXIII.]
10
[Proposed 1960; Ratified 1961]
11
Section. 1. The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in
12
such manner as the Congress may direct:
13
A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of
14
Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a
15
State, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those
16
appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of
17
President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the
18
District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment.
19
20
Section. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
21
Article. [XXIV.]
22
[Proposed 1962; Ratified 1964]
23
Section. 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for
24
President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or
25
Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by
26
reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.
27
28
Section. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
29
Article. [XXV.]
30
[Proposed 1965; Ratified 1967]
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
Section. 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the
2
Vice President shall become President.
3
Section. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President
4
shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both
5
Houses of Congress.
6
Section. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate
7
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
8
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration
9
to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting
10
11
President.
Section. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of
12
the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the
13
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their
14
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
15
the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
16
President.
17
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and
18
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he
19
shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either
20
the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law
21
provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
22
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
23
the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling
24
within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days
25
after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one
26
days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that
27
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall
28
continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the
29
powers and duties of his office.
30
Article. [XXVI.]
31
[Proposed 1971; Ratified 1971]
32
Section. 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to
33
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
2
3
Section. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
[Inoperative Article.]
4
[Proposed 1972; Expired Unratified 1982]
5
Article —
6
7
8
9
Section. 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex.
Section. 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
10
Section. 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
11
[Inoperative Article.]
12
[Proposed 1978; Expired Unratified 1985]
13
Article —
14
Section. 1. For purposes of representation in the Congress, election of the President and
15
Vice President, and article V of this Constitution, the District constituting the seat of government
16
of the United States shall be treated as though it were a State.
17
Section. 2. The exercise of the rights and powers conferred under this article shall be by
18
the people of the District constituting the seat of government, and as shall be provided by the
19
Congress.
20
21
22
Section. 3. The twenty-third article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States
is hereby repealed.
Section. 4. This article shall be inoperative, unless it shall have been ratified as an
23
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within
24
seven years from the date of its submission.
25
Article. [XXVII.]
26
[Proposed 1789; Ratified 1992; Second of twelve Articles comprising the Bill of Rights]
27
No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives,
28
shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 194
STATUTES OF LIMITATION DO NOT APPLY
1
2
3
Time limitation does not apply where the judgment is based on a fraudulent
return. (Washko v. Stewart, supra, p. 318; Richert v. Benson Lbr. Co., supra, p. 677.).
Statutory Limitations go out the window in malicious prosecution cases: “Duty of
4
5
a trial court to afford every DEFENDANT a fair and impartial trial is of constitutional
6
dimension; where the procedure has fallen short of that standard, an accused has been
7
denied due process and the inherent power of the court to correct matters by granting a
8
new trial transcends statutory limitations. People v. Oliver, 120 Cal.Rptr. 368, 46 C.A.3d
9
747.
10
“A void order which is one entered by court which lacks jurisdiction over parties
11
or subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter judgment, or order procured by fraud,
12
can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally,” People ex rel.
13
Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994).
14
15
MISPRISION OF FELONY
Title 18 U.S.C. § 4. MISPRISION OF FELONY. “Whoever, having knowledge of
16
the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals
17
and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person
18
in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or
19
imprisoned not more than three years, or both.”
20
Title 18 U.S.C.A. 242 (U.S. Criminal Code) "Whoever, under color of law, statute,
21
or ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitants of any state to the
22
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
23
Constitution or Law of the United States. . . shall be fined no more than $1,000 or
24
imprisoned one year or both."
25
Title 18 U.S.C.A. 241, 242 are the criminal equivalent of Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1983,
26
1985 et seq. "Judges have no immunity from prosecution for their judicial acts." -
27
BRADLEY V. FISHER, U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871)
28
"When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to deprive a person of his
29
constitutional rights, he exercises no discretion or individual judgment; he acts no longer
30
as a judge, but as a "minister" of his own prejudice." - PIERSON V. RAY, 386 U.S. 547
31
at 567 (1967)
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 195
1
2
EVERY PERSON LIABLE FOR CRIMES UNDER COLOR
OF LAW
3
Every person who, under color of any statute ordinance, regulation, custom, or
4
by usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
5
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
6
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
7
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
8
redress. EVERY PERSON SHALL BE LIABLE IN AN ACTION AT LAW SUIT IN
9
EQUITY N0 EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY ANY ACT OF CONGRESS UNITED
10
STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1985 (3) If two or more persons . . . conspire. . for
11
the purpose of depriving. any person. . . of the equal protection of the laws . . . the party
12
so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages . . . RECOVERY
13
OF DAMAGES AGAINST ANY ONE OR MORE OF THE CONSPIRATORS N0
14
EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY ANY ACT OF CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE,
15
TITLE 42, SECTION 1986 Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs .
16
. . are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the
17
commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do . . . shall be liable . . . EVERY
18
PERSON SHALL BE LIABLE FOR ALL DAMAGES NO EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY
19
ANY ACT OF CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1988:
20
21
22
23
UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1983
PROCEEDINGS OUTSIDE OF COURT AUTHORITY ARE
VOID
"But proceedings outside the authority of the court, or in violation or
24
contravention of statutory prohibitions, are, whether the court have jurisdiction of the
25
parties and subject-matter of the action or proceedings, or not, utterly void." - Sache v.
26
Wallace, 101 Minn. 169, 112 N.W. 386 (1907)
27
PARENT CAN SUE FOR INTERFERENCE WITH PARENTAL RIGHTS
28
Either parent can sue for interference with parental rights:
29
STRODE V. GLEASON, 510 P.2d 250 (1973);
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 196
1
FEDERAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION ON DIVORCE CLAIMS
2
Federal Courts can rule on federal claims (constitutional questions)
3
involved in state divorce cases and award money damages for federal torts or in
4
diversity of citizenship cases involving intentional infliction of emotional distress
5
by denial of parental rights, "visitation", as long as the Federal Court is not asked
6
to modify custodial status:
7
8
9
10
LLOYD V. LOEFFLER, 518 F.Supp 720 (custodial father won $95,000
against parental kidnapping wife)
FENSLAGE V. DAWKINS, 629 F.2d 1107 ($130,000 damages for
parental kidnapping)
11
KAJTAZI V. KAJTAZI, 488 F.Supp 15 (1976)
12
SPINDEL V. SPINDEL, 283 F.Supp. 797 (1969)
13
HOWARD V. KUNEN, USDC Mass CA No. 73-3813-G, 12/3/73
14
(unreported)
15
SCHWAB V. HUTSON, USDC, S.Dist. MI, 11/70 (unreported)
16
LORBEER V. THOMPSON, USDC Colorado (1981)
17
18
CUSTODY MAY BE CHANGED IF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
ABRIDGED
19
Custody can be changed if visitation is denied.
20
Wife can be held in contempt if visitation is denied.
21
ENTWISTLE V. ENTWISTLE, 402 NYS 2d 213
22
23
Custody can be changed if wife is "disrespectful" of "visitation" order:
24
MURASKIN V. MURASKIN 283 NW 2d 140 (N. Dakota 1979)
25
26
U.S.C. SECTION 1738A AND 42 AND 654, 663
27
The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (28 U.S.C. Section 1738A and 42
28
U.S.C. Section 654, 663) is a federal statute enacted in 1980 to address
29
kidnapping by noncustodial parents and inconsistent child custody decisions
30
made by state courts. The law provides for penalties for kidnapping and requires
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
states to recognize and enforce the custody decisions of courts in other states,
2
rather than make a second, and possibly inconsistent, decision.
3
4
CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE KIDNAP
278. Every person, not having a right to custody, who maliciously takes,
5
entices away, keeps, withholds, or conceals any child with the intent to detain or
6
conceal that child from a lawful custodian shall be punished by imprisonment in a
7
county jail not exceeding one year, a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars
8
($1,000), or both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state
9
prison for two, three, or four years, a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars
10
($10,000), or both that fine and imprisonment.
11
12
13
278.5. (a) Every person who takes, entices away, keeps, withholds, or
14
conceals a child and maliciously deprives a lawful custodian of a right to custody,
15
or a person of a right to visitation, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county
16
jail not exceeding one year, a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000),
17
or both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16
18
months, or two or three years, a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars
19
($10,000), or both that fine and imprisonment.
20
(b) Nothing contained in this section limits the court's contempt power.
21
(c) A custody order obtained after the taking, enticing away, keeping,
22
withholding, or concealing of a child does not constitute a defense to a crime
23
charged under this section.
24
25
280. Every person who willfully causes or permits the removal or
26
concealment of any child in violation of Section 8713, 8803, or 8910 of the Family
27
Code shall be punished as follows:
28
29
(a) By imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year if the
child is concealed within the county in which the adoption proceeding is pending
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 198
1
or in which the child has been placed for adoption, or is removed from that
2
county to a place within this state.
3
(b) By imprisonment in the state prison, or by imprisonment in a county
4
jail for not more than one year, if the child is removed from that county to a place
5
outside of this state.
6
7
8
§ 44 Aggravated Kidnapping
9
Aggravated kidnapping is the doing of any of the following acts with the
10
intent thereby to force the victim, or some other person, to give up anything of
11
apparent or prospective value, or to grant any advantage or immunity, in order to
12
secure the release of the person under the offender’s actual or apparent control:
13
14
15
16
(1)
the forcible seizing and carrying of any person from one place to
another; or
(2)
the enticing or persuading of any person to go from one place to
another; or
17
(3)
the imprisoning or forcible secreting of any person.
18
A FELONY
19
20
§ 44.1 Second degree kidnapping
21
A.Second degree kidnapping is the doing of any of the acts listed in
22
Subsection B wherein the victim is:
23
(1)
used as a hostage or shield;
24
(2)
used to facilitate the commission of a felony or the flight after an
25
26
27
28
attempt to commit or the commission or a felony;
(4)
imprisoned or kidnapped for 72 or more hours, except as provided
by RS 14:45 (A) (4) or (5); or
(5)
imprisoned or kidnapped when the offender is armed with a
29
dangerous weapon or leads the victim to reasonably believe he is armed with a
30
dangerous weapon.
31
B.for the purposes of this section, Kidnapping is:
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 199
1
2
3
4
(1)
the forcible seizing and carrying or any person from one place to
another; or
(2)
the enticing or persuading of any person to go from one place to
another; or
5
(3)
the imprisoning or forcible secreting of any person
6
A FELONY
7
8
§ 45 Simple Kidnapping
9
A.Simple kidnapping is:
10
11
12
(1)
the intentional and forcible seizing and carrying of any person from
one place to another without his consent.
(2)
The intentional taking, enticing or decoying away, for an unlawful
13
purpose, of any child not his own and under the age of fourteen years, without
14
the consent of his parent or the person charged with its custody.
15
(3)
The intentional taking, enticing or decoying away, without the
16
consent of the proper authority, or any person who has been lawfully committed
17
to an orphan, insane, feeble-minded or other similar institution.
18
(4)
The intentional taking, enticing or decoying away and removing
19
from the state, by any parent of his or her child, from the custody of any person
20
to whom custody has been awarded by any court of competent jurisdiction of any
21
state, without the consent of the legal custodian, with intent to defeat the
22
jurisdiction of the said court over the custody of the child.
23
(5)
the taking, enticing or decoying away and removing from the state,
24
by any person, other than the parent, of a child temporarily placed in his custody
25
by any court of competent jurisdiction in the state, with the intention to defeat the
26
jurisdiction of said court over the custody of the child. A FELONY
27
28
§ 46 False imprisonment
29
False imprisonment is the intentional confinement or detention of another,
30
without his consent and without proper legal authority. A MISDEMEANOR
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 200
1
2
3
FEDERAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER CUSTODY MATTERS
Federal judges can set aside or overturn state courts to preserve
constitutional rights:
4
MITCHUM V. FOSTER, 407 US 225 (1972)
5
Title 28 US Code sec. 2284.
6
7
Federal Courts can rule on federal claims (constitutional questions)
8
involved in state divorce cases and award money damages for federal torts or in
9
diversity of citizenship cases involving intentional infliction of emotional distress
10
by denial of parental rights, "visitation", as long as the Federal Court is not asked
11
to modify custodial status:
12
13
14
15
LLOYD V. LOEFFLER, 518 F.Supp 720 (custodial father won $95,000
against parental kidnapping wife)
FENSLAGE V. DAWKINS, 629 F.2d 1107 ($130,000 damages for
parental kidnapping)
16
KAJTAZI V. KAJTAZI, 488 F.Supp 15 (1976)
17
SPINDEL V. SPINDEL, 283 F.Supp. 797 (1969)
18
HOWARD V. KUNEN, USDC Mass CA No. 73-3813-G, 12/3/73
19
(unreported)
20
SCHWAB V. HUTSON, USDC, S.Dist. MI, 11/70 (unreported)
21
LORBEER V. THOMPSON, USDC Colorado (1981)
22
23
Right of parents to the care, custody and to nurture their children is of
24
such character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental
25
principals of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
26
institutions, AND SUCH RIGHT IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT PROTECTED BY
27
THIS AMENDMENT AND AMENDMENTS 5, 9, and 14:
28
29
DOE V. IRWIN, 441 f. SUPP. 1247, U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF
MICHIGAN (1977)
30
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 201
1
2
3
Parents have fundamental constitutionally protected interest in continuity
of legal bond with their children:
MATTER OF DELANEY, 617 P.2d 886, Oklahoma (1980)
4
5
The United States Supreme Court noted that a parent's right to "the
6
companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children" is an
7
interest "far more precious" than any property right:
8
MAV V. ANDERSON, 345 U.S. 528, 533; 73 S.Ct. 840, 843 (1952)
9
10
11
12
13
"No bond is more precious and none should be more zealously protected
by the law as the bond between parent and child.":
CARSEN V. ELROD, 411 F.Supp. 645, 649 (U.S. District Court Eastern
Dist. Virginia 1976)
14
15
"A parent's right to the preservation of his relationship with his child
16
derives from the fact that the parent's achievement of a rich and rewarding life is
17
likely to depend significantly on his ability to participate in the rearing of his
18
children. A child's corresponding right to protection from interference in the
19
relationship deprives form the psychic importance to him of being raised by a
20
loving, responsible, reliable adult." - FRANZ V. UNITED STATES, 707 F.2d 582,
21
595-599 (U.S. Ct. App. D.C. Circuit 1983)
22
23
Loss of First Amendment Freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,
24
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Though First Amendment rights are
25
not absolute, they may be curtailed only by interests of vital importance, the
26
burden of proving which rests on their government. - ELROD V. BURNS, 96 S Ct
27
2673; 427 US 347, (1976).
28
Parent's right to custody of child is a right encompassed within protection
29
of this amendment which may not be interfered with under guise of protecting
30
public interest by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable
31
relation to some purpose within competency of state to effect. - REYNOLD V.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 202
1
BABY FOLD, INC., 369 NE 2d 858; 68 Ill 2d 419, appeal dismissed 98 S Ct
2
1598, 435 US 963, IL, (1977).
3
4
The United States Supreme Court noted that a parent's right to "the
5
companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children" is an
6
interest "far more precious" than any property right. - MAY V. ANDERSON, 345
7
US 528, 533; 73 S Ct 840, 843, (1952).
8
9
A parent's right to care and companionship of his or her children are so
10
fundamental, as to be guaranteed protection under the First, Ninth, and
11
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. - IN RE: J.S. AND C.,
12
324 A 2d 90; supra 129 NJ Super, at 489.
13
14
Parent's rights have been recognized as being "essential to the orderly
15
pursuit of happiness by free man." - MEYER V. NEBRASKA, 262 or 426 US 390
16
; 43 S Ct 625, (1923).
17
18
No bond is more precious and none should be more zealously protected
19
by the law as the bond between parent and child." - CARSON V. ELROD, 411 F
20
Supp 645, 649; DC E.D. VA (1976).
21
22
State Judges, as well as federal, have the responsibility to respect and
23
protect persons from violations of federal constitutional rights. - GROSS V.
24
STATE OF ILLINOIS, 312 F 2d 257; (1963).
25
26
27
CUSTODY IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY SECURED RIGHT –
ENABLING FEDERAL JURISDICTION
The Court stressed, "the parent-child relationship is an important interest
28
that undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
29
interest, protection." A parent's interest in the companionship, care, custody and
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 203
1
management of his or her children rises to a constitutionally secured right, given
2
the centrality of family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility.
3
4
5
A child has an equal right to be raised by the father, and must be awarded
to the father if he is the better parent, or mother is not interested:
STANLEY V. ILLINOIS, 405 US 645, 651; 92 S Ct 1208, (1972).
6
7
A parent's right to the custody of his or her children is an element of
8
"liberty" guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment to the
9
Constitution of the United States:
10
MATTER OF GENTRY, 369 N.W.2d. 889, Mich. Appellate Div. (1983)
11
12
The rights of parents to the care, custody and nurture of their children is of
13
such character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental
14
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
15
institutions, and such right is a fundamental right protected by this amendment
16
(First) and Amendments 5, 9, and 14. - DOE V. IRWIN, 441 F Supp 1247; U.S.
17
D.C. of Michigan, (1985).
18
19
20
EX PARTE HEARINGS ON CUSTODY ORDERS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Ex Parte conferences, hearings or Orders denying parental rights or
21
personal liberties are unconstitutional, cannot be enforced, can be set aside in
22
federal court, and can be the basis of suits for money damages.
23
RANKIN V. HOWARD, 633 F.2d 844 (1980);
24
GEISINGER V. VOSE, 352 F.Supp. 104 (1972).
25
IF MOTHER HAS BOYFRIEND CUSTODY AWARDED TO FATHER
26
If custodial mother has boyfriend living with her, state can change custody
27
28
to father.
JARRETT V. JARRETT, 101 S.Ct. 329
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 204
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
FATHER HAS RIGHT TO CUSTODY
Custody can be awarded to father of girls of "tender years" if mother
commits perjury, and is otherwise immoral.
BEABER V. BEABER, 322 NE 2d 910.
JUDGES CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR WILLFUL DEPRAVATION OF
CUSTODY RIGHTS OR ANY CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION
Fathers' Rights Case Law Title 42 USC 1983 is for (federal) civil rights
8
violations. "Judges may be punished criminally for willful deprivation of rights on
9
the strength of Title 18 U.S.A. 241 and 242."
10
11
12
"Judges may be punished criminally for willful deprivation of rights on the
strength of Title 18 U.S.A. 241 and 242."
[The fact that There are federal rules\laws regarding suing including
13
judges for violations of constitutional rights is proof enough that it occurs.]: -
14
IMBLER V. PACHTMAN, 424 U.S. 409; 96 S.Ct. 984 (1976)
15
16
"When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to deprive a person of his
17
constitutional rights, he exercises no discretion or individual judgement; he acts
18
no longer as a judge, but as a "minister" of his own prejudice.": PIERSON V.
19
RAY, 386 U.S. 547 at 567 (1967)
20
21
"Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we have held
22
that qualified immunity (Ed. Note: or "good faith") would be defeated if an official
23
"knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere
24
of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if
25
he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
26
constitutional rights or other injury. . ." - HARLOW V. FITZGERALD, 102 S.Ct.
27
2727 at 2737, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)
28
29
30
Every person who, under color of any statute ordinance, regulation,
custom, or by usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 205
1
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
2
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
3
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
4
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. EVERY PERSON SHALL BE
5
LIABLE IN AN ACTION AT LAW SUIT IN EQUITY N0 EXCLUSION FOR
6
JUDGES BY ANY ACT OF CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42,
7
SECTION 1985 (3) If two or more persons . . . conspire. . for the purpose of
8
depriving. any person. . . of the equal protection of the laws . . . the party so
9
injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages . . .
10
RECOVERY OF DAMAGES AGAINST ANY ONE OR MORE OF THE
11
CONSPIRATORS N0 EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY ANY ACT OF
12
CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1986 Every person
13
who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs . . . are about to be committed,
14
and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same,
15
neglects or refuses so to do . . . shall be liable . . . EVERY PERSON SHALL BE
16
LIABLE FOR ALL DAMAGES NO EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY ANY ACT OF
17
CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1988: - UNITED
18
STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1983
19
20
"We should, of course, not protect a member of the judiciary "who is in
21
fact guilty of using his power to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other
22
personal motive not connected with the public good." - GREGOIRE V. BIDDLE,
23
177 F.2d 579, 581.
24
25
"Government immunity violates the common law maxim that everyone
26
shall have remedy for an injury done to his person or property." - FIREMAN'S
27
INS/ CO. OF NEWARK, N.J. V. WASHBURN COUNTY, 2 Wis.2d 214, 85
28
N.W.2d 840 (1957)
29
30
31
Immunity fosters neglect and breeds irresponsibility, while liability
promotes care and caution, which caution and care is owed by the government to
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 206
1
its people." - RABON V. ROWEN MEMORIAL HOSP., INC, 269 NSI. 13, 152
2
S.E.2d 485, 493 (`1967)
3
"Actions by state officers and employees, even if unauthorized or in
4
5
excess of authority can be actions under 'color of law'." - STRINGER V.
6
DILGER, 313 F.2d 536 (U.S. Ct. App 10th Circ. - 1963
7
"A judge is not immune from criminal sanctions under the civil rights act."
8
9
"State officials acting in their official capacities, even if in abuse of their lawful
10
authority , generally are held to act "under color" of law. This is because such
11
officials are " clothed with the authority" of state law, which gives them power to
12
perpetrate the very wrongs that Congress intended Section 1983 to prevent. " -
13
EX PARTE VIRGINIA, 100 U.S. 339, 346-347 (1879)
14
"The language and purpose of the civil rights acts, are inconsistent with
15
16
the application of common law notions of official immunity. . . " - JACOBSEN V.
17
HENNE, 335 F.2d 129, 133 (U.S. Ct. App. 2nd Circ. - 1966) Also see"
18
ANDERSON V. NOSSER, 428 F.2d 183 (U.S. Ct. App. 5th Circ. - 1971)
19
20
"Governmental immunity is not a defense under (42 USC 1983) making
21
liable every person who under color of state law deprives another person of his
22
civil rights." - WESTBERRY V. FISHER, 309 F.Supp. 95 (District Ct.- of Maine -
23
1970 "
24
25
26
Judicial immunity is no defense to a judge acting in the clear absence of
jurisdiction." - BRADLEY V. FISHER, U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871)
27
28
As long as a DEFENDANT who abridges a plaintiff's constitutional rights
29
acts pursuant to a statute of local law which empowers him to commit the
30
wrongful act, an action under the Federal Civil Rights statute is established. 42
31
U.S.C.A. 1981 et seq. - LAVERNE V. CORNING, 316 F.Supp. 629
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 207
1
2
"The Supreme Court initially discussed judicial immunity in Randall v.
3
Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1869). In Randall, the Court wrote
4
that judges of superior or general jurisdiction courts were not liable to civil actions
5
for their judicial acts, even when such acts, where the acts, in excess of
6
jurisdiction, are done maliciously or corruptly." [Editor's Note: In more recent
7
cases: Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) and Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S.
8
24 it was found that judges were really not acting in a malicious and corrupt
9
manner and the proofs also showed that. Congress by its words and meaning
10
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and that meaning included judges to be held
11
responsible to an injured plaintiff for the deprivation of Constitutional Rights. Any
12
judge made case finding to the contrary is hereby challenged as unconstitutional
13
and unlawful. No Court has ever challenged the Constitutionality of the Civil
14
Rights Act of 1871, and therefore said Congressionally enacted legislation stands
15
as law. The only way to change an act of Congress is by an act of Congress. No
16
judge can change it and any such findings and changes are not to be upheld in
17
Federal Courts as lawful. No changes in the wording have ever been made to
18
Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 and therefore these
19
Congressionally enacted laws are enforceable in the Federal Courts. The only
20
change made to Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 took place in 1979. At this time the words
21
"or the District of Columbia" were inserted following "Territory". If any judges or
22
persons representing judges had wanted to make a change this would have been
23
an opportune time to do so. No action was ever taken to change the wording of
24
the law and it remains as such today.] - RANDALL V. BRIGHAM, 74 U.S. (7
25
Wall.) 523, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1869).
26
27
"I agree with the substantive standard announced by the Court today,
28
imposing liability when a public-official DEFENDANT "knew or should have
29
known" of the constitutionally violative effect of his actions. This standard would
30
not allow the official who actually knows that he was violating the law to escape
31
liability for his actions, even if he could not "reasonably have been expected" to
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 208
1
know what he actually did know. Thus the clever and unusually well-informed
2
violator of constitutional rights will not evade just punishment for his crimes. I,
3
also agree that this standard applies "across the board," to all "government
4
officials performing discretionary functions.," - Harlow at 2739, Justice Brennan,
5
Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmum concurring. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
6
547, Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting
7
8
9
10
"Judges are not immune for their nonjudicial activities, i.e., activities which
are ministerial or administrative in nature." - SANTIAGO V. CITY OF
PHILADELPHIA, 435 F.Supp. 136
11
12
"It is not a judicial function for judge to commit intentional tort, even though
13
tort occurs in courthouse." - YATES V. VILLAGE OF HOFFMAN ESTATES,
14
ILLINOIS, 209 F.Supp. 757
15
16
"There was no judicial immunity to civil actions for equitable relief under
17
Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 Shore v. Howard. 414 F.Supp. 379
18
"There is no judicial immunity from criminal liability". Id. "Repeated pattern of
19
failing to advise litigants of their constitutional and statutory rights is serious
20
judicial misconduct." - MATTER OF PEEVES, 480 N.Y.S. 2d 463.
21
22
"When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction or acts in face of clearly
23
valid statutes or case law expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity
24
is lost." - RANKIN V. HOWARD, 633 F.2d 844.
25
26
27
"There is no judicial immunity from criminal liability." - SHORE V.
HOWARD, 414 F.Supp. 379
28
29
"State judges, as well as federal, have the responsibility to respect and
30
protect persons from violations of federal constitutional rights." - GOSS V.
31
STATE OF ILLINOIS, 312 F2d. 1279 (U.S.Ct.App. - Illinois - 1963)
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 209
1
2
3
"Conduct of trial judge must be measured by standard of fairness and
impartiality." - GREENER V. GREEN, 460 F.2d 1279 (U.S.Ct. App. - Pa. - 1972)
4
5
Judges must maintain a high standard of judicial performance with
6
particular emphasis upon conducting litigation with scrupulous fairness and
7
impartiality. 28 USCA § 2411; - PFIZER V. LORD, 456 F 2d 532; cert denied 92
8
S Ct 2411; US Ct App MN, (1972).
9
10
"A judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid
11
statutes or case law expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is
12
lost." Id. "Law requires not only impartial tribunal, but that tribunal appears to be
13
impartial." 28 U.S.C.A. 455.- IN RE TIP-PAHANDS ENTERPRISES, INC., 27
14
B.R. 780 (U.S. Bankruptcy Ct.)
15
16
17
MUNICIPALITY AND SATE MAY BE SUED
A parent may bring a suit against a municipality which failed to provide
18
protection against an ex-spouse, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The parent may
19
recover damages for her son's death and her own injuries, where the police force
20
assured her of protection from a violent ex-spouse:
21
22
23
24
RAUCCI V. TOWN OF ROTTERDAM, No. 89-7693, U.S. Dist. Ct. --N.Y.,
April 27, 1990
POLICE OFFICERS NO IMMUNITY
Police officer loses qualified immunity to claim that facially neutral policy
25
has been executed in a discriminatory manner in a domestic violence situation if
26
that police officer knows that the policy has a discriminatory impact:
27
28
29
HANSEN V. CITY OF ) LEGAL DEPT., 864 F.2d 1026, 3rd Cir. (1988)
ATTORNEY’S CAN BE SUED
Attorney can be sued for malpractice under consumer protection laws.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 210
DEBAKEY V. STAGG, 605 SW 2d 631 (1980)
1
THE COURT HAS A DUTY TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
2
It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
3
4
of the citizen, against any stealthy encroachments thereon." -BOYD V. U.S., 116
5
US 616, 635, (1885)
" In short, the federal courts could step in where the state courts were
6
7
unable or unwilling to protect federal rights." - ALLEN v. McCURRY, 449 U.S. 90
8
(1980)
9
10
EVIL ORDERS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Laws and court procedures that are "fair on their faces" but administered
11
"with an evil eye or a heavy hand" was discriminatory and violates the Equal
12
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
13
YICK WO V. HOPKINS, 118 S.Ct. 356 (1886)
14
JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED
15
Justice delayed is justice denied.
16
MAGNA CHARTA, Art.40, June 15, 1215.
17
VOID ORDERS
18
Judge's dismissal for no cause is reversible.
19
FOMAN V. DAVIS, 371 US 178 (1962)
20
NON-LAWYERS ENTITLED TO COURT
21
Non-lawyers can assist or represent litigants in court.
22
JOHNSON V. AVERY, 89 S.Ct. 747
23
Members of group who are competent nonlawyers can assist other
24
members of group achieve the goals of the group in court without being charged
25
with "unauthorized practice of law"
26
BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY TRAINMEN V. VIRGINIA , 377 US 1;
27
NAACP V. BUTTON, 371 US 415 (1962);
28
SIERRA CLUB V. NORTON, 92 S.Ct. 1561;
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 211
1
UNITED MINE WORKERS V. GIBBS, 383 US 715;
2
FARETTA V. CALIFORNIA, 422 US 806.
3
4
PRO SE TO BE CONSIDERED WITHOUT TECHNICALITY
“Pro Se (Without a Lawyer, representing self) pleadings are to be
5
considered without technicality; pro se litigants pleadings are not to be held to the
6
same high standards of perfection as lawyers.” - HAINES V. KERNER, 92 S.Ct.
7
594; JENKINS V. MCKEITHEN, 395 US 411, 421 (1969); PICKING V. PENNA.
8
RWY. CO. 151 F.2d 240; PUCKETT V. COX, 456 F.2d 233.
9
“The pleading of one who pleads pro se for the protection of civil rights should be
10
liberally construed” - BLOOD V. MARGIS, 322 F.2d 1086 (1971)
11
There are decisions in virtually every federal circuits that generously proclaim
12
that pro per petitions should be construed liberally and that pro per petitioners
13
should be held to less stringent standards than lawyers. See, e.g., Price v.
14
Johnston (1948) 334 U.S. 266, 292; Chase v. Crips (10th Cir. 1975) 523 F.2d
15
595, 597; Curtis v. Illinois (7th Cir. 1975) 512 F2d 717; Ham v. North Carolina
16
(4th Cir. 1973) 471 F.2d 406, 407; Hairston v. Alabama (5th Cir. 1972) 465 F.2d
17
675, 678 n5; Turrell v. Perini (6th Cir. 1969) 414 F.2d 1231, 1233; Montgomery v.
18
Brierly (3rd Cir. 1969) 414 F.2d 552; Pembrook v. Wilson, (9th Cir. 1966) 370
19
F.2d 37, 40; Whittaker v. Overholster (D.C. Cir. 1962) 299 F.2d 447, 448. See
20
also Haines v. Kerner (1972) 404 U.S. 519.
21
This right is also protected under the First Amendment Free Speech Clause.
22
And within those rights, the pro se litigant's court submissions are to be
23
construed liberally and held to less stringent standards than submissions of
24
lawyers. If the court can reasonably read the submissions, it should do so
25
despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor
26
syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with rule
27
requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d
28
551 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251
29
(1976) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80
30
(1957)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972);
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 212
1
McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); United
2
States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992)(holding pro se petition cannot be
3
held to same standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys); Then v. I.N.S., 58
4
F.Supp.2d 422, 429 (D.N.J. 1999).
5
The courts provide pro se parties wide latitude when construing their pleadings
6
and papers. When interpreting pro se papers, the Court should use common
7
sense to determine what relief the party desires. S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560,
8
1582 (11th Cir. 1992). See also, United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3rd
9
Cir. 1999) (Court has special obligation to construe pro se litigants' pleadings
10
liberally); Poling v. K.Hovnanian Enterprises, 99 F.Supp.2d 502, 506-07 (D.N.J.
11
2000). Defendant has the right to submit pro se briefs on appeal, even though
12
they may be inartfully drawn but the court can reasonably read and understand
13
them. See, Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1998). Courts will go to
14
particular pains to protect pro se litigants against consequences of technical
15
errors if injustice would otherwise result. U.S. v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243
16
(D.C.Cir. 1996).
17
18
19
20
PROHIBITION OF BIAS
21
United States District Court General Order No. 40, Prohibition of Bias, states:
22
Prologue
23
The Court is committed to ensuring that all forms of bias and prejudice are eliminated from
24
the practice of law in our district….
25
Duties and Procedures
26
(1) The practice of law before the United States District Court for the Northern District of
27
California must be free from prejudice and bias in any form. Treatment free of bias must be
28
accorded all other attorneys, litigants, judicial officers, court room jurors or support personnel.
29
The duty to exercise nonbiased behavior includes the responsibility to avoid comment or
30
behavior manifesting prejudice or bias toward another. This duty is owed by all attorneys,
31
judges, judicial officers and court personnel in connection with cases pending before the
32
district court.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 213
1
2
DIRECTORS, THE REAL PARTY OF INTEREST IN
3
CORPORATIONS ENTITLED TO 1ST AMENDMENT SELF
4
REPRESENTATION
5
A corporation in the U.S.A. is recognized as “person” as defined by the 14th
6
Amendment and is therefore Constitutionally guaranteed the right to self representation.
7
By law a corporation may be represented by their principles who are the real parties of
8
interest. This argument at law has been well substantiated in Plaintiffs earlier filings and
9
has not and can not be refuted by any parties. Rulings buy incompetent judges do not
10
make any new laws. C.L.D. Const. Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) and Caressa
11
Camille, In.d v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Apeals Board do not make any new law,
12
these cases were ruled in error to the most basic construct of Constitutional law.
13
Constitution overrules Common-Law? Judges and attorneys efforts to usurp the
14
Legislature authority amounts to treason: Article I, Section 1. “All legislative Powers
15
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of
16
a Senate and House of Representatives.”
17
It must be noted that the whim and caprice of a judge, no matter at what level of
18
the court, is by no means an establishment of the “will of the people” as represented by
19
the Common Law precedent concept. The judiciary has no right to legislate law. The
20
judiciary also has no need or right to interpret the law, the function of the judiciary is to
21
administer the courts. The judiciary’s vital role is to ensure that the law of the land is
22
fairly followed. In Common Law, it is clear that no law can exist that cannot be
23
understood by the common man, eliminating the need to “interpret” the law. I.e. if a law
24
is ambiguous, if it is open to interpretation, then that law does not meet the fundamental
25
construct of Common Law. In cases where law is ambiguous, the only function of the
26
Judiciary is to send the law back to the legislature.
27
There is no lawful mandate that any matter must be represented in court by a
28
class of individuals called attorneys or lawyers. The 13th Amendment which was
29
properly ratified at the Virginia General Assembly on March 12, 1819 and which has
30
subsequently disappeared unlawfully from the Constitution reads: "If any citizen of the
31
United States shall accept, claim, receive, or retain any title of nobility or honour, or shall
32
without the consent of Congress, accept and retain any present, pension, office, or
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 214
1
emolument of any kind whatever, from any Emperor, King, Prince, or foreign Power,
2
such person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of
3
holding any office of trust or profit under them, or either of them." dictates that any
4
individual who pledges allegiance to the BAR and takes on the title “Esq” looses their
5
citizenship. How is it that some judges who themselves, according to this ratified
6
amendment, are not entitled to hold office, go as far as to insist that only ‘attorneys’ may
7
speak for corporations or children. Not only is such a ruling trying to force attorneys to
8
speak on behalf of corporations unlawful but it is blatantly treasonous to the construct of
9
the Constitution in light of the hated practice in England of courts only allowing Barristers
10
to speak on behalf of persons, which clearly our Constitution eliminates. Furthermore
11
considering that DEFENDANTS are directly responsible for driving Plaintiff into financial
12
ruin as a consequence of their malicious prosecution and thereby make it impossible for
13
Plaintiffs to afford competent counsel, such a ruling dismissing corporate parties in this
14
basis is clearly utterly unjust. Corporate parties remain in this case.
15
A person in law, includes both a natural person, i.e., a human being, and an
16
artificial person, i.e., a corporation. In strict sense, in law, a person is any being capable
17
of having rights and duties and is of two classes only, namely, natural person and legal
18
person. A natural person is a human being who has the capacity for rights and duties. A
19
corporation is a legal person.. See First National Bank of Boston v Belluth, 435 U.S. 765,
20
98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707. Lawrence v Craven Tire Co., 169 S.E.2d 440, 210 Va.
21
138. §1-201(29) of the U.P.C. defines the word “person” as follows: an individual, a
22
corporation, an organization, or other legal entity. The word has been statutorily defined
23
as follows: "Person" includes individual, partnership, and corporation, but does not
24
include governmental unit. 11 U.S.C. §101(30). An individual, a corporation, a
25
partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, any unincorporated
26
organization, or a government or political subdivision thereof. As used in this paragraph
27
the term "trust" shall include only a trust where the interest or interests of the beneficiary
28
or beneficiaries are evidenced by a security. 15 U.S.C. §77(b)(2). An individual, a
29
corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a business trust, or an
30
unincorporated organization. 15 U.S.C. §78(c)(9). An individual or company. 15 U.S.C.
31
§79(b)(1) "Person" and "whoever" means an individual, partnership, committee,
32
association, corporation, or any other organization or group of persons. 18 U.S.C.
33
§591(g). The term "person" and the term "whoever" include any individual, corporation,
34
company, association, firm, partnership, society, or joint-stock company. 18 U.S.C.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 215
1
§917(1). Any employee, or agent of the United States or any State or political
2
subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint-stock company,
3
trust, or corporation. 18 U.S.C. §2510(6). "Person" includes one or more individuals,
4
labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives,
5
mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees,
6
trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers. 29 U.S.C. §403 (d). An individual, a corporation, an
7
organization, or other legal entity. U.C.C. §1-201(29). "Person" includes an individual or
8
an organization. U.C.C. §1-201(30). A natural person or an organization. 12 C.F.R.
9
§226.2(v). Principles of a cooperation represent the person of the corporation and are
10
not only liable for actions of the corporation but are also entitled to speak for the
11
corporation and are in fact the only Real Parties of Interest of the corporation. An
12
attorney is not a Real Party of Interest for a corporation or for that matter a minor child
13
(other than their own children), consequentially an attorney cannot speak for the
14
corporation or child, everything an attorney submits on behalf of a corporate person or
15
child is by definition of the law, hearsay.
16
17
CUSTODY MATTERS DICTATE DUE PROCESS
Cal.App. 1975. Judgment freeing child from custody and control of
18
its parents results in total severance of its natural ties between
19
parents and child and amounts to taking of a "liberty" under due
20
process clause of Constitution.
21
Ann.Civ.Code. Sec. 232.
22
C.A.3d 300.
23
24
25
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends.
5, 14; West's
In re Susan Lynn M., 125 Cal.Rptr. 707, 53
-8A Cal D 2d-436
Cal.App. 1974.
due process of law.
Parent in dependency proceeding is entitled to
In re J.T., 115 Cal.Rptr. 553, 40 C.A.3d 633.
Notice of allegations upon which deprivation of custody of
26
minor children is predicated is fundamental due process.
27
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
In re J.T., 115 Cal.Rptr. 553, 40 C.A.3d 633.
28
Findings of fact made by juvenile court in adjudicating minors
29
to be dependent children of court were conclusory in nature and denied
30
mother of minor children due process of law in that such findings
31
failed to apprise her of court's reason for its decision and did not
32
form adequate basis for review.
33
Sec.Sec. 600-602, 702, 726(a-c).
34
C.A.3d 633.
35
West's Ann. Welfare & Inst.Code.
In re J.T., 115 Cal.Rptr. 553, 40
-8A Cal D 2d-436
Cal.App. 1971.
Parent had right to custody of her child of which
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 216
1
she could not be deprived in dependency proceeding without essential
2
ingredients of due process, including a fair hearing.
3
Ann.Welfare & Inst.Code. Sed. 600; U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14;
4
Superior Court for Los Angeles County, 97 Cal.Rptr. 158, 19 C.A.3d 895.
5
-8A Cal D 2d-437
Cal.App. 1970.
6
West's
R. v.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a requisite to
7
due process at adjudicatory state of a state juvenile court proceeding,
8
and United States Supreme Court decision to that effect is applicable
9
to cases pending on direct appeal at time of decision.
West's
10
Ann.Welfare & Inst.Code, Sec. 700. In re W., 91 Cal.Rptr. 702, 12
11
C.A.3d 1120.
-8A Cal D 2d-438
CUSDOCY AND CALIFORNIA CODES
12
13
CALIFORNIA CODES
14
CIVIL CODE
15
SECTION
16
711.
17
Conditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the
interest created, are void.
18
CALIFORNIA CODES
19
CIVIL CODE
20
SECTION
21
43.
Besides the personal rights mentioned or recognized in the
22
Government Code, every person has, subject to the qualifications and
23
restrictions provided by law, the right of protection from bodily
24
restraint or harm, from personal insult, from defamation, and from
25
injury to his personal relations.
DUE PROCESS DICTATES GOOD CAUSE
26
C.A.Cal. 1981.
27
State must ultimately justify depriving person of
28
protected liberty interest by determining that good cause exists for
29
deprivation.
30
1017.
31
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d
-8A Cal D 2d-399
Cal. 1971.
In order that presumption satisfy due process clause
32
of Fourteenth Amendment there must be a rational connection between the
33
facts provided and the facts presumed. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
34
People v. Montalvo, 482 P.2d 205, 93 Cal. Rptr. 581, 4 C.3d 328, 49
35
A.L.R.3d 518.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 217
1
Cal.App. 1977.
If individual is condemned to suffer grievous
2
loss of liberty, he must first be accorded due process of law,
3
irrespective of burden imposed upon government agency. ... Fundamental
4
mandate of Fourteenth Amendment is that person be afforded notice and
5
opportunity to be heard prior to deprivation of significant liberty or
6
property interest U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
7
Cal.Rptr. 546, 73 C.A.3d 38.
8
Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1985.
9
In re Anderson, 140
-8A Cal D 2d-424
Where one's liberty is at stake,
application of strict-scrutiny test is required and it becomes
10
government's burden to justify procedure by showing it has compelling
11
interest which is furthered by procedure in question.
12
of Waltz, 213 Cal.Rptr. 529, 167 C.A.3d 835.
13
Cal.App. 4 Dist 1984.
Conservatorship
"Procedural due process" rules exist to
14
minimize risk of substantively unfair or mistaken deprivation of life,
15
liberty or property by enabling persons to contest basis on which
16
government proposes to deprive them of their protected interests.
17
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5. McCaffrey v. Preston, 201 Cal.Rptr. 252, 154
18
C.A.3d 422.
19
-8A Cal D 2d-424
Cal. 1977.
When state participates in deprivation of person's
20
right to personal liberty, even conditional liberty, due process
21
requires that facts justifying that action be reliably established and,
22
to that end, person must receive hearing after adequate written notice
23
of basis for proposed action and an opportunity to appear in person and
24
to present evidence in his own behalf, and he has right to
25
confrontation by , and opportunity to cross-examine, adverse witnesses,
26
a neutral and detached decision maker, findings by preponderance of
27
evidence and record of proceeding adequate to permit meaningful
28
judicial or appellate review.
U.S.C.S.Const. Amend. 14; West's
29
Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7(a).
In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 141
30
Cal.Rptr. 298, 19 C.3d 921.
31
Cal. 1980.
-8A Cal D 2d-423
Identification of dictates of due process generally
32
requires consideration of (1) private interest that will be affected by
33
the official action, (2) risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
34
interest through procedures used, and probable value, if any, of
35
additional or substitute procedural safeguards, (3) dignitary interest
36
in informing individuals of nature, grounds and consequences of the
37
action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a
38
responsible governmental official, and (4) governmental interest,
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 218
1
including function involved and fiscal and administrative burdens that
2
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
3
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7.
4
v. Scott, 613 P.2d 210, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149, 27 C.3d 424.
5
398
6
Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1984.
Van Atta
-8A Cal D 2d-
Deprivation of freedom falls within
7
prohibition against deprivation of liberty expressed in State and
8
Federal Constitutions. .... Implicit in concept that freedom from
9
arbitrary adjudicative processes is substantive element of one's
10
liberty is that court will require sufficient information to make a
11
reasoned decision that reflects and exercise of discretion; which must
12
be given to important due process value of promoting accuracy and
13
reasonable predictability in governmental decision making when
14
individuals are subject to deprivatory action.
15
Art. 1, Sec. 7(a).
16
-8A Cal D 2d-424
17
Cal.App. 1977.
West's Ann.Cal. Const.
People v. Davis, 207 Cal.Rptr. 18, 160 C.A.3d 970.
Juvenile proceedings which may result in
18
substantial loss of freedom are regarded as quasi criminal in nature
19
and, as a consequence, fundamental notions of due process and fairness
20
must be strictly observed.
21
In Matter of Aaron N., 139 Cal.Rptr. 258, 70 C.A.3d 931.
22
Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1985.
Wets's Ann.Welfare & Inst.Code, Sec. 702.5.
Due process requires that parents be
23
afforded notice and opportunity to be heard at jurisdictional hearings
24
in juvenile court dependency proceedings.
25
West's Ann.Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code Sec. 300.
26
864, 165 C.A.3d 270.
27
28
29
30
31
32
Cal. 1979. Minors have a liberty interest that entitles them to due
process whenever a state initiates action to deprive them of liberty.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14. In re Scott K., 595 P.2d 105, 155 Cal.Rptr.
671, 24 C.3d 395, certiorari denied Fare v. Scott K., 100 S.Ct. 468,
444 U.S. 973, 62 L.Ed.2d 388.
Cal. 1977. Minor is entitled to protection of due process
33
whenever state itself initiates action, whether civil or quasi
34
criminal, to deprive minor of his liberty.
35
West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7(a).
36
141 Cal.Rptr. 298, 19 C.3d 921.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14;
In re C.P., 230 Cal.Rptr.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14;
In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286,
37
Even conditional liberty interest, such as that of minor, is
38
entitled to protections of due process when state is involved to any
39
significant degree in its diminution.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 219
1
Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7(a).
2
Cal.Rptr. 298, 19 C.3d 921.
3
Cal.App. 1954.
In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 141
Under constitutional guaranties, no right of an
4
individual, valuable to him pecunirily or otherwise, can be justly
5
taken away without its being done conformably to principle of justice
6
which afford due process of law unless the law constitutionally
7
otherwise provides, and due process of law does not mean according to
8
the whim, caprice, or will of the judge but according to the law.
9
re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291.
10
11
Judicial absolutism is not a part of the American way of life,
and the odious doctrine that the end justifies the means does not
13
prevail in our system for the administration of justice.
14
Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291
In re
DUE PROCESS DICTATES AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND
16
FAIR TRIAL BY JURY
17
U.S.Cal. 1982.
Due process demands impartiality on the part of
18
those who function in judicial of auasi-judicial capacities.
19
Const.Amend. 5.
20
L.Ed.2d 1.
21
-8A
Cal D 2d-377
12
15
In
U.S.C.A.
Schweiker v. McClure, 102 S.Ct. 1665, 456 U.S. 188, 72
-8A Cal D 2d-385
D.C.Cal. 1971.
Due process requires that government abide by
22
basic principles of fairness when dispensing, or revoking, a privilege.
23
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
24
D.D.Cal 1975.
Hester v. Craven, 322 F.Supp. 1256.
At heart of any due process hearing is requirement
25
of an impartial decision maker.
26
Housing Authority of Tulare County, 389 F.Supp. 635.
27
Cal.App. 1954.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend 5.
Ponce v
-8A Cal D 2d-386
Under constitutional guaranties, no right of an
28
individual, valuable to him pecunirily or otherwise, can be justly
29
taken away without its being done conformably to principle of justice
30
which afford due process of law unless the law constitutionally
31
otherwise provides, and due process of law does not mean according to
32
the whim, caprice, or will of the judge but according to the law.
33
re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291.
34
Cal D 2d-377
35
36
In
-8A
Judicial absolutism is not a part of the American way of life,
and the odious doctrine that the end justifies the means does not
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 220
1
prevail in our system for the administration of justice.
2
Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291.
3
Cal D 2d-377
D.C.Cal. 1980.
4
In re
-8A
In order to satisfy fair hearing requirement of
5
due process clause, a tribunal, whether administrative or judicial,
6
must be impartial; adjudicator may neither have pecuniary interest in
7
outcome nor have been target of personal abuse or criticism from party
8
before him.
McClure v. Harris, 503
DUE PROCESS DICTATES COMPETENT AND SUBJECT
9
10
U.S.C.A.Const Amend. 14.
MATTER JURISDICTION:
Cal.App.
11
1966.
The essentials of due process are regular and
12
orderly procedure in court of competent jurisdiction, notice to
13
defendant, opportunity for defendant to be heard, and fair hearing.
14
State Acting By and Through Dept. of Water Resources v. Natomas Co., 49
15
Cal.Rptr 64, 239 C.A.2d 547.
Cal.App. 1859.
16
There are two essentials to due process in a
17
judicial proceeding: (1) that the court have jurisdiction over the
18
parties and the subject matter of the action, and (2) that the parties
19
have reasonable notice and an opportunity for hearing.
20
Ann.Const.art. 1, Sec.Sec. 2, 13.
21
C.A.2d 613.
D.C.Cal 1975.
22
West's
Datta v. Staab, 343 P.2d 977, 173
The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the
23
legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact laws
24
which will deprive individuals of their liberty without due process.
25
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983.
26
F.Supp 871, supplemented 402 F.Supp. 623.
Lipp v. Procunier, 395
DUE PROCESS DICTATES FAIRNESS:
27
Cal.Ap. 1982.
28
Fundamental fairness, i.e. due process, includes
29
right to present legal and factual issues in deliberate and orderly
30
manner.
31
Quality, Bd. of Medical Quality Assur., 180 Cal.Rptr. 516, 128 C.A.3d
32
699.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
White v. Division of Medical
-8A Cal D 2d-387
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 221
1
Cal.App. 1974.
Procedural due process requires that the property
2
of a deprivation of substantial right to be resolved in a manner
3
consistent with essential fairness.
4
For City and County of San Francisco, 114 Cal.Rptr. 404, 39 C.A.3d 611.
5
-8A Cal D 2d-387
6
U.S.Cal. 1985.
Ursino v. Superior Court, In and
Very nature of the due process inquiry indicates
7
that the fundamental fairness of a particular procedure does not turn
8
on the result obtained in any individual case but, rather, procedural
9
due process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare
10
exception.
11
Radiation Survivors, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 473 U.S. 305, 87 L.Ed.2d 220, on
12
remand 111 F.R.D. 595.
13
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
Cal.App.
1962.
Walters v. National Ass'n of
-8A Cal D 2d-385
Due process requires fair trial before impartial
14
tribunal, and such trial requires that person or body who decides cases
15
must known, consider, and appraise evidence.
16
Berkley, 26 Cal.Rptr. 550, 210 C.A.2d 313.
17
Petitioner refuses Bifurcation.
Le Strange v. City of
-8A Cal D 2d-385
There is no reason to Bifurcate
18
this matter.
Petitioner demands this matter be fully heard before an
19
impartial and fair Jury in a Court of lawful subject matter
20
jurisdiction with a fair judge in conformance with the applicable law.
21
Petitioner is in the process of suing the Santa Cruz Superior Court and
22
Judge assigned to this case.
23
jurisdiction on this matter as a matter of contract and as a
24
Constitutional mandate that dictates the right to a fair and impartial
25
hearing and trial by jury: United States of America Constitution
26
Amendment The Seventh:"In suits at common law, where the value in
27
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
28
shall be preserved":
Santa Cruz Superior Court has given up
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 222
1
DUE PROCESS DICTATES AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND FAIR TRIAL BY JURY
2
U.S.Cal. 1982.
Due process demands impartiality on the part of
3
those who function in judicial of auasi-judicial capacities.
4
Const.Amend. 5.
5
L.Ed.2d 1.
6
U.S.C.A.
Schweiker v. McClure, 102 S.Ct. 1665, 456 U.S. 188, 72
-8A Cal D 2d-385
D.C.Cal. 1971.
Due process requires that government abide by
7
basic principles of fairness when dispensing, or revoking, a privilege.
8
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
9
D.D.Cal 1975.
Hester v. Craven, 322 F.Supp. 1256.
At heart of any due process hearing is requirement
10
of an impartial decision maker.
11
Housing Authority of Tulare County, 389 F.Supp. 635.
12
Cal.App. 1954.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend 5.
Ponce v
-8A Cal D 2d-386
Under constitutional guaranties, no right of an
13
individual, valuable to him pecunirily or otherwise, can be justly
14
taken away without its being done conformably to principle of justice
15
which afford due process of law unless the law constitutionally
16
otherwise provides, and due process of law does not mean according to
17
the whim, caprice, or will of the judge but according to the law.
18
re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291.
19
Cal D 2d-377
20
-8A
Judicial absolutism is not a part of the American way of life,
21
and the odious doctrine that the end justifies the means does not
22
prevail in our system for the administration of justice.
23
Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291.
24
Cal D 2d-377
25
In
D.C.Cal. 1980.
In re
-8A
In order to satisfy fair hearing requirement of
26
due process clause, a tribunal, whether administrative or judicial,
27
must be impartial; adjudicator may neither have pecuniary interest in
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 223
1
outcome nor have been target of personal abuse or criticism from party
2
before him.
U.S.C.A.Const Amend. 14.
McClure v. Harris, 503
3
DUE PROCESS DICTATES COMPETENT AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION:
4
Cal.App.
1966.
The essentials of due process are regular and
5
orderly procedure in court of competent jurisdiction, notice to
6
defendant, opportunity for defendant to be heard, and fair hearing.
7
State Acting By and Through Dept. of Water Resources v. Natomas Co., 49
8
Cal.Rptr 64, 239 C.A.2d 547.
9
Cal.App. 1859.
There are two essentials to due process in a
10
judicial proceeding: (1) that the court have jurisdiction over the
11
parties and the subject matter of the action, and (2) that the parties
12
have reasonable notice and an opportunity for hearing.
13
Ann.Const.art. 1, Sec.Sec. 2, 13.
14
C.A.2d 613.
15
West's
Datta v. Staab, 343 P.2d 977, 173
Furthermore, it is improper and unethical of Respondent to call
16
this hearing three days before Petitioners release from Santa Cruz
17
County Jail where Petitioner is falsely imprisoned as a consequence of
18
Respondent's false 911 call on March 10, 2003, which as a result of
19
Respondent's lies to the Sheriffs, according to the Sheriffs, caused a
20
Deputy Sheriff to shoot at and nearly murder Petitioner and his
21
children (See Exhibit A: "DEFENDANTS Proof of Innocence").
22
Petitioner is falsely incarcerated, Petitioner, in propria persona, sui
23
juris, is unable to properly prepare for and attend said hearing.
24
Consequentially, Petitioner notifies all parties that Petitioner is
25
unable to attend said hearing on December 16, 2004, in the Santa Cruz
26
Superior Court.
27
28
While
Without any authority to do so, Santa Cruz Superior Court
improperly and unlawfully assigned pseudo lawyer, Mr. Frandeen, to
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 224
1
represent Petitioners sons.
2
repugnant court filings along with excessive frivolous calls to
3
Petitioners attorney burnt up Petitioners legal funds and has left
4
Petitioner unable to afford competent counsel.
5
Respondent to seek sanctions is emphasized in the fact that Respondent
6
transferred $180,000.00 from our joint accounts into her personal
7
account just prior to being caught in adultery; the fact that
8
Respondent's criminal actions against Petitioner have caused Petitioner
9
to be driven into bankruptcy and denied the most basic liberty and
10
Mr Frandeen's false allegations and
The audacity of
rights, including the right to his very own children!
11
DUE PROCESS DICTATES GOOD CAUSE
12
C.A.Cal. 1981.
State must ultimately justify depriving person of
13
protected liberty interest by determining that good cause exists for
14
deprivation.
15
1017.
16
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d
-8A Cal D 2d-399
Cal.App. 1977.
If individual is condemned to suffer grievous
17
loss of liberty, he must first be accorded due process of law,
18
irrespective of burden imposed upon government agency. ... Fundamental
19
mandate of Fourteenth Amendment is that person be afforded notice and
20
opportunity to be heard prior to deprivation of significant liberty or
21
property interest U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
22
Cal.Rptr. 546, 73 C.A.3d 38.
23
Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1985.
In re Anderson, 140
-8A Cal D 2d-424
Where one's liberty is at stake,
24
application of strict-scrutiny test is required and it becomes
25
government's burden to justify procedure by showing it has compelling
26
interest which is furthered by procedure in question.
27
of Waltz, 213 Cal.Rptr. 529, 167 C.A.3d 835.
Conservatorship
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 225
1
Cal.App. 4 Dist 1984.
"Procedural due process" rules exist to
2
minimize risk of substantively unfair or mistaken deprivation of life,
3
liberty or property by enabling persons to contest basis on which
4
government proposes to deprive them of their protected interests.
5
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5. McCaffrey v. Preston, 201 Cal.Rptr. 252, 154
6
C.A.3d 422.
7
-8A Cal D 2d-424
Cal. 1977.
When state participates in deprivation of person's
8
right to personal liberty, even conditional liberty, due process
9
requires that facts justifying that action be reliably established and,
10
to that end, person must receive hearing after adequate written notice
11
of basis for proposed action and an opportunity to appear in person and
12
to present evidence in his own behalf, and he has right to
13
confrontation by , and opportunity to cross-examine, adverse witnesses,
14
a neutral and detached decision maker, findings by preponderance of
15
evidence and record of proceeding adequate to permit meaningful
16
judicial or appellate review.
U.S.C.S.Const. Amend. 14; West's
17
Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7(a).
In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 141
18
Cal.Rptr. 298, 19 C.3d 921.
19
Cal. 1980.
-8A Cal D 2d-423
Identification of dictates of due process generally
20
requires consideration of (1) private interest that will be affected by
21
the official action, (2) risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
22
interest through procedures used, and probable value, if any, of
23
additional or substitute procedural safeguards, (3) dignitary interest
24
in informing individuals of nature, grounds and consequences of the
25
action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a
26
responsible governmental official, and (4) governmental interest,
27
including function involved and fiscal and administrative burdens that
28
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 226
1
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7.
2
v. Scott, 613 P.2d 210, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149, 27 C.3d 424.
3
398
4
Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1984.
Van Atta
-8A Cal D 2d-
Deprivation of freedom falls within
5
prohibition against deprivation of liberty expressed in State and
6
Federal Constitutions. .... Implicit in concept that freedom from
7
arbitrary adjudicative processes is substantive element of one's
8
liberty is that court will require sufficient information to make a
9
reasoned decision that reflects and exercise of discretion; which must
10
be given to important due process value of promoting accuracy and
11
reasonable predictability in governmental decision making when
12
individuals are subject to deprivatory action.
13
Art. 1, Sec. 7(a).
14
-8A Cal D 2d-424
15
West's Ann.Cal. Const.
People v. Davis, 207 Cal.Rptr. 18, 160 C.A.3d 970.
Cal.App. 1954.
Under constitutional guaranties, no right of an
16
individual, valuable to him pecunirily or otherwise, can be justly
17
taken away without its being done conformably to principle of justice
18
which afford due process of law unless the law constitutionally
19
otherwise provides, and due process of law does not mean according to
20
the whim, caprice, or will of the judge but according to the law.
21
re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291.
22
Cal D 2d-377
23
and the odious doctrine that the end justifies the means does not
25
prevail in our system for the administration of justice.
26
Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291
28
-8A
Judicial absolutism is not a part of the American way of life,
24
27
In
In re
Due Process, Fair Hearing & Trial By Jury LAW DEFINED
8A Cal D 2d-374
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 227
1
U.S. Cal 1952.
Due process of law is a summarized constitutional
2
guarantee of respect for those personal immunities which are so rooted
3
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
4
fundamental of are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
5
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.
6
U.S. 165, 96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396.
Rochin v. People of Cal., 72 S.Ct. 205, 342
7
8A Cal D 2d-375
8
C.A.Cal. 1967. The present concept of due process stems from the
9
American ideal of fairness in the treatment of all.
10
Amend. 5.
11
2129, 388 U.S. 915, 18 L.Ed.2d 1356.
U.S.C.A.Const.
Howard v. U.S., 372 F.2d 294, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct.
12
8A Cal D 2d-377
13
Cal.App. 1954.
Under constitutional guaranties, no right of an
14
individual, valuable to him pecunirily or otherwise, can be justly
15
taken away without its being done conformably to principle of justice
16
which afford due process of law unless the law constitutionally
17
otherwise provides, and due process of law does not mean according to
18
the whim, caprice, or will of the judge but according to the law.
19
re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291
20
Judicial absolutism is not a part of the American way of life,
21
and the odious doctrine that the end justifies the means does not
22
prevail in our system for the administration of justice.
23
Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291
24
In
Cal.App.
192.
In re
Due process is not concerned with mere technical
25
formalism, but rather it is the substance that determines whether a
26
litigant has been deprived of it.
27
Pharmacy, 243 P.2d 890, 110 C.A.2d 826.
28
8A Cal D 2d-382
29
Cal. 1979.
Vita-Pharmacals, Inc. v. Board of
Application of the due process clauses of the
30
California Constitution must be determined in the context of the
31
individual's due process liberty interests in freedom from arbitrary
32
adjudicative procedures; thus, when a person is deprived of a statutory
33
conferred benefit, due process analysis must start, not with a judicial
34
attempt to decide whether the statute has created an "entitlement" that
35
can be defined as "liberty" or "property", but with an assessment of
36
what procedural protections are constitutionally required in light of
37
the governmental and private interests at stake.
38
art. 1 Sec.Sec. 7(a), 15.
West's Ann.Const.
People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 158 Cal
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 228
1
Rptr. 316, 25 C.3d 260.
2
Cal 1979. Touchstone of due process is fundamental fairness.
3
U.S.C.A.Const. Ammend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1 Sec.Sec. 7(a).
4
Salas v. Cortez, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal.Rptr. 529, 24 C.3d 22,
5
certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 209, 444 U.S. 900, 62 L.Ed.2d 136.
6
8A Cal D 2d-382
7
Cal.App. 3Dist. 1985.
Cardinal principle of substantive due
8
process is that a law which deprives a person of life, liberty, or
9
property must not be product of arbitrary legislative judgment; such a
10
law must be reasonably related to the object sought to be attained by
11
its enactment.
12
210 Cal.Rptr.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
People v. Armbruster,
11, 163 C.A.3d 660.
13
8A Cal D 2d-382
14
Cal.App. 1979.
Substantive due process prohibits governmental
15
interference with a person's fundamental right to life, liberty or
16
property by unreasonable or arbitrary legislation.
17
Amend. 14; West's Ann.
18
Cal.Rptr. 63, 91 C.A.3d 184.
19
8A Cal D 2d-385
20
U.S.Cal. 1985.
Const. art. 1 Sec. 7.
U.S.C.A.Const.
In re David B., 154
Very nature of the due process inquiry indicates
21
that the fundamental fairness of a particular procedure does not turn
22
on the result obtained in any individual case but, rather, procedural
23
due process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare
24
exception.
