Department of International Relations
Eurasia
FHSS, Bond University, Australia
2006
Russia-China Relations: The Bear and the Dragon
- by Guest Lecturer: Dr Rosita Dellios
Introduction & Overview
China and Russia are the two largest and most powerful countries of the Eurasian
region. (See Map 1.) They share a 4,300 km border,1 less than it was in the old days of
the USSR - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to which Russia belonged, and
which lasted as a Communist Party-ruled state from 1917-1991. Upon the success of
China's Communist Revolution in 1949, resulting in its formal emergence as the
People's Republic of China (PRC), the two were Communist allies, with the USSR
supplying much-needed aid for China's efforts to industrialise. The comradely union
was short lived. Ideological divisions and old rivalries emerged as of 1960 and by 1969
the two were at war with one another. Their border war2 was ostensibly over the actual
demarcation but was actually highly charged by ideological and nationalist sentiments.
For over a decade the two Eurasian neighbours became sworn enemies, with Mao
calling upon his fellow Chinese to dig nuclear shelters lest their next war be a nuclear
one. However by 1982 normalisation talks began, with plodding progress throughout
the 1980s. China refused to resume relations until what it termed the Three Obstacles
were removed. These were:
1. withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan;
2. an end to Soviet support of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia; and
3. reduction of Soviet military strength on the Sino-Soviet border to pre-1969
levels - amounting to an 80 per cent cut. (See Box 1.)
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the first two 'obstacles' were removed (and not
only for China's sake but as part of the end of the Cold War), while the removal of the
third was well underway. China and Russia (then called the USSR) resumed full
diplomatic relations in May 1989, shortly before the Tiananmen tragedy in which the
Chinese authorities cracked down on pro-democracy demonstrators killing an estimated
1000 people. China was determined not to follow the Soviet Union's lead in what was to
become, on Christmas Day 1991, the death of the world's premier socialist state. That
title has now gone to China which, although still socialist in name is increasingly
capitalist in orientation. Russia emerged from the old USSR as an independent but
troubled democratic country.
Early Impressions: 13th Century - the Mongol Mantle
Russia's most unforgiving memory of the Chinese was arguably not a memory of the
Chinese at all, but of the Mongol conquerors. They ruled Russia for 240 years from
1240 to 1480, and China for 89 years from 1279 to 1368, under separate dynasties of
1 On 14 October 2004, China and Russia signed the Supplementary Agreement on the Eastern Section of
the China-Russia Boundary Line. This was said to have “effectively concluded agreements on their 4,300kilometer land border, opening up more favourable conditions for resource and economic development.”
(Jeffrey Robertson, ‘China’s Power Hunger Trumps Japan Diplomacy’, Asia Times Online, 2 November
2004, www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FK02Ad01.html)
2 The main fighting occurred on the Ussuri River. See inset, Map 2.
1
their empire: the dynasty that absorbed Russia and Eastern Europe was known as the
Golden Horde ('Golden' meant imperial); that of the Chinese, the Yüan.
Mongolia, which today is a poor state wedged between the enormity of Russia and
China (see Map 1), provides the setting for the formative stages of Russian-Chinese
relations. Mongolia was the birthplace of one of history's 'world-conquerors', Ghengis
Khan. It was he who created through wars of conquest an empire across the Eurasian
expanse linking Europe, the Middle East and Asia. The Mongol Empire, according to
one historian, "achieved what all Inner Asian steppe empires had dreamed of, control of
the continental caravan routes from China to Persia".3 Another remarked that: "No
nomad people has ever attained a fame equal to that of the Mongols, and Ghengiz Khan
and his sons ruled over a wider land empire than has ever been formed before or
since."4 Indeed his grandson, Kublai Khan, thanks to the writings of Marco Polo, "is
perhaps the only Emperor of China whose name is commonly known in the west".5
With these myth-making - and hence meaning-making - early histories, confusion in the
European imagination between Chinese and Mongols is perhaps understandable. Even
the name 'Cathay' by which Europeans first knew China derives from 'Khitai', a
steppeland nomadic culture which had more in common with the Mongols than the Han
Chinese. To complicate matters, not only was the fabled Chinese empire, about which
little was known, part of the larger and better known Mongol world, but the Mongols
somehow became subsumed by Chinese history. Their identities - from the perspective
of the untrained eye (almost all of Latin Europe and their Russian cousins) - blurred
into one another even more. The Kublai regime adopted many features of the Chinese
system of administration and honoured Confucianism. In short, the Mongol invaders
were sinicised.
