Human Language: Abstract Use of Discrete Primate Vision
Joseph Emonds
University of Newcastle, 27 May, 2009
1 The size of Natural Language Lexicons: 20,000+
Natural language lexicons are larger than generally realized. Animal inventories of signs, by
the most generous of estimates, are tiny in comparison.
Rough estimates of a speaker’s vocabulary size are easy to come by; take a reasonably
complete dictionary, ask a speaker to determine how many separate lexical items they know
on an average page, and multiply by the number of pages. The result, 15,000-25,000 will
almost surely be an underestimate.
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It has been often repeated, “Shakespeare had a vocabulary of 20,000 words,” meaning
he used such a vocabulary. Yet it is rare that college-educated people don’t recognize
his individual words, and they know in turn many words unknown to Shakespeare.
Jespersen (1905) cites contemporary work on size of the Swedish lexicon, which
concluded that ordinary Swedes who read books and magazines had vocabularies of
about 20,000 words.
More recently, Aitchison’s (2003) study of vocabulary types, mental storage and
provenance of words claims that modern adults who read moderately control about
20,000 lexical entries.
Some computationalists, when asked, say that more reasonable current estimates
would be over 30,000 entries (counting lexical compounds and idioms as separate).
In contrast, primate sign inventories have at most a few hundred items, even according to
fervid proponents of their signing abilities.
We can ask, (i) what human mental property makes possible this large lexicon? Of course,
once acquired, it clearly gives a species that uses it a huge advantage in natural selection.
We can also ask, (ii) what does the lexicon’s internal organization suggest about its source,
i.e. its evolutionary basis? I will focus on this second question returning to the first at the end.
(1)
Query. What kinds of classes of items make up these massive mental assemblages
called lexicons?
2 The roles of lexical features in natural language grammar
Items in lexicons can be thought of as differentiated by a simple theoretical construct called
“features.” As said earlier, each speaker has probably 15-20,000 lexical entries. So lexical
items must be differentiated and characterized by many features and many types of features.
Some but by no means all these Features have central roles in grammar. Let’s begin with
some features that distinguish items in nominal categories (N, NP, DET, PRONOUN):
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±Animate. In grammar this important feature distinguishes e.g. who from what and him from
it. It also plays a role in determining what classes of nouns can appear in various contexts.
For example, many English “psychological predicates” require animate subjects or objects.
(2)
The {cat/ crowd/ two of us/ *child’s courage/*house/ *evening} feared another storm.
The storm frightened the {cat/ crowd/ two of us/ *child’s courage/ *house/ *evening}.
± Gender. This feature is central in many grammars. One non-trivial aspect of grammatical
masculine and feminine gender is that males and females referred to must be “human-like in
their gender role.” (Chickens that aren’t pets are never “she” but roosters are perceived as like
men—or vice versa.) That is, Gender as a feature is oriented toward our own species.
Count vs. Mass Nouns. This feature is crucial for whether numerals and certain quantifiers
can modify an English noun. Objection, schedule and concert are +Count. Evidence,
information and music are –Count (=Mass). Some words (e.g. argument, delay) can be either.
(3)
She presented {four/ many} {objections/ schedules/ concerts}.
She presented {four/ many} {*evidence(s)/ *information(s)/ *music(s)/ arguments}.
She didn’t present much {*objection(s)/ *schedule(s)/ *concert(s)}.
She didn’t present much {evidence/ music/ information/ argument(*s)}.
Low counting: 1, 2, 3, (?)4. Many grammatical systems specially distinguish one, two and
three: once, twice, thrice. Czech grammar treats (only) 1-4 like agreeing adjectives
(Veselovská 2001), with 3 and 4 having identical inflections. “Cuts” in counting systems at
higher levels (ninety-nine vs. one hundred) don’t appear to be properties of grammars.
Activity verbs vs. State verbs. This feature ±ACTIVITY on verbs has been argued to be a
grammatical feature. Activities such as learn, keep, buy, plan have different grammatical
behaviour from states such as know, have, own, need.
(4)
Mary was {learning/ keeping/ *knowing/ *having the answer}.
We are {buying a house/ planning a house/ *owning a house/ *needing a house}.
(5)
Please {learn/ keep / *know/ *have} the address of that school.