25
Radiation Survivors, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 473 U.S. 305, 87 L.Ed.2d 220, on
26
remand 111 F.R.D. 595.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
27
8A Cal D 2d-385
28
U.S.Cal. 1982.
Walters v. National Ass'n of
Due process demands impartiality on the part of
29
those who function in judicial of auasi-judicial capacities.
30
Const.Amend. 5.
31
L.Ed.2d 1.
32
U.S.C.A.
Schweiker v. McClure, 102 S.Ct. 1665, 456 U.S. 188, 72
C.A.9 (Cal.) 1986.
Due process clause guarantees aggrieved party
33
opportunity to present case and have its merits fairly judged.
34
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
35
Utilities Com'n of State of Cal., 793 F.2d 1090, certiorari denied 107
36
S.Ct. 1334, 479 U.S. 1102, 94 L.E.2d 184.
37
38
Jackson Water Works, Inc. v. Public
Under due process clause, every party is entitled to impartial
tribunal.
Jackson Water Works, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com'n of State
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 229
1
of Cal., 793 F.2d 1090, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 1334, 479 U.S.
2
1102, 94 L.E.2d 184.
C.A.Cal 1967.
3
Due process is denied where the procedure tends to
4
shock the sense of fair play.
5
375 F.2d 294, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 2129, 388 U.S. 915, 18 L.Ed.2d
6
1365.
7
8A Cal D 2d-386
8
D.D.Cal 1975.
9
10
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5.
Howard v. U.S.,
At heart of any due process hearing is requirement
of an impartial decision maker.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend 5.
Ponce v
Housing Authority of Tulare County, 389 F.Supp. 635.
D.C.Cal. 1971.
11
Procedural due process must obtain whenever
12
individual is subject to "grievous loss" at hands of state or its
13
instrumentalities.
14
Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767, modified, cause remanded 497
15
F.2d 809, modified 510 F.2d 613, certiorari granted Enomoto v.
16
Clutchette, 95 S.Ct. 2414, 421 U.S. 101, 44 L.Ed.2d 810, vacated, on
17
remand 536 F.2d 305, on remand 471 F.Supp 1113.
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Rudimentary principles of due process require presence of counsel
18
19
when rights of individual are seriously threatened by governmental
20
action.
21
F.Supp. 767, modified, cause remanded 497 F.2d 809, modified 510 F.2d
22
613, certiorari granted Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S.Ct. 2414, 421 U.S.
23
101, 44 L.Ed.2d 810, vacated, on remand 536 F.2d 305, on remand 471
24
F.Supp 1113.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328
25
8A Cal D 2d-387
26
Cal.Ap. 1982.
Fundamental fairness, i.e. due process, includes
27
right to present legal and factual issues in deliberate and orderly
28
manner.
29
Quality, Bd. of Medical Quality Assur., 180 Cal.Rptr. 516, 128 C.A.3d
30
699.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
31
8A Cal D 2d-387
32
Cal.App. 1974.
White v. Division of Medical
Procedural due process requires that the property
33
of a deprivation of substantial right to be resolved in a manner
34
consistent with essential fairness.
35
For City and County of San Francisco, 114 Cal.Rptr. 404, 39 C.A.3d 611.
36
Cal.App.
1966.
Ursino v. Superior Court, In and
The essentials of due process are regular and
37
orderly procedure in court of competent jurisdiction, notice to
38
defendant, opportunity for defendant to be heard, and fair hearing.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 230
1
State Acting By and Through Dept. of Water Resources v. Natomas Co., 49
2
Cal.Rptr 64, 239 C.A.2d 547.
Cal.App.
3
1962.
Due process requires fair trial before impartial
4
tribunal, and such trial requires that person or body who decides cases
5
must known, consider, and appraise evidence.
6
Berkley, 26 Cal.Rptr. 550, 210 C.A.2d 313.
Cal.App. 1859.
7
Le Strange v. City of
There are two essentials to due process in a
8
judicial proceeding: (1) that the court have jurisdiction over the
9
parties and the subject matter of the action, and (2) that the parties
10
have reasonable notice and an opportunity for hearing.
11
Ann.Const.art. 1, Sec.Sec. 2, 13.
12
C.A.2d 613.
C.A.9 (Cal) 1985.
13
West's
Datta v. Staab, 343 P.2d 977, 173
If individual bringing procedural due process
14
challenge demonstrates likelihood of irreparable harm, resulting from
15
lack of predeprivation hearing, it is unlikely that government will be
16
able to demonstrate any public interest that will overcome individual's
17
interest, and some additional form of predeprivation process will
18
probably be require; in absence of such showing, however, courts must
19
balance governmental interests in retaining existing process against
20
private interest that will effect and probability of erroneous
21
deprivation associated with that process.
22
14.
Jolly v. U.S. 764 F.2d 642.
C.A.Cal 1983.
23
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5,
Central meaning of procedural due process is that
24
parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard at a
25
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
26
14.
27
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5,
Orloff v. Cleland, 708 F.2d 372.
C.A.Cal 1985.
Fundamental requirements of due process is the
28
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner
29
in terms of the threatened conduct, U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
30
Club v. Watt, 608 F.Supp. 305.
31
D.D.Cal 1984.
Opportunity to be heard guaranteed by due process
32
is opportunity which must be granted at meaningful time and in
33
meaningful manner.
34
E.P.A. 599 F.Supp. 69.
35
D.C.Cal. 1980.
Sieffa
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
Aminoil, Inc. v. U.S.
In order to satisfy fair hearing requirement of
36
due process clause, a tribunal, whether administrative or judicial,
37
must be impartial; adjudicator may neither have pecuniary interest in
38
outcome nor have been target of personal abuse or criticism from party
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 231
1
2
before him.
U.S.C.A.Const Amend. 14.
D.C.Cal. 1970.
McClure v. Harris, 503
The due process right to predetermination
3
hearing, with right to confront and question witnesses, is the
4
constitutional norm and not the exception when government action
5
seriously injures an individual and the crucial decision is based upon
6
facts alleged by a third party.
7
Resources, 325 F.Supp. 1314, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 2495, 408 U.S.
8
924, 33 L.Ed.2d 335, revised 490 F.2d 580, vacated 95 S.Ct. 1110, 420
9
U.S. 917, 43 L.Ed.2d 388.
10
Cal. 1985.
Crow v. California Dept. of Human
Fundamental fairness includes both right to adequate
11
notice and right to defend against charged violations.
12
Sales v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd.
13
America, AFL-CIO), 703 P.2d 27, 216 Cal.Rptr. 688, 39 C.3d 209.
14
Cal. 1982.
respond, and a hearing.
16
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend, 14.
17
Cal.Rptr. 508, 31 C.3d 637.
Cal. 1979.
(United Farm Workers of
Rudiments of fair play include notice, opportunity to
15
18
Harry Carian
West's Ann.Const.Art. 1, Sec. 7;
In re Marriage of Flaherty, 646 P.2d 179, 183
Where prior notice of potentially adverse decision is
19
constitutionally required, such notice must, at minimum, be reasonably
20
calculated to afford affected persons realistic opportunity to protect
21
their interests.
22
P.2d 1134, 156 Cal.Rptr. 718, 24 C.3d 605.
23
Cal. 1975.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend 14.
Horn v. Ventura County, 596
Fundamental requisite of due process is the
24
meaningful opportunity to be heard and to explain one's actions.
25
People v. Coleman, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 13 C.3d 867.
26
Cal. 1968.
Since right to hearing is one of rudiments of fair
27
play assured by Fourteenth Amendment, there can be no compromise on
28
footing of convenience or expediency when that minimal requirement has
29
been neglected or ignored.
30
Schutzbank, 436, P.2d 297, 65 Cal.Rptr. 297, 68 C.2d 162.
31
Cal.App.2Dist. 1989.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Due process requires notice and opportunity
32
for a hearing before an impartial tribunal.
33
West's Ann.Cal. Const.Art. 1, Sec. 7, 15.
34
Cal.Rptr. 199, 211 C.A.3d 133, review denied.
35
8A Cal D 2d-387
36
C.A.Cal 1983.
Endler v.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14;
Bennett v. Bodily, 259
Central meaning of procedural due process is that
37
parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard at a
38
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5,
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 232
1
14.
Orloff v. Cleland, 708 F.2d 372.
2
8A Cal D 2d-390
3
Cal.App. 2 Dist.
1987.
A fundamental requisite of due process
4
is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and a meaningful
5
manner.
6
Cal.Rptr. 605, 196 C.A.3d 1526.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
7
384, 13 C.3d 867.
8
Cal. 1968.
9
Cordova v. Vons Grocery Co., 242
Since right to hearing is one of rudiments of fair
play assured by Fourteenth Amendment, there can be no compromise on
10
footing of convenience or expediency when that minimal requirement has
11
been neglected or ignored.
12
Schutzbank, 436, P.2d 297, 65 Cal.Rptr. 297, 68 C.2d 162.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Endler v.
13
103 S.Ct. 1497, 460 U.S. 1051, 75 L.Ed.2d 929.
14
Cal.App. 1981. One aspect of the procedural protection of due
15
process is the opportunity to be heard within a reasonably prompt
16
period of time. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. Garcia v. Los Angeles County
17
Bd. of Ed., 177 Cal.Rptr. 29, 123 C.A.3d 807.
18
8A Cal D 2d-377
19
Cal.App. 1954.
Under constitutional guaranties, no right of an
20
individual, valuable to him pecunirily or otherwise, can be justly
21
taken away without its being done conformably to principle of justice
22
which afford due process of law unless the law constitutionally
23
otherwise provides, and due process of law does not mean according to
24
the whim, caprice, or will of the judge but according to the law.
25
re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291
26
In
Judicial absolutism is not a part of the American way of life,
27
and the odious doctrine that the end justifies the means does not
28
prevail in our system for the administration of justice.
29
Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291
30
8A Cal D 2d-382
31
Cal. 1979.
In re
Application of the due process clauses of the
32
California Constitution must be determined in the context of the
33
individual's due process liberty interests in freedom from arbitrary
34
adjudicative procedures; thus, when a person is deprived of a statutory
35
conferred benefit, due process analysis must start, not with a judicial
36
attempt to decide whether the statute has created an "entitlement" that
37
can be defined as "liberty" or "property", but with an assessment of
38
what procedural protections are constitutionally required in light of
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 233
1
the governmental and private interests at stake.
2
art. 1 Sec.Sec. 7(a), 15.
3
Rptr. 316, 25 C.3d 260.
4
8A Cal D 2d-382
5
Cal.App. 3Dist. 1985.
West's Ann.Const.
People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 158 Cal
Cardinal principle of substantive due
6
process is that a law which deprives a person of life, liberty, or
7
property must not be product of arbitrary legislative judgment; such a
8
law must be reasonably related to the object sought to be attained by
9
its enactment.
10
210 Cal.Rptr.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
People v. Armbruster,
11, 163 C.A.3d 660.
11
8A Cal D 2d-382
12
Cal.App. 1979.
Substantive due process prohibits governmental
13
interference with a person's fundamental right to life, liberty or
14
property by unreasonable or arbitrary legislation.
15
Amend. 14; West's Ann.
16
Cal.Rptr. 63, 91 C.A.3d 184.
17
8A Cal D 2d-397
18
D.C.Cal 1982.
Const. art. 1 Sec. 7.
U.S.C.A.Const.
In re David B., 154
Question as to whether individual has an interest
19
protected by due process is not merely "weight" of the interests but
20
rather, whether nature of the interest is one within contemplation of
21
"liberty or property" language of Fourteenth Amendment.
22
Const.Amend. 14.
23
D.C.Cal. 1980.
U.S.C.A.
It is nature of interest at stake in proceeding,
24
that determines whether constitutional requirements of due process
25
apply; alleged violations of "rights" that arise exclusively out of
26
failure to comply with procedures provided by city charter, ordinances
27
and regulations do not sustain a federal constitutional claim.
28
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
29
Concord, 511 F.Supp. 87. affirmed 686 F.2d 798, certiorari denied 103
30
S.Ct. 1777, 460 U.S. 1085, 76 L.Ed.2d 349.
31
D.C.Cal.1973.
Contra Costa Theater, Inc. v. City of
To determine whether due process requirements
32
apply, court must not look to the weight, but to the nature of the
33
interests at stake.
34
of University of California, 353 F.Supp. 618.
35
D.C.Cal. 1972.
U.S.C.A.Const Amends. 5, 14.
Perkins v. Regents
To receive due process protection, interests in
36
dispute need not reach level of the traditional constitutional "right."
37
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.
38
F.Supp. 798, affirmed Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated
Keller v. Kate Maremont Foundation, 365
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 234
1
2
Mortg. Investers, 504 F.2d 483.
Due process analysis requires consideration of precise nature of
3
governmental function and private interests which will be affected by
4
the government action.
5
Maremont Foundation, 365 F.Supp. 798, affirmed Geneva Towers Tenants
6
Organization v. Federated Mortg. Investors, 504 F.2d 483.
7
D.C.Cal. 1971.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.
Keller v. Kate
Procedural due process is not required only when
8
some "vested right" is being impaired.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
9
Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767, modified, cause remanded 497
10
F.2d 809, modified 510 F.2d 613, certiorari granted Enomoto v.
11
Clutchette, 95 S.Ct 2414, 421 U.S. 1010, 44 L.Ed.2d 678, reversed
12
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 96 S.Ct 1551, 425 U.S. 308, 47 L.Ed.2d 810,
13
vacated, on remand 536 F.2d 305, on remand 471 F.Sup. 1113.
14
D.C.Cal. 1971.
Due process requires that government abide by
15
basic principles of fairness when dispensing, or revoking, a privilege.
16
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
17
Cal. 1980.
Hester v. Craven, 322 F.Supp. 1256.
Identification of dictates of due process generally
18
requires consideration of (1) private interest that will be affected by
19
the official action, (2) risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
20
interest through procedures used, and probable value, if any, of
21
additional or substitute procedural safeguards, (3) dignitary interest
22
in informing individuals of nature, grounds and consequences of the
23
action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a
24
responsible governmental official, and (4) governmental interest,
25
including function involved and fiscal and administrative burdens that
26
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
27
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7.
28
v. Scott, 613 P.2d 210, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149, 27 C.3d 424.
29
8A Cal D 2d-398
30
Cal.App 2 Dist. 1984.
Van Atta
Identification of dictates of state due
31
process, generally requires consideration of:
private interests that
32
will be affected by official actions; risk of an erroneous deprivation
33
of such interests through procedures used, and probable value, if any,
34
of additional or substitute safeguards; dignitary interest in informing
35
individual of nature, grounds and consequences of action and enabling
36
them to present their side of story before responsible governmental
37
official; and governmental
38
fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute
interests, including function involved and
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 235
1
procedural requirement would entail.
2
Sec.Sec. 7(a), 15.
3
721.
Matter of Thomas, 206 Cal.Rptr. 719, 161 C.A.3d
Cal.App. 1982.
4
West's Ann.Cal.Const. Art. 1
Due process to be afforded in given case depends
5
upon private interests that will be affected by official actions: risk
6
of erroneous deprivation of such interests through procedures used, and
7
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
8
safeguards; and finally, government's interest, including function
9
involved and fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or
10
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
11
5, 14.
12
460, 131 C.A.3d 636.
13
Cal.App. 1980.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends.
Broussard v. Regents of University of California, 184 Cal.Rptr.
When injury to reputation is combined with loss
14
or damage to property interests of an individual, compliance with
15
fundamental precepts of due process is imperative.
16
Amend. 14.
17
Cal.Rptr. 198, 106 C.A.3d 524.
U.S.C.A.Const.
Lackner v. St Joseph Convalescent Hospital, Inc. 165
18
8A Cal D 2d-399
19
253(1). Nature in general
20
C.A.9(Cal) 1989.
In determining whether substantive due process
21
rights have been violated, court will look to such factors as needed
22
for governmental action in question, relationship between need and
23
action, extent of harm inflicted, and whether action was taken in good
24
faith or for purpose of causing harm.
25
Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1390,
26
certiorari denied Doody v. Sinaloa Lake Owners Association, Inc., 110
27
S.Ct. 1317, 108 L.Ed.2d 493.
28
29
30
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
8A Cal D 2d-422
255. Deprivation of life or liberty in general.
C.A.9(Cal) 1990.
Fundamental requirement of procedural due
31
process are notice and opportunity to be heard before government may
32
deprive person of protected liberty or property interest
33
City of Santa Ana, 897 F.2d 1487
34
C.A.Cal. 1982.
Conner v.
Procedural due process imposes constraints on
35
governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty or property
36
interests within the meaning of the due process clause of the Fifth or
37
Fourteenth Amendment.
38
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 683 F.2d 1229.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
Dash, Inc. v.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 236
C.A.Cal. 1981.
1
State must ultimately justify depriving person of
2
protected liberty interest by determining that good cause exists for
3
deprivation.
4
1017.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
S.D.Cal. 1989.
5
Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d
Deprivation of liberty must be accompanied by
6
procedural safeguards; trial court must consider significance of
7
individual's interest, risk of erroneous determination through
8
procedures used, and probable value of additional safeguards.
9
Const. Amends. 5, 14.
U.S. v. Terrones, 712 F.Supp. 786.
D.C.Cal. 1984.
10
U.S.C.A.
State must afford an individual certain
11
procedural protections against deprivatory governmental action whenever
12
there is a Fourteenth Amendment property of liberty interest at stake.
13
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.
14
D.C.Cal. 1980.
Conti v. Dyer, 593 F.Supp. 696.
When liberty interest is impaired by arbitrary
15
action of government, constitutional guarantee of due process has been
16
violated.
17
F.Supp. 1108.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
18
8A Cal D 2d-423
19
D.C.Cal 1975.
Kindem v. City of Alameda, 502
The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the
20
legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact laws
21
which will deprive individuals of their liberty without due process.
22
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983.
23
F.Supp 871, supplemented 402 F.Supp. 623.
Lipp v. Procunier, 395
24
D.C.Cal. 1975.
25
The purpose of due process hearing is to
26
safeguard from deprivation the liberty or property rights of protected
27
persons, and this can only be done where the requisite hearing is held
28
before the decision maker so that the decision maker can sift through
29
the facts, weigh the evidence and reach the appropriate conclusion.
30
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.
31
389 F.Supp. 635.
32
Cal. 1984.
Ponce v. Housing Authority of Yulare County,
Procedures necessary to ensure reliability in fact
33
finding process when state participates in deprivation of personal
34
liberty are required by due process.
35
Sec. 15.
36
510.
37
38
West's Ann.Cal.Const. Art. 1,
People v. Geiger, 674 P.2d 1303, 199 Cal. Rptr. 45, 35 C.3d
Cal. 1977.
When state participates in deprivation of person's
right to personal liberty, even conditional liberty, due process
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 237
1
requires that facts justifying that action be reliably established and,
2
to that end, person must receive hearing after adequate written notice
3
of basis for proposed action and an opportunity to appear in person and
4
to present evidence in his own behalf, and he has right to
5
confrontation by , and opportunity to cross-examine, adverse witnesses,
6
a neutral and detached decision maker, findings by preponderance of
7
evidence and record of proceeding adequate to permit meaningful
8
judicial or appellate review.
U.S.C.S.Const. Amend. 14; West's
9
Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7(a).
In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 141
10
Cal.Rptr. 298, 19 C.3d 921.
Cal. 1975.
11
Due process clause requires proof beyond reasonable
12
doubt not only of guilt of defendant in traditional criminal
13
prosecution but also of dispositive fact or facts in any proceeding in
14
which state threatens to deprive individual of his "good name and
15
freedom."
16
7(a).
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann. Const. art. 1, Sec.
People v. Burnick, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal.Rptr. 488, 14 C.3d 306.
Cal. 1970.
17
Where fundamental personal liberties are involved,
18
they may not be abridged by states simply on showing that regulatory
19
statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of the
20
proper state purpose; the state may prevail only upon showing a
21
subordinating interest which is compelling and the law must be shown
22
necessary and not merely rationally related to the accomplishment of a
23
permissible state policy.
24
P.2d 225, 85 Cal.Rptr. 1, 2 C.3d 259, 37 A.L.R.3d 1313.
Cal. 1968.
25
Cisty of Carmel-by-the-sea v. Young, 466
State cannot deprive person of his life, liberty, or
26
property without affording him opportunity to be heard by tribunal
27
empowered to decide lawfulness of depravation.
28
148, 72 Cal.Rptr. 340, 69 C.2d 486.
Cal. 1963.
29
In re Harris, 466 P.2d
Fourteenth Amendment in declaring that state shall
30
not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
31
process of law gives to each of these an equal sanction, recognizing
32
liberty and property as co-existent human rights, and debars the states
33
from any unwarranted interference with either.
34
14.
35
718, 59 C.2d 247.
36
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend.
Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley, 379 P.2d 22, 28 Cal.Rptr.
Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1989.
Right not to be deprived of life,
37
liberty, or property without due process of law is fundamental
38
constitutional right guaranteed by Federal and State Constitutions.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 238
1
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann. Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7(a).
2
Redevelopment Agency of City of Concord v. Tobriner, 264 Cal.Rptr. 481,
3
215 C.A.3d 1087, review denied.
4
Mandate of due process is that person must be afforded reasonable
5
notice and opportunity to be heard prior to deprivation of significant
6
liberty or property interest.
7
Ann.Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7(a).
8
Concord v. Tobriner, 264 Cal.Rptr. 481, 215 C.A.3d 1087, review denied.
9
10
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; West's
Redevelopment Agency of City of
8A Cal D 2d-424
Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1985.
Where one's liberty is at stake,
11
application of strict-scrutiny test is required and it becomes
12
government's burden to justify procedure by showing it has compelling
13
interest which is furthered by procedure in question.
14
of Waltz, 213 Cal.Rptr. 529, 167 C.A.3d 835.
15
Cal.App. 4 Dist 1984.
Conservatorship
"Procedural due process" rules exist to
16
minimize risk of substantively unfair or mistaken deprivation of life,
17
liberty or property by enabling persons to contest basis on which
18
government proposes to deprive them of their protected interests.
19
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5. McCaffrey v. Preston, 201 Cal.Rptr. 252, 154
20
C.A.3d 422.
21
Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1984.
Deprivation of freedom falls within
22
prohibition against deprivation of liberty expressed in State and
23
Federal Constitutions.
24
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
25
C.A.3d 970.
West's Ann.Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7(a);
People v. Davis, 207 Cal.Rptr. 18, 160
26
Implicit in concept that freedom from arbitrary adjudicative
27
processes is substantive element of one's liberty is that court will
28
require sufficient information to make a reasoned decision that
29
reflects and exercise of discretion; which must be given to important
30
due process value of promoting accuracy and reasonable predictability
31
in governmental decision making when individuals are subject to
32
deprivatory action.
33
v. Davis, 207 Cal.Rptr. 18, 160 C.A.3d 970.
34
Cal.App. 1979.
West's Ann.Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7(a).
People
due process clauses of State and Federal
35
Constitutions operate to prevent state from depriving any person of
36
life, liberty or property without due process.
37
1, Sec. 7; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
38
91 C.A.3d 455.
West's Ann.Const. art.
In re Watson, 154 Cal.Rptr. 151,
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 239
1
Cal.App. 1977.
If individual is condemned to suffer grievous
2
loss of liberty, he must first be accorded due process of law,
3
irrespective of burden imposed upon government agency.
4
Amend. 14.
U.S.C.A.Const.
In re Anderson, 140 Cal.Rptr. 546, 73 C.A.3d 38.
Fundamental mandate of Fourteenth Amendment is that person be
5
6
afforded notice and opportunity to be heard prior to deprivation of
7
significant liberty or property interest U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
8
re Anderson, 140 Cal.Rptr. 546, 73 C.A.3d 38.
9
Cal.App. 1977.
In
Procedural due process requires that before an
10
individual is deprived of property or his life and liberty he must be
11
given notice and a hearing in order to determine the propriety of the
12
deprivation upon consideration of elements of fundamental fairness and
13
justice.
14
Abel v. Cory, 139 Cal.Rptr. 555, 71 C.A.3d 589.
15
16
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7.
VOID JUDGEMENTS MUSTE BE SET ASIDE
A void order which is one entered by court which lacks
17
jurisdiction over parties or subject matter, or lacks inherent power to
18
enter judgment, or order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any
19
time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that
20
party is properly before court,
21
Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994).
22
People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 – Triad Energy Corp. v. McNell
110
23
F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). A void judgment is one which shows upon the
24
face of the record a want of jurisdiction in the court assuming to
25
render the judgment, which want of jurisdiction may be either of the
26
person, or of the subject-matter generally, or of the particular
27
question attempted to be decided or the relief assumed to be given.
28
(Citations omitted). 160 Tenn. at 336, 24 S.W.2d at 883. A void
29
judgment lacks validity anywhere and is subject to attack from any
30
angle. State ex rel. Ragsdale v. Sandefur, 215 Tenn. 690, 701, 389
31
S.W.2d 266, 271 (1965); Acuff v. Daniel, 215 Tenn. 520, 525, 387 S.W.2d
32
796, 798 (1965).
33
A "final" but void order can have no preclusive effect. " 'A void
34
judgment [or order] is, in legal effect, no judgment. By it no rights
35
are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in
36
itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 240
1
neither binds nor bars any one.' [Citation.]" ( Bennett v. Wilson
2
(1898) 122 Cal. 509, 513-514 [55 P. 390].) (Ibid)
3
In further alternative, I summit that when the US Supreme Court
4
decided that a decision of the state court is binding on the Federal
5
court as cited by the Defendant, it provides a condition: "For reasons
6
already discussed at length, nothing in the language or legislative
7
history of [449 U.S. 90, 104] 1983 proves any congressional intent to
8
deny binding effect to a state-court judgment or decision when the
9
state court, acting within its proper jurisdiction, has given the
10
parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate federal claims, and
11
thereby has shown itself willing and able to protect federal rights."
12
And: " In short, the federal courts could step in where the state
13
courts were unable or unwilling to protect federal rights." ALLEN v.
14
McCURRY, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)
15
"Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a
16
court in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional
17
provisions, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the
18
courts and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in excess
19
of jurisdiction, in so far as that term is used to indicate that those
20
acts may be restrained by prohibition or annulled on certiorari. "
21
(Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal. (2d) 280, 291 [109 P.
22
(2d) 942, 132 A.L.R. 715].)
23
Thus, where the action of a court is in violation of
24
constitutional restrictions upon its power, it has been held that the
25
court has exceeded its authority. (Fortenbury v. Superior Court, 16
26
Cal. (2d) 405 [106 P. (2d) 411]; McClatchy v. Superior Court, 119 Cal.
27
413 [51 Pac. 696, 39 L.R.A. 691]; Langdon v. Superior Court, 65 Cal.
28
App. 41 [223 Pac. 72].)
29
Where statutory limitations or restrictions upon a court's power
30
to act are violated, many cases have held that such unauthorized acts
31
are in excess of the court's jurisdiction for purposes of certiorari or
32
prohibition. (See, for example, modification of court's judgment or the
33
granting of a new trial in violation of statutory limitations on such
34
power: Treat v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. (2d) 636 [62 P. (2d) 147];
35
Lankton v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. (2d) 694 [55 P. (2d) 1170]; Stanton
36
v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. 478 [261 Pac. 1001]; Diamond v. Superior
37
Court, 189 Cal. 732 [210 Pac. 36]; Prothero v. Superior Court, 196 Cal.
38
439 [238 Pac. 357]; Estate of Paulsen, 179 Cal. 528 [178 Pac. 143];
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 241
1
Lamg v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 491, [12 Pac. 306, 416]; Colthurst v.
2
Justice's Court, 100 Cal. App. 146 [279 Pac. 812].
3
Failure of a court or tribunal of limited statutory jurisdiction
4
to comply with the express limitations contained in the statute: Olcese
5
v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. 566 [292 Pac. 964]; Texas Co. v. Bank of
6
America etc. Assn., 5 Cal. (2d) 35 [53 P. (2d) 127]; Sprcckels Sugar
7
Co. v. Industrial Accident Com., 186 Cal. 256 [199 Pac. 8].
8
9
Issuance of an injunction against the enforcement of a public
statute in violation of a statutory limitation on such power:
10
Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. 672 [154 Pac. 845]; Evans
11
v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. (2d) 563 [96 P. (2d) 107]; Loftis v.
12
Superior Court, 25 Cal. App. (2d) 346 [77 P. (2d) 491].
13
Attempted use of bail deposited by a third person in satisfaction
14
of the fine levied against a defendant in violation of statutory
15
restrictions: Rodman v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. (2d) 262 [89 P. (2d)
16
109]; Hudson v. Police Court of Oakland, 39 Cal. App. 149 [178 Pac.
17
172]; Paton v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. (2d) 475 [99 P. (2d) 698].)
18
Similarly, there are certain procedural rules developed by the
19
courts which operate as a limitation on their power and are so
20
fundamental in their nature that any violation thereof constitutes an
21
excess of jurisdiction for the purposes of certiorari or prohibition.
22
(For example, failure to exhaust the administrative remedies provided
23
by statute before resorting to a court of law to challenge the order of
24
an administrative agency: Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, supra;
25
United States v. Superior Codurt, 19 Cal. (2d) 189 [120 P. (2d) 26];
26
Louis Eckart B. Co. v. Unemployment R. Com., 47 Cal. App. (2d) 844 [119
27
P. (2d) 227]. Failure to join an indispensable party in an action where
28
his rights will inevitably be affected by the court's decree: Bank of
29
California v. Superior court, 16 Cal. (2d) 516 [106 P. (2d) 879].)
30
District v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 20 Cal. 2d 348,
31
125 P.2d 490 (Cal. 05/01/1942)
32
33
DUE PROCESS
34
8A Cal D 2d-374
35
U.S. Cal 1952.
Due process of law is a summarized constitutional
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 242
1
guarantee of respect for those personal immunities which are so rooted
2
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
3
fundamental of are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
4
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.
5
U.S. 165, 96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396.
Rochin v. People of Cal., 72 S.Ct. 205, 342
6
8A Cal D 2d-375
7
C.A.Cal. 1967. The present concept of due process stems from the
8
American ideal of fairness in the treatment of all.
9
Amend. 5.
10
U.S.C.A.Const.
Howard v. U.S., 372 F.2d 294, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct.
2129, 388 U.S. 915, 18 L.Ed.2d 1356.
C.A.Cal. 1965.
11
In protecting any defendant's constitutional
12
rights, federal courts look beyond form to substance.
13
344 F.2d 943, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 73, 382 U.S. 832, 15 L.Ed.2d
14
76.
15
8A Cal D 2d-377
16
Cal.App. 1954.
Pool v. U.S.,
Under constitutional guaranties, no right of an
17
individual, valuable to him pecunirily or otherwise, can be justly
18
taken away without its being done conformably to principle of justice
19
which afford due process of law unless the law constitutionally
20
otherwise provides, and due process of law does not mean according to
21
the whim, caprice, or will of the judge but according to the law.
22
re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291
23
Judicial absolutism is not a part of the American way of life,
24
and the odious doctrine that the end justifies the means does not
25
prevail in our system for the administration of justice.
26
Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291
27
Cal.App.
192.
In re
Due process is not concerned with mere technical
28
formalism, but rather it is the substance that determines whether a
29
litigant has been deprived of it.
30
Pharmacy, 243 P.2d 890, 110 C.A.2d 826.
31
32
In
Law Rev. 1966.
Vita-Pharmacals, Inc. v. Board of
The constitutionality of the Fourteenth Amendment
39 So.Cal.L.R. 378
33
8A Cal D 2d-378
34
Law Rev. 1961.
The process of prescribing "due process".
49
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 243
1
2
3
4
5
S.L.R. 215
Law.Rev. 1960. The second American revolution: free enterprise
under the Bill of Rights.
Law Rev. 1959.
46 A.B.A.J. 597.
Federal Encroachment on state rights: the
Fourteenth Amendment.
45. A.B.A.J. 1044.
6
Law Rev. 1958.
Due process of law.
5 U.C.L.A. Law R. 661
7
Law Rev. 1954.
Due process: defendant's rights where valid
8
statute is applied in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
9
U.C.L.A.Law R. 596.
10
11
12
13
Law Rev. 1954.
merely declaratory.
Law Rev. 1953.
8A Cal D 2d-381
15
251.3.
16
History of Fourteenth Amendment, conceived of as
7 Stan.L.R. 3.
Crosskey theory of erroneous construction of
Fourteenth Amendment.
14
1
41 C.L.R. 209, 224.
Reasonableness or arbitrariness; rational basis and
relation to object.
17
8A Cal D 2d-382
18
Cal. 1979.
Application of the due process clauses of the
19
California Constitution must be determined in the context of the
20
individual's due process liberty interests in freedom from arbitrary
21
adjudicative procedures; thus, when a person is deprived of a statutory
22
conferred benefit, due process analysis must start, not with a judicial
23
attempt to decide whether the statute has created an "entitlement" that
24
can be defined as "liberty" or "property", but with an assessment of
25
what procedural protections are constitutionally required in light of
26
the governmental and private interests at stake.
27
art. 1 Sec.Sec. 7(a), 15.
28
Rptr. 316, 25 C.3d 260.
West's Ann.Const.
People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 158 Cal
29
Cal 1979. Touchstone of due process is fundamental fairness.
30
U.S.C.A.Const. Ammend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1 Sec.Sec. 7(a).
31
Salas v. Cortez, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal.Rptr. 529, 24 C.3d 22,
32
certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 209, 444 U.S. 900, 62 L.Ed.2d 136.
33
8A Cal D 2d-382
34
Cal.App. 3Dist. 1985.
Cardinal principle of substantive due
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 244
1
process is that a law which deprives a person of life, liberty, or
2
property must not be product of arbitrary legislative judgment; such a
3
law must be reasonably related to the object sought to be attained by
4
its enactment.
5
210 Cal.Rptr.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
People v. Armbruster,
11, 163 C.A.3d 660.
6
8A Cal D 2d-382
7
Cal.App. 1979.
Substantive due process prohibits governmental
8
interference with a person's fundamental right to life, liberty or
9
property by unreasonable or arbitrary legislation.
10
Amend. 14; West's Ann.
11
Cal.Rptr. 63, 91 C.A.3d 184.
12
8A Cal D 2d-385
13
U.S.Cal. 1985.
Const. art. 1 Sec. 7.
U.S.C.A.Const.
In re David B., 154
Very nature of the due process inquiry indicates
14
that the fundamental fairness of a particular procedure does not turn
15
on the result obtained in any individual case but, rather, procedural
16
due process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare
17
exception.
18
Radiation Survivors, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 473 U.S. 305, 87 L.Ed.2d 220, on
19
remand 111 F.R.D. 595.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
Walters v. National Ass'n of
20
CFB-S: Clearly the TRO and VC filed just before the Sheriffs Shot
21
at Defendant are directly and materially related to the case as the TRO
22
and VC specifically relate to the reason the Sheriffs claimed to have
23
shot at Defendant.
24
8A Cal D 2d-385
25
U.S.Cal. 1982.
Due process demands impartiality on the part of
26
those who function in judicial of quasi-judicial capacities.
27
Const.Amend. 5.
28
L.Ed.2d 1.
29
U.S.C.A.
Schweiker v. McClure, 102 S.Ct. 1665, 456 U.S. 188, 72
C.A.9 (Cal.) 1986.
Due process clause guarantees aggrieved party
30
opportunity to present case and have its merits fairly judged.
31
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
32
Utilities Com'n of State of Cal., 793 F.2d 1090, certiorari denied 107
33
S.Ct. 1334, 479 U.S. 1102, 94 L.E.2d 184.
34
Jackson Water Works, Inc. v. Public
Under due process clause, every party is entitled to impartial
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 245
1
tribunal.
Jackson Water Works, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com'n of State
2
of Cal., 793 F.2d 1090, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 1334, 479 U.S.
3
1102, 94 L.E.2d 184.
C.A.Cal 1967.
4
Due process is denied where the procedure tends to
5
shock the sense of fair play.
6
375 F.2d 294, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 2129, 388 U.S. 915, 18 L.Ed.2d
7
1365.
8
8A Cal D 2d-386
9
D.D.Cal 1975.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5.
At heart of any due process hearing is requirement
10
of an impartial decision maker.
11
Housing Authority of Tulare County, 389 F.Supp. 635.
D.C.Cal. 1971.
12
Howard v. U.S.,
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend 5.
Ponce v
Procedural due process must obtain whenever
13
individual is subject to "grievous loss" at hands of state or its
14
instrumentalities.
15
Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767, modified, cause remanded 497
16
F.2d 809, modified 510 F.2d 613, certiorari granted Enomoto v.
17
Clutchette, 95 S.Ct. 2414, 421 U.S. 101, 44 L.Ed.2d 810, vacated, on
18
remand 536 F.2d 305, on remand 471 F.Supp 1113.
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Rudimentary principles of due process require presence of counsel
19
20
when rights of individual are seriously threatened by governmental
21
action.
22
F.Supp. 767, modified, cause remanded 497 F.2d 809, modified 510 F.2d
23
613, certiorari granted Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S.Ct. 2414, 421 U.S.
24
101, 44 L.Ed.2d 810, vacated, on remand 536 F.2d 305, on remand 471
25
F.Supp 1113.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328
26
8A Cal D 2d-387
27
Cal.Ap. 1982.
Fundamental fairness, i.e. due process, includes
28
right to present legal and factual issues in deliberate and orderly
29
maner.
30
Bd. of Medical Quality Assur., 180 Cal.Rptr. 516, 128 C.A.3d 699.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
31
8A Cal D 2d-387
32
Cal.App. 1974.
White v. Division of Medical Quality,
Procedural due process requires that the property
33
of a deprivation of substantial right to be resolved in a manner
34
consistent with essential fairness.
Ursino v. Superior Court, In and
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 246
1
For City and County of San Francisco, 114 Cal.Rptr. 404, 39 C.A.3d 611.
Cal.App.
2
1966.
The essentials of due process are regular and
3
orderly procedure in court of competent jurisdiction, notice to
4
defendant, opportunity for defendant to be heard, and fair hearing.
5
State Acting By and Through Dept. of Water Resources v. Natomas Co., 49
6
Cal.Rptr 64, 239 C.A.2d 547.
Cal.App.
7
1962.
Due process requires fair trial before impartial
8
tribunal, and such trial requires that person or body who decides cases
9
must known, consider, and appraise evidence.
10
Le Strange v. City of
Berkley, 26 Cal.Rptr. 550, 210 C.A.2d 313.
Cal.App. 1859.
11
There are two essentials to due process in a
12
judicial proceeding: (1) that the court have jurisdiction over the
13
parties and the subject matter of the action, and (2) that the parties
14
have reasonable notice and an opportunity for hearing.
15
Ann.Const.art. 1, Sec.Sec. 2, 13.
16
C.A.2d 613.
Law Rev 1977.
17
West's
Datta v. Staab, 343 P.2d 977, 173
Standards of judicial review.
50 So.Cal.L.R. 689.
NOTICE AND HEARING.
18
19
8A Cal D 2d-387
20
C.A.9 (Cal) 1985.
If individual bringing procedural due process
21
challenge demonstrates likelihood of irreparable harm, resulting from
22
lack of predeprivation hearing, it is unlikely that government will be
23
able to demonstrate any public interest that will overcome individual's
24
interest, and some additional form of predeprivation process will
25
probably be require; in absence of such showing, however, courts must
26
balance governmental interests in retaining existing process against
27
private interest that will effect and probability of erroneous
28
deprivation associated with that process.
29
14.
Jolly v. U.S. 764 F.2d 642.
C.A.Cal 1983.
30
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5,
Central meaning of procedural due process is that
31
parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard at a
32
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
33
14.
34
35
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5,
Orloff v. Cleland, 708 F.2d 372.
C.A.Cal 1985.
A Fundamental requirements of due process is the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 247
1
in terms of the threatened conduct, U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
2
Club v. Watt, 608 F.Supp. 305.
3
D.D.Cal 1984.
Opportunity to be heard guaranteed by due process
4
is opportunity which must be granted at meaningful time and in
5
meaningful manner.
6
E.P.A. 599 F.Supp. 69.
7
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
D.C.Cal. 1980.
Sieffa
Aminoil, Inc. v. U.S.
In order to satisfy fair hearing requirement of
8
due process clause, a tribunal, whether administrative or judicial,
9
must be impartial; adjudicator may neither have pecuniary interest in
10
outcome nor have been target of personal abuse or criticism from party
11
before him.
12
U.S.C.A.Const Amend. 14.
D.C.Cal. 1970.
McClure v. Harris, 503
The due process right to predetermination
13
hearing, with right to confront and question witnesses, is the
14
constitutional norm and not the exception when government action
15
seriously injures an individual and the crucial decision is based upon
16
facts alleged by a third party.
17
Resources, 325 F.Supp. 1314, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 2495, 408 U.S.
18
924, 33 L.Ed.2d 335, revised 490 F.2d 580, vacated 95 S.Ct. 1110, 420
19
U.S. 917, 43 L.Ed.2d 388.
20
Cal. 1985.
Crow v. California Dept. of Human
Fundamental fairness includes both right to adequate
21
notice and right to defend against charged violations.
22
Sales v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd.
23
America, AFL-CIO), 703 P.2d 27, 216 Cal.Rptr. 688, 39 C.3d 209.
24
Cal. 1982.
respond, and a hearing.
26
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend, 14.
27
Cal.Rptr. 508, 31 C.3d 637.
Cal. 1979.
(United Farm Workers of
Rudiments of fair play include notice, opportunity to
25
28
Harry Carian
West's Ann.Const.Art. 1, Sec. 7;
In re Marriage of Flaherty, 646 P.2d 179, 183
Where prior notice of potentially adverse decision is
29
constitutionally required, such notice must, at minimum, be reasonably
30
calculated to afford affected persons realistic opportunity to protect
31
their interests.
32
P.2d 1134, 156 Cal.Rptr. 718, 24 C.3d 605.
33
Cal. 1975.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend 14.
Horn v. Ventura County, 596
Fundamental requisite of due process is the
34
meaningful opportunity to be heard and to explain one's actions.
35
People v. Coleman, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 13 C.3d 867.
36
Cal. 1968.
Since right to hearing is one of rudiments of fair
37
play assured by Fourteenth Amendment, there can be no compromise on
38
footing of convenience or expediency when that minimal requirement has
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 248
1
been neglected or ignored.
2
Schutzbank, 436, P.2d 297, 65 Cal.Rptr. 297, 68 C.2d 162.
3
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Cal.App.2Dist. 1989.
Due process requires notice and opportunity
4
for a hearing before an impartial tribunal.
5
West's Ann.Cal. Const.Art. 1, Sec. 7, 15.
6
Cal.Rptr. 199, 211 C.A.3d 133, review denied.
7
8A Cal D 2d-390
8
Cal.App. 2 Dist.
9
1987.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14;
Bennett v. Bodily, 259
A fundamental requisite of due process
is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and a meaningful
10
manner.
11
Cal.Rptr. 605, 196 C.A.3d 1526.
12
Endler v.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
Cal.App. 2Dist. 1983.
Cordova v. Vons Grocery Co., 242
Adequate notice prior to imposition of
13
sanctions is mandated not only by statute, but also by due process
14
clauses of both State and Federal Constitutions.
15
7; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
16
C.A.3d 957.
Const. Art. 1, Sec.
O'Brien v. Cseh, 196 Cal.Rptr. 409, 148
17
CFB: Judge Barton unlawfully sanctioned Petitioner when
18
petitioner brought the just and urgent request to have his children
19
returned to him after Judge Barton, Ass. D.A. Drotter and the Santa
20
Cruz Sheriffs kidnapped and held hostage Petitioners children from
21
Petitioner.
22
Cal.App.2Dist. 1983.
Requirement of notice is so fundamental to
23
concepts of due process that it is deemed jurisdictional in nature.
24
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
25
C.A.3d 416.
26
Cal.App.2Dist.
1988.
Oats by Oats v Oats, 196, Cal.Rptr. 20, 148
At a minimum, due process requires notice
27
and an opportunity for hearing.
28
Menefee & Son v. Department of Food & Agriculture, 245 Cal.Rptr.
29
199 C.A.3d 774.
30
Cal.App. 3Dist. 1987.
West's Ann.Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7.
166,
For purposes of due process analysis,
31
notice procedures should be evaluated not in hyper technical situation
32
but according to common experience; what is proper notice in given
33
situation must be determined on case-by-case basis.
34
Amends. 5, 14.
35
California (Subaru of Northern California), 234 Cal.Rptr. 226, 189
36
C.A.3d 13, review denied.
U.S.C.A. Const.
Sonoma Subaru, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 249
1
Cal.App.5Dist. 1983.
Notice and opportunity to be heard are due
2
process prerequisites for adequate administrative proceedings U.S.C.A.
3
Const.Amends. 5, 14.
4
Cal.Rptr. 782, 144 C.A.3d 777.
5
Cal.App. 1982.
Drum v. Fresno County Dept. of Public Works, 192
Persons who settle their claims of right and duty
6
through judicial process must be given meaningful opportunity to be
7
heard, including right to appointed counsel under certain
8
circumstances, regardless of whether actions labeled civil or criminal.
9
Ventura County v. Tillett, 183 Cal.Rptr. 741, 133 C.A.3d 105 certiorari
10
11
denied 103 S.Ct. 1497, 460 U.S. 1051, 75 L.Ed.2d 929.
Cal.App. 1981. One aspect of the procedural protection of due
12
process is the opportunity to be heard within a reasonably prompt
13
period of time. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. Garcia v. Los Angeles County
14
Bd. of Ed., 177 Cal.Rptr. 29, 123 C.A.3d 807.
15
Cal.App. 1980.
Essence of procedural due process is that the
16
individual be given adequate notice and meaningful opportunity to be
17
heard before he can be deprived of a fundamental right.
18
Amend 14.
19
Cal.Rptr. 198.
U.S.C.A.Const.
Lackner v. St. Joseph Convalescent Hospital, Inc., 165
20
8A Cal D 2d-391
21
Cal.App.
1980.
A fundamental requirement of due process is
22
opportunity to be heard and principles of due process are fully
23
applicable to administrative proceedings which are quasi-judicial in
24
nature, but no particular form or proceeding is required so long as
25
statute provides for a "reasonable" opportunity to be heard, and what
26
is a "reasonable" opportunity to be heard will not turn solely on fact
27
that a constitutionally protected interest is affected by government
28
action, but, rather, nature of claimed procedural rights, extent of
29
interference with private interests, and governmental interest all
30
coalesce to define scope of due process.
31
Stanson v. San Diego Cost Regional Commission, 161 Cal.Rptr. 392, 101
32
C.A.3d 38.
33
Cal.App. 1979.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Notice which due process requires is notice
34
which, according to common experience, should reasonably give notice of
35
impending interference with ownership or right of possession.
36
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
Atkins v. Kessleer, 159 Cal.Rptr. 231, 97
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 250
1
C.A.3d 784.
Cal.App. 1979.
2
Right to a fair hearing is an essential of due
3
process whether life, liberty or property is being taken by criminal or
4
civil process.
5
14.
6
West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend.
In re Watson, 154 Cal.Rptr. 151, 91 C.A.3d 455.
Cal.App. 1978.
Fundamental requirement of the concept of due
7
process is the opportunity to be heard;' it is only under the most
8
unusual circumstances that a person could even be temporarily deprived
9
of his property without opportunity for a prior hearing.
10
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
11
Cal.Rptr. 431, 85 C.A.3d 308.
12
Cal.App. 1978.
People v. Rath Packing Co., Inc., 149
Notice and an opportunity to be heard are the
13
very essence of due process.
14
Angeles County, 146 Cal.Rptr. 798. 81 C.A.3d 950.
15
Cal.App. 1978.
Hendricks v. Superior Court for Los
When the state is to deprive a citizen of a
16
substantial right, adequate notice and hearing is synonymous with due
17
process.
18
Hughes v. Neth, 146 Cal.Rptr. 37, 80 C.A.3d 952.
19
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec.7.
Cal.App. 1977.
20
notice and hearing.
21
C.A.3d 57.
22
Cal.App. 1975.
Essential ingredients of due process of law are
People v. Surety Ins. Co., 143 Cal.Rptr. 47, 76
Notice is fundamental to due process.
23
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7.
24
Madigan, 126 Cal.Rptr. 376, 53 C.A.3d 943.
25
Cal.App. 1975.
Taylor v.
In determining whether procedure of governmental
26
hearing affecting individual rights meets due process requirements,
27
factors such as nature of right affected, degree of danger caused by
28
proscribed condition or activity, and availability of prompt remedial
29
measures must be considered.
30
Cal.Rptr. 163, 53 C.A.3d 679.
31
8A Cal D 2d-392
32
Cal.App. 1973.
Roth v. City of Los Angeles, 126
a taking without notice or hearing is a
33
deprivation of due process. U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
34
Superior Court In and For Sacramento County, 109 Cal.Rptr; 428, 33
35
C.A.3d 997.
36
Cal.App. 1973.
Nork v.
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 251
1
requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before an individual
2
suffers governmental deprivation of a fundamental interest; entitlement
3
to procedural protections depends upon extent to which "grievous loss"
4
is threatened and requires court to weigh individual's interest in
5
avoiding the loss against government interests in summary adjudication.
6
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. C. v. Superior Court for Sacramento County.
7
106 Cal.Rprt. 123, 29 C.A.3d 909.
8
9
Opportunity for hearing must precede, not follow, deprivation of
fundamental interest, except for extraordinary occasions
10
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. C. v. Superior Court for Sacramento County.
11
106 Cal.Rprt. 123, 29 C.A.3d 909.
12
In determining whether a status or right is fundamental in
13
connection with requirement of guarantee of due process of law for
14
notice and an opportunity to be heard, courts consider its effect in
15
human terms and its importance to individual's life situation.
16
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. C. v. Superior Court for Sacramento County.
17
106 Cal.Rprt. 123, 29 C.A.3d 909.
18
Cal.App. 1971.
Procedural due process requires that, before
19
person is deprived of his life, liberty, or property, he must be given
20
notice of proceedings against him, he must be given opportunity to
21
defend himself, and propriety of deprivation must be resolved in manner
22
consistent with essential fairness.
23
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
24
C.A.3d 1.
25
Cal.App.
1970.
West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 13;
Gray v. Whitmore, 94 Cal.Rptr. 904, 17
Implicit notion of fairness and central to legal
26
and social system, as respects due process, is idea that if interest
27
being defended is of value, defendant ought to have his day in court
28
and opportunity to be heard.
29
Albany Judicial Dist., Alameda County, 87 Cal.Rptr. 17, 7 C.A.3d 479.
30
Cal.App. 1970.
Mihans v. Municipal Court for Berkley-
Fundamental due process requirements of fair and
31
impartial hearing are reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to
32
be heard.
33
34
35
Baker v. Wadsworty, 85 Cal.Rptr. 880, 6 C.A.3d 253.
Cal.App. 1965.
process.
Adequate notice is essential to procedural due
Application of Singh, 44 Cal.Rptr. 474, 234 C.A.2d 455.
Cal.App. 1953.
"Due process of law" means, broadly speaking,
36
that before property of a person may be taken by the state, he must be
37
given notice of the proceedings which may terminate in the taking, and
38
be given opportunity to be heard.
People v. One 1950 Mercury Sedan,
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 252
1
Engine No. 50LA40896M, 1950 License No. 29B9130, 254 P.2d 666, 116
2
C.A.2d 746.
3
4
RIGHTS, INTERESTS, BENEFITS, OR PRIVILEGES
EVOLVED, IN GENERAL
5
8A CalD 2d-395
6
C.A.9(Cal.) 1985.
Adequate or due process depends on nature of
7
interest affected; the more important interest and greater effect of
8
its impairment, the greater procedural safe guards state must provide
9
to satisfy due process.
U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14.
Haygood v.
10
Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, certiorari denied Cranke v. Haygood, 106 S.Ct.
11
3333, 478 U.S. 1020, 92 L.Ed.2d 739.
12
8A Cal D 2d-396
13
C.A.Cal. 1982.
Fundamental right may require strict scrutiny
14
under due process clause. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
15
Co. 672 F.2d 1305.
16
8A Cal D 2d-396
17
C.D.Cal. 1990.
Halet v. Wend Inv.
When state puts person in danger, due process
18
clause requires state to protect him to the extent that state's actions
19
have put person at increased risk.
20
Talevich v. Voss, 734 F.Supp. 425.
21
E.D.Cal. 1986.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
Defamation coupled with significant alteration in
22
legal status justifies the invocation of procedural due process
23
safeguards.
24
554, appeal dismissed and case remanded 844 F.2d 791.
25
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
D.C.Cal. 1985.
Greene v Bowen, 639 F.Supp,
Party claiming protection of due process clause
26
must first demonstrate that the interest deprived was constitutionally
27
protected and once it is determined that due process applies, question
28
remains what process is due.
29
Watt, 608 F.Supp. 305.
30
D.C.Cal 1985.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
Sierra Club v.
Determination of whether procedures provided for
31
are constitutionally sufficient under due process requirements requires
32
analysis of private interest affected by official action, governmental
33
function involved, and probable value of any additional procedural
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 253
1
safeguards.
2
F.Supp 1283.
U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14.
3
8A Cal D 2d-397
4
D.C.Cal. 1973.
U.S. v. Freitas, 602
To determine whether due process requirements
5
apply, court must not look to the weight, but to the nature of the
6
interest at stake.
7
of University of California, 353 F.Supp. 618.
D.D.Cal. 1972.
8
9
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.
Perkins v. Regents
To receive due process protection interests in
dispute need not reach level of traditional constitutional "right."
10
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.
11
F.Supp. 798, affirmed Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated
12
Mortg. Investors, 504 F.2d 483.
D.C.Cal. 1971.
13
Keller v. Kate Maremont Foundation, 365
Procedural due process is not required only when
14
some "vested right" is being impaired, U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
15
Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767, modified, cause remanded 497
16
F.2d 809, modified 510 F.2d 613, certiorari granted Enomoto v.
17
Clutchette, 95 S.Ct 2414, 421 U.S. 1010, 44 L.Ed.2d 678, reversed
18
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 96 S.Ct 151, 425 U.S. 308, 47 L.Ed.2d 810,
19
vacated, on remand 536 F.2d 305, on remand 471 F.Supp. 1113.
D.C.Cal. 1971.
20
Due process requires that government abide by
21
basic principles of fairness when dispensing, or revoking, a privilege.
22
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
23
8A Cal D 2d-398
24
Cal.App. 2Dist. 1984.
Hester v. Craven, 322 F.Supp. 1256.
Identification of dictates of state due
25
process generally requires consideration of: private interests that
26
will be affected by official actions; risk of an erroneous deprivation
27
of such interests through procedures used, and probable value, if any,
28
of additional or substitute safeguards; dignitary interest in informing
29
individual of nature, grounds and consequences of action and enabling
30
them to present their side of story before responsible governmental
31
official; and governmental interests, including function involved and
32
fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute
33
procedural requirement would entail.
34
Sec.Sec. 7(a), 15.
35
721.
West's Ann.Cal.Const. Art. 1,
Matter of Thomas, 206 Cal.Rptr. 719, 161 C.A.3d
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 254
Cal.App. 1982. Due process to be afforded in given case depends
1
2
upon private interests that will be affected by official actions; risk
3
of erroneous deprivation of such interests that will be affected by
4
official actions; risk of erroneous deprivation of such interests
5
through procedures used, and probable value if any, of additional or
6
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, government's interest,
7
including function involved and fiscal and administrative burdens that
8
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
9
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.
10
Broussard v. Regents of University of
California, 184 Cal.Rptr. 460, 131 C.A.3d 636.
Cal.App. 5Dist. 1984.
11
While state owes to each individual that
12
process which, in light of the values of a free society, can be
13
characterized as due, whether any procedural protections are due
14
depends on extent to which the defendant will be condemned to suffer
15
grievous loss.
16
206 Cal.Rptr. 843, 160 C.A.3d 725.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 15.
People v. Hernandez,
17
CFB: As a result of the denial of due process of the Kelly Order,
18
and of the TRO and Verified Criminal Complaints Mr. Boustred filed, Mr.
19
Boustred along with his children were nearly murdered, Mr. Boustred's
20
chidden were kidnapped, his business destroyed and Mr. Boustred has
21
been dragged through hell.
IN REGARD TO CALIFORNIA’S “NO-FAULT” DIVORCE
22
23
8A Cal D 2d-387
24
Cal.App. 1974.
Procedural due process requires that the property
25
of a deprivation of substantial right to be resolved in a manner
26
consistent with essential fairness.
27
For City and County of San Francisco, 114 Cal.Rptr. 404, 39 C.A.3d
28
611.8
29
A Cal D 2d-382
30
Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1983.
Ursino v. Superior Court, In and
Substantive due process essentially
31
requires protection from arbitrary legislative action; under that
32
principle, a deprivation of property is justified only if the conduct
33
from which depravation flows is prescribed by reasonable legislation
34
reasonably applied, i.e. the law must not be unreasonable, arbitrary or
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 255
1
capricious but must have a real and substantial relation to the object
2
sought to be obtained.
3
294, 146 C.A.3d 597.
4
Armstrong v. San Mateo County, 194 Cal.Rptr.
Cal.App. 2Dist. 1984.
For substantive due process, rational
5
basis test is that the law must not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or
6
capricious but must have a real and substantial relation to object
7
sought to be obtained.
8
California State Personnel Bd., 202 Cal.Rptr. 587, 156 C.A.3d 96.
9
U.S. C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
Cal.App. 2Dist. 1984.
Goggin v.
Substantial due process requires only that
10
law not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that it have
11
real and substantial relation to object sought to be obtained.
12
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
13
Angeles County, 202 Cal.Rptr. 377, 155 C.A.3d 435.
14
Cal.App. 3Dist. 1986.
Interstate Marina Development Ca. v. Los
Unless application of statute impinges
15
upon fundamental rights, initial question posed by substantive due
16
process challenge is whether application is procedurally fair and
17
reasonably related to proper legislative goal.
18
14; West's Ann.Cal. Const Art. 1, Sec. 7(a).
19
231 Cal.Rptr. 757, 187 C.A.3d 36, review denied.
20
8A Cal D 2d-382
21
Cal.app. 5Dist. 1986.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
In re Marriage of Siller,
Due process in not violated as long as
22
statute procedurally is fair and is reasonably related to proper
23
legislative goal.
24
Cal.Rptr. 465, 178 C.A.3d 74, review denied.
25
U.S.C.A Cosnt.Amends. 5, 14.
Cal.App. 1979.
People v. Flores, 223
Substantive due process requires that legislation
26
must not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious but must have a real
27
and substantial relation to object sought to be obtained.
28
U.S.A.A.Const Amend. 14.
29
C.A.3d 14.
Adoption of D.S.C., 155 Cal.Rptr. 406, 93
30
CFB: "No-Fault Divorce" is neither reasonable, it is entirely
31
arbitrary and utterly capricious in nature and has no effect on any
32
object to be obtained, to the contrary spouses in the wrong now
33
flagrantly and outrageously employ governmental services such as Child
34
Protective Services and local Sheriffs and Police to set up their
35
partner for the purpose of obtaining a favorable divorce settlement.
36
These flagrant and criminal acts are carried out by spouses with
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 256
1
impunity under the guise of "No-Fault Divorce".
2
shocks the conscious and implements an utterly unfair treatment,
3
imagine if the Legislature enacted "No-Fault Murder", or "No-Fault
4
Battery", such acts, as in "No-Fault Divorce" are utterly against the
5
grain of justice and fair treatment under the law and completely
6
violate the Constitutional guarantee of Due Process "which are so
7
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
8
as fundamental of are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
9
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.
10
11
No-Fault Divorce
Rochin v. People of Cal., 72 S.Ct. 205, 342
U.S. 165, 96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396.
Law Rev. 1974.
The due process clause invoked to invalidate
12
state action found to be arbitrary or capricious.
13
U.L.Rev 617.
14
8A Cal D 2d-383
15
Cal.App.
6 Southwestern
1970. Concept of over breadth rests on principles of
16
substantive due process which forbid prohibition of certain individual
17
freedoms and issue is whether language of statute, given its normal
18
meaning, is so broad that its sanctions may apply to conduct protected
19
by the Constitution.
20
88 Cal.Rptr. 500, 9 C.A.3d 675.
21
8A Cal D 2d-472.
22
D.C.Cal.1952.
Castro v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County,
A statute challenged as repugnant to the due
23
process clause of the fifth amendment must be tested on its face, since
24
it is the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the
25
rule to govern conduct and warns against transgression.
26
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5.
U.S. v. De Cadena, 105 F.Supp. 202.
27
D.C.Cal. 1951. A statute challenged as repugnant to the due
28
process clause of the fifth amendment must be tested on its face, since
29
it is the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the
30
rule to govern conduct and warns against transgression.
31
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5.
32
S.Ct. 591, 343 U.S. 169, 96 L.Ed. 863, rehearing denied 72 S.Ct 1040,
33
343 U.S. 951, 96 L.Ed. 1353.
U.S. v. Spector, 99 F.Supp, 778, reversed 72
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 257
1
8A Cal D 2d-474.
2
D.C.Cal. 1951.
Test or reasonableness or unreasonableness or
3
similar tests which can be judged by reference to a common standard of
4
conduct, satisfy due process requirement of definiteness in a statute,
5
and that is especially true in dealing with statutes which seek to
6
control economic activities.
7
Sec.Sec. 12, 15; Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, Sec.Sec. 1-
8
4, 3, 15 U.S.C.A. Sec.Sec. 13-13b, 21a, 13a; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5.
9
F.& A. Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 98 F.Supp. 180.
Clayton Act, Sec.Sec. 1, 4, 15 U.S.C.A.
TRIAL IN GENERAL
10
11
8A Cal D 2d-571
12
U.S.Cal. 1984.
Under due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment,
13
criminal prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of
14
fundamental fairness.
C.A.9(Cal. 1987.
15
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
California v. Tr
District judge may not adopt procedure that
16
impairs defendant's right to due process or his other rights guaranteed
17
by Constitution.
18
1254.
19
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5.
C.A.Cal. 1981.
U.S. v. Thompson, 827 F.2d
When conviction is secured by methods that offend
20
elementary standards of justice, defendant may invoke Fourteenth
21
Amendment guarantee of a fundamentally fair trial; this principle is
22
not strictly limited to those situations in which defendant has
23
suffered arguable prejudice, but, rather, principle is designed to
24
maintain also public confidence in the administration of justice.
25
v. Taylor, 648 F.2d 565, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 329, 454 U.S. 866,
26
70 L.Ed.2d 168, on remand 527 F.Supp. 863.
27
C.A.Cal. 1962.
U.S.
Requirements of Fourteenth Amendment is for a
28
fair trial and the due process clause prohibits conviction and
29
incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to common and fundamental
30
ideas of fairness and right.
31
Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, certiorari denied 83 S.Ct. 1110, 372 U.S. 978, 10
32
L.Ed.2d 143.
33
C.A.Cal. 1962.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Burbaker v.
Contention that trial court occurrence was of
34
such nature as to deprive criminal defendant of due process presents
35
question whether occurrence was of kind which must be presumed to have
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 258
1
prejudiced defendant despite instruction and other action to cure
2
error.