By contrast, they were not Russianised, despite spending more time ruling the Russians,
well over a century more, than ruling the Chinese. This need not reflect badly on the
Russians in terms of cultural power, for there were other important contributing factors,
such as the Golden Horde's ability to rule Russia indirectly from the outlying steppes
and Russia's peripheral economic importance in terms of the China-Persia caravan
trade.6
History as a Powerful Cultural Resource
Nonetheless, there is the more nuanced issue of comparative national histories. One's
history is a cultural resource conducive to pride as much as any acquired physical
resource, such as the power of military technology. For the purposes of international
relations as much as domestic politics, history may be regarded as a cultural product,
carefully packaged for public viewing. An outstanding example is the Long March.7
The Chinese communists converted a military retreat from their opponents in the
3 Charles J. Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History,
Indiana university Press, Bloomington, 1985, p. 25.
4 C. P. FitzGerald, China: A Short Cultural History, 3rd edn, Cresset Press, London, 1965, p. 431.
5 Ibid., p. 437. Emphasis added.
6 Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde, p. 30.
7 The Long March occurred in 1934-35 across 8,000 kilometres from south to north. Of the 90,000
soldiers who began the journey in Jiangxi, only 20,000 survived to reach Shaanxi.
2
Chinese Civil War into a propaganda victory and launched one of China's great heroic
narratives.
Thus from the point of view of history as a resource, Russia's marginalisation
contributed little to its national standing vis-a-vis China. Instead of making the Mongols
appear to be part of an enduring Russian system, as the Chinese had, they were rendered
the 'Tatar Yoke'; an unspeakable period in Russian history. While both nations suffered
severely, their responses as signalled by their histories suggest differences in outlook.
The Chinese (culturally) swallowed their (territorial) predators so that it was difficult
for those far removed to tell Mongol from Han, let alone who conquered whom.
Admittedly it was easier for the Chinese to cushion the adverse effects of occupation
given the strength of China's cultural and economic attractions. While this may seem
obvious it did have to be pointed out to the Mongols by the Chinese scholar and
politician, Yelü Chucai (1190-1244). There is many an account applauding his ability to
appeal to Mongol economic self-interest, and in doing so to save productive expanses of
northern China from being turned into grazing lands for the Mongols' herds.8 Yelü
Chucai's story is an example of a recurring theme in Chinese history. It is the theme of
gaining the strategic upper-hand in a seemingly hopeless situation. It was evident in the
transformed value of the Long March; it was also evident in Mao's problem of how a
weak army can best defend against a strong one (the people's war doctrine which
employs guerrilla warfare); or Deng's problem of how China might be strengthened
without loss of socialist identity ('Socialism with Chinese characteristics' which seems
to be 'Capitalism with Confucian characteristics'9).
Psychological Opposites?
In view of China's resourceful strategic culture it is worth pausing to consider Lucian
Pye's view that the cultures of China and Russia are psychological opposites:
The Chinese, ever the optimists since the 1911 Revolution, are prone to proclaim
that the past was awful, the present grim, but the future is certain to be wonderful
and glorious with the emergence of a "New China" - a perfect cast of mind for a
society of entrepreneurs. In contrast, the Russian spirit is full of gloom and
negativism, terrible for boosting business, but exactly what is needed for producing
great literature.10
Certainly with regard to the Mongol chapter in their history, the Russians have tended to
dwell on the horrors inflicted but, curiously, they avoided actually admitting that they
were conquered.11 One might add to Pye's "gloom and negativism" a certain lack of
realism. Their historians spoke of the 'Tatar Yoke' without connecting to the political
realities, or even to ethnic ones. The designation 'Tatar' was more a statement of disdain
than an accurate portrayal of ethnicity (just as Mongol was hardly a suitable synonym
8 See, for example, FitzGerald, China: A Short Cultural History, p. 434; Bai Shouyi (ed.), An Outline
History of China, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1982, p. 290.