Do {buy/ plan/ *own/ *need} a second house soon.
Looking ahead, it is of interest to note that advanced primates almost certainly use the
conceptual distinctions on which the above grammatical features are based.
Presumably primates distinguish what is alive from what is not, and so ±ANIMATE
functions in their store of concepts. It is also pretty clear that primates (as well as other
animals) have a concept of gender limited to their own species.
It seems plausible that primates differentiate entities with discrete members (+COUNT) from
those without them. Moreover, Hauser (2000) argues with experimental support that animals
can compute cardinality up to three but beyond this number become confused.
It is an interesting question whether advanced primates might distinguish “activities” such as
sleeping and listening from “states” such as resembling and needing. I return to this issue.
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3 Features of cognition that don’t appear in grammar
In contrast to the feature-based contrasts just reviewed, many conceptual features don’t seem
to enter into grammatical systems, i.e. induce different grammatical agreements or different
copulas for example for hot things vs. cold things, far things vs. near things, etc.
Illustrations of some non-grammatical features: degree of heat of an object (hot, warm, cool,
cold, lukewarm, etc.), brightness, loudness, danger, distance, verbs for actions of liquids
(pour, flow, seep, leak) vs. those for actions of solids (break, crumble, shatter, crack), etc.
Now such features as these are certainly shared with primates. In fact, most human language
features never play a role in grammar, including the many others that primates lack:
Product vs. Natural Kind Nouns. Certain linguistic contexts require one or the other but not
both, as seen in (6). Because the semantic feature involved is not part of grammar, the
acceptability judgments are not clear cut (Chomsky 1965: Ch.II).
(6)
They { constructed/ planned } a { park/ space for kids/ lake/ cooking area/ new
artificial heart/ missile shield }.
??They { constructed/ planned } a(n) { cat/ cloud/ ocean / earthquake / healthy heart/
bad cold }.
It would be far-fetched to attribute such a contrast to primates.
A feature for “Day-like” period vs. other periods of time. English treats a day and certain
other time stretches metaphorically as temporal “surfaces” which one acts “on,” while other
time periods are “volumes” which one acts “in.”
(7)
a. I’ll do it {on/ *in} {Friday/ Easter/ Homecoming Weekend/ our anniversary/ 7-62010/ the Solstice/ Halloween/ Thanksgiving/ my lunch break}.
b. I’ll do it {in/ *on} {June/ Lent/ Homecoming Week/ Summer term / 3-2010 / the
next hour / the daytime/ the evening / third period}.
It would be anthropomorphic to claim that primates conceptualize weekends and lunch times
as different from workweeks and class (training) periods. More likely, they may have
concepts for (special) days as in (7a) but none for most other types of temporal spans (7b).
A feature for Damage vs. Ruin. Some verbs of “damage” imply that a direct object
“product” can still be used according to its design, while others that imply that their direct
objects can’t be. Some feature f’ on verbs must indicate this lexical difference:
(8)
John got into an accident with his bicycle. It was {damaged/ harmed/ nicked up/
messed up}, but he is still using it.
John got into an accident with his bicycle. ??It was {ruined/ destroyed/ totalled/
wrecked}, but he is still using it.
This f’ is an implausible candidate for status in the system of grammar. A concept of
“eliminates designed use” seems equally unlikely to play a role in primate cognition.
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I use upper case F for grammatical features such as +ANIMATE and +COUNT, and lower
case f for purely semantic features that have no grammatical role (+product, +day-like, etc.).
The system of syntax properly speaking is then by definition a theory of how the upper case
F features combine, but is independent of the lower case f features.
Most items in the categories N, V and P have both “cognitive/ grammatical features F” (e.g.
±ACTIVITY) and “purely semantic f” (e.g. ±designed use). Based on analysis of several
more such features, Emonds (2000: Chs. 3 and 4) concludes that lexical items with purely
semantic features ±f can only occur as the categories N, V, A and P.
Thus, although all features play a role in determining which combinations of lexical classes
“make sense” or “come to mind” in certain contexts, only some features also play a role in
“grammar” strictly speaking.
Chomsky (1965: Ch. II) observes that unacceptability judgments are clearer when selection
based on grammatical features F is violated, as in (2)-(5), than when violations involve only
purely semantic features f, as in (6) and (8).