3
1602, 370 U.S. 952, 8 L.Ed.2d 818.
4
FEDERAL COURT
Duncan v. Carter, 299 F.2d 179, certiorari denied 82 S.Ct.
5
8A Cal D 2d-572
6
C.A.Cal. 1960.
It is only where criminal trials in state courts
7
are conducted in such a manner as amounts to a disregard of the
8
fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice that due
9
process is offended and federally court interference is warranted.
10
Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, certiorari denied 81 S.Ct. 379, 364
11
U.S. 934, 5 L.Ed.2d 366, rehearing denied 81 S.Ct.1092, 366 U.S. 922, 6
12
L.Ed.2d 244.
13
8A Cal D 2d-572
14
Cal. 1985.
Prosecution is obligated to respect defendant's right
15
to a fair trial and an impartial trial in compliance with due process
16
of law.
17
217 Cal.Rptr. 652, 39 C.3d 667.
18
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14.
Cal. 1979.
People v. Trevino, 704 P.2d 719,
A trial procedure in which the trier of fact can only
19
find against the accused, even if only advisory, is a blatant violation
20
of constitutional standards; all triers of fact must be free to find
21
for or against the party appearing before them b.
22
art. 1, Sec. 7(a); art. 6, Sec. 22; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
23
Perrone C., 603 P.2d 1300, 160 Cal.Rptr. 704, 26, C.3d 49.
24
Cal. 1977.
West's Ann.Const.
In re
Fair and impartial trial is fundamental aspect of the
25
right of the accused person not to be deprived of liberty without due
26
process of law.
27
Sec. 7(a).
28
1164, 137 Cal.Rptr. 476, 19 C.3d 255.
29
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1,
People v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 561 P.2d
Cal. 1972.
Assurance of fair trial is constitutionally found in
30
due process.
31
488, certiorari denied 93 S.C2. 1380, 410 U.S. 944, 35 L.Ed.2d 610.
32
People v. Sharp, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal.Rptr. 233, 7 C.3d
Cal. 1960.
Denial of a fair trial and impartial trial amounts to
33
a denial of due process of law and is a miscarriage of justice within
34
meaning of the phrase as used in Constitution.
West's Ann.Const. art,
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 259
1
6, Sec. 4 1/2.
Ex parte Winchester, 348 P.2d 904, 2 Cal.Rptr. 296, 53
2
C.2d 528, certiorari denied 80 S.Ct. 163 U.S. 852, 4 L.Ed.2d 1734.
Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1984.
3
Fair hearing is requisite of due process
4
in both civil and criminal cases, and its denial is act in excess of
5
jurisdiction and reversible error per se.
6
In re Hector R., 200 Cal.Rptr. 110, 152 C.A.3d 1146.
Cal.App. 1982.
7
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
It is obligation of prosecution, as well as of
8
court, to respect mandate that fair and impartial trial is fundamental
9
aspect of right of accused persons not to be deprived of liberty
10
without due process of law.
11
Fuller, 186 Cal.Rptr. 283, 136 C.A.3d 403.
Cal.App. 1979.
12
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Right to fair trial is a fundamental liberty
13
secured by Fourteenth Amendment.
14
Williams, 155 Cal.Rptr. 414, 93 C.A.3d 40.
Cal.App. 1975.
15
People v.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
People v.
Persons accused of a crime enjoy the fundamental
16
constitutional right to fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth
17
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
18
6, 14.
19
51 C.A.3d 190, certorari denied 96 S.Ct. 3200, 427 U.S. 912, 49 L.Ed.2d
20
1204.
Rosato v. Superior Court of Fresno County, 124 Cal.Rptr. 427,
Cal.App. 1975.
21
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends.
Duty of a trial court to afford every defendant a
22
fair and impartial trial is of constitutional dimension; where the
23
procedure has fallen short of that standard, an accused has been denied
24
due process and the inherent power of the court to correct matters by
25
granting a new trial transcends statutory limitations.
26
Oliver, 120 Cal.Rptr. 368, 46 C.A.3d 747.
27
8A Cal D 2d-573
28
Cal.App. 1970.
Due process requires that accused receive fair
29
trial by impartial jury, free from outside influences.
30
Byers, 88 Cal.Rptr. 886, 10 C.A.3d 410.
Cal.App. 1967.
31
People v.
People v.
The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing
32
violates even the minimal standards of due process.
33
v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County, 62 Cal.Rptr. 435, 253 C.A.2d
34
670.
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
35
36
Los Angeles County
process.
Los Angeles County v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County,
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 260
1
2
62 Cal.Rptr. 435, 253 C.A.2d 670.
Cal. App. 1963.
As applied to criminal trial, denial of due
3
process is a failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to
4
concept of justice, and in order to declare a denial thereof there must
5
be a finding that absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial.
6
People v. Causey, 34 Cal.Rptr. 43, 220 C.A.2d 641, certiorari denied 84
7
S.Ct. 981, 376 U.S. 959, 11 L.Ed.2d 976.
8
9
Cal.App. 1960. Defendant's rights, which may be waved in criminal
case without affecting due process, are: to be brought to trial within
10
60 days after filing of information; to a public trial; to any trial at
11
all by plea of guilty; to trial by jury; to be confronted with
12
witnesses against him; to defend with counsel; and to be put in
13
jeopardy only once for same offense by failure to raise plea.
14
v. Norman, 1 Cal.Rptr. 699, 177 C.A.2d 59, certiorari denied 81 S.Ct.
15
56, 364 U.S. 820, 5 L.Ed.2d 51.
16
Cal.App. 1957.
People
Right of DEFENDANTS to be confronted with witness
17
against him, to be brought to trial within 60 days after filing of
18
information, not to be put in double jeopardy, to public trial, to
19
counsel and to trial by jury, may be waved by defendant without
20
affecting due process in the trial. West's Ann. Pen.COse. Se.Sec. 686,
21
subs. 1, 3, 1043, 1193.
22
Baird, 310 P.2d 454, 150 C.A.2d 561, 68 A.L.R.2d 628.
23
Petition of Spencer, for and on Behalf of
SHAM TRIALS
24
8A Cal D 2d-576
25
Cal.App. 1977.
It is the failure to have an appropriate
26
adjudication of a defense that reduces trial to a farce or a sham, and
27
which thus renders defendant's trial fundamentally unfair, in violation
28
of constitutional due process rights guaranteed to defendant.
29
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 6, 14.
30
73 C.A.3d 1023.
31
8A Cal. D 2d-577
32
Cal.App. 1965.
People v. Rodrigez, 141 Cal.Rptr. 118,
Wrongful interference with defendant in
33
preparing for his defense of criminal prosecution, in opportunity
34
to interview witnesses who have appeared before grand jury in
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 261
1
proceedings leading up to return of indictment of defendant, or
2
witnesses whose statements given to the police or district
3
attorney are basis of prosecution actually commenced, is denial
4
of due process and of equal protection of the laws and is
5
violative of the right to have compulsory process for obtaining
6
witnesses; but such unlawful interference is not denial of right
7
to confront and cross
DISCLOSURE AND DISCOVERY; NOTICE OF DEFENSE.
8
9
8A Cal D 2d-584
P U.S.Cal. 1984.
10
Due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
11
requires state to disclose to criminal defendant favorable evidence
12
that is material either to guilt or to punishment.
13
Amend. 14.
14
L.Ed.2d 413 S.Ct. 2528, 467 U.S. 479, 81 L.Ed.2d 413, on remand People
15
v. Trombetta, 219 Ca.Rptr. 637. 173 C.A.3d 1093, review denied.
U.S.C.A.Const.
Califonria v. Trombetta, 104 S.Ct 2528, 467 U.S. 479, 81
16
8A Cal D 2d-585
17
C.A.Cal. 1976.
Whether an accused's due process right was
18
violated by prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence is determined by
19
whether undisclosed evidence was so important that its absence
20
prevented accused from receiving his constitutionally guaranteed fair
21
trial.
U.S. v. Cervantes, 542 F.2d 773.
22
8A Cal D 2d-586
23
C.A.Cal.197. Prosecution's suppression of requested evidence
24
favorable to accused violates due process where evidence is material
25
either to guilt or punishment irrespective of good faith or bad faith
26
or prosecution.
27
S.Ct. 16, 414 U.S. 801, 38 L.Ed.2d 38, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 1945,
28
416 U.S. 940, 40 L.Ed.2d 292.
29
U.S. v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, appeal dismissed 94
DEFENDANTS claiming to have been denied due process because of
30
prosecution's suppression of evidence must show that relevant evidence
31
tending to exculpate them has been suressed.
32
150, appeal dismissed 94 S.Ct. 16, 414 U.S. 801, 38 L.Ed.2d 38,
U.S. v. Baxter, 492 F.2d
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 262
1
2
certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 1945, 416 U.S. 940, 40 L.Ed.2d 292.
C.A.Cal. 1973.
Whether a defendant's right to due process is
3
violated by failure to disclose exculpatory evidence is determined by
4
whether the undisclosed evidence is so critical that its absence
5
prevents defendant from receiving a fair trial under the Constitution.
6
U.S. v. Diaz-Rodrigez, 478 F.2d 1005, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 3024,
7
412 U.S. 964, 37 L.Ed.2d 1013.
8
9
C.A.Cal. 1972.
Whether accused's right to due process was
violated by failure to disclose evidence in determined by whether the
10
undisclosed evidence was so important that its absence prevented the
11
accused from receiving his constitutionally guaranteed fair trial.
12
U.S. v. Hiber, 463 F.2d 455.
13
Facts that defense counsel did not specifically request the
14
information that prosecution failed to disclose, or that diligent
15
defense attorney might have discovered information on his own or that
16
the prosecution did not suress the evidence in bad faith were not
17
conclusive; due process could be denied by failure to disclose alone.
18
U.S. v. Hiber, 463 F.2d 455.
19
20
8A Cal D 2d-587
21
C.A.Cal. 1970.
Suppression of evidence favorable to accused
22
violates due process where evidence is material either as to guilt or
23
punishment irrespective of good faith or bad faith of prosecution.
24
Loraine v. U.S., F.2d 335, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 292, 393 U.S.
25
933, 21 L.Ed.2d 270
26
Evidence which goes only to credibility of witness may be
27
"material" within rule that suppression of evidence favorable to
28
accused violates due process.
29
denied 89 S.Ct. 292, 393 U.S. 933, 21 L.Ed.2d 270
Loraine v. U.S., F.2d 335, certiorari
30
C.A. Cal. 1968. Deliberate concealment by government of
31
evidence which might clearly operate in favor of a defendant
32
would constitution a violation of due process, entitling
33
defendant to a new trial.
34
8A Cal D 2d-589
35
Cal 1975.
Lee. v. U.S., 388 F.2d 737.
Suppression of substantial material evidence bearing
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 263
1
on credibility of a key prosecution witness is a denial of due process,
2
and an accused is entitled to relief in such circumstances unless court
3
can declare a belief that denial was harmless beyond a reasonable
4
doubt.
5
121 Cal.Rptr. 261, 14 C.3d 399.
6
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Cal. 1974.
People c. Ruthford, 534 P.2d 1341,
Intentional suppression of material evidence
7
favorable to defendant who has requested it constitutes violation of
8
due process, irrespective of good or bad faith of prosecution.
9
v. Hitch. 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal.Rptr. 9 , 12 C.3d 641.
10
8A Cal D 2d-591
11
Cal.A. 4 Dist. 1990.
People
Intentional or negligent suppression by
12
prosecution of material evidence favorable to accused on issue of guilt
13
violates due process.
14
271 Cal.Rptr. 738, 222 C.A.3d 541.
15
8A Cal D 2d-592
16
Cal.A.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
People v. Boyd,
1982. Intentional suppression of material evidence
17
favorable to defendant, who has requested it, constitutes a violation
18
of due process, irrespective of the good or bad faith or the
19
prosecution.
20
Cal.Rptr. 324, 138 C.A.3d 832.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14. Peple v. Brown, 188
21
8A Cal D 2d-594
22
Cal.A. 1976.
Due process requires the prosecution to disclose
23
all material evidence favorable to the accused whether such evidence
24
relates directly to the issue of guilt or can lead to defense to
25
favorable evidence.
26
People v. Vera, 132 Cal.Rptr. 817, 62 C.A.3d 293.
27
8A Cal D 2d-595
28
Cal.A. 1972.
West's Ann.Evid.Code, Sec.Sec. 140, 600(b).
Suppression by prosecution of evidence favorable to
29
accused violates due process where evidence is material either to guilt
30
or to punishment, irrespective of good faith or bad faith of
31
prosecution.
32
33
People v. McManis, 102 Cal.Rptr. 889, 26 C.A.3d 608.
Cal.A. 1969.
It is always permissible for defendant to show his
trial was being unfairly conducted, and by establishing that
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 264
1
prosecution is suressing material witness, defendant demonstrates he
2
has been denied fair trial and due process.
3
Cal.Rptr. 79, 276 C.A.2d 601.
People v. Singletary, 81
4
8A Cal D 2d-597
5
LawRev. 1969. Nondisclosure of evidence by the prosecution.
6
Hastings L.J. 974.
7
LawRev. 1967. Suppression of evidence.
8
268(6) Presence of accused and counsel; public trial and
9
14 U.C.L.A.Law R. 670
confrontation.
10
8A Cal D 2d-598
11
U.S.Cal. 1969.
Confrontation clause of Sixth Amendment is
12
applicable to state trials by reason of due process clause of
13
Fourteenth Amendment.
14
California, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 395 U.S. 250, 23 L.Ed.2d 284.
15
C.A.Cal. 1978.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14.
Harrington v.
Confrontation clause of Sixth Amendment is
16
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
17
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14.
18
20
C.A.Cal. 1966.
Patterson v. McCarthy, 581 F.2d 220.
Sixth Amendment right of accused to confront
19
witnesses against him is fundamental right and is made obligatory on
20
states by Fourteenth Amendment, U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14.
21
v. Wilson, 368 F.2d 677.
22
C.A.Cal. 1965.
McGarrity
Right of accused to cross-examine and confront
23
prosecution witnesses in state criminal trial is essential ingredient
24
of fair trial, and as such it is embodied in due process.
25
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
26
denied 86 S.Ct. 288, 382 U.S. 919, 15 L.Ed.2d 234.
27
D.C.Cal. 1968.
Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282, certiorari
Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-
28
examine witness is applicable to states under Fourteenth Amendment.
29
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14.
30
8A Cal D 2d-599
31
D.C.Cal. 1964.
Rodrigez v. Nelson, 286 F.Su. 321.
The right of accused to cross-examine and
32
confront prosecution witnesses in a state criminal trial is guaranteed
33
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
34
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Gray v. Wilson, 230 F.Su. 860, certiorari
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 265
1
denied 85 S.Ct. 693, 379 U.S. 983, 13 L.Ed.2d 573, reversed 345 F.2d
2
282, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 288, 382 U.S. 919, 15 L.Ed.2d 234.
3
Cal. 1971.
The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment is
4
applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
5
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14.
6
31, 4 C.3d 911, certiorari dismissed 92 S.Ct. 348, 404 U.S. 980, 30
7
L.Ed.2d 295.
8
9
Cal. 1969.
In re Terry, 484 P.2d 1375, 95 Cal.Rptr.
Right of cross-examination secured by confrontation
clause of Sixth Amendment is made applicable to states by Fourteenth
10
Amendment.
11
361, 82 Cal.Rptr. 161, 1 C.3d 277, certiorari denied Baker v.
12
California, 91 S.Ct. 462, 400 U.S. 993, 27 L.Ed.2d 441.
13
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14.
Cal. 1967.
People v. Brawley, 461 P.2d
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of defendant's right to
14
be confronted with witnesses against him is made applicable to the
15
states by the Fourteenth Amendment, and defendant also has a statutory
16
right to confrontation.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14.
17
Ann.Pen.Code. Sec. 686.
People v. Foster, 432 P.2d 976, 63 Cal.Rptr.
18
288, 67 C.2d 604.
19
Cal. 1959.
West's
It is a denial of due process of law and fundamental
20
fairness for a court to determine issues upon the basis of evidence
21
available to it and the prosecution but not also available to the
22
defendant and his counsel since it is analogous to denying the accused
23
his right to cross-examine or confront witnesses produced against him
24
and in fact is more akin to a procedure whereby a defendant and his
25
counsel would be prevented from even seeing the witnesses or hearing
26
their testimony or examining physical evidence.
27
335 P.2d 114, 51 C.2d 590.
28
8A Cal D 2d-600
29
Cal. A. 1982.
People v. Cartier,
Right to confront and cross-examine
30
witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf are essential
31
to due process.
32
Claxton, 181 Cal.Rptr. 281, 129 C.A.3d 638.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends.
33
8A Cal D 2d-602
34
Cal.A. 1959.
35
6, 14.
People v.
Privilege of a defendant in a criminal action to
confrontation by the witnesses against him in the presence of the court
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 266
1
is protected by the due process clause of the federal and state
2
constitutions, and improper denial of the right of cross-examination is
3
a denial of due process.
4
333 P.2d 188, 166 C.A.2d 371.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
BIAS AND PREJUDICE GENERALLY
5
6
8A Cal D 2d-603
7
Cal.A. 1968.
Due process requires that accused receive a trial
8
by impartial jury free from outside influences.
9
14.
10
People v. Redwine,
U.S.C.A.Cosnt. Amend.
People v. McKee, 71 Cal.Rptr. 26, 265 C.A.2d 53.
Cal.A. 1968
Due process requires that an accused receive a fair
11
trial by an impartial jury, free from outside influences.
12
Richardson, 65 Cal.Rptr. 487, 258 C.A.2d 23.
13
14
People v.
QUALIFICATIONS, ACTIONS, AND COMMENTS OF
JUDGE, JURY, OR PROSECUTOR.
15
8A Cal D 2d-603
16
C.A.Cal. 1980.
A hearing by a biased judge does not
17
comport with fundamental concepts of due process of law.
18
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5.
19
8A Cal D 2d-604
20
C.A.Cal. 1957.
U.S. v. Navarro-Flores, 628 F.2d 1178.
When prosecutor in state court is guilty of such
21
unfair, dishonest, or ignoble conduct as to prevent a fair trial for
22
defendant, then defendant has been denied due process called for by the
23
Fourteenth Amendment.
24
F.2d 154, certiorari denied 78 S.Ct. 271, 355 U.S. 896, 2 L.Ed.2d 194
25
and Rogers v. Teets, 78 S.Ct. 271, 355 U.S. 896, 2 L.Ed.2d 194,
26
rehearing denied 78 S.Ct. 384, 355 U.S. 927, 2 L.Ed.2d 358, rehearing
27
denied 78 S.Ct. 385, 355 U.S. 928, 2 L.Ed.2d 358.
28
8A Cal D 2d-606
29
Cal. 1960.
30
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
Burwell v. Teets, 245
Where prosecution is allowed to control course of
proceedings in manner which would prevent accused from presenting
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 267
1
material evidence, accused is denied a fair trial and due process.
2
People v. Kiihoa, 349 P.2d 673, 3 Cal.Rptr. 1, 53 C.2d 748.
3
8A Cal D 2d-607
4
Cal.A. 5 Dist. 1984.
Dignitary requirements of procedural due
5
process dictate that not just bias in fact but the appearance of bias
6
and impropriety are due process considerations; goals of the guarantee
7
of due process are the individual's reasonable belief that proceedings
8
are fair and maintenance of confidence in the honesty and integrity of
9
the judge and his proper performance of his judicial function.
West's
10
Ann.Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 15; U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.
People
11
v. Hernandez, 206 Cal.Rptr. 843, 160 C.A.3d 725,
Cal.a. 5 dist 1984.
12
Procedure outlined in disqualification
13
statute, which permits party who believes he has been aggrieved by
14
decision of aointed judge on issue of disqualification because of that
15
judge's actual bias or prejudice against him to immediately file
16
appellate court petition for writ of mandate, which alleges both facts
17
indicative of actual bias or prejudice against party who sought to
18
disqualify judge and fact indicating that such bias or prejudice
19
operated to deprive litigant of fair hearing, sufficiently comports
20
with due process requirements.
21
Ann.Cal.Const. Art. 1, Sec. 15, cl. 7; West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. Sec.
22
170(e).
23
C.A.3d 670.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14; West's
Garcia v. Superior Court (People), 203 Cal.Rptr. 290, 156
24
8A Cal D 2d-609
25
C.A.Cal. 1981.
A conviction violated Fourteenth Amendment if it
26
is obtained by the use of perjured testimony which prosecution knows to
27
be false or later discovers to be false and allows to go uncorrected.
28
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
29
denied 102 S.Ct. 329, 454 U.S. 866, 70 L.Ed.2d 168, on remand 527 F.Su.
30
863.
31
C.A. Cal. 1978.
U.S. v. Taylor, 648 F.2d 565, certiorari
Failure of prosecutor to correct testimony of
32
witness known to be false may deny defendant due process and allow
33
reversal of a conviction.
34
35
C.A.Cal. 1965.
U.S. v. Vargas-Martinez, 569 F.2d 1102.
Conviction obtained through use of false
evidence, known to be such by prosecution, must fall under
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 268
1
Fourteenth Amendment to Federal Constitution, and rule allied
2
when prosecution, though not soliciting false evidence, knowingly
3
allows it to go uncorrected when it bears in evidence.
4
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
5
certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 41, 382 U.S. 817, 15 L.Ed.2d 64,
6
appeal after remend 378 F.2d 16, certirorari denied 88 S.Ct. 294,
7
389 U.S. 930, 19 L.Ed.2d 283, rehearing denied 88 S.Ct. 585, 389
8
U.S. 1025, 19 L.Ed.2d 674.
9
D.C.Cal. 1969.
U.S. v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782,
Criminal conviction obtained through
10
prosecution's knowing use of perjured or false evidence violates
11
defendant's right to due process.
12
Imbler v. Craven, 298 F.Su. 795, affirmed 424 F.2d 631,
13
certiorari denied California v. Imbler, 91 S.Ct. 100, 400
14
U.S.865, 27 L.Ed.2d 104.
15
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
Knowledge by prosecution is required to suort claim of denial of
16
due process base on existend of prejudicial perjured testimony.
17
Imbler v. Craven, 298 F.Su. 795, affirmed 424 F.2d 631, certiorari
18
denied California v. Imbler, 91 S.Ct. 100, 400 U.S.865, 27 L.Ed.2d 104.
19
Due process does not tolerate prosecutor's selective inattention
20
to significant facts but requires that he exercise good faith, a
21
requirement not fulfilled where he allows witness to give false
22
testimony of which he has advance knowledge and accuracy of which he
23
has reason to suspect good faith imposes affirmative duty to avoid even
24
unintentional deception and misrepresentation, and prosecutor must
25
undertake careful study of case and exercise diligence in its
26
preparation, particularly where confronted with fact tending to cast
27
doubt upon his witness's testimony.
28
affirmed 424 F.2d 631, certiorari denied California v. Imbler, 91 S.Ct.
29
100, 400 U.S.865, 27 L.Ed.2d 104.
30
Imbler v. Craven, 298 F.Su. 795,
HABEAS
31
8A Cal D 2d-609
32
Ca. 1963.
A judgment of conviction based on testimony known by
33
representatives of the state to be perjured deprives defendant of due
34
process of law and may be attacked on habeas corpus.
In re Imbler, 387
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 269
1
P.2d 6, 35 Cal.Rptr. 293, 60 C.2d 554, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 196,
2
379 U.S. 908, 13 L.Ed.2d 181.
Cal.A. 1976.
3
Due process proscribes a criminal conviction
4
obtained through perjured testimony knowingly used by the prosecution
5
against the accused.
6
C.A.3d 32.
Peple v. Westmoreland, 129 Cal.Rptr. 554, 58
A denial of due process can result if the prosecution, although
7
8
not soliciting false evidence, allows a misleading and false impression
9
to go uncorrected when it appears; it matters little that the false
10
impression goes only to the credibility of a prosecution witness or
11
that the prosecutor's silence was not the result of guile or a desire
12
to prejudice.
Peple v. Westmoreland, 129 Cal.Rptr. 554, 58 C.A.3d 32.
Cal.A. 1969.
13
A criminal action presented to a trier of fact on
14
partial evidence which by reason of false inferences created becomes
15
false evidence is an unfair trial which denies accused due process.
16
People. v. Stuart, 77 Cal.Rptr. 531, 272 C.A.2d 653.
RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE; WITNESSES.
17
18
8A Cal. D 2d-613
19
C.A.Cal. 1965.
Undue infringement of right to cross-examination
20
as well as improper restrictions on right to present evidence in
21
rebuttal is a deprivation of constitutional guaranty of due process of
22
law.
23
Commission, 403 P.2d 140, 45 Cal.Rptr. 12, 63 C.2d 48.
West's Ann.Labor Code, Sec. 5704.
Pence v. Industrial Acc.
24
8A Cal. D 2d-614
25
Cal. 1960. Intentional suppression of material evidence by state
26
is a denial of a fair trial and due process, and this can, in some
27
circumstances, be manifested by failure of prosecution to call certain
28
witnesses.
People v. Kiihoa, 349 P.2d 673, 3 Cal.Rptr. 1, 53 C.2d 748.
29
Cal.A. 2 Dist. 1990. Constitutional guarantee of due
30
process includes right of criminal defendant to compel presence
31
of witness in his behalf.
32
Fernandez, 269 Cal.Rptr. 116, 219 C.A.3d 1379, opinion mondified.
33
8A Cal. D 2d-615
34
Cal.A. 5 Dist. 1984.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
People v.
To establish violation of due process
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 270
1
rights by prosecutorial intimidation of defense witness, defendant need
2
not establish that prosecutor's remarks were either direct or exclusive
3
factor in witness' decision not to testify; all that need be shown is a
4
strongy suggestion that comments were cause.
5
14.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5,
People v. Bryant, 203 Cal.Rptr. 733, 157 C.A.3d 582
Accused's due process right to offer testimony of witness is
6
7
violated whenever government conduct, whether by state statute,
8
judicial misconduct, or prosecutorial misconduct, interferes with such
9
right.
10
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.
People v. Bryant, 203 Cal.Rptr.
733, 157 C.A.3d 582
11
8A Cal. D 2d-616
12
Cal.A. 1962.
Right of cross-examination is fundamental to due
13
process of law, and, though scope thereof is limited to testimony
14
received on direct examination, wide latitude is allowed in testing
15
credibility.
16
21 Cal.Rptr. 22, 202 C.A.2d 372.
17
West's Ann. Code Civ.Proc. Sec. 2048.
Payette v. Sterle,
Cal.A. 1961. Intentional suppression of material evidence by
18
state would deny accused a fair trial and due process of law.
19
v. Blair, 15 Cal.Rptr. 533, 195 C.A.2d 1, certiorari denied 82 S.Ct.
20
373, 368 U.S. 934, 7 L.Ed.2d 196, certiorari denied 82 S.Ct. 651, 369
21
U.S. 807, 7 L.Ed.2d 554.
22
People
INSTRUCTIONS
23
8A Cal. D 2d-617
24
U.S.Cal. 1989.
Due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
25
denies states the power to deprive the accused of liberty unless the
26
prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the
27
charged offence; jury instructions relieving states of this burden
28
violate a defendant's cue process rights.
29
Carella v. California, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 105 L.Ed.2d 218, rehearing
30
denied 110 S.Ct. 23, 106 L.Ed.2d 636.
31
8A Cal. D 2d-621
32
Cal. 1984.
33
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Failure to instruct on intent as element of special
circumstance, because it takes issue of intent from trier of fact,
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 271
1
denies defendant due process of law in violation of Fourteenth
2
Amendment.
3
205 CalRptr. 265, 36 C.3d 539, certiorari denied California v. Garcia,
4
105 S.Ct. 1229, 469 U.S. 1229, 84 L.Ed.2d 366.
5
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
Cal. 1973.
People v. Garcia, 684 P.2d 826,
Due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment of Federal
6
Constitution protects accused against conviction except upon proof
7
beyond a reasonable doubt; an erroneous instruction to jury which in
8
effect reverses this burden of proof is therefore an infringement of
9
defendant's constitutional right to due process, and such an error is
10
not necessarily cured by instructions which state the rules correctly.
11
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
12
Cal.Rptr. 65, 9 C.3d 753.
13
8A Cal. D 2d-623
14
Cal.A. 3 Dist. 1983.
People v. Serrato, 512 P.2d 289, 109
Jury instruction which has effect of
15
reversing or lightening State's burden of proof constitutes
16
infringement of defendant's constitutional right to due process.
17
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
18
C.A.3d 458, certiorari denied Deletto v. California, 104 S.Ct. 2156,
19
466 U.S.952, 80 L.Ed 542.
20
People v. Deletto, 195 Cal.Rptr. 233, 147
Cal.A. 4 Dist. 1988. Trial court's failure to sua sponte instruct
21
jury on element of specific intent needed to convict defendant of
22
felony for willfully failing to aear, after being released on bail, as
23
required, in order to evade process of court, denied defendant due
24
process.
25
1320.5.
26
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14; West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code Sec.
People v. Wesley, 243 Cal.Rptr. 785, 198 C.A.3d 519.
Cal.A. 1982.
Testimony as to prior inconsistent statements of
27
material witness for prosecution is relevant testimony tending in
28
reason to disprove disputed fact of defendant's guilt and is admissible
29
when otherwise not barred by law, and right to produce legally
30
admissible relevant evidence in defense is basic ingredient of due
31
process of law, and defendant was denied such right when defense
32
counsel was not allowed to give testimony tending to impeach testimony
33
of prosecution witness, defense counsel having been previously denied
34
permission to withdraw on ground that he was prospective witness.
35
West's Ann.Evid.Code Sec.Sec. 210, 351; U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
36
People v. Goldstein, 182 Cal.Reptr. 207, 130 C.A.3d 1024.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 272
1
Cal.A. 1982.
Right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and
2
to call witnesses in one's own behalf are essential to due process.
3
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14.
4
C.A.3d 638.
5
Cal.A. 1971.
People v. Claxton, 181 Cal.Rptr. 281, 129
Failure to instruct, in prosecution for felony
6
battery upon a police officer, as to reasonable doubt and presumption
7
of innocence after representation that such an instruction would be
8
given at appropriate time was additional factor to be considered in
9
assessing overall compliance with requirements of due process.
10
Ann.Pen. Code Sec.Sec. 242, 243, 1093, subd. 6.
11
98 Cal.Rptr. 25, 20 C.A.3d 688.
12
West's
People v. Townsend,
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
13
8A Cal D 2d-623
14
268.1(1) In general.
15
U.S.Cal. 1975.
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of Federal
16
Constitution guarantee that person brought to trial in any state
17
of federal court be afforded right to assistance of counsel
18
before he can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment.
19
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14.
20
2525, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L.Ed.2d 562.
21
Faretta v. California, 95 S.Ct.
Sixth Amendment rights of accused in all criminal prosecutions to
22
be informed of nature and cause of accusation, to be confronted with
23
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining
24
witnesses in his favor and to have assistance of counsel for his
25
defense are part of the "due process of law" that is guaranteed by
26
Fourteenth Amendment to DEFENDANTS in the criminal courts of state.
27
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14.
28
U.S. 806, 45 L.Ed.2d 562.
29
U.S.Cal. 1967.
Faretta v. California, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 422
Sixth Amendment's requirement that accused
30
have right to assistance of counsel was made obligatory on states
31
by Fourteenth Amendment.
32
v. State of Cal., 87 S.Ct. 1396, 386 U.S. 738, 18 L.Ed.2d 493,
33
rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 2094, 388 U.S. 924, 18 L.Ed.2d 1377.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 140.
Anderes
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 273
1
8A Cal D 2d-624
2
Cal. 1985.
Failure to respect accused's right to retain counsel
3
of his own choosing as well as to give retained counsel a reasonable
4
time in which to prepare a defense constitutes a denial of due process.
5
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14.
6
Cal.Rptr. 193, 37 C.3d 784.
7
Cal.1979.
People v. Coutrs, 693 P.2d 778, 210
Due process guarantee that persons forced to settle
8
their claims of right and duty through the judicial process be given a
9
meaningful opportunity to be heard includes the right to a defendant to
10
aointed counsel under certain circumstances regardless of whether the
11
action is labeled criminal or civil. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14; West's
12
Ann.Const. art 1, Sec. 7(a).
13
Cal.Rptr. 529, 24 C.3d 22, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 209, 444 U.S.
14
900, 62 L.Ed.2d 136.
15
Cal.A. 1976.
Salas v. Cortez, 593 P.2d 226, 154
Due process is no yardstick of definite vlaue, but
16
rather is embodiment of traditional notions of fair play and justice;
17
it is clearly violated when defendant is denied counsel in criminal
18
proceedings, but may also be denied under circumstances which do not
19
include outright refusal to provide counsel.
20
Cal.Rptr. 279, 57 C.A.3d 437.
21
People v. Moore, 129
Cal.A. 1966. If defendant in criminal case has been deprived of
22
procedural due process because deprived of services of counsel, due
23
process is not satisfied if defendant is penalized because he does not
24
in some manner and from some source seasonably ascertain nuances of the
25
law so as to make timely alication for relief.
26
Cal.Rptr. 603, 239 C.A.2d 252.
27
Cal.A. 1963.
People v. Campbell, 48
If defendant is so prejudiced by denial of counsel
28
as to infect his subsequent trial with absence of that fundamental
29
fairness essential to very concept of justice, he has been denied due
30
process of law.
People v. Sigal, 34 Cal.Rptr. 767, 221 A.A.2d 684.
31
8A Cal D 2d-625
32
Cal.A. 1960.
Defendant whose attorney was relieved by court
33
without any notice to defendant was deprived of due process of law.
34
West's Ann.Code.Civ.Proc.
35
People v. Kerfoot, 7 Cal.Rptr. 674, 184 C.A.2d 622.
36
Cal.A. 1953.
Sec. Sec. 284, 285; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Denying the right to counsel in criminal
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 274
1
proceedings is denial of due process.
2
120 C.A.2d 896.
LawRev 1975.
3
People v. Mora, 262 P.2d 594,
The right to effective counsel in criminal trials:
4
Judicial standards and the California Bar Association Response.
5
Golden Gate L.Rev. 499.
6
LawRev. 1973.
7
LawRev.
8
LawRev. 1967.
9
counsel.
1972.
LawRev. 1967.
11
tax investigations.
12
LawRev. 1964.
LawRev.
24 Stan.L.R. 387.
The new definition: A Fifth Amendment right to
Fifth Amendment right to counsel in federal income
19 Stan.L.R. 1014.
Safeguarding economic liberties. S. John Insalata.
The right to counsel in California.
5 Santa Clara L.
75.
Lawrev. 1960.
16
17
James Gordley.
50 A.B.A.J. 1144.
14
15
Legal aid.
10 C.W.L.R. 196.
14 U.C.L.A.Law R. 604.
10
13
Right to self representation.
5
The right to counsel in misdemeanor cases.
48
C.L.R. 501.
LawRev. 1951.
18
Prohibiting communications by defendant with
19
counsel during recess of court as deprivation of constitutional right
20
to assistance of counsel.
24 So.Cal.L.R. 105.
NECESSITY IN GENERAL.
21
22
8A Cal D 2d-626
23
Cal.A. 1965.
Due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment includes
24
Sixth Amendment guarantee to right to counsel. U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6,
25
14.
26
People v. Ferry, 47 Cal.Rptr. 324, 237 C.A.2d 880.
Cal.A.1964.
Right to counsel guaranteed by Sixth Amendment is
27
applicable in criminal trials in state courts.
28
People v. Phillips, 40 Cal.Rptr. 403, 229 C.A.2d 496.
29
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 6.
A denial of right to counsel is a denial of due process and
30
furnishes basis for ruling that defendant has not been legally
31
committed.
People v. Phillips, 40 Cal.Rptr. 403, 229 C.A.2d 496.
32
8A Cal D 2d-627
33
D.C.Cal. 1964. Where substantial issues of fact will be presented
34
in proceeding to vacate and set aside sentence, court is duty bound to
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 275
1
appoint counsel to represent petitioner and that duty arises not out of
2
Sixth Amendment but out of due process clause of Fifth Amendment.
3
U.S.C.A. Sec. 2255; U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 6.
4
231 F.Su. 177.
LawRev. 1969.
5
6
Henderson v. U.S.,
The right to counsel-in-custody interrogation.
20
Hastings L.J. 958.
LawRev. 1966.
7
8
28
appellate stages.
The right to have assistance of counsel at all
52 A.B.A.J. 135.
268.1(5) Choice of counsel; necessity of request and waver.
9
10
8A Cal D 2d-631
11
Cal.A. 1982.
United States Constitution does not permit state to
12
force attorney on unwilling criminal defendant, because to do so is
13
contrary to his basic right to represent himself if he truly wants to
14
do so.
15
136 C.A.3d 494.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14.
In re Gary U., 186 Cal.Rptr. 316,
ADEQUACY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
16
17
REPRESENTATION.
18
8A Cal D 2d-632
19
U.S.Cal. 1967.
Constitutional requirements of substantial
20
equality and fair process can only be attained where counsel acts
21
in role of active advocate in behalf of client, as opposed to
22
that of amicus curae.
23
State of Cal., 87 S.Ct. 1396, 386 U.S. 738, 18 L.Ed.2d 493,
24
rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 2094, 388 U.S. 924, 18 L.Ed.2d 1377.
C.A.Cal. 1980.
25
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14.
Anders v.
Government interference with defendant's
26
relationship with his attorney may render counsel's assistance so
27
ineffective as to violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel as
28
his Fifth Amendment right to due process
29
5, 6.
30
U.S.C.A.Cosnt. Amends.
U.S. v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182.
C.A.Cal. 1974.
Counsel for defendant convicted of crime in a
31
state court has a affirmative duty to protect his client's right of
32
appeal by filing a notice of appeal for his client or by telling him
33
how he can proceed on his own behalf, and failure to provide the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 276
1
obligation deprives defendant of effective assistance of trial counsel
2
when the lawyer knows that his indigent client may want to appeal and
3
that his client does not know how to do so.
4
381.
5
C.A.Cal. 1972.
Riser v. Crave, 501 F.2d
To sustained contention that criminal defendant
6
was denied due process because representation furnished by attorney was
7
inadequate and ineffective, inadequacy must have been such that trial
8
was a farce or mockery of justice or so ineffective as to shock the
9
conscience of the court.
10
11
U.S. v. Steed, 465 F.2d 1310, certiorari
denied 93 S.Ct. 697, 409 U.S. 1078, 34 L.Ed.2d 667.
C.A.Cal. 1971.
Assistance of counsel required by Sixth and
12
Fourteenth Amendments must be effective assistance.
13
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14.
Barber v. Nelson, 451 F.2d 1017.
14
8A Cal D 2d-633
15
D.C.Cal. 1964. Assistance of counsel, whether demanded by Fifth
16
or Sixth Amendment, must be effective assistance.
17
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 6.
18
8A Cal D 2d-634
19
Ca. 1970.
Hendeerson v. U.S., 231 F.Su. 177.
Constitutional right to assistance of counsel in a
20
criminal case includes guarantee that such assistance is effective, and
21
effective counsel required by due process is counsel reasonably likely
22
to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.
23
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 6.
24
633, 2 C.3d 1033.
25
Cal. 1959.
In re Saunders, 472 P.2d 921, 88 Cal.Rptr.
Where federal due process requires appointment of
26
counsel, the states court's appointment of counsel, the state court's
27
aointment must be effective; it must afford counsel time and oortunity,
28
and impose upon him the duty, to consult with defendant and investigate
29
and prepare the case for trial.
30
Mattson, 366 P.2d 937, 51 C.2d 777.
U.S.C.A..Const. Amend. 6.
People v.
31
8A Cal D 2d-635
32
Cal.A. 1973. Determination of whether the demands of due process
33
have been met in a particular case with respect to assistance of
34
counsel is always a question of judgment and degree to be answered in
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 277
1
light of all the circumstances with a view to fundamental fairness;
2
generally, the standards employed pose a question of whether counsel's
3
representation reduced the trial to a farce or a sham.
4
Strawder, 108 Cal.Rptr. 901, 34 C.A.3d 370.
5
8A Cal D 2d-636
6
Cal.A. 1970.
People v.
Inexcusable failure of defense counsel to discharge
7
his duty to carefully investigate all defenses of fact and law that may
8
be available to defendant constitutes a denial of effective assistance
9
of counsel equating a denial of his constitutional right to counsel and
10
also constitutes denial of a fair trial equating denial of due process.
11
People v. Dobson, 91 Cal.Rptr. 433, 12 C.A.3d 1177.
Cal.A. 1966.
12
Federal due process requires reversal of conviction
13
which is "fundamentally unfair" for lack of effective aid of counsel.
14
People v. Goldman, 53 Cal.Rptr. 810, 245 C.A.2d 376.
Cal.A. 1962.
15
Defendant complaining that inadequacy of
16
representation denied him due process must show that counsel displayed
17
such lack of diligence and competence as to reduce trial to farce or
18
sham.
19
C.A.2d 364.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
20
8A Cal D 2d-637
21
Cal.A. 1958.
People v. Lyons, 22 Cal.Rptr. 327, 204
To violate guarantee of Fourteenth Amendment,
22
representation by counsel must be of such a low order as to render
23
trial a farce and a mockery of justice, or it must be shown that
24
essential integrity of proceeding as a trial was destroyed by
25
incompetence of counsel. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
26
319 P.2d 39, 156 C.A.2d 60.
27
Cal.A. 1954.
People v. Dupree,
Record failed to sustain defendant's contention
28
that he was denied due process by failure of his attorneys to fight for
29
his rights and by their claimed conspiracy with the prosecution.
30
People v. Meehan, 269 P.2d 70, 124 C.A.2d 589, certiorari denied 75
31
S.Ct. 67, 348 U.S. 845, 99 L.Ed. 666, certiorari denied 75 S.Ct. 662,
32
349 U.S. 922, 99 L.Ed. 1254.
33
LawRev. 1969.
Defendant's right to relief where he
34
received incompetent defense could not depend upon whether
35
counsel was assigned or retained.
55 A.B.A.J. 254.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 278
1
2
3
LawRev. 1967. Counsel.Standards to guarantee effective
assistance.
8 Santa Clara L. 108.
LawRev.
1957.
Incompetence of counsel as a ground for attacking
4
criminal convictions in California and federal courts.
5
Rev. 400.
6
8A Cal D 2d-642
7
Cal.A.
4 U.C.L.A.Law
1966. Fourteenth Amendment makes Sixth Amendment
8
guarantee of counsel obligatory on states, requiring publicly sulied
9
legal representation for indigent felony DEFENDANTS.
10
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14.
11
C.A.2d 96.
12
8A Cal D 2d-643
13
C.A.9(cal.) 1987.
In re Van Brunt, 51 Cal.Rptr. 136, 242
Petitioner had protected liberty interest
14
against excessive punishment and a liberty interest in the correct
15
sentence of eight months for state offense of escape from local custody
16
and thus it was due process violation for state court to order
17
petitioner to a full two-year term. West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code Sec.
18
209(a); U.S.C.A.Cosnt.Amend. 14.
19
Wasko v. Vasquez, 820 F.2d 1090.
MATTERS CONSIDERED; PRESENTENCE REPORT.
20
8A Cal D 2d-652
21
C.A.9(Cal.) 1986.
Defendant's due process rights are violated
22
when a trial judge relies on materially false or unreliable information
23
in sentencing.
24
U.S. v. Hull, 792 F.2d 941.
C.A.Cal. 1983.
When trial judge relies on materially false or
25
unreliable information in sentencing defendant, defendant's due process
26
rights are violated. U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
27
F.2d 409.
28
C.A.Cal. 1982.
U.S. v. Ruster, 712
Due process requirements that sentencing judge
29
listen to and fairly consider information material to mitigation of
30
punishment.
31
centiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 1187, 459 U.S. 1202, 75 L.Ed.2d 433.
U.S.C.A.Cosnt.Amend. 5.
U.S. v. Coletta, 682 F.2d 820,
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 279
1
8A Cal D 2d-653
2
C.A.Cal. 1979. Due process is violated whenever a defendant is
3
sentenced on the basis of information that is materially false or
4
unreliable. U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
5
6
DISCRIMINATION AND VINDICTIVENESS; SENTENCE
ON RETRIAL.
7
8A Cal D 2d-656
8
C.A.Cal. 1975.
9
U.S. v. Lasky, 592 F.2d 560.
Due process requires that corrective resentencing
be free of vindictiveness, pique or the appearance thereof.
U.S. v.
10
Kenyon, 519 F.2d 1229, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 293, 423 U.S. 935, 46
11
L.ed.2d 267.
12
Cal.A. 1981.
Due process mandates that defendant not be shackled
13
with fear of retaliation by sentencing judge.
14
14; West's Ann.Const.Art. 1, Sec.Sec. 7, 15.
15
Cal.Rptr. 384, 127 C.A.3d 136, certiorari denied Rivera v. California,
16
102 S.Ct. 2942, 457 U.S. 1123, 73 L.Ed.2d 1338.
17
8A Cal D 2d-661
18
C.A.Cal. 1979.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5,
People v. Rivera, 179
Imposition of severest sanction, i.e. full length
19
of previously suspended sentence, on revocation of probation violated
20
due process where defendant was not allowed the opportunity to prove
21
relevant mitigating facts; defendant was entitled to a full hearing at
22
which he could present witnesses and evidence in mitigation and to
23
argue in suort of a lesser punishment.
24
U.S. v. Daz-Burgos, 601 F.2d 983.
25
D.C.Cal. 1974.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
Revocation of probation on grounds of
26
defendant's escape from prison farm resulted in violation of
27
defendant's fundamental due process rights where revocation
28
occurred before defendant was allowed to speak and without his
29
even being asked directly if he had escaped. Sailer v. Gunn, 387
30
F.Su. 1367, reversed 548 F.2d 271.
31
8A Cal D 2d-662
32
Cal. 1976.
A defendant is not afforded procedural due process
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 280
1
protections in probation hearings when procedures employed are
2
"fundamentally unfair" to him.
3
People v. Edwards. 557 P.2d 995, 135 Cal.Rptr. 411, 18 C.3d 796.
4
Cal. 1972.
West's Ann.Pen.Code, Sec. 1203(a).
The rule that there is not right to notice and
5
hearing preceding revocation of probation is no longer consistent with
6
the state constitutional requirements of due process. West's Ann.Const.
7
art. 1, Sec. 13.
8
8 C.3d 451.
9
10
People v. Vickers, 503 P.2d 1313, 105 Cal.Rptr. 305,
8A Cal D 2d-663
Cal.A. 1 Dist. 1988. Principles of due process apply to probation
11
revocation proceedings, requiring trial court to provide sufficient
12
reasons for its order.
13
253 Cal.Rptr. 379, 206 C.A.3d 27.
14
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
Cal.A. 2 Dist. 1985.
People v. Latham,
It is an essential component of due process
15
that individual be given fair notice of those acts which may lead to
16
loss of liberty whether loss of liberty arises from criminal conviction
17
or revocation of probation.
18
209 Cal.Rptr. 657, 163 C.A.3d 812.
19
8A Cal D 2d-666
20
Cal.A. 1977.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
In re Robert M.,
Actual revocation of probation cannot occur until
21
probationer has been afforded due process hearing rights.
22
Barkins, 145 Cal.Rptr. 926, 81 C.A.3d 30.
23
8A Cal D 2d-669
24
Cal.A. 1953.
People v.
As part of the protection afforded by the due
25
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution,
26
there must be available an effective judicial corrective process to
27
enable a convicted person, even after appeal and affirmance of a
28
judgment of conviction, to establish that in truth the judgment was
29
procured under circumstances which offend the fundamental concepts of
30
justice
31
People v. Sica, 253 P.2d 75, 166 C.A.2d 59, certiorari denied 74 S.Ct.
32
36, 346 U.S. 831, 98 L.Ed. 354.
33
34
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14; West's Ann.PenCode. Sec. 1265.
Provisions of Penal Code requiring that after a judgment has been
affirmed on aeal, a proceeding in the nature of error coram nobis to
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 281
1
vacate judgment shall be addressed to court which affirmed judgment,
2
and that when a hearing is not granted by the supreme court, the
3
alication for writ shall be made to the District Court of Aeal, as is
4
not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
5
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14; West's Ann.PenCode. Sec. 1265.
6
Sica, 253 P.2d 75, 166 C.A.2d 59, certiorari denied 74 S.Ct. 36, 346
7
U.S. 831, 98 L.Ed. 354.
8
8A Cal D 2d-670
9
C.A.Cal. 1966.
People v.
When efforts of a state prisoner to obtain an
10
available state appellate review of his convictions are frustrated by
11
actions of penal officials, there has been a violation of due process
12
clause of Fourteenth Amendment.
13
Pail, 366 F.2d 682.
14
8A Cal D 2d-671
15
D.C.Cal. 1958.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
DeWitt v.
An action in forma paupris is entirely statutory
16
and is a privilege and not a right and involves no requirement as to
17
due process.
18
Alication of Hodge, 262 F.2d 778.
19
Hodge v. Heinze, 165 F.Su. 726, certificate denied
Cal. 1990.
Delay attributable to appeals should be considered
20
potentially prejudicial to defendant for due process purposes, only
21
when it occurs after issuance of remitter by appellate court.
22
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
23
Cal.Rptr. 802, 50 C.3d 826, rehearing denied.
24
8A Cal D 2d-672
25
Cal.A. 1981.
People v. Mattson, 789 P.2d 983, 268
Foreclosure of meritorious appellate review in
26
criminal cases offends basic notions of justice and due process of law.
27
West's Ann.Const.art. 1, Sec.Sec. 7, 15; U.S.C.A.Const.Amends, 5, 14.
28
People v. Rivera, 179 Cal.Rptr. 384, 127 C.A.3d 136, certiorari denied
29
Rivera v. California, 102 S.Ct. 2942, 457 U.S. 1123, 73 L.Ed.2d 1338.
30
Cal.A.
1976.
Once appellate review is established, it must be
31
kept free from any procedures which violate due process of equal
32
protection of law.
33
Cal.Rptr. 291, 56 C.A.3d 225.
34
Cal.A. 1973.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14. In re Walker, 128
Due process required that any issues which are
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 282
1
arguable on appeal in a criminal case must be argued, whether or not
2
the record contains grounds for reversal.
3
Cal.Rptr. 600, 36 C.A.3d 97.
People v. Scobie, 111
4
8A Cal D 2d-673
5
LawRev. 1965.
Right to free transcript.
6
LawRev. 1964.
The lawyers and the ware against poverty.
7
L. Goldfarb.
9
Ronald
50 A.B.A.J. 1152.
LawRev. 1964.
8
17 Hastings L.J. 113.
Safeguarding economic liberties. S. John Insalata.
50 A.B.A.J. 1144.
LawRev. 1960.
10
Denial of indigent prisoner's request for
11
transcript as not entitling him to be released from custody.
12
Hastings L.J. 226.
LawRev. 1957.
13
11
Due process of law - equal to protection of the
14
laws - right of indigent DEFENDANTS convicted of non-capital offenses
15
to free transcripts.
LawRev. 1957.
16
30 S.Cal.L.R. 350.
Due process and equal protection; right of an
17
indigent defendant to a transcript of the trial.
18
274.
19
20
21
4 U.C.L.A. Law Rev.
EXECUTION OF SENTENCE.
LawRev. 1977. Due process argument for an explanation of
sentence.
25 U.C.L.A.Law Rev. 344.
22
LawRev. 1977.
23
U.(L.A.)L.Rev. 731.
24
LawRev. 1972.
Requirements of procedural due process.
The status of a prisoner's sentence as substantial
25
personal interest to be protected by procedural due process.
26
C.W.L.R. 516.
27
28
29
30
31
LawRev. 1967.
petitions.
10 Loyola
8
Prisoner assistance on federal habeas corpus
19 Stan.L.R. 887.
IMPRISONMENT AND INCIDENTS THERE OF.
8A Cal D 2d-675
The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has a
32
corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the
33
courts in order to seek redress for violations of their constitutional
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 283
1
rights; inmates must have reasonable opportunity to seek and receive
2
the assistance of attorneys and regulations and practices that
3
unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional representation
4
or other aspects of the right of access to the courts are invalid.
5
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
6
U.S. 396, 40 L.Ed.2d 224.
7
C.A.9(Cal.).
Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 416
1990.
DEFENDANTS due process rights at
8
sentencing include right not to have his sentence based on
9
materially false information.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5; U.S.S.G.
10
Sec. 6A1.3(a), p.s., 18 U.S.C.A.A.
11
1350.
12
U.S. V. Wilson, 900 F.2d
PARDON AND PAROLE.
13
8A Cal D 2d-690
14
D.C.Cal. 1975.
Fixing of parole release date affords prisoner
15
substantial interest that may not thereafter be withdrawn except upon
16
minimum procedures appropriate under circumstances and required by due
17
process clause.
18
Jackson v. Wise, 390 F.Su. 19.
19
42 U.S.C.A.Sec. 1983; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Due process requirements for recession or modification of
20
parole release date are less than those applicable to revocation of
21
probation but nevertheless include (1) advance written notice of
22
charge, (2) written statement by fact-finders of evidence relied on and
23
reasons for their decision, (3) right of prisoner to be present, (4)
24
right of prisoner to present witnesses and documentary evidence on his
25
behalf, if so doing would not be unduly hazardous to institutional
26
safety or correctional goals, (5) right, if prisoner is found
27
illiterate or other wise incompetent to protect his own interests, to
28
have attorney substitute, and (6) adjudication of charges by panel
29
sufficiently impartial to satisfy due process requirements.
30
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
31
Jackson v. Wise, 390 F.Su. 19.
FAIR JUDGE
32
8A Cal D 2d-385
33
U.S.Cal. 1982.
Due process demands impartiality on the part of
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 284
1
those who function in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities.
2
Const.Amend. 5.
3
L.Ed.2d 1.
Schweiker v. McClure, 102 S.Ct. 1665, 456 U.S. 188, 72
C.A.9 (Cal.) 1986.
4
U.S.C.A.
Due process clause guarantees aggrieved party
5
opportunity to present case and have its merits fairly judged.
6
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
7
Utilities Com'n of State of Cal., 793 F.2d 1090, certiorari denied 107
8
S.Ct. 1334, 479 U.S. 1102, 94 L.E.2d 184.
Jackson Water Works, Inc. v. Public
Under due process clause, every party is entitled to impartial
9
10
tribunal.
Jackson Water Works, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com'n of State
11
of Cal., 793 F.2d 1090, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 1334, 479 U.S.
12
1102, 94 L.E.2d 184.
C.A.Cal 1967.
13
Due process is denied where the procedure tends to
14
shock the sense of fair play.
15
375 F.2d 294, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 2129, 388 U.S. 915, 18 L.Ed.2d
16
1365.
17
8A Cal D 2d-386
18
D.D.Cal 1975.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5.
At heart of any due process hearing is requirement
19
of an impartial decision maker.
20
Housing Authority of Tulare County, 389 F.Su. 635.
21
D.C.Cal. 1971.
Howard v. U.S.,
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend 5.
Ponce v
Procedural due process must obtain whenever
22
individual is subject to "grievous loss" at hands of state or its
23
instrumentalities.
24
Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Su. 767, modified, cause remanded 497
25
F.2d 809, modified 510 F.2d 613, certiorari granted Enomoto v.
26
Clutchette, 95 S.Ct. 2414, 421 U.S. 101, 44 L.Ed.2d 810, vacated, on
27
remand 536 F.2d 305, on remand 471 F.Su 1113.
28
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Rudimentary principles of due process require presence of counsel
29
when rights of individual are seriously threatened by governmental
30
action.
31
F.Su. 767, modified, cause remanded 497 F.2d 809, modified 510 F.2d
32
613, certiorari granted Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S.Ct. 2414, 421 U.S.
33
101, 44 L.Ed.2d 810, vacated, on remand 536 F.2d 305, on remand 471
34
F.Su 1113.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 285
1
8A Cal D 2d-387
2
Cal.Ap. 1982.
Fundamental fairness, i.e. due process,
3
includes right to present legal and factual issues in deliberate
4
and orderly manner.
5
of Medical Quality, Bd. of Medical Quality Assur., 180 Cal.Rptr.
6
516, 128 C.A.3d 699.
7
8A Cal D 2d-387
8
Cal.A. 1974.
9
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
White v. Division
Procedural due process requires that the property
of a deprivation of substantial right to be resolved in a manner
10
consisted with essential fairness.
11
For City and County of San Francisco, 114 Cal.Rptr. 404, 39 C.A.3d 611.
12
Cal.A.
1966.
Ursino v. Superior Court, In and
The essentials of due process are regular
13
and orderly procedure in court of competent jurisdiction, notice
14
to defendant, opportunity for defendant to be heard, and fair
15
hearing.
16
Natomas Co., 49 Cal.Rptr 64, 239 C.A.2d 547.
17
State Acting By and Through Dept. of Water Resources v.
Cal.A.
1962.
Due process requires fair trial before
18
impartial tribunal, and such trial requires that person or body
19
who decides cases must known, consider, and appraise evidence.
20
Le Strange v. City of Berkley, 26 Cal.Rptr. 550, 210 C.A.2d 313.
21
Cal.A. 1859.
There are two essentials to due process in a
22
judicial proceeding: (1) that the court have jurisdiction over the
23
parties and the subject matter of the action, and (2) that the parties
24
have reasonable notice and an opportunity for hearing.
25
Ann.Const.art. 1, Sec.Sec. 2, 13.
26
C.A.2d 613.
27
28
Law Rev 1977.
West's
Datta v. Staab, 343 P.2d 977, 173
Standards of judicial review.
50 So.Cal.L.R. 689.
NOTICE AND HEARING
29
8A Cal D 2d-387
30
C.A.9 (Cal) 1985.
If individual bringing procedural due process
31
challenge demonstrates likelihood of irreparable harm, resulting from
32
lack of predeprivation hearing, it is unlikely that government will be
33
able to demonstrate any public interest that will overcome individual's
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 286
1
interest, and some additional form of predeprivation process will
2
probably be require; in absence of such showing, however, courts must
3
balance governmental interests in retaining existing process against
4
private interest that will effect and probability of erroneous
5
deprivation associated with that process.
6
14.
Jolly v. U.S. 764 F.2d 642.
C.A.Cal 1983.
7
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5,
Central meaning of procedural due process is that
8
parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard at a
9
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
10
11
14.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5,
Orloff v. Cleland, 708 F.2d 372.
C.A.Cal 1985.
Fundamental requirements of due process is the
12
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner
13
in terms of the threatened conduct, U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
14
Club v. Watt, 608 F.Su. 305.
15
D.D.Cal 1984.
Sieffa
Opportunity to be heard guaranteed by due process
16
is opportunity which must be granted at meaningful time and in
17
meaningful manner.
18
E.P.A. 599 F.Su. 69.
19
D.C.Cal. 1980.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
Aminoil, Inc. v. U.S.
In order to satisfy fair hearing requirement of
20
due process clause, a tribunal, whether administrative or judicial,
21
must be impartial; adjudicator may neither have pecuniary interest in
22
outcome nor have been target of personal abuse or criticism from party
23
before him.
24
U.S.C.A.Const Amend. 14.
D.C.Cal. 1970.
McClure v. Harris, 503
The due process right to predetermination
25
hearing, with right to confront and question witnesses, is the
26
constitutional norm and not the exception when government action
27
seriously injures an individual and the crucial decision is based upon
28
facts alleged by a third party.
29
Resources, 325 F.Su. 1314, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 2495, 408 U.S.
30
924, 33 L.Ed.2d 335, revised 490 F.2d 580, vacated 95 S.Ct. 1110, 420
31
U.S. 917, 43 L.Ed.2d 388.
32
Cal. 1985.
Crow v. California Dept. of Human
Fundamental fairness includes both right to adequate
33
notice and right to defend against charged violations.
34
Sales v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd.
35
America, AFL-CIO), 703 P.2d 27, 216 Cal.Rptr. 688, 39 C.3d 209.
36
Cal. 1982.
Harry Carian
(United Farm Workers of
Rudiments of fair play include notice, opportunity to
37
respond, and a hearing.
38
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend, 14.
West's Ann.Const.Art. 1, Sec. 7;
In re Marriage of Flaherty, 646 P.2d 179, 183
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 287
1
2
Cal.Rptr. 508, 31 C.3d 637.
Cal. 1979.
Where prior notice of potentially adverse decision is
3
constitutionally required, such notice must, at minimum, be reasonably
4
calculated to afford affected persons realistic opportunity to protect
5
their interests.
6
P.2d 1134, 156 Cal.Rptr. 718, 24 C.3d 605.
7
Cal. 1975.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend 14.
Horn v. Ventura County, 596
Fundamental requisite of due process is the
8
meaningful opportunity to be heard and to explain one's actions.
9
People v. Coleman, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 13 C.3d 867.
10
Cal. 1968.
Since right to hearing is one of rudiments of fair
11
play assured by Fourteenth Amendment, there can be no compromise on
12
footing of convenience or expediency when that minimal requirement has
13
been neglected or ignored.
14
Schutzbank, 436, P.2d 297, 65 Cal.Rptr. 297, 68 C.2d 162.
15
Cal.A.2Dist. 1989.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Endler v.
Due process requires notice and opportunity
16
for a hearing before an impartial tribunal.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14;
17
West's Ann.Cal. Const.Art. 1, Sec. 7, 15.
18
Cal.Rptr. 199, 211 C.A.3d 133, review denied.
Bennett v. Bodily, 259
SPEEDY HEARING RIGHT
19
20
8A Cal D 2d-387
21
C.A.Cal 1983.
Central meaning of procedural due process is
22
that parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be
23
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
24
Const.Amends. 5, 14.
25
8A Cal D 2d-390
26
Cal.A. 2 Dist.
U.S.C.A.
Orloff v. Cleland, 708 F.2d 372.
1987.
A fundamental requisite of due process is
27
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and a meaningful
28
manner.
29
Cal.Rptr. 605, 196 C.A.3d 1526.
30
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
384, 13 C.3d 867.
Cal. 1968.
Cordova v. Vons Grocery Co., 242
Since right to hearing is one of
31
rudiments of fair play assured by Fourteenth Amendment, there can be no
32
compromise on footing of convenience or expediency when that minimal
33
requirement has been neglected or ignored.
34
Endler v. Schutzbank, 436, P.2d 297, 65 Cal.Rptr. 297, 68 C.2d 162.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 288
1
103 S.Ct. 1497, 460 U.S. 1051, 75 L.Ed.2d 929.
2
Cal.A. 1981. One aspect of the procedural protection of due
3
process is the opportunity to be heard within a reasonably prompt
4
period of time. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. Garcia v. Los Angeles County
5
Bd. of Ed., 177 Cal.Rptr. 29, 123 C.A.3d 807.
6
8A Cal D 2d-377
7
Cal.A. 1954.
Under constitutional guaranties, no right of an
8
individual, valuable to him pecunirily or otherwise, can be justly
9
taken away without its being done conformably to principle of justice
10
which afford due process of law unless the law constitutionally
11
otherwise provides, and due process of law does not mean according to
12
the whim, caprice, or will of the judge but according to the law.