9 Marie-Chaire Bergère, La République populaire de Chine de 1949 à nos jours, Armand Colin, Paris,
1987, pp. 222-3.
10 Lucian W. Pye, 'Chinese Politics in the Late Deng Era', Review Essay, The Chinese Quartley, No. 142,
June 1995, p. 580.
11 See Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde.
3
for Chinese). The Tatars were a steppe peoples who were conquered and absorbed into
Mongol identity.
Xenophobes, Chauvinists and Ethnocentrists?
The Tatars, like the Chinese, were all 'Mongols' to the Russians; Asiatics who brought
to Russia their Oriental despotism and barbarous ways. Whether the threat be nomadic,
Turkic, Mongolian, Chinese, or even Japanese, it all issued from Russia's Oriental
frontiers. Terms like 'Great Khan expansionism' were still used in anti-Chinese
propaganda issuing from Moscow in the 1980s.12 'Great Khan expansionism' was not an
accusation directed at Mongolia whose fortunes had greatly diminished by this time.
The ancestral home of the Mongols had, in fact, been reduced in the Cold War years of
the 20th century to a Soviet puppet state hosting some four Soviet military divisions
across the border from China. Russian xenophobia simply did not draw distinctions
between the sedentary Chinese and the military extravagance of their one-time
conquerors. Their conflation by fear was later reinforced by chauvinism. The Chinese
emperor had to be watched and held in check. Even revolutionary China was by no
means to be trusted. The same passage which speaks of 'Great Khan expansionism',
reminds the reader that "a number of writers, going back to Kan Yu Wei, the 19th
century political leader . . . foresaw the day when the yellow dragon flag . . . would fly
over all countries".13
The Chinese, for their part, have been accused by external analysts of harbouring a
'Middle Kingdom' complex. While the Chinese did traditionally regard themselves as
culturally superior, and hence displayed ethnocentrism, they cannot be portrayed - as the
Russians often are - as xenophobes. The caravan trade and the tribute-trade system
ensured a cosmopolitan disposition. During the 20th century, Republicanism was
imported into China and even the Communist helmsman, Mao Zedong, had no
difficulty relating to foreigners like writer Edgar Snow or, indeed, adapting for China a
foreign ideology, that of Marxism-Leninism.14
Mutual Suspicion
Russia's bleak view of China was rivalled only by popularised Chinese views of the
Russians. Neither side was 'fooled' by the other's Socialist pretensions. Aggressive
imperialist ambition was regarded as symptomatic of the other's national character. As
the Russians themselves had observed of Chinese historical writings in the post-Mao
China years:
Articles distorting the history of Russia and of Russo-Chinese relations, and
portraying the Russian State at all times and in relation to all continents as "the
fiercest aggressor", an "enemy of the peoples", a threat to China "from the north", . . .
12 See World Affairs Report, Califoria Institute of International Studies, California, No. 1022790. See
also Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde, pp. vii-ix, for an overview of the biases in Russian
historiography.
13 World Affairs Report, ibid.
14 These are only two of a number of points of argument to show that Mao was not xenophobic, as
discussed in Tu Wei-ming, 'Maoism as a Source of Social Suffering in China', Daedalus, Vol. 125, No. 1,
Winter 1996, p. 161.
4
made no distinction between the policy of tsarist Russia and the policy of the Soviet
State . . .15
This passage captures the spirit of Chinese documented attitudes toward Russia. They
seemed unreservedly to regard the Russians as interlopers into China's suzerain
domain.16 Whereas the Mongol experience shaped early Russian perceptions of China,
it was Russia's expansion into Siberia, two and a half centuries after the end of Mongol
hegemony, that brought it into the Chinese mental orbit of friend and foe. (See Box 2
and Map 2.) Clearly, this formative impression was not a favourable one.