For what follows, keep in mind that the human syntactic system consisting of combining
grammatical features F has its own limited semantic content, and includes concepts such as
ANIMATE, GENDER, LOW NUMERALS, COUNT vs. MASS, ACTIVITY, etc.
However, the syntactic system does not include finer grained concepts: neither those shared
with primates such as degree of heat, brightness, loudness, danger, distance, nor vast
numbers of features not shared with primates, like product, day-like, designed use, etc.
Rather, both types of semantic concepts seem “tacked onto” a basic syntactic system through
extensive use of features f used in the four large “open class” categories N, V, A and P.
4 An evolutionary source for features used in grammar
We have arrived at a more than curious paradox, which relates the scope of a limited system
of human syntactic features F to the much richer system of purely semantic f:
(9)
The Syntactic Paradox. Almost all concepts F of specifically human syntax are
those that we might associate with aspects of non-human primate cognition.
Putting (9) the other way around, how is it that the semantic concepts f that seem most
characteristic of humans are NOT used in human syntax, while a subset of semantic
concepts plausibly used by non-human primates are the basis of this same syntax?
Strangely, a combinatorial system of “primate semantic” features is precisely what seems to
make humans special and sets them apart from primates.
An Evolutionary Scenario. The only way to make sense of this Syntactic Paradox (9) is
through an evolutionary approach to human language.
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The “last pre-human primate ancestors.” At the point of an evolutionary linguistic leap, a
generation of animals didn’t have any grammar (no syntactic F), and they certainly had a
smaller set of semantic features f’ than today’s humans:
(10)
{primate f’} С {current human f*}
For example, although primate semantic f’ might include a feature ±liquid (vs. solid), they
might well not contain a semantic feature f* of “product” vs. “natural kind.”
The “mutants” or first human family. Linguistically endowed mutants appeared, who could
combine certain (not all) primate cognitive categories by means of some kind of syntax.
(11)
{human syntactic F} C {primate f’}
Precisely because these “ancestors” had no access to subsequent human culture, the initial
building blocks of their syntax (the innovation that made them human) necessarily drew on
the semantic concepts present in their pre-human culture.
That is, their {syntactic F} from among {primate f’} included e.g. ANIMATE, GENDER,
LOW NUMERALS, COUNT, ACTIVITY, PLURAL, MOTION, SPACE, LOCATION, etc.
This then solves the Syntactic Paradox (9). Human syntax captures a moment in primate
evolution, but it has nothing to do with further human evolution or history. Without the
theory of Evolution, the Paradox cannot be resolved. Grammar is thus the window onto the
primate mind of our pre-human ancestors and onto the mind of our earliest ancestors.
5 Which primate features form the basis of syntax?
But this explanation of the Syntactic Paradox (9) leads immediately to another question:
(12)
What determines the subset relation in (11) between the rather large set of primate
concepts {f’} and the initial subset of them used as human syntactic features {F}?
We can get a good if partial answer by reasoning on the basis of some things that are known
about currently used grammatical features F.
(13)
Some known Grammatical Features
a. In the nominal system for “objects” (nouns, pronouns, numerals, modification):
Animate or Inanimate Nouns and Pronouns
Masculine vs. Feminine Gender
Count vs. Mass Nouns
Demonstratives: Japanese kono, sono, ano; Spanish has a similar system. These
systems are based on perceived proximity to the speaker of the items referred to.
Features for the low numerals numerals 1, 2, 3, 4 (these have special agreement
syntax in some Slavic languages; cf. also once, twice, thrice)
Universal vs. Existential Quantification
Aggregated vs. Individual Plurality among Universal Quantifiers (every vs. each)
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b. In the verbal system for “actions,” including auxiliaries:
Activity vs. State Verbs
Real vs. Imaginary “Mood” (English Present and Past Tense vs. Modals such as can,
will, may, must, etc.)
Perfect vs. Incomplete Aspect of Verbs (Japanese suffixes –ta vs. –ru)
c. In the system for “locations”:
Prepositions of Space vs. Time
Prepositions of Path (into) vs. Place (within)
Orientations (up, down, in, out, off, on, etc.)
A Design Feature of Human Language. Upon reflection, almost all—perhaps all—
syntactic F seem likely candidates for primate cognition f’. But as seen earlier, many other
primate features are not part of syntax: degree of heat, brightness, loudness, danger, distance.