13
re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291
14
In
Judicial absolutism is not a part of the American way of life,
15
and the odious doctrine that the end justifies the means does not
16
prevail in our system for the administration of justice.
17
Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291
18
8A Cal D 2d-382
19
Cal. 1979.
In re
Alication of the due process clauses of the
20
California Constitution must be determined in the context of the
21
individual's due process liberty interests in freedom from arbitrary
22
adjudicative procedures; thus, when a person is deprived of a statutory
23
conferred benefit, due process analysis must start, not with a judicial
24
attempt to decide whether the statute has created an "entitlement" that
25
can be defined as "liberty" or "property", but with an assessment of
26
what procedural protections are constitutionally required in light of
27
the governmental and private interests at stake.
28
art. 1 Sec.Sec. 7(a), 15.
29
Rptr. 316, 25 C.3d 260.
30
8A Cal D 2d-382
31
Cal.A. 3Dist. 1985.
West's Ann.Const.
People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 158 Cal
Cardinal principle of substantive due
32
process is that a law which deprives a person of life, liberty, or
33
property must not be product of arbitrary legislative judgment; such a
34
law must be reasonably related to the object sought to be attained by
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 289
1
its enactment.
2
210 Cal.Rptr.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
People v. Armbruster,
11, 163 C.A.3d 660.
3
8A Cal D 2d-382
4
Cal.A. 1979.
Substantive due process prohibits governmental
5
interference with a person's fundamental right to life, liberty or
6
property by unreasonable or arbitrary legislation.
7
Amend. 14; West's Ann.
8
Cal.Rptr. 63, 91 C.A.3d 184.
9
10
Const. art. 1 Sec. 7.
U.S.C.A.Const.
In re David B., 154
8A Cal D 2d-397
D.C.Cal 1982.
Question as to whether individual has an interest
11
protected by due process is not merely "weight" of the interests but
12
rather, whether nature of the interest is one within contemplation of
13
"liberty or property" language of Fourteenth Amendment.
14
Const.Amend. 14.
15
D.C.Cal. 1980.
U.S.C.A.
It is nature of interest at stake in proceeding,
16
that determines whether constitutional requirements of due process aly;
17
alleged violations of "rights" that arise exclusively out of failure to
18
comply with procedures provided by city charter, ordinances and
19
regulations do not sustain a federal constitutional claim.
20
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
21
Concord, 511 F.Su. 87. affirmed 686 F.2d 798, certiorari denied 103
22
S.Ct. 1777, 460 U.S. 1085, 76 L.Ed.2d 349.
23
D.C.Cal.1973.
Contra Costa Theater, Inc. v. City of
To determine whether due process requirements aly,
24
court must not look to the weight, but to the nature of the interests
25
at stake.
26
University of California, 353 F.Su. 618.
27
U.S.C.A.Const Amends. 5, 14.
D.C.Cal. 1972.
Perkins v. Regents of
To receive due process protection, interests in
28
dispute need not reach level of the traditional constitutional "right."
29
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.
30
F.Su. 798, affirmed Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated
31
Mortg. Investors, 504 F.2d 483.
32
Keller v. Kate Maremont Foundation, 365
Due process analysis requires consideration of precise nature of
33
governmental function and private interests which will be affected by
34
the government action.
35
Maremont Foundation, 365 F.Su. 798, affirmed Geneva Towers Tenants
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.
Keller v. Kate
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 290
1
Organization v. Federated Mortg. Investors, 504 F.2d 483.
D.C.Cal. 1971.
2
Procedural due process is not required only when
3
some "vested right" is being impaired.
4
Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Su. 767, modified, cause remanded 497
5
F.2d 809, modified 510 F.2d 613, certiorari granted Enomoto v.
6
Clutchette, 95 S.Ct 2414, 421 U.S. 1010, 44 L.Ed.2d 678, reversed
7
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 96 S.Ct 1551, 425 U.S. 308, 47 L.Ed.2d 810,
8
vacated, on remand 536 F.2d 305, on remand 471 F.Sup. 1113.
D.C.Cal. 1971.
9
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
Due process requires that government abide by
10
basic principles of fairness when dispensing, or revoking, a privilege.
11
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
Cal. 1980.
12
Hester v. Craven, 322 F.Su. 1256.
Identification of dictates of due process generally
13
requires consideration of (1) private interest that will be affected by
14
the official action, (2) risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
15
interest through procedures used, and probable value, if any, of
16
additional or substitute procedural safeguards, (3) dignitary interest
17
in informing individuals of nature, grounds and consequences of the
18
action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a
19
responsible governmental official, and (4) governmental interest,
20
including function involved and fiscal and administrative burdens that
21
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
22
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7.
23
v. Scott, 613 P.2d 210, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149, 27 C.3d 424.
24
8A Cal D 2d-398
25
Cal.A 2 Dist. 1984.
Van Atta
Identification of dictates of state due
26
process, generally requires consideration of:
private interests that
27
will be affected by official actions; risk of an erroneous deprivation
28
of such interests through procedures used, and probable value, if any,
29
of additional or substitute safeguards; dignitary interest in informing
30
individual of nature, grounds and consequences of action and enabling
31
them to present their side of story before responsible governmental
32
official; and governmental
33
fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute
34
procedural requirement would entail.
35
Sec.Sec. 7(a), 15.
36
721.
interests, including function involved and
West's Ann.Cal.Const. Art. 1
Matter of Thomas, 206 Cal.Rptr. 719, 161 C.A.3d
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 291
Cal.A. 1982.
1
Due process to be afforded in given case depends
2
upon private interests that will be affected by official actions: risk
3
of erroneous deprivation of such interests through procedures used, and
4
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
5
safeguards; and finally, government's interest, including function
6
involved and fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or
7
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
8
5, 14.
9
460, 131 C.A.3d 636.
10
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends.
Broussard v. Regents of University of California, 184 Cal.Rptr.
Cal.A. 1980.
When injury to reputation is combined with loss or
11
damage to property interests of an individual, compliance with
12
fundamental precepts of due process is imperative.
13
Amend. 14.
14
Cal.Rptr. 198, 106 C.A.3d 524.
15
U.S.C.A.Const.
Lackner v. St Joseph Convalescent Hospital, Inc. 165
DUE PROCESS 253(1). Nature in general
16
8A Cal D 2d-399
17
C.A.9(Cal) 1989.
In determining whether substantive due process
18
rights have been violated, court will look to such factors as needed
19
for governmental action in question, relationship between need and
20
action, extent of harm inflicted, and whether action was taken in good
21
faith or for purpose of causing harm.
22
Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1390,
23
certiorari denied Doody v. Sinaloa Lake Owners Association, Inc., 110
24
S.Ct. 1317, 108 L.Ed.2d 493.
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
DEPRIVATION OF LIFE OR LIBERTY IN GENERAL.
8A Cal D 2d-422
C.A.9(Cal) 1990. Fundamental requirement of procedural due process are
notice and opportunity to be heard before government may deprive person
of protected liberty or property interest Conner v. City of Santa Ana,
897 F.2d 1487
C.A.Cal. 1982. Procedural due process imposes constraints on
governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty or property
interests within the meaning of the due process clause of the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment. U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14. Dash, Inc. v.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 683 F.2d 1229.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 292
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
C.A.Cal. 1981. State must ultimately justify depriving person of
protected liberty interest by determining that good cause exists for
deprivation. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d
1017.
S.D.Cal. 1989. Deprivation of liberty must be accompanied by
procedural safeguards; trial court must consider significance of
individual's interest, risk of erroneous determination through
procedures used, and probable value of additional safeguards. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amends. 5, 14. U.S. v. Terrones, 712 F.Su. 786.
D.C.Cal. 1984. State must afford an individual certain procedural
protections against deprivatory governmental action whenever there is a
Fourteenth Amendment property of liberty interest at stake. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. 14. Conti v. Dyer, 593 F.Su. 696.
D.C.Cal. 1980. When liberty interest is impaired by arbitrary action
of government, constitutional guarantee of due process has been
violated. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. Kindem v. City of Alameda, 502
F.Su. 1108.
8A Cal D 2d-423
D.C.Cal 1975. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures
of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact laws which will
deprive individuals of their liberty without due process.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983. Li v. Procunier, 395
F.Su 871, sulemented 402 F.Su. 623.
D.C.Cal. 1975. The purpose of due process hearing is to safeguard from
deprivation the liberty or property rights of protected persons, and
this can only be done where the requisite hearing is held before the
decision maker so that the decision maker can sift through the facts,
weigh the evidence and reach the appropriate conclusion.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5. Ponce v. Housing Authority of Yulare County,
389 F.Su. 635.
Cal. 1984. Procedures necessary to ensure reliability in fact finding
process when state participates in deprivation of personal liberty are
required by due process. West's Ann.Cal.Const. Art. 1, Sec. 15.
People v. Geiger, 674 P.2d 1303, 199 Cal. Rptr. 45, 35 C.3d 510.
Cal. 1977. When state participates in deprivation of person's right to
personal liberty, even conditional liberty, due process requires that
facts justifying that action be reliably established and, to that end,
person must receive hearing after adequate written notice of basis for
proposed action and an opportunity to aear in person and to present
evidence in his own behalf, and he has right to confrontation by , and
opportunity to cross-examine, adverse witnesses, a neutral and detached
decision maker, findings by preponderance of evidence and record of
proceeding adequate to permit meaningful judicial or appellate review.
U.S.C.S.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7(a). In re
Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal.Rptr. 298, 19 C.3d 921.
Cal. 1975. Due process clause requires proof beyond reasonable doubt
not only of guilt of defendant in traditional criminal prosecution but
also of dispositive fact or facts in any proceeding in which state
threatens to deprive individual of his "good name and freedom."
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann. Const. art. 1, Sec. 7(a). People
v. Burnick, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal.Rptr. 488, 14 C.3d 306.
Cal. 1970. Where fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may
not be abridged by states simply on showing that regulatory statute has
some rational relationship to the effectuation of the proper state
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 293
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
purpose; the state may prevail only upon showing a subordinating
interest which is compelling and the law must be shown necessary and
not merely rationally related to the accomplishment of a permissible
state policy. Cisty of Carmel-by-the-sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225, 85
Cal.Rptr. 1, 2 C.3d 259, 37 A.L.R.3d 1313.
Cal. 1968. State cannot deprive person of his life, liberty, or
property without affording him opportunity to be heard by tribunal
empowered to decide lawfulness of depravation. In re Harris, 466 P.2d
148, 72 Cal.Rptr. 340, 69 C.2d 486.
Cal. 1963. Fourteenth Amendment in declaring that state shall not
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law gives to each of these an equal sanction, recognizing liberty and
property as co-existent human rights, and debars the states from any
unwarranted interference with either. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley, 379 P.2d 22, 28 Cal.Rptr. 718,
59 C.2d 247.
Cal.A. 1 Dist. 1989. Right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law is fundamental constitutional right
guaranteed by Federal and State Constitutions. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend.
14; West's Ann. Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7(a). Redevelopment Agency of
City of Concord v. Tobriner, 264 Cal.Rptr. 481, 215 C.A.3d 1087, review
denied.
Mandate of due process is that person must be afforded reasonable
notice and opportunity to be heard prior to deprivation of significant
liberty or property interest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; West's
Ann.Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7(a). Redevelopment Agency of City of
Concord v. Tobriner, 264 Cal.Rptr. 481, 215 C.A.3d 1087, review denied.
8A Cal D 2d-424
29
30
31
32
33
34
Cal.A. 4 Dist. 1985. Where one's liberty is at stake, alication of
strict-scrutiny test is required and it becomes government's burden to
justify procedure by showing it has compelling interest which is
furthered by procedure in question. Conservatorship of Waltz, 213
Cal.Rptr. 529, 167 C.A.3d 835.
Cal.A. 4 Dist 1984. "Procedural due process" rules exist to
35
minimize risk of substantively unfair or mistaken deprivation of life,
36
liberty or property by enabling persons to contest basis on which
37
government proposes to deprive them of their protected interests.
38
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5. McCaffrey v. Preston, 201 Cal.Rptr. 252, 154
39
C.A.3d 422.
40
Cal.A. 5 Dist. 1984.
Deprivation of freedom falls within
41
prohibition against deprivation of liberty expressed in State and
42
Federal Constitutions.
43
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
44
C.A.3d 970.
45
West's Ann.Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7(a);
People v. Davis, 207 Cal.Rptr. 18, 160
Implicit in concept that freedom from arbitrary adjudicative
46
processes is substantive element of one's liberty is that court will
47
require sufficient information to make a reasoned decision that
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 294
1
reflects and exercise of discretion; which must be given to important
2
due process value of promoting accuracy and reasonable predictability
3
in governmental decision making when individuals are subject to
4
depravitory action.
5
v. Davis, 207 Cal.Rptr. 18, 160 C.A.3d 970.
Cal.A. 1979.
6
West's Ann.Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7(a).
People
due process clauses of State and Federal
7
Constitutions operate to prevent state from depriving any person of
8
life, liberty or property without due process.
9
1, Sec. 7; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
10
West's Ann.Const. art.
In re Watson, 154 Cal.Rptr. 151,
91 C.A.3d 455.
Cal.A. 1977.
11
If individual is condemned to suffer grievous loss
12
of liberty, he must first be accorded due process of law, irrespective
13
of burden imposed upon government agency.
14
In re Anderson, 140 Cal.Rptr. 546, 73 C.A.3d 38.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
Fundamental mandate of Fourteenth Amendment is that person be
15
16
afforded notice and opportunity to be heard prior to deprivation of
17
significant liberty or property interest U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
18
re Anderson, 140 Cal.Rptr. 546, 73 C.A.3d 38.
Cal.A. 1977.
19
In
Procedural due process requires that before an
20
individual is deprived of property or his life and liberty he must be
21
given notice and a hearing in order to determine the propriety of the
22
deprivation upon consideration of elements of fundamental fairness and
23
justice.
24
Abel v. Cory, 139 Cal.Rptr. 555, 71 C.A.3d 589.
Law Rev.
25
26
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7.
1978.
Constitutional liberty and property; federal
common law and Section 1983.
51 So.Cal.L.R. 355.
27
Law Rev. 1977.
Reputation alone.
28
Law Rev. 1964.
Freedom of movement.
29
Law Rev. 1960.
Our freedom based on law-Is liberty possible
30
without law?
8A Cal D 2d-426
32
C.D.Cal. 1990.
Right to personal security is a historic liberty
33
interest protected by due process clause.
34
14.
36
11 U.C.L.A.Law R. 481, 542.
46 A.B.A.J. 506.
31
35
17 Santa Clara L.Rev. 959.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5,
Talevich v. Voss, 734 F.Su. 425.
N.D.Cal. 1990.
Shooting by police could give rise not only to
Fourth Amendment claim of excessive force, but also Fourteenth
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 295
1
Amendment claim on ground that officers allegedly created dangerous
2
situation victim found himself in shortly before he was shot.
3
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 4, 14.
4
1502.
5
Ward v. City of Sant Jose, 737 F.Su.
Victim’s Fourteenth Amendment rights are violated where police
6
officers create dangerous situation leading to confrontation resulting
7
in death.
8
F.Su. 1502.
9
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 4, 14.
D.C.Cal.
1964.
Ward v. City of Sant Jose, 737
Where police officers are involved in actions
10
for deprivation of civil rights, motive bears heavily in determining
11
what constitutes lack of due process, but specific intent to deprive a
12
person of a specific constitutional right need not be present.
13
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983.
14
Wingard, 230 F.Su. 167.
15
Beauregard v.
Arrest by state officers without warrant or probable cause and
16
with an ulterior motive, not with purpose of enforcing law, is an
17
arrest without due process, and imprisonment by the officers pursuant
18
to such arrest is likewise without due process.
19
14; 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983.
20
Law Rev. 1956.
21
22
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend.
Beauregard v. Wingard, 230 F.Su. 167.
Denial of passport upon undisclosed information.
44 C.L.R. 579.
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
23
8A Cal D 2d-454
24
257. In general.
25
U.S.Cal. 1975.
Sixth Amendment rights of accused in all criminal
26
prosecutions to be informed of nature and cause of accusation, to be
27
confronted with witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for
28
obtaining witnesses in his favor and to have assistance of counsel for
29
his defense are part of the "due process of law" that is guaranteed by
30
Fourteenth Amendment to DEFENDANTS in criminal courts of state.
31
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 6, 14.
32
422 U.S. 806, 45 L.Ed.2d 562.
33
8A Cal D 2d-455
34
U.S.Cal. 1952.
Faretta v. California, 95 S.Ct. 2525,
Due process of law is a historical product and is
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 296
1
not to be turned into a destructive dogma against the states in the
2
administration of their systems of criminal justice.
3
Amend. 14.
4
L.E.d. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396.
U.S.C.A.Const.
Rochin v. People of Cal., 72 S.Ct. 205, 342 U.S. 165, 96
5
Judicial review of the guarantee of due process imposes on
6
Federal Supreme Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of
7
proceeding to ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and
8
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking
9
peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offences.
10
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
11
U.S. 165, 96 L.E.d. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396.
12
Rochin v. People of Cal., 72 S.Ct. 205, 342
In reviewing a state criminal conviction under a claim of right
13
guaranteed by Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment, Federal
14
Supreme Court may not draw on merely personal and private notions and
15
disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function, and
16
even though the concept of due process of law is not final and fixed,
17
these limits are derived from considerations that are fused in the
18
whole nature of judicial process, and these are considerations deeply
19
rooted in reason and in compelling traditions of the legal profession.
20
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
21
U.S. 165, 96 L.E.d. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396.
22
Rochin v. People of Cal., 72 S.Ct. 205, 342
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
23
state's convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend a
24
sense of justice.
25
72 S.Ct. 205, 342 U.S. 165, 96 L.E.d. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396.
26
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
C.A.9(cal) 1985.
Rochin v. People of Cal.,
Right to notice under Firth and Sixth
27
Amendments is personal to defendant.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 6.
28
U.S. v. Merchant, 760 F.2d 963, certiorari granted 106 S.Ct. 3293, 478
29
U.S. 1003, 92 L.Ed.2d 708, certiorari dismissed 107 S.Ct. 1596, 480
30
U.S. 615, 94 L.Ed.2d 614.
31
8A Cal D 2d-456
32
C.A.Cal. 1965.
Determination whether due process demands are met
33
requires decision as to whether, upon the whole course of proceedings,
34
and in all the attending circumstances, there was a denial of
35
fundamental fairness, and this is a question of judgment and degree.
36
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.
Pinedo v. U.S., 347 F.2d 142 certiotati
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 297
1
denied 86 S.Ct. 547, 382 U.S. 976, 15 L.Ed.2d 468.
C.A.Cal. 1961.
2
As alied to state criminal proceeding, denial of
3
due process is failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential
4
to very concept of justice.
5
Dickson, 287 F.2d 55.
6
8A Cal D 2d-458
7
Cal. 1972.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
Linden v.
In most cases involving claims of due process
8
deprivations, a showing of identifiable prejudice to accused is
9
required, but under some circumstances there is such probability of
10
prejudice to accused that prejudice is presumed.
11
14.
12
certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 1382, 410 U.S. 947, 35 L.Ed.2d 613.
13
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend.
People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal.Rptr. 385, 7 C.3d 710,
Cal. 1967.
Utilization of constitutionally invalid prior
14
conviction, at trial of a subsequent offense, for any purpose leading
15
to a conviction for such subsequent offense, is violative of the due
16
process of the Fourteenth Amendment.
17
People v. Coffey, 430 P.2d 15, 60 Cal.Rptr. 457, 67 C.2d 204.
18
Cal. 1966.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 6, 14.
While primary value expressed by concept of
19
procedural due process is that seeking to minimize the possibility that
20
an innocent man will be punished, the due process concept does not
21
begin and end with the concern that our processes for determination of
22
guilt be reliable or fair, and there is the additional concern that the
23
individual against whom these processes operate to be accorded
24
treatment consistent with human dignity.
25
868, 53 Cal. Rptr. 284, 65 C.2d 199.
26
Cal. 1962.
People v. Crovedi, 417 P.2d
Where defendant is denied fair and impartial trial
27
guaranteed by law, he is denied due process.
28
617, 23 Cal.Rptr. 569, 58 C.2d 229, 3 A.L.R.3d 946.
29
Cal. 1962.
People v. Peres, 373 P.2d
Conviction by means of obnoxious to federal concept
30
of due process cannot be sustained.
31
Cal.Rptr. 165, 57 C.2d 415, certiorari denied Cisneros v. California,
32
83 S.Ct. 67, 371 U.S. 852, 9 L.Ed.2d 88 and Ditson v. California, 83
33
S.Ct. 93, 371 U.S. 852, 9 L.Ed.2d 88, vacated 83 S.Ct. 519, 371 U.S.
34
541, 9 L.Ed.2d 508 cartiorari dismissed 83 S.Ct. 885, 372 U.S. 933, 9
35
L.Ed.2d 769.
36
People v. Ditson, 369 P.2d 714, 20
Courts must protect right of defendant to fair trial and due
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 298
1
process of law in full measure as against power of state
2
Ditson, 369 P.2d 714, 20 Cal.Rptr. 165, 57 C.2d 415, certiorari denied
3
Cisneros v. California, 83 S.Ct. 67, 371 U.S. 852, 9 L.Ed.2d 88 and
4
Ditson v. California, 83 S.Ct. 93, 371 U.S. 852, 9 L.Ed.2d 88, vacated
5
83 S.Ct. 519, 371 U.S. 541, 9 L.Ed.2d 508 cartiorari dismissed 83 S.Ct.
6
885, 372 U.S. 933, 9 L.Ed.2d 769.
Cal. 1956.
7
People v.
Where accused is denied a fair and impartial trial as
8
guaranteed by law, procedure amounts to a denial of due process of law.
9
People v. Lyons, 303 P.2d 329, 47 C.2d 311.
Cal.A. 1 Dist. 1984.
10
Right of accused to due process of law is,
11
in essence, right o fair opportunity to defend against State's
12
accusations.
13
Cal.Rptr. 375, 152 A.A.3d 42.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.
Cal.A. 4 Dist.
14
1984.
People v. Reynolds, 199
To punish a person because he has done
15
what the law plainly allows is due process violation of the most basic
16
sort.
17
153 C.A.3d 416.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
18
8A Cal D 2d-459
19
Cal.A.
1978.
People v. Lucious, 200 Cal.Rptr. 251.
Accused's right to due process is constitutional
20
guarantee and it may not be granted, or withheld, according to court's
21
discretion or rules attending criminal discovery.
22
Amends. 5, 14.
23
Judicial Dist. of Alameda County., 150 Cal.Rptr. 543, 86 C.A.3d 737.
24
U.S.C.A.Const.
Sallas v. Municipal Court For San Leandro-Hayward
Cal.A. 1973.
Punishment without trial is alien to ideal of due
25
process.
26
Dist. of Los Angeles County, 108 Cal.Rptr. 797, 33 C.A.3d 122.
27
Porno, Inc. v. Municipal Court for the Los Angeles Judicial
Cal.A. 1972.
As alied to criminal matters, due process generally
28
includes notice, presence and a hearing, and representation by counsel.
29
People v. Youngs, 99 Cal.Rptr. 901, 23 C.A.3d 180.
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
Law Rev. 1973.
Demands of due process in criminal prosecutions.
6 Loyola U.(L.A.) 165.
Law Rev. 1971.
The aims of the criminal law revisited: A plea
for new look at "substantive due process".
Law Rev. 1965.
procedure.
44 So.Cal.L.R. 490
The Bill of Rights as a code of criminal
53 C.L.R. 929.
Law Rev. 1965.
Rights of the accused.
17 Hastings L.J. 124.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 299
1
2
3
Law Rev. 1964.
Pennsylvania statute assessing costs to acquitted
DEFENDANTS held constitutional .
Law Rev 1959.
17 Stan.L.R. 152.
The concept of ordered liberty, the law of the
4
land, rather than the incorporation of theory, as proper measures of
5
due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment.
6
Law Rev. 1959. Fair trial.
7
Law Rev. 1953.
47 C.L.R. 238.
34 S.Bar J. 953.
Alication of Fourteenth Amendment to state
8
criminal proceedings, necessity for a finding of prejudicial err of as
9
basis for finding of lack of due process.
41 C.L.R. 672.
10
8A Cal D 2d-462
11
C.A.Cal. 1983. Prosecution is barred on due process grounds
12
because of government actions only when government's conduct is so
13
grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense of
14
justice.
15
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5.
C.A.Cal. 1982.
Right to due process is violated where government
16
undertakes course of action in orted to penalize person for exercising
17
protected statutory or constitutional right.
18
U.S. v. Allen, 699 F.2d 453.
19
8A Cal D 2d-466
20
D.C.Cal. 1970.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5.
Entrapment is affront to basic concepts of
21
justice and violation of due process. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
22
Chisum, 312 F.Su. 1307.
23
Cal.1963.
U.S. v.
Suppression by state of material evidence deprives
24
defendant of due process of law. In re Imbler, 387 P.2d 6, 35 Cal.Rptr.
25
293, 60 C.2d 554, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 196, 379 U.S. 908, 13
26
L.Ed.2d 181.
27
Cal. 1959.
The right to counsel includes reasonable opportunity
28
to prepare for trial and the refusal to introduce any evidence may
29
amount to a denial of a hearing.
30
C.2d 1, certiorari denied Linden v. California, 80 S.Ct. 127361 U.S.
31
867, 4 L.Ed.2d 106, certiorari denied 80 S.Ct. 600, 361 U.S. 969, 4
32
L.Ed.2d 549, certiorari denied 81 S.Ct. 94, 364 U.S. 849, 5 L.Ed.2d 73.
33
8A Cal D 2d-467
34
Cal.A. 5 Dist. 1987.
People v. Linden, 338 P.2d 397, 52
Proceedings against accused are rendered
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 300
1
improper when conduct on part of law enforcement authorities is so
2
outrageous as to interfere with accused's due process of law.
3
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
4
C.A.3d 1108.
5
8A Cal D 2d-468
6
Cal.A. 1978.
People v. Tribble, 236 Cal.Rptr. 733, 191
Prosecutorial misconduct giving rise to violation
7
of due process rights implies use of deceptive or reprehensible methods
8
to attempt to persuade either court or jury; absent of good faith is
9
essential ingredient of prosecutorial misconduct.
10
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
11
A.A.3d 59.
12
Cal.A.
1963.
People v. Morgan, 150 Cal.Rptr. 712, 87
Intentional suppression of material evidence by
13
district attorney can result in denial of fair trial, and when it does,
14
such suppression amounts to denial of due process.
15
Cal.Rptr. 650, 214 C.A.2d 596.
16
8A Cal D 2d-471
17
LawRev 1981.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Limitations upon retaliatory prosecution by
vindictive prosecutor.
LawRev 1979.
13 U.West L.A.L.Rev. 1.
Why federal courts are not meticulously observing
due process in entrapment situation?
LawRev 1973
People v. Mort, 29
11 Southwestern L.Rev. 687.
Defense of discriminatory prosecution.
6 Loyola
U.(L.A.) 227.
LawRev 1962.
officers.
Disregard of constitutional rights by police
48 A.B.A.J. 130.
25
LawRev 1962.
Due process of law for juveniles.
26
LawRev 1954.
The fourteenth amendment and the third degree.
27
37 S.Bar J. 32
Stan.L.R. 411.
28
258.Creaton of definition of offense.
29
D.C.Cal. 1968.
Due process clause requires that criminal
30
statutes be strictly construed against prosecution and in favor of
31
defendant.
U.S. v. Chaell, 292 F.Su. 494.
32
8A Cal D 2d-493
33
C.A.9(Cal.) 1988.
34
6
If police officer's conduct which results in
injury to arrestee constitutes gross negligence or recklessness, as
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 301
1
oosed to mere negligence, then it constitutes deprivation of arrestee's
2
right to be free from excessive force, in violation of due process.
3
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983.
4
Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638.
5
8A Cal D 2d-494
6
C.A.9(cal.)
1985.
Fargo v. City of San
Fifth and Eight Amendment's prohibitions of
7
deprivation of liberty without due process and of excessive bail
8
require careful review of pretrial detention orders to ensure that
9
mandate of Bail Reform Act of 1984 for release under the least
10
restrictive conditions that will reasonably assure appearance has been
11
respected.
12
18 U.S.C. (1982 Ed.) Sec.Sec. 3146-3152.
13
1403.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 8; 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3142(c)(2);
14
8A Cal D 2d-495
15
D.C.Cal. 1983.
U.S. v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d
Claims relating to pretrial alication of physical
16
force by police officers are properly governed under due process clause
17
of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.
18
of Sacramento, 567 F.Su. 662.
19
Soto v. City
Use of excessive force in arrest deprives a citizen of the
20
liberty interest, that is, his right to be free from preconviction
21
punishment without due process of law.
22
Soto v. City of Sacramento, 567 F.Su. 662.
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.
23
24
8A Cal D 2d-501
25
Law Rev. 1971. Resisting unlawful arrest - infringement of
26
constitutional right - California Penal Code Se. 834-a Arthur R.
27
Chenen.
28
5 U.S.F.L.R. 195.
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION AND COMMITMENT.
29
8A Cal D 2d-501
30
C.A.9(Cal.) 1989.
County policy of conducting probable cause
31
determinations only at warrantelss arrestees' arraignment, pursuant to
32
California statute permitting as much as 48 hours plus intervening
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 302
1
Sunday or holiday to elapse before the determination is made, violated
2
arrestees' due process rights, and county was properly ordered to make
3
probable cause determinations with respect to inmates housed in central
4
urban center within 36 hours, where 36 hours provided county with ample
5
time to complete its administrative procedures.
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend.
6
5; West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code Sed.Sec. 825, 991.
McLaughlin v. County
7
of Fiverside, 888 F.2d 1276.
Cal.A.
8
9
1 Dist. 1983.
Although a defendant does not have a Sixth
Amendment or state constitutional right to an open preliminary hearing,
10
defendant's statutory right to an open preliminary hearing is closely
11
aligned with certain values protected under the Firth, Sixth, and
12
Fourteenth Amendment, which together provide a criminally accused
13
person with a right to fair trial before an unbiased jury. U.S.C.A.
14
Const.Amends. 5, 6. 14; West's Ann. Cal.penal Code Sec. 868.
15
v. Superior Court, 195 Cal.Rptr. 816, 148 C.A.3d 188.
Eversole
Cal.A. 1966. Vehicle code requirement that one who so demands
16
17
must immediately be taken before magistrate is designed to afford
18
speedy opportunity for judicial determination and affords right of due
19
process to accused and is thus entitled to strong suort and liberal
20
construction by courts.
21
Kramer v. Superior Court, Humboldt County, 48 Cal.Rptr. 897, 239 C.A.2d
22
500.
23
8A Cal D 2d-529
24
Cal.A. 1957.
West's Ann.Vehicle Code, Sec. 40302(c).
When defendant is not permitted to ask questions
25
about a material element of the crime, such as those concerning feigned
26
accomplice, he is being denied a substantial right which amounts to
27
denial of due process.
28
435.
People v. Lawrence, 308 P.2d 821, 149 C.A.2d
29
8A Cal D 2d-552
30
266(7). Presumptions, burden of proof, and weight of evidence.
31
U.S.Cal. 1989.
Due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
32
denies states the power to deprive that accused of liberty unless the
33
prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the
34
charged offense; jury instructions relieving states of this burden
35
violate a defendant's due process rights.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 303
1
Carella v. California, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 105 L.Ed.2d 218, rehearing
2
denied 110 S.Ct. 23, 106 L.Ed.2d 636.
3
8A Cal D 2d-552
4
C.A.9(cal.) 1989.
Due process requires state to prove every
5
element of crime beyond reasonable doubt, and defective jury
6
instruction can violate this requirement by effectively allowing
7
government to presume element of intent.
8
Watts v. Bonneville, 879 F.2d 685.
C.A.9(Cal.) 1986.
9
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Violation of due process appears if criminal
10
conviction is not based on evidence that has convinced trier of fact
11
beyond reasonable doubt of existence of every element of offense.
12
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5.
13
For Alameda County, 803 F.2d 1051, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 2464,
14
481 U.S. 1070, 95 L.Ed.2d 873.
15
8A Cal D 2d-555
16
Cal. 1982.
Newton v. Superior Court of California, In and
Fourteenth Amendment for the United States
17
Constitution guarantees due process of law and mandates that no person
18
shall suffer the onus of criminal conviction except upon sufficient
19
proof to convince a trier of fact beyond reasonable doubt of the
20
existence of every element of the offense.
21
In re Miguel L., 649 P.2d 703, 185 Cal.Rptr. 120, 32 C.3d 100.
Cal. 1975.
22
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
Due process clause requires proof beyond a reasonable
23
doubt not only of guilt of defendant in traditional criminal
24
prosecution but also of dispositive fact or facts in any proceeding in
25
which state threatens to deprive individual of his "good name and
26
freedom." U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec.
27
7(a).
28
People v. Burnick, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal.Rptr. 488, 14 C.3d 306.
Cal. 1973.
Due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment of Federal
29
Constitution protects accused against conviction except upon proof
30
beyond reasonable doubt; an erroneous instruction to jury which in
31
effect reverses this burden of proof is therefore an infringement of
32
defendant's constitutional right to due process, and such an error is
33
not necessarily cured by instructions which state the rules correctly.
34
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
35
Cal.Rptr. 65, 9 C.3d 753.
People v. Serrato, 512 P.2d 289, 109
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 304
1
Cal. 1971.
In order that presumption satisfy due process clause
2
of Fourteenth Amendment there must be a rational connection between the
3
facts provided and the facts presumed. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
4
People v. Montalvo, 482 P.2d 205, 93 Cal. Rptr. 581, 4 C.3d 328, 49
5
A.L.R.3d 518.
6
8A Cal D 2d-556
7
Cal.A. 4 Dist. 1984.
Due process protects the accused against
8
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
9
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
10
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
11
C.A.3d 217.
People v. Acero, 208 Cal.Rptr. 565, 161
12
8A Cal D 2d-557
13
Cal.A. 1975. Due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment to
14
Federal Constitution protects accused against conviction except upon
15
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
16
Garcia, 126 Cal.Rptr. 275, 54 C.A.3d 61, certiorari denied California
17
v. Carcia, 96 S.Ct. 2238, 426 U.S. 911, 48 L.Ed.2d 838.
18
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
People v.
Cal.A. 1972. If no evidence suort offense charged conviction
19
violates due process provisions of Fourteenth Amendment.
20
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
21
C.A.3d 148.
22
8A Cal D 2d-558
23
Cal.A. 1963.
People v. Norwood, 103 Cal.Rptr. 7, 26
Evidence establishing a conspiracy was admissible
24
even though such crime was not charged in the information, and
25
admission thereof did not violate defendant's rights under the
26
Fourteenth Amendment. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
27
Cal.Rptr. 896, 220 C.A.2d 423, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 1354, 377
28
U.S. 949, 12 L.Ed.2d 308.
29
8A Cal D 2d-559
30
Cal.Super. 1982.
People v. Demes, 33
To be proper in criminal prosecution,
31
underlying fact giving rise to presumption must be provided beyond
32
reasonable doubt, and due process requires that there be rational
33
connection between proven fact and that presumed.
West's
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 305
1
Ann.Cal.Evid.Code Sec. 607; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
2
188 Cal.Rptr. 366, 138 C.A.3d Su. 1.
3
8A Cal D 2d-559.
4
LawRev.
5
1970. Use of statutory criminal presumptions as
vulnerable to attack on due process grounds. 18 U.C.L.A.Law R. 164.
Law Rev. 1970 Statutory criminal presumptions -
6
7
People v. Campos,
unconstitutionality.
22 Stan.L.R. 341.
CONFESSIONS, STATEMENTS, AND ADMISSIONS
8
266.1(1) In general
9
10
8A Cal D 2d-560
11
Cal. 1965. The use of involuntary confession results in denial of
12
due process and requires reversal regardless of other evidence of
13
guilt.
14
certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 1765, 381 U.S. 937, 14 L.Ed.2d 702.
People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 62 C.2d 338,
Cal.a. 5 Dist. 1987.
15
It is a deprivation of due process to base
16
a conviction, in whole or in part, on coerced confession, regardless of
17
its truth,
18
suort the conviction.
19
236 Cal.Rptr. 299, 188 C.A.3d 723, review denied.
and even though there may be sufficient other evidence to
20
8A Cal D 2d-561
21
Cal.A.1976.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
People v. Zaragoza,
Evidentiary use of an involuntary confession or
22
admission in a criminal case is a denial of due process; the coercion
23
may be physical or psychological; the totality of circumstances must be
24
taken into account; the reviewing court must examine the uncontradicted
25
facts and determine independently whether the statements were
26
voluntary.
People v. Writht, 131 Cal.Rptr. 311, 60 C.A.3d 6.
Cal.A. 1967.
27
The use of an illegally obtained confession results
28
in a denial of due process and results in a denial of due process and
29
requires reversal of a defendant's conviction regardless of other
30
evidence of guilt.
31
934.
32
33
Cal.A. 1963.
People v. Trumpour, 61 Cal.Rptr. 899, 253 C.A.2d
Evidentiary use of involuntary confession is denial
of due process, violating both federal and state Constitutions and
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 306
1
requiring reversal of conviction, even in presence of corroborating
2
evidence of guilt.
People v. Sigal, 34 Cal.Rptr. 767, 221 C.A.2d 684.
3
8A Cal D 2d-562
4
LawRev.
5
6
1962.
Due process reasons for excluding juvenile court
confessions from criminal trials.
LawRev. 1961.
50 C.L.R. 902.
Due process: use of confession obtained by fraud
7
consistent with due process unless fraud likely to procure untrue
8
statement.
9
10
8 U.C.L.A.Law R. 193.
Law.Rev.
1953.
Prejudice from illegally obtained confession as
basis for claim of lack of due proces.
11
8A Cal D 2d-562
12
Cal.A. 1965.
41 C.L.R. 672.
Obtaining incriminating statements through coercive
13
methods or in violation of right to counsel or to remain silent
14
constitutes a denial of due process and an invasion of constitutionally
15
guaranteed rights.
16
17
People v. Haley, 44 Cal.Rptr. 346, 234 C.A.2d 444.
PROMISES OR OTHER INDUCEMENTS; THREATS AND
FEAR.
18
8A Cal D 2d-565
19
U.S.Cal.
1958.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits use of
20
coerced confessions in state prosecutions.
21
Cooker v. State of Cal., 78 S.Ct. 1287, 357 U.S.433, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448,
22
rehearing denied 79 S.Ct. 12, 358, 3 L.Ed.2d 92.
23
8A Cal D 2d-566
24
Cal. 1960.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
25
requires exclusion of coerced admission if they are sufficiently
26
damaging.
27
53 C.2d 160, certiorari granted Atchley v. California, 80 S.Ct. 1081,
28
362 U.S. 987, 4 L.Ed.2d 1021, certiorari dismissed 81 S.Ct. 1051, 366
29
U.S. 207, 6 L.Ed.2d 233.
30
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Cal.1959.
People v. Atchley, 346 P.2d 746,
In criminal prosecution use of confession obtained by
31
force, fear, promise of immunity or reward constitute a denial of due
32
process of law both under federal and state constitutions, requiring
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 307
1
reversal of conviction although other evidence may be consistent with
2
guilt.
People v. Berve, 332 P.2d 97, 51 C.2d 286.
Cal.A. 1963.
3
Due process bars conviction by use of coerced
4
confession without regard to its truth.
5
767, 221 C.A.2d 684.
Cal.A.1963.
6
People v. Sigal, 34 Cal.Rptr.
Confessions obtained as result of physical abuse or
7
psychological torture are inadmissible as violative of due process.
8
People v. Jones, 34 Cal.Rptr. 267, 221 C.A.2d 37, certiorari denied 84
9
S.Ct. 1174, 377 U.S. 911, 12 L.Ed.2d 181.
Cal.A. 1961.
10
Conviction and sentence based on confession
11
obtained by coercion, brutality, and violence are not in compliance
12
with due process.
13
Sec. 8.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1,
People v. Almarez, 12 Cal.Rptr. 111, 190 C.A.2d 380.
Cal.A. 1960.
14
Use of a confession, obtained either by physical or
15
psychological coercion as a means of obtaining a finding or verdict of
16
guilt constitutes a violation of due process clauses of federal and
17
state constitutions.
18
199.
People v. Monatano, 7 Cal.Rptr. 307, 184 C.A.2d
19
Cal.A. 1958. The use of a confession obtained by either physical
20
or psychological coercion as a means of obtaining or finding a verdict
21
of guilt, constitutes a violation of due process clauses of United
22
States and state Constitutions. U.S.C.A.onst. Amend. 14; West's
23
Ann.Const. art. 1, sec. 13.
24
25.
25
People v. Speaks, 319 P.2d 709, 156 C.A.2d
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
26
8A Cal D 2d-569
27
Cal. 1973.
"Vicinage" requirement as stated in the Sixth
28
Amendment, namely, trial by a jury of district wherein the crime shall
29
have been committed, is an essential feature of jury trial preserved
30
though changed by the Sixth Amendment and made binding upon the states
31
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
32
Jones, 510 P.2d 705, 108 Cal.Rptr. 345, 9 C.3d 546.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14.
People v.
33
8A Cal D 2d-570
34
Cal.A. 1979. Right to trial by jury selected from residents of
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 308
1
vicinage is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
2
Federal Constitution.
3
153 Cal.Rptr. 89, 89 C.A.3d 809, certiorari denied Remiro v.
4
California, 100 S.C.t. 160, 444 U.S.876, 62 L.Ed.2d 104 and California
5
v. Little, 100 S.Ct 288, 444 U.S. 937, 62 L.Ed.2d 197.
6
Cal.A. 1977.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14.
Peple v. Remiro,
Requirement that jury represents fair cross section
7
of community is fundamental part of Sixth Amendment guarantee to jury
8
trial, which is made binding on states by virtue of Fourteenth
9
Amendment.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 6, 14.
People v. Manson, 139
10
Cal.Rptr. 275, 71 C.A.3d i, certiorari denied Manson v. California, 98
11
S.Ct. 1582, 435 U.S. 953, 55 L.Ed.2d 803.
12
8A Cal D 2d-571
13
Cal.A. 1960.
Defendant's rights, which may be waved in criminal
14
case without affecting due process, are: to be brought to trial within
15
60 days after filing of information; to a public trial; to any trial at
16
all by plea of guilty; to trial by jury; to be confronted with
17
witnesses against him; to defend with counsel; and to be put in
18
jeopardy only once for same offense by failure to raise plea.
19
v. Norman, 1 Cal.Rptr. 699, 177 C.A.2d 59, certiorari denied 81 S.Ct.
20
56, 364 U.S. 820, 5 L.Ed.2d 51.
21
Cal.Super. 1974.
People
Federal constitutional provisions relating to
22
jury trials are applicable to states through Fourteenth Amendment.
23
West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7; U.S.C.A.Const. art. 3, Sec. 2;
24
Amends. 6, 14; West's Ann.Pen. Cosde, Sec. 19c.
25
116 Cal.Rptr. 795, 42 C.A.3d Su. 4.
26
27
LawRev. 1965.
People v. Oenheimer,
Requirement of an impartial jury.
17 Hastings
L.J. 80.
JUDICIAL ERROR.
28
29
8A Cal D 2d-400
30
Cal.A. 1973.
Due process alies to construction of statutes by
31
courts.
People v. Sobiek, 106 Cal.Rptr. 519, 30 C.A.3d 458, 82
32
A.L.R.3d 804, certiorari denied Sobiek v. California, 94 S.Ct. 155, 414
33
U.S. 855, 38 L.Ed.2d 104.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 309
1
HABEAS CORPUS
2
8A Cal D 2d-422
3
C.A.Cal. 1953.
Under California law, where alication for writ of
4
habeas corpus alleges violation of due process which is dehors the
5
record of criminal proceeding, California Supreme Court is required to
6
issue writ and denial of alication is denial of due process.
7
Ann.Pen.Code. Sec.Sec. 1476, 1483; U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
8
v. Teets, 205 F.2d 236, certiorari denied 74 S.Ct. 240, 346 U.S. 910,
9
98 L.Ed. 407.
10
West's
Thomas
JURISDICTION
11
8A Cal D 2d-491.
12
Atty.Gen. 1950.
Conviction by court lacking jurisdiction
13
can be contended to be in violation of due process clause of
14
Fourteenth Amendment (U.S.C.A.Const.)
15
LAW SUIT
16
8A Cal D 2d-399
17
C.D.Cal. 1990.
50-10, 15 Op.Atty.Gen 69.
Violation of substantive due process is shown
18
only when conduct involved is such as to "shock the conscience"
19
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
20
Cal. 1975.
Talevich v. Voss, 734 F.Su. 425.
Use of excessive force which shocks conscience
21
violates due process of law.
West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 13;
22
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 4, 14, 14, Sec. 1.
23
P.2d 624, 124 Cal.Rptr. 528, 15 C.3d 394.
People v. Bracamonte, 540
24
8A Cal D 2d-400
25
Cal. 1953. Judicial decisions may be overruled and dicta may be
26
disaroved without violating either due process clause of United States
27
Constitution. U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
28
Pioneer Soc., 257 P.2d 1, 40 C.2d 852, certiorari denied Los Angeles
29
County Pioneer Soc. v. Historical Soc. of Southern Cal., 74 S.Ct. 139,
30
346 U.S. 888, 98 L.Ed. 392, rehearing denied 74 S.Ct. 306, 346 U.S.
In re Los Angeles County
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 310
1
2
928, 98 L.Ed. 420
Cal.A. 2Dist. 1990. Egregious government conduct in the form of
3
excessive and brutal use of force violates substantive due process.
4
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
5
309, 219 C.A.3d 318, review denied.
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
Wright v. City of Los Angeles, 268 Cal.Rptr.
A8 Cal D 2d-420.
C.A.Cal. 1974. Due process clause forbidding state from depriving any
person of liberty denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also peripheral benefits, such as freedom from serious damage to one's
standing and associations in the community. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
Paskaly v. Seale, 506 F.2d 1209.
D.C.Cal. 1983. Right to hold specific employment and to follow chosen
career free from unreasonable governmental interference comes within
liberty and property concepts of Fifth Amendment, with "property"
consisting of employment itself and "liberty" consisting of freedom to
follow a career. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5. Clemente v. U.S., 568 F.Su.
1150, reversed 766 F.2d 1358, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 881, 474 U.S.
1101, 88 L.Ed.2d 917.
D.C.Cal. 1977. The right to liberty proclaimed by Fourteenth Amendment
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also right of
individual to contract, to engage in any of common occupations of life
and generally, to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law
as essential to orderly pursuit of hainess by free men. U.S.C.A.Const.
Amend. 14. Orrin W. Fox Co. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of State of Cal.,
440 F.Su. 436, injunction stayed 98 S.Ct. 359, 434 U.S. 1345, 54
L.Ed.2d 439, probable jurisdiction noted 98 S.Ct. 1230, 434 U.S. 1060,
55 L.Ed.2d 760, reversed 99 S.Ct 403, 439 U.S. 96, 58 L.Ed.2d 361.
One basic requirement of due process is that "liberty" of a person may
be curtailed only after a hearing. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14. Orrin W.
Fox Co. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of State of Cal., 440 F.Su. 436,
injunction stayed 98 S.Ct. 359, 434 U.S. 1345, 54 L.Ed.2d 439, probable
jurisdiction noted 98 S.Ct. 1230, 434 U.S. 1060, 55 L.Ed.2d 760,
reversed 99 S.Ct 403, 439 U.S. 96, 58 L.Ed.2d 361.
8A Cal D 2d-421.
Cal. 1979. Minors have a liberty interest that entitles them to due
process whenever a state initiates action to deprive them of liberty.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14. In re Scott K., 595 P.2d 105, 155 Cal.Rptr.
671, 24 C.3d 395, certiorari denied Fare v. Scott K., 100 S.Ct. 468,
444 U.S. 973, 62 L.Ed.2d 388.
Cal.A. 5 Dist. 1984. It is fundamental to due process that an
individual be accorded the fullest opportunity to preserve his rights
and defend against charges and that, when an individual is subject to
deprivatory governmental action, he always has a due process liberty
interest both in fair and unprejudiced decision making and in being
treated with respect and dignity. U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14; West's
Ann.Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 15. People v. Hernandez, 206 Cal.Rptr.
843, 160 A.A.3d 725.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 311
RE: CORPORATION
1
2
8A Cal D 2d-394
3
Corporate plaintiff can assert rights under the Fourteenth
4
Amendment and suits under the Civil Rights statutes by corporate
5
plaintiffs are also permissible.
6
Amend. 14. California Diversified Promotions, Inc. v. Musick, 505 F.2d
7
278
8
8A Cal D 2d-393
9
C.A.Cal 1980.
42 U.S.C.A. Sec 1983; U.S.C.A.Const.
Allegation by corporation that the Small Business
10
Administration disorientated against it because its owner was black
11
stated a cause of action under the Fifth Amendment; corporation may
12
suffer injury, actionable under the Fifth Amendment, from unlawful
13
discrimination against its officers and directors in their corporate
14
capacities or against it because its officers or directors are members
15
of minority groups.
16
1217
17
8A Cal D 2d-394
18
D.C.Cal. 1979.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5. Marshall v. Klee, 637 F.2d
The Fourteenth Amendment explicitly extends equal
19
protection and due process of law to all "persons"; law is well settled
20
that these protections aly to all people within jurisdiction of the
21
United States, whether here legally or otherwise.
22
Amend. 14.
U.S.C.A.Const.
U.S. v. Otherson, 480 F.Su. 1369.
23
8A Cal D 2d-393
24
C.A.9(Cal.) 1987. Corporation is "person" possessing Fourteenth
25
Amendment due process rights.
26
Bernardino Physicians' Services Medical Group, Inc. v. San Bernardino
27
County, 825 F.2d 1404
28
8A Cal D 2d-394
29
D.C.Cal. 1974.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
San
Aliens are "persons" and are entitled to the
30
rights to due process and the access to United States courts that the
31
United States Constitution grants to "persons."
32
Sec. 2; 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1332.
U.S.C.A.Const. art. 3,
Times Newspapers Ltd. (Of Great
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 312
1
2
Brittain) v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 387 F.Du. 189.
D.C.Cal. 1953.
Aliens in the United States are persons entitled
3
to the protection of the Fifth Amendment, but they have no
4
constitutional right to be naturalized.
5
U.S.Cal. 1954.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.
An "alien" is a "person" entitled to the same
6
protection for his life, liberty and property under the due process
7
clause as is afforded to a citizen. U.S.C.A.Cons. Amend. 5.
8
Press, 74 S.Ct 737, 347 U.S. 522, 98 L.Ed. 911 rehearing denied 75
9
S.Ct. 17, 348 U.S. 852, 99 L.Ed. 671.
10
8A Cal D 2d-395
11
Cal.A. 1975.
Galvan v.
Aliens in United States are afforded many, if not
12
most, of privileges and rights enjoyed by its citizens and are entitled
13
to equal protection of laws encompassed in Fourteenth Amendment in
14
states in which they reside and are persons within protection of Fifth
15
Amendment who may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without
16
due process of law.
17
123 Cal.Rptr. 536, 50 C.A.3d 242, 87 A.L.R.3d 678, certiorari denied 96
18
S.Ct. 1492, 425 U.S. 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 752.
19
20
21
Law Rev. 1978.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.
Alonso v. State,
Child, parent, state and due process clause.
51
So.Cal.L.R. 769.
RELATED TO STATE OR STATE ACTION.
22
8A Cal D 2d-409
23
C.A.9(Cal) 1985.
Where injury is product of operation of state
24
law, regulation, or institutionalized practice, and thus within power
25
of state to control, state may not take away protected interest without
26
hearing in advance of injury.
27
Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, certiorari denied Cranke v. Haygood, 106 S.Ct
28
3333, 478 U.S. 1020, 92 L.Ed.2d 739.
29
D.C.Cal. 1970.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
Haygood v.
Fourteenth Amendment protects citizen against
30
state itself and all of its creatures, including boards of education.
31
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
32
D.C.Cal. 1964.
Alexander v. Thompson, 313 F.Su. 1389.
First eight amendments, of bill of rights, of
33
federal constitution were intended as a restriction upon federal
34
government, and Fourteenth Amendment constitutes limitation upon the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 313
1
states.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 1 et seq., 4, 14.
2
Wingard, 230 F.Su. 167.
Beauregard v.
In so far as due process under Fourteenth Amendment requires
3
4
states to observe any immunities that are valid against federal
5
government by force of specific pledges of particular amendments, it
6
does so because they have been found to be implicit in concept of
7
ordered liberty and thus through Fourteenth Amendment have become valid
8
against the states.
9
230 F.Su. 167.
D.C.Cal. 1961.
10
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Beauregard v. Wingard,
Prohibitions of Fourteenth Amendment to federal
11
Constitution aly only in cases involving state action.
12
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
13
F.2d 1.
Cal. 1974.
14
Koch v. Zuieback, 194 F.Su. 651, affirmed 316
For due process purposes, action of the state which
15
is not merely permissive of discrimination but a significant
16
encouragement of it, and the consequent involvement of the state in it,
17
constitutes state action.
18
Fargo Bank, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal.Rptr. 449, 11 C.3d 352, 65 A.L. R.3d
19
1266.
Cal. 1968.
20
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Kruger v. Wells
Constitutional scrutiny of state action is not
21
predicated upon finding of direct restriction, and there need only be
22
causative relation between state action and obnoxious result.
23
v. Public Utilities Commission, 442 P.2d 685, 69 Cal.Rptr. 605, 69 C.2d
24
67.
Cal.A.
25
Huntley
1954. The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
26
alies to the Federal Government and not to the several states, and does
27
not constitute a limitation on power of states, and hence had no
28
alication in proceeding under Reciprocal Enforcement of Suort Law to
29
enforce suort of minor child.
30
1681; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.
31
154.
Law Rev. 1964.
32
33
West's Ann.Code Civ.Poce. SecSec. 1650Smith v Smith, 270 P.2d 613, 125 C.A.2d
A statement against state action.
37 So.Cal.L.R.
463.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 314
1
INCORPORATION OF BILL OF RIGHTS
2
8A Cal D 2d-421
3
U.S.Cal. 1974.
The Fourteenth Amendment makes the constitutional
4
command of the First Amendment applicable to the states.
5
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 1, 14.
6
416 U.S. 396, 40 L.Ed.2d 224.
7
Cal. 1974.
Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S.Ct. 1800,
Provisions of the First Amendment are binding on the
8
states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
9
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 1. 14.
10
11
California Educational Facilities
Authority v. Priest, 526 P.2d 513, 116 Cal.Rptr. 361, 12 C.3d 593.
RE: CHILDREN
12
8A Cal D 2d-394
13
Cal.A. 3Dist. 1984.
Minors are "persons" under State
14
Constitution possessed of variety of due process rights afforded to
15
defendant in criminal proceedings.
16
160 C.A.3d 697.
In re Dung T., 206 Cal.Rptr. 772,
17
8A Cal D 2d-428
18
255(4). Minors; juvenile delinquents.
19
C.A.Cal. 1974.
Due process requires state to aoint counsel for
20
indigent parent in child dependency proceeding whenever parent, unable
21
to present his or her case properly, faces substantial possibility of
22
loss of custody or of prolonged separation from child.
23
Cal.Welfare & Inst.Code, Sec. 600.
24
D.C.Cal. 1973.
Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940
Applicable due process standard in juvenile
25
proceedings is one of "fundamental fairness".
26
F.R.D. 101.
27
Cal. 1977.
West's Ann.
Taylor v. Breed, 58
Minor is entitled to protection of due process
28
whenever state itself initiates action, whether civil or quasi
29
criminal, to deprive minor of his liberty.
30
West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7(a).
31
141 Cal.Rptr. 298, 19 C.3d 921.
32
33
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14;
In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286,
Even conditional liberty interest, such as that of minor, is
entitled to protections of due process when state is involved to any
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 315
1
significant degree in its diminution.
2
Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7(a).
3
Cal.Rptr. 298, 19 C.3d 921.
4
8A Cal D 2d-430
5
Cal. 1974.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's
In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 141
Presentation of argument by counsel based on evidence
6
introduced at hearing is an integral part of the right of a juvenile to
7
be represented by counsel at a jurisdictional hearing, and the denial
8
of that right unless waved is a denial of due process.
9
Ann.Welfare & Inst.Code, Sec.Sec. 602, 680.
10
11
West's
In re F, 520 P.2d 986,
113, Cal.Rptr. 170, 11 C.3d 249.
Cal. 1971.
Juveniles are entitled to foundational protection of
12
bill of rights in proceedings which may result in confinement or other
13
sanctions, whether state labels such proceedings which may result in
14
confinement or other sanctions, whether state labels such proceedings
15
"criminal" or "civil"; disaroving cases inconsistent with opinion to
16
extent of inconsistency.
17
Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 13; West's Ann.Welf. & Inst.Code, Sec.Sec. 590-
18
914, 602, 702, 707.
19
664, 93 Cal.Rptr. 752, 4 C.3d 370.
20
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14; West's
M. v. Superior Court of Shasta County, 482 P.2d
Cal.A. 1 Dist. 1985.
Due process requires that parents be
21
afforded notice and opportunity to be heard at jurisdictional hearings
22
in juvenile court dependency proceedings.
23
West's Ann.Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code Sec. 300.
24
864, 165 C.A.3d 270.
25
Cal.A.2Dist. 1988.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14;
In re C.P., 230 Cal.Rptr.
When particular minor's dependence on or need
26
for his or her parent renders preparation of defense impossible without
27
parent's assistance and when that parent is willing and able to assist
28
the minor, such a minor does have right to reasonable continuance
29
make reasonable efforts to secure presence of his or her parent at
30
adjudication hearing and such right stems not from parent's right to be
31
present, but rather from minor's own due process right to fair and just
32
hearing.
33
Const.Amends. 5, 14.
34
8A Cal D 2d-432
35
Cal.A. 4 Dist. 1986.
to
West's Ann.Cal.Welf. & Inst.Code Sec. 602; U.S.C.A.
In re Eric J. 244 Cal.Rptr. 861, 199 C.A.3d 624.
Minor has same due process right as adult
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 316
1
not to be more severely punished for exercising right to hearing with
2
procedural safeguards found to be constitutional rights for juveniles.
3
U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14.
4
178 C.A.3d 423, review denied.
5
Cal.A. 1982.
In re Lawanda L., 223 Cal.Rptr. 685,
Use in juvenile proceeding of confession obtained
6
without intelligent, knowledgeable waiver of constitutional rights
7
violates Fifth Amendment and due process clause of Fourteenth
8
Amendment.
9
Sec. 602.
10
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14; West's Ann.Welf. & Inst.Code
In re Abdul Y., 182 Cal.Rptr. 146, 130 C.A.3d 847.
Cal.A. 1981.
Due process requires prosecution to disclose all
11
material evidence favorable to accused in juvenile proceeding whether
12
such evidence relates directly to issue of guilt or can lead defense to
13
favorable evidence.
14
Cal.Rptr. 531, 115 C.A.3d 629.
15
Cal.A. 1980.
U.S.C.A.Cons. Amend. 14.
In re Gary G., 171
A minor has a right to the essentials of due
16
process and fair treatment before a juvenile referee or judge.
17
Ann.Welfare & Inst.Code, Sec.Sec. 251, 252, 254, 602; U.S.C.A.Const.
18
Amend. 5.
19
West's
People v. Eduardo N.G., 166 Cal.Rptr 873, 108 C.A.3d 745.
A process which constitutionally limits hearing officer to
20
finding against minor and prohibits finding in his favor, no matter how
21
weak a case against him, is violative of due process. West's
22
Ann.Welfare & Inst.Code, Sec.Sec. 251, 252, 254, 602; U.S.C.A.Const.
23
Amend. 5.
People v. Eduardo N.G., 166 Cal.Rptr 873, 108 C.A.3d 745.
24
8A Cal D 2d-435
25
Cal.A. 1978.
Where father was not actually exercising control at
26
time of jurisdictional hearing because juvenile court had earlier
27
ordered minor detained following his mother's hospitalization, father,
28
who had acknowledged paternity, had right to show that, as natural
29
father, he was willing and was capable of exercising control over
30
minor, and juvenile court denied due process in holding that gather's
31
offer of proof was irrelevant.
32
300(a); Welfare & Inst.Code, Sec.Sec. 600, 600(a), St.1971, p. 3736.
33
In re Kelvin M., 143Cal.Rptr. 561, 77 C.A.3d 396.
34
Cal.A. 1977.
West's Ann.Welfare & inst.Code, Sec.
Juvenile proceedings which may result in
35
substantial loss of freedom are regarded as quasi criminal in nature
36
and, as a consequence, fundamental notions of due process and fairness
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 317
1
must be strictly observed.
Wets's Ann.Welfare & Inst.Code, Sec. 702.5.
2
In Matter of Aaron N., 139 Cal.Rptr. 258, 70 C.A.3d 931.
3
8A Cal D 2d-436
4
Cal.A. 1975. Judgment freeing child from custody and control of
5
its parents results in total severance of its natural ties between
6
parents and child and amounts to taking of a "liberty" under due
7
process clause of Constitution.
8
Ann.Civ.Code. Sec. 232.
9
C.A.3d 300.
10
11
12
Cal.A. 1974.
process of law.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends.
In re Susan Lynn M., 125 Cal.Rptr. 707, 53
Parent in dependency proceeding is entitled to due
In re J.T., 115 Cal.Rptr. 553, 40 C.A.3d 633.
Notice of allegations upon which deprivation of custody of minor
13
children is predicated is fundamental due process.
14
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
15
5, 14; West's
In re J.T., 115 Cal.Rptr. 553, 40 C.A.3d 633.
Findings of fact made by juvenile court in adjudicating minors to
16
be dependent children of court were conclusory in nature and denied
17
mother of minor children due process of law in that such findings
18
failed to arise her of court's reason for its decision and did not form
19
adequate basis for revies.
20
600-602, 702, 726(a-c).
21
8A Cal D 2d-437
22
Cal.A. 1971.
West's Ann. Welfare & Inst.Code. Sec.Sec.
In re J.T., 115 Cal.Rptr. 553, 40 C.A.3d 633.
Parent had right to custody of her child of which
23
she could not be deprived in dependency proceeding without essential
24
ingredients of due process, including a fair hearing.
25
Ann.Welfare & Inst.Code. Sed. 600; U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14;
26
Superior Court for Los Angeles County, 97 Cal.Rptr. 158, 19 C.A.3d 895.
27
8A Cal D 2d-438
28
Cal.A. 1970.
West's
R. v.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a requisite to
29
due process at adjudicatory state of a state juvenile court proceeding,
30
and United States Supreme Court decision to that effect is applicable
31
to cases pending on direct appeal at time of decision.
32
Ann.Welfare & Inst.Code, Sec. 700. In re W., 91 Cal.Rptr. 702, 12
33
C.A.3d 1120.
34
Cal.A. 1970.