As they were to do in the 1980s thaw of Sino-Soviet relations,17 in those early days the
Russians were the ones to make overtures to the Chinese and not vice-versa. Russia
established its first mission in China in 1618. It was the first European nation to sign a
treaty with China. This was the Treaty of Nerchinsk, 1689. Eventually, in its zeal to
maximise its benefits during China's period of weakness and in line with the
imperialistic practices of other European powers, the Russians were to gain territory
through the infamous 'unequal treaties' method. China still claims this territory as being
rightfully Chinese because the treaties (of which there were nine with Russia) were
granted by China under duress. This territory amounts to half a million square
kilometres and includes Russia's gateway to the Pacific - the city of Vladivostok.
Similarities
Despite their differences, Russia and China share outstanding commonalities. Suffering
is one outstanding feature. Russians and Chinese died in the tens of millions, in the
name of politics by every means, not only in the 20th century but also most notably
under the Mongol invasions of the Middle Ages. Another feature is their national
greatness: greatness of artistic enterprise, territorial expanse, strategic power, and
Communistic politics. Whereas the United States of America deserves the term
'superpower'18 - it is an American word for an American global condition - Russia and
China are truly 'great powers'. They have persevered in their greatness despite being
Easterners in a Western-organised world. Indeed they both experienced the reach of the
West at about the same time, and after a period of having undergone their own isolated
development as essentially unified cultures. Treadgold relates this observation to
another major similarity between Russia and China - their conversion to Communism and that ideology's own bias, at least as practised by Communist-ruled states, toward
producing a unified culture.19
15 S. L. Tikhvinsky, 'For a Scientific Approach to the History of Russo-Chinese Relations (17th-19th
Centuries)', in S. L. Tikhvinsky (ed.), Chapters from the History of Russo-Chinese Relations 17th-19th
Centuries, trans. Vic Schneierson, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1985 (Russian edn, 1982), p. 6.
16 This is so even of texts in the scholarly genre. An example is Bai Shouyi, An Outline History of China,
pp. 466-468.
17 Though this is a controversial point, as Gerald Segal has challenged the prevailing view, saying instead
that China made the initial overtures. (See Barry Buzan and Rosemary Foot (eds), Does China Matter? A
Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal, Routledge, London, 2004.)
18 The term ‘superpower’ was coined by William Fox in 1944 when he noted the arrival of ‘the
superpowers’, noted for their great power and global reach. (William T. R. Fox, The Superpowers: The
United States, Britain and the Soviet Union – Their Responsibility for Peace, Harcourt Brace, New York,
1944. This origin of the term is noted in Lawrence Freedman, ‘China as a Global Strategic Actor’, in
Barry and Foot (eds), Does China Matter?, pp. 24-25.)
19 Donald W. Treadgold, The West in Russia and China, Volume 1, Russia: 1972-1917, Westview Press,
5
Divergent Security Perceptions
Cultural unity could also hold the key to understanding divergent security perceptions
between the two countries. Occupying as they do the northern and southern sectors of
the vast Eurasian landmass would offer China and Russia an obvious cause for
connections (as it had for the Mongols) into a wider regional identity with its security
and economic considerations. This, however, has not been the case. It has traditionally
been overruled by their own sense of centrality. For the Chinese 'Middle Kingdom'
centrality was an outcome of cultural confidence in a barbarian wasteland. The Russian
'Empire of the Middle',20 by contrast, expressed more a centrality of uncertainty (being
in between): was Russia European or Oriental, Western or Eastern?
While having endured the aesthetically monotonous culture associated with Communist
rule, and for reasons deemed obviously more important than artistic pleasure (that is,
reasons of social emancipation), it is nonetheless a curious contradiction that both the
Chinese and Russian cultures were highly aesthetic ones. Their quest for social
emancipation, with its attendant bloody revolution, may in fact be but a severe
expression of this sensitivity.