To determine the subset relation of human syntactic F to primate cognitive f’ in (11), I
introduce a design feature of human language brought out in Hockett (1960):
DISCRETENESS. Systems that humans invent tend to be discrete, i.e., composed of
separate forms which can be counted. Foremost among these is natural language.
Discrete systems in human biology and culture include language (we can count the words in a
sentence), music (we can count tones on a scale or notes in a passage), aspects of vision (we
can count objects we see), kinship systems, arithmetic, etc. Countability (discreteness) seems
to play no role in animal creations (anthill tunnels, bird nests, beaver dams, bee swarms, etc.)
Yet by no means are all human or primate concepts discrete. Heat, brightness, loudness of
sound, degree of danger, (our perception of) animal cries, absolute pitch of the voice, colour
distinctions, smells, tastes, pain levels, whether something is a liquid, etc. are not discrete
properties, but are perceived in continuums. However:
(14)
Discreteness of grammar. All the categories of grammatical features (13) appear to
refer to categories conceptualized by speakers as discrete.
Though the things referred to are not necessarily discrete, linguistic categorizations of say
demonstratives or of count vs. mass impose discreteness on objects under discussion.
Moreover linguistic structure itself is discrete; the phoneme and morpheme systems of
natural language always consist of countable combinations of discrete items. So we ask:
Why were the linguistic systems of the (first human-mutant) primates based on discrete
elements? In this talk I focus only on (14) and question (15). I do not discuss (16):
(15)
Why is the syntax or grammar system based on discrete categorizations?
(16)
a. The discreteness of the phonology systems
b. The internal structures of the dual patterning systems in human language
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6 Discreteness in primate and human vision
Discreteness and Vision. Let’s now reflect on the features of human lexicons briefly
surveyed above, and see what they suggest for pinpointing an evolutionary source of
Discreteness in human syntax.
Reviewing the list of lexical features of syntax in (13), most of them seem like concepts that
sighted humans understand first and foremost as visible properties.
(13)
Some known Grammatical Features
Animate vs. Inanimate
Masculine vs. Feminine Gender
Count vs. Mass Nouns
Demonstratives based on being near the speaker, near the addressee, or elsewhere
Features for the low numerals 1, 2, 3, 4 (singular, dual, plural)
Universal vs. Existential Quantification
Aggregated vs. Individual Plurality among Universal Quantifiers (every vs. each)
Activity vs. State Verbs
Real vs. Imaginary “Mood” (an activity or state has happened or not)
Perfect vs. Incomplete Aspect of Verbs
Orientations for Space and Time
Path (into) vs. Place (within)
Perceptually, if not always actually physically, such properties either hold or they don’t hold,
i.e. they are discrete. And all these distinctions are based either fully or primarily on vision.
(17)
Discreteness based on vision. Vision seems to be the only primate (and human)
sense that reports certain sense data using discrete categories.
It makes sense that primate vision reports being animate and being female as yes/no, that it
counts small sets of entities, that it makes 3-way divisions of territory, that it distinguishes
between all vs. some members of a set, that it distinguishes activities from states, etc.
On the other hand, there is no real discreteness in any other sensual mode (excluding the
human ability to count beats in the time dimension), neither for us or primates. As often
observed, language terms for smell and taste are impoverished even among our current
cultural features; most are metaphors from nouns (salty, oily, spicy, rotten egg smell, etc.).
In fact, early humans seem to have used nothing in the domains of smell, taste, feel and
hearing for structuring language. So why not? I claim that they could not, because neither
for us nor for our mutated ancestors are any of these sense data discrete.
Going back then to (12), discreteness is the key for which primate features f’ get into { F }.
Here then is the origin of Discreteness, one of Hockett’s (1960) design features of human
language. Vision is the only sure source of discreteness in primate sense distinctions, and I
propose this conjuncture is the source of human language as we know it.
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The Syntax Mutation. The first human primates used their visual discrete categories
to create a mental screen dissociated from their “here and now.”
I propose that the Syntax Mutation
(18) is the formal basis of Displacement (use of language to refer outside the “here and
now”), the greatest evolutionary advantage of language.
It may also be that the invention of scrolls, the page and the computer screen are external
reflections of the mental screen or workspace that is the essence of human language.