West's
"Preponderance of evidence" standard may not be
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 318
1
alied by trial court in juvenile matter; proof beyond reasonable doubt
2
is Fourteenth Amendment due process requirement applicable against
3
state juvenile courts.
4
Cal.Rptr. 361, 11 C.A.3d 1193.
5
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
In re G., 90
8A Cal D 2d-439
6
7
8
9
10
11
Cal.A. 1951. Regardless of good intentions of public authorities in
proceedings regarding wayward minors, such children should not be
deprived of their liberty, nor their parents deprived of their
children, without due process of law. Ex parte Moilanen, 233 P.2d 91,
104 C.A.2d 835.
Law.Rev. 1973. Void for vagueness: State statutes proscribing
12
conduct only for a juvenile. Edward R. Roybal.
Law.Rev. 1972. Juvenile law - equal protection for juveniles in
13
14
the post-adjudicateve process.
Constitutional considerations.
Law Rev. 1970.
17
18
burden of proof.
Leftein.
22
Sud process in juvenile delinquency proceedings In re Gault, juvenile couts and lawyers, Norman
53 A.B.A.J. 811
Law Rev. 1960.
21
46. S.Bar J. 320.
3 Loyola U.(L.A.) 431.
Law Rev. 1967.
19
20
9 San Diego L.Rev. 345.
Law Rev. 1971. Admissibility of evidence in juvenile court:
15
16
1 Pepertrdine L.Rev. 1.
Constitutional rights in juvenile court.
46
A.B.A.J. 1206.
23
8A Cal D 2d-503
24
Law Rev. 1966.
An analysis of the California decision bearing on
25
the problem of defining a "custodial interrogation." Kenneth W. Graham,
26
Jr.
27
14 U.C.L.A.Law R. 59.
RE: PRISONERS:
28
8A Cal D 2d-393
29
C.A.Cal. 1979.
In the context of prison environment, the
30
guaranty of due process rights is no less important than is the
31
guaranty to society at large; a prisoner does not shed his basic
32
constitutional protections when he enters an American prison.
33
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
34
granted 100 S.Ct. 1630, 446 U.S. 1302, 64 L.Ed.2d 216, certiorari
35
granted 100 S.Ct 3055, 448 U.S. 910, 65 L.Ed.2d 1139, vacated 101 S.Ct
Mata v. Sumner, 611 F.2d 754, stay
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 319
1
764, 449 U.S. 539, 66 L.Ed.2d 722, on remand 649 F.2d 713, certiorari
2
granted and vacated 102 S.Ct. 1303, 455 U.S. 591, 71 L.Ed.2d 480, on
3
remand 696 F.2d 1244, certiorari granted and vacated 104 S.Ct. 386, 464
4
U.S. 957, 78 L.Ed.2d 332, on remand 721 F.2d 1251.
5
8A Cal D 2d-394
6
Prisoners are protected by the due process and equal protection
7
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. Smith v.
8
Schneckcloth, 414 F.2d 680.
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Cal.A. 5 Dist. 1984. It is fundamental to due process that an
individual be accorded the fullest opportunity to preserve his rights
and defend against charges and that, when an individual is subject to
deprivatory governmental action, he always has a due process liberty
interest both in fair and unprejudiced decision making and in being
treated with respect and dignity. U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14; West's
Ann.Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 15. People v. Hernandez, 206 Cal.Rptr.
843, 160 A.A.3d 725.
17
8A Cal D 2d-396
18
C.D.Cal. 1990.
When state puts person in danger, due process
19
clause requires state to protect him to the extent that state's actions
20
have put person at increased risk.
21
Talevich v. Voss, 734 F.Su. 425.
22
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
LIBERTIES AND LIBERTY INTERESTS PROTECTED.
23
8A Cal D2d-419
24
U.S.Cal. 1974.
The interests of prisoners and their
25
correspondents in uncensored communications by letter, grounded as it
26
is in the First Amendment, is plainly a "liberty" interest within the
27
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment even though qualified of necessity
28
by the circumstance of imprisonment, and, as such, it is protected from
29
arbitrary governmental invasion.
30
Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 416 U.S. 396, 40 L.Ed.2d 224.
31
C.A.Cal. 1982.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 1, 14.
Liberty interests protected by due process clause
32
of Fourteenth Amendment includes right to be free from actions which
33
impose stigma or other disability that forecloses one's freedom to take
34
advantage of other employment oortunities.
35
Erdelyi v. O'Brien, 680 F.2d 61.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 320
1
8A Cal D 2d-423
2
D.C.Cal. 1964.
Person is deprived of his liberty when he is
3
arrested and imprisoned, and freedom from arrest and from imprisonment
4
except through due process are rights implicit in concept of ordered
5
liberty and guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment for Federal Constitution
6
against invasion by state.
7
Wingard, 230 F.Sup. 167.
8
A8 Cal D 2d-455.
9
C.A.Cal 1980.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
Beauregard v.
Right to due process of law is violated where the
10
government increases the severity of alleged charges in response to the
11
exercise of constitutional or statutory rights.
12
5, 14.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends.
U.S. v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831.
Penalizing a person for doing what the law plainly allows him to
13
14
do is a due process violation of the most basic sort.
15
Amends. 5, 14.
U.S. v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831.
C.A.Cal. 1980.
16
U.S.C.A.Const.
The defendant's right to due process is violated
17
where the prosecution increases the severity of alleged charges in
18
response to the exercise of a constitutional or statutory right.
19
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.
20
certiorari granted 101 S.Ct. 71, 449 U.S. 819, 66 L.Ed.2d 21, affirmed
21
101 S.Ct. 1629, 451 U.S. 182, 68 L.Ed.2d 22.
C.A.Cal.
22
1975.
U.S. v. Rosales-Lopez, 617 F.2d 1349,
Due process requires fair administration of
23
justice and guarantees the crucial right of an indigent to reasonably
24
fair equality with those who have adequate financial means to protect
25
their rights.
26
254.
18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3006A(e).
27
8A Cal D 2d-457
28
Cal. 1979.
U.S. v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d
To punish a person for exercising a constitutional
29
right is a due process violation of the most basic sort.
30
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
31
528, 23 C.3d 274, 100 A.L.R.3d 823.
32
8A Cal D 2d-463
33
C.A.Cal. 1981.
34
In re Lewallen, 590 P.2d 383, 152 Cal.Rptr.
Right to due process of law is violated where the
government increases severity of alleged charges in response to
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 321
1
exercise of constitutional or statutory rights.
2
5.
3
certiorari granted 102 S.Ct. 3081, 458 U.S. 263, 73 L.Ed.2d 754, on
4
remand 682 F.2d 1352.
5
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend.
U.S. v Hollywood Motor Car Co., Inc., 646 F.2d 384, reversed,
C.A.Cal. 1980.
Prosecutorial vindictativeness is normally found
6
where the government has occasioned to retry the defendant following
7
the exercise of a procedural right.
8
v. Rosales-Lopez, 617 F.2d 1349, certiorari granted 101 S.Ct. 71, 449
9
U.S. 819, 66 L.Ed.2d 21, affirmed 101 S.Ct. 1629, 451 U.S. 182, 68
10
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5, 14.
U.S.
L.Ed.2d 22.
11
8A Cal D 2d-466
12
D.C.Cal. 1964.
Prohibition against effectively discriminating
13
against indigent petitioners in collateral proceedings is imposed in
14
federal proceedings by due process clause of Fifth Amendment.
15
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5.
16
Henderson v. U.S., 231 F.Su. 177.
Cal. 1985. Due process clause of California Constitution [West's
17
Ann.Cal.Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7] prohibits increased charges motivated by
18
prosecutorial vindictiveness.
19
Cal.Rptr. 267, 38 C.3d 865.
20
8A Cal D 2d-467
21
Cal.A. 4 Dist. 1984.
In re Bower, 700 P.2d 1269, 215
Due process dictates that defendant may not
22
be deterred from exercising his constitutional right to attack his
23
conviction by even possibility of prosecutorial retaliation.
24
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
25
C.A.3d 341.
26
8A Cal D 2d-469 & 571
27
Cal.A. 1960.
In re Tirado, 198 Cal.Rptr. 682, 151
Defendant's rights, which may be waved in
28
criminal case without affecting due process, are: to be brought
29
to trial within 60 days after filing of information; to a public
30
trial; to any trial at all by plea of guilty; to trial by jury;
31
to be confronted with witnesses against him; to defend with
32
counsel; and to be put in jeopardy only once for same offense by
33
failure to raise plea.
People v. Norman, 1 Cal.Rptr. 699, 177
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 322
1
C.A.2d 59, certiorari denied 81 S.Ct 56, 364 U.S. 820, 5 L.Ed.2d
2
51.
3
8A Cal D 2d-470
4
Cal.A.1951.
To compel a plea of guilty by threats, fraud or
5
coercion, is denial of due process, and, in proper case, if found to
6
exist, would warrant issuance of writ of error coram nobis but to be
7
entitled to writ, alication must be filed with due diligence.
8
v. Chapan, 234 P.2d 716, 106 C.A.2d 51.
9
People
8A Cal D 2d-491
Cal.A. 5 dist. 1985.
10
Double jeopardy clause of Fifth Amendment
11
alies to states through due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment.
12
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
13
C.A.3d 1061, review denied.
Cal.A. 1981.
14
In re Saul S., 213 Cal.Rptr. 541, 167
It is unfair and violates due process in criminal
15
or quasi criminal proceedings to redetermine matters once resolved.
16
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend 14. Hoffman v. Superior Court, 177 Cal.Rptr. 868,
17
122 C.A.3d 715.
Law Rev 1976.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Doubel jeopardy and corporations. 28 Stan.L.Rev.
805
Law Rev 1970 Double jeopardy and the states-denial of due
process.
3 Loyola U.(L.A.) 414
Law Rev 1959.
jeopardy.
10 Hastings L.J. 195.
Law Rev 1954.
amendments.
Due process and the federal construciton of double
double jeopardy - due process under fourteenth
26 So.Cal.L.R. 443.
Law Rev 1953.
Conditionality of declaring mistrial and requiring
accused to be presented to another jury.
28
8A Cal D 2d-509
29
Cal. 1990.
39 .B.A.J. 405.
Criminal defendant has due process rights to notice
30
of charges and presentation of defense.
31
People v. Jones, 792 P.2d 643, 270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 51 C.3d 34, 51 C.3d
32
294, modified.
33
34
Cal. 1989.
U.S.C.A.Cosnt.Amends. 6, 14.
Conviction of non included offense implicates
defendant's due process right to notice.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 323
1
People v. Toro, 766 P.2d 577, 254 Cal.Rptr. 811, 47 C.3d 966, rehearing
2
denied.
3
Cal. 1983.
To convict a defendant of an uncharged offense not
4
included in accusatory pleading is a denial of due process unless
5
defendant waves his fifth to be advised of the charge.
6
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
7
890, 34 C.3d 350.
8
8A Cal D 2d-556
9
Cal.A. 1982.
People v. Fain, 667 P.2d 694, 193 Cal.Rptr.
Conviction founded upon testimony coerced by State
10
would violate basic due process.
11
Claxton, 181 Cal.Rptr. 281, 129 C.A.3d 638.
12
8A Cal D 2d-571
13
Cal.A.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
People v.
1957. Right of defendant to be confronted with witnesses
14
against him, to be brought to trial within 60 days after filing of
15
information, not to be put in double jeopardy, to public trial, to
16
counsel and to trial by jury,
17
of Baird, 310 P.2d 454, 150 C.A.2d 561, 68 A.L.R.2d 628.
18
Petition of Spencer, for and on Behalf
FEDERAL COURT
19
8A Cal D 2d-456
20
C.A.Cal.
1976.
Denial of due process in state criminal case,
21
sufficient to justify federal court interference, is failure to observe
22
that fundamental fairness essential to very concept of justice.
23
v. Wilson, 372 F.2d 15, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 2085, 387 U.S. 948.
24
18 L.Ed.2d 1337.
25
Nolen
PHOTO COPY.
26
8A Cal D 2d-470
27
Cal.A.
1952.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizing
28
court at any time after filing of information or indictment to order
29
attorney for Government to permit defendant to inspect and copy or
30
photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects
31
obtained from or belonging to defendant or obtained from others by
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 324
1
seizure or by process, has no alication in state courts and cannot be
2
incorporated into Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution as a
3
limitation on state action.
4
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
5
6
Fed.RulesCrim. Proc. rule 16, 18 U.S.C.A.;
People v. Kross, 247 P.2d 44, 112 C.A.2d 602.
DURESS AND COERCION
A person is incapable of committing a crime where the act is
7
committed or the omission is made under threats or menaces sufficient
8
to show that he had reasonable cause to believe, and did believe, hit
9
life would be endangered if he refused. This defense is unavailable,
10
however, where the offense is punishable by death.
11
defense of duress in a criminal case, it is essential to show a threat
12
of imminent violence.
13
the defense must be, or reasonably aear to be, imminent and immediately
14
impinging; a future and remote danger is not sufficient.
15
qualification alies not only to persons of age, but also to a minor
16
otherwise capable of committing the crime involved.
17
To establish the
The danger to the life of the person claiming
This
An honest but unreasonable belief as to duress may negate the
18
specific intent necessary for robbery and kidnaing for the purpose of
19
robbery.
20
reasonable , would absolve the defendant of liability for the charged
21
crime, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on honest but
22
unreasonable belief by defendant that his life was in danger.
23
24
Where the evidence suggests an honest belief, which if
DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT OF LAW
Discriminatory enforcement of the law may be a valid defense in a
25
case in which the defendant can establish deliberate invidious
26
discrimination by prosecutorial authorities.
27
28
ENTRAPMENT
Entrapment in California is that conduct of a law enforcement
29
agent likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to commit an
30
offense (sec. 2267).
31
agents to pressure a suspect by overbearing conduct, such as badgering,
32
cajoling, or importuning or other affirmative acts likely to induce a
33
normally law-abiding person to commit a crime (Sec. 2268).
34
may be effected by an unwitting agent of law enforcement officials
It is impermissible for the police or their
Entrapment
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 325
1
(Sec. 2269).
2
Aside form the defense of entrapment, sufficiently gross police
3
misconduct could conceivably lead to a finding that conviction of the
4
accused would violate his constitutional right to due process of the
5
law (Sec. 2272).
6
defendant has the burden of proving it (Sec. 2273).
7
entrapment instructions sua sponte constitutes a reversible error where
8
substantial evidence to sustain the defense is offered or introduced
9
(Sec. 2274).
Entrapment is an affirmative defense, and the
Failure to give
10
Sec. 2267 In General; Test.
11
The test of entrapment in California is whether the conduct of
12
the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding
13
person to commit the offense.
14
character of the suspect, his predisposition to commit the offense, and
15
his subjective intent are irrelevant.
16
Under this test, such matters as the
While the inquiry must focus primarily on the conduct of the law
17
enforcement agent, that conduct is not to be viewed in a vacuum.
18
should also be judged by the effect it would have on a normally law-
19
abiding person situated in the circumstances of the case at hand.
20
purposes of the test, the presumption is that a law-abiding person
21
would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime presented by the
22
simple opportunity to act unlawfully.
23
relevant are the transactions preceding the offense, the gravity of the
24
crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission.
25
It
For
Circumstances which may be
This test differs form the federal standard which requires a
26
showing that the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime and
27
from the hybrid standard, formerly used in California, which
28
incorporated elements of both the subjective and objective theories of
29
entrapment.
30
Although the defense is available to a defendant who is otherwise
31
guilty, a defendant need not admit his guilt, or even commission of the
32
act, to raise a defense of entrapment.
33
question for the jury, although in a rare case it may be show as a
34
matter of law.
35
36
The defense of entrapment is a
In accordance with the general rule that questions not raised in
the trial court will not be considered on aeal, the defense of
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 326
1
entrapment cannot be raised for the first time on aeal.
2
54. People v Benford, 53 C2d 1, 345 P2d 928; People v Perez, 62
3
C2d 769, 44 Cal Rptr 326, 401 P2d 934; People v McIntire, 22 C3d 742,
4
153 Cal Rptr 237, 591 P2d 527.
5
The first duties of the officers of the law are to prevent,
6
not to punish, crime.
7
for the sole purpose of prosecuting and punishing it.
8
Makovsky, 3 C2d 366, 44 P2d 536.
9
10
It is not their duty to incite and create crime
People v
Sec. 2268 Impermissible police conduct
Official conduct which does no more than offer the opportunity to
11
act unlawfully, such as a decoy program, is permissible.
12
impermissible for the police or their agents to pressure a suspect by
13
overbearing conduct, such as badgering, cajoling, or importuning, or
14
other affirmative acts likely to induce a normally law-abiding person
15
to commit the crime.
16
But it is
Although the determination of what police conduct is
17
impermissible must to some extent proceed on an ad hoc basis, guidance
18
will generally be found in the alication of one of both of two
19
principles.
20
generate in a normally law-abiding person a motive for the crime other
21
than ordinary criminal intent, entrapment will be established.
22
example of such conduct would be an appeal by the police that would
23
induce such a person to commit the act because of friendship or
24
sympathy, instead of a desire for personal gain or other typical
25
criminal purpose...
First, if the actions of the law enforcement agent would
An
26
There is no entrapment when official conduct is found to have
27
gone no further than necessary to assure the suspect that he is not
28
being set up.
29
restrained, steps to gain the confidence of suspects.
The police remain free to take reasonable, though
30
Sec. 2269 Entrapment by one not a law enforcement officer
31
Entrapment may be effected by an unwitting agent of law
32
enforcement officials.
Manipulation of a third party by law
33
enforcement officers to procure the commission of a criminal offense by
34
another renders the third party a government agent for purposes of the
35
entrapment defense, even though a third party remains unaware of the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 327
1
law enforcement object.
2
Sec. 2272 Police misconduct as a violation of due process
3
The California Supreme Court has intimated that sufficiently gr
4
oss police misconduct could conceivably lead to a finding that
5
conviction of the accused would violate his or her constitutional right
6
to due process of the law.
7
yet alied, by the United States Supreme Court.
8
9
The doctrine has been recognized, but not
The defense has been recognized and alied by lower federal
courts.
In the federal courts, the defense is distinct from that of
10
entrapment.
11
defense presents a question of law.
12
defense is available even though the defendant was predisposed to
13
commit the crime.
14
First, while entrapment presents a question of fact, this
Second, under federal law this
California's entrapment standard, however, differs from the
15
federal standard.
Thus, it has been stated that the defense of police
16
misconduct so gross and outrageous as to constitute a violation of due
17
process has little alication in California.
18
federal due process/outrageous conduct claim is the same as
19
California's entrapment defense, that is, the deterrence of police
20
misconduct, there would be few, if any, situations in which a due
21
process violation would not also constitute entrapment.
22
federal standard, entrapment is not a defense where the defendant has a
23
demonstrated predisposition to commit the crime...
Since the purpose of the
As under the
24
It has also been stated that, notwithstanding the obvious
25
overlap, there may well be cases where police misconduct as to third
26
persons would not fit within an entrapment framework but would
27
nonetheless prevent a DEFENDANTS conviction on the grounds of
28
fundamental fairness.
29
Sec 2274 Instructions
30
In accordance with the general rule, failure to give entrapment
31
instructions sua sponte constitutes reversible error when substantial
32
evidence to sustain the defense is offered or introduced.
33
prosecution for selling heroin, where there was substantial evidence
34
suortive of an entrapment defense, the trial court erred in failing to
35
instruct the jury sua sponte on the defense of entrapment.
Thus in a
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 328
1
The defendant is entitled to the benefit of an instruction on
2
entrapment, and it is prejudicial error to deny it, where the facts
3
alleged, if true, are legally sufficient to justify the reasonable
4
inference that he was the victim of an entrapment that precludes his
5
conviction.
6
in a ruling by the trial court that refuses to consider such an
7
instruction.
8
9
10
But where the evidence is insufficient, there is not error
(As a duty to instruct sua sponte in criminal prosecutions
generally, see Sec. 3049)
RESISTANCE
11
Sec. 2283-2285 Resistance Generally
12
A person may lawfully resist the commission of a public offense
13
against him or his family, or against hid property, or against another
14
person (Sec. 2283).
15
defending against a threatened injury is defined by statute and does
16
not differ substantially form the right as it existed at common law
17
(Sec. 2284).
18
illegal attempt to take or injure by force property in his lawful
19
possession (Sec. 2285).
20
Sec. 2283 In General
21
The situations where lawful resistance will justify what
The right of one person to aid another in
A person may make resistance sufficient to prevent an
22
otherwise would be a crime are described generally in the title of the
23
Penal Code on prevention of public offenses.
24
provisions on this kind of justification are contained in the chapter
25
on homicide.
26
commission of a public offense may be made by the party about to be
27
injured, and by other parties.
28
In addition, specific
Under the general provisions, lawful resistance to the
An individual may make resistance sufficient to prevent an
29
offense against his person, his family, or a member thereof, or to
30
prevent an illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his
31
lawful possession.
32
common law rule that deadly force was justified only if the offense as
33
a forcible and atrocious crime.
34
defense of the person about to be injured, make resistance sufficient
This provision must be read in the light of the
Any other person may, in aid or
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 329
1
to prevent the offense.
2
(see Sec. 300 and Sec. 2286 & 2284 for self-defense)
3
78.
4
Instructions on lawful resistance in prosecutions for assault by
Deering's Pen C Sec. 693.
5
means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen C Sec 245)
6
should be drawn within the purview of Pen C Sec. 693, and not Pen C
7
Sec. 197. People v Moody, 62, CA2d 18.
8
Sec 2284 Defense of others
9
The right of one person to aid another in defending against a
10
threatened injury is defined by statute, and it does not differ
11
substantially from the right as it existed under the common law.
12
regard to homicide, the statue refers to lawful defense of a person
13
attacked "or of a wife or husband, parent, child, master, mistress, or
14
servant" of the defendant, whereas the code provisions on lawful
15
resistance generally refer to "any other person," in addition to the
16
defendant's "family or some member thereof".
With
The Civil Code provides that any necessary force may be used to
17
18
protect from wrongful injury a wife, husband, child, parent, other
19
relative, or member of one's family, or of a ward, servant, master, or
20
guest.
21
22
Sec. 2285 Defense of habitation or property
23
A person may make resistance sufficient to prevent an illegal
24
attempt to take or injure by force property in his lawful possession.
25
The resistance may extent to the taking of life where it is offered in
26
defense against one who manifestly intends or endeavors by violence or
27
surprise to commit a felony or to enter a habitation for the purpose of
28
doing violence to someone there.
29
to prevent the offence is justifiable.
30
defense of habitation or of real or personal property is not justified
31
against a mere trespasser who is not acting feloniously.
32
short of homicide, if excessive, will make the defense unavailable.
33
Necessary force may be used to repel a trespasser who goes upon the
34
premises with the intent and means to commit a felony.
35
excessive force against a trespasser is either actually used or
However, only resistance sufficient
Thus homicide committed in
Even force
But when
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 330
1
unlawfully attempted, a criminal assault is committed.
The Civil Code provides that any necessary force may be used to
2
3
protect from wrongful injury one's property, or the property of a wife,
4
husband, child, parent, other relative, or a member of one's family, or
5
of a ward, servant, master, or guest.
6
penal statute authorizing resistance sufficient to prevent an illegal
7
attempt by force to take or injure property in hid lawful possession.
8
However, when an officer charged with the duty of enforcing a judgment
9
by execution lawfully and peacefully enters premises, one had no right
10
However, this provision of the
to expel that officer or his assistant from the premises.
SELF-DEFENSE
11
The right of a party violently assaulted by another to repel such
12
13
attack and to protect himself is a law of nature antedating written
14
enactments (Sec. 2286).
15
reasonable appearance of imminent peril to the person attacked (Sec.
16
2287).
17
force as is necessary to repel the attack and will be held responsible
18
for a marked excess (Sec. 2288). Generally, it is not a prerequisite to
19
the successful assertion of the defense of self-defense that the
20
defendant retreat; one who is attacked may pursue his assailant until
21
he has secured himself from danger, if that course appears to him to be
22
reasonably necessary (Sec. 2289).
23
attacker has withdrawn, there can be no justification for the use of
24
force (Sec. 2290).
25
willfully, and without any necessity for his own protection, creates a
26
danger with which he was thereupon threatened or who invites a
27
situation which gives rise to the aarent necessity of self-defense
28
(Sec. 2291).
The right of self-defense is based on the
Generally, one who is assaulted may lawfully use only so much
Where the danger has passed and the
Self-defense may not be claimed by a defendant who
29
Sec. 2286 In General
30
The right of a party violently assaulted by another to repel such
31
attack and to protect himself is a law of nature antedating written
32
enactments and is recognized in the legislation of all civilized
33
people, it is a "sacred" right.
34
35
The term "self-defense," with a single exception, is not
mentioned in the Penal Code, although that code specifically covers the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 331
1
substance of the privileges of self-defense in connection with the
2
crime of homicide.
3
resistance.
4
assault, and one may interpose the defense of self or property in a
5
civil action for assault.
6
defense where he encounters resistance in making an arrest.
7
defense may be a defense to the crime of possession of firearms by ex-
8
felons or narcotics addicts and may be a defense to possession to
9
mayhem.
The code also contains general provisions on lawful
Self-defense is available in a criminal prosecution for
A peace officer has the right of selfSelf-
Self-defense is not available to one who by prearranged duel,
10
or by consent, enters into a deadly mutual combat in which he slays his
11
adversary.
12
A person may use necessary force to protect himself where he is
13
assailed in his own house, or upon his own premises; where he has
14
reasonable ground to believe that a felony is about to be committed on
15
his person; where he is under a reasonable arehension of great bodily
16
harm; or where he is about to be subjected to an unlawful arrest,
17
unless he knows or should know that he is being arrested by a peace
18
officer.
19
Sec. 2287 Arehension of peril
20
The right of self-defense is based on the reasonable appearance
21
of imminent peril to the person attacked.
22
defendant was actually in fear of his life or of serious bodily injury
23
and that the conduct of the other party was such as to produce that
24
state of mind in a reasonable person.
25
there existed in the mind of the defendant a belief that he was in
26
actual peril.
27
sufficient grounds for his belief.
28
It requires a showing that
Thus, it is not enough that
It must also aear that, as a reasonable person, he had
The justification of homicide does not depend on the existence of
29
actual danger but on the appearance of danger.
30
necessary to show the existence of actual peril, for an aarent
31
situation of danger may also justify self-defense, if it is of such a
32
nature as might result in a similar mistake by a reasonable person.
33
person acting gin self-defense on aearances thus acts at his risk with
34
regard to the reasonable-person standard.
35
36
Thus, it is not
A
There can be no reasonable ground for arehending harm in the
absence of some overt act or physical demonstration.
Therefore, mere
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 332
1
threats on a previous occasion will not justify a deadly assault, when
2
the party assailed has made no demonstration of a hostile or equivocal
3
character.
4
defense by introducing evidence of a previous affray entirely
5
independent of and separate from the assault with which he is charged.
Nor can a person justify his acts on the ground of self-
Where there is a prima facie proof of facts tending to suort a
6
7
finding of reasonable cause to arehend death or great bodily harm, the
8
defendant is entitled to testify as to his own mental reaction, and is
9
error not to allow him to do so.
It is for he jury to determine
10
whether, as a reasonable person, the defendant was justified in
11
believing himself in danger.
12
Sec. 2288 Reasonable force
13
Generally, one who is assaulted may lawfully use only so much
14
force as is necessary to repel the attack and will be held responsible
15
for a marked excess.
16
prevent the injury.
17
force will itself constitute an assault and battery though the act
18
would have been lawful if excessive or improper force had not been
19
used.
20
21
22
The means employed to defend must be necessary to
If excessive or improper force is employed, such
Only such force as a reasonable person similarly situated should
deem necessary to insure his safety, is permissible.
In determining whether a defendant acted within the proper scope
23
of the right of self-defense, the finders of fact should keep in mind
24
the amount or extent of force that a reasonable person would employ
25
under similar circumstances.
26
lawful, the force on uses must be only such as appears reasonably
27
necessary, in view of the circumstances, to prevent the impending
28
injury.
29
For acts done in self-defense to remain
14. People v Conkling, 111 C 616, 44 P 314; People v Keys, 62
30
CA2d 903, 145 P2d 589; People v Prez, 12 CA3d 232, 90 Cal Rptr 521 (in
31
prosecuting for battery on a police officer engaged in the performance
32
of his duties, assuming the right of self-defense exists, it would be
33
subject to the same rules as in other cases).
34
31. People v Blackshear, 182 CA2d 71, 5 Cal Rptr 618
35
Where, from the nature of the attack, a person, as a reasonable
36
man, is justified in believing that his assailant intends to commit a
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 333
1
felony on him, he has the right in defense of his person to use all
2
force necessary to repel the assault.
3
26 Cal Rptr 502.
People v. Mercer, 210 CA2d 153,
4
Sec. 2289 Duty to retreat
5
Generally it is not a prerequisite to the successful assertion of
6
the defense of self-defense that the defendant "retreat to the wall."
7
A person confronted or attacked is not bound to retreat but is entitled
8
to stand and defend himself and act as a reasonable person under the
9
circumstances as they aear to him....
10
A defendant who is an aggressor
has no right to stand his ground but must retreat.
11
One who is attacked may pursue his assailant until he has secured
12
himself from danger, if that course appears to him, and would aear to a
13
reasonable person in the same situation, to be reasonably and aarently
14
necessary.
15
Sec. 2290 Termination of peril
16
As the right of self-defense is based on the appearance of
17
imminent peril to the person attacked, where the danger has passed and
18
the attacker has withdrawn, there can be no justification for the use
19
of further force.
20
aggressor of the original assailant, there is, of course, no further
21
need for self-defense by the former.
Where the originally assailed person becomes the
22
Sec. 2291 Effect of creation of danger by person claiming defense
23
Self-defense may not be claimed by a defendant who willfully and
24
without any necessity for his own protection creates a danger with
25
which he is thereupon threatened, or who invites a situation which
26
gives rise to the aarent necessity of self-defense.
27
that in effect states that the defendant must have been without fault
28
before he could resort to self-defense is too broad and therefore not
29
correct.
But an instruction
30
Sec. 2312 Idiocy
31
A DEFENSE FOR THE DA: The Penal Code provides that idiots are
32
incapable of committing a crime!
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 334
1
FORMER JEOPARDY
2
Sec. 2313 In general; Constitutional Guarantee
3
The California Constitution provides that no person may be twice
4
put in jeopardy for the same offense.
And the Fifth Amendment to the
5
general Constitution provides that no person may be subject for the
6
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.
7
provision alies to the states through the due process clause of the
8
Fourteenth Amendment.
9
jeopardy consists of three separate guarantees, protecting an accused
This latter
The constitutional prohibition of double
10
against a second criminal prosecution for the same offense after
11
acquittal, against a second preoccupation for the same offense after
12
conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same offense.
13
Jeopardy is thus a broader concept than the former conviction of
14
acquittal, and "once in jeopardy" in a general sense embraces also the
15
claim of former conviction or acquittal on trial for the same offense,
16
although the pleas for once in jeopardy and former conviction or
17
acquittal are not the same.
18
alication in a single criminal prosecution of a defendant who is tried
19
but once on several accounts.
20
The doctrine of double jeopardy has no
The right to not to be put a second time in jeopardy for the same
21
offense is as important, and to be as sacredly regarded, as the right
22
of trial by jury, or any other constitutional provision intended for
23
the protection of life, liberty, or property of a citizen.
24
based there on is favored by the courts, which are inclined to construe
25
the constitutional prohibition liberally in favor of the defendant.
26
A plea
Although the minimum federal standards of double jeopardy
27
protection for criminal DEFENDANTS are binding on state courts, a
28
higher level of double jeopardy protection may be delineated under the
29
California Constitution.
30
Sec. 2361 Res judicata distinguished
31
The doctrine of double jeopardy to a certain extent overlaps
32
with, but nevertheless is distinct from, the doctrine of res judicata,
33
which has an independent field of alication in criminal law.
34
speaking, res judicata is based on former final adjudication of the
35
merits of the same issue, whereas once in jeopardy is invoked on the
Generally
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 335
1
basis of a prior proceeding involving the same offense where that prior
2
proceeding reached a stage constituting "jeopardy" as defined by the
3
courts.
4
Where the offenses respectively involved in a former and in a
5
subsequent prosecution are not identical in terms of the doctrine of
6
once in jeopardy, res judicata may nevertheless have the effect that a
7
decision in the former prosecution denying the existence of an element
8
common to both offenses bars the subsequent prosecution.
9
doctrine of res judicata is legally different from the doctrine of once
But since the
10
in jeopardy, a defendant relying on res judicata should separately
11
raise this point by proper and timely objection to the introduction of
12
evidence inconsistent therewith.a
13
14
15
EFFECT OF SETTING ASIDE OR REVERSING
CONVICTION AT DEFENDANT'S REQUEST
The plea of once in jeopardy does not lie against a retrial of
16
the accused following the setting aside or reversal of his conviction
17
in consequence of his motion or appeal (Sec. 2336).
18
determination on appeal that the evidence was insufficient as a matter
19
of law to suort the conviction bars a retrial on the grounds of former
20
jeopardy (Sec. 2337).
21
lesser included offense, he cannot be retried on the originally charged
22
greater offense (Sec. 2338)
However, a
Where on obtains a reversal of a conviction of a
23
Sec. 2336 In General
24
The plea of once in jeopardy does not lie against a retrial of
25
the accused following the setting aside or reversal of his conviction
26
in consequence of his motion or aeal.
27
having his conviction set aside thereby impliedly waves any objection
28
to being retired on the charge of which he was convicted.
29
axiomatic that when he successfully attacks a judgment of conviction he
30
subjects himself to a retrial which may reach the same result.
31
jeopardy as to an offense of which a defendant has been convicted
32
continues during appellate proceedings and retrial following reversal
33
of the judgment, but ends as to the offenses of which he has been
34
expressly or impliedly acquitted.
35
A defendant who succeeds in
It is
Thus,
Likewise, where the original sentence is set aside on appeal at
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 336
1
defendant's behest it cannot be successfully pleaded as constituting
2
former jeopardy former jeopardy and there is no denial of due process
3
in ordering a new trial on the single issue of the penalty to be
4
imposed.
5
in punishment after appeal and retrial.
6
However, the prosecution of double jeopardy bars and increase
Whenever a verdict, whether valid in form or not, is rendered on
7
an accusation, either good or bad, and the defendant for any cause
8
moves in arrest of judgment, or alies to the court to vacate a judgment
9
already entered, he is presumed to wave thereby any objection to being
10
placed a second time in jeopardy, though in attacking his conviction he
11
does not ask for a new trial.
12
been entered, and from the evidence on the trial there is reason to
13
believe the defendant guilty of the offense originally charged, or of
14
another offense, the verdict is not a bar to another prosecution.
15
if no evidence appears sufficient to charge him with any offense, the
16
arrest of judgment operates as an acquittal of the charge on which the
17
indictment or information was founded.
18
Where an order arresting judgment has
But
The granting of a new trial places the parties in the same
19
position as if no trial had been had, and the former verdict or finding
20
cannot be pleaded in bar of any conviction which might have been had
21
under the accusatory pleading.
22
Sec. 2337 On Grounds of insufficiency of evidence
23
A determination on appeal of a criminal conviction that the
24
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to suort the conviction
25
bars a retrial under the federal double jeopardy clause.
26
determination of insufficient evidence is tantamount to a finding that
27
the trial court should have directed a verdict of acquittal, which bars
28
a retrial.
29
on aeal.
30
conviction is whether from the evidence, including reasonable
31
inferences to be drawn there from, there is any substantial evidence of
32
the existence of each element of the offense charged.
An appellate
A new trial is also improper after the equivalent decision
The test to be alied by an appellate court is reviewing a
33
However, the foregoing rule only bars a retrial when the state
34
has failed as a matter of law to prove its case and not when a trial
35
judge independently weighs the evidence rather than alying the
36
substantial evidence rule and determining legal sufficiency.
In
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 337
1
California, in considering a motion for a new trial on the ground that
2
the verdict is contrary to the evidence, the trial court is not bound
3
by the jury's decision as to conflicts in the evidence or inference to
4
be drawn there from.
5
benefit of its independent conclusion as to the sufficiency of credible
6
evidence to suort the verdict.
7
under this motion, the decision is not an acquittal and is not a bar to
8
retrial for the offense of which the aellant has been convicted.
9
10
It is under a duty to give the defendant the
If the trial court grants a new trial
Sec. 2338 Lesser Included Offense: Crime of Lesser Degree
Inasmuch as a conviction of the lesser and included offense
11
amounts in law to an acquittal of the higher offense originally
12
charged, if one charged with a certain offense is convicted only of a
13
lesser offense necessarily included therein, he cannot, on obtaining a
14
reversal of that conviction, be retried on the original charge.
15
Therefore, where a defendant has procured reversal of a manslaughter
16
conviction, he cannot, on the resulting retrial, be convicted of
17
murder.
18
mistakenly views as a necessarily included offense, an attack on the
19
validity of the conviction of the lesser offense does not undermine the
20
adjudication that defendant was not guilty of the greater offense.
21
error affecting the expressed verdict of guilty does not affect the
22
conclusiveness of the implied verdict of acquittal.
23
Where a trier of fact convicts a defendant of what it
The double jeopardy clause precluded convicting a defendant of a
24
higher degree of crime after he has secured the reversal of his
25
conviction of the lower degree of the offense.
26
Any
A defendant who appeals from an erroneous judgment convicting him
27
of first degree murder and sentencing him to life imprisonment and
28
obtains a reversal and a retrial may not, after again being convicted
29
of first degree murder, be sentenced to death; the double jeopardy
30
provisions of the state and federal Constitutions aly to forbid a
31
greater punishment for the same crime.
32
Sec. 2339 In general: availability of extraordinary remedies for Jeopardy:
33
No need to wait for appeal - go straight to Habeas or mandamus. -
34
requires specific form Sec 2340, burden of proof on defendant;
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 338
JURISDICTION
1
2
GENERALLY
3
Sec. 2425: In General
4
... Since the court derives it's jurisdiction from the law, its
5
jurisdiction extends only to such matters as the law declares criminal,
6
and when it undertakes an imprisonment for an offense to which no
7
crimiminality is attached, it acts beyond its jurisdiction.
ARREST AND DETERMINATION
8
GENERALLY
9
An arrest is the taking of a person into custody in a case and in
10
11
the manner authorized by law (Sec. 2454).
Both the federal and state
12
Constitutions provide that the right of the people to be secure in
13
their persons against unreasonable seizures may not be violated, and
14
that a warrant may not issue except on probable cause, suorted by oath
15
or affirmation, particularly describing the persons to be seized (Sec.
16
2455).
17
circumstances specified by statute (Sec. 2456)
18
private persons, and public officers and employees under certain
19
circumstances, are authorized to make arrests (Sec. 2457)
Certain persons are exempted from arrest under the
Peace officers, and
20
Sec. 2455
21
Both the federal and state Constitutions provide that the right
22
of the People to be secure in their persons against unreasonable
23
seizures may not be violated, and that a warrant may not issue except
24
on probable cause, suorted by oath or affirmation, particularly
25
describing the persons to be seized.
26
United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the
27
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the police from making a warrantless
28
and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a
29
routine felony arrest.
30
to an arrest warrant setting forth the commission of a specific crime,
31
or without a warrant under the circumstances prescribed by the Penal
32
Code; an arrest cannot be made merely for the investigation of a crime.
33
However, it is not "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment for a
34
police officer, as a matter of routine, to monitor the movements of an
The Fourth Amendment to the
To be lawful, an arrest must be made pursuant
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 339
1
arrested person as his judgment dictates following an arrest, and such
2
surveillance is not an impermissible invasion of the privacy or
3
personal liberty of an individual who has been arrested.
4
An arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries
5
with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect
6
lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.
7
other hand, an arrest without a warrant within the home is per se
8
unreasonable in the absence of probable cause and exigent
9
circumstances.
On the
The term "exigent circumstances" means an emergency
10
situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or
11
serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a
12
suspect or destruction of evidence.
13
extraordinary situation must be measured by the facts known to the law
14
enforcement officers involved.
15
emergency conditions justifying warrantless arrests, including hot
16
pursuit of a fleeing felon, destruction of evidence, and ongoing fire.
17
Alication of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a
18
home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to
19
believe that only a minor offence has been committed.
20
warrantless arrest in the home may be valid despite the absence of
21
exigent circumstances, if police presence in the home is consensual.
22
23
24
In each case, the claim of an
The courts have recognized only a few
However, a
Forms: Jury instruction as to warantles arrest in home, 3
California Criminal Forms & Instructions Sec. 44:7.
Forms: Jury instruction defining "exigent circumstances"
25
authorizing lawful warrantless arrest in the home, 3 California
26
Criminal Forms & Instructions Sec. 44:8
27
"The "hot pursuit" exception to the warrant requirement alies in
28
situations where the delay occasioned by obtaining a warrant would
29
permit the escape of a suspect in a "grave offense" who remains
30
"dangerous to life and limb."
31
no imminent danger if allowed to temporarily remain at large."
32
v Keltie (1983, 2d Dist) 148 CA3d 773, 196 Cal Rptr 243
It does not aly where the suspect poses
People
33
Sec. 2458 In general; issuance form, and validity or warrant
34
...In order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's requirement of
35
probable cause, the complaint underlying the arrest warrant must be
36
verified and must recite competent facts that lead a person of ordinary
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 340
1
caution and prudence conscientiously to entertain a strong suspicion of
2
the accused's guilt.
3
couched in the statutory language of the alleged offence may suort a
4
valid arrest warrant if the complaint alleges sufficient facts for the
5
magistrate to conclude that probable cause suorts the warrant in that
6
the allegations indicate: (1) the commission of the crime by the person
7
whose arrest is sought; and (2) the reliability of the information and
8
credibility of its source; absent such allegation, the warrant fails
9
and an arrest made pursuant to it is illegal.
A complaint based on "information and belief" and
10
The forms of warrants are set out by statute.
11
... When a defendant challenges the validity of an arrest
12
13
warrant, the burden is on the prosecution to establish its legality.
ARREST WITH A WARRANT
14
Sec 2458 In General; issuance, form and validity of warrant
15
...
16
In order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's requirement of
17
probable cause, the complaint underlying the arrest warrant must be
18
verified and must recite competent facts that lead to a person of
19
ordinary caution and prudence conscientiously to entertain a strong
20
suspicion of the accused's guilt.
21
and belief" and couched in the statutory language of the alleged
22
offence may suort a valid arrest warrant if the complaint alleges
23
sufficient facts for the magistrate to conclude that probable cause
24
suorts the warrant in that the allegations indicate: (1) the commission
25
of the crime by the person whose arrest is sought; and (2) the
26
reliability of the information and credibility of its source; absent
27
such allegations, the warrant fails and an arrest made pursuant to it
28
is illegal.
29
A complaint based on "information
The forms of warrants are set out by statute...... The warrant
30
must also state the time of issuance of the city or county where it is
31
issued, and must be signed by the issuing magistrate, judge, or
32
justice, or other authority issuing it, the title of his office and the
33
name of the court or other issuing agency. The affixing of a seal is
34
not required.
35
bailable, the magistrate is required to indorse on the warrant a
At the time the warrant is issued, if the offense is
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 341
1
statement of the sum in which the defendant is to be admitted to bail.
2
(A judge or justice court who is not a member of the State Bar must
3
also obtain the concurrence of the district attorney of the county in
4
which he sits or the state attorney general. Sec 2458)
5
A warrant for arrest can be upset only if the affidavit fails as
6
a matter of law to set forth sufficient competent evidence suortive of
7
the magistrate's finding of probable cause.
8
defendant to attack a facially sufficient search warrant affidavit on
9
the grounds that it contains misstatements of omissions is equally
The case law permitting a
10
applicable to arrest warrant affidavits.
11
negligently made, the trial court must excise the negligent
12
misstatements, and test the remainder for probable cause.
13
misstatement was negligent, made with a reckless disregard for the
14
truth, or intentional is a question of fact for the trial judge, and if
15
there is substantial evidence to suort his conclusion, a reviewing
16
court is bound by his decision.
17
18
19
If misstatements are
Whether a
.. When a defendant challenges the validity of an arrest warrant,
the burden is on the prosecution to establish its legality.
Every person who maliciously and without probable cause procures
20
a warrant of arrest to be issued and executed is guilty of a
21
misdemeanor.
22
Sec. 2460. Duty of officer to execute; liability for execution
23
When a warrant valid in form and issued by a magistrate of
24
competent jurisdiction is placed in the hands of an officer for
25
execution, it is his duty to carry out its commands without delay.
26
fact, disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, or process of a court
27
of justice is a contempt of the authority of the court; and failure to
28
serve a duly issued warrant is dispedience of a lawful order of the
29
court, and a contempt thereof, for which the disobeying officer may be
30
punished.
In
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 342
1
2
Sec. 2461 Bench Warrant.
ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT.
3
Sec. 2462 In general; by peace officers
4
A person authorized to act as a peace officer may arrest without
5
a warrant: (1) whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the
6
person to be arrested has committed a public offense in his presence;
7
(2) when the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in
8
his presence; or (3) whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that
9
the person to be arrested has committed a felony, whether to not a
10
felony has in fact been committed.
11
..
12
Whether an offense has been committed in an officer's presence is
13
determined by whether he, as a witness, can testify from actual
14
knowledge to every element of the offense.
15
The written order of any member of the Board of Person Terms, or
16
of each county board of parole commissioners, is a sufficient warrant
17
for any peace or prison officer to return to actual custody any
18
conditionally released or paroled prisoner...
19
Sec. 2463 By public officer or employee
20
...may arrest without a warrant whenever he has reasonable cause
21
to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a misdemeanor
22
in his presence which is a violation of a statute or ordinance which
23
such officer or employee has the duty to enforce.
24
arrested does not demand to be taken before a magistrate, the public
25
officer or employee making the arrest must prepare a written notice to
26
aear and release the person on his promise to aear, as prescribed by
27
designated statutory provisions.
28
80. Deering's Pen C Sec 836(2).
29
A police officer may not arrest an
Where the person so
individual without a warrant
30
for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence. Miller v Glass (1955)
31
44 C2d 359, 282 P2d 501.
32
81. Deering's Pen C Sec 836(3).
33
An arrest upon suspicion or upon information of other that an
34
offense has been committed is wholly unauthorized.
Re Alication of
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 343
1
Milstead (1919) 44 CA 239, 186 P 170; Boyes v Evans (1936) 14 CA2d 472,
2
58 P2d 922; Hanna v Raphael Weill & Co. (1949) 90 CA2d 461, 203 P2d
3
564.
4
Sec. 2464 By private person; indemnification
5
A private person may make an arrest: (1) for a public offense
6
committed or attempted in his presence[5]; (2) when the person arrested
7
has committed a felony, although not in his presence [6]; or (3) when
8
he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested has committed
9
a felony and a felony has in fact been committed [7].
COERC : A citizen may arrest any person they believe has
10
11
committed a felony; they can arrest anyone who commits a misdemeanor in
12
their presence.
13
[5]. Deering's Pen C Sec. 837(1)
14
The term "in his presence," as used in Pen C Sec. 837(1), is
15
liberally construed to mean not merely physical proximity but whether
16
the crime is aarent to the person's senses, including those of hearing
17
and smell.
People v Burgess (1959,2d Dist) 170 CA2d 36, 338 P2d 525
A private person may arrest for a misdemeanor if it is committed
18
19
or attempted in his presence, and the arrest is a valid one and
20
continues even though he transfers custody of the accused to a peace
21
officer.
Re K. (1978, 2d Dist) 82 CA3d 295, 147 Cal Rptr 96.
IN an arrest effected by a private citizen pursuant to Pen C Sec.
22
23
837(1), where the validity of the arrest turns on whether the
24
arrestee's conduct constituted a public offence, the these to be alied
25
must be one of whether the person making the arrest had a reasonable
26
good faith belief that it did.
27
392, 169 Cal Rptr 350.
Gomez v Garcia (1980, 2d Dist) 112 CA3d
A citizen in whose presence a misdemeanor has been attempted or
28
29
committed may effect a citizen's arrest, pursuant to Pen C Sec. 837(1),
30
and in so doing may both summon the police to his aid (Pen C 839)), and
31
delegate to the police the physical act of taking the offender into
32
custody.
33
687.
People v Johnson (1981, 1st Dist) 123 CA3d, 495, 176 Cal Rptr
34
[7]. Deering's Pen C Sec. 837(1)
35
It is for the best interests of society that those who offended
36
against the laws shall be promptly punished, and that any citizen who
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 344
1
has good reason to believe that the law has been violated shall have
2
the right to cause the arrest of the offender.
3
(1981) 30 C3d 244, 178 Cal Rptr 618, 636 P2d 582.
4
Barela v Superior Court
For a valid arrest by a private citizen under Pen C Sec. 837(1),
5
the requirement that there in fact be a felony committed can only be
6
met if there is evidence of the corpus delicti and it is an offense
7
known by the arresting party to have been committed. People v Aldapa
8
(1971, 2d Dist) 17 CA3d 184, 94 Cal Rptr 579 (city police officers
9
acting beyond the limits of the geographic area under their authority,
10
and thus having only that power to arrest conferred upon a private
11
citizen in the same circumstances, were not authorized, under Pen C
12
Sec. 837(3) to arrest defendant for possession of heroin for sale,
13
where the only evidence offered to show possession of heroin was heroin
14
found after defendant had been arrested; since there was no evidence,
15
prior to the arrest, of a corpus delicti of the crime charged, the
16
arrest based upon that of a "private citizen" was required to be
17
declared invalid).
18
19
REASONABLE OR PROBABLE CAUSE
Sec 2467 In general
20
21
The test of reasonable or probable cause for an arrest is not
22
whether the evidence on which the arrest was made is sufficient to
23
convict but only whether the prisoner should stand trial. In other
24
words, the validity of an arrest does not depend on whether defendant
25
may in fact be found guilty or the offense for which he is arrested.
26
An arrest and search based on events as consistent with innocent
27
activity as with criminal activity is unlawful ((Remers v Superior
28
Court of Alameda County (1970) 2 C3d 659, 87 Cal Rptr 202, 470 P2d 11))
29
"Probable", as used in the expression "probable cause," means
30
having more evidence for than against; suorted by evidence that
31
inclines the mind to believe but leaves some room for doubt.
32
Guy (1956, 2d Dist) 145 CA2d 481, 302 P2d 657; People v Rixner (1958,
33
2d Dist) 157 CA2d 387, 321 P2d; People v Carnes (1959, 2d Dist) 173
34
CA2d 559, 343 P2d 626.
35
People v
Suspicion, even though reasonable, does not constitute probable
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 345
1
cause to make an arrest.
2
85 Cal Rptr 683.
3
People v McLean (1970, 2d Dist) 6 CA3d 300,
As with any intrusion upon an individual's personal security,
4
simple good faith on part of the arresting officer is not enough and,
5
in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able
6
to point to specific and articuable facts which, taken together with
7
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant his suspicion.
8
Cunha v Superior Court or Alameda County (1970) 2 C3d 352, 85 Cal Rptr
9
160, 466 P2d 704 (not followed People v Handy (2d Dist) 16 CA3d 858, 94
10
Cal Rptr 387) as stated in Santos v Superior Court (1st Dist) 154 CA3d
11
1178, 202 Cal Rprtr 6; People v Martin (1973) 9 C3d 687, 108 Cal Rptr
12
809, 511 P2d 1161, cert den 414 US 1113, 38 L Ed 2d 740, 94 S Ct 844.
13
Forms: Jury instructions defining reasonable cause to arrest, 3
14
15
16
California Criminal Forms & Instructions Sec 44:5
Forms: Jury instructions as to burden of establishing lawfulness
of arrest, 3 California Criminal Forms & Instructions Sec 44:9.
17
Sec. 2468 Questions of law and fact; review
18
what constitutes reasonable grounds for arrest without a warrant
19
is always a question of fact: People v White (1958, 2d Dist) 159 CA2d
20
586, 324 P2d; People v Scott (1959, 1st Dist) 170 CA2d 446, 339 P2d
21
162, cert den 361 US 937; People v Miller (1959, 2d Dist) 176 CA2d 571,
22
1 Cal Rptr 656
23
An appellate court is not bound by the trial judge's
24
determination as to the existence of probable cause.
25
(1922) 188 C 199, 205P 113.
Michel v Smith
26
In passing on the question of probable cause to make an arrest
27
without a warrant, the court reviews, as it were, the sufficiency of
28
the evidence on which the arresting officer acted in making the arrest.
29
People v Clark (1973, 4th Dist) 30 CA3d 549, 106 Cal Rptr 147, cert den
30
414 US 852, 38 L Ed 2d 101, 94 S Ct 146.
31
Sec. 2477 information from informers
32
...
33
As a general rule, absent some circumstances that would cast
34
doubt on their information, private citizens who are witnesses to or
35
victims of a criminal act should be considered reliable informants,
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 346
1
provided they have furnished underlying facts sufficiently detailed to
2
cause a reasonable person to believe that a crime had been committed
3
and the named suspect was the perpetrator, and that the police are
4
aware of the identity of the person providing the information and of
5
his status as a true citizen informant.
6
also includes a person whose information has in the past led to the
7
police to valid suspects.
8
admitting crimes or declarations against interest tend to show
9
reliability.
10
Moreover, statements of an informant
It has been stated that such statements contain "an
internal guarantee of reliability."
Where there is no evidence to show reliability of an informant,
11
12
The term "reliable informant"
his information does not constitute probable cause for arrest.
IN FACT: It was know to the Sheriffs that DEFENDANTS wife, the
13
14
Sheriffs "informant", had made previous false police calls on July 9,
15
2002 for which she was ordered out of the family home, and other false
16
calls and that the DEFENDANTS wife had stolen the DEFENDANTS million
17
dollar life insurance policy.
18
informant, the Defendant's wife who was in the process of a divorce and
19
custody battle with the Defendant, was of UNCLEAN HANDS and had every
20
incentive to provide FALSE information and was by EVERY DEFINITION OF
21
THE LAW AN UNRELIABLE INFORMANT.
22
ORDER IN THE SHERIFFS POSESSION PROVED THAT THE INFORMANT WAS LYING:
23
Mother shall have custody form the children from 3:00 pm to 6:00 pm.
24
"evidence justifying the conclusion that reliance on the information
25
was reasonable must be presented to the court."
26
65 C2d 830, 56 Cal Rptr 492, 423 P2d 564.
The BLATANT FACT that the sheriffs
And the very FACTS in the CUSTODY
People v Talley (1967)
Whether an informant was reliable and whether a police officer
27
28
relied on the information received must be determined by the trial
29
court acting with sound discretion (Lorenzen v Superior Court of San
30
Francisco (1957, 1st Dist) 150 CA2d 506, 310 P2d 180; People v Dean
31
(1957, 2d Dist) 151 CA2d 165, 311 P2d 85).
32
credibility of the officer and the soundness of his reasons for relying
33
on his informant (People v Dean (1957, 2d Dist) 151 CA2d 165, 311 P2d
34
85).
The only issue is the
35
36
While it may be perfectly reasonable for law enforcement officers
37
in the field to break into homes and make arrests on the basis of
38
information furnished to them by other officers, when it comes to
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 347
1
justifying the total police activity in a court, the People must prove
2
that the source of the information is something other than the
3
imagination of an officer who does not become a witness.
4
Adkins (1969, 2d Dist) 272 CA2d 196, 78 Cal Rptr 397.
People v
The question of probable cause to justify an arrest without a
5
6
warrant must be tested by the facts which the record shows were known
7
to the arresting officers at the time the arrest was made. People v
8
Pompei (1968, 1st Dist) 267 CA2d 581, 73 Cal Rptr 163.
9
The statement of a narcotics trafficker in custody cannot from
10
the basis for an arrest, because his obvious motive is to ingratiate
11
himself with the police for purely selfish reasons.
12
Court of Santa Barbara County (1970, 2d Dist) 13 CA3d 206, 91 Cal Rptr
13
477.
14
Ming v Superior
The report of a confessed thief who informs after he is in
15
custody is not alone sufficient to constitute reasonable cause for
16
arrest.
17
272 CA 2d 548, 77 Cal Rptr 565
18
Pollock v Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1969, 2d Dist)
A motorist's failure to have or produce the registration card for
19
his vehicle, without more, cannot reasonably give rise to the belief
20
that the vehicle is stolen, nor can the failure of the motorist to have
21
his driver's license in his immediate possession reasonably transform
22
the coincident lack of a registration card into grounds to believe the
23
motorist guilty of grand theft.
24
are necessary to justify the making of an arrest without a warrant for
25
automobile theft.
26
7 C3d 186, 101 Cal Rptr 837, 496 P2d 1205.
27
Assitional suspicious circumstances
People v Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1972)
The general rule that when an officer furnished another officer
28
with information that leads to an arrest, the People must show the
29
basis for the former officer's information, does not aly where the
30
information relates specific and articulable facts observed by the
31
informing officer, is not hearsay based on hearsay, and is not a
32
conclusionary statement based on unknown sources.
33
(1971, 4th Dist) 16 CA3d 481, 94 Cal Rptr 94.
34
People v Poehner
People v Hogan (1969) 71 C2d 888, 80 Cal Rptr 28, 457 P2d 868
35
(Information provided by an untested or anonymous informer is not,
36
without some showing justifying reliance, sufficient to justify an
37
arrest); Lewis v Superior Court of San Francisco (1964, 1st Dist) 226
38
CA2d 102, 37 Cal Rptr 773 (fact that alleged information was relayed by
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 348
1
one officer to another adds no element of reliability to original
2
informant).
The mere fact that suspect walked rapidly away from arresting
3
4
officers on becoming aware of their presence did not authorize his
5
arrest.
6
712.
7
People v Zabala (1963, 5th Dist) 217 CA2d 550, 31 Cal Rptr
Mere flight at the aroach of a police officer is not, itself,
8
ground for arrest, but an officer is justified in investigation to
9
discover the reason for the flight.
10
Dist) 245 CA2d 561, 54 Cal Rptr 60.
People v Villalobos (1966, 2d
MANNER OF MAKING ARREST
11
12
Generally Sec. 2479-2482
13
The procedure to be observed in making arrests is prescribed by
14
statute.
An arrest for a felony may be made on any day and at any time
15
of the day or night.
16
nighttime only in the manner and under the circumstances specified by
17
statute: not between the hours of 10:00 pm and 6:00 am unless: (1) the
18
arrest is made without a warrant, pursuant to specified Penal Code
19
provisions; (2) the arrest is made ina public place; (3) the arrest is
20
made when the person is in custody pursuant to another lawful arrest;
21
or (4) the arrest is made pursuant to a warrant which, for good case
22
show, directs that it may be served at any time of the day or night.
But an arrest for a misdemeanor may be made as
23
Sec. 2481 Notice of authority
24
The person making the arrest must inform the person to be
25
arrested of the intention to arrest him, the cause of his arrest, and
26
the authority to make it.
27
The person making the arrest must also, on request of the
28
arrestee, inform the arrestee of the offense for which he is being
29
arrested.
30
SEE Assault and Other Willful Torts Sec. 62 for the civil
31
liability of an arresting officer for failure to declare authority to
32
arrest.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 349
1
USE OF FORCE
2
..
3
The Penal Code provides generally that the person arresting may
4
be subjected to such restraint as is reasonable for his arrest and
5
detention [47].
6
7
Whether the force employed is reasonably necessary is for the
determination of the jury [51].
8
[47] Deering's Pen C Sec 835
9
An instruction is proper, where it is alicable, to the effect
10
that whoever makes a lawful arrest for a felony, officer of or citizen,
11
must use as little violence as possible, although, if resisted, he may
12
use sufficient force to effect his purpose, even to the extent of
13
taking life.
14
15
16
[51]
People v Brooks (1901 131 C 311, 63 P 464.
People v Adams (1890) 85 C 231, 24 P 629; Peole v Burres
(1980, 1st Dist) 101 CA3d 341, 161 Cal Rptr 593.
Annotations: Police action in connection with arrest as violation
17
of Civil Rights Act, 42 USC Sec 1983, 1 ALR Fed 519; When does police
18
officer's use of force during arrest become so excessive as to
19
constitute violation of constitutional rights, imposing liability under
20
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS Sec 1983), 60 ALR Fed 204.
21
Law Reviews: Permissible force, 39 CLR 96, 110; Problem of police
22
brutality, 10 Santa Clara LR 168; Justification for use of force in
23
criminal law, 13 Stan LR 566; "Reasonable" and "necessary" restraint,
24
32 St BJ 607; Police officers and the use of deadly force - the
25
continuing saga, 5 West St. U LR 301.
26
Froms: Complaint against peace officer alleging unjustified
27
assault and battery during arrest, 22 Am Jur P1 & Pr Forms (Rev),
28
Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, Forms 132, 133
29
Practice References: 9 POF 2d p. 435, Police Officer's Use of
30
Excessive Force in Making Arrest (proof that police officer, in making
31
an arrest for a misdemeanor and later a felony, used excessive force).
32
Sec. 2484 Self-defense
33
to justify the peace officer in taking the life of the purported
34
offender to save or preserve his own, there must be a real or aarent
35
necessity for the resort to such an extreme measure [56].
36
[56] People v Newsome (1921) 51 CA 42, 195 P 938.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 350
1
Sec. 2485 in arrest for misdemeanor
2
A peace officer has the right to use only such force as is
3
necessary to arrest a misdemeanment [57].
He may be held civilly [58]
4
or criminally [59] liable for using excessive force.
5
defense, a peace officer making an arrest for a misdemeanor [61], or
6
preventing the escape of an arrested misdemeanant, has no right
7
intentionally to shoot or kill the offender.
Except in self-
8
[57]
9
As to liability of public officer for assault and battery under
10
Towle v Matheus (1900) 130 C 574, 62 P 1064
Tort Claims Act, see GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY Sec 46
Annotations; Peace officer's civil liability for death or
11
12
personal injuries caused by intentional force in arresting
13
misdemeanment, 83 ALR3d 238.
14
[59]
15
Law Reviews: Watson and Ramey: the balance of interests in
16
People v Wilson (1918) 36 CA 589, 172 P 1116
nonexigent felony arrests, 13 San Diego LR 838.
17
Sec. 2486 In arrest for felony
18
A police officer is held to the same standard as a private
19
citizen in using deadly force to arrest a felony suspect [65].
hence,
20
deadly force may not be used against a fleeing suspect unless the
21
felony is of the sort that threatens death or serious bodily harm, of
22
there are other circumstances which reasonably create a fear of death
23
or serous bodily harm to the officer or to another [66].
.. statutes which on their face authorize the use of deadly force
24
25
by a police officer or a private citizen in attempting to arrest a
26
fleeing felon have been construed to aly only where the felony
27
committed is one which threatens death or great bodily harm [69].
[65 & 66] Kortum v Alkire (1977, 1st Dist) 69 CA3d 325 Cal Rptr
28
29
26.
[69] Peole v Pirorkowski (1974, 2d Dist) 41 CA3d 324, 115 Cal
30
31
Rptr 830; Peple v Quesada (1980, 1st Dist) 113 CA3d 533, 169 Cal Rptr
32
881.