Literary greatness is a better known manifestation of the Russian aesthetic, as is the
related quality of Russian spirituality. The Russians are understood to have chosen
Byzantine Christianity over its Roman alternative on aesthetic rather than theological
grounds.21 As Treadgold has elaborated:
Russian Christianity from the first sought to reproduce the beauties of the services of
the Constantinopolitan churches. Byzantine iconography, ecclesiastical architecture,
and liturgical music were imported at once, and became the starting point for
brilliant and original achievements by the Russians themselves.22
The names of literary works from the Byzantine were, interestingly, reminiscent of the
Chinese practice of poetic labelling. Examples are The Pearl, The Emerald, and The
Gold River.23 Chinese literary works, historical periods, governmental divisions, and
even social practices are invariably described in poetic language. For example, in
literature there is China's famous novel, The Dream of the Red Chamber, and history
has the Spring and Autumn Period (770-450 BC). In government, the administrative
region that was located sufficiently far from both court intrigue at the centre and
barbarian raids at the periphery was known as the domain of tranquil tenure. The object
of one of the more perverse aesthetic attractions, the bound (deformed) female foot, was
called Golden Lotus. Demonstrating that which was regarded as unattractive was not
discriminated against in this labelling system, larger unbound feet were simply referred
to as Lotus Boats.
Boulder and London, 1985, p. xvii.
20 "Holy Russia, Empire of the Middle, what have they done to you, and what have you done to
yourselves?" - Petru Dumitriu, Incognito, cited in the Dedication, ibid.
21 Ibid., p. xxxi, citing the Russian Primary Chronicle for supporting evidence.
22 Ibid.
23 Cited in ibid.
6
If the Russians and Chinese have regarded themselves as Easterners coming to terms
with the West, the time may fast be approaching when the West will be riveted economically, culturally and geopolitically - by the East in a globalising world.
Meanwhile, in the 'middle', there is a reformulated Eurasia. Six new Central Asian
nations emerged from the break-up of the Soviet empire, all "holding out hopes for
lucrative, market-invigorated revivals of trade and industry along the ancient Silk Route
to Europe".24 Eduard Shevardnadze, when he was Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union
in its last days, foresaw a "modern 'Great Silk Road'", linking the continents of Europe
and Asia, while the last Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev, in his famous 1986
Vladivostok Speech25 had firmly identified a Eurasian identity for his country's future.
Post-Cold War Geoeconomics in the 1990s and a return to Geopolitics in the 21st
Century
In the 13th century, Pax Mongolica created what we call today 'economic regionalism'.
Eurasia was a NET - a Natural Economic Territory - of its time. (See Box 3.) In those
days it took a world-conqueror to hasten a development that today's global business
culture is seeking: the ability to trade freely and safely across ethnic borders with
minimal political interference. It is not likely in the present international climate that a
new Eurasian super-NET would be forged by another Ghengis Khan, but it might well
be forged by the most powerful states in the region acting in collaboration, as they have
been for security and trade reasons in the 1990s, creating what we call today 'economic
regionalism'.
With the 'war on terror' at the start of the 21st century, there is also a security
regionalism emerging. Despite American leadership in the global 'war on terror', China
and Russia are leading regional states. China strengthened its anti-terrorist agenda in the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (which it set up in 1996 with Russia and the Central
Asian states formerly part of the USSR), while Russia reinforced its military
deployments on the Afghan-Tajik border with tanks and thousands of elite troops from
its 201st infantry division.26 As to the 2003 US-led ‘war on Iraq’, both China and Russia
were opposed to military action that did not have UN support. The external factor of US
hegemonic power could well be a significant influence in strengthening the Sino-Soviet
relationship. A Treaty on Good Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation between the
Russian Federation and the PRC, signed in Moscow on 16 July 2001, just before the
9/11 terrorist attacks brought the US into an anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan, is
indicative Sino-Russian vigilance against US preponderant power after the collapse of
the USSR. A cooperative policy on energy (a 2,400-km oil pipeline from Siberia to NE
China is being completed) has emerged.27 In February 2005, military cooperation
24 ASIA, INC map.
25 Reprinted in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (eds), The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific
Power: Implications of Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok Initiative, Westview Press, Boulder and London,
1987.