We can schematize my hypothesis with a diagram:
 Smaller oval = {f ’} = primate cognitive features
 Larger oval = {f} = the set of human cognitive and cultural features, with many
developed since mutation.
 Grey area = primate discrete vision, the origin of syntax
(19)
primate cognition
discrete vision 
full human semantics
 human syntax features
Octogon = Human Syntax = the set {F} = the discrete vision subset of {f ’} + any features
F’of human syntax that may have developed since the Syntax Mutation
(18).
(20)
The Discreteness Conjecture: Syntax develops by a new use of those primate
cognitive features which are a) discrete and b) realized in the innate primate mental
faculty of “vision.”
Human Syntax is thus a system of displaced and simplified mental vision, whose primitive
elements are countable, discrete morphemes rather than countable, discrete images.
The features of syntax are rather a kind of “still photo” of immediately pre-human primate
culture of the moment of the human mutation in the “evolutionary movie.”
The diagram (19) suggests further questions about current inventories of linguistic features.
(21)
What should we say about the many semantic f that have developed solely in humans?
(22)
What types of candidates are there for features F’ in current syntax that might not be
in the set of cognitive features {f’} available to pre-human primates?
As far as question (21) goes, the Discreteness Conjecture (20) doesn’t require us to say much
about purely human cognitive features f’. Clearly, many human semantic concepts
that today crowd our Large Lexicons were simply not available at the time of the
Syntax Mutation
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(18).
Regarding question (22), there might well be some “post-primate” syntactic F’ (the octagon
outside the grey area). Thus, perhaps even the most advanced primates lack the distinction
“Real vs. Imaginary” of many auxiliary systems (English TENSE vs. English MODAL).
Another F’ possibly unique to humans: While primates may compute only to 3, certain
syntactic systems treat only 5 and above differently than the lower numerals. “4” might then
signal “beginning to count,” whilst 5 and above might mean “counting” (L. Veselovská, pers.
comm.). A syntactic feature for “up through 4” could be human innovation.
7 Speculations about distinctions between Language and Vision
Primate psychology and cognition. According to the above scenario, any fairly well
delineated feature of grammar is a likely candidate for a mental category of higher primates.
Human psychology and cognition. There are also many implications in this area. Properties
of discrete vision and grammatical features should generally correspond to each other.
Problems with grammatical features being “more detailed” than vision
:
 The vast majority of verbs are +ACITIVITY. But we saw in Section 2 that a
grammatical feature differentiates them from –ACTIVITY (STATE) verbs (have,
need, owe, know, etc.). Though primates may well have the distinction, at least in
human language it is not purely visual: sleep, stare, listen, etc. are +ACTIVITY.

Grammatical but not visual categories seem to differ across languages to some extent,
although not really vastly. A difficult example: the grammatical “numeral
classifiers” for counting in East Asian, Mayan and Australian languages do indeed
seem related to vision, but yet not all languages have them.

How is the contrast Past vs. Future to be treated? Neither are “visible.” Possible
answer: many languages treat Past and Present together (though not Latin or Spanish),
and these two types of events are understood as “visible to someone at sometime.”

The English modal auxiliaries each have distinct syntax, indicating that each has
different grammatical features. But if so, what is the difference between should and
must? If this is due to a grammatical ±F, how can it possibly correspond to vision?

Though not widely noted, many—several—few appear to all mean “three or more.”
The distinctions correspond to “more than expected—no expectation—less than
expected.” This latter grammatical difference seems more a property of the workspace
than of vision.
When we find a feature of syntax that is not visual, we can (i) question the analysis of its
syntax, or (ii) rethink a perhaps facile understanding of vision, or (iii) think about how
certain Syntactic Features F may have entered the human psyche since the Syntax
Mutation
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(18).
Problems with categories of discrete human vision that are not in grammar. In such cases,
one should first ask whether advanced primate vision has that category. That is, human
discrete vision itself may have developed beyond primate capacities.
For example, though colours are a physical continuum, human vision may impose a discrete
sequence on the spectrum. But even so, it is quite probable that advanced primates do not.
For another example, suppose simple fractions such as e.g. 2/3 or figures such as (Kant’s)
triangles are beyond the grasp of primates. They are clearly in the realm of elementary
discrete human vision—it is hard to imagine learning their meaning through any other sense.