33
Although Pen C Sec 196(3), 197(1), 197(2), 197(4), 835a, 837, on
34
their face authorize the use of deadly force by a police officer or a
35
private citizen in resisting an attempt to commit, or in arresting the
36
perpetrator of a nonviolent felony and do not distinguish between
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 351
1
violent and nonviolent felonies, such statutes are to be construed to
2
prohibit the use of deadly force by anyone, including a polilce
3
officer, against a fleeing felony suspect unless the felony is of a
4
violent variety.
5
Rptr 26.
Kortum v Alkire (1977, 1st Dist) 69 CA3d 325, 138 Cal
6
Sec. 2487 In entering a dwelling
7
Law Review: Probable cause for entry, 56 CLR 1680; Knock and
8
9
10
demand policy, 2 UCLA LR 132
"knock and notice" requirements
People v Hirsch (1977, 2d Dist) 71 CA3d 987, 140 Cal Rptr 13:
11
Police officer did not give defendant and the occupants of his
12
apartment sufficient time to admit them before they kicked in the door
13
and entered, and thus they did not comply with the knock and demand
14
requirements of Pen C Sec. 844
15
CFB RESEARCH Pen C Sec 844
16
Must comply with 884 Peple v DeSantiago (1969)... see section for
17
18
more info
RESISTANCE TO ARREST
19
Sec 2488 In general; unlawful arrest
20
...
21
The arrest of one who is exempt is not void, but only voidable,
22
and the exempt person has no legal right to offer physical violence or
23
resistance to the arresting officer.
24
Although cases have held that reasonable resistance to an
25
unlawful arrest may rightfully be made either by the person sought to
26
be arrested of by third persons acting in his aid[17], the legislature
27
has changed this rule by providing that ir a person has knowledge, or,
28
by the exercise of reasonable care, should have knowledge, that he is
29
being arrested by a peace officer, it is the duty of such a person to
30
refrain from using force or any weapon to resist such arrest [18].
31
so providing, the legislature intended to do away with the form rule
32
that a person could resist an unlawful arrest [19].
33
been held that unlawful detention by a police officer does not justify
34
unlawful resistance thereto [20], although there is a contrary
By
It has similarly
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 352
1
authority on this point [21].
However, a distinction has been made
2
between a technically unlawful arrest and an arrest accomplished with
3
excessive force.
4
to defend life and limb against excessive force by the arresting
5
officer [22].
6
refrain from using force or a weapon to resist arrest [23] is not
7
applicable to a charge under the Penal Code provision relating to
8
resisting officers in the discharge of their duties [24], and that a
9
person who uses reasonable force to protect himself or others against
10
the use of unreasonable excessive force in making an arrest cannot be
11
convicted under the latter statute because the arresting officer is not
12
"in the discharge of is duty"[25].
13
be that if a private person attempts to make an unauthorized arrest,
14
the party sought to be arrested may resist [26].
In the latter case, a person may use reasonable force
It has also been held that the duty of a person to
Moreover, the rule still seems to
15
16
[17]
People v Craig (1907) 152 C 42, 91 P 997; People v Perry
17
(1947) 79 SA2d Su 906, 180 P2d 465; Jackson v Superior Court of Merced
18
County (1950) 98 CA2d 183, 219 P2d 879; People v Spinosa (1953) 115
19
CA2d 659, 252 P2d 409.
20
[18]
Deering's Pen C Sec 834a
21
While an arrest is a "seizure," and an arrest without warrant or
22
probable cause is "unreasonable' within the purview of the Forth
23
Amendment, the state in removing the right to resist arrest does not
24
deny due process, contribute to, or effectuate a deprivation of an
25
arrestee's constitutional rights, or alter or diminish the remedies
26
available against the illegality of an arrest without probable cause,
27
but merely requires a person to submit peacefully to the inevitable and
28
pursue his available remedies through the ordinary judicial process.
29
People v Curtis (1969) 70 C2d 347, 74 Cal Rptr 713, 450 P2d 33.
30
Under Pen C Sec 834a, a citizen subjected to an attempted arrest
31
by a known police officer must submit quietly.
32
Dist) 247 CA2d 487, 55 Cal Rptr 681.
33
[19]
People v Baca (1966, 2d
People v Coffey (1967) 67 C2d 204, 60 Cal Rptr 457, 430 P2d
34
15 (not followed on another point, People v Escarcega (1st Dist) 43
35
CA3d 391, 117 Cal Rptr 595) (the legislative intent behind the
36
enactment of Pen C Sec. 834a was to withdraw the former privilege of
37
resistance to an unlawful arrest, and, limiting the effect of the
38
statute to cases of actual arrest as oosed to detention for
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 353
1
questioning, to remove disputes as to their legality from the streets
2
to the courtroom).
Pen Code Sec 834a, prohibits forcible resistance to unlawful as
3
4
well as lawful arrests.
People v Curtis (1969) 70 C2d 347, 74 Cal Rptr
5
713, 450 P2d 33; People v Soto (1969, 5th Dist) 276 CA2d 81, 80 Cal
6
Rptr 627.
7
Pen C Sec. 243 makes felonious an assault on a peace officer who
8
is actually engaged in the performance of his duties; however, since a
9
peace officer is under no duty to make an unlawful arrest, an assault
10
on a peace officer by a person who is resisting an unlawful arrest is
11
not a felony under Pen C Sec 243, but may be a misdemeanor under Pen C
12
834a, which prohibits forcible resistance to unlawful as well as to
13
lawful arrests.
14
Rptr 916.
Annotations: Modern status of rules as to right to forcefully
15
16
People v Cuevas (1971, 5th Dist) 16 CA3d 245, 93 Cal
resist illegal arrest, 44 ALR3d 1078.
[20]
17
People v Newton (1970, 1st Dist) 8 CA3d 359, 87 Cal Rptr
18
394 (disagreement with on other grounds Peple v Morall (4th Dist) 144
19
CA3d 406, 192 Cal Rptr 601, op withdrawn by order of ct).
20
As to detention generally, see Sec 2491
21
[21]
An officer engaged in unlawful detention for questioning
22
may be resisted by means of reasonable force.
23
Dist) 8 CA3d 710, 87 Cal Rptr 625.
Forms: Jury instruction as to resistance to detention, 3
24
25
People v Jones (1970, 2d
California Criminal Forms & Instructions Sec 44:12
26
[22] People v Curtis (1969) 70 C2d 347, 74 Cal Rptr 713, 450 P2d
27
33 (in a persecution for battery on an arresting officer, the question
28
of the exercise of reasonable force and the right to self-defense,
29
distinct from that of the lawfulness of the arrest, is for the trier of
30
fact to determine).
Use of excessive force by a peace officer is a defense to an
31
32
alleged violation of Pen C Sec. 245(b) (assault by means of force
33
likely to produce great bodily injury upon the person of a peace
34
officer), since it takes the peace officer outside the scope of his
35
duties.
36
593.
37
38
People v Burres (1980, 1st Dist) 101 CA3d 341, 161 Cal Rptr
Forms Jury instructions as to what constitutes excessive force in
making an arrest, 3 California Criminal Forms & Instructions Section
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 354
1
44:6; Answer to charge of assault and battery , alleging that force
2
used by defendant was necessary for self-protection during attempt by
3
plaintiff to commit unlawful arrest, 2 Am Jru P1 & Pr Forms (Rev),
4
Assault and Battery Form 213.
5
6
7
BAIL
Where the defendant is already free on bail at the time of his
conviction, it has been held optional with the
8
§2583. Statutory provisions
9
Under the statutory provision, a person charged
10
11
2. After conviction and pending alication for probation or aeal
20 Cal Jur 3d (Rev) P822
12
§ 2584 In General
13
The penal Code provides that the admission of a defendant to bail
14
following his or her conviction of an offence not punishable with death
15
and pending appeal or alication for probation, is committed to the
16
discretion of the trial court in all cases other than those involving
17
misdemeanors or appeals from judgments imposing fines only [65].
18
discretion should not be arbitrarily exercised.
This
19
[65]
20
The trial court abused its discretion in denying an alication for
21
a stay of execution and release on personal recognizance of a defendant
22
convicted and sentenced for bribery violations where the trial court
23
correctly found that defendant’s appeal from the conviction was not
24
frivolous or vexatious, where it further indicated it found there was
25
no danger that defendant would try to escape, and where it did not aear
26
that defendant would have the opportunity to commit similar criminal
27
offenses pending aeal, he having been removed from office on
28
conviction.
29
Deerings’s Pen C § 1272(3)
Re Robinson (1917, 2d Dist) 16 CA3d 539, 94 Cal Rptr 148.
Where defendant, after conviction of involuntary manslaughter,
30
was granted probation for three years with incarceration in the county
31
jail for one year as a condition thereof, it was an abuse of discretion
32
to deny bail pending appeal in the absence of circumstanced or
33
additional terms in the probation order indicating the inadvisability
34
of bail.
Re McCauglan (1956, 3d Dist) 142 CA2d 690, 298 P2d 871.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 355
1
A defendant may be entitled “almost as a matter of right” to bail
2
after conviction and on appeal in a felony case where probation has
3
been granted on the condition of serving a sentence such as imposed in
4
a misdemeanor case.
5
(treating denial of bail by trial court as abuse of discretion).
6
Re Torres (1947) 80 CA2d 579, 182 P2d 573
[66] Ex parte Hoge (1874) 48 C 3; Ex parte Smallman (1879) 54 C
7
35; People v Davis (1945) 67 CA2d 837, 155 P2d 675; Re Torres (1947) 80
8
CA2d 579, 182 P2d 573.
9
Where one convicted on a felony charge was placed on probation
10
for a two-year period, conditioned on confinement in the county jail
11
and payment of a fine, the length of probation and the term of
12
imprisonment and fine being within those which could be granted in case
13
of a misdemeanor conviction, it was an abuse of discretion by the trial
14
court to deny admission to bail pending aeal.
15
579, 182 P2d 573.
16
Re Torres (1947) 80 CA2d
–
TEMPORARY DETENTION
17
20 Cal Jur 3d (Rev) P410
18
Summary
19
There is a well-settled distinction in law between an arrest and
20
a detention; a detention is a lesser intrusion on a person’s liberty
21
than an arrest, and consists of briefly stoing a person for questioning
22
or other limited investigation (§ 2491).
23
be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the officer must have a
24
reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is
25
involved in criminal activity (§ 2492).
26
reasonable cause to believe that a person has unlawful possession of a
27
firearm or other deadly weapon, the peace officer may detain that
28
person to determine whether a crime relating to firearms or deadly
29
weapons has been committed (§ 2493).
In order for a detention to
If a peace officer had
30
§ 2490 Conspiracy to resist
31
Pursuant to the felony-murder rule, it has been held that where
32
several persons conspire to commit a crime and to resist arrest even to
33
the extent of taking life, the killing of an officer by any one of them
34
in resisting arrest, in pursuance of their common design, is the act of
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 356
1
all….
2
§ 2491 In general; definitions and distinctions
3
For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, there are basically
4
three different categories or level of police “contracts” or
5
“interactions” with individuals, ranging from the least to the most
6
intrusive.
7
police-individual interactions which result in no restraining of an
8
individual’s liberty whatsoever, i.e., no “seizure,” however minimal,
9
and which may be properly initiated by police officers, even if they
First, there are “consensual encounters,” which are those
10
lack any “objective justification.”
11
seizures of an individual which are strictly limited in duration,
12
scope, and purpose, and which may be undertaken by the police if there
13
is an articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to
14
commit a crime.
15
individual which exceed the permissible limits of a detention, seizures
16
which include formal arrests and restraints on an individual’s liberty
17
which are comparable to an arrest, and which are constitutionally
18
permissible only if the police have probable cause to arrest the
19
individual for a crime [38].
20
a police officer and a citizen can be transformed into a seizure or
21
detention, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, if, in view of
22
all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
23
would have believed that he was not free to leave [39].
24
Third, and finally, there are those seizures of an
An initially consensual encounter between
The distinction in law between an arrest and a detention is well-
25
settled [40].
26
than an arrest [41].
27
Second, there are “detentions,”
A detention is a lesser intrusion on a persons liberty
A detention occurs whenever a police officer accosts an
28
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, or when there is an
29
assertion of authority such as when a citizen is aroached and
30
questioned, or when an officer stops an individual because he suspects
31
that the individual may be personally involved in some criminal
32
activity [42].
33
to enable law enforcement officers to determine whether to make and
34
arrest, to investigate further, or to take no action [43].
35
detaining a person, a police officer is not restricted to mere
36
questioning but may conduct other limited investigation, and in that
The purpose of temporary detention for questioning is
In
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 357
1
regard reasonable latitude should be allowed police in the use of
2
acceptable procedures for the investigation of crime and the
3
maintenance of peace in the community [44].
4
detention, a police officer may require a suspect to alight from a
5
vehicle where the officer is concerned for his own safety [45].
6
is no requirement that a suspect consent to a police interview, nor
7
does a suspect possess the right to resist a lawful detention [46].
8
However, detention of a suspect becomes illegal when it extends beyond
9
the time reasonably necessary under the circumstances for the police to
10
CFB: Why are you detaining me? Are you investigating a crime?
If
so what and how am I implicated?
[38] Wilson v Superior Court (1983) 34 C3d 777, 195 Cal Rptr 671,
13
14
There
wind up their investigation [47].
11
12
As part of a lawful
670 P2d 325, cert den (US) 80 L Ed 2d 474, 104 S Ct 1929.
Probable cause is required to stop a robbery suspect on a public
15
16
street, handcuff him, and place him in the back of a patrol car. This
17
is a significant intrusion, and the functional equivalent of an arrest.
18
People v Ford (1984, 5th Dist) 150 CA 3d 687, 198 Cal Rptr 80.
19
[41]…..
20
A temporary detention may be akin to an arrest inasmuch as during
21
the time of such detention, the person detained, if he is physically
22
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, may be
23
considered to be in custody.
24
F3d 462.
As to the stoing of a motorist for a traffic violation as
25
26
detention or arrest see § 1674.
[46]
27
28
31
People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1976, 2d
Dist) 65 CA3d 511, 135 Cal Rptr 306.
[47]
29
30
Call V United States (1969, CA9 Cal) 417
People v. Paz (1981, 4th Dist) 118 CA3d 332, 173 Cal Rptr
272.
An investigatory detention exceeds constitutional bounds when
32
extended beyond what is reasonably necessary under the circumstances
33
which made its initiation permissible.
34
Dist) 153 CA3d 180, 200 Cal Rptr 149, op withdrawn by order of ct.
35
36
People v. De La Cruz (1984, 5th
Forms: Jury instruction as to detention of excessive duration, 3
California Criminal Forms & Instructions § 44:15
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 358
1
§ 2492. Determination of validity
2
If an individual is stoed or detained by the police because the
3
officer suspects the person may be personally involved in some criminal
4
activity, that person’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated and he
5
is entitled to the safeguards of rules requiring the officer, before he
6
is justified in stoing or detaining, to objectively suspect that some
7
activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to
8
occur, and the person detained is involved in that activity.
9
safeguards are not required if the officer acts for other proper
Similar
10
reasons [51].
11
a routine traffic stop constitutes a seizure, within the meaning of the
12
Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and
13
the resulting detention quite brief.
14
cause to make an arrest may justify a police officer stoing and briefly
15
detaining a person for questioning or other limited investigation [52];
16
but in order for such a seizure of a person to be reasonable under the
17
Fourth Amendment, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion, base on
18
objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity
19
[53].
20
crime has been committed [54], a detention requires a lesser showing of
21
probable cause to believe nonspecific criminal activity is afoot [55]
22
Roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to
Circumstances short of probable
While an arrest requires probable cause to believe a specific
The applicable test for determining the validity of the temporary
23
detention of a suspect by a police officer is to inquire whether the
24
circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable person in a like
25
position that such a course is necessary to the proper discharge of the
26
officer’s duties, and the inquiry must be based on an objective
27
perception of events rather than the subjective feelings of the
28
detaining officer [56].
29
based on a mere hunch, is unlawful even thought the officer may have
30
acted in good faith; there must be a rational suspicion by the officer
31
that some activity out of the ordinary is taking place or has taken
32
place, some indication to connect the person under suspicion with the
33
unusual activity, and some suggestion that the activity is related to
34
crime [57].
35
means of physical force or a show of authority, he must be able to
36
point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with
37
rational inferences from those facts, reasonable warrant that intrusion
A police officer’s detention of a person,
Before an officer detains an individual for questioning by
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 359
1
[58].
… As with all intrusions without a warrant, the burden lies with
2
3
the state to justify a detention.
4
…
5
A police officer may detain a person for investigation or
6
questioning on the basis of information received through “official
7
channels [61]”.
8
have personal knowledge of facts justifying the detention, but acts
9
solely on the basis of information or discretion given him through
However, if the detaining officer himself does not
10
police channels, the prosecution must establish in court, when
11
challenged, evidence showing the officer who originally furnished the
12
information had probable cause to believe the suspect had committed a
13
felony, or, at the very least, that such officer was in possession of
14
facts amounting to circumstances short of probable cause which would
15
have justified him to personally make the detention….
16
a temporary detention by a police officer must be tested by the
17
knowledge that the officer had at the time.
[51]
18
The validity of
Terry v Ohio (1968) 392 US 1, 20 L Ed 2d 889, 88 S Ct 1868;
19
Re C. (1978) 21 C3d 888, 148 Cal Rptr 366, 582 P2d 957; People v Bower
20
(1979) 24 C3d 638, 156 Cal Rptr 856, 597 P2d 115 (not followed on
21
another point, People v Ramirez (1st Dist) 152 CA3d 1134, 200 Cal Rptr
22
103, op withdrawn by order of ct); Santos v Superior Court (1984, 1sr
23
Dist) 154 CA3d 1178, 202 Cal Rptr 6.
Just as a search that is reasonable at its inception may violate
24
25
the Fourth Amendment, by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope,
26
so may an investigatory detention exceed constitution bounds when
27
extended beyond what is reasonably necessary under the circumstanced
28
that made its initiation permissible.
29
Diego County (1969, 46th Dist) 2 CA3d 555, 83 Cal Rptr 22.
Willett v Superior Court of San
30
As to constitutional requirement generally see § 2455
31
Law Reviews: License check stops and the Fourth Amendment, 68 CLR
32
1167; Nonarrest automobile stops; unconstitutional seizures of person
33
25 Stan LR 865.
[53]
34
Brown v Texas (1979) 443 US 47, 61 L Ed 2d 357, 99 S Ct
35
2637; People v Aldridge (1984) 35 C3d 473, 198 Cal Rptr 538, 674 P2d
36
240.
37
38
Defendant’s detention was unlawful where it rested on the police
officer’s suspicion that defendant and his comrades were violating a
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 360
1
city ordinance making it unlawful for a minor “to loiter, idle, wander,
2
and stroll, or play in or upon the public streets” and other public
3
places between 10 PM and 5 AM, and where defendant’s automobile, when
4
observed by the officer at about 2 AM, was proceeding at a lawful speed
5
without any suspicious behavior, since the officer lacked any
6
objectively reasonable basis for suspecting that defendant or his
7
passengers were violating the prohibitory language of the curfew
8
ordinance.
9
640 P2d 753.
People v Teresinski (1982) 30 C3d 822, 180 Cal Rptr 617,
The mere act of turning one’s back on a police officer, even
10
11
though, to the officer, the action seems to be a “nervous” one, is not
12
sufficient to justify detention by the police.
13
(1970, 2d Dist) 16 CA3d 619, 94 Cal Rptr 380.
People v Rosenfeld
When a uniformed officer aroaches a citizen and “requests” he
14
15
accompany him, even a short distance, for questioning, there is some
16
infringement on personal liberty, and such activity, if conducted on
17
the street and with no objective facts to justify it, is not
18
permissible.
19
304.
Forms: Jury instruction as to detention at nighttime, 3
20
21
People v. Botos (1972, 4th Dist) 30 CA3d 326, 106 Cal Rptr
California Criminal Forms & Instructions § 44:14.
22
[57]..
23
To justify even a limited detention as a necessary course in the
24
proper discharge of a law enforcement officer’s duties, there must
25
exist some suspicious or unusual circumstances which are sufficiently
26
distinguishable from innocent activity so that taken together with the
27
rational inferences to be draw from the facts, they would reasonable
28
warrant the conclusion that criminal activity is afoot.
29
Superior Court of Lake County (1970, 1st Dist) 13 CA3d 189, 91 Cal Rptr
30
429.
31
[58] LONG.
32
[62]
Restani v
Restani v Superior Court of Lake County (1970, 1st Dist) 13
33
CA3d 189, 91 Cal Rptr 429; People v Collin (1973, 1st Dist) 35 CA3d 416,
34
110 Cal Rptr 869.
35
To justify temporary detention, the information upon which the
36
officer relies need not be of the quality required for probable cause
37
to arrest and
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 361
1
§ 2493 Firearms or weapons offense
2
…. Pro purposes of this statute, “reasonable cause to detain”
3
requires that the circumstances known or aarent to the officer must
4
include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that some
5
offense relating to firearms or deadly weapons has taken place or is
6
occurring or is about to occur and that the person he intends to detain
7
is involved in that offense;
8
9
10
11
12
CITATION FOR INFRACTION OR MISDEMEANOR
§ 2495 In general
.. The arrestee may be taken into custody only if he refuses to
present such identification, or refuses to sign such a written promise.
…. When a person signs a written promise to aear at the time and
13
place specified and has not posted bail, the magistrate must issue an
14
have delivered for execution a warrant for his arrest within twenty
15
days after his failure to aear as promised [77].
16
on the charge for the arrest of a person who has given a written
17
promise to aear in court, unless he has violated that promise or has
18
failed to deposit bail, to aear for arraignment, trial, or judgment, or
19
to comply with the terms and provisions of the judgment, as required by
20
law [78].
21
22
No warrant may issue
[77] Deering’s Pen C § 853.8 (referring to bail provided in Pen C
§ 853.6)
23
[78]
24
§ 2496 Citation procedure
25
Unless waved by arrestee, the time specified in the notice to
26
27
Deering’s Pen C § 853.6(f)
aear must be at least ten days after arrest..….
.after signing promise to aear. Thereupon, the arresting officer
28
must immediately release the arrestee form custody [Deering’s Pen C §
29
853.6(d)]
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 362
1
2
CUSTODY AND DISPOSITION OR ARRESTEE OR
PRISONER
3
Summary
4
..An arrested person must in all cases be taken before a
5
magistrate without unnecessary delay, and in any event, within two days
6
after his arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays (§ 2500).
7
upon being booked, and except where physically impossible, no lather
8
than three hours after arrest, an arrested person has the right to make
9
at least two completed telephone calls.
Immediately
10
.. The Penal Code provides a procedure whereby a person who has
11
been arrested or detained and is factually innocent may request a law
12
enforcement agency or the court to provide for the sealing and
13
destruction of the arrest record (§2504)
14
§ 2497 In general
15
..
16
An officer making an arrest in the county of his jurisdiction for
17
an offense triable in the superior court of another county, under a
18
warrant issued upon a complaint filed in his county, must take the
19
person arrested before the nearest and most accessible magistrate of
20
the county in which the offense is triable, and must deliver to the
21
magistrate the complaint and the warrant, with his return indorsed
22
thereon…
23
Any physician and surgeon, including a psychiatrist, licensed to
24
practice in this state, who is employed by the prisoner or his attorney
25
to assist in the preparation of defense, must be permitted to visit the
26
prisoner while he is in custody.
27
§ 2498 Felony arrest
28
… such law enforcement agency must take custody of the defendant
29
within five days in the county in which he was arrested……
30
§ Misdemeanor arrest in another county
31
If the offense charged is a misdemeanor, and the defendant is
32
arrested in another county, the officer must, without unnecessary
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 363
1
delay, inform the defendant in writing of his right to be taken before
2
a magistrate in that county, note on the warrant that he has so
3
informed the defendant, and, on being required by the defendant, take
4
him before a magistrate in that county, who must admit him to bail in
5
the amount specified in the endorsement on the warrant of arrest, or if
6
no bail is specified, the magistrate may set bail; if the defendant is
7
demitted to bail the magistrate must direct the defendant to aear
8
before th3e court of magistrate who issued the warrant.
9
given, the magistrate must indorse thereon a memorandum of his order
If bail is
10
for the appearance of the defendant [Deerings Pen C § 822 (referring to
11
bail provided in Pen C § 815a) see also §§2495, 2496 for misdemeanors
12
and § 2579 for bail]
13
… five days..
14
§ 2500 Duty to bring prisoner before magistrate without unnecessary delay
15
An arrested person must in all cases be taken before a magistrate
16
without unnecessary delay, and, in the event, within two days after his
17
arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays.
18
days expire at a time when the court in which the magistrate is sitting
19
is not in session, such time is extended to include the duration of the
20
next regular court session on the judicial day immediately following
21
[5].
22
However, if the prescribed two
When an arrest is made without a warrant by a peace officer of a
23
private person, the arrested person, if not otherwise released, must be
24
taken without unnecessary delay to the nearest or most accessible
25
magistrate in the county in which the offense is triable, and a
26
complaint stating the charge against the arrested person must be laid
27
before such magistrate [6].
28
mentioned statute [7] has been incorporated by construction in the
29
latter statute [8] as a maximum time [9].
30
few hours may be unreasonable [10].
31
The tow-day limit aearing in the firstHowever, a delay of even a
Another section of the code provides that a private individual,
32
arresting another for the commission of a public offense, must without
33
unnecessary delay take the person arrested before a magistrate [11] or
34
deliver him to a peace officer [12].
35
be unreasonable under this statute [13].
36
A delay of even a few hours may
Every public officer or other person, having arrested any person
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 364
1
on a criminal charge, who willfully delays to take the arrestee before
2
a magistrate having jurisdiction, to take his examination, is guilty of
3
a misdemeanor [14].
To warrant reversal for failure to bring a defendant before the
4
5
magistrate within the prescribed time, the delay must materially affect
6
the outcome of the trial [15].
Subsequent unreasonable delay in taking an arrested person before
7
8
a magistrate will not affect the legality of a lawful arrest [16].
[5] Cal Const Art 1 § 14 (felony); Deering’s Pen C § 825.
9
Pen C § 825 does not authorize a two-day detention in all cases,
10
11
but places a limit on what may be considered a necessary delay and
12
detention of less than two days, if unreasonable under the
13
circumstances, is a violation of the statute. Dragna v White (1955) 45
14
C2d 496, 289 P2d 428.
Unnecessary delay in arraignment violates a fundamental right of
15
16
the arrested person and is in disobedience of the law.
Such conduct by
17
the police is patently illegal and its illegality is not lessened by
18
the fact that similar conduct is not unusual of that such delays make
19
the work of the police and the district attorney easier.
20
Pettingill (1978) 21 C3d 231, 145 Cal Rptr 861, 578 P2d 108.
People v.
Under certain circumstances even a delay in bringing a defendant
21
22
before a magistrate which is within the statutory maximum (Pen C § 825)
23
may be patently unreasonable.
24
83 Cal Rptr 715.
People v Lee (1970, 4th Dist) 3 CA3d 514,
Pen C § 825 is applicable to parolees charged with crimes.
25
26
However, a delay in arraigning a defendant did not violate Pen C § 825,
27
where defendant would have been released by the police prior to
28
expiration of the time limit if his parole officer had not placed a
29
parole detention “hold” on him.
30
defendant, he was no longer being detained prior to arraignment, and
31
Pen C § 825 ceased to operate.
32
defendant pursuant to the old without preliminary hearing or inquiry
33
was illegal.
34
91.
When the detention hold was placed on
Nevertheless, the extended detention of
People v Gordon (1978, 2d Dist) 84 CA3d 913, 149 Cal Rptr
35
A defendant who was arraigned 45 hours after his arrest on
36
burglary charges, during which time he made statement which were
37
inconsistent with his trial testimony, met his burden of establishing
38
the unreasonableness of the delay under Cal Const Art I § 14 and Pen C
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 365
1
§ 825, where all of the evidence linking defendant to the burglary was
2
in the possession of the sheriff’s office at the time of his arrest.
3
The fact that the detective to whom the case was assigned was on
4
vacation did not provide sufficient justification for the delay.
5
People v. Cook (1982, 4th Dist) 135 CA3d 785, 185 Cal Rptr 576.
6
Annotations:
.. Delay in taking before magistrate or denial of
7
opportunity to give bail as suorting action for false imprisonment, 98
8
ALR2d 2966.
9
10
Law Reviews: Holding prisoner incommunicado, 43 CLR 401; Delay in
bringing prisoner before magistrate, 39 CLR 96, 113.
11
[6] Deerings’s Pen C § 849(a)
12
A person who is already in custody cannot logically be arrested,
13
as arrest means taking a person into custody; thus there was no need to
14
arrest a person .. Re Mugica (1968) 69 C2d 516, 72 Cal Rptr 645, 446
15
P2d 525.
16
[7] Deerings’s Pen C § 825
17
[8] Deerings’s Pen C § 849(a)
18
[9] People v Zammora (1944) 66 CA2d 166, 152 P2d 180 (Pen C § 825
19
defines “unnecessary delay” in Pen C § 849 as meaing in any event
20
within two days after the arrest); People v Sewell (1950) 95 CA2d 850,
21
214 P2d 113, cert den 339 US 958, 94 L Ed 1369, 70 S Ct 975 (referring
22
in the two-days’ maximum time in determining that the defendant was
23
timely brought before the court).
24
25
26
27
[10]
Peopoe v Haydel (1974) 12 C3d 190, 115 Cal Rptr 394, 524
P2d 866.
[14] As to delay in presentment before magistrate as false
imprisonment, see Assault and Other Willful Torts § 63
28
[15]
Re Mugica (1968) 69 C2d 516, 72 Cal Rptr 645, 446 P2d 525.
29
A violation of defendant’s right to be taken before a magistrate
30
within the time specified by law does not require reversal unless he
31
shows that through such wrongful conduct he was deprived of a fair
32
trial or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result. People v Combes
33
(1961) 56 C2d 135, 14 Cal Rptr 4, 363 P2d 4; People v Lane (1961) 56
34
C2d 773, 16 Cal Rptr 801, 366 P2d 57.
35
§ 2501 Right of accused to make telephone calls
36
Immediately upon being booked, and except where physically
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 366
1
impossible, no later that three hours after arrest, an arrested person
2
has the right to make at least tow completed telephone calls [17].
3
arrestee has the right to free telephone calls within the local dialing
4
area, or at his own expense if outside the local area,
..
5
The
A sign in bold block type advising the arrestee of this
6
information must be posted in a conspicuous place under any police
7
facility of place where an arrestee is detained [19].
8
the telephone calls must be given immediately, or as soon as
9
practicable [20].
Upon request,
The statute does not abrogate a law enforcement
10
officer’s duty to advise a suspect of his right to counsel or of any
11
other right [21].
12
deprives an arrested person of any right granted by this statute is
13
guilty of a misdemeanor [22].
Any public officer or employee who willfully
… Al thought the person arrested must be allowed to make his
14
15
phone calls no later than three hours after his arrest, the right
16
arises immediately after the booking and lasts an indefinite time until
17
the accused has no more need thereof [24].
18
limited if the prison authorities are amenable to more calls being
19
made.
20
The number of calls is not
… There must be a sufficient showing that the denial of a fair
21
trial or prevented the petitioner from obtaining and presenting
22
evidence of his innocence, as in the case of denial of the right to
23
call a physician for a blood sample, in order for habeas corpus to be
24
granted [27]
25
§ 2504. Sealing and expungement of records
26
The Penal Code provides a procedure whereby a person who has been
27
arrested or detained and is factually innocent may request law
28
enforcement agency or the court to provide for the sealing and
29
destruction of the arrest record [38].
30
[38]
Deering’s Pen C § 851.8, 851.85 (latter statute is
31
operative only if former statute is repealed, and it covers a narrower
32
range of circumstances).
33
Pen C § 851.8 does not empower a court to seal records in matters
34
that are dismissed in the furtherance of justice (Pen C § 1385).
The
35
purpose of Pen C § 851.8, is to benefit DEFENDANTS who, after
36
presentation of evidence, are found not to have committed a crime.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 367
1
2
People v. Glimps (1979, 2d Dist) 92 CA3d 315, 155 Cal Rptr 230.
Pen C § 851.8 was intended as a compromise between the valid
3
public purposes that arrest records may serve and a recognition that
4
innocent persons had suffered adverse consequences and were entitled to
5
relief.
6
People v White (1978) 77 CA3d Su 17, 144 Cal Rptr 128.
Annotations:
Right of exonerated arrestee to have fingerprints,
7
photographs, or other criminal identification or arrest records
8
expunged or restricted, 46 ALR3d 900; Consideration of arrest record as
9
unlawful employment practice violative of Titel VII of Civil Rights Act
10
11
12
13
of 1964 (42 USCS §§ 2000e et seq.), 33 ALR Fed 263.
Law Reviews: Arrest record expungement in California: the
polishing of sterling, 9 USF LR 299.
Ops Att Gen: 65 Ops Att Gen 563 (a law enforcement agency may
14
lawfully refuse to furnish a copy of an arrest or compliant report
15
requ3ested by one who has provided information contained in the report;
16
however, the agency must make public certain information contained in
17
such reports).
18
Forms: Letter requesting criminal record, 2 California Criminal
19
Forms & Instructions § 36:1; Destruction of record of marijuana
20
conviction, …; Destruction of law enforcement agency record of arrest,
21
2 California Criminal Forms & Instructions § 36:3; Petition to seal and
22
destroy record of arrest, 2 California Criminal Forms & Instructions §
23
36:4; Declaration in suort of petition to seal and destroy record of
24
arrest, 2 California Criminal Forms & Instructions § 36:6; Order to
25
seal and destroy record of arrest, 2 California Criminal Forms &
26
Instructions § 36:7; Petition to seal and destroy record of dismissal,
27
2 California Criminal Forms & Instructions § 36:8; Declaration in suort
28
of petition to seal and destroy record of dismissal, 2 California
29
Criminal Forms & Instructions § 36:9; Points and authorities in suort
30
of petition to seal and destroy record of dismissal, 2 California
31
Criminal Forms & Instructions § 36:10; Petition to expunge misdemeanor
32
conviction, 2 California Criminal Forms & Instructions § 36:13; Order
33
to expunge misdemeanor conviction, 2 California Criminal Forms &
34
Instructions § 36:14; Petition to expunge felony conviction, 2
35
California Criminal Forms & Instructions § 36:15; Order to expunge
36
felony conviction, 2 California Criminal Forms & Instructions § 36:16;
37
Interview sheet for certificate of rehabilitation, 2 California
38
Criminal Forms & Instructions § 36:22; Petition for certificate of
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 368
1
rehabilitation, 2 California Criminal Forms & Instructions § 36:23;
2
Notice of filing petition for certificate o rehabilitation, … Cert or
3
rehabilitation..
4
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
5
A. Generally; Constitutional Standards §§ 2505-2510
6
Summary.
7
Both federal and state constitutions guarantee the right of every
8
person to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
9
provide that no search warrant may issue except on probable cause,
10
suorted by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
11
searched and the persons or things to be seized (§2505).
12
purpose of the constitutional guarantees relating to searches and
13
seizures is to prevent unreasonable invasion of the security of People,
14
in their persons, houses, papers and effects (§ 2506).
15
constitutional guarantees prohibiting unreasonable searches and
16
seizures and legislation regulating the process of search and seizure
17
must be liberally construed to carry out the purpose and to safeguard
18
the right of privacy, in such a way at to protect both the individual
19
rights guaranteed by the constitutional provisions and the interests of
20
society in the suppression of crime (§ 2507).
21
the constitution guaranties with respect to searches and seizures is
22
granted, not against all searches and seizures, but only against those
23
that are “unreasonable” (§ 2508).
24
suspect or believe that contraband is present or that a crime has been
25
committed or attempted must exist to justify a search pursuant to a
26
search warrant or to a lawful arrest (§ 2509).
27
protects people, not places, and wherever an individual may harbor a
28
reasonable expectation of privacy, he is entitled to be freed from
29
unreasonable governmental intrusion (§ 2510)
The primary
The
The immunity embodied in
Reasonable or probable cause to
The Fourth Amendment
30
California Constitution, Article I §§ 1, 2, 4, 13, 15, 28(d)
31
US Constitution, First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth
32
Amendment.
33
§ 2505 In general
34
The federal and state constitutions both guarantee the right of
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 369
1
the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
2
against unreasonable seizures and searches, and provide that no warrant
3
may issue, but on probable cause, suorted by oath or affirmation,
4
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
5
things to be seized [40].
6
searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment of the United States
7
Constitution has been made applicable to state action as part of due
8
process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment [41], and the
9
reasonableness of a state search and seizure is determined by the
The prohibition against unreasonable
10
standard established by the Fourth Amendment and the decisions of the
11
United States Supreme Court in alying that amendment [42].
12
the standard for obtaining a search warrant is the same under the
13
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments [43].
Similarly,
Nevertheless, not all …
14
..
15
In analyzing the legality of searches and seizures,
16
constitutional provisions in addition to the search and seizure
17
provisions should be considered.
18
may violate the constitutional right to privacy [46], freedom of speech
19
and of the press [47], freedom of religion [48], due process of law
20
[49], or the prohibition against self-incrimination [50].
Thus, a particular search or seizure
21
[40]
US Const Fourth Amendment; Cal Const Art I § 13
22
The sanctity of a private home is not only guaranteed by the
23
federal and state constitutions, but is traditional in our Anglo-Saxon
24
heritage.
25
People v Privett (1961) 55 C2d 698, 12 Cal Rptr 874, 361 P2d 602.
26
As to
27
see § 3181.
“A man’s home is his castle” is more than an empty phrase.
standing to challenge the legality of search or seizure
28
As to reasonable or probable cause, see § 2509.
29
As to the necessity of an affidavit, see §§ 2523 et seq.
30
As to the required particularity in describing a place or person
31
to be searched or seized, see § 2529.
32
As to remedies generally, see §§ 2572 et seq.
33
Annotations: comment Note. - Federal Constitution as affecting
34
admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure, 84
35
ALR2d 959.
36
Law Reviews: Towards workable rules of search and seizure-amicus
37
curiae brief, 50 CLR 421; Search and seizure: a no-man’s land in the
38
criminal law, 49 CLR 474; Unreasonable search and seizure in
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 370
1
2
California, 48 CLR 498; Nith Circuit survey …
[41]
Ma v Ohio (1916) 367 US 643, 6 L Ed 2d 1081, 81 S Ct 1684,
3
16 Ohio Ops 2d 384, 86 Ohio L Abs 513, 84 ALR2d 933, reh den 368 US
4
871, 7 L Ed 2d72, 82 S Ct 23; Stanford v Texas (1965)
5
Ed 2d 431, 85 S Ct 506, reh den 380 US 926, 13 L Ed 2d 813, 85 S Ct
6
879; Cooper v California (1967) 386 US 58, 17 L Ed 2d 730, 87 S Ct 788,
7
reh den 386 US 988, 18 L Ed 2d 243, 87 S Ct 1283; People v Castro
8
(1967, 2d Dist) 249 CA2d 168, 57 Cal Rptr 108.
9
379 US 476, 13 L
No statute regardless of its purpose, or entitlement, may
10
authorize a police search or seizure in contravention of the Fourth
11
Amendment.
12
Dist) 69 CA3d 183, 137 Cal Rptr 851.
13
14
15
Skinner v Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1977, 1st
[42] Ker v California (1963) 374 US 23, 10 L Ed 2d 726, 83 S Ct
1623, 24 Ohio Ops 2d 201.
Questions regarding the reasonableness of searches under US Const
16
Fourth Amendment are controlled by federal law in state as well as
17
federal courts.
18
Rptr 770 (disaroved on another point People v Tribble, 4 C3d 826, 94
19
Cal Rptr 613, 484 P2d 589).
People v Paxton (1967, 2d Dist) 255 CA2d 62, 62 Cal
20
[46] Cal Const Art I § 1.
21
Constitutional protection of privacy is directed toward (1)
22
“government snooping” and secret gathering of personal information, (2)
23
the overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary personal
24
information by government and business interests, (3) the improper use
25
of information properly obtained for a specific purpose, and (4) the
26
lack of a reasonable check on the accuracy of existing records.
27
constitutional provision does not purport to prohibit all incursion
28
into individual privacy, but intends that any such intervention must be
29
justified by a compelling interest.
30
self-executing, i.e., the provision creates a legal and enforceable
31
right of privacy for every Californian.
32
V Gherardini (1979, 4th Dist) 93 CA3d 669, 156 Cal Rptr 55 (trial court
33
improperly issued order calling for production of hospital records and
34
documents).
The
The provision is intended to be
Board of Medial Quality Assur.
35
As to protection of a reasonable expectation of privacy under
36
constitutional provisions relating to search and seizure see § 2510
37
As to right of privacy generally see Constitutional Law § 234
38
[49]
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 371
1
…
2
As to the use of force or brutality in obtaining evidence from
3
person of an accused as violation of due process see § 2228.
4
See Const Law §342
5
§ 2506 Nature and purpose
6
The primary purpose of the constitutional guarantees relating to
7
searches and seizures is to prevent unreasonable invasion of the
8
security of the People in their persons, houses, papers and effects
9
[52].
The privacy and security of individuals is safeguarded against
10
arbitrary invasions by governmental officers [53].
11
is to protect the citizen against unreasonable use of governmental
12
force [54], and not to shield criminals, it follows that the
13
constitutional guarantees are not violated when a reasonable search or
14
seizure is made either as incidental to a lawful arrest [55], or
15
pursuant to a valid warrant [56].
[52]
16
Since the purpose
Steagald v United states (1981) 451 US 204, 68 L Ed 2d 38,
17
101 S Ct 1642, on remand..….(the Fourth Amendment is designed to
18
prevent, not simply redress, unlawful police action); People v Maddox
19
(1956) 46 C2d 301, 294 P2d 6, cert den 352 US 858, 1 L Ed 2d 65, 77 S
20
Ct 81.
A random police search is the precise invasion of privacy that
21
22
the Fourth Amendment was intended to prohibit.
23
Court of Sacramento County (1971) 4 C3d 699, 94 Cal Rptr 412, 484 P2d
24
84.
25
26
[53]
Mozzetti v Superior
People v Tremayne (1971, 4th Dest) 20 CA3d 1006, 98 Cal Rptr
193; Peole v Smith (1977, 5th Dist) 67 CA3d 638, 136 Cal Rptr 764.
27
The Fourth Amendment and Cal Const Art I § 13, prohibiting
28
unreasonable searches, embody a variety of values, primary among which
29
is the protection of privacy.
30
283, 151 Cal Rptr 749 (disaroved on other grounds Peoplev Laiwa, 34 C3d
31
711, 195 Cal Rptr 503, 669 P2d 1278).
32
People v Brown (1979, 3d Dist) 88 CA3d
Law Reviews: Toward the preservation of personal privacy: Chief
33
Justice Wright’s opinion of search and seizure and the right of
34
privacy, 4 Hast Con LQ 723.
35
[54] People v Cahan (1955) 44 C2d 434, 282 P2d 905, 50 ALR2d 513.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 372
1
§ 2507. Construction
2
It is a fundamental principle of law that constitutional
3
provisions should receive liberal interpretation in favor of the
4
citizen, especially in regard to those matters designed to safeguard
5
liberty and security of person and property [57].
6
the alication of the rule have arisen in cases dealing with search and
7
seizure; and, in accord with this primary canon of constitutional law,
8
the courts have repeatedly stated that the constitutional guaranties
9
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and legislation
Frequent examples of
10
regulating the process of search and seizure are to be liberally
11
construed to carry out their purposes and to safeguard the right to
12
privacy, in such a way as to protect both the individual rights
13
guaranteed by the constitutional provisions and the interests of
14
society in the suppression of crime [58].
15
provisions prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures should
16
receive a liberal construction so as to prevent stealthy encroachment
17
of gradual depreciation of the rights secured by them by imperceptible
18
practice of courts or by well-intentioned but mistakenly zealous
19
officers [59].
20
….
21
What constitutes a reasonable search cannot be summarized in any
It is also said that the
22
rigid formula, or determined by any single standard or fixed
23
touchstone, but depending on all the circumstances of each case [61].
24
In determining under what circumstances a particular search will be
25
allowed, governmental interests must be weighed against the citizen’s
26
right to privacy, since the constitutional provisions prohibit only
27
unreasonable searches and seizures [62].
28
determination cannot ordinarily be left to the police.
29
of some grave emergency the constitutional guarantees interpose a
30
magistrate between the citizen ant the police, so that an objective
31
mind may weigh the need to invade the privacy of the individual in
32
order to enforce the law [63]
In any event, the
In the absence
33
[57]
see const law § 40
34
[58]
People v Chan (1955) 44 C2d 434, 282 P2d 905, 50 ALR2d 513.
35
Fourth Amendment protections are so fundamental that they are to
36
be jealously guarded and liberally construed.
Blair v Pitchess (1971)
37
5 C3d 258, 96 Cal Rptr 42, 486 P2d 1242, 45 ALR3d 1206.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 373
A probationer enjoys the protection of constitutions guarantees
1
2
against unreasonable searches and seizures of his home, absent some
3
other legal basis for the search.
4
CA3d 955, 82 Cal Rptr 229.
People v Jasso (1969, 2d Dist) 2
Because the proceeding by a search warrant is a “drastic one,”
5
6
whose abuse led to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment itself,
7
legislation regulating the process must be liberally construed in favor
8
of the individual affected, and every constitutional and statutory
9
requirement must be fully met, including all formalities required by
10
statue, before a valid search warrant may issue.
Bowyer v Superior
11
Court of Santa Cruz County (1974, 1sd Dist) 37 CA3d 165, 112 Cal Rptr
12
266.
13
[59]
Wirin v Horral (1948) 85 CA2d 487, 193 P2d 470.
14
All owe the duty of effective enforcement of the constitutional
15
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures lest there be
16
impairment of the rights of the protection of which it was adopted. Re
17
Alication of Schaefer (1933) 134 CA 498, 25 P2d 490
18
[63]
19
An intrusion by the state into the privacy of the home for any
20
purpose is one of the most awesome incursions of police power into the
21
life of the individual.
22
anathema to the system of checks envisioned by the Constitution.
23
essential that the dispassionate judgment of a magistrate, an official
24
dissociated from the competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime be
25
interposed between the state and the citizen at this critical juncture.
26
The frightening experiences of certain foreign nations with the
27
unexpected invasion of private homes by uniformed authority to seize
28
individuals therein , often in the dead of night, is too fresh in
29
memory to permit this portentous power to be left to the uninhibited
30
discretion of the police alone.
31
County
(1977,4th
Unrestricted authority in this area is
It is
Lohman v Superior Court of San Diego
Dist) 69 CA3d 894, 138 Cal Rptr 403.
32
As to reasonable or probable cause requirement see § 2509
33
§ 2508. Scope
34
The immunity embodied in constitutional guarantees with respect
35
to searches and seizures is granted, not against all searches and
36
seizures, but only against those that are “unreasonable.” [64]
All
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 374
1
unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited, whether conducted
2
pursuant to a warrant or not [65].
The constitutional provisions embrace seizures of the person as
3
4
well as seizures of property [66]; and extend to civil, as well as
5
criminal, matters [67].
6
when the police make a through investigation into the private property
7
of an individual, even though they are not searching for the express
8
purpose of finding evidence of crime [68]. The constitutional
9
provisions are not limited to persons having title to the searched
The constitutional provisions are applicable
10
premises [69].
The constitutions protection against unreasonable
11
searches and seizures has been alied to private dwellings [70],
12
businesses and commercial premises [71], garages [72], a locker used by
13
a patron in a bowling alley [73], private areas within public places,
14
such as a toilet stall offered to the public for private, albeit
15
transient individual use [74], vehicles [75], and even, on occasion,
16
open land [76].
17
…
18
As to such searches and seizures as are not authorized by law or
19
consented to by the person concerned, the constitutional provisions
20
relating to unreasonable searches and seizures make no distinction
21
between the guilty and the innocent.
22
the rights of the innocent if the police were permitted to justify
23
unreasonable searches and seizures on the ground that they assumed that
24
their victims were criminals [89]
It would be impossible to protect
Since the guilty and the innocent alike are included within the
25
26
guaranty that in no case may the right of the People to be secure
27
against unreasonable searches and seizures be violated, such violations
28
cannot be justified by any supposed necessity of bringing criminal to
29
justice.
30
premise that it is better for a few criminals to escape punishment than
31
for society generally to be subject to the demoralizing anxiety
32
generated by arbitrary and unreasonable searches and seizures [90].
[65]
33
34
35
In face, the constitutional provisions were enacted on the
People v Scott (1978) 21 C3d 284, 145 Cal Rptr 876, 578 P2d
123.
Both the Fourth Amendment and Cal Const Art I § 13 protect
36
against an unreasonable seizure as well as an unreasonable search
37
People v Superior Court of San Bernardino County (1970, 4th Dist) 9 CA3d
38
203, 88 Cal Rptr 21.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 375
1
As to searches without a warrant see §§ 2534 et seq;
2
[68]
3
People v Smith (1977, 5ht Dist) 67 CA3d 638, 136 Cal Rptr
764.
The constitutional right of privacy of an occupant of a house
4
5
against police intrusion extends to entry for purposes of investigation
6
as well as to those for purposes of arrest.
7
Dist) 14 CA3d 71, 91 Cal Rptr 837.
People v Mesaris (1970, 2d
8
As to administrative inspections see § 2551.
9
[70]
10
Guidi v Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1973) 10 C3d
1, 109 Cal Rptr 684, 513 P2d 908.
The right of a person to retreat into his own home and there be
11
12
free from unreasonable government intrusion is at the very core of the
13
Fourth Amendment.
14
100 S Ct 1371, on remand 51 NY2d 169, 433 NYS2d 61, 412 NE2d 1288.
[72].
15
Payton v New York (1980) 445 US 573, 63 L Ed 2d 639,
People v Medina (1972) 7 C3d 30, 101 Cal Rptr 521, 496 P2d
16
433 (the degree of intrusion of a garage is significantly less than
17
that of a person’s house, but both are subject to Fourth Amendment
18
protections).
[75] Because a vehicle is moveable, the opportunity to search it
19
20
is fleeting, and in most instances its contents would never be found
21
again if a law enforcement officer had to obtain a search warrant;
22
therefore greater latitude is given to searches of vehicles without
23
warrants than is given to the search of a home or building.
24
extend to which an officer may search a vehicle without a warrant is
25
not without constitutional restrictions; it is government by the
26
exigencies of the situation, and each case must be judged on its own
27
facts.
28
29
30
31
But the
People v Koehn (1972, 5th Dist) 25 CA3d 799, 102 Cal Rptr 102.
[76]
Phelan v Superior Court of Mariposa County (1979, 5th Dist)
90 CA3d 1005, 153 Cal Rptr 738
[89]
People v Cahan (1955) 44 C2d 434, 282 P2d 905, 50 ALR2d
513; People v Brown
(1955) 45 C2d 640, 290 P2d 528.
32
The Fourth Amendment forbids every search that is unreasonable
33
and protects those suspected or known to be offenders as well as the
34
innocent.
35
1623, 24 Ohio Ops 2d 201.
36
[90]
Ker v California (1963) 374 US 23, 10 L Ed 2d 726, 83 S Ct
People v Cahan (1955) 44C2d 434, 282 P2d 905, 50 ALR2d 513.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 376
1
§ 2509. Reasonable or probable cause
2
Reasonable or probable cause to suspect or believe that
3
contraband is present or that a crime has been committed or attempted
4
must exist to justify a search pursuant to a search warrant [91] or to
5
a lawful arrest [92].
6
with searches and seizures has been variously defined.
7
stated that reasonable or probable cause is such a state of facts as
8
would lead a person of ordinary care an prudence to believe, or to
9
entertain an honest and strong suspicion, that the person involved is
“Reasonable or probable cause” in connection
It has been
10
guilty of the offense charges [93].
11
in the disjunctive with respect to the elements of care and prudence
12
and in the conjunctive with respect to the elements of belief and
13
suspicion [94].
14
than suspicion is required [95], and on the other that an honest and
15
strong suspicion is sufficient [96].
16
defined as meaning having more evidence for than against, or suorted by
17
evidence that inclines the mind to believe but leaves some room for
18
doubt [97].
19
search is a suspicion founded on circumstances sufficiently strong to
20
warrant a reasonable person to believe that the suspect is guilty of
21
the crime charged [98].
22
has been stated that probable cause for a search without a warrant
23
exists when an officer is aware of facts that would lead a person of
24
ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously to
25
entertain, a strong suspicion that the object of the search is in the
26
particular place to be searched [99].
27
than a mere furtive gesture to constitute probable cause to search [1],
28
….
29
This proposition has been stated
It has been stated on the one hand that belief rather
The term “probable” has been
Still another vi3ew is that probable cause for arrest and
In connection with warrantless searches, it
Although the law requires more
Reasonableness is determined by balancing the need to search
30
against the invasion which the search entails [4].
31
“unreasonable” may be taken as substantially synonymous with
32
“illegal.”…
33
In this connection,
The rule of probable cause is a practical, non technical
34
conception affording the best compromise that has been found for
35
accommodating the often oosing interests of protecting citizens’
36
privacy from rash and unreasonable interferences and giving reasonable
37
flexibility to law enforcement.
Requiring more would unduly hamper law
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 377
1
enforcement; to allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at
2
the mercy of the officers’ whim or caprice [7].
.. And the mere possession of facts entitling police to a warrant
3
4
to search particular premises does not justify a search of such
5
premises without a warrant [11].
[93]
6
People v Kilvington (1894) 104 C 86, 37 P 799; People v
7
Melendrez (1900) 129 C 549, 62 P 109; People v Lawrence (1957, 1st Dist)
8
149 CA2d 435, 308 P2d 821; People v Silvestri (1957, 1st Dist) 150 CA2d
9
114, 309 P2d 871; People v Dewson (1957, 1st Dist) 150 CA2d 119, 310 P2d
10
162; People v Morris (1962, 2d Dist) 211 CA2d 274, 27 Cal Rptr 129;
11
People v Guy (1980, 2d Dist) 107 CA3d 593, 165 Cal Rptr 463.
Reasonable cause to conduct an investigation is not merely a
12
13
subjective standard, but one that demands that the facts available to
14
the officer at the time in question would warrant the belief of a
15
person or reasonable caution that the action taken was appropriate.
16
People v Baldwin (1976, 1st Dist) 62 CA3d 727, 133 Cal Rptr 427.
[94]
17
Probable cause for an arrest is shown if a person of
18
ordinary caution or prudence would be led to believe and
19
conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the
20
accused. People v Fischer (1957) 49 C2d 442, 317 P2d 967.
[95]
Cook v Stinger Sewing Machine Co. (1934) 138 CA 418, 32 P2d
23
[96]
People v Hu (1943) 61 CA2d 447, 143 Ped 84.
24
Belief however well-founded, that an article sought is concealed
21
22
430.
25
in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that
26
place without a warrant, and such searches are unlawful notwithstanding
27
facts unquestionably showing probable cause.
28
Dist)
People v Landry (1969, 4th
276 CA2d 370, 80 Cal Rptr 880.
29
[99]
30
Forms: Alleging warrantless search without probable cause, 22 Am
31
Jur P1 & Pr Froms (Rev), Searches and Seizures, Form 83.
32
§ 2510. Reasonable expectation of privacy
33
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and wherever an
34
individual may harbor a reasonable expectation of privacy, he is
35
entitled to be freed from unreasonable governmental intrusion [14].
36
The basic test as to whether there has been an unconstitutional
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
invasion of a person’s privacy is whether he has exhibited a subjective
2
expectation of privacy which is objectively reasonable and, if so,
3
whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable governmental
4
intrusion.
5
circumstances involved in the context of a each case [15].
6
absence of a reasonable privacy expectation, it cannot be successfully
7
claimed that an intrusion without a warrant constitutes a “search”
8
subject to constitutional challenge [16].
9
Reasonableness is dependant on the totality of facts and
In the
In alying the reasonable expectation of privacy test, it has been
10
held, for example, that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of
11
privacy in his bank records, financial statements and cancelled checks
12
[17], in letters and other sealed packages [18]; in information
13
regarding charges made on his credit card [189]; re records of
14
telephone calls made by an individual from his home, office [20]; or
15
hotel room [21]; in his unlisted name; address; and telephone number
16
[21]; in his closed storage locker located in a room in his employer’s
17
premises to which the public was not admitted [22]; in his filed
18
maintained by his attorney [24]; in fire-damaged premises [25]; in
19
motel room [26]; in an enclosed backyard [27] or other outdoor
20
enclosure [28]; in the air space above his property [29]; in a public
21
[30] or private [31] rest room; in the trunk of an automobile [32]; and
22
in a recessed area between the bumper and body of his automobile [33].
23
[14]
United States v Mendenhall (1980) 446 US 544, 64 L Ed 2d
24
497, 100 S Ct 1870, reh den 448 US 908, 65 L Ed 2d 1138, 100 S Ct 3051;
25
People v Medina (1972) 7 C3d 30, 101 Cal Rptr 521, 496 P2d 433; People
26
v Mayberry (1982) 31 C3d 335, 182 Cal Rptr 617, 644 P2d 819; Cohen v
27
Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1970, 2d Dist) 5 CA3d 429, 85 Cal
28
Rptr 354; People v Smith (1977, 5th Dist) 67 CA3d 638, 136 Cal Rptr 764;
29
People v Ammons (1980, 1st Dist) 103 CA3d 20, 162 Cal Rptr 772; People v
30
Ingram (1981, 2d Dist) 122 CA3d 673, 176 Cal Rptr 199.
31
An unreasonable search or seizure is basically an unwarranted
32
invasion of the right of privacy that lies behind the constitutional
33
guarantees prohibiting such searches and seizures.
34
(1955) 44
35
(1954) 347
36
Ed 1083, 74 S Ct 527.
37
38
People v Cahan
C2d 434, 282 P2d 905, 50 ALR2d 513; Irvine v California
US 128, 98 L Ed 561, 74 S Ct 381, reh den 347 US 931, 98 L
An unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of US Const
Fourth Amendment and Cal Const At I § 13, occurs whenever a person’s
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 379
1
reasonable expectation of privacy is violated by governmental
2
intrusion.
3
circumscribed exceptions, such a search is per se unreasonable if it is
4
not conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant.
5
Court of Alameda County (1979) 24 C3d 297, 155 Cal Rptr 559, 594 P2d
6
984.
In the absence of one of a number of carefully
Cleaver v Superior
7
[15] Katz v United States 1967) …. Very long refs…
8
The inquiry as to whether a person invoking the protection of the
9
Fourth Amendment can claim a justifiable, reasonable, or a legitimate
10
expectation of privacy that has been invaded by government action
11
normally embraces two questions: (1) whether the individual, by his
12
conduct, has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,
13
that is, whether he has shown that he seeks to preserve something as
14
private; and (2) whether the individual’s subjective expectation of
15
privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,
16
that is, whether the expectation, viewed objectively, is justifiable
17
under the circumstances.
18
2d 220, 99 S Ct 2577 (not followed People v Sporleder (Colo) 666 P2d
19
135) and (not followed People v Chapman, 36 C3d 98, 201 Cal Rptr 628,
20
678 P2d 62) and (not followed People v Corr (Colo) 682 P2d 20).
21
Smith v Maryland (1979) 442 US 735, 61 L Ed
In order to be constitutionally protected, the individual must
22
exhibit an objective, reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to
23
thearea of search or sezure. People v St. Amour (1980, 1st Dist) 104
24
CA3d 886, 163 Cal Rptr 187 (disagreed with on other grounds People v
25
Agee (3d Dist) 153 CA3d 1169, 200 Cal Rptr 827, hear grby sup ct).
26
[26]
27
A trespass committed by a police officer when he climbed out on a
28
trellis to look into a second floor motel room through an accidental
29
aperture in the curtains was an unreasonable government intrusion and
30
constituted an unreasonable search, where the occupants had exhibited a
31
reasonable expectation of privacy by drawing the curtains on the window
32
of the room, which was located at a considerable distance from any
33
public vantage point. Pate v Municipal Court for Modesto Judicial
34
Deist. (1970, 5th Dist)
35
[27]
11 CA3d 721, 89 Cal Rptr 893.
Vidaurri v Superior Court of San Diego County (1970, 4th
36
Dist) 13 CA3d 550, 91 Cal Rptr 704 (a person who surrounds his backyard
37
with a fence, and limits entry with a gate, locked or unlocked, has
38
shown a reasonable expectation of privacy for that area, and it is
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 380
1
protected from unreasonable government intrusion or search without a
2
warrant, unless the circumstances excuse the warrant).
Although police officer were on legitimate police business of
3
4
investigating defendant’s son when they aroached defendant’s house, the
5
officers could have determined at the front door that no one was at
6
home.
7
defendant’s home ended.
8
surpassed what was reasonable under the circumstances, for no exigency
9
existed to justify suspension of defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Once this determination was made, their official business at
By trespassing into the backyard, the
10
The police were conducting a routine investigation, merely looking for
11
a suspect to interview; no evidence showed that defendant’s son was
12
dangerous or even that he was attempting to evade the law.
13
Winters (1983, 4th Dist) 149 CA3d 705, 196 Cal Rptr 918.
14
[32]
People v
The trunk of an automobile is recognized as the area of a
15
vehicle as to which there is the greatest expectation of privacy.
16
Independent justification is required therefore, before the trunk may
17
be searched.
18
Dist) 63 CA3d 990, 134 Cal Rptr 174.
19
WHAT CONSTITUTES “SEARCH” “OR SEIZURE”
People v Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1976, 2d
20
Summary
21
The word “search” implies some exploratory investigation, or a
22
looking for and seeking out.
A “seizure” is an arrest or determination
23
of an individual or a forcible dispossession of property from its owner
24
or custodian (§ 2511).
25
unreasonable searches and seizures are directed against governmental
26
action; they do not aly to a search by a private citizen who is not
27
acting as an agent of the state or other governmental unit (§2512).
28
The activities of the government in attaching electronic devices to
29
intercept confidential oral or wire communications constitute a “search
30
and seizure,” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and comply
31
with constitutional standards only when authorized by a neutral
32
magistrate on a showing of probable cause and under precise limitations
33
and appropriate safeguards (§2513).
The constitutional prohibitions against
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
§ 2511. In general
2
The word “search” implies some exploratory investigation, or an
3
invasion or quest, a looking for and seeking out [51].
4
a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed and that is the
5
object searched for has been hidden or intentionally put out of the way
6
[52].
7
expressly or implicitly invited, a search has begun [53].
If observations are made from a place to which the public is not
A search takes place not only when the police are prying into
8
9
It also implies
hidden places for that which is concealed or viewing that which is
10
intended to be private; a search can also occur whenever there is a
11
governmental intrusion upon, or invasion of, a citizen’s personal
12
security in an area in which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy
13
[54]. A search occurs whenever the intrusion is for the purpose of
14
facilitating the discovery and gathering of incriminating evidence,
15
whether the contemplated discovery or gathering is immediate or not
16
[55].