26 James Clark, ‘Powers Gird for a Battle of Minds’, The Australian, 24 September 2001, p. 8.
27
According to China Daily (29 March 2004): “China and Russia signed a nonbinding framework
agreement last March to build an oil pipeline, running from Angarsk in eastern Siberia to Daqing in
northeast China. The trunkline would allow China to ship 700 million tons of Russia's crude through the
pipeline to China over the next 25 years. The deal, worth US$150 billion in total, would be the largestever bilateral trade agreement between the two countries.”
(http://china.org.cn/english/2004/Mar/91573.htm, accessed 15 Feb 05)
7
between Russia and China strengthened with the announcement of regular security
consultations. Chinese State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan called Russia China's "main
partner for strategic cooperation," and said that this was “the first time ever that China is
establishing a mechanism of national security consultations with another country." A
joint Russian-Chinese military exercise was held in August 2005. The maneuvers were
seen by many observers as Russia's response to the cooling of relations with the United
States and other Western nations, most recently over the presidential election in
Ukraine. This represents a further development in their ‘strategic partnership’ of 1991
when the USSR collapsed and Russia and China promoted a "multipolar world" (i.e.
opposition to the unipolaririty of a single superpower – the USA – in the IR system).28
Conclusion
If the future of Chinese-Russian relations can be held together within a frame of
1. Eurasian economic regionalism (though more needs to be done to advance
Sino-Russian trade beyond a predominance in arms sales),29
2. security against secessionist forces, and
3. vigilance against American regional dominance,
the old patterns of suspicion and rivalry may yet be weakened. China and Russia have
more to gain if they cooperate rather than compete in a region already frail from new
geopolitical ambitions. Indeed, it may well be asked: Can they afford not to be allies?
28
‘Russia,
China
Tighten
Security
China Daily, 3 February 2005, http://taiwansecurity.org/News/2005/CD-030205.htm
Links’,
29 China absorbs 40% of Russia’s arms trade. According to Robert H. Donaldson and John A. Donaldson
(‘The Arms Trade in Russian-Chinese Relations’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 4, Dec.
2003, p. 712):
Despite an ambitious target, set in 1994, of achieving a trade volume $20 billion by the end of the
decade, Sino-Russian trade actually declined as a result of tightened Russian visa requirements –
imposed in the face of a rising tide of Chinese immigration (most of it illegal) into the sparsely
populated Russian Far East. Indeed by the end of Yeltsin’s term as president [Dec 1999], trade had
stagnated to just over $6 billion a year – the largest component of which was Russian weaponry
sold to China.
Moreover (pp. 721-2):
China seeks to satisfy its demand for advanced industrial equipment not in Russia, but in the West.
Apart from energy and arms, the remaining portion is localized on border areas – so-called shuttle
trade – and involves foodstuffs and cheap consumer goods. The management of Russian-Chinese
trade is plagued with contract violations, corruption, disorder and distrust.
8
BOX 1: Major Soviet Force Build-Up on the Chinese Border, 1969-79
In the decade since the two sides clashed on the Ussuri River, Soviet Far East
ground forces increased from 20 combat divisions to 56. (Amounting to 700,000,
they were still outnumbered by the million-strong Chinese deployments on the
other side.) While the escalation of Soviet forces may be dated from 1969, the
build-up became noticeable in 1966 with the first deployment of nuclear missiles
to the area. This was two years after China tested its first atom bomb. Troops
were also stationed in the Soviet buffer state of the Mongolian People's
Republic and divisional reinforcements were placed elsewhere on the border
with China. Not all the armoury was directed toward China. The Soviets were
concerned with balancing the American presence in Northeast Asia,
particularly in the maritime region around Japan which could be used to deny
Soviet warships access to the Pacific Ocean.