If so, what is the expectation of this paper’s framework? If primate psychology doesn’t intuit
divisions into 3, then I expect human syntax does not include treatment of such fractions, and
in this case the Discreteness Conjecture (20) seems to make exactly the right prediction.
Fractions such as thirds or quarters play no role in syntax because the early mutating
humans did not yet understand them.
In conclusion, the hypotheses advanced here are not only of interest in themselves. They
suggest many puzzles and yet at the same time are potentially or actually confirmed by
several otherwise unexplained correlations of syntactic systems or of human vision.
8 The genesis of Large Lexicons in human language
At the end of Section 1, I proposed to treat the following question in this final section: What
human mental property makes possible the large lexicons of natural language?
The structuralist linguist Charles Hockett’s “Origins of Language” examined a number of
“design features” of human language in Scientific American (1960). Four, or perhaps five of
these, really seem to be the hallmarks of human language, absent in animal systems.
I have claimed here that one of these, Discreteness, has its origins not in primate
communication but in primate vision. In particular, I have argued that discrete visual
cognate properties, plausibly shared with primates, are central in organizing human lexicons.
A DISCRETENESS. All systems that humans invent tend to be discrete, i.e.,
composed of separate forms whose elements can be indefinitely counted. Foremost
among these systems appears to be natural language.
Moreover, it seems to me that Discreteness has a very specific basic role to play in the
architecture of natural language. I propose that it is also the basis for a second design feature
of natural language that Hockett calls “Duality of Patterning.”
B DUALITY OF PATTERNING. Human phonology and syntax are two different
superimposed systems, using distinct category systems and combinatory principles.
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The formal basis of Duality of Patterning is not at first easy to understand. Here is its essence:
(23) System-internal combination. In true communicative systems, the smallest elements
that function as elements in the system combine by rule to give bigger units.




Bee dancing: Certain body movements combine to describe food sources.
Primate signals: Hand claps and/or calls combine to give messages.
Human gestures by non-signers: Sequences of gestures can create larger messages.
Human language: sounds or phonemes such as ‘k’, ‘i’, ‘w’… combine to make words.
Alternatively, some might analyze consonant-vowel “mora” sequences as the smallest
elements, e.g. ‘ku’, ‘pi’, ‘wa’…
(24)
Essence of Duality. In only human language: the smallest units are in general
meaningless, and the bigger units again combine by different types of rules to make
yet bigger units, of a different type.
(25)
a. Example: interactive
Smallest elements combine by rules (phonology):
i–n–t–r–a–k–t–i–v
The rules violated in *rtniavtki:
*r–t–n–i–a–v–t–k –i
The items in (25) that combine by phonological rules don’t make sense in isolation; they are
meaningless. Nobody really disputes this, though people don’t think through the fact that
Duality is almost certainly absent in all animal communication, even bird song.
When the bigger units (words) are constructed, they again combine (by syntax) to yield
meaningful sequences:
(26)
Example: active – be – can – ing – inter – ‘s – talk – very – women
Bigger units combine by different types of rules (syntax or “grammar”):1
Women’s talking can be very interactive.
Can women’s talking be very interactive?
More generally, though no clear logical relation connects Discreteness and Duality, it may
well be that mental Duality of Patterning can develop only in terms of discrete
combinatorial systems. Both kinds of systems postulated for human language structure
(phonology and syntax) are deeply rooted in combinatorial principles for discrete elements.
1
There are 3,628,800 (= 9 factorial) possible sequences of the 9 morphemes in (26); here are 6 more:
*Be talking women’s can very interactive.
*Be can interactive very talking women’s.
*Very women’s talking interactive can be.
*Talking women’s be can interactive very.
*Be very women’s talking can interactive.
*Interactive women’s talking can be very.
…
Obviously, the vast majority of these sequences violate “rules for the bigger units,” i.e. grammar,
though curiously even numerous “linguists” seem to dispute this. How many of the 720 possible
sequences of the 6 words in (26) conform to English syntax? Can you find 5?
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Conjecture. A discrete mental system A was a necessary precondition for Duality B.
I claim that the only structural property (as opposed to functional properties) that is clearly
specific to humans is the Duality of Patterning of the phonology and syntax systems.