17
designed to gather evidence and instrumentalities of crime [56].
18
For purposed of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
A search can occur while the police are engaged in an activity
19
unreasonable searches and seizures, an individual who is taken into
20
custody by police, transported to the police station without being told
21
he is under arrest, and detained at the police station for
22
interrogation is “seized”.
23
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has “seized” that
24
person [57].
25
property form its owner or custodian, as distinguished from a voluntary
26
surrender [58].
27
Whenever a police officer accosts an
A “seizure” also refers to a forcible dispossession of
The following actions, inter alia, have been held to constitute a
28
“search”, within the meaning of the constitutional provisions:
29
installation of a tracking device in an airplane [59], an investigating
30
officer’s conduct in entering upon a private driveway area and looking
31
[51]
Bielicki v Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1962) 57
32
C2d 602, 21 Cal Rptr 552, 371 P2d 288; People v Edwards (1956, 1st Dist)
33
142 CA2d 419, 298 P2d 664; People v West (1956, 2d Dist) 144 CA2d 214,
34
300 P2d 729; People v Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1969, 2d
35
Dist) 2 CA3d 131, 82 Cal Rptr 507; People v Ammons (1980, 1st Dist) 103
36
CA3d 20, 14 Cal Rptr 772; People v Haugland (1981, 2d Dist) 115 CA3d
37
248, 171 Cal Rptr 237.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 382
[52]…. People v Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1969, 2d
1
2
Dist) 2 CA3d 131, 82 Cal Rptr 507; People v Superior Court of Santa
3
Clara County (1970, 1st Dist) 3 CA3d 636, 84 Cal Rptr 81.
[53] People v Ammons (1980, 1st Dist) 103 CA3d 20, 162 Cal Rptr
4
5
81.
[54]
6
United States v Jacobsen (1984, US) 80 L Ed 2d 85, 104 S
7
Ct 1652 (a “search” occurs when an expectation of privacy that society
8
is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed); People v Mayberry
9
(1982) 31 C3d 335, 182 Cal Rptr 617, 644 P2d 810; People v Smith (1977,
10
5th Dist) 67 CA3d 638, 136 Cal Rptr 764.
[55] People v Smith (1977, 5th Dist) 67 CA3d 638, 136 Cal Rptr
11
12
764.
[56] People v Smith (1977, 5th Dist) 67 CA3d 638, 136 Cal Rptr
13
14
764.
15
§ 2512. Private searches
16
The constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and
17
seizures are directed against government action.
They do not aly to a
18
search or seizure by a private citizen who is not acting as an agent of
19
the state or other governmental unit [75]
20
prohibitions do not aly to private individuals, unless they are
21
participating in a joint activity or in cooperation with law
22
enforcement officers.
23
of , or with the participation of, the police, is subject to the
24
constitutional prohibitions.
The constitutional
However, a search conducted at the instigation
25
§ 2513. Interception of communications
26
The activities of the government in attaching an electronic
27
listening and recording device to the outside of a telephone booth from
28
which the suspect placed his calls constitutes a "search and seizure,"
29
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; the fact that electronic
30
eavesdroing of private conversations is a search or seizure, it can
31
comply with constitutional standards only when authorized by a neutral
32
magistrate on a showing of probable cause and under precise limitations
33
and appropriate safeguards [89]
34
35
There is no unreasonable search or seizure when the police
eavesdrop on a conversation between the accused and an informant by
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 383
1
means of a radio transmitter concealed
on the informant's person [91].
2
3
Letters and sealed packages subject to first class postage in the
4
mail are as fully guaranteed from examination and inspection, except as
5
to their outward form and weight, as if retained by the senders in
6
their own domiciles.
7
only under warrant, issued on similar oath or affirmation particularly
8
describing the thing to be seized, as required where papers are subject
9
to search in one's own household.
While in the mail they may be opened and examined
No law of Congress can place in the
10
hands of officials connected with the postal service any authority to
11
invade the secrecy of letters and sealed packages in the mail; and all
12
regulations adopted as to mail matter o this kind must be in
13
subordination to the principle embodied in the Fourth Amendment of the
14
United States Constitution [98].
15
[98]
Weeks v United States (1914) 232 US 383, 58 L Ed 652, 34 S
16
Ct 341 (ovrld on other grounds Elkins v United States, 364 US 206, 4 L
17
Ed 2d 1669, 80 S Ct 1437); Olmstead v United States (1928) 277 US 438,
18
72 L Ed 944, 48 S Ct 564, 66 ALR 376 (disaroved on other grounds Berger
19
v New York, 388 US 41, 18 L Ed 2d 1040, 87 S Ct 1873, conformed to 20
20
NY2d 801, 284 NYS2d 456, 231 NE2d 132) and (ovrld on other grounds Katz
21
v United States, 389 US 347, 19 L Ed 2d 576, 88 S Ct 507).
22
The protection against unreasonable search and seizure of one's
23
papers or other effects, guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, extends to
24
their presence in the domestic mails, and first-class mail packages
25
moving entirely within the United States cannot be seized and retained,
26
or opened and searched, without the authority of a search warrant.
27
28
People v Superior Court of Butte County (1969, 3d Dist) 275 CA2d
489, 79 Cal Rptr 904.
29
As to interception of international mail see § 2553.
30
Annotations: Opening, search, and seizure of mail, 61 ALR2d 1282;
31
Validity, under Fourth Amendment, of "mail cover", 57 ALR Fed 742.
32
2. Investigations Falling Short of Search §§ 2514-2518
33
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 384
1
SEARCH WARRANTS
2
Summary
3
A search warrant is a written order, signed by a magistrate, and
4
directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
5
property and bring it before the magistrate (§ 2591).
6
whenever practical, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and
7
seizures through the warrant procedure (Sec 2520).
8
circumstances, the sufficiency and reliability of evidence used to
9
justify a search must be made by a neutral and detached magistrate,
The police must,
Absent exigent
10
rather than by a police officer engaged in the often competitive
11
enterprise of ferreting out crime (§ 2521).
12
§ 2520. Necessity for obtaining
13
The police must, whenever practible, obtain advance judicial
14
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure [40].
15
Searches conducted outside the judicial process, witout prior approval
16
by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under Fourth
17
Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and well
18
delineated exceptions [41],
19
arrest [42] or searches with the suspect's consent [43]. In the
20
ordinary case, a search of private property must be both reasonable and
21
performed pursuant to a properly issued search warrant.
22
reasonableness of a search, assessed in the light of the surrounding
23
circumstances, is not a substitute for the judicial warrant required
24
under the Constitution [44].
25
such as searches incident to a lawful
The mere
The only legal means by which the private premises of an
26
individual can be searched, in the absence of reasonable ground for
27
arrest of an occupant thereof [45], is by use of a search warrant.
28
Neither a private person nor an officer may break in on the privacy of
29
premises and subject its occupants to the indignity of a search for
30
evidence of crime without a legal warrant for that purpose [46].
31
possession by the police of facts constituting grounds for the issuance
32
of a warrant to search particular premises does not validate a search
33
made without a warrant [47.
34
the immediate arrest of an occupant, belief grounded on facts showing
35
probable cause that on article sought as contraband is concealed in a
The
Thus, in the absence of probable cause for
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 385
1
dwelling is no justification for searching the premises without a
2
warrant [48].
3
used for residential purposes, such as homes [49], apartments [50], or
4
hotel rooms [51], although a warrant is not required to search a hotel
5
room once it has been vacated by the tenant [52].
6
other parts of premises under an occupant's control, such as a garage
7
[53].
10
implementing statutes is to arise the householder that the search has
been authorized by a magistrate [56]
[40]
11
12
It also extends to
A secondary purpose of the constitutional provisions and
8
9
The necessity for a search warrant alies to all premises
People v Torralva (1971, 1st Dist) 17 CA3d 686, 94 Cal Rptr
900.
13
A police officer who believes he has probable cause to search a
14
house must aly for a search warrant rather than take the law into his
15
own hands.
16
officer's belief, the warrant will issue.
17
proper course is for the officer to renew his investigation and
18
lawfully develop additional facts which will suort an inference of
19
probable cause.
20
constitution itself which strikes the balance in favor of the citizen's
21
right to privacy.
22
privacy through alication of search and sezure law, the courts must
23
consider the expectations of the innocent as well as the guilty.
24
innocent people are subjected to illegal searches, their rights are
25
violated even though such searches turn up no evidence of guilt.
26
People v Cook (1978) 22 C3d 67, 148 Cal Rptr 605, 583 P2d 130
27
(superseded by statute as stated in People v Truer (5th Dist) 157 CA3d
28
345, 203 Cal Rptr 693, hear gr by sup ct).
If a neutral and detached magistrate concurs in the
However, if he does not, the
If he remains unable to do so, it is the state
In seeking to honor reasonable expectations of
29
In the absence of one of a number of carefully circumscribed
30
exceptions, a search is per se unreasonable if it is not conducted
31
pursuant to a valid search warrant.
32
Alameda County (1979) 24 C3d 297, 155 Cal Rptr 559, 594 P2d 984.
When
Cleaver v Superior Court of
33
[41] see § 2534
34
[42] see § 2536
35
[43] see § 2555
36
[44] People v Dalton (1979) 24 C3d 850, 157 Cal Rptr 497, 598 P2d
37
38
467, cert den 445 US 946, 63 L Ed 2d 781, 100 S Ct 1345.
As to presumptions and burden of proof see Sec 2577
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 386
1
[46]
Badillo v Superior Court of San Francisco (1956) 46 C2d
2
269, 294 P2d 23.
Forms: Alleging illegal warrantelss search by state official, 22
3
4
Am Jur P1 & Pr Forms (Rev), Searches and Seizures, Form 81; Alleging
5
illegal warranteless search by federal agents, 22 Am Jur P1 & Pr Forms
6
(Rev) Searches and Seizures, Form 82.
[47]
7
Agnello v United States (1925) 269 US 20, 70 L Ed 145, 46 S
8
Ct 4, 51 ALR 409 (ovrld on other grounds United States v Havens, 446 US
9
620, 64 L Ed 2d 559, 100 S Ct 1912, 6 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1, reh den
10
448 US 911, 65 L Ed 2d 1172, 101 S Ct 25 and on remand (CA5 Fla) 625
11
F2d 1311, cert den 450 US 995, 68 L Ed 2d 195, 101 S Ct 1697); Marron v
12
United States (1925, CA9 Cal) 8 F2d 251.
Belief grounded on facts unquestionably showing probable cause
13
14
that an article subject to seizure is concealed in a dwelling is no
15
justification for search without a warrant. Bell v United States (1925,
16
CA9 Cal) 9 F2d 820; United States v Baldocci (1930, DC Cal) 42 F2d 567.
[48] People v Fein (1971) 4 C3d 747, 94 Cal Rptr 607, 484 P2d
17
18
583; bell v United States (1925, CA9 Cal) 9 F2d 820; United States v
19
Baldocci (1930, DC Cal) 42 F2d 567.
[49]
20
21
22
23
People v Cahan (1955) 44 C2d 434, 282 Ped 905, 50 ALR2d
513.
Annotations: Premises temporarily unoccupied as dwelling within
provision forbidding unreasonable searches of dwellings, 33 ALR2d 1430.
24
[53]
People v Dixon (1956) 46 C2d 456, 296 P2d 557.
25
Ops Atty Gen: 24 Ops Atty Gen 95, 100 (the right to be free from
26
unreasonable search and seizure extends to a place of business, an
27
office a hotel room or a garage, though there are indications that the
28
home may be entitled to a higher degree of sanctity than an office of
29
place of business).
30
§ 2521. Issuance by neutral and detached magistrate.
31
Federal and state constitutional provisions [54] require that
32
decisions about the sufficiency and reliability of evidence used to
33
justify a search be made by a neutral and detached magistrate, rather
34
than by a police officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
35
ferreting out crime.
36
rather than a police officer, must make the decision that probable
Absent exigent circumstances, the magistrate,
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 387
1
cause exists to belive that a person or object to be seized is within a
2
particual place.
3
persuasivenss of the facts relied on by a complaining officer to show
4
probable cause for the warrant [55].
5
The magistrate must judge for himself the
A secondary purpose of the constitutional provisions and
6
implementing statutes is to arise the householder that the search has
7
been authorized by a magistrate [56].
8
9
[55]
Stegald v United States (1981) 451 US 204, 68 L Ed 2d 38,
101 S Ct 1642, on remand (CA5 Ga) 656 F2d 109, reh gr (CA5 Ga)664 F2d
10
1241, on reh (CA5 Va) 664 F2d 1242 and (not followed United States v
11
Underwood (CA9 Cal) 693 F2d 1206, op withdrawn (CA9) 704 F2d 1059);
12
People v Minjares (1970) 24 C3d 410, 153 Cal Rptr 224, 591 P2d 514,
13
cert den 444 US 887, 62, L Ed 2d 117, 100 S Ct 181; People v Superior
14
Court of Los Angeles County (1977, 2d Dist) 75 CA3d 76, 141 Cal Rptr
15
917; People v Superior Court of San Francisco (1979, 1st Dist) 94 CA3d
16
367, 156 Cal Rptr 416; Kaylor v Superior Court of Nevada County (1980,
17
3d Dist) 108 CA3d 451, 166 Cal Rptr 598.
18
The requirements of a search warrant is not an empty formality,
19
but is the cornerstone of the guaranty of the right to privacy provided
20
by US Const Fourth Amendment.
21
probable cause will be made by a neutral and detached magistrate,
22
rather than an officer under stress in the field is not a minor
23
guaranty.
24
executing officer and his need to search are carefully reviewed.
25
Limits are imposed on the search through the requirement of
26
particularity, and the factual basis on which the affiant is justifying
27
the search is made in advance of the search itself.
28
a search will not be impermissibly justified by what it turns up.
29
People v Dalton (1979) 24 C3d 850, 157 Cal Rptr 497, 598 P2d 467, cert
30
den 445 US 946, 63 L Ed 2d 781, 100 S Ct 1345.
The assurance that a determination of
Under the warrant requirement, the authority of the
31
As to showing of probable case see § 2525
32
As to exigent circumstances see §2535
33
[56]
34
35
36
37
This insures that
People v Superior Court Los Angeles County (1977, 2d Dist)
75 CA3d 76, 141 Cal Rptr 917.
2. Grounds § 2522
§ 2522. In general
A search warrant may be issued on any of the following grounds:
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 388
1
(1) when the property was stolen or embezzled [57]; (2) when the
2
property or things were used as the means of committing a felony [58];
3
(3) when the property or things are in the possession of any person
4
with the intent to use it as a means of committing a public offense, or
5
in the possession of another to whom he or she may have delivered it
6
for the purpose of concealing it or preventing its being discovered
7
[59]; (4) when the property or things to be seized consist of any item
8
or constitutes any evidence which tends to show a felony has been
9
committed, or the ends to show that a particular person has committed a
10
felony [60]; or (5) when the property or things to be seized consist of
11
evidence which tends to show that sexual exploitation of a child, in
12
violation of a specified provision of the Penal Code, has occurred or
13
is occurring [61].
14
Cause for issuance of an inspection warrant [62] is deemed to
15
exist if either reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
16
conducting a routine or area inspection are satisfied with respect to
17
the particular place, dwelling, structure, premises, or vehicle, or
18
there is reason to believe that a condition of nonconformity exists
19
with respect to the particular place, dwelling, structure, premises, or
20
vehicle [63].
21
The Penal Code provides for the issuance, upon a proper
22
complaint, of a warrant authorizing an officer to enter and search any
23
building or place, and to arrest any person there present violating, or
24
attempting to violate, any law relating to, or in any way affecting,
25
dumb animals, or birds, and the Penal Code further provides for seizure
26
of birds and animals used in violation of law [64].
27
28
29
No warrant may issue for certain designated types of news sources
described in a particular provision of the Evidence Code [65]
Statutes authorizing the use of search warrants to search for and
30
seize property the possession or use of which is declared by the
31
legislature to be illegal or detrimental to public health or morals are
32
not incompatible with the constitutional guarantees against
33
unreasonable searches and seizures [66].
34
35
36
[61]
Deerings's Pen C § 1524(a)(5) (referring to sexual
exploitation of a child in violation of Pen C § 311.3).
[65]
Deerings's Pen C § 1524(g) (referring to Ev C Sec 1070,
37
relating to immunity of news reporters for nondisclosure of specified
38
news sources).
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 389
1
2
3. Alication § 2523-2527
Summary
A warrant cannot be issued except upon probable cause, suorted by
3
4
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched
5
and the persons and things to be seized (§ 2523).
6
before issuing the warrant, examine on oath the person seeking the
7
warrant and any witnesses he may produce, and must take the affidavits
8
in writing, and cause them to be subscribed by the party making them (§
9
2524).
The magistrate may,
As a matter of constitutional law, a search warrant should not
10
issue where the affidavit does not provide a sufficient basis for a
11
finding of probable cause (§ 2525).
12
sanctions for negligent or innocent misstatements of fact, or omissions
13
of fact, in a search warrant affidavit, and compels mere excision of
14
misstatements that are intentional or reckless (§ 2526).
15
on mere information and belief, not stating the evidence on which such
16
belief is predicated, does not satisfy constitutional requirement
17
pertaining to probable cause for the issuance of search warrants, but
18
informant hearsay evidence in an affidavit may furnish proper suort for
19
a magistrate's finding of probable cause on issuance of a search
20
warrant (§ 2527).
21
22
§ 2523. In general; affidavit
The federal and state constitutions forbid the issuance of a
23
search warrant except on "probable cause," suorted by oath or
24
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the
25
persons and things to be seized [67].
26
almost the same language, that a search warrant cannot be issued except
27
on probable cause, suorted by affidavit, naming or describing the
28
person, and particularly describing the property and the place to be
29
searched [68].
The Fourth Amendment imposes no
A deposition
The Penal Code provides, in
The affidavit or affidavits must set forth the facts tending to
30
31
establish the grounds of the alication for a warrant, or probable cause
32
for believing that they exist [69].
33
alicable, that the place to be searched is in the possession or under
34
the control of an attorney, physician, psychotherapist, or clergyman
35
[70].
36
and definitely specify the time of occurrence of the events relied upon
37
to justify the issuance of a warrant, and that not more than a
38
reasonable amount of time has elapsed between the events and the making
The alication must specify, when
A further requirement for a valid affidavit is that it clearly
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
of the affidavit [71].
A search warrant is not rendered invalid by
2
being based on an affidavit that establishes a future, rather than a
3
present, probable cause search [72]. However, the use of presigned
4
warrants or the alteration of affidavits after issuance of warrants
5
constitutes a reversible error [73].
An inspection warrant [74] is issued only upon cause, suorted by
6
7
affidavit, particularly describing the place, dwelling, structure,
8
premises, or vehicle to be searched and the purpose for which the
9
search is made.
In addition, the affidavit must contain either a
10
statement that consent to inspection has been sought and refused or
11
facts or circumstances reasonably justifying the failure to seek such
12
consent [75].
Where property is seized under a search warrant unlawfully
13
14
issued, the seizure cannot be legalized by the issuance of a second
15
warrant based on information obtained through the first search and
16
seizure [76].
17
searching premises is unlawful in the first instance, a search warrant
18
subsequently obtained on the basis of what they then observed is
19
invalid, so that a search or seizure the reunder is unlawful and
20
unreasonable [77].
And where the conduct of police officers in entering and
21
[68]
22
As to descriptions of person and property in affidavit, see §
23
Deerings's Pen C § 1525
2529
Forms: Alleging failure of alication for warrant to particularly
24
25
describe person or place to be searched, 22 Am Jur P1 & Pr Forms (Rev),
26
Searches and Seizures, Form 51; Alleging lack of probable cause for
27
warrant, 22 Am Jur P1 & Pr Forms (Rev), Searches and Seizures, Form
28
104.
29
[71] People v Nelson (1959, 1st Dist) 171 CA2d 356, 340 P2d 718
30
(ovrld on other grounds People v Butler, 64 C2d 842, 52 Cal Rptr 4, 415
31
P2d 819); Rugendorf v United States (1964) 376 US 528, 11 L Ed 2d 887,
32
84 S Ct 825, reh den 377 US 940, 12 L Ed 2d 303, 84 S Ct 1330.
33
[73]
People v Murgia (1974, 4th Dist) 43 CA3d 85, 117 Cal Rptr
34
564 (defendant's criminal conviction required reversal where the
35
evidence leading to defendant's arrest and conviction was seized
36
pursuant to a search warrant which was issued one day before the
37
suorting affidavit was executed; the danger posed by the possible use
38
of pre-signed warrants or the alteration of affidavits after issuance
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
of warrants is too great for the court to consider the matter an
2
inconsequential irregularity).
3
[74] See § 2519.
4
[75] Deering's CCP § 1822.51
5
[76] United States v Mitchell (1921, DC Cal) 274 F 128.
6
7
§ 2524. Examination by magistrate
The magistrate may, before issuing the warrant, examine on oath
8
the person seeking the warrant and any witnesses he may produce, and
9
must take the affidavits in writing, and cause them to be subscribed by
10
11
the party making them [78].
In lieu of the written affidavit, the magistrate may take an oral
12
statement under oath which must be recorded and transcribed.
The
13
transcribed statement is deemed an affidavit for purposed of this
14
statute.
15
the transcribed statement must be certified by the magistrate receiving
16
it and they must be filed with the clerk of the court. ..
In such cases, the recording of the sworn oral statement and
17
Before issuing an inspection warrant [80], the judge may examine
18
on oath the alicant and any other witness, and must satisfy himself of
19
the existence of grounds for granting the alication [81].
20
21
§ 2525. Showing of probable cause
A search warrant cannot be issued except on probable cause,
22
suorted by oath or affirmation [82].
23
law, a search warrant should not issue where the affidavit does not
24
provide a sufficient basis for a finding or probable cause.
25
evidence obtained as a result of such a search warrant is inadmissible
26
in a criminal trial, state as well as federal [83].
27
warrant to satisfy the constitutional requirement of probable cause,
28
the affidavit on which it is based must contain competent evidence
29
sufficient to suort the finding of the issuing magistrate [84].
30
search warrant affidavit must provide probable cause to believe the
31
material to be seized is still on the premises to be searched when the
32
warrant is sought [85].
33
As a matter of constitutional
The
For a search
A
In determining the sufficiency of an affidavit for a search
34
warrant, the standards as to probable cause set down by the United
35
States Supreme Court in its alication of the Fourth Amendment to
36
affidavits used in the federal system must be followed [86].
37
decision to issue a search warrant must rest primarily with the
38
magistrate to whom alication is made, and a court may set aside a
The
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
warrant only if, as matter of law, the affidavit or deposition on which
2
it is based shows, on its face, that the probable cause required by the
3
Constitution and by the Penal Code is lacking [87].
4
validity of a search warrant, a reviewing court may consider only
5
information brought to the magistrate's attention [88].
In passing the
In determining the sufficiency of an affidavit for the issuance
6
7
of a search warrant, the test of probable cause is aroximately the same
8
as that applicable to an arrest without a warrant, a commitment by a
9
magistrate, or an indictment by a grand jury [89].
10
However, the probable cause needed for the issuance of a search
11
warrant is less than that needed for a search without a warrant [90].
12
In determining probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the
13
question is not whether the offense charged was in fact committed but
14
whether the affiant, at the time of his affidavit, has reasonable
15
grounds for belief that the law was being violated on the premises to
16
be searched, and if the aarent facts recited in the affidavit would
17
lead a reasonably prudent person to that belief, there is reasonable
18
cause to issue the warrant [91].
19
search warrant exists if a person of ordinary care and prudence would
20
be led to conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that
21
a crime has been or is being committed, or that there is specific
22
property subject to seizure in the location for which a warrant is
23
sought [92].
Probable cause for issuance of a
24
[82] See § 2523
25
[83] Aguilar v Texas (1964) 378 US 108, 12 L Ed 2d 723, 84 S Ct
26
1509 (ovrld on other grounds Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 76 L Ed 2d
27
527, 103 S Ct 2317, reh den (US) 77 LEd 2d 1453, 104 S Ct 33 and (not
28
followed People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 465 NYS2d 867, 452 NE2d 1185) as
29
stated in People v Ward (3d Dep) 99 A Div 2d 561, 470 NYS2d 943) and
30
(not followed United Stated v Peyko (CA2 Vt) 717 F2d 741) and (not
31
followed State v Anderson (Utah) 668 P2d 1258) and (not followed
32
Commonwealty v Honneus, 390 Mass 136, 453 NE2d 1053
[84]
33
Skelton v Superior Court of Orange County (1969) 1 C3d 144,
34
81 Cal Rptr 613, 460 P2d 485; People v Garnett (1970, 1st Dist) 6 CA3d
35
280, 85 Cal Rptr 769; Re M. (1971, 2d Dist) 16 CA3d 96, 93 Cal Rptr
36
679.
[85] People v Smith (1980, 5th Dist) 108 CA3d 843, 166 Cal Rptr
37
38
778.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 393
[86]
1
Aguilar v Texas (1964) 378 US 108, 12 L Ed 2d 723, 84 S Ct
2
1509 (ovrld on other grounds Illonios v Gates, 462 US 213, 76 L Ed 2d
3
527, 103 S Ct 2317, reh den (US) 77 L Ed 2d 1452, 104 S Ct 33 and (not
4
followed People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 465 NYS2d 875, 452 NE2d 1185) as
5
stated in People v Ward (3d Dept) 99 A Div 2d 561, 470 NYS2d 943) and (
6
[87]
7
A search warrant is issued without probable cause, and therefore
8
in violation of constitutional proscriptions, when the affidavit upon
9
which it is based
contains no competent evidence sufficient to suort
10
the finding of a magistrate, the indicated questions of competency and
11
sufficiency being quesions of law.
12
78 Cal Rptr 491, 455 P2d 419.
People v Scoma (1969) 71 C2d 332,
In passing upon a determination of whether a search warrant was
13
14
issued upon probable cause, a reviewing court is bound by the rule that
15
the warrant can be used only if the affidavit fails as a matter of law
16
to set forth sufficient evidence suortive of the magistrate's finding
17
of probable cause, since it is the function of the trier of fact, not
18
the reviewing court, to appraise and weigh evidence when presented by
19
affidavit as well a when presented by oral testimony. People v Superior
20
Court of Santa Clara County (1979, 1st Dist) 91 CA3d 463, 154 Cal Rptr
21
157.
A search warrant can be used only if the suorting affidavit fails
22
23
as a matter of law to set forth sufficient competent evidence suortive
24
of the magistrate's finding of probable cause; it is the function of
25
the trier of fact, not a reviewing court, to appraise and weigh
26
evidence when presented by affidavit.
27
sufficiency of the facts therein to suort the magistrate's finding of
28
probable cause, the courts are to interpret the affidavit in a
29
commonsense no technical manner.
30
CA3d 236, 171 Cal Rptr 203.
In examining the affidavit for
People v Caron (1981, 2d Dist) 115
Search warrant affidavits should be viewed and construed as a
31
32
whole in a commonsense manner. Because of the preference accorded to
33
warrants, doubtful or marginal cases will be resolved to uphold the
34
warrant.
35
172.
People v Caron (1981, 2d Dist) 155 CA3d 769, 203 Cal Rptr
36
As to the reasonable of probable cause See § 2509.
37
Annotations:
38
Disputation of truth of matters stated in affidavit
in suort of search warrant-modern cases, 24 ALR4th 1266; Counsel's
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
right in criminal prosecution to argue law or to read law books to the
2
jury, 67 ALR2d 245; Federal court determination of probable cause for
3
search warrant: consideration of oral testimony which was, in addition
4
to affidavit, before officer who issued warrant, 24 ALR Fed 107.
5
Law Review: Right to controvert affidavit suorting a warrant, 61
6
CLR 467; Rulde governing probable or reasonable cause for issuance of
7
search warrant, 15 SCLR 139; The outwardly sufficient search warrant
8
affidavit what if it's false?, 19 UCLA LR 96.
9
Forms:
Alleging failure of alication for warrant to show
10
probable cause to issue warrant, 22 Am Jru P1 & Pr Forms (rev) Searches
11
and Seizures, Form 52.
12
[89]
Skelton v Superior Court of Orange County (1969) 1 C3d 144,
13
81 Cal Rptr 613, 460 P2d 485; People v Garnett (1970, 1st Dist) 6 CA3d
14
280, 85 Cal Rptr 769.
15
As to reasonable or probable cause for arrest without a warrant,
16
see § 2467
17
[90]
18
A reviewing court will pay substantial deference to the
19
magistrate's determination of probable cause, and may sustain a search
20
where one without a warrant would fail.
21
115 CA3d 236, 171 Cal Rptr 203.
People v Caron (1981, 2d Dist)
22
As to probable cause needed for a warrantless search see § 2509
23
[91]
People v Acosta (1956, 4th Dist) 142 CA2d 59, 298 P2d 29;
24
Arata v Superior Court of San Mateo County (1957, 1st Dist)153 CA2d
25
767, 315 P2d 473 (ovrld on other grounds Peole v Butler, 64 C2d 842, 52
26
Cal Rptr 4, 415 P2d 819); Williams v Justice Court for Orville Judicial
27
District. (1964, 3d Dist) 230 CA2d 87, 40 Cal Rptr 724; People v
28
Garnett (1970, 1st Dist) 6 CA3d 280, 85 Cal Rptr 769.
29
The affidavit in suort of a search warrant must furnish
30
sufficient competent evidence to suort the magistrate's finding of
31
probable cause and must describe with reasonable particularity the
32
place to be searched and the property to be seized, the test for the
33
latter being whether the warrant places a meaningful restriction on the
34
object to be seized.
35
62 Cal Rptr 891.
36
People v Alvarado (1967, 2d Dist) 255 CA2d 285,
A suspect's past criminal record is a proper factor to consider
37
in determining whether probable cause to search exists.
38
Thomas (1980, 2d Dist) 112 CA3d 980, 169 Cal Rptr 570.
People v
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
2
§ 2526 Misstatement or omission of fact.
.. To mandate an evidentiary hearing, subsequent to the ex parte
3
issuance of a search warrant, a criminal defendant, challenging the
4
truthfulness of factual statements made in the warrant affidavit, must
5
make a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly
6
and intentionally, or reckless disregard for the truth, was included by
7
the affiant in the warrant affidavit.... There must be allegations,
8
accompanied by an offer of proof, of deliberate falsehood or of
9
reckless disregard for the truth; allegations of negligence or innocent
10
11
mistake are insufficient [97].
On the other had, state courts, relying on California law, have
12
determined that deliberate or reckless misstatements in the warrant
13
affidavit compel automatic quashing of the search warrant [98], and
14
that unreasonable or negligent misstatement of fact in an affidavit for
15
a search warrant must be excised and their remainder tested by the
16
standard of probable cause [99]
17
.... On the other hand, when an affiant intentionally omits any
18
fact from a search warrant affidavit for the purpose of deceiving the
19
magistrate of recklessly disregards the accuracy and completeness of
20
the affidavit, appropriate response of the court reviewing the
21
affidavit is to quash the warrant, regardless of whether the omissions
22
ultimately deemed material [6].
23
..
24
When a material fact is negligently omitted from a search warrant
25
affidavit, the reviewing court should add the omitted fact to the
26
affidavit and retest it for probable cause.
27
material facts, unreasonably forgets to include them, or makes a good
28
faith but unreasonable decision that they need not or should not be
29
included [8]
Negligent omissions of
30
[98]
31
If an affidavit is found to contain deliberately false statements
32
of fact, the entire affidavit is tainted and evidence obtained pursuant
33
to the search warrant must be excluded. People v Tallmadge (1980, 2d
34
Dist) 103 CA3d 980, 163 Cal Rptr 372.
35
36
§ 2527. Hearsay and informant information
A deposition on mere information and belief, not stating the
37
evidence on which such belief is predicated, does not satisfy
38
constitutional requirements pertaining to probable cause for the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
issuance of search warrants [9].
But a deposition that sets forth the
2
commission of alleged offense and the location of the property sought,
3
not on information but in positive terms, is not subject to attack for
4
failure to set forth the evidence rather than the ultimate facts [10].
5
Both the state and federal courts have held that informant
6
hearsay evidence in an affidavit may furnish proper suort for a
7
magistrate's finding of probable cause on issuance of a search warrant
8
[11].
9
relevant on the issue of probable cause on an alication for a search
Although information provided by an anonymous informer is
10
warrant, corroborating evidence must be presented to justify the
11
conclusion that reliance on the information was reasonable [12]
12
..
13
An affidavit in suort of a search warrant based on information
14
received by the affiant from an informant should allege the informant's
15
statement in language that is factual rather than conclusory, it should
16
establish that the informant spoke with personal knowledge of the
17
matter contained in such statement, and it should contain some
18
underlying factual information from which the magistrate issuing the
19
warrant can reasonably conclude that the informant was credible or his
20
information reliable [15].
In
21
...
22
In determining the reliability of informants upon whose
23
information search warrants are based, the courts recognize a
24
distinction between "citizen-informants" acting openly in aid of law
25
enforcement and criminally involved or disposed "police-informers."
26
The strict requirement of a showing of reliability and credibility is
27
ordinarily addressed to the particular problem of criminal informers
28
and should not be alied in a wooden fashion to cases where the
29
information comes from an alleged victim of or witness to a crime [17].
30
[9]
31
The issuance of a search warrant based on an affidavit of
32
suspicion and belief, without any statement of facts and circumstances
33
from which the issuing officer can find probable cause therefore,
34
violates the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
35
(1933)
290 US 41, 78 L Ed 159, 54 S Ct 11.
36
[12]
37
In the absence of any proof of having given reliable information
38
in the past with regard to criminal activity, corroborating evidence is
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 397
1
necessary to establish the credibility of a confidential informant.
2
People v Levine (1984, 2d Dist) 152 CA3d 1058, 199 Cal Rptr 756.
3
[15]
4
Probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant was not shown
5
where the affidavit contained no reason in suort of the conclusion that
6
the informant was "reliable," and where the affidavit did not
7
sufficiently state the underlying circumstances from which the
8
informant concluded that the defendant was engaged in criminal
9
bookmaking activity.
Spinelli v United States (1969) 393 US 410, 21 L
10
Ed 2d 637, 89 S Ct 584 (ovrld on other grounds United States v Harris,
11
403 US 573, 29 L Ed 2d 723, 91 S Ct 2075) as stated in United States v
12
Andrews (CA5 Mich) 600 F2d 108, 100 S Ct 166 and (overld on other
13
grounds Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 76 L Ed 2d 527, 103 S Ct 2317,
14
reh den (US) 77 L Ed 2d 1453, 104 S Ct 33 and as stated in People v
15
Ward (3d Dept) 99 A Div 2d 561, 470 NYS2d 943
16
[17] People v Schulle (1975, 1st Dist) 51 CA3d 809, 124 Cal Rptr
17
585; People v Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1979, 1st Dist) 91
18
CA3d 463, 154 Cal Rptr 157.
19
A citizen-informant is a citizen who purports to be the victim of
20
or to have been the witness of a crime who is motivated by good
21
citizenship and acts openly in aid of law enforcement. It is reasonable
22
for police officers to act upon the reports of such an observer of
23
criminal activity.
24
just as conclusionary as the designation "reliable-informant", and in
25
either case the conclusion must be suorted by facts stated in an
26
affidavit in suort of a search warrant based on hearsay statements of
27
such an informant.
28
553 P2d 557.
29
However, the designation "citizen-informant" is
People v Smith (1976) 17 C3d 845, 132 Cal Rptr 397,
In regard to the use of information sulied by informers in an
30
affidavit for a search warrant, the status of a person as a "citizen-
31
informer" does not eliminate the necessity of establishing that his or
32
her information was reliable, and facts should be stated relative to
33
the informant's identity which indicate the reliability of the
34
information given.
35
Cal Rptr 455.
36
People v Robinson (1974, 1st Dist) 41 CA3d 658, 116
Because experienced stool pigeons or persons criminally involved
37
or disposed are generally motivated by something other than good
38
citizenship in providing information to law enforcement officers, they
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
are not regarded as reliable informants for the purposes of the
2
issuance of search warrants.
3
(1979, 1st Dist) 94 CA3d 367, 156 Cal Rptr 416.
4
People v Superior Court of San Francisco
To establish the credibility of a criminal informant, either he
5
must be shown to have given reliable information in the past with
6
regard to criminal activity, or the information he is presently giving
7
is corroborated.
8
Cal Rptr 171.
9
People v Schimidt (1980, 1st Dist) 102 CA3d 172, 162
4. Issuance Sec § 2528, 2529.
10
11
§ 2529 Form and contents
A search warrant must be substantially in the form prescribed in
12
the Penal Code [26].
13
and statutory provisions for its issuance.
14
public officials are presumed to act legally in the performance of
15
their duties, a duly issued warrant is prima face valid [27].
16
It must conform strictly to the constitutional
But, under the rule that
A search warrant must be signed by the magistrate with his name
17
of office, and directed to a peace officer in his county, commanding
18
him forthwith to search the person or place named, for the property or
19
things specific, and to retain such property or things in his custody
20
subject to order of the court [28]. An inspection warrant [29] must
21
particularly describe each place, dwelling, structure, premises, or
22
vehicle to be inspected and designate the purpose and limitations of
23
the inspection, including the limitations required by the code [30]
24
25
The magistrate may orally authorize a peace officer to sign the
magistrate's name on a duplicate original warrant.
26
A search warrant is irregular and void on its face as a seizure
27
of property their under is concerned, where it fails to describe with
28
particularity the property to be taken [40]
29
[23]
Ops Atty Gen: 61 Ops Atty Gen 487 (a commissioner of a
30
municipal court who is sworn as a temporary judge of the municipal
31
court does not have the authority to issue search warrants, a temporary
32
judge may issue bench warrants.
33
Forms: Alleging lack of authority to issue search warrant, 22 Am
34
Jur P1 & Pr Forms (Rev), Searches and Seizures, Form 58; Alleging
35
search warrant issued by non-neutral magistrate, 22 Am Jur P1 & Pr
36
Forms (Rev), Searches and Seizures, Form 59.
37
[26] Deering's Pen C § 1529.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
2
Forms: Search warrant, 22 Am Jur P1 & Pr, Searches and Seizures,
Form 21, 22; 1
3
Searches and Seizures, Form 15:3, 15:4, 15:13.
4
[27]
5
Absent some palpable indication to the contrary, it is assumed
6
the magistrate considered all the material presented him in suort of an
7
alication for a search warrant, but this assumption is not indulged
8
where substantial irregularity appears on the face of the record.
9
People v Jordan (1984, 4th Dist) 155 CA3d 769, 203 Cal Rptr 172
10
As to presumptions and burden of proof see § 2577
11
5. Execution § § 2530-2533
12
13
§ 2530 in general
.... A search warrant may be served only between the hours of
14
7:00 A.M. and 10:00 P.M., unless the magistrate issuing it, on a
15
showing of good cause, inserts a direction in the warrant that it may
16
be served at a time of the day or night [54].
17
...
18
An inspection pursuant to an inspection warrant [57] may not be
19
made between 6:00 P.M. of any day and 8:00 A.M. of the succeeding day,
20
nor in the absence of an owner or occupant of the particular place,
21
dwelling, structure, premises, or vehicle unless specifically
22
authorized by the judge upon a showing that such authority is
23
reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the regulation being
24
enforced [58].
25
26
§ 2532. Time of execution
A search warrant must be executed and returned within ten days
27
after date of issuance.
28
must be deemed to have been timely executed, and no further showing of
29
timeliness need be made.
30
warrant, unless executed, is void.
31
A warrant executed within the ten-day period
After the expiration of ten days, the
An inspection warrant [69] is effective for the time specified
32
therein, but not for a period of more than fourteen days, unless
33
extended or renewed by the judge who signed and issued the original
34
warrant, upon satisfying himself that the extension of renewal is in
35
the public interest... After the expiration of such time, the warrant,
36
unless executed, is void[70]
37
§ 2533 Knock and notice rule.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
In executing a search warrant, the officer to whom it is directed
2
may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any
3
part of a house, or anything therein, if, after notice of his authority
4
and purpose, he is refused admittance, [71]
5
[71]
Failure to comply with the knock-notice requirements of Pen
6
C § 1531 before entering premises to execute a search warrant renders
7
any search and seizure dependent thereon unreasonable within the
8
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and, as a consequence, any evidence
9
seized pursuant thereto is inadmissible.
10
People v Constancio (1974, 3d
Dist) 42 CA3d 533, 116 Cal Rptr 910.
11
D. Searches and Seizures Without Warrant § § 2534 2559
12
1. Generally
13
Summary
14
Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without proper
15
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
16
Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and
17
well-delineated exceptions (§ 2534).
18
magnitude, or exigent circumstances, may justify a search conducted
19
without prior judicial approval (§ 2535).
20
21
§ 2534. In general
Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without proper
22
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
23
Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and
24
well-delineated exceptions [84].
25
Emergencies of overriding
Because of the limitations on the use of search warrants [85],
26
the most important problem as to searches and seizures, both from the
27
point of view fo the adequacy of permissible law enforcement techniques
28
and from the point of view of individual liberty as against police
29
intrusions, is the extent to which searches without warrants are
30
permitted [86].
31
only from searches and seizures that are "unreasonable," which may be
32
taken generally to mean "unlawful,"
33
The constitutional guaranties protect the individual
[84] Katz v United States (1967) 389 US 347, 19 L Ed 2d 576, 88 S
34
Ct 507; Mincey v Arizona (1978) 437 US 385, 57 L Ed 290, 98 S Ct 2408;
35
People v Minjares (1979) 24 C3d 410, 153 Cal Rptr 224, 591 P2d 514,
36
cert den 444 US 887, 62 L Ed 2d 117, 100 S Ct 181; People v Dalton
37
(1979) 24 C3d 850, 157 Cal Rptr 497, 598 P2d 467, cert den 445 US 946,
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 401
1
63 L Ed 2d 781, 100 S Ct 1345; People v Chapman (1984) 36 C3d 98, 201
2
Cal Rptr 628, 679 P2d 62; People v Barker (1970, 1st Dist) 12 CA3d 826,
3
96 Cal Rptr 760; People v Hampton (1981, 1st Dist) 115 CA3d 515, 171
4
Cal Rptr 312.
A search without a warrant is presumed unreasonable, and cannot
5
6
be justified by probable cause alone, nor may exigency alone do so.
7
People v Bradley (1982, 4th Dist) 132 CA3d 737, 183 Cal Rptr 434.
Annotations: Lawfulness of nonconsensual search and seizures
8
9
without warrant, prior to arrest, 89 ALR2d 715, 721.
Law Reviews: Lawful searches and seizures without warrant, 43 CLR
10
11
12
13
14
565
Forms: Alleging warrantless search not incident to arrest, 2 Am
Jur P1 & Pr Forms (Rev), Searches and Seizures, Form 86.
[85] see Sec 2523
15
16
§ 2535. Emergencies; exigent circumstances
The cardinal principle of the Fourth Amendment is that a warrant
17
is required unless some grave emergency can be shown that necessitates
18
an immediate search without a warrant [94].
19
security is involved, the Fourth Amendment requires judicial approval
20
before initiation of a search or surveillance [95].
21
22
Even where domestic
Emergencies of overriding magnitude, or exigent circumstances may
justify a search conducted without prior judicial approval [96].
23
...
24
.. However, a warrantless search is not justifiable simply
25
because a homicide recently occurred at the scene of the search, nor
26
because the officers had begun their search promptly on arriving at the
27
scene and my have searched only for evidence establishing the
28
circumstances of death or circumstances relevant to motive, intent, or
29
knowledge [4].
30
not in itself create exigent circumstances of the kind that under the
31
Fourth Amendment will justify a warrantless search, where there is no
32
emergency threatening life or limb, no indication that evidence will be
33
lost, destroyed or removed during the time required to obtain a search
34
warrant, and no suggestion that a warrant cannot easily and
35
conveniently be obtained [5].
36
The seriousness of the offense under investigation does
There is no really "litmus" test for determining whether
37
emergency or exigent circumstances exist, and in each case the claim of
38
an extraordinary situation must be measured by the facts known to the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 402
1
police officer at the time of the search [6].
A search without warrant must be strictly circumscribed by the
2
3
exigencies which justify its initiation.
4
cease to exist, the exception also ceases to exist and a warrant must
5
be obtained [7].
[94] People v Minjares (1979) 24 C3d 410, 153 Cal Rptr 224, 591
6
7
When those circumstances
P2d 514, cert den 444 US 887, 62 L Ed 2d 117, 100 S Ct 181.
8
Where police officers are not responding to an emergency, there
9
must be compelling reasons and exceptional circumstances to justify a
10
search in the absence of a search warrant.
Mozzetti v Superior Court
11
of Sacramento County (1971) 4 C3d 699, 94 Cal Rptr 412, 484 P2d 84.
12
With respect to alication of the "doctrine of necessity" to a
13
search without a warrant, the constitutionally guaranteed right to
14
privacy must prevail, in the absence of a showing of a substantial
15
threat to life, health, or property.
16
101 Cal Rptr 893, 496 P2d 1261.
People v Smith (1972) 7 C3d 282,
The presence of a search warrant serves a high function.
17
Absent
18
grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate
19
between the citizen and the police.
20
criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities.
21
was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that
22
privacy in order to enforce the law.
23
constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant
24
without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional
25
mandate that the exigencies of this situation made that course
26
imperative.
27
Rptr 434.
It
Courts cannot be true to that
People v Bradley (1982, 4th Dist) 132 CA3d 737, 183 Cal
[95] United States v United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist.
28
29
This was not done to shield
(1972) 407 US 297, 32 L Ed 752, 92 S Ct 2125.
Annotations: Construction and alication of "national security"
30
31
exceptions to Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement, 39 ALR Fed
32
646.
33
[96]
34
As to burden of proving emergency see § 2577
35
As to emergencies or exigent circumstances see § 2462
36
[5] Mincey v Arizona (1978) 437 US 385, 57 L Ed 2d 290, 98 S Ct
37
2408.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 403
1
2. Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest or Detention § § 2536-2544
2
3
§ 2536. In general
The right, without a search warrant, to search the person, as an
4
incident to arrest, has always been recognized in this country and
5
England.
6
action of officers, it was not unreasonable to search him.
7
is a permissible area of search beyond the person proper. A limited
8
right to search exists in connection with a lawful arrest, whether made
9
with or without a warrant of arrest by a police officer or private
Where one was placed in the custody of the law by the valid
And there
10
person.
11
for instrumentalities used to commit the crime, the fruits of that
12
crime, and other evidence thereof which will aid in the arehension or
13
conviction of the criminals; for articles the possession of which is
14
itself unlawful, such as contraband or goods known to be stolen; and
15
for weapons which can be used to assault the arresting officer or to
16
effect an escape.
17
Searches incident to an arrest have been limited to searches
Not every person undergoing arrest may be searched for weapons.
18
The issue is whether a reasonably prudent person under the
19
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that
20
of other was in danger [12].
21
search was not justified when the search was incident to a citation for
22
an ordinary traffic violation[13], for breach of an ordinance against
23
having open camp fires [14], or for public intoxication by liquor [15].
Thus, it has been held that a warrantless
24
25
Probable cause for an arrest is ordinarily identical with
26
probable cause for a search incident thereto, but there are
27
circumstances in which a search may be unreasonable and unlawful
28
whether or not a contemporaneous arrest of the suspect is lawful, and
29
cannot be made to suort the arrest and subsequent prosecution.
30
it might be that an arrest could be justified if it aeared after the
31
fact that the person arrested had committed a felony, but a search
32
cannot be justified by what it turns up, and a search incidental to an
33
arrest cannot be justified in the absence of reasonable cause known to
34
an officer prior to the search merely by the fact that it reveals that
35
the suspect has actually committed a felony and is hence subject to
36
arrest [18].
37
[18].
Thus,
People v. Brown (1955) 45 C2d 640, 290 P2d 528; People v.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 404
1
Simon (1955) 45 C2d 645, 290 P2d 531; People v. Boyles (1955) 45 C2d
2
652, 290 P2d 535.
3
4
§ 2537. Arrest for offense committed in presence of arresting officer.
A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant whenever he
5
has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has
6
committed a public offense in his presence [31].
7
reasonable cause to believe an offense has been committed in his
8
presence, he has reasonable cause, without a warrant, to search the
9
person and premises of the person he has arrested.
10
When the officer has
Reasonable or probable cause for an arrest and incidental search
11
by an officer acting without a warrant must exist in the officer's mind
12
before the arrest [33].
13
believing that a felony was committed in his presence where the facts
14
do not point to any identifiable felony for which the defendant could
15
have been arrested [34].
16
An officer cannot have reasonable grounds for
...
17
18
§ 2538. Arrest based on belief that arrestee has committed felony
A peace officer, without a warrant, may arrest a person whom he
19
has reasonable cause to believe has committed a felony, whether or not
20
a felony has in fact been committed [38]. To justify the search of such
21
a person, reasonable and probable cause for the arresting officer's
22
belief that the person has committed a felony must be measured by the
23
facts presented to the officer at the time he is required to act.
24
circumstances to be considered include the time of day or night, the
25
location of the suspect’s activities, and the suspect's conduct.
26
27
§ 2539. Arrest based on information obtained from others
Reasonable cause for arrest and search is not limited to evidence
28
that would be admissible at a trial on the issue of guilt, but may
29
consist of information obtained form persons other than those who carry
30
out the arrest and search.
31
and search without a warrant, it is not the number of informants
32
involved but the reliability of an informant and the reasonableness of
33
the information sulied that should be considered by the officer [53].
34
In this connection, a person whose information has in the past led
35
police to valid and guilty suspects may be termed a "reliable
36
informant"[54].
37
38
[53]
The
In determining whether to make an arrest
People v.Gallegos (1964) 62 C2d 176, 41 Cal.Rptr. 590, 397
P2d 174 (a search and seizure was unreasonable where officers who
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 405
1
arrested defendant and searched his premises acted on information from
2
an informant who was under the influence of narcotics and whose
3
reliability was unknown).
4
Where a search or arrest without a warrant is sought to be
5
justified on the basis of information secured from an allegedly
6
reliable informant, his reliability may be substantiated not only by
7
past experience showing him to have been a source of tested reliable
8
information, i.e., information that in the past has led police to valid
9
suspects, but also by the substantial corroboration from other sources
10
of the information given in the present case.
People v Bates (1958,
11
1st Dist)
12
13
§ 2540 Temporary detention.
The Fourth Amendment alies to searches and seizures that involve
14
only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.
15
stop and search must be justified by some objective manifestation that
16
the person stoed is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity, or
17
there must be reasonable grounds to believe that the person is wanted
18
for past criminal conduct [63].
163 CA2d 847, 330 P2d 102.
An investigatory
19
§ 2542. Booking or incarceration
20
... It has been held that accelerated booking searches are
21
inappropriate for arrestees who are merely cited for misdemeanors and
22
are not subject to the booking process [82].
23
[82]
People v Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1972) 7 C3d
24
186, 101 Cal Rptr 837, 496 P2d 1205 (traffic violation); People v
25
Brisendine (1975) 13 C3d 528, 19 Cal Rptr 315, 531 P2d 1099 (ilegal
26
open campfire); People v Longwill (1975) 14 C3d 943, 123 Cal Rptr 297,
27
538 P2d 753 (overld on other grounds People v Laiwa, 34 C3d 711, 195
28
Cal Rptr 503, 669 P2d 1278) (Public drunkenness).
29
§ 543. Probation and parole
30
A person on parole or probation retains many of his civil rights,
31
including the protection of the constitutional guaranty against
32
unreasonable searches and seizures [89].
33
police officers other than parole officers are not justified in
34
conducting a search of the parolee's premises without a search warrant
35
or the parolee's consent, they may accompany a parole officer in such a
36
search [92].
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 406
1
..
2
The defendant may, as an express condition of his parole or
3
probation, agree to submit to warrantless searches.
4
parole of probation officers must comply with the terms of the
5
agreement [96].
6
invalid if it is not reasonably related to the crime for which the
7
probationer was convicted [97].
However, the condition of a warrantless search is
[89] People v Jasso (1969, 2d Dist) 2CA3d 955, 82 Cal Rptr 229 (a
8
9
In such cases, the
probationer enjoys the protection of constitutional guaranties against
10
unreasonable searches and seizures of his home, absent some other legal
11
basis for the search); People v Howard (1978, 2d Dist) 79 CA3d 46, 143
12
Cal Rptr 342; In re Alan R. (1982, 3d Dist) 132 CA3d 601, 183 Cal Rptr
13
325.
14
An order prohibiting a probationer from carrying weapons does not
15
subject him to a pat-down search for weapons by a police officer at any
16
time; even a probationer hose rights have been radically restricted by
17
court imposed conditions of probation is not without rights under the
18
Fourth Amendment.
19
Rptr 66.
[92]
20
21
People v Grace(1973, 4th Dist) 32 CA3d 447, 108 Cal
People v Thompson (1967, 1st Dist) 252 CA2d 76, 60 Cal Rptr
203, cert den 392 US 930, 20 L Ed 2d 1388, 88 S Ct 2276.
That a person is on parole does not, in itself, justify search by
22
23
peace officers other than parole officers.
People v Gilkey (1970, 1st
24
Dist) 6 CA3d 183, 85 Cal Rptr 642, cert den 401 US 924, 27 L Ed 2d 827,
25
91 S Ct 887.
26
[96]
27
A consent to search clause, to be a valid condition of probation
28
or parole, must bear a reasonable relationship to the crime committed
29
and the protection of the public, and such a clause is strictly
30
construed.
31
than the grounds for an arrest or search warrant, to trigger the
32
search.
33
harassment or merely because the subject haens to be a probationer or
34
parolee, but must be based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal
35
activity.
36
555.
37
38
There must also be a reasonable cause, which may be less
Additionally, such a search may not be for purposes of
People v Guerrero (1978, 5th Dist) 85 CA3d 572, 149 Cal Rptr
Although a search of defendant's belongings was a condition of
his parole, there was a condition of his parole, there was no authority
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 407
1
to suort the proposition that such a search extended to the private
2
belongings of the parolee's wife who lived with the parolee.
3
Beronica (1980, 2d Dist) 107 CA3d 906, 166 Cal Rptr 109.
People v
4
§ 2544. Questions of law and fact; review
5
The determination of the existence of reasonable or probable
6
cause for and arrest may be a question of fact of the jury where the
7
evidence on the point is in conflict.
SEARCHES OF PREMISES OF EFFECTS
8
9
§ 2545. In general
Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
10
11
presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment [7].
... In determining whether the officer acted reasonably, due
12
13
weight must be given to his unparticularized suspicions or hunches, but
14
to the reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the
15
facts in the light of his experience; he must be able to point to
16
specific and articulable facts form which he concluded that his action
17
was necessary [9].
[7]
18
19
Payton v New York(1980) 445 US 573, 63 L Ed 2d 639, 100 S Ct
1371.
20
Absent consent or exigent circumstances, a private home may not
21
be entered to conduct a search or effect an arrest without a warrant.
22
Donovan v Dewey (1981) 452 US 594, 69 L Ed 2d 262, 101 S Ct 2534.
23
Annotations: Premises temporarily unoccupied as dwelling within
24
provision forbidding unreasonable search of dwellings, 33 ALR2d 1430.
25
26
27
[9] Guidi v Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1973) 10 C3d 1,
109 Cal Rptr 684, 513 P2d 908.
VEHICLE SEARCHES
28
§ 2547 In general
29
A warrant is ordinarily required for the search of an automobile
30
[26] or a ship [27].
31
...
32
The search of an automobile, whether pursuant to a warrant or
33
not, must be suorted by probable cause.
Probable cause exists to
34
conduct a search without warrant of an automobile, where a police
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 408
1
officer is aware of facts that would lead a person of ordinary caution
2
or prudence to believe, and consciously to entertain, a strong
3
suspicion that the object of the search is in the particular place to
4
be searched.
5
use the public highways and have a right to free passage thereon
6
without interruption or search, unless a public officer authorized to
7
search knows of probable cause for believing that the vehicle is
8
carrying contraband or that its occupants have violated some law [32].
9
In the absence of such probable cause, a search without a warrant is
Persons lawfully within the United States are entitled to
10
unreasonable.
11
authorized to stop every automobile on the mere chance of finding
12
contraband or criminals and thus subject all persons lawfully using the
13
highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such search [33].
14
for local police on specific occasions to block off designated portions
15
of a city and stop all automobiles entering or leaving the blocked off
16
area, and to search them without having first obtained a search warrant
17
and without having probable cause for believing them to be carrying
18
contraband is unreasonable and in violation of the constitutional
19
guarantees [34].
20
is not enough in itself to justify a search of the automobile without a
21
warrant or probable cause to believe there is contraband in the vehicle
22
[35], and the right to search an automobile without a warrant does not
23
extend to allow the search of an occupant of the vehicle, other than
24
the driver, without a warrant or unless incidental to lawful arrest
25
[36].
26
It would be intolerable and unreasonable if police were
Thus,
Moreover, the presence of suspects in an automobile
In early cases, it was held that warrantless vehicle searches
27
must be based on both probable cause and exigent circumstances [37].
28
However, under current law, probable cause to believe that a lawfully
29
stoed automobile contains contraband justifies an immediate warrantless
30
search of the automobile, despite the absence of any additional exigent
31
circumstances [38].
32
The random stop of a drive in order to check the driver’s license
33
and the registration of the automobile constitutes an unreasonable
34
seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, where the police
35
officer has no articulable and reasonable suspicion that the motorist
36
is unlicensed or that the automobile is not registered, or that either
37
the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for
38
violation of law.
There is no justification for subjecting every
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 409
1
occupant of every vehicle on the roads to a seizure at the unbridled
2
discretion of law-enforcement officials on the basis of a state
3
interest in promoting roadway safety [39].
[26] People v Blodgett (1956) 46 C2d 114, 293 P2d 57; People v
4
5
Gale (1956) 46 C2d 253, 194 P2d 13.
Law Rev: Constitutional limitations on automobile searches, 3
6
7
Loyola U of LA LR 95.
8
[27] Atlas Finance Corp. v Kenny (1945) 68 CA2d 504, 157 P2d 401.
9
Annotations: Authority of United States officials to conduct
10
inspection or search of American registered vessel located outside
11
territorial waters of United States, 40 ALR Fed 402.
12
13
14
[31]
In traffic violation cases, search for a weapon without a warrant
15
must be based on specific facts giving the officer reasonable grounds
16
to believe weapons to be present in the stoed vehicle.
17
(1975) 14 C3d 929, 123 Cal Rptr 109, 538 P2d 237.
People v Norman
18
[32] Wirin v Horrall (1948) 85 CA 2d 497, 193 P2d 470.
19
Every citizen has the constitutional right to free passage on the
20
public highways. The mere possibility that a motor vehicle may be used
21
for criminal activity is insufficient of itself to justify a stop and
22
search.
23
freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious
24
conduct associated in some manner with criminality, is a fundamental
25
constitutional right which must be protected by the courts.
26
Glover (1979, 1st Dist) 93 CA3d 376, 155 Cal Rptr 592.
The right of the citizen to drive on a public street with
People v
27
[33] People v Gale (1956) 46 C2d 253, 294 P2d 13.
28
[34] Wirin v Horrall (1948) 85 CA 2d 497, 193 P2d 470.
29
[35] Henery v United States (1959) 361 US 98, L Ed 2d 134, 80 S
30
31
32
33
Ct 168.
[36] United States v Di Re (1948) 332 US 98, 4 L Ed 2d 134, 80 S
Ct 168.
[37] Coolidge v New Hampshire (1971) 403 US 443, 29 L Ed 2d 564,
34
91 S Ct 2022, reh den 404 US 874, 30 L Ed 2d 120, 92 S Ct 26 and (ovrld
35
on other grounds Washington v Chrisman, 455 US 1, 70 L Ed 2d 778, 102 S
36
Ct 812 (where police knew of the presence of the automobile and planned
37
all along to seize it, there were no exigent circumstances justifying
38
their failure to obtain a valid warrant); People v Huff (1978, 1st
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 410
1
Dist) 83 CA3d 549, 147 Cal Rptr 316.
A search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the
2
3
Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope;
4
consequentially, the scope of an automobile search, like any other
5
search, must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances
6
occasioning it.
7
(1976) 16 C3d 557, 128 Cal Rptr 641, 547 P2d 417.
The mobility of an automobile makes it particularly susceptible
8
9
Wimberly v Superior Court of San Bernardino County
to searches under the exigent circumstances exception to the
10
requirement of a search warrant.
As long as it can be demonstrated
11
that exigent circumstances rendered the obtaining of a warrant an
12
impossible or impractical alternative and probable cause existed for
13
the search, a search without a warrant of an automobile can be
14
conducted.
15
search or seizure absent exigent circumstances.
16
to an automobile which may give rise to exigent circumstances are that
17
the care is movable, the occupants are alerted and the car's contents
18
may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained, but absent such
19
circumstances, US Const Fourth Amendment requires a warrant.
20
no general automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
21
Odom (1980, 4th Dist) 108 CA3d 100, 166 Cal Rptr 283.
However, no amount of probable cause can justify such a
The elements peculiar
There is
People v
Both probable cause and exigent circumstances must exist to
22
23
justify the search of an automobile without a warrant.
24
effects have been lawfully seized from an automobile and placed within
25
a police officer's exclusive authority, and immediate search of the
26
automobile is not necessary and a warrant must be obtained for its
27
search.
28
control of a police officer, the fact that the item was lawfully seized
29
does not validate the search of the item itself.
30
(1980, 5th Dist) 110 CA3d 528, 168 Cal Rptr 44.
33
When an item taken from an automobile is in the exclusive
People v George
[39] Delaware v Prouse (1979) 440 US 648, 59 L Ed 2d 660, 99 S Ct
31
32
Once personal
391.
IDENTITY OR BEHAVIOR OF OCCUPANT
34
...
35
An automobile occupant's conduct reasonably susceptible of
36
innocent interpretation does not constitute probable cause to search
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 411
1
the vehicle incident to citation for a traffic violation.
2
incident to such citation is constitutionally authorized only if the
3
conduct would induce a reasonable person to believe hat contraband or
4
weapons are being concealed [51].
5
that something is being concealed will justify a search of that portion
6
of the vehicle where it appears that the object was hidden [52].
7
the other hand, to constitute probable cause for an arrest or search
8
without a warrant, a furtive gesture alone is not sufficient.
9
be coupled with prior reliable information known to the officer or with
10
11
A search
However, futive conduct indicating
On
It must
additional suspicious circumstances observed by him [53]
[51]
A search of a car cannot be justified on the ground that
12
the driver might be arrested for double parking, since the search would
13
have no relation to the traffic violation and would not be a reasonable
14
incident to an arrest therefore.
15
293 P2d 57.
People v Blodgett (1956) 46 C2d 114,
16
In traffic violation cases, a search without a warrant for
17
weapons, like a search for contraband, must be based on specific facts
18
or circumstances giving the officer reasonable grounds to believe that
19
such weapons are present in the vehicle he has stoed; and where a
20
traffic officer observed the passenger in a speeding car bend down and
21
the driver of the car stop and walk toward the patrol car without
22
waiting for the officer to aroach, such observations did not justify a
23
belief that the driver and passenger were in possession of weapons.