- from Rosita Dellios, INTR13-303 Chinese Defence Policy lecture on SinoSoviet/Russian Relations
9
MAP 1
Map Courtesy PCL Map Library
10
BOX 2: Tsarist Russia's Expansion Eastward, 17th - 19th Centuries
With the exception of the Mongolian offensive westward during the 13th and 14th
centuries, practically all the major movements [in Chinese-Russian links] were
Russian. The initial thrust was made by waves of private adventurers who occupied all
of eastern Siberia and the whole of the Lena valley in the 17th century. This was
followed by subjugation of the extreme north-east . . . By the end of the 17th century,
Muscovy [Russia] was already bordering on the Pacific. Further Russian advance,
especially beyond the Amur River, was stopped by the Manchus [who ruled China as
the Qing dynasty] by successful military initiatives and finally through the conclusion
of the Treaties of Nerchinsk and Kiakhta in 1689 and 1727 which fixed boundaries
between the domains of the Tsar and Manchu emperors.
But this was only a temporary interlude. In the middle of the 19th century the
expansionary process was again set off. . . Taking swift advantage of the chaos in
China as a result of the wars with Britain and France, . . . the Chinese were forced to
sign a series of "unequal treaties" that finally enabled [Russia] to seize more territory
and obtain more privileges than any maritime power. The Treaty of Aigun of 1858, for
instance, secured for the Tsar a territory as large as France. The Treaty of Tianjin,
signed in 1858, gave Russia all the privileges secured by England, France and the
United States; and the Treaty of Beijing, signed in 1860, not only recognised Russian
sovereignty over territories ceded previously, but extended Russian jurisdiction over
the vast region between the Ussuri and the Gulf of Tartary and granted trading
privileges in Mongolia and Chinese Turkistan [Xinjiang]. Russia's predominance over
China probably reached its climax in 1895-1905 when she firmly implanted herself in
Manchuria.
- from Harish Kapur, The Awakening Giant: China's Ascension in World Politics,
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Rockville, USA, 1981, pp. 17-18.
BOX 3: Natural Economic Territories (NETs)
The concept of NETs (Natural Economic Territories) may be defined as "economic
entities that cut across political lines to combine resources, manpower, capital and
technology".30 According to Gerald Segal, "The NET is a useful concept because it
stresses the extent to which contacts can develop despite existing internal and external
frontiers. The strength of NETs can be 'measured' by the intensity of trade and
financial flows, as well as the movement of people or even ideas." 31 The concept has
also come to be recognised in its 'geometrical' phraseology of growth triangles,
growth quadrangles and growth circles. For example, there were a series of features
in Asia Inc. magazine (Nov. 1993, Dec. 1993, Feb. 1994) examining 'Asia's New
Growth Circles' and a conference held in March by that name. A pioneer NET was
Guangdong-Hong Kong-Taiwan. NETs in Southeast Asia have been identified in
Jahore-Singapore-Riau and the Greater Mekong sub-region.
30 Robert A. Scalapino, 'APEC and the Current Pacific-Asian Scene', NBR Analysis, loc. cit., p. 22.
31 Adephi Paper No. 287, IISS/Brassey's, March 1994, p. 20.
11
MAP 2
Sino-Soviet Boundary showing disputed areas
Map Courtesy PCL Map Library
12
CLASS EXERCISE
Class divides into 4 groups (2 representing Chinese strategists and 2 representing
Russian strategists). The purpose of each group is to advise their political leadership
(represented by the lecturer) on a strategy for dealing with the other country.
Group 1: Russian Hardliners
They are suspicious of China and seek to contain its growing power. How will this be
done?
Group 2: Russian Moderates
They see Russia’s national interest as being best served by cooperation and partnership
with China. What programs can advance this position?
Group 3: Chinese Hardliners
They are suspicious of Russia and seek to prevent it from becoming a superpower again.
Moreover, they hope to make Russia compliant to China’s interests. How will this be
done?
Group 4: Chinese Moderates
They see China’s national interest as being best served by cooperation and partnership
with Russia. What programs can advance this position?
______________________________________________________________________
Useful Reference:
The China-Russia chapter in Kornberg, Judith F. and John R. Faust, China in World
Politics, 2nd edn, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 2004. (In Library Reserve for
INTR13/71-303.)
13