From this perspective, what mutation would lead to human language? Here is a possible
evolutionary scenario that involves the above four properties, assuming only one mutation:
(28)
The Phonological Mutation: Based on the pre-existing primate vision capacity A,
Duality of Patterning systems B become mentally possible.
It may be that the Syntax Mutation (18) is a second and separate evolutionary step. It is also
conceivable that advanced primate brains are organized so that the step (18) into abstraction
is quick and natural, once Duality of Patterning is established.
I call the above mutation “phonological” because the innovation is having a species-specific
communicative system whose primitive items are meaningless. This is true for phonology,
though it is not true for syntax.2
Let’s now examine how mutation (28), introducing Duality, might bring about Hocektt’s
other design properties of natural language. Here are two of them, the first from Section 1.
C LARGE LEXICONS. Hockett’s term is “Traditional Transmission.” In
evolutionary terms, a large lexicon is an “acquired trait”: new in every generation.
Words are learned orally from other speakers, not through genetics.
Duality of Patterning by its nature makes a Large Lexicon possible. That is, suppose simple
two syllable words can be formed by choosing first and third consonant segments from a list
of 30 consonant clusters, and second and fourth vowels from among 5 (e.g., bati, sleko, trima,
ronu, zuye, etc.) Though this provides no compounds or long words, it already yields a
possible 30 x 5 x 30 x 5 = 22,500 words, the same order of magnitude as a human lexicon.
This huge increase in the potential store of communicable concepts must give a species
advantages in natural selection. These advantages of Large Lexicons C then “pass back”
natural selection for Duality B (i.e. humans defeat other primates and become dominant).
Large Lexicons are almost certainly related to a third design feature of human language.
Unlike animals, we use language to plan, mislead, lie, joke, be ironic, make propaganda, talk
about imaginary worlds (impossible fantasy, outer space), distant places and future time.
D DISPLACEMENT. We talk in detail about the past, possible futures, and many
other non-existing situations. Animals don’t communicate in such ways.
2
Incidentally, nothing here supports the “common sense” assumption that a lexicon of isolated words,
presumably including some phonemic structure, preceded syntax. For a view which reverses this
standard assumption that phonology precedes syntax, see Corballis (1999).
A final speculative possibility is that the Syntax Mutation into abstraction suffices to set up Duality
of Patterning, but this seems less plausible to me.
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Large Lexicons C obviously reinforce Displacement D. The more things we can talk about,
the more the tendency to talk about absent things. Consequently the evolutionary advantage
of Displacement is another plausible motor for Duality of Patterning.
Note that Displacement and to a large extent Large Lexicons are properties of language use,
not of language structure. Although Displacement certainly provides advantages in natural
selection, it could not evolve without a physical basis, i.e. in the absence of the biological
property of Duality. In turn, as we have seen, Duality is plausibly based on Discreteness.
The essence of the Phonological Mutation (28), that is, Duality of Patterning, is that it frees
the primitive units of sound from meaning. The development of Duality means nothing
more and nothing less than the building blocks of the main human communication system are
based on meaninglessness. This is the crucial role of Phonology in human communication.
A final design feature of human language in Hockett is that normally, language use is novel:
E PRODUCTIVITY. Human language can be used to produce and understand wellformed sequences that a speaker or hearer has never experienced before.
For example, it is almost certain that no one here has heard or read 99% of the sentences I am
pronouncing. Moreover, the novel sentences we constantly construct and understand are not
random, but typically appropriate to situations, the so-called “problem of Descartes.”
(Chomsky’s Language and Mind, 1968/ 1972, Ch. 1).
As I see it, the limited complexity of animal communication systems (lacking Large Lexicons
and Duality of Patterning) makes it hard to decide to what extent they could even in principle
be adapted to novel situations. That is, within their limitations, animal systems perhaps
exhibit appropriate productivity, i.e. appropriate novel use.
A telling example that comes to mind is bird navigation systems, known to be adaptable to
novel and complex journeys. Once Duality has developed into providing an abstract linguistic
workspace (the “Syntax Mutation”), perhaps extension to producing and understanding novel
sentences is just full use of advanced primate brain power.
That is, Productivity may be a purely functional property that piggy-backs on Properties B-D.
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