24
People v Superior Court of Yolo County (1970) 3 C3d 807, 91 Cal Rptr
25
729, 478 P2d 449, 45 ALR3d 559.
26
A search of an automobile in which suspects were riding when
27
arrested for making an unlawful u-turn cannot be justified where it
28
bears no relation to the traffic violation or to a vagrancy charge on
29
which the suspects were booked.
30
CA2d 129, 303 P2d 350.
People v Molarius (1956, 3d Dist) 146
31
Stoing the driver of a car for a violation of Veh C § 27150
32
("loud pipes"), did not authorize a search of the interior of the car.
33
People v Muniz (1970, 2d Dist) 4 CA3d 562, 84 Cal Rptr 501.
34
Although a traffic violation is technically under arrest during
35
the period immediately preceding his execution of a promise to aear,
36
neither he nor his vehicle may be searched on that ground alone; the
37
right to search must depend on other circumstances.
38
Court of Marin County (1971, 1st Dist) 14 CA3d 935, 92 Cal Rptr 545.
People v Superior
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 412
1
A police officer's investigation relating to the detention
2
required to issue a warning or citation for a minor traffic or vehicle
3
violation is limited.
4
produce his driver's license and the registration certificate for the
5
vehicle, and he may interrogate the driver with respect to the
6
violation or violations which he has observed, but, absent some
7
suspicious circumstances he may not search the driver or the vehicle,
8
and he may not conduct an exploratory interrogation designed to elicit
9
incriminating information wholly unrelated to the matter at hand.
10
He may require the driver to identify himself,
People v Grace (1973, 4th Dist) 32 CA3d 447, 108 Cal Rptr 66.
11
[53]
12
When a motorist stoed by a police officer on a traffic offense,
13
is seen to make a suspicious movement and is asked by the officer to
14
explain it, the motorist may elect to stand on his constitutional right
15
not to cooperate with the officers in securing evidence against him.
16
In such a case, probable cause for the officer's search of the vehicle
17
for either contraband or weapons must be predicted on specific facts or
18
circumstances (other than the mere negative response by the driver)
19
that giver reasonable grounds to believe that contraband or weapons are
20
present.
21
855, 97 Cal Rptr 693, 489 P2d 573.
Gallik v Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1971) 5 C3d
22
[56]
23
To be incident to a lawful arrest, a search without a warrant
24
must be limited both as to time and place, and once an accused is
25
safely in custody at the station house, removed from the vicinity of
26
his car, the reasons justifying such a search of a vehicle as incident
27
to the arrest no longer obtain.
28
CA3d 614, 106 Cal Rptr 461.
29
People v Balassy 91973, 2d Dist) 30
CONSENT
30
§ 2556 What constitutes; voluntariness
31
Consent to a search without warrant must be unequivocal,
32
specific, and freely and intelligently given [37].
33
...
34
Where no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority is
35
shown, the burden of proving consent is not discharged, and the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 413
1
admission of plainly damaging evidence obtained throughout the search
2
is prejudicial error [41].
3
the door of a private dwelling may be a disturbing experience, and a
4
request to enter made by such officers to a distraught or timid person
5
might under certain circumstances carry with it an implied assertion of
6
authority that the occupant should not be expected to resist [42].
7
The appearance of four police officers at
[37] Whether consent to a search is voluntary is a question of
8
fact; the lower court's determination will not be overturned where it
9
is suorted by substantial evidence People v. Abbott 91970, 1st Dist) 3
10
CA3d 966, 84 Cal Rptr 40.
11
[42]
People v Michael 91955) 45 C2d 751, 290 P2d 852.
12
§ 2559
13
Voluntary consent to a search may be withdrawn at any time before
14
the search is completed, and actions inconsistent with a previous
15
consent to a search may act as a withdrawal, if those actions are
16
positive in nature
17
SCOPE AND MANNER OF SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
18
§ 2560 In general
19
A search must be conducted in a reasonable manner and must be
20
limited in scope to the search for evidence relating to the crime
21
suspected or charged.
22
In addition to the requirement of reasonable or probable cause
23
for a search [4], a search without a warrant must be conducted in a
24
reasonable manner and must be limited in scope to the search for
25
evidence relating to the crime suspected or charged [5].
26
On the other hand, forcible entries or seizures without either a
27
warrant or reasonable cause for arrest are illegal and hence
28
unreasonable [15].
29
stealth, or subterfuge [16]
The same is true of entries gained by trickery,
30
[4] see sec. 2509
31
[5] People v Winston (1956) 46 C2d 151, 293 P2d 40.
32
The scope of a search must be strictly tied to, and justified by,
33
the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible [7].
34
search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth
A
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 414
1
Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope[8].
2
§ 2561
3
Seizure under a search warrant is limited to the articles
4
specified by statute, and a warrant to search for one thing does not
5
ordinarily justify seizure of another
6
§ 2563. Disposition of seized property
7
... If it appears that the property taken is not the same as that
8
described in the warrant, or that there is no probable cause for
9
believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued,
10
the magistrate must cause the property seized to be resorted to the
11
person from whom it was taken [54].
12
duty on the magistrate.
13
currency taken under a search warrant where the affidavit for the
14
warrant did not mention or describe the currency [55].
15
This provision imposes a mandatory
Thus, the magistrate must order the return of
PARTICULAR TYPES OF SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
16
§ 1565. Place, time, and duration
17
...The right to make a contemporaneous search without a warrant
18
upon lawful arrest has been limited to the arrestee's person and to the
19
area under the arrestee's immediate control [72].
20
his immediate control" means the area form within which the arrestee
21
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence [73].
The phrase "within
22
[72]
23
A search, though incident to a lawful arrest, may be unlawful
24
because it was unreasonable in scope; scope must be strictly tied to
25
and justified by the particular circumstances which initially permitted
26
the search.
27
186, 101 Cal Rptr 837, 496 P2d 1205.
28
People v Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1972) 7 C3d
[73] Chimel v California 91969) 395 US 752, 23 L Ed 2d 685, 89 S
29
Ct 2034, reh den 396 US 869, 24 L Ed 2d 124, 90 S Ct 36 (where police
30
officers, after arresting the accused in his home for burglary of a
31
coin shop, conducted a warrantless search of his entire three-bedroom
32
house, including the attic, the garage, a small workshop, and various
33
drawers, the search went far beyond the person of the accused and the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 415
1
area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or
2
something that could have been used as evidence against him, and was
3
not authorized in the absence of a search warrant).
4
§ 2566. Search of persons.
5
... in the absence of exigent circumstances[83], a body search
6
must be based on probable cause and be conducted pursuant to a warrant
7
[84].
8
[85]
9
The federal courts have upheld border searches of body cavities,
10
including such searches carried out in spite of the violent resistance
11
of the person searched, but there must be a clear indication of the
12
possession of narcotics or of smuggling which must be over and beyond a
13
mere suspicion, i.e., in the absence of a clear indication that in fact
14
such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require
15
law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disaear unless
16
there is an immediate search Henderson v United States (1967, CA9 Cal)
17
390 F2d 805.
18
SEARCH & SEIZURE REMEDIES
19
§ The proceedings provided for in the statute relating to motions
20
for the return of property seized or for the suppression of property as
21
evidence [46], and in those provisions relating to motions to set aside
22
an indictment or information [47], to motions to reinstate a complaint
23
[48], and to aealable decisions [49], constitute the sole and exclusive
24
remedies, prior to conviction, to test the unreasonableness of a search
25
or a seizure where the person making the motion for the return of the
26
property or the suppression of evidence is a defendant in a criminal
27
case an the property or thing has been offered or will be offered as
28
evidence against him [50].
29
authorizing search and seizure motions for the return of property or
30
the suppression of evidence [51] prohibits a person from making a
31
motion, otherwise permitted by law, to return property, brought on the
32
ground that the property obtained is protected by the free speech and
33
press provisions of the federal and state constitutions [52].
However, nothing contained in the statute
34
Those affected by an allegedly unconstitutional search and
35
seizure involving a third person have the right to challenge its
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 416
1
legality in a court of law [53].
Thus, defendant who was arrested for
2
offering to sell cocaine had the right to challenge the legality of a
3
search without warrant of an apartment in which a police officer
4
interc3epted defendant's telephone call, during which defendant offered
5
to sell cocaine to the officer who posed as a friend of the occupant of
6
the apartment [54].
A number of additional remedies ay be available to a person who
7
8
is threatened with an illegal search.
Thus, a person who is threatened
9
with an illegal search, whether of his person or premises, may be able
10
to avail himself of the provisions of the Penal Code section [55]
11
authorizing resistance sufficient to prevent an offense against his
12
person or an illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his
13
lawful possession [56].
14
premises can resist force with force, increasing it, short of
15
commission of homicide, in the ratio of the intruder's resistance [57].
16
This is the common-law rule that the lawful occupant of premises has
17
the right forcibly to eject trespassers if the force used in not
18
excessive [58].
19
search and seizure, a person does not need to forcibly resist an
20
officer's assertion of authority to enter his home to search it or his
21
person, so long as he does not expressly or impliedly consent to the
22
entry or search [59].
It has been held that a person defending his
To protect his right to object to an unreasonable
23
[46] see §§ 3182 et seq.
24
[47] see §§ 2774 et seq
25
[48] see § 2718
26
[49] see §§ 3586 et seq
27
[53] People v Harwood (1977, 2d Dist) 74 CA3d 460, 141 Cal Rptr
28
519.
[54] People v Hawood (1977, 2d Dist) 74 CA3d 460, 141 Cal Rptr
29
30
519.
31
[55] Deering's Pen C § 693.
32
[56] People v Ross (1912) 19 CA 469, 126 P 375.
33
As to lawful resistence in defense of property generally, see §§
34
35
36
293, 557, 2285.
[57] People v Hubbard (1923) 64 CA 27, 220 P 315; Lorenz v Hunt
(1928) 89 CA 6, 264 P 336.
37
[58] Phelps v Arnold (1931) 112 CA 518, 297 P 31.
38
[59] People v Michael (1955) 45 C2d 751, 290 P2d 852.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 417
CIVIL ACTIONS
1
The victim of an unlawful search and seizure can recover any
2
3
property illegally seized by a civil action for its return [60].
4
addition, the owner of seized property can bring a suit for damages for
5
its detention, as well as damages for any trespass involved [61].
6
the property has been destroyed, recovery can be had for its value
7
[62].
8
resulting from the invasion of privacy [63].
9
In
If
And, in a proper case, recovery can be had for mental suffering
Individuals participating in unreasonable searches and seizures
10
are subject to civil liability under the federal statutes pertaining to
11
civil rights [64].
12
[60] Ligda v Edmonds (1971, 1st Dist) 16 CA3d 715, 94 Cal Rptr
13
234 (replevin or claim and delivery); Franklin v Municipal Court for
14
San Francisco Judicial Dist. (1972, 1st Dist) 26 CA3d 884, 103 Cal Rptr
15
354 (conversion).
16
-- Writ of Mandate for return of seized property.
17
As to motion for return of property made in criminal proceedings,
18
19
see §§ 3182 et seq.
[61] Ryan v Crist (1914) 23 CA 744, 139 P 436; People v
20
Gershenhorn 91964, 2d Dist) 225 CA2d 122, 37 Cal Rptr 176 (suspended by
21
statute on other grounds as stated in People v Laiwa, 34 C3d 711, 195
22
Cal Rptr 503, 669 P2d 1278).
23
Annotations: Construction and alication of provision of Omnibus
24
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS § 2520) authorizing
25
civil cause of action by person whose wire or oral communication is
26
intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of Act, 25 ALR Fed 759;
27
Survivability of actions against federal officials for damages based on
28
alleged constitutional violation, 48 ALR Fed 587.
29
Forms: Complaint for trespass under invalid search warrant, 22 Am
30
Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Searches and Seizures, Form 102; Alleging
31
liability of surety for wrongful seizure by officer, 22 Am Jur Pl & Pr
32
Forms (Rev), Searches and Seizures, Form 103; Complaint in federal
33
court for civil liability of federal agents for illegal search and
34
seizure in violation of Fourth Amendment, 22 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms
35
(Rev), Searches and Seizures, Form 105.
36
Practice References: 14 Cal Practice, Action For Damages: 14 Cal
37
Practice, Action For Damages For Wrongful Search and Seizure §§ 238:1-
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 418
1
238:14.
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
2
The provisions of the Federal Civil Rights Act, specifying that
3
4
whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation of any
5
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
6
Constitution or laws of the United States is subject to criminal
7
penalties [65], are applicable to illegal searches and seizures [66].
The Penal Code provides that every public officer, or person
8
9
pretending to be a public officer, who, under the pretense or color of
10
any process or other legal authority, seizes or levies on any property,
11
or dispossesses any one of the lands or tenements, without a regular
12
process or other lawful authority therefore, is guilty of a misdemeanor
13
[67
14
without probable cause procures a search warrant to be issued and
15
executed is guilty of a misdemeanor [68].
16
17
The Penal Code also provides that every person who maliciously and
[62] Silva v MacAuley (1933) 135 CA 249, 26 P2d 887, reh den 135
CA 259, 27 P2d 791.
18
[63] Melvin v Reid (9131) 112 CA 285, 297 P 91 (superceded by
19
statute on other grounds as stated in Roberts v Gulf Oil Corp. (5th
20
Dist) 147 CA3d 770, 195 Cal Rptr 393).
21
Annotations: Right of privacy, 14 ALR2d 750.
22
[64] Irvine v California 91954) 347 US 128, 98 L Ed 561, 74 S Ct
23
381, reh den 347 US 931, 98 L Ed 1083, 74 S Ct 527.
24
Annotations: Defense of good faith in action for damages against
25
law enforcement official under 42 USCS § 1983, providing for liability
26
of person who, under color of law, subjects another to deprivation of
27
rights, 61 ALR Fed 7.
28
[65] 18 USCS § 242.
29
[66] Irvine v California (1954) 347 US 128, 98 L Ed 561, 74 S Ct
30
381, reh den 347 US 931, 98 L Ed 1083, 74 S Ct 527; People v Cahan
31
(1955) 44 C2d 434, 282 P2d 905, 50 ALR2d 513.
32
Law Reviews: Remedies for unreasonable search and seizure under
33
Federal Civil Rights Act, 7 Stan LR 76; Right of victim of unreasonable
34
search and seizure to relief under criminal provisions of Federal Civil
35
Rights Act, 3 UCLA LR 55.
36
[67] Deerings's Pen C § 146.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 419
1
As to impersonation of an officer, see §§ 1338-1340
2
[68] See § 1978.
PERSONS LIABLE
3
Where a magistrate refuses to restore on demand property
4
5
illegally seized under a search warrant, he is liable for detention of
6
and damage to the property as well as in trespass [69].
7
subjects a person or his premises to the indignity of an unlawful
8
search or seizure with or without a warrant is liable in damages [70]
9
Under certain circumstances, the officer's superiors may be liable for
An officer who
10
his wrongful acts under the principle of respondent superior [71].
And
11
where a public officer has given a surety bond, the victim of an
12
unlawful search or seizure by that officer may in some circumstances
13
have an action against the surety [72].
An officer who properly executes a search warrant regular on its
14
15
face is not liable for any defects in the proceedings in which it was
16
issued [73].
17
[69] Ryan v Crist (1914) 23 CA 744, 139 P 436.
18
[70] Ryan v Crist (1914) 23 CA 744, 139 P 436; Silva v MacAuley
19
(1933) 135 CA 249, 26 P2d 887, reh den 135 CA 259, 27 P2d 791.
As to tort liabilities and immunities of public officers and
20
21
agencies generally, see GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY §§ 1 et seq.
[71] Silva v MacAuley (1933) 135 CA 249, 26 P2d 887, reh den 135
22
23
CA 259, 27 P2d 791.
As to the doctrine of respondeat superior generally, see EMPLOYER
24
25
AND EMPOLYEE §§ 83 et seq.
[72] Gomez v Scanlan (1960) 2 CA 579, 84 P 50, affd 155 C 528,
26
27
102 P 12.
28
[73] Deerings's CCP § 262.1.
29
Under Pen C § 830.6, providing that a citizen aiding an officer
30
has such powers as the supervising officer may delegate, the citizen
31
derives his immunity from the officer's own immunity; and the
32
solicitation of aid by the police, as well as assistance in the search
33
of another's premises conducted under the authority of a validly issued
34
search warrant, are privileged and cannot serve as a basis for civil
35
liability, Forro Precision, Inc. v International Business machines
36
Corp.
(1982, CA9 Cal) 673 F2d 1045, 215 USPQ 299, 1982-1 CCH Trade
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 420
1
2
3
Cases # 64708, 10 Fed Rules Evid Serv 671, 33 FR Serv 2d 1645.
EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
A preemptory writ of prohibition will not be granted to restrain
4
the execution of a search warrant where, before issuance of the
5
alternative writ, the warrant is executed and properly taken into the
6
magistrate's possession, and no showing is made of further attempted
7
judicial action on his part [74].
8
prohibited from turning over to another party property taken under
9
search warrant proceedings instituted solely to gain summary possession
10
11
However, a magistrate may be
of the property [75].
Where a state has provided an opportunity for full and fair
12
litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be
13
granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence
14
obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his
15
trial [76].
16
The remedy of injunction may be available in certain situations
17
involving searches and seizures.
Thus, it has been held that an
18
illegal search and seizure was challengeable by a tax payer's suit to
19
retrain the illegal expenditure and waste of public funds [77].
20
An order granting or denying a monition for the return of
21
property or the suppression of evidence is reviewable by a pretrial
22
petition for writ of mandate or prohibition [78].
23
[74] Ryan v Crist (1914) 23 CA 744, 139 P 436.
24
As to employment of writ of prohibition in criminal actions and
25
26
27
28
proceedings generally, see §§ 3888 et seq.
[75] Modern Laon Co. v Police Court of San Francisco (1910) 12 CA
582, 108 P 56 (property alleged to have been stolen).
[76] Stone v Powell (1976) 428 US 465, 49 L Ed 2d 1067, 96 S Ct
29
3037, on remand (CA9 Cal) 539 F2d 693 and reh den, modif den 429 US
30
874, 50 L Ed 2d 158, 97 S Ct 197.
31
[77] Wrin v Parker (1957) 48 C2d 890, 313 P2d 844 (police
32
surveillance by means of concealed microphones); Blair v Pitches (1971)
33
5 C3d 258, 96 Cal Rptr 42, 486 P2d 1242, 45 ALR3d 1206 (searches and
34
seizures under color of claim and delivery law);
35
85 CA2d 497, 193 P2d 470 (general police blockade).
36
Wirin v Horral (1948)
A complaint stated a cause of action against police officers and
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 421
1
a city employing them where it alleged tat the DEFENDANTS were
2
illegally expending public funds by blocking off areas of the city and
3
stoing all persons and automobiles entering or leaving such areas and
4
searching then without having first obtained search warrants, and
5
without having probable cause to believe that the automobiles contained
6
contraband or that the individuals has violated the law.
7
Horral (1948) 85 CA2d 497, 193 P2d 470 (general police blockade).
Wirin v
8
As to injunctions generally, see INJUNCTIONS §§ 1 et seq.
9
Practice References: 1 Cal Practice, Injunctive Relief, Chapter
10
5.
[78] See § 3186.
11
PRESUMPTIONS; BURDEN OF PROOF
12
13
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that
14
officers acted legally in entertaining premises to make an arrest and
15
in seizing property incidental to the arrest [79].
16
record is silent as to whether the officers making a search had a
17
search warrant or a warrant of arrest, and there is no evidence showing
18
the illegality of the search, it must be presumed that the officer
19
regularly and lawfully performed their duties and has a search warrant
20
[80].
21
convenience, make use of fictitious anonymous informants as a basis for
22
illegal searches and seizures is not to be indulged, and it is directly
23
contrary to the statutory presumption that official duty has been
24
regularly preformed and the law obeyed [81].
25
that an officer's entry of private premises was made in a legal manner
26
will not be extended to show that an entry made by picking a lock was
27
made pursuant to a valid consent by a building superintendent [82].
Thus, where the
And an assumption that police officers will, to suit their
However, the presumption
An accused has the burden of raising the question of legality of
28
29
a search and seizure [83].
30
prosecution then has the burden of producing a warrant if one exists
31
[84].
32
establishes a prima facie case by showing that the search was made
33
without a warrant [85].
34
show that the search falls within one of the authorized exceptions to
35
the warrant requirements [86].
36
Once objection has been made, the
An accuses who challenges the legality of a search and seizure
The burden then rests on the prosecution to
Where the prosecution seeks to justify a search without a warrant
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 422
1
on the ground that consent was given, it has the burden of proving the
2
consent and the voluntariness thereof [87].
3
the prosecution must prove consent by preponderance of the evidence
4
[88], by clear and positive evidence [89], or by substantial evidence
5
[90].
6
consented to a search of his premises that disclosed the evidence
7
claimed to have been illegally obtained, it is not necessary for it to
8
show further that the search and seizure were reasonable as incidental
9
to a lawful arrest [91].
It has been stated that
But where the prosecution shows that an accused voluntarily
And, if a defendant does not dispute the
10
prosecution's evidence as to consent at the trial, he may not do so on
11
appeal [92].
12
Where the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search on
13
the ground of an emergency or exigent circumstances [93], the burden
14
rests on the prosecution to establish the emergency exception or the
15
existence of exigent circumstances [94].
As a general rule, the burden of establishing the invalidity of a
16
17
search warrant is on the defendant [95].
18
seeks to prove that an affidavit is suort of a search warrant contained
19
knowingly false statements of fact [96], the defendant has the burden
20
of proving the affiant's knowledge of falsity by a preponderance of
21
evidence, or by direct evidence in the affiant, in which case the
22
conflict is resolved by the trier of fact [97].
23
defendant seeks to prove that the affiant intentionally omitted
24
material information with the purpose of deceiving the magistrate, or
25
recklessly disregarded the accuracy and completeness of the affidavit
26
[98], the defendant has the burden of proving the affiant's intent or
27
recklessness by a preponderance of the evidence [99].
28
search warrant has been obtained upon information acquired by an
29
illegal search [1], the burden is on the prosecution to show that the
30
warrant was not obtained by exploitation of the initial illegality [2].
33
34
35
Similarly, when the
However, where a
[84] People v Burke (1964) 61 C2d 575, 39 Cal Rptr 531, 394 P2d
31
32
Thus, where the defendant
67.
[85] People v Constancio (1974, 3d Dist) 42 CA3d 533, 116 Cal
Rptr 910.
[86] People v Haven (1963) 59 C2d 713, 31 Cal Rptr 47, 381 P2d
36
927; People v King (1963) 60 C2d 308, 32 Cal Rptr 825, 384 P2d 153;
37
People v Shelton (1964) 60 C2d 740, 36 Cal Rptr 433, 388 P2d 665; Dyas
38
v Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1974) 11 C3d 628, 114 Cal Rptr
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 423
1
114, 522 P2d 674; People v Norman (1975) 14 C3d 929; 123 Cal Rptr 109,
2
538 P2d 237; People v Holgun (1956, 2d Dist) 145 CA2d 520, 302 P2d 635;
3
People v Silvestri (1957, 1st Dist) 150 CA2d 114, 309 P2d 871; People v
4
Bradford (1972, 1st Dist) 28 CA3d 695, 104 Cal Rptr 852; People v
5
Robinson (1974; 1st Dist) 41 CA3d 658, 116 Cal Rptr 455; People v Smith
6
(1977, 5th Dist) 67
7
(1979, 4t Dist) 90 CA3d 994,153 Cal Rptr 746; People v Salzman (1982,
8
3d Dist) 131 CA3d 676, 182 Cal Rptr 748; People v Sedillo (1982, 5th
9
Dist) 135 CA3d 616, 185 Cal Rptr 475 (disagreed with on other grounds
10
People v Britton (5th Dsit) 156 CA3d 689, 202 Cal Rptr 882); People v
11
Brown (1975) 53 CA3d Su 1, 125 Cal Rptr 739.
12
CA3d 638, 136 Cal Rptr 764; People v Woolsey
Where it appears that officers broke into a house without a
13
search warrant, the burden rests on the prosecution to introduce
14
evidence that the officers had reasonable cause to break and enter to
15
make an arrest.
16
established for the purposes of a proceeding in prohibition to restrain
17
further proceedings under an information that the entry into the house
18
was unlawful, and it is immaterial whether or not the house was the
19
defendant's.
20
269, 294 P2d 23.
21
In absence of such evidence, it must be taken as
Badillo v Superior Court of Sant Francisco (1956) 46 C2d
The burden of justifying home searches by a government
22
department, without warrant, rests on the government, and is a heavy
23
one where it seeks to rely on a supposed waiver of constitutional
24
rights.
25
623, 425 P2d 223.
Parish v Civil Service Com. (1967) 66 C2d 260, 57 Cal Rptr
26
The prosecution in a criminal case must establish by a
27
preponderance of the evidence that an arrest without a warrant and
28
search is justified under a recognized exception to the warrant
29
requirement.
30
P2d 1135; Re V. (1978, 2d Dist 85 CA3d 120, 149 Cal Rptr 180.
31
People v James (1977) 19 C3d 99, 137 Cal Rptr 447, 561
Where a search was made without a warrant and not incidental to a
32
lawful arrest of defendant, the burden rests on the prosecution to
33
justify the search as a reasonable one; in considering the question of
34
reasonableness, the court looks to the facts and circumstances
35
presented to the officers when they were called upon to act. People v
36
Molarius (1963, 1st Dist) 213 CA2d 10, 28 Cal Rptr 541.
37
38
When the legality of a search and seizure is raised, a defendant
makes a prima facie case by establishing that the search was made
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 424
1
without a warrant, and the burden then rests on the prosecution to show
2
proper justification.
3
(1969, 2d Dist) 2 CA3d 304, 82 Cal Rptr 766 (disaroved on other grounds
4
Mozzetti v Superior Court of Sacramento County, 4 C3d 699, 94 Cal Rptr
5
412, 484 P2d 84).
6
7
8
9
People v Superior Court of Los Angeles County
CFB NOTE: - my lawyers never employed this defense to eliminate
case off the bat:
In a proceeding for a writ of prohibition to restrain a superior
court from proceeding to trial, the burden was on the prosecution to
10
show the validity of a search without warrant of petitioner’s premises
11
that had led to seizure of evidence for trial, and that the search had
12
been incident to petitioner's arrest.
13
Clara County (1971, 1st Dist) 21 CA3d 342, 98 Cal Rptr 342.
Eisman v Superior Court of Santa
14
As to exceptions to the warrant requirements, see §§ 2534 et seq.
15
[87]
Bumper v North Carolina (1968) 391 US 543, 20 L Ed 2d 797,
16
88 S Ct 1788, 46 Ohio Ops 2d 382; Schneckloth v Bustamonte (1973) 412
17
US 218, 36 L Ed 2d 854, 93 S Ct 2041, on remand (CA9) 479 F2d 1047;
18
People v Gorg (1955) 45 C2d 776, 291 P2d 469; People v Roberts (1956)
19
47 C2d 374, 303 P2d 721; People v Johnson (1968) 68 C2d 629, 68 Cal
20
Rptr 441, 440 P2d 921; Blair v Pitchess (1971) 5 C2d 258, 96 Cal Rptr
21
42, 486 P2d 1242, 45 ALR3d 1206; People v James (1977) 19 C3d 99, 137
22
Cal Rptr 447, 561 P2d 1135; People v Strawder (1973, 1st Dist) 34 CA3d
23
370, 108 Cal Rptr 901 (disaroved on other grounds People v Bustamante,
24
30 C3d 88, 177 Cal Rptr 576, 634 P2d 927).
25
When the subject of a search is not in custody, and the state
26
attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth
27
and Fourteenth Amendments require that the state demonstrate that the
28
consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or
29
coercion, express or implied.
30
218, 36 L Ed 2d 854, 93 S Ct 2041, on remand (CA9) 479 F2d 1047.
31
Schneckloth v Bustamonte (1973) 412 US
The burden is on the prosecution where it seeks to justify entry
32
into an apartment on the ground that police officers reasonably
33
believed in good faith that they had the consent of an authorized
34
person to such entry.
People v Roberts (1956) 47 C2d 374, 303 P2d 721.
35
When the People seek to justify a search on the ground that
36
consent was given, they have the burden of proving that the consent was
37
lawful, was not a mere submission to authority, and was not
38
inextricably bound up with unlawful conduct.
People v Lawler (1973) 9
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 425
1
2
C3d 156, 107 Cal Rptr 13, 507 P2d 621.
Where police officers had no search warrant, the burden is on the
3
prosecution to show that their entry into a room or other premises was
4
on invitation of one of the occupants or with the consent of such
5
occupant, express or implied.
6
CA2d 641, 27 Cal Rptr 619.
7
People v Contereras (1963, 2d Dist) 211
The burden is on the People to establish the legality of a search
8
without a warrant, and when they rely on the consent exception to the
9
warrant requirement, they must establish not only htat the defendant
10
consented, but that his consent was voluntarily given.
11
(1980, 2d Dist) 114 CA3d 60, 170 Cal Rptr 440.
12
People v Ibarra
Because of the importance of preserving constitutional rights,
13
various rules have been stated for the guidance of the trial judge in
14
determining whether consent to the search was in fact given; the
15
government must prove that it was given and in so doing must show that
16
there was not duress or coercion, express or implied.
17
be "unequivocal and specific" and "freely and intelligently given."
18
Oliver v Bowens (1967, CA9 Cal)386 F2d 688.
19
As to consent generally, see §§ 2555 et seq.
20
[88]
The consent must
The people have the burden of proving by a preponderance of
21
the evidence that the defendant's manifestation of consent was the
22
product of his free will and not a mere submission to an express or
23
implied assertion of authority.
24
174 Cal Rptr 557.
25
[89]
Re G. (1981, 5th Dist) 120 CA3d 218,
Bumper v North Carolina (1968) 391 US 543, 20 L Ed 2d 797,
26
88 S Ct 1788, 46 Ohio Ops 2d 382; People v Gorg (1955) 45 C2d 776, 291
27
P2d 469.
28
[90] People v Challoner (1982, 2d Dist) 136 CA3d 779, 186 Cal
29
Rptr 458 (when the government relies on consent to justify a search
30
without a warrant, it must establish by substantial evidence that the
31
consent was voluntarily given; mere acquiescence to a claim of
32
authority will not suffice).
33
Where the prosecution relies upon consent in justification of a
34
search without warrant, it has the burden of presenting substantial
35
evidence of such consent.
36
freely and voluntarily given, and the burden cannot be discharged by
37
showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.
38
must be shown that the consent was uncontaminated by any duress of
It must show that the consent was, in fact,
It
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 426
1
coercion, actual or implied.
2
1027, 100 Cal Rptr 661.
People v McKelvy (1972, 4th Dist) 23 CA3d
[91] People v Burke (1956) 47 C2d 45, 301 P2d 241 (ovrld on other
3
4
grounds People v Sidener, 58 C2d 645, 25 Cal Rptr 697, 375 P2d 641, 10
5
L Ed 2d 1048, 83 S Ct 1912 and (ovrld on other grounds People v
6
Tenorio, 3 C3d 89, 89 Cal Rptr 249, 473 P2d 993); People v Fields
7
(1959, 2d Dist) 167 CA2d 773, 334 P2d 1001.
8
[92] See § 2578
9
[93] see § 2535
[94] To obtain the benefit of the emergency exception to the
10
11
general requirement for a warrant for a search for, or a seizure of,
12
material alleged to be obscene..
[95] People v Butler (1966) 64 C2d 842, 52 Cal Rptr 4, 415 P2d
13
14
819.
15
[96] See § 2526
16
[97] People v Cook (1978) 22 C3d 67, 148 Cal Rptr 605, 583 P2d
17
130 (superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v Truer
18
(5th Dist) 157 CA3d 345, 203 Cal Rptr 693, hear gr by sup ct); People v
19
Sawkow (9184, 2d Dist) 150 CA3d 999, 198 Cal Rptr 374.
20
[98] See
2526
21
[99] People v Sawkow (9184, 2d Dist) 150 CA2d 999, 198 Cal Rptr
22
374 (an affidavit in suort of a search warrant, which failed to
23
disclose that a witness was unable to make a positive identification at
24
the stakeout or at a later photo lineup, contained an omission of
25
immaterial fact, and DEFENDANTS failed to prove by a preponderance of
26
the evident that the affinity omitted such information with the intent
27
to mislead the magistrate or in reckless disregard of the accuracy of
28
the affidavit..
29
[1] See § 2523
30
31
32
33
§ 2578 Defenses; waiver of right to object
BARGAIN WITH PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
Certain agreements between a public prosecutor and a prospective
34
defendant are in flagrant violation of the interests of justice and
35
therefore highly improper.
36
promise an accused, in return for a confession of guilt regarding a
Thus, it is improper for a prosecutor to
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 427
1
particular crime, immunity from prosecution for other crimes that he
2
may have committed. People v Groves, 63 CA 709, 219 P 1033 (neither
3
prosecutor nor court is bound by such bargain).
BAIL AND RECOGNIZANCE
4
A Generally §§ 2579-2581
5
6
7
§ 2579 In general; definitions and distinctions
"Bail," used as a noun, may refer to the means of procuring the
8
release of one charged with an offense, .... The term "bail" may be
9
used to refer to the security or bond for a defendant's appearance in
10
court.
Again, "bail" may be used in general sense so that it includes
11
deposits made instead of bail.
12
designate the person in whose custody the defendant is placed when
13
released from jail and who acts as surety for the appearance of the
14
defendant or the party under arrest.
15
described as the "surety," and sometimes as the "bailor.".
The term "bail" ma also be used to
This person is also frequently
16
"Bail," the verb, refers to the delivery of a person to his
17
sureties, upon their giving, together with him, sufficient security for
18
his appearance to answer the charge at the time and place aointed.
19
§ 2580 Recognizance
20
A "recognizance," at common law, is an obligation entered into
21
before some court of record or duly authorized magistrate, with a
22
condition to some particular act, usually to aear and answer a criminal
23
accusation.
24
25
§ 2581 Purpose and effect.
The purpose of both bail and recognizance is to assure the
26
defendant's attendance in court where his or her presence is required
27
either before or after conviction [23].
28
Bail is not to be used as a means for punishing DEFENDANTS [24]
29
or protecting the public safety [25]; although the California
30
constitutional provision regarding the right to bail has been amended
31
to permit detention in certain circumstances of a defendant charged
32
with a felony involving violence or threats of violence [26].
33
basis intended for the purpose of raising revenue [27], affording
34
pecuniary compensation to the government [28], or punishing the
35
sureties [29].
36
37
Nor is
[23] Law Reviews: The politics of bail reform and the need for
judicial intervention, 12 UWLA LR 1.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 428
[24] Re Newbern (1961) 55 C2d 500, 11 Cal Rptr 547, 360 P2d 43;
1
2
Re Underwood (1973) 9 C3d 345, 107 Cal Rptr 401, 508 P2d 721; Re Boyle
3
(1974) 11 C3d 165, 113 Cal Rptr 99, 520 P2d 723.
4
[25] Re Boyle (1974) 11 C3d 165, 113 Cal Rptr 99, 520 P2d 723.
5
[26] see § 2582
6
[27] People v North Beach Bonding Co. (1974, 1st Dist) 26 CA3d
7
663, 111 Cal Rptr 757.
8
[28] County of Los Angeles v Maga (1929) 97 CA 688, 276 P 352.
9
[29] People v North Beach Bonding Co. (1974, 2st Dist) 26 CA3d
10
663, 111 Cal Rptr 757.
11
12
13
B AS A MATTER OF RIGHT OR DISCRETION §§ 2582-2585
§ In General; constitutional provisions
Under the state Constitution, a person must be released on bail
14
by sufficient sureties except when he or she has committed a capital
15
crime and the facts are evident or the presumption great,
16
Under an initiative measure designed as Proposition Four, the
17
California constitutional provision relating to bail was amended in
18
1982 [34].
19
released on bail by sufficient sureties, except for the following:
20
capital crimes when the facts are evident or the presumption great
21
[35]; felony offenses involving acts of violence on another person when
22
the facts are evident or the presumption great and the court finds,
23
based upon clear and convincing evidence, that there is a substantial
24
likelihood the person's release would result in great bodily harem to
25
others [36]; or felony offenses when the facts are evident or the
26
presumption great and the court finds, based on clear and convincing
27
evidence, that the person has threatened another with great bodily harm
28
and that there is a substantial likelihood that the person would carry
29
out the threat if released [37].
As adopted, the provision specifies that a person must be
The provision as to "substantial likelihood" cannot be reduced to
30
31
a rigid formula susceptible of mechanical alication; the circumstances
32
must be reviewed by the magistrate or judge on a case-by-case basis
33
[38].
Excessive bail may not be required [39].
34
In fixing the amount of
35
bail, the court must take into consideration the seriousness of the
36
offense charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the
37
probability of his or her aearing at the trial or hearing of the case
38
[40].
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 429
Under the constitutional provision, a person may be released on
1
2
his or her own recognizance in the court's discretion [41].
It should be noted that another initiative measure, designated as
3
4
Proposition Eight and known as the Victims' Bill of Rights, was also
5
passed by the voters at the same time as Proposition Four [42].
Under the constitutional rule that, where proposed amendments
6
7
conflict, the measure receiving the highest affirmative vote prevails
8
[43], the provisions of Proposition Four, having received the larger
9
vote, govern insofar as bail procedures are concerned [44].
10
[34] Cal Const Art I § 12.
11
[35] Cal COnst Art I § 12(a)
12
[36] Cal Const Art I § 12(b)
13
Annotations: Pretrial preventative detention by state court, 57
14
ALR3d 956.
15
[37] Cal Const Art I § 12(c)
16
Clear and convincing evidence justified the trial courts denial
17
of bail to an accused charged with two counts of soliciting murder,
18
under Cal Const Art I § 12... paid $60 to an undercover police officer
19
as a down payment on a death "contract."
20
143 CA3d 538, 192 Cal Rptr 38.
[38]
21
22
In re Nordin (1983, 1st Dist)
In re Nordin (1983, 1st Dist) 143 CA3d 538, 192 Cal Rptr
38.
23
[39] See Sec. 2601
24
[40] See Sec. 2600
25
[41]
26
As to factors to be considered on alication for release on
Cal COnst Art 1 § 12.
27
personal recognizance, see § 2587.
28
[42] Cal Const Art 1 § 28(e)
29
[43]
30
[44] Brosnahan v Brown (1982) 32 C3d 236, 186 Cal Rptr 30, 651
Cal Const Arts II § 10(b), XVIII § 4.
31
P2d 274.
32
33
§ 2583. Statutory provisions
The Penal Code provides that, in a noncapital case, a defendant
34
must be released from custody prior to conviction upon the posting of
35
bail as a matter of right, or the defendant my be released from custody
36
upon his or her own recognizance [45].
37
a person charged with other than a capital offense is entitled to bail
38
as a matter of right at any time prior to conviction [46], which right
Under the statutory provision,
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 430
1
is absolute [47]..
... Thus, a person arrested and charged with a crime punishable
2
3
by death is entitled to release on bail and recognizance where the
4
proof is not evident and the presumption is not great under this rule
5
[50].
6
evident" and "presumption thereof great" is that bail should be refused
7
in capital case where the evidence is such that a verdict of guilty
8
based on it would be sustained by a court [51].
The construction given to the statutory phrases "proof is
.. Under the Penal Code, a defendant arrested for a misdemeanor
9
10
may be released from custody upon conditional release or upon execution
11
an appearance bond [60].
12
prior to arraignment, be released from custody upon compliance with the
13
applicable provisions for release on bail upon a deposit of a
14
percentage of bail fixed and for release upon agreement to specified
15
conditions [61].
Such a defendant must, as a matter of right,
Any person who has been arrested for or charged with an offense
16
17
other than a capital offense may be released on his or her own
18
recognizance by a court or magistrate who could release a defendant
19
from custody upon the defendant giving bail, including defendant
20
arrested upon an out-of-county warrant [62].
21
custody and is arraigned on a complaint alleging an offense which is a
22
misdemeanor, and a defendant who appears before a court or magistrate
23
upon an out-of-county warrant arising out of a case involving only
24
misdemeanors, is entitled to an own recognizance release unless the
25
court makes a finding upon the record that such release will not
26
reasonably assure appearance of the defendant as required.
27
event the court must set bail and specify the conditions, if any,
28
whether the defendant may be released [63].
31
32
33
34
In such
[45] Deering's Pen C § 1268a(a) (effective until December 31,
29
30
A defendant who is in
1985).
As to factors to be considered in determination of whether to
release a defendant on his or her own recognizance, see § 2587.
Law Reviews: 44 CLS (bail in California); 2 Loyola U of LA LR 71
(the bail system and equal protection).
35
[46] Ex parte Wolf (1880) 57 C 94.
36
[47] RE Law (1973) 10 C3d 21, 109 Cal Rptr 573, 513 P2d 621.
37
[50] Ex parte Strange (1881) 59 C 416; Ex parte Brown (1885) 68 C
38
176, 8 P 829.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 431
[51] Re Troia (1883) 64 C 152, 28 P 231; Ex parte Curtis (1891)
1
2
92 C 188, 29 P 223; Re Alication of Weinberg (1918) 177 C 781, 171 P
3
937.
4
[60] Deering's Pen § 1268a(a)
5
Any person who has been arrested for or charged with a
6
misdemeanor may be released by a court or magistrate upon execution of
7
an appearance bond.
8
31, 1985).
As to release of a defendant arrested for a misdemeanor upon
9
10
deposit of a percentage of the bail, see § 2606.
As to conditions for release of a person charged with a
11
12
misdemeanor, see § 2626.
[61] Deerings's Pen C § 1268a(b), referring to Pen C § 1269d
13
14
(both provisions effective until December 31, 1985).
As to release of a defendant arrested for misdemeanor upon
15
16
deposit of a percentage of bail, see § 2606
As to conditions for release of a person charged with a
17
18
Deering's Pen C § 1270.1 (effective unitl December
misdemeanor, see § 2626
19
[62] See § 2592
20
[63] Deering's Pen C § 1270(a) (effective until December 31,
21
1985).
22
The trial court, in prosecution for violation of Veh C § 23123,
23
having an open container of an alcoholic beverage in a motor vehicle,
24
abused its discretion in fixing the amount of bail at $25 rather than
25
releasing defendant on his own recognizance, where defendant had been
26
released on his own recognizance by the police, was charged at the most
27
with a misdemeanor (a municipal court violation dismissed during plea
28
bargaining) and was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of
29
right and to release on his own recognizance on good cause being shown.
30
People v Arnold (1976) 58 CA3d Su 1, 132 Cal Rptr 922.
31
Annotations: alication of state statutes establishing pretrial
32
release of accused on personal recognizance as presumptive from of
33
release, 78 ALR3d 780.
34
2 AFTER CONVICTION AND PENDING ALICATION FOR PROBATION OR
35
APPEAL §§ 2584, 2585
36
37
§ 2584. In General
The Penal Code provides that the admission of a defendant to bail
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 432
1
following his or her conviction of an offense not punishable with death
2
and pending appeal or alication for probation, is committed to the
3
discretion of the trial court in all cases other than those involving
4
misdemeanors or appeals from judgments imposing fines only [65].
5
discretion should not be arbitrarily exercised [66].
This
6
In ruling on an alication for admission to bail following
7
conviction, the trial court should be governed by legal rules with the
8
view of doing justice according to law, or to analogies of the law, as
9
nearly as may be arrived at [67].
The exercise of discretion by the
10
trial court will not be disturbed, however, except in an instance of
11
manifest abuse [68].
12
admission to bail pending aeal, on the sole ground that it is not the
13
practice of the court to allow bail in cases where the matter is on of
14
discretion, does not constitute an abuse of discretion [69].
For example, the denial by the trial court of
15
The fact that in all probability an imposed jail term will have
16
been served before determination of an appeal does not make denial of
17
admission to bail an abuse of discretion [70].
18
Where trial judge bases denial of an alication for bail on appeal
19
for conviction of a felony on the erroneous determination that he
20
lacked discretion in the premises, such denial will be deemed a refusal
21
to exercise a jurisdiction imposed on him by the code provision [71].
22
Where defendant is already free on bail at the time of his conviction,
23
it has been held optional with the trial court to permit him to remain
24
on bail pending judgment [72].
25
sentenced on more than one conviction but has aealed from only one
26
judgment, the court is without power to fix bail [73].
However, where the defendant has been
27
[65]
28
The trial court abused its discretion in denying an alication for
29
a stay of execution and release on personal recognizance of a defendant
30
convicted and sentenced for bribery violations where the trial court
31
correctly found that defendant’s appeal from the conviction was not
32
frivolous or vexatious, where it further indicated it found there was
33
no danger that defendant would try to escape, and where it did not aear
34
that defendant would have the opportunity to commit similar criminal
35
offenses pending aeal, he having been removed from office on
36
conviction.
37
38
Deering's Pen C § 1272(3)
Re Robinson (1971, 2d Dist) 16 CA3d 539, 94 Cal Rptr 148.
Where defendant, after conviction of involuntary manslaughter,
was granted probation for three years with incarceration in the county
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 433
1
jail for one year as a condition thereof, it was an abuse of discretion
2
to deny bail pending appeal in the absence of circumstance of
3
additional terms in the probation order indicating the inadvisability
4
of bail. Re McCaughan (1956, 3d Dist) 142 CA2d 690, 298 P2d 871.
A defendant may be entitled "almost as a matter of right" to bail
5
6
after conviction and on aealing a felony case where probation has been
7
granted on the condition of serving a sentence such as imposed in a
8
misdemeanor case.
9
denial of bail by trial court as abuse of discretion).
As to matters to be considered by the court in determining
10
11
whether to grant bail after conviction, see § 2596.
For discussion of the rule when misdemeanors or appeals from
12
13
judgments imposing a fine only are involved see § 2585.
Law Reviews: Stated discretion and bail pending aeal: judicial
14
15
Re Torres (1947) 80 CA2d 579, 182 P2d 573 (treating
silence may no longer be golden, 8 SW U LR 810.
[66]
16
Ex parte Hoge (1874) 48 C 3; Ex parte Smallman (1879) 54 C
17
35; People v Davis (1945) 67 CA2d 837, 155 P2d 675; Re Torres (1947) 80
18
CA2d 579, 182 P2d 573.
19
Where one convicted on a felony charge was placed on probation
20
for a two-year period, conditioned on confinement in the county jail
21
and payment of a fine, the length of probation and term of imprisonment
22
and fine being within those which could be granted in case of a
23
misdemeanor conviction, it was an abuse of discretion by the trial
24
court to deny admission to bail pending aeal.
25
579, 182 P2d 573.
Re Torres (1947) 80 CA2d
26
[67] Ex parte Hoge (1874) 48 C 3
27
[68] ...defendant engaged in other criminal activities before,
28
during, and after trial...
[69] Ex parte Smith (1891) 89 C 79, 26 P 638 (criticizing a rule
29
30
adopted by the trial court that bail would not be allowed to anyone
31
pending appeal from a conviction of a felony as being inconsistent with
32
Pen C § 1272); People v Cornell (1915) 28 CA 654, 153 P 726 (commenting
33
that such a rule on its face may very well be said to be an aarent
34
abuse of discretion); People v Ephraim (1925) 72 CA 479, 237 P 801; Re
35
Alication of Ephraim (1925) 73 CA 104, 237 P 801.
36
[70] Re Torres (1947) 80 CA2d 579, 182 P2d 573.
37
[71] Re Friedman on behalf of Brumback (1956) 46 C2d 810, 299 P2d
38
217.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
Page 434
[72] People v Scott (1960, 1st Dist) 184 CA2d 792, 7 Cal Rptr
1
2
3
755.
[73] People v Walters (1954)123 CA2d 184, 266 P2d 563.
4
5
§ 2585. Misdemeanors or appeals from judgment imposing fine only
The Penal Code provides that after conviction of an offense not
6
punishable with death, a defendant who has made alication for probation
7
or who had aealed may be admitted to bail as a matter of right, before
8
judgment is pronounced pending alication for probation in cases of
9
misdemeanors, or when the appeal is from a judgment imposing a fine
10
only [74]; and as a matter of right, before judgment is pronounced
11
pending alication for probation in cases of misdemeanors, or when the
12
appeal is from a judgment imposing imprisonment in cases of
13
misdemeanors [75].
14
Where an offense is punishable at the discretion of the trial
15
court either as a felony or as a misdemeanor, admission to bail after
16
judgment and on appeal is discretionary when the sentence imposed is
17
one for felony [76], but a matter of right when the punishment imposed
18
is for a misdemeanor [77].
19
[74] Deering's Pen § 1272(1)
20
[75] Deering's Pen § 1272(2)
21
[76] Re Alication of Wilkins (1924) 66 CA 754, 226 P 964;
22
Frankfort v Superior Court of California (1925) 71 CA 357, 235 P 60.
23
As to discretion of the trial court to admit defendant to bail
24
following a felony conviction, see § 2595.
25
[77] People v Oreck (1945) 69 CA2d 317, 158 P2d 940.
26
C. PROCEEDINGS FOR ADMISSION TO BAIL OR RELEASE ON PERSONAL
27
RECOGNIZANCE §§ 2586-2598
28
29
1. GENERALLY
Admission to bail is obtained on the basis of a request by or on
30
behalf of the defendant or an alication to a judge or magistrate having
31
jurisdiction to admit to bail (§ 2586).
32
defendant will aear for subsequent court proceedings if released on
33
personal recognizance, the trial court must consider his or her
34
connection with the community, including employment or other sources of
35
income, duration and location of residence, family attachments,
36
property holdings, and any independent reason the defendant may have
37
for wanting to leave or to remain in the community, together with other
In determining whether a
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
pertinent matters (§ 2587).
The various aearances or other performance
2
by the defendant on which bail may be conditioned are specified in the
3
Penal Code (§ 2588).
4
justification of bail (§ 2589), as well as the taking of bail (§ 2590),
5
must be conducted in accordance with the applicable statutory
6
provisions.
Procedure for acceptance, aroval, and
7
§ 2586 In general; allocation and notice
8
Admission to bail is obtained on the basis of a request by or on
9
10
behalf of the defendant or an alication to a judge or magistrate having
jurisdiction to admit to bail
11
The manner of making alication for bail in the lower courts and
12
before magistrates is not pointed out in the Penal Code; in practice,
13
the procedure appears to be informal, being merely a request to the
14
judge or magistrate having jurisdiction to admit to bail [80].
Alications to the courts of appeal or to the Supreme Court, when
15
16
the case is pending on aeal, may be by petition for writ of habeas
17
corpus or by motion [81].
If the defendant is brought before a magistrate of another county
18
19
for the purpose of giving bail, the magistrate must proceed in respect
20
thereto in the same manner as if the defendant has been brought before
21
him on a warrant of arrest, and the same proceeding must be had thereon
22
[84].
23
[80] People v Cornell (1915) 28 CA 654, 153 P 726.
24
[81] People v Cornell (1915) 28 CA 654, 153 P 726.
25
As to the right to release on bail or recognizance following
26
27
28
conviction and pending aeal, see § 2595.
As to habeas corpus proceedings for admission to bail, see §§
3858, 3859.
29
[84] See § 2806.
30
§ 2587. Matters to be considered an burden no proof on alication for release on
31
32
personal recognizance
In determining whether a detainee will aear for subsequent court
33
proceedings if released on his own personal recognizance, the trial
34
court must consider the detainee's ties to the community, including his
35
employment or other sources of income, the duration and location of his
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
residence, his family attachments, property holdings, and any
2
independent reason the defendant may have for wanting to leave or to
3
remain in the community, the detainee's record of appearance at past
4
court hearings or flight to avoid persecution, and the severity of the
5
sentence the detainee faces [85].
6
are charged can the question of severity of sentence be considered
7
dispositive of the issue [86].
8
9
Only when the most serious offenses
In a hearing on a pretrial detainee's request for release on his
own recognizance, the prosecution must bear the burden of producing
10
evidence of the detainee's record of nonappearance at prior court
11
hearings and the severity of the sentence the detainee faces, while the
12
detainee bears the burden of producing evidence of community ties.
13
prosecution also bears the burden of proof concerning the detainee's
14
likelihood of aearing at future court proceedings [87]. IN such
15
proceedings, the trial court is not required to issue a statement of
16
reasons for denying release of the defendant [88].
17
[85]
Van Atta v Scott (1980) 27 C3d 424, 166 Cal Rptr 149, 613
18
P2d 210 (taxpayers' action to enjoin expenditure of public funds in
19
operation of bail and recognizance release systems).
20
21
22
The
[86] Van Atta v Scott (1980) 27 C3d 424, 166 Cal Rptr 149, 613
P2d 210.
[87] Van Atta v Scott (1980) 27 C3d 424, 166 Cal Rptr 149, 613
23
P2d 210 (disaroving Kawaichi v Madigan (1st Dist) 53 CA3d 461, 126 Cal
24
Rptr 63 to the extent it is inconsistent).
25
26
[88] Van Atta v Scott (1980) 27 C3d 424, 166 Cal Rptr 149, 613
P2d 210
27
§ 2588. Appearance or performance on which bail may be conditioned
28
The various aearances or other performance by the defendant on
29
which bail may be conditioned are specified in the Penal Code (§ 2588).
30
Procedure for acceptance, aroval, and justification of bail (§ 2589),
31
as well as the taking of bail (§ 2590), must be conducted in accordance
32
with the applicable statutory provisions.
33
D. BAIL AMMOUNT §§ 2599-2610
34
35
§ 2599 In general
If a defendant has aeared before a judge of the court on the
36
charge contained in the complaint, indictment, or information the bail
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
must be in the amount fixed by the judge at the time of the appearance
2
[54].
3
amount fixed in the warrant of arrest or, if no warrant of arrest has
4
been issued, the amount of bail must be pursuant to the uniform
5
countywide schedule of bail for the county in which the defendant must
6
aear [55].
7
8
9
10
11
If no such appearance has been made, the bail must be in the
Provisions of the Penal Code relating to bail are declared to be
applicable in cases triable in inferior courts [56].
[55]
Deering's Pen C § 1269b(b), referring to bail schedule as
provided for in Pen C §§ 1269b(c), 1269b(d).
As to bail schedule generally see § 2605.
12
13
§ 2600. Factors or circumstances to be considered
Constitutional [57] and statutory [58] provisions specify that in
14
fixing the amount of bail, the judicial officer must take into
15
consideration the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous
16
criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of the
17
defendant's aearing at the trial or hearing of the case.
18
In fixing the amount of bail in a particular case, the court
19
should give consideration to the purpose of bail, which is to assure
20
the presence of the accused to answer the charge against him [59].
21
[57] Cal Const Art I § 12.
22
As to factors to be considered in setting bail under the
23
constitutional provision adopted pursuant to the measure known as
24
Proposition 8, see § 2582.
25
26
§ 2601. Excessive bail
Federal [64] and state [65] constitutions prohibit the
27
requirement of excessive bail [66].
28
reasonably calculated to ensure that the accused will aear to stand
29
trial and submit to sentence if convicted is excessive under the
30
constitutional provisions [67].
31
for the purpose of punishing a person charged with the commission of a
32
crime [68], bail will not be deemed excessive merely because it is more
33
than the accused is able to pay [69].
34
Bail set at an amount higher than
Although bail should not be exacted
The determination as to when bail is disproportionate in amount
35
to the offense charged does not depend alone on the amount of money
36
which may have been lost by one party or secured to another by the
37
offense [70]; the issue depends, rather, on the moral turpitude of the
38
crime, the danger resulting to the public from the commission of the
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
offense, and the punishment imposed or authorized by law [71]
2
[64] US Const Eight Amendment
3
The federal constitutional provision against excessive bail is to
4
be understood as a restraint on judicial discretion respecting the
5
amount of bail and not as an attempt to regulate the legislative poser
6
respecting eligibility for bail.
7
CA3d 538, 192 Cal Rptr 38.
In re Nordin (1983, 1st Dist) 143
8
[65] Cal COnst Art I § 12.
9
Whether State the constitutional limitation on excessive bail
10
alies to bail after conviction and pending appeal has been doubted,
11
since it appears in the same article and section of the constitution
12
which declares the right to bail except in capital cases where the
13
proof is evident or the presumption
14
construed to aly only to bail before conviction.
15
Burnette (1939) 35 CA2d 358, 95 P2d 684 (finding nevertheless that bail
16
in the amount exacted was not excessive).
Re Alication of
[66] Practice References: Excessive Bail, 18 Am Jur POF 2d p.
17
18
great, and the latter provision is
149.
19
[67] Re Scaggs (1956)47 C2d 416, 303 P2d 1009.
20
A statute requiring that 25 percent of the amount determined to
21
be reasonable bail be added to the amount of the bail and that the
22
total sum be exacted of a defendant before being released from custody
23
is unconstitutional as alied to bail since the result, if the statute
24
were followed, would require excessive bail.
25
Court of San Francisco (1972) 6 C3d 693, 100 Cal Rptr 297, 493 P2d
26
1161.
McDermott v Superior
27
[68] See Sec. 2581.
28
[70] Re Williams (1889) 82 C 183, 23 P 118.
29
[71] Ex parte Ryan (1872) 44 C 555; Re Williams (1889) 82 C 183,
30
23 P 118.
31
32
2. BAIL SCHEDULE
A uniform county wide schedule of bail for all bailable felony
33
offenses is prescribed by Penal Soce. Sec. 2605.
34
in the amount specified in a bail schedule may be permitted however in
35
certain circumstances Sec. 2606.
Increase or decrees
36
Sec. 2605. In general; preparation and adoption
37
Under the Penal Code, it is the duty of the superior, municipal,
38
and justice court judges in each county to prepare, adopt, and from
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
time to time revise, at a meeting called by the presiding judge of the
2
superior court of the county, a uniform county wide schedule of bail
3
for all bailable felony offenses [82].
4
[82] Deerinsg's Pen C Sec. 1269b(c)
5
Sec. 2606. When variation permissible
6
Where a defendant is arrested without a warrant for a bailable
7
felony offense and a peace officer has reasonable cause to believe that
8
the amount of bail set forth in the schedule for that offense is not
9
sufficient to assure the defendant's aearance, the peace officer must
10
prepare a declaration under penalty of perjury requesting an order
11
setting a higher bail [85].
12
and circumstances in suort of the officer's belief and it must be filed
13
with a magistrate in the county in which the offense is alleged to have
14
been committed or the county having jurisdiction of the person of the
15
defendant [86].
The declaration must set forth the facts
The defendant may make alication to such magistrate for release
16
17
on bail lower than that provided in the schedule of bail or on his own
18
recognizance.
19
is made is authorized to set bail in such amount s he deems sufficient
20
to assure the DEFENDANTS' appearance and to set such bail on such terms
21
and conditions as in his discretion he deems appropriate, or he may
22
authorize the defendant's release on his own recognizance.
23
such an alication is made, no order changing the amount of bail is
24
issued within the specified number of hours after booking, the
25
defendant is entitled to be released on posting the amount of bail set
26
forth in the applicable bail schedule [87].
The magistrate or commissioner to whom such an alication
If, after
27
[85]
Deering's Pen C Sec. 1269c
28
[86]
Deering's Pen C Sec. 1269c, referring to magistrates as
29
defined in Pen C Sec. 808
30
[87]
Deering's Pen C Sec. 1269c
31
3. Increase or Reduction After Indictment Sec. Sec. 2607, 2608
32
H DISCHARGE OR EXONERATION OF BAIL OR DEPOSITOR Sec. Sec. 2630-
33
2636
34
35
Sec. 2630. In General; impossibility of or excuse for performance
Sureties on a bail bond are liable for the appearance of the
36
accused in accordance with the terms of the undertaking [16].
37
these terms or conditions are met or the bond is cancelled by the court
When
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
for any reason, the surety is exonerated [17].
2
performance of the condition of conditions of the undertaking may be
3
rendered impossible or excused by an act of God, or of the oblige, or
4
of the law; in such cases the sureties are also exonerated [18].
5
this rule, delay and hazards caused by a deliberate act of the state
6
may excuse performance of the bail bond [19].
7
[19]
It is recognized that
Under
People v Meyers (1932) 215 C 115, 8 P2d 837 (authorities in
8
second county, though requested to hold prisoner at conclusion of
9
sentence for trial on first charge, effected his release without notice
10
either to sureties or to authorities of first county); People v
11
National Auto. & Casualty Ins. Co (1979, 2d Dist) 92 CA3d 481, 154 Cal
12
Rptr 872.
13
2. Particular acts or events resulting in exoneration sec. sec. 2632-2636
14
An order by the court committing a defendant previously on bail
15
to the custody of the sheriff, on the defendant's appearance of trial,
16
followed by an actual taking into custody by the officer, exonerates
17
the sureties on a bail bond as effectively as would a surrender of the
18
defendant by the sureties [37].
19
[37] People v McReynolds (1894) 102 C 308, 36 P 590.
20
§ 2543
21
The protection afforded persons by the Fourth Amendments are not
22
alied in the same manner to parolees or probationers.
However, a
23
parolee or probationer may as an express condition of his parole or
24
probation, agree to submit to a warrantless search.
25
L. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
26
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs prays for the following relief as to all Claims for Relief
27
28
and Plaintiffs pray for the following relief:
A.
Pursuant to failure to appear of any real parties of interest of the
29
DEFENDANTS (in case numbers C 05-00996 and C07 00391) under Title 28
30
Summary Judgment be issued in UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
31
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION Case
32
Numbers C 05-00996 and C07 00391
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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1
B.
A judgment awarding plaintiffs general, special and punitive damages against
2
DEFENDANT DEFENDANTS in amounts according to proof but/or no less
3
than listed herein;
4
C.
5
A judgment awarding plaintiffs general and special and punitive damages
against DEFENDANTS amounts according to proof;
6
D.
A judgment awarding plaintiffs reasonable attorney’s fees;
7
E.
A judgment awarding plaintiffs their costs of suit; and
8
F.
Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.
9
G.
Prayers for relief as listed in the original Complaint, Amendments to the
10
Compliant, Motions and Responses to Motions.
11
M. DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
12
Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury on all of the above causes of action where
13
14
the jury determines both fact and law.
N. VERIFICATION
15
I, Clive Boustred, am a Party in the above-entitled action and the Chairman,
16
President and CEO of the Corporate Parties and the Father to the Minor Children
17
herein. I have read the foregoing Document(s), Affidavit(s), Declaration(s), and/or
18
Materials, Id., including referenced and/or attached documents, and/or duplicates of
19
such documents and know the contents thereof. The same is true of my own
20
knowledge, except as to those matters which are therein alleged on information and
21
belief, and as to those matters, I believe it to be true.
22
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and
23
that this declaration was executed at Santa Cruz, California on January twenty four
24
two thousand and eight.
25
26
Date: January 24, 2008____________________________________
27
Clive Boustred, representing Plaintiffs,
28
In Propria Persona Sui Juris, Without Prejudice UCC 1-207
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